REVIEWER PFR:

Art. 1- also known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, was pursuant to R.A. 386; passed on Dec. 15, 1947 and
took effect Aug. 30, 1950.
Art. 2- Laws shall take effect...
Related Laws Involved:
Sec. 3(1) and 4 of chapter 2, Book VII of the Admin. Code of 1987
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center,
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code
which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who
may be affected by them.
CASES:
1. Tanada V. Tuvera 1985 invoking of peoples constitutional rights on matters/ information regarding laws that were not
published (PDs, E.O., Letters of Instructions etc. By Pres. Marcos)
Sec. Of the President cited Art. 2 (unless otherwise provided by law clause)
Court ruled in favor of petitioners- publication (CA 638) is a sine qua non requirement.
2. Tuvera V. Tuvera 1986 Clarification of where and when the laws should be published, what are laws of general
applicability
3. PASEI V. Torres
POEA and DOLE Dept. Order and Memoranda (temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong)
Such were not filed in accordance to Sec. 3(1) and 4 of chapter 2, Book VII of the Admin. Code
of 1987. (ONAR, UP LAW CENTER)
4. PHILSA V. SEC.
POEA Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983 (illegal exaction/ money claims of
respondents)
Such were not filed (as required by Sec. 3(1) and 4 of chapter 2, Book VII of the Admin. Code of
1987) and should not be basis for additional obligations of petitioners.
5. RP V. PILIPINAS SHELL
Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956
Shell was informed by DOE of their inability to pay certain charges on time and asked them to
pay so, now with additional surcharges as per MOF Circular No. 1-85 amending MOF
Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985.
Albeit SHELL paid its insufficiencies, it did not incur the surcharges from which it asseverated
that it lacked filing with ONAR (UP Law Center); from which the CA and SC held.
6. UMALI V. ESTANISLAO
Consolidated cases- Mandamus and Prohibition
R.A. 7167- Adjusting basic personal and additional tax exemptions (amending NIRC); published
in Malaya newspaper

 It took effect after 15 days of its publication in the Malaya

7. Gatbonton V. NLRC
MIT Associate Professor who was complained of unjust/unfair grading, sexual harassment and
unbecoming conduct of an academician.
He was then punished with preventive suspension in pursuance of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995)
When he was preventively suspended, the Mapua Rules which entails the enforcement of such
general law was not properly published in the school organ (although parties have agreed to have
it published as a part of admin rules)
SC ruled in favor of petitioner on grounds that the MAPUA rules corollary to enforcement of
R.A. 7877 was still inoperative at the time the preventive suspension was imposed to the
petitioner.
Art. 3- Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
CASES:
1. Kasilag V. Rodriguez Petitioner and Emiliana Amborosio (mother of defendants) entered into 2 contracts; 1st is
mortgage of a land and the 2nd is the modification of that 1st contract due to Emilianas failure to
pay the years interest.
Petitioner defended that he is a POSSESSOR IN GOOD FAITH (art. 526 of the Civil code)
and didnt know of the ANTI-CHRESIS (Article 1881 of the Civil Code) which makes
contracts void.
SC ruled in accordance to justice of the ownership or enjoyment of mortgage of the land, its
improvements etc.
2. D.M. Consunji V. CA Jose Juego, a construction worker of petitioner has fallen 14 floors down causing his death
His widow, Maria, has filed for benefits which she thus have taken from the State Insurance
Fund (ECC).
However, after which, she has still filed a separate civil action for damages in the RTC; where
the court has approved the same.
Petitioner invokes Art. 3 on the account that a beneficiary/workmen could either get
compensation from Workmens Compensation Act (Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5
of the) or the ECC.
Maria confesses that she did not even know of her rights since she finished only elementary
school; and grant of RIGHTS are different from that of mandatory or prohibitory laws.
3. People V. Gasacao
Petitioner Florencio Gasacao, together with his nephew, was charged with LARGE SCALE
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT pursuant to R.A. 8042, Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995.
His defense regarding his unawareness of Sec. 60 of the said law prohibiting the imposition of
BONDS/DEPOSITS as guarantee for placement was not appreciated by courts because of Art. 3
(NCC).
Art. 4- Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
RELATED LAWS INVOLVED: ART. 22, REVISED PENAL CODE
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they FAVOR THE PERSONS GUILTY OF A FELONY, who is not a habitual criminal, as
this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the

publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
CASES:
1. PNB V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Private respondents entered into mortgage contract with Makati Village Inc. For a portion of a
land of its subdivision. However, notwithstanding the agreement, MVI forclosed the mortgaged
resulting to the ownership of the herein petitioner without the knowledge of the respondents who
still has paid their obligations to MVI and have actually erected their houses therein.
CA ruled for the respondents in invoking P.D. 957, The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree of 1976.
Petitioner desists since the law took effect a year after the entering of contract.
SC ruled that even if there is no EXPRESS provision that states its retroactivity, the preamble
itself encompasses its true intention in protecting innocent purchasers.
2. COLUMBIA PICTURES V. CA
Columbia Pictures filed a case against Sunshine Home Video for illegally reproducing copies of
their materials in violation of PD 49, Sec. 50 (amended by PD 1988) of 1988 AKA Decree on
Protection of Intellectual property.
In 1986, VRB filed for search warrants and have seized items from the accused. However, CA
said on the pending proceeding that allegations should be with conformity to 20TH Century Fox
V. CA case promulgated 1988. (2 years after the filing of the complaint)
SC ruled it must not be applied since the issue here is the material/facts as used as evidence and
during the filing of the case, it must not have been foreseen that such requirement of
ORIGINAL/MASTER copy of the movie cd/vhs must be attached as a necessary evidence for
the allegation of violation.
3. Morales V. People
Art. 5- Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when
the law itself authorized its validity.
CASES:
1. Far East Bank V. Marquez Private respondent herein has entered into contract with TSE for a unit worth 800,000.
On the other hand, TSE entered into a loan mortgaging the land from which the unit at issue is
included with Far East Bank; failing to pay , FEA extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage.
However, since the respondent has already paid the said amount, he invokes Sec. 18, PD 957which declared that no mortgage shall be shall be made by the owner without permission of the
Authority (HLURB)
SC ruled in favor of the respondent
2. Nicolas V. CA
Anastacio Madlangsakay bought 3 parcels of land, Lots 6, 7 and 8. At the time of purchase, he is
a tenant of Lot 8.
After which, Madlangsakay negotiated with other tenant for the subdivision of lot 8 and its
selling. However, nothing was agreed upon.
Herein petitioners alleged that they have had a contract (which they were found by the court to
be guilty of forgery) about the said lot.
RTC up to SC upheld the retaliation of Madlangsakay that it is a forged document they presented
and that knowing the parcel of land is a conjugal property, it may not be sold without the
signature of the spouse, which is conspicuous on the documents presented (contracts)
3. Lee V. Tambago

Herein respondent has executed a FORGED will of the petitioners father. As notary public, he
has forged the signature of the deceased, has included OLD residence certificate of the deceased,
has faltered by having only 2 witnesses (3 required by law) without as well attaching thereto
their residence certificates.
Also, he did not follow the stipulation of Art. 806 which says that notaries public must leave a
copy of a will to the clerk of court to be archived therein.
SC suspended him and perpetually disqualified him to practice his notary public powers.

Art. 6- Rights maybe waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
1. People V. Donato
Herein private respondent(s) are rebels who have confederated to ensue violence and cause
disturbance of peace and government.
They are executed in violation of ART. 134 OF THE RPC (Rebellion) in which the imposable
penalty is prision mayor. By this, they have pleaded for motion to bail and have agreed to be
under the jurisdiction/legal custody of the court.
Judge of court entertained motion to bail and subsequent revocation of warrant of arrest.
People through sol. General insists that the moment they have submitted themselves for court
jurisdiction, they have also waived their right to bail.
SC ruled with the Sol. Gen. Stating that that right of the respondents are personal and that is not
prejudicial to a right of a third party. The judge then committed grave abuse of discretion when
he ordered the paying of bail of the respondent
2. People. V. Bodoso
Herein petitioner has been charged of qualified rape by mean of intimidation by her own
daughter.
After several proceedings, public defendant has presented that the accused already has waived
his right to be heard and rests the case at bar.
However, because there are no available transcript or stenographic notes that would identify the
history of the proceedings to ascertain as to whether the accused has been totally informed of the
constitutional right that he is waiving and the effects it might bring, the Court remanded the case
for further proceedings since waiver by implication at this case could not be appreciated.
3. Borromeo-Herrera V. Borromeo
Herein case is about the Waiver of Rights of the other parties who, at one point, has opposed to
the earlier WILL as presented by Jose Junquera; subsequently found forged by the court.
Moreover, those other parties who were alleged to have WAIVED their rights with the intestate
estate could not be appreciated since the requisites thereupon are not present: EXISTENCE OF
RIGHT, KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH EXISTENCE, INTENTION OF RELINQUISHING
SUCH RIGHT.
Art. 7- Law are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, customs or practice to the contrary.
When the court declares a law to be unconstitutional, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the constitution.
CASES:
1. Legamia V. IAC-

Herein petitioner has filed for death benefits for her son with Agri. Cultural Administration Naga
City Branch wherein his deceased live-in partner has served as Branch Claim manager.
As when petitioner used the surname of her live-in partner for 19 years, the LEGITIMATE
spouse has sued her in violation of CA 142 (Pseudonym).
Court held that is must not be applied to her since the set up we have in the Philippines, although
not encouraged, of the practice of common-law wives use the surnames of their partners is
generously countenanced.
2. RP V. CA RP has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the private respondents for
the widening and concreting.
Respondents, however, demand that the just compensation for the property should be based
on fair market value and NOT that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which
fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the
owner, whichever is lower.
The instant controversy, however, is too far distant away from any of the above exceptional
cases.
3. Fort Bonifacio V. CIR R.A. 7167- Goods/Products...
Art. 8- Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
CASES:
1. Co V. CA Herein petitioner is charged in violation of B.P. 22 aka Bouncing Check law. He was sentenced
to be imprisoned for 60 days and to indemnify the aggrieved party from which he has promised
to help for the salvage of a sunken vessel.
However, some four years before the Que V. People (used by respondent as jurisprudence), the
MISTER OF JUSTICE has released his construction of the said Batas pambansa, from which the
petitioner herein has relied on its interpretation; that where the check was issued as arrangement
to guarantee/ secure payment, one is not criminally liable with estafa nor BP 22.
SC ruled sustaining the petitioners pleading since because the belief he had of the construction
of the DOJ minister, though not binding, was of important bearing. And although the DOJ
opinion has been reversed, that has already been a year after the alleged violation was done.
2. Ting V. Ting After having 6 children and a total of 18 years of married life, wife defendant in herein case has
filed before RTC her intention for the nullification of her marriage with her husband pursuant to
Art. 36 of the Family Code. (Psychological incapacity)
RTC and CA ruled in favor or he woman spouse and declared their marriage ab initio.
In the course of proceeding, the herein defendant has said that Molina and Santos cases shouldnt
have a retroactive application to the case as regards requirements to prove psychological
incapacity.
However, SC again has declared that the evidences presented by wife spouse do not entirely
constitute psychological incapacity.
Art. 13- When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from
sunset to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.
RELATED LAWS INVOLVED:
BOOK I
SOVEREIGNTY AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 8 LEGAL WEIGHTS MEASURES AND PERIOD
Section 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days
the specific month contains; "day," to a day of twenty-four hours; and "night," from sunset to sunrise.
CASES:
1. National Marketing Corp. V. Tecson

The only question of law here is whether in the period of Dec. 21 1955- Dec. 21, 1965 is
equitable to a period of 10 years with the fact that 2 years therein are leap years?

SC ruled that a year should be understood to have 365 days each regardless of leap years.
2. Tolentino V. Shenton
Herein petitioner has mortgaged her property to Bank of Southeast Asia which then has extrajudicially foreclosed her property because of failure to pay obligations.
Respondent herein was the highest bidder of the said mortgaged property which obtained its
certificate of title on Feb. 7, 2001.
According the Sec. 28, Rule 39 of Civil Procedures, one may redeem a property after an extrajudicial foreclosure after one year of release of certificate of title to the new owner provided that
the former shall pay the amount it spent for the property.
On Feb. 6, 2002, petitioner has filed a civil action for redeem of property, which is lying under
the scope of the 1 year reglementary period according to art. 13 of the civil code. Therefore, she
may redeem her property so long as she is able to pay the new owner, which again she is not able
to do so.
SC ruled in favor of respondent.
Art. 14- Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (8a)
CASE:
1. Liang V. People
Herein petitioner was initially charged, arrested but by bail was released after some Joyce Cabal
filed a criminal case against him on grounds of Grave Oral Defamation.
After bailing and upon the arraignment, MeTC judge has received letter from DFA stating that
the petitioner and the cases be dismissed since the same is bound by diplomatic immunity; which
the judge so did.
SC on the other hand ruled that DFA letters have no binding effect to courts. Also, the dismissal
of case was unknown to petitioner, which therefore violates due process of law; another is that
diplomatic immunity per se must not supersede ones right to file a criminal case to those who

even in their OFFICIAL duties, must commit a crime bec. Such is not countenanced by our laws;
next is the according to Vienna convention, persons who shall enjoy immunity are those to which
practices or exercises their official duties or functions in a state elsewhere he is designated.
Art. 15- Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon all citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.
RELATED LAWS INVOLVED:
Republic Act No. 9225
August 29, 2003
Section 1. Short Title. This act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003".
CASES:
1. Tenchavez V. Esacano
Pastor and Vicenta are sweethearts who had a whirlwind of a love relationship. After some
elopement abandonment of Vicenta as she went abroad and filed for a decree of final and
absolute divorce in the United States, Nevada (before her naturalization), herein petitioner files
moral damages against parents of Vicenta for alienation of affections and for legal separation.
SC ruled that the divorce decree is not binding in the Philippines since according to Art. 15, she
is still under the observance of Philippine laws because at the time of her filing of the same, she
is STILL a Filipino citizen, rendering her divorce decree void/invalid; however, court ruled that
petitioner is entitled of the moral damages.
2. Van Dorn V. Romillo
Alice Reyes was previously married with Richard Upton (US citizen) which subsequently has
been granted absolute divorce at the State of Nevada.
After which, Alice married for the second time with another US citizen Theodore Van Dorn.
On the information of the decree of divorce, Upton has declared that they had no conjugal
property left in the Philippines (galleon shop) which he is suing the petitioner herein for
partition.
SC ruled that since they have had decree of divorce, from which he has declared they had no
conjugal property whatsoever, he has estopped his right for the same and he had no legal
standing for he is not the husband of the petitioner herein.
3. Pilapil V. Ibay-Somera
Imelda and Erich Geilling (german national) has been married in Germany, resided in the
Philippines for some 3 years and subsequently has been divorced as per filing of husband in the
same country; which was latter granted by the countrys court.
Private respondent now files a criminal action for adultery of petitioner with some 2 men at the
time of their marriage, which has already been absolved by a divorce decree.
SC ruled that this action could no longer be instituted since that the respondent filed the case
AFTER the divorce, meaning, that they are no longer husband and wife, which purports that the
case must no continue at all; which is also corollary to the provision of art. 15 with regard to
STATUS of the Filipino.
4. Llorente V. CA
Lorenzo and Paula Llorente has been married in the Philippines. After sometime, Lorenzo has
been naturalized in the United States during his enlistment as US Navy. Upon, returning home,
he learned that his wife was pregnant by his own brother. After, they have entered to an
agreement that they would separate, the allowance would be suspended and that no criminal case
for adultery would be filed by Lorenzo.
He went to US again where he married again with Alicia, herein respondent and after a decree of
divorce from his previous marriage, whom he begot 3 children.

Upon returning home, he executed a will bequeathing his properties in the Philippines to his
children and Alicia. But court denied since he is still alive. Even before the end of proceeding,
llorente died.
Paula now files for her right on the property saying she is the legal wife.
SC ruled to remand the case on the reason of validity of the will but RECOGNIZES the validity
of decree of divorce of llorente in the US.
5. Roehr and Rodriguez
Another tale of a mixed-marriage, Filipina married to a German. Got divorced and wanted
custody of children
SC ruled that divorce decree validly granted by a foreigner is recognized in the Philippines but
the legal effects are under the jurisdiction of our courts (such as custody of children, care,
support)
6. RP V. Iyoy
Crasus, herein petitioner, was married to one Fely, where they begot 5 children. Fely was a
nagger and extravagant. She then flew for US and there has filed for a divorce decree and
married another man
However, when she filed for divorce decree in the US, she is still a Filipino.
SC ruled that she is still bound under the Philippine law since she has not yet obtained her
naturalization before institution of divorce decree according to Art. 15 of the Civil code on
statuses.
Art. 16- Real property as well as personal property, is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
DOCTRINE INVOLVED: Renvoi
CASES:
1. Miciano V. Brimo
Andre Brimo, herein respondent, is a brother of the deceased Turkish national (Joseph B.).
However, the administrator of the property did not include him in the partition because of the
will executed by the deceased, which he said that he wanted his properties to be distributed acc.
To Philippines laws.
This was contended by Andre in the sense that he says it ignores the Turkish laws (national law
of Joseph) but he was unable to present such evidences that would prove that Turkish laws
prohibit such wills.
SC rules that in the absence of such rules, it is presumed that it is like ours. Andre was added to
the partition.
2. Ancheta V. Dalaygon
Herein petitioner is the administrator of will of then Audrey ONeill, who was married to a
Richard Guersey (both US citizens but resided in the Philippines). Her will was probated in
Maryland.
When Audrey died, Richard was married to herein respondent who wants a share of the Makati
property bequeathed by Audrey to Richard.
Ancheta did not administer the property for he thought our laws are to be applied to the will,
contrary to art. 16 of Civil Code; Audrey is US national and the will was done in the US.

3. Estate of Amos Bellis

Amos Bellis, resident and national of Texas USA has been married 2 in his lifetime; 1st with
Marry Mallen (5 legitimate children) and the second (3 illegitimate children).
He then executed a will in the Philippines. However, his illegitimate children opposed to
partition since they said they were deprived of their legitimes.
SC ruled that the will of the deceased according to his national law (Texan) must sustain over his
property in the Philippines.
Art. 17- The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
CASES:
1. BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA V. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF
APPEALS
Petitioners herein entered with 3 other companies to a loan. As the later were not able to pay the
obligations, they re-entered into another agreement, with the herein respondent as a 3rd party
mortgager (parcel of land)
After again failing to pay petitioner, they have filed personal actions in SC of another country
and subsequently has file s REAL action for foreclosure of mortgage (ARC).
SC ruled that aggrieved party is only allowed to take a 1 course of action as if contrary, it would
result to double compensation from the other party. Since petitioner has already filed personal
actions in HK, that is entitled of an action that waives its other action for foreclosure in the
Philippines.
2. PNB V. Cabansag
Herein respondent Florence Cabansag has filed at Regional Arbitration Branch about illegal
termination of PNB Singapore branch.
She is a direct hire in the said country; prior her work, she has secured herself with a POEA
certification and local certification to satisfy her necessities of working on that said country.
After regularization, she was instantaneously informed that she is fired, without any investigation
or hearing.
Upon returning home, she filed the case at the Labor arbiter.
SC ruled in her favor since her signing of Local Permit in Singapore DOES NOT automatically
mean that she is not subject under protective mantle of Labor laws of the Philippines.
CIVIL PERSONALITIES
1. Geluz V. CA
Herein petitioner is a physician who has conducted 3 different abortions with a Nita Villanueva.
After the 3rd abortion, the husband has filed a civil action for damages for injuries in behalf of the
unborn against the petitioner.
SC ruled that it could be upheld since the actual information and action for injuries and damages
is for an UNBORN fetus, which, in any of its time, did not acquire civil personality
2. Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation V. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator

Herein respondent has appealed for grant bereavement leave and death and accident insurance
benefits to Rolando Hortillan pursuant to the death of his child (38 weeks died during labor) in
accordance to stipulations of CBA of the herein petitioner.
Petitioner only approved the paternity leave but other others, rejected. Thus he filed a civil case
about this matter since he is filing for the benefits not on behalf of the child but based on HIS
own right.
SC ruled that according to the CBA, requirements to be bestowed with these benefits are: a.
Death, b. ... of a legitimate dependent; which are both present in the case at bar. Petitioner also
asseverated that the provisions are clear regarding death but there is no specificity that the
Court has seen as to their assertion that one must have had a civil personality before they could
grant the death and accident benefits.
USE OF SURNAMES:

LAWS INVOLVED:
BOOK I
PERSONS
Title I. - CIVIL PERSONALITY
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction
are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other
codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief
or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases
specified by law. (n)
CHAPTER 2
NATURAL PERSONS
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article. (29a)
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal
womb. (30a)
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and
by will. (32a)
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to
which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of
rights from one to the other. (33)
CHAPTER 3
JURIDICAL PERSONS
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law
grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member. (35a)
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws
creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and
bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. (38a)
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose
mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law
or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the property and other assets
shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which
during the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same. (39a)

Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will. (n)
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not bind, deaf or dumb,
and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this
Code. (n)
Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines;
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony. (n)

Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:

(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write. (1263a)
Art. 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a state of
drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable. (n)
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage,
are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding
articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving
parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be
manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar,
or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official
authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for
marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a)
Article 34. Civil interdiction. - Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.

Title XIII. - USE OF SURNAMES (n)

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If
recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
Art. 367. Natural children by legal fiction shall principally employ the surname of the father.
Art. 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the
surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden
name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance
with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
"Junior" can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
(2) Add the Roman Numerals II, III, and so on.
Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
Art. 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other
relief.
Art. 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the
latter.
Art. 379. The employment of pen names or stage names is permitted, provided it is done in good faith and
there is no injury to third persons. Pen names and stage names cannot be usurped.
Art. 380. Except as provided in the preceding article, no person shall use different names and surnames.
FAMILY CODE Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the
Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and
sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code.
(264a)
CASES:
1. In re: petition for the change of name of Julian Lin Wang
Parents of herein petitioner wanted to drop his middle name CARULASAN for convenience and
to prevent humiliation and confusion since they are to stay in a long period in Singapore (they do
not attach middle initial) for the latters education.
SC ruled and has mentioned these conditions for the change of name:
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling
reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
(RLAFAS)
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and
was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

Also, SC ruled that since the law is giving right to legitimate children the principal use of
parents surname, but silent on surnames, it must be understood that the child is a minor and may
not know the consequences of dropping his middle initial. SC said that if the child comes in to
intelligence and adulthood, if he may still want to change his name, they he could institute it by
his own will if determined but not this time.

2. In the matter of adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

Honorato Catindig adopted her illegitimate minor child Stephanie Nathy and asks court to adopt
the surname of the former.

The court granted the petition and named the child Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Without any
middle name.
They file a separate motion for clarification/consideration as to the use of middle initial of the
mother of the child Garcia.
SC ruled that although the law is silent about middle names, they are still granting the petition in
the sense that middle name, as a part of the full name, is essential to one and to set aside the
notions of illegitimacy of the child, and also since it is not opposed by any parties or prejudicial
to public interest.

Art. 176- Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force. (287a)
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9255 February 24 2004
AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR
FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."
CASE:
1. Leonardo V. CA
Ann Brigette Leonardo is a child of common-law spouses who petitioned to use the SURNAME
( Eddie Fernandez)of his father. Because of this the father has executed a will regarding this
matter and petitioned at the Local Civil Registrar who then declined the same presenting art. 176
of the Family Code.
SC ruled in favor of CA since the Family code has already been in force at the time when the
child has been born on 1993
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
CASE:
1. Johnston V. RP
Isabel Valdes Johnston has adopted a child named ANA ISABEL HENRIETTE ANTONIO
CONCEPCION GEORGIANA
She prayed for the adopted child to use her surname (including her husbands surname who, for
himself, did not actually participate in the adoption).
Court did allow for the use of surname of VALDES only.
SC upheld the court in applying only VALDES since she was the only one, according to adoption
papers, who adopted the child, without support or consent of her husband.

Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
CASES:
1. In the Matter of the Change of Name of Milagros Llerena Telmo. MILAGROS LLERENA
TELMO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Herein petitioner wanted to change the spelling of her husbands surname to THELMO is it the
trend now used in the US and for other purposes she considered to be important for.
Lower court granted the petition but assailed by RP.
SC ruled in favor of the RP since; the change of name was initiated by the Wife, not the
HUSBAND himself, and thus only presented a written document saying he is not opposing the
petition, together with the 2 children.
2. Alfon V. RP
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte petitioned to change her name to Estrella S. Alfon
since she has used this from her childhood up to right to suffrage and obtaining her nurse degree.
Lower court has granted only the change in name but the surname for it invoked Art. 364.
SC said that it should have granted the petition fully since the name/surname to be used is that of
her mother, and the provision of art. 365 only said that legitimate child shall PRINCIPALLY not
EXCLUSIVELY use the name of the father. One may choose to use the surname of the mother is
he/she may want to.
3. PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMES. JOSEFINA ANG CHAY and MERCEDITA ANG
CHAY V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Herein petitioners petition for the change of surname from ANG CHAY to HERNANDEZ.
They were not informed by their mother of their Chinese ancestry and have use the surname
petitioned to from childhood, to college, up to suffrage and paying of income tax. After knowing
of their descent, they immediately have petitioned for naturalization and for the change of
surname. Lower court has granted the petition
SC agreed with the decision and found no flaw about it.
4. Naldoza V. RP
Herein petitioner Zosima Naldoza prays to change the surname of her children from
Divinagracia to Naldoza since her husband has abandoned her and that he is alleged to have
swindled some people; her intention is to prevent any odious effects to her children.
Lower court has refused to grant the petition
SC upheld the lower in accordance to Art. 364, and that when the children reach the age of
adulthood, they are the ones to know if they should/may want to use the surname they have or
not. (Divinagracia)
5. Uy V. RP
Candido/Ricardo Uy prays for the change of surname to BALUYOT (Secretary Baluyot close to
his family and did not oppose to use the surname) since his was frequently identified as of
Chinese ancestry and this has been a factor to the fall of his furniture business.
Lower court granted the petition.
SC upheld the decision since it found that the change of name was done in good faith and that it
does not prejudice a right of a third person or injurious to the gov. Or the public interest.
6. Padilla V. RP
Dolores Gemora was initially married to Vincent Co. The latter abandoned the former. They
begot 5 children
After, former has married again to one Edward Padilla. Dolores wanted to change the surname of
her children to PADILLA.
Lower court refused invoking art. 364 and art. 369 (surname of children is of fathers; before
declaration of nullity of the marriage)

SC upheld the lower court for the same articles mentioned and for the reason that the children
may actually decide for themselves if they want to in the future and institute their own.
7. RP V. CA (Wong)
Herein petitioner Maximo Wong was legally adopted by WONG spouses from one Maximo
Alcala since the spouses were impotent.
However, since he is an environment of Muslims when in fact he is surnamed Wong, it entailed
embarrassment and effected negatively to his business. Because of this, he initiated this petition.
CA has approved the lower court grant but repelled by RP
SC ruled in favor wong, who now is MAXIMO ALCALA, JR., since RP contention of crass
ingratitude of the petitioner is not substantiated because his adopter herself has presented an
affidavit of support for change of surname and appeared before the court for the same purposes
and that the reason for change of name is also not prejudicial to any 3rd person.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden
name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname
employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance
with Article
RELATED LAWS INVOLVED:
Republic Act No. 8239 Philippine Passport Act of 1996
d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced or widowed or whose marriage has been
annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of marriage, court decree of separation,
divorce or annulment or certificate of death of the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the
Office of the Civil Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or
declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert to the use of her maiden name:
Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under existing laws of the Philippines;
CASES:
1. Yasin V. Sharia District Court
Petitioner Hatima Yasin want to use her maiden name after the subsequent divorce from his
husband who then has also married to another man
Lower court said that the petition is for CHANGE of name and that it should be treated in
another way
SC ruled that she may use her maiden name whenever she wants to since when a woman marries,
she may optionally use the surname of her husband if she wills or not. The name she is known of
and is registered in the Local Civil Registry remains the same and that being married is just a
change in civil status. Therefore, this is not a case of change of name as the lower court asserts it
to be.
2. Remo V. Sec. Of Foreign Affairs

Maria Virginia R. Villanueva is reapplying for her Philippine passport with an additional prayer
of reverting her name instituted therein by using her maiden name.
According to R.A. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, conditions to which one married
woman can revert her maiden name is when the spouse died or the marriage has been annulled,
legally separated or obtained absolute divorce.
In her case, her marriage is still subsisting with Villanueva
SC ruled in favor of the respondent disallowing her to have her name reverted to its maiden
status as what the law itself provides.

Art. 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other
relief.
Art. 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the
latter.
CASE:
1. Tolentino V. CA Constancia Tolentino herein petitioner has been enjoined to stop using her surname Tolentino by
action initiated by the present (3rd) wife of Arturo Tolentino, Consuelo.
CA ruled at first that it is favouring Constancia but later has revoked and modified its decision
favouring Consuelo.
SC ruled that the law is silent about the issue at hand but ruled to let things as it be since there is
no usurpation on the part of Consuelo, and that there is no envisioned injury to rights of the
Constancia anyway.
Art. 380. Except as provided in the preceding article, no person shall use different names and surnames.
RELATED LAWS INVOLVED:
REPUBLIC ACT No. 6085
AN ACT AMENDING COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO
REGULATING THE USE OF ALIASES.
Section 1. Section one of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and
in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which
he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided,
That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized,
have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames."
CASE:
1. Ursua V. CA Petitioner herein has been convicted (by lower court and CA) of violation of C.A. 142 regarding
use of alias.
The petitioner was asked by his counsel/boss to deliver a certain document and in return receive
one from the office of the ombudsman. Initially, the task is not for him to do, but the messenger

then was absent due to some errands and he was the one entrusted to do the job on behalf of the
former.
Upon arrival to office of ombudsman, he has signed in the log and receipt book the name of the
supposed receiver Oscar Perez. However, the one who has given him the document knew that he
is a different person to that of which he has entered his name on the book, the former asked
ombudsman for his punishment
SC ruled that an alias is one that is to be used by person publicly and habitually, usually in
business transactions and other purposes as such that would not injure a third partys right or
public interest. Historically, the CA 142 from which he was deemed to violate was created in the
light of the rampant use of aliases of Chinese men to fraudulently confuse their business partners.
In the present case, SC understood that petitioners signing of Oscar Perez in the log book was
not in his mind to be used publicly and habitually, therefore not equating it to an alias. And
additionally, it is not kind of Alias from which the intention of the framers must have been
seeking to remedy or repel. Therefore, the petitioner is acquitted.

EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY:

Republic Act No. 6809
Section 1. ARTICLE 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws
in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for
children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180
of the Civil Code."
ABSENCE:
Title XIV. - ABSENCE
CHAPTER 1
PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CASE OF ABSENCE
Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an
agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may
appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the absentee has
expired. (181a)
Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall take the
necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify the powers,
obligations and remuneration of his representative, regulating them, according to the circumstances, by the rules
concerning guardians. (182)
Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is no legal
separation.

If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be appointed by the
court. (183a)
CHAPTER 2
DECLARATION OF ABSENCE
Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news,
and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property, his absence
may be declared. (184)
Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;
(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of his death.
(185)
Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. (186a)
CHAPTER 3
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE ABSENTEE
Art. 387. An administrator of the absentee's property shall be appointed in accordance with Article 383. (187a)
Art. 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the husband's property cannot alienate or encumber
the husband's property, or that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial authority. (188a)
Art. 389. The administration shall cease in any of the following cases:
(1) When the absentee appears personally or by means of an agent;
(2) When the death of the absentee is proved and his testate or intestate heirs appear;
(3) When a third person appears, showing by a proper document that he has acquired the absentee's property by
purchase or other title.
In these cases the administrator shall cease in the performance of his office, and the property shall be at the
disposal of those who may have a right thereto. (190)
CHAPTER 4
PRESUMPTION OF DEATH
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order
that his succession may be opened. (n)
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known
for four years. (n)
Art. 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his property in
the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been alienated or the
property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194)
CHAPTER 5
EFFECT OF ABSENCE UPON THE
CONTINGENT RIGHTS OF THE ABSENTEE
Art. 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to a person whose existence is not recognized must prove that he
was living at the time his existence was necessary in order to acquire said right. (195)
Art. 394. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article, upon the opening of a succession to which
an absentee is called, his share shall accrue to his co-heirs, unless he has heirs, assigns, or a representative. They
shall all, as the case may be, make an inventory of the property. (196a)

Art. 395. The provisions of the preceding article are understood to be without prejudice to the action of petition
for inheritance or other rights which are vested in the absentee, his representatives or successors in interest.
These rights shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for prescription. In the record that is made in
the Registry of the real estate which accrues to the coheirs, the circumstance of its being subject to the
provisions of this article shall be stated.(197)
Art. 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance shall appropriate the fruits received in good faith
so long as the absentee does not appear, or while his representatives or successors in interest do not bring the
proper actions. (198)
FUNERALS:
Title X. - FUNERALS
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with
the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers
and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the
funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the
other members of the family.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in articles 294 and 305.
Art. 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to
the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
Art. 310. The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral expenses, and
shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.
CASES:
1.) Eugenio Sr. V. Velez
Herein petitioner is the common-law-spouse of one Vitaliana Vargas whom her brothers and
sisters deemed to have been forced and illegally confined in the residence of the former. This has
lead the Vargases to file a case for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Tomas Eugenio has said that upon the institution of the case of habeas corpus, Vitaliana has
already been dead and that the Court does not have jurisdiction in cases of such actions to a dead
person. Also, he contended that since Vitaliana is now dead, he is the one responsible to give her
a decent funeral as he is the common-law-spouse of the later.
Vargases have amended the petition for the purpose of assuming arrangement and funeral rites of
the their sister as they are the appropriate persons preferred by the Civil Code.
The Court gave right for the arrangement of the funeral of Vitaliana to her descendants as they
are the person contemplated by the law and mere common-law-spouse status of one person does
not give him/her the rights that of conferred to those who have been legitimately married.
CIVIL REGISTRAR
LAWS INVOLVED:
CASES:
1. Silverio V. RP
Rommel Silverio has underwent a sexual reassignment surgey in Thailand who petitioned in the
RTC for change of name accordingly to the assignment (Mely) and for purposes of getting
married with another MAN.

RTC has rendered a decision favouring the petitioner herein.

RP through Solicitor General intervened and invoked PD 9048 and pertinent laws of the CIVIL
code that prohibits such alteration or change in the name of person and SEX for that matter; as
such is now to be under the administration of Consul General or Local civil registrar as per PD
9048- so that the courts do not have jurisdiction over these instances.
Supreme Court held that even if the courts shall not decline to render decisions, it must not enter
to judicial legislation upon the matter of the case at bar. Such change as provided in the PD only
refers to TYPOGRAPHICAL AND/OR CLERICAL ERRORS as entered in the local civil
register and that it must not include the change of SEX and NAME for purposes that would
prejudice or impair vested rights, specifically to FEMALES. Such purpose or intention of
Rommel is to be wed with another man , and that would be a contradiction to CIVIL codes
provision of MARRIAGES which should contracted by a MAN and a WOMAN.
FAMILY RELATIONS:

LAWS INVOLVED:
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
STATE POLICIES
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men

ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just
programs of social security.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1083
A DECREE TO ORDAIN AND PROMULGATE A CODE RECOGNIZING THE SYSTEM OF
FILIPINO MUSLIM LAWS, CODIFYING MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS, AND PROVIDING FOR ITS
ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
TITLE II MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Chapter One APPLICABILITY CLAUSE
Article 13. Application.
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments
to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and
maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization
and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife parental
authority, and the properly relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws.
CASE:
1. Malang V. Moson
Hadji Abdula Malang has contracted Several Marraiges in his lifetime under different laws
governing at the time of its celebration. He has divorced 3 of those marriages at the time PD
1083 has already taken effect.
The question in this issue is about the laws governing at the time of the celebration of his first
marriage (before PD 1083, which is the CIVIL CODE) and if his divorced marriages are valid
and what are the laws that should govern the property relations left intestate by Malang.
According to the Court, PD. 1083, on its provisions declared that the laws that are in force before
its effectivity shall govern all cases falling under such situation i.e. the New Civil Code. So then,
his marriage should be in contemplation of the NCC which should be monogamous in nature.
About the property relations, it must be governed by PD 1083 since this is the latest law in force
with accordance to Muslims and at the time of death of Malang.
However, the Court remanded the case to ascertain correctly the time of his cohabitation with
several women which he has divorced to suffice the property relations ( such that would be
falling, if ever, in the NCC or PD 1083) because the dates were not included in the reports of the
Shariah court. This is also important to ascertain as to whether the properties during the marriage
after the 1st marriage valid under NCC were obtained exclusively or through efforts of the
Malang and his current spouse at the time of cohabitation.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

LAWS INVOLVED:
CHAPTER 2 Human Relations (New Civil Code)
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
CASES:
1. Wassmer V. Velez
Herein respondent Francisco Velez and petitioner Beatriz Wassmer is set to have their marriage
celebrated.
2 days before the marriage, respondent left a note that he wants to postpone the wedding because
his mother opposed.
The following day, he sent a telegram saying everything planned shall suffice, but he did not
show up on the day of celebration of marriage. Because of this, Wassmer filed for damages for
the actuation of the Man.
Several instances were given by the lower court for amicable settlement, but the defendant and
his counsel twice failed to appear upon summon of the court. Respondent however invoked that a
mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
However, the court has settled that while it is true the in several cases the Court has declared that
it is not an actionable wrong, Articles on Human relations could be invoked by an aggrieved
party regarding wilful cause of loss or injury in a manner done contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy.
Court granted the petition but deduced the earlier award to 15,000 pesos (from 25k)
2. Baksh V. Court of Appeals
Herein petitioner is an Iranian national who is currently in the Philippines as an exchange
student. He has met Marilou (virgin and never had a boyfriend) at the restaurant where she was
working at the moment.
After, they have been sweethearts and that the man promised her to a marriage. They
subsequently went to Marilous parents for their approval of the marriage. The parents have then,
because of Filipino hospitality, has prepared the necessary things for the celebration of the
marriage.
Parties have lived in together for that while and Marilou has seen a change with the Iranian as he
maltreated her and said that he would want to pursue the marriage anymore. (After she has
already been deflowered.)
Defendant herein has filed for moral damages which was favoured by Lower Court and CA.
Petitioner has sought to dismiss the case invoking breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong and that he did not in any manner did so that promise. Also, he sees Marilou as
a nobody but a waitress.
SC has held the CAs judgement with reference to Art. 21 of the Civil Code as the Iranian
bullshit has employed such pernicious plans and machinations, by means of promise of marriage
to attain his plan of deflowering Marilou, who the Court sees to be a lass of high morals and
wouldnt have had her virginity lost if wasnt for a believable actuations of the petitioner. Also,

what the Iranian is truly WILL CAUSE OF LOSS OR INJURY CONTRARY TO FILIPINO
CUSTOMS AND MORALS. The Court is opines that he has abused the Philippine hospitality of
Marilou and her parents through his wanton and fraudulent means to perpetrate the sexual
intercourse with Marilou.
REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
LAWS INVOLVE:
TITLE I
MARRIAGE
Chapter 1. Requisites of Marriage
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code. (52a)
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35 (2).
------Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage. (54a)
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This
declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and
their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage
certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which
fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a)
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or
religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written
authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties
belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during
a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. (56a)
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the

church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect. (57a)
Art. 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with
Chapter 2 of this Title. (58a)
Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or viceconsul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil
registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said
consular official. (75a)
Art. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
(1) Full name of the contracting party;
(2) Place of birth;
(3) Age and date of birth;
(4) Civil status;
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
(6) Present residence and citizenship;
(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;
(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;
(9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and
(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the
contracting party has neither father nor mother and is under the age of twenty-one years.
The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence certificates in any
formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license. (59a)
Art. 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation of the original
birth certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such
documents duly attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of
the documents by this Article need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The
signature and official title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity.
If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of
either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any
other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same has been
required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party
may furnish in lieu thereof his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the
local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall
contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence and
citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of birth of such
party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or,
in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the locality.
The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties
appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of
said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the
applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be convinced that either or both of them have the
required age. (60a)
Art. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of
the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance
and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse. (61a)

Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage,
are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding
articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent
or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested
in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form
of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to
administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the
affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications. (61a)
Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their
parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be
unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the completion of the
publication of the application therefor. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect that such
advice has been sought, together with the written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for
marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn
statement. (62a)
Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in
addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister
authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the
proper government agency to the effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling.
Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a
period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage
license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not
affect the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, the other party must be
present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n)
Art. 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the
applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten
consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place
within the building and accessible to the general public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge
of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be
issued after the completion of the period of publication. (63a)
Art. 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall
nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a
competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition
nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of the order. (64a)
Art. 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before
the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind for
the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have
no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their
affidavit, or by their oath before the local civil registrar. (65a)
Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from
the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the
contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of
every license issued. (65a)
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for
them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage,
issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein
required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a)
Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and
wife, shall also state:

(1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;
(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;
(4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage provided for
in Chapter 2 of this Title;
(5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in appropriate cases;
(6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement regarding
parental advice in appropriate cases; and
(7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a)
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties
the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the
marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate
copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in
proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other
than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a)
Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to
administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in
connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n)
Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a
registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the
applicants, the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary. (n)
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
CASES: Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent.....
1. Perido V. Perido
Lucio Perido has married twice in his lifetime (1. Benita Talorong (died during Spanish regime)
and 2. Marcelina Baliguat) and had 8 children from both (3:5).
Lucio died intestate and so the children and grandchildren of both families executed a document
for declaration of heirship and extra-judicial partition. However, the family members of the 1st
family had second thoughts about the said document and alleged that the properties are
CONJUGAL properties by Lucio and the 1st wife and that they are ILLEGITIMATE children
and had no successional rights.
Court ruled that the Children in the 2nd marriage are all legitimate as they are born out of a legal
marriage since 1st wife has died at the time of Spanish regime so Lucio had no legal impediment
when he contracted marriage with Baliguat
Also, the Court said that the properties Lucio had were are EXCLUSIVE properties (he obtained
from her grandmother) except for Lot 458 which is truly a CONJUGAL property between Lucio
and Marcelina.
2. Selanova V. Mendoza
Herein petition Saturnino Selanova charged the respondent who is a City Judge for gross
ignorance of the law as he prepared and ratified a document for extrajudicial liquidation of the
conjugal partnership with another condition that they are waiving their rights (Selanova spouses)

to prosecute each other for adultery or concubinage) as opposed to the provisions laid out in Art.
221 of the New Civil Code.
Mendoza commented that he had done so because of his application of Art. 191 (4) of the Old
Civil code which provides that spouses may agree upon the dissolution of conjugal property
subject to the approval of the Court of first instance of their residence and the belief that the
spouses would do as invoked.
Court has presumed that the judge might have been unaware of the new law since he was
admitted to the bar way back and that the New civil code was not the basis of his study in the
law school as that he was not able to apply it on the case at bar. However, the entered contract
STILL is void but the punishment of suspending the release of his retirement pay was relieved
by the Court but the judge was strictly censured (although he has already retired).
3. People V. Mawallil
Herein respondent has been previously convicted of parricide by killing his WIFE Sophia Sera;
was sentenced of reclusion perpetua and to pay indemnity of P 20,000 by CA.
Previously, Sera was married to one Nusi Munib whom she has also divorced with a muslim
leader pursuant to the law in force at that time. After, she eloped with respondent and got
married with him.
Sukarno is jobless and had the propensity to jealousy. He had suspected that Sophia goes to
school for flirtation reasons and because of this he maltreated his wife and oftentimes threatened
to kill her with a batangas knife. One day, he went out of the house and said that he is going to
Basilan. Later that day, Sophia and her sister went to rizal theatre and they have been surprised
to see him in front of them. When she got home, Sukarno is already at the sala, laughing and said
he lied on going to Basilan. After, he asked Sophia to have dinner somewhere, and the tragedy
happened afterwards. She killed her wife and raped her. In his testimony he said that they were
victims of hold up and that they were robbed (he also told lies about buying and selling of gold,
and that he really went to Basilan which was therefore been found to be untrue since the ship
that went to their place hasnt reached the port yet contradicting his tale that he landed to basilan
30 before the actual time of the arrival of the ship to HIS PLACE yet and not it Basilan)
Court ruled that his tales were all lies and affirmed the conviction with additional to the award of
indemnity.
4. Trinidad V. CA
Petitioner herein Arturo Trinidad wants to have his legitimate share of the 4 parcels of land left
by his grandparent to his father, uncle and auntie. The two said that their brother Inocentes had
died single and did not have any son.
In the RTC, Trinidad was not able to shell out a copy of the marriage certificate of his parents
and his own birth certificate as these were probably damaged or burned during the Japanese war
in the Philippines. This was invoked by the respondents and they said that he was not able to
institute necessary evidences to support his legitimacy and property relations to the said 4 parcel
of lands except for his BAPTISMAL record, testimonies of his witnesses (and himself) and
several pictures elucidating moments of himself and the oppositors of the case.
Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and has held that even that the mentioned marriage and
birth certificates are truly important documents as per this matter, they are not fatal to his claims
as they were necessarily purported by the local civil registrar to be out of the record because of
the Japanese war that occurred during that time. The evidences; such as the pictures and the
baptismal records, as for the case, are already sufficient for the assumption and validity of his
legitimacy and that he deserve the parcel of land in question.
5. Sarmiento V. CA
Herein petitioners are sisters (Grandchildren of Fracisco Arguelles and Emilia Pinelli) claiming
that they are also LEGITIMATE co-owners of some lot left to the petitioners Mother (Leogarda)
subsequently. On the other hand, Francisco had another child, the step brother of Leogarda, to

another woman.
The petitioners contend that they also have partition to the lands left by their grandparent as
partitioned by Simon Arguelles. The later said that his father and Emilia Pinelli have not been
married so Leogarda is illegitimate.
RTC favoured the petitioners but the CA reversed.
Court now favoured CA as that even if the fact that 2 persons (male and female) have cohabited
with each other for a long period, in the absence of a valid marriage, their children are to be
deemed illegitimate. Mere presumption of marriage because of that cohabitation is not sufficient
to the court to believe there has been one (since also in the death certificate of Francisco, it was
seen that he had NO spouse.)

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
CASE:
1. Alcantara V. Alcantara
Petitioner herein is a Civil Engineer who wants to declare his marriage with Respondent Rosita
Alcantara.
One of the petitioners contention is that they contracted into the marriage without a valid
marriage license and such one reflected on the marriage contract they have entered to was a
SHAM as it was issued by the Local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite from which they are both
not a resident.
CA dismissed the case as the prima facie evidence of marriage contract and license from
Carmona, Cavite oppose his very own petitions.
Court reinstated the decision of the CA in toto. Such evidences elucidating the marriage license
number in the marriage contract issued by the mentioned province is sufficient enough to the
Court to believe that the offices involved in the security of marriage have performed their
responsibilities. And even, if in case, that the marriage was contracted without a valid marriage
license, or by mere typographical error, the validity of the MARRIAGE itself shall not be
affected except those responsible for the irregularities who shall suffer civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities.
Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This
declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and
their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage

certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which
fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. (55a)
CASE:
1. Martinez V. Tan
Rosalia Martinez herein petitions that the marriage having said she has instituted with Angel tan
is no valid for she was not present on the day of the celebration of the marriage and did not
personally declare her acceptance of the latter as her husband.
The only question here is whether there was a marriage contracted between parties herein. The
justice of peace then of the Leyte has truly solemnized the marriage as purported by the
respondent, the justice of peace, the witnesses present (2) and the bailiff of court of peace.
The only evidence of Rosalia was her on testimony.
Court therefore ruled in favor of Tan.
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or
religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written
authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties
belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during
a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10. (56a)
OTHER LAWS INVOLVED:
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991
CHAPTER III Officials and Offices Common to All Municipalities
ARTICLE I The Municipal Mayor
Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the
municipal government, and in this connection, shall:
(xviii) Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding;
CASE:
1. Beso V. Daguman
Herein petitioner Zenaida Beso (OFW) charges the respondent Judge Juan Daguman, for
solemnizing a marriage OUTSIDE of his jurisdiction and negligence (in not retaining and
securing a copy of her marriage certificate/contract at the local civil registry.
Then, Zenaida was about to leave the Philippines and have asked the respondent to have her wed
with her then fianc. The judge did inside his own house, not in public chambers, even outside
of his jurisdiction and without the written request of the parties that they wanted to celebrate the
marriage in another place other the those prescribed by law.
After sometime, Beso was abandoned by her husband without any reason at all. She then
proceeded to the local civil registrar to ask for a copy of her marriage contract. To her surprise,

there was none. Even more surprised, when she went to the judge, he was not able to retain a
copy of which since he believes that the man took all the copies of the marriage contract.
These circumstances were dealt with by the Court with favor to the petitioner. According to the
Family code, Art. 26, it is the duty of the solemnizing officer to secure a copy of marriage
contract and furnish one to either of the parties and file the duplicate and triplicate copies of
which to the local civil registry where the marriage was celebrated and shall also have a
quadruplicate for his own copy; which he failed to do so. Also, he took much of the new
conception that OFWs are given more priority by the government in terms of their privileges
and securities for affording speedy and less expensive marriages that he chose to solemnize the
marriage even outside of his jurisdiction. This had led him to pay fine of 5 thousand pesos.

ARTICLE. 8. The marriage shall be SOLEMNIZED PUBLICLY in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
CASE:
1. Navarro V. Domagtoy
Herein filed an administrative case against a municipal trial court judge (herein respondent) for
Gross Misconduct and Inefficiency in office and Ignorance of the Law.
Respondent judge has solemnized a marriage between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga,
despite the knowledge that the groom is MERELY SEPARATED from his first wife.
In relation to the charges against him, RESPONDENT judge seeks EXCULPATION FROM
HIS ACT of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated
from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife
have not seen each other for almost seven years.
The CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "SEPARATED." In effect, Judge
Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida
Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample REASON FOR HIM TO PROCEED WITH
THE MARRIAGE CEREMONY.
SC disagreed as according to article 41 of the Civil code even if one of the spouses has a wellfounded belief that the other party has been dead/presumed dead for that matter, one of them
MUST first institute a summary proceeding for presumption of death of the other spouse as
requirement before entering a VALID subsequente marriage.
As for the other concern, the marriage solemnized by the judge happened inside his very own
home, OUTSIDE of his jurisdiction. Respondent maintained that he was requested to do such
celebration in his house, BUT Court learned that it was only the woman who wanted to celebrate
the marriage therein and not with the consent/request of the other party. However, the
irregularities or deficiencies of the same requirements DO NOT infirm the validity of the
marriage and thus the person (judge) responsible for such should be liable- to which he was
suspended for practice for 6 months with stern warning that repetition of the same would be
dealt more severely.
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter

validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
CASES:
1. Yao-Kee V. Sy-Gonzales
Sy Kiat, is a Chinese national, who died in the Philippines leaving real and personal properties
amounting to more or less 300,000 in Jan. 1977. His children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina,
whom he cohabited for a long period of time in the Philippines, filed a petition for the
administration of the said properties.
However, this was opposed by Yao-Kee (Yui Yip), who opines that she is the legal wife of Kiat
and that they celebrated that marriage in Fukien China. But that marriage couldnt be proved
with a valid marriage contract as it was, at that moment and location, was celebrated by
employing customary traditions. Yao Kee relied on the ff.: Her testimonial, the testimonial of her
brother, the admission of Asuncion of the knowledge of Sy kiats marriage with the same, the
alien cards that purport that Sy is married to the same woman.
RTC formerly has ruled over the herein petitioner but later modified by CA as such that
Asuncion have not had a marriage with the man, and that the alleged marriage of Yao kee to Sy
kiat was NOT proven with accordance to the Chinese laws. This time, the CA said that both
children from both parties are to be considered ACKNOWLEDGED children of Sy Kiat and that
all of them have equal shares to the real and personal properties left by the deceased.
2. RP V. Orbecido III
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left
for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live
at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Court ruled that with accordance to Art. 26 of the Family code, thought silent in marriages
contracted by BOTH Filipinos, should be based on the intent as well that when the other Filipino
obtained naturalization in another country and have obtained a divorce decree, the other Filipino
spouse shall likewise be capacitated to marry. However, since the case of Orbecido was
dependent of mere information given by his son, the Court sets aside the case without prejudice
on the fact that in the future, Orbecido may institute another action with proper presentation of
evidences pertinent to his claims.
3. San Luis V. San Luis
Felicisimo San Luis, the former governor of province of laguna, has contracted 3 marriages in
his lifetime. The 1st was with Virginia Sulit were they had 6 children; Virginia predeceased him.
2nd was with Merry Lee Corwin, which the same divorced in the State of Hawaii to which the
sames court granted absolute divorce plus custody of their one child. 3rd was with the herein
petitioner whom he married in the California and have lived with her for almost 18 years until
the death of the man
Due to this, she has filed in the Makati RTC a petition for the dissolution of the conjugal
property amounting to more or less 30,000,000 million pesos plus partition to the children
Felicisimo had with his past marriages. This was opposed by Edgar San Luis, one of the children

of the deceased in the 1st marriage as the respondent was alleged to not have legal standing since
she is a mere mistress and that the petition was filed in a wrong court since the deceased is a
resident of Laguna, not Alabang Muntinlupa, where the deceased resided til his death. Also, it
was alleged that Family Code should not be applied retroactively as it would impair vested rights
of the herein petitioners and that the marriage contracted to by the deceased shall be considered
VOID and bigamous.
On the matter of legal standing, the Court ruled that Felicidad has legal standing since her
marriage with Felicisimo is valid. However, on the account of the validity of the foreign law on
the obtained divorce decree of Merry lee with the deceased did not satisfy the court since it is a
requisite that those foreign laws shall be proved with accordance to law of the state in issue.
On the matter of filing the petition on the appropriate court, SC ruled that the respondent filed
the same in the correct RTC as the deceased really is a resident of muntinlupa alabang up to his
death. According to the Rules of court, petitions as such should be filed on the Court were the
deceased or person in consideration RESIDES- which only requires physical presence- and not
DOMICILED. And, that Alabang Muntinlupa at that time was still under the jurisdiction of
Makati City.
The petition for dismissal was approved but the case was remanded for reception of proper
evidences as for the requirements of proving the accordance of foreign laws of Hawaii with
Merry Lees grant of absolute divorce.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM THE LICENSE REQUIREMENT:

LAWS INVOVED:
Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be
solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently
survives.(72a)
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such
party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of
a marriage license. (72a)
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit
executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the
marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or
barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before
the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the
contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a)
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the
marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
(75a)
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship
captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers
at ports of call. (74a)
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members
of the armed forces or civilians. (74a)
Art. 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed
validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices. (78a)
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting

parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
CASES:
1. Ninal V. Bayadog
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death.
PEPITO AND RESPONDENT NORMA BADAYOG GOT MARRIED WITHOUT ANY
MARRIAGE LICENSE. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11,
1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their fathers death, PETITIONERS FILED A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE OF PEPITO TO NORMA ALLEGING THAT THE SAID
MARRIAGE WAS VOID for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
(FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of their celebration.
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and
a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that THERE MUST BE A JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect.
Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
2. RP V. Dayot
Herein respondent Jose Dayot has been married with Felisa at the Pasay City Hall sans a valid marriage
license with the supporting affidavit that they have lived together as husband and wife for 5 years.
(1986)
After, he has filed a complaint seeking the nullification for reasons that he did not sign the affidavit
mentioned, and that the consent he has given was obtained through fraud (signed the marriage contract
because he told that he was threatened to be killed by the brother of Felisa)
On the other hand, Felisa defended their marriage as valid. ; Subsequently, Rufina, whose marriage with
Jose is still subsisting upon the marriage of the latter with Felisa, filed an admin case against him.
RTC ruled in favor of the Felisa but then reversed by CA- Void ab initio
Court ruled according to the invalidity of the marriage since the affidavit they have instituted was
prepared so EVEN WITHOUT 5 year period contemplated in Art 76 of the Civil Code.
Also, he did not come to the come to the court with clean hands as because he wanted to nullify the
subsequent marriage to prevent Rufina from suing him of bigamy.
VIOD AND VOIDABLE MARRAIGES:

LAWS INVOLVED:
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority
to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or
her own spouse. (82)
CASES:
1. Enrico V. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli
Herein petitioners seek to nullify the marriage of their father Eulogio Medinaceli and Lolita
Enrico since that the mentioned had their marriage without a valid marriage licence. The herein
petitioners are the heirs and children of Eulogio with Trinidad who had their marriage prior the
one being petitioned to be nullified in this case.
Lolita said that they have cohabited for at least 21 years openly and publicly and that there is no
need for a valid marriage license to contract to one. Also, the marriage happened in 2005, that
which, that Family Code shall rule on the issue. This is in relation to the Rules of Court
promulgated by the SC to the effect of scope and persons who may file for the declaration of
nullity of marriages.
AM No. 02-11-10 of the Supreme Court (2003) clearly states that marriages contracted during
the effectivity of the Family code shall be governed by this rule and that ONLY the spouses
could file the petition for the same; Reliance on Ninal of the respondents couldnt be held on this
matter.
2. Dino V. Dino
Alain Dino (petitioner) and Maria Caridad Dino (respondent) were childhood sweethearts who
started living together from 1984 to 1994 (til they separated). In 1996, they again lived together
and got married.

On May of 2001, petitioner filed for declaration of nullity of Marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity against respondent; who before such petition went to the United States
and was therefore naturalized and obtained absolute decree of divorce.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared the marriage void from the beginning and with
conditions that such declaration must be issued only after the liquidation of absolute community
of property.
Petitioner asked for reconsideration since Arts. 50 and 51 must not apply to the case at bar since
the grounds for nullity of marriage is under art. 36. RTC partially granted the reconsideration
and modified its earlier decision stating that such declaration may push through only upon
liquidation as stated in Art. 147.
Court ruled favouring the petitioner and said that CA erred in declaring that promulgation of
such nullity of marriage must proceed only after such liquidation of properties.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
CASES:
1. Santos V. CA
Herein petitioner Leouel Santos hopes to have his marriage with Julia Bedia-Santos annulled on
grounds of Psychological incapacity.
20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived
with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia
gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not
last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by
Julia's parents
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse. Seven
months after, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did.
When Leouel got the chance to go to the USA for his training program, he looked for his wife
but never found her.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding
Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1),
who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized BY (A) GRAVITY, (B)
JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE, AND (C) INCURABILITY. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Court ruled that mere abandonment and/or other claims of Leouel that Julia is psychologically
incapacitated with everything they have experienced do not constitute psychological incapacity,
or does not even measure to its true imposition. Court said Undeniably and understandably,
Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor
society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
2. RP V. CA and Molina
Roridel Molina, Herein respondent, has initially filed for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage with Reynaldo Molina invoking art. 36.
According to her, Reynaldo has shown immaturity and irresponsibility after their marriage

(jobless, squandered money, all time with friends) After losing job, he went back to his parents
in baguio and abandoned his family ; this was one of Roridels claims of psych incapacities of
Reynaldo. Since then, Roridel has been the breadwinner of the family.
RTC rendered decision in favor of Roridel; which was then reinstated by CA.
Solicitor General intervened by assailing that CA erred in interpretation of art. 36
Court favoured RP. As for the earlier case of Santos, mere physical and character
irreconcilabilities are not grounds for art. 36. The claims of respondent herein are not constituent
of the JIG.
Aside from that, Court has furnished a set of requirements as for the ratiocination and invocation
of Art. 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar (BRJIGEMP):
(1.) The burden of proof of nullity belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in the continuance of the marriage and against its invalidity
(2.) Root cause of psych incapacity must be proved: a. Medically/clinically identified b.
Alleged in the information c. Suffieciently proved by experts d. Clearly explained in the
decision
(3.) Juridical Antecedence (such incapacity must be present at the time of the celebration
of the marriage or even before so and that the manifestations only became evident after
the celebration of the said marriage
(4.) That such incapacity is incurable, or if it is, they are beyond the means of the parties
involved
(5.)That such incapacity is so GRAVE that it deprived a party to discern or even know
the essential marital obligations
(6.) That those essential marital obligations must be that of provided in articles 68-71 of
the Family Code and those that pertain to parents and children support.
(7.) The interpretation of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
church is to be respected , but not binding, in the courts.
(8.) And in such cases involving invocation of Art. 36, the trial court shall order the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal to investigate if there is collusion between parties and if the
evidences were fabricated and to order the solicitor general to appear before the state (to
comment favourably or not according to the decisions)

3. Chi Ming Tsoi V. CA

Herein petitioner hopes to save his marriage with Gina Tsoi as the latter has filed for the
declaration of the nullity of their marriage in grounds of psychological incapacity as approved
by CA.
The herein respondent has, after merely 10 months of living together as married couple, never
had any sexual intercourse (after marriage, in baguio and the rest of the 10 months they lived
together). This has made them consult medical experts from which it was deduced that petitioner
is capable of having hard-on but neglected his obligation.
Court has approved the CA decision as such that in this case, the actuation of the herein
petitioner is so grave to have it constitute PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
4. Marcos V. Marcos
Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on,
he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos
Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary
Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought
a discharge from the military service.
Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.

As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of
her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he WOULD HIT AND BEAT
HER. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness.
The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
CA dismissed the case as they both the parties did not submit themselves for medical assessment
but the COURT ruled and agreed with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE she presented does not show
such incapacity.
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition.
However, although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material
support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of
his acts DOES NOT LEAD to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA,respondents.
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in
the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner
Roberto Domingo.
unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage
is VALID AND STILL EXISTING; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for BIGAMY...
She has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation...
She discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he had been
disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent...

The petition prayed:

That a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties;
Their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect;
and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of
their void marriage
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated NO CAUSE OF ACTION. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and
unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real
and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
RULING OF COURT: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated
while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such,
it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, MARRIES AGAIN. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.
AS REGARDS THE NECESSITY FOR A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE, PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE SAME CAN BE MAINTAINED ONLY IF IT IS FOR
THE PURPOSE OF REMARRIAGE. FAILURE TO ALLEGE THIS PURPOSE, ACCORDING TO
PETITIONER'S THEORY, WILL WARRANT DISMISSAL OF THE SAME.
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer FOR SEPARATION OF
PROPERTY will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that PURPOSE IS BASELESS. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the SEPARATION OF
PROPERTY ACCORDING TO THE REGIME OF PROPERTY RELATIONS GOVERNING THEM. It
stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise
clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without

said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second
marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
... an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his
first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
RULING OF COURT:
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to PREVENT HIS PROSECUTION FOR
BIGAMY. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. PER
CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE, A MARRIAGE THOUGH VOID STILL NEEDS A JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF SUCH FACT BEFORE ANY PARTY CAN MARRY AGAIN; OTHERWISE THE
SECOND MARRIAGE WILL ALSO BE VOID. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is PRESUMED TO BE SUBSISTING. In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner.20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY
proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN,
respondent.
Accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City
Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court
against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case... accused filed an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva

RULING OF COURT: In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet
no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
...that he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To
repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in
the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent
victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to
doubt said testimonies.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the
consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth
[would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed
damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in
Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P.
Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On
April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160, praying
that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license
when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna
Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had
not been issued.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was
contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at
Rosario, Cavite.
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO in its decision dated November 4, 1991.
Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS
DECISION. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be
secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and
defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of P15,000.00
to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?
RULING OF COURT: Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendozaand Aragon. The
first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. IN THIS CASE, THEREFORE, WE
CONCLUDE THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SECOND MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER IS VALID.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no
express provision to that effect.
In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally,
we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private respondents deceit
and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus,
coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the
marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this
matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed petitioner
but they lacked a marriage license. INDEED WE FIND THERE WAS A MARRIAGE LICENSE, though it
was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the
church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage.
In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for
a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this
license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use
thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage...
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but
for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a
baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a

SITUATION WHERE THE HUSBAND PAYS THE WIFE DAMAGES FROM CONJUGAL OR
COMMON FUNDS.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996
and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty
and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award
of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye
Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between
the two Susans whom he married.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted TWO MARRIAGES, the first was
on June 20, 1969, with PETITIONER SUSAN NICDAO CARIO with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with RESPONDENT SUSAN
YEE CARIO, with whom he had NO CHILDREN in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back
in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT FILED CLAIMS FOR MONETARY BENEFITS and
financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao
was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pagibig,[3] while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS).
She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it
only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license.
1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;
[5] and
2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
RULING OF COURT: In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM THE LICENSE
REQUIREMENT. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having
been solemnized WITHOUT THE NECESSARY MARRIAGE LICENSE, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The
fact remains that their marriage was solemnized WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING A JUDICIAL
DECREE declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, THE
MARRIAGE OF RESPONDENT SUSAN YEE AND THE DECEASED IS, LIKEWISE, VOID AB
INITIO.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by
the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said
that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are
not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no
right whatsoever to claim the same. BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION, THE SAID DEATH BENEFITS
OF THE DECEASED SHALL PASS TO HIS LEGAL HEIRS. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of
the deceased is not one of them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay
respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
JARILLO V. RP
In the Decision dated September 29, 2009, the COURT AFFIRMED PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR
BIGAMY. Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since petitioner's marriages
were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the
Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
RULING OF COURT: Petitioner's argument lacks merit.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.,[3] the Court already made the declaration that Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself
provides that said CODE SHALL HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT INSOFAR AS IT DOES NOT
PREJUDICE OR IMPAIR VESTED OR ACQUIRED RIGHTs.
The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and this, the Court shall never sanction.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner's asseveration, that Article 40 of the Family Code should not be applied to her
case, cannot be upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 11, 2009 is DENIED
with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of theCivil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10,
a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of
the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition (Provincial Prosecutor)

that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,"
attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent
the law on marriage

On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker (he met in a Bar in England) in San Jose,
Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment
contract as a seaman and LEFT HIS WIFE WITH HIS PARENTS IN SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet
Monica had given birth to his son (and eventually left). He asked permission to leave, which was then granted
(ship).
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England
proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road,
Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, WERE ALL
RETURNED TO HIM. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of
Janet Monica.
He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco...respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica
never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to

dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she
(Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December
1982 for England.
The trial court GRANTED NOLASCO'S PETITION in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988.
The REPUBLIC APPEALED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there
existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, holding that respondent had
sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
RULING OF COURT:
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's
departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another
seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her
personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his
failure to locate her.
Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their
friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short
his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9)
months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally
reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, cLAIMED HE MARRIED JANET MONICA PARKER WITHOUT INQUIRING
ABOUT HER PARENTS AND THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain
why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to
find his wife.
In fine, RESPONDENT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE HAD THE WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF

required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's
decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value
of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein RESPONDENT MARIETTA CALISTERIO.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds
on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having
priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein PETITIONER ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, a surviving sister of
Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT MARIETTA
ESPINOSA CALISTERIO BEING ALLEGEDLY BIGAMOUS and thereby NULL AND VOID. She
prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been
settled.
Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and
respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now
assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a
new one entered declaring as follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
XXX
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, prompting her to
interpose the present appeal.
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased Teodorico
and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.

RULING OF COURT: Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the
New Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
UNTIL DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY A COMPETENT COURT."
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second
marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during
the regime of the Civil Code, SHOULD THUS BE DEEMED VALID NOTWITHSTANDING THE
ABSENCE OF A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF JAMES BOUNDS.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another
property regime between the spouses, PERTAINS TO THEM IN COMMON. Upon its dissolution with the
death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the
surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED
except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner
are likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion
of her own children. No costs.
MANUEL V. PEOPLE
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then
previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and WITHOUT the said marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the
existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City
sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was
then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to
Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas
resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring her that he was single. EDUARDO EVEN BROUGHT HIS PARENTS TO BAGUIO CITY TO
MEET TINAS PARENTS, AND WAS ASSURED BY THEM THAT THEIR SON WAS STILL SINGLE.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they
were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started
making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she
asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes,
left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSOcertified copy of the marriage contract.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous
marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in
order until this one time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he
believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid.
Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no
longer valid because he HAD NOT HEARD FROM RUBYLUS FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS.
THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared
that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even
if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when
he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained
that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no
longer subsisted.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance on
the Courts ruling in United States v. Enriquez[13] were MISPLACED; what is applicable is Article 41 of
the Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code.
... BIGAMY IS AN OFFENSE AGAINST THE STATE AND NOT JUST AGAINST THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and
sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA RENDERED JUDGMENT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE RTC
WITH MODIFICATION AS TO THE PENALTY OF THE ACCUSED. It ruled that the prosecution was
able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been absent for 21 years since 1975; under
Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is
still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to
the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.

RULING OF COURT: The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been
legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage.[
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such
marriage WAS NOT JUDICIALLY DECLARED A NULLITY; hence, the MARRIAGE IS PRESUMED
TO SUBSIST.[36] The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996,
long AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution
for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW IS NOT AN EXCUSE BECAUSE EVERYONE IS PRESUMED TO KNOW THE LAW. Ignorantia
legis neminem excusat.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article
390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must INSTITUTE SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse.
An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury,
whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable
act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the
offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the
PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FOR MORAL DAMAGES under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he
maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, changed her status from a
single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have
married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, BEING BOUND TO A MAN WHO IT TURNED

OUT WAS NOT HER LAWFUL HUSBAND.[

The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the
family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral
damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RP V. CA
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar,
Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A. Julaton.
the court set the petition for hearing on May 30, 2001 at 8:30 a.m. and directed that a copy of the said order be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in the Samar Reporter, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Province of Samar, and that a copy be posted in the courts bulletin board for at least three
weeks before the next scheduled hearing.
The court also directed that copies of the order be served on the Solicitor General, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Samar, and Alan, through counsel, and that copies be sent to Lea by registered mail. Alan complied with all
the foregoing jurisdictional requirements.
On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Motion to Dismiss[3] the petition, which was, however, denied by the court for failure to comply with Rule 15
of the Rules of Court.

He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would be better for her to go back to her
parents.[6] Lea did not reply.
when he reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later
in the day, Lea was nowhere to be found.
he went to the house of Leas parents to see if she was there, but he was told that she was not there
He also went to the house of Leas friend, Janeth Bautista
Alan sought the help of Barangay Captain Juan Magat, who promised to help him locate his wife.
town fiesta of Catbalogan
He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth, Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was,
Janeth told him that she had not seen her
Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but
still to no avail.
Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station.
Alan also reported Leas disappearance to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on July 9, 2001.[

On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, petitioners absent spouse ROSALIA JULATON is hereby
declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD for the purpose of the petitioners subsequent marriage under Article 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.
The OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CAs decision alleging that respondent Alan B. Alegro
failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that Lea was already dead.
RULING OF COURT: The petition is meritorious.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a WELLFOUNDED BELIEF THAT THE ABSENT SPOUSE IS ALREADY DEAD before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief.
What is so worrisome is that, the respondent failed to MAKE INQUIRIES FROM HIS PARENTS-INLAW regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced the
credibility of the respondent had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Leas whereabouts
considering that Leas FATHER WAS THE OWNER OF RADIO DYMS.
The respondent did report and seek the help of the local police authorities and the NBI to locate Lea, BUT
IT WAS ONLY AN AFTERTHOUGHT. He did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition
in the RTC.
In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief,
before he filed his petition in the RTC, that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 73749 is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, is ORDERED to DISMISS the respondents petition.
SO ORDERED.
SSS V. DE BAILON
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona,
Sorsogon.
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Sorsogon a petition [7] to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,[8] the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of
the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared
to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,000[12] by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits[13] which was also granted by the
SSS on April 6, 1998.

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested
before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted
three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with
respondent, ALL OF WHOM ARE STILL ALIVE; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailons medical
and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are
spurious.
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of Aliz
P. Diaz, filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons death,[17] he further attesting in
a sworn statement[18] that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children[19] subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailons beneficiaries
before the SSS.
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund
of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits.
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,[22] advised respondent that as Cecilia
and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,[23] the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage
with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the
December 10, 1970 CFI ORDER DECLARING ALICE PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD DID NOT BECOME
FINAL,
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,[26] maintained the denial of her claim for
and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not deprived of
her right to file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition[27] against the SSS before the SSC for the RESTORATION to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000
representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings forcibly and
coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake.
After the SSS filed its Answer[29] to respondents petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit[30] dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting
that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare
her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she having
stayed at her parents residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an
extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC FOUND THAT THE MARRIAGE OF RESPONDENT TO
BAILON WAS VOID.
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration[34] having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition
for review[35] before the Court of Appeals (CA).

By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003
Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her.
RULING OF COURT: That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage,
benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, IT CANNOT REVIEW,
MUCH LESS REVERSE, DECISIONS RENDERED BY COURTS OF LAW as it did in the case at bar
when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently
disregarded the same, making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alices marriage on
the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the
Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code.
Article 83 of the Civil Code[43] provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, ALICE HAD BEEN ABSENT FOR 15 CONSECUTIVE YEARS
when BAILON SOUGHT THE DECLARATION OF HER PRESUMPTIVE DEATH, which JUDICIAL
DECLARATION WAS NOT EVEN a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.
IF THE ABSENTEE REAPPEARS, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the
subsequent marriage, WILL NOT TERMINATE SUCH MARRIAGE.[50] Since the second marriage has
been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally
an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents marriage
prior to the formers death in 1998, RESPONDENT IS RIGHTFULLY THE DEPENDENT SPOUSEBENEFICIARY OF BAILON.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELITA VALDEZ V. RP
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth
to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because the latter

was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling.
Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.[3] Subsequently,
however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security
was denied because petitioners marriage to Sofio was subsisting.
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The
RTC held that Angelita was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was
already dead.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies in this case
and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long before
the Family Code took effect.
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended that the Court
set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The OSG
argues that the requirement of well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case.
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state that we are denying
the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, of if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
It held that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law.
RULING OF COURT: In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the
presumption of Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by
operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their
marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief
will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to
achieve.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over
but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be
incurable.

ALCAZAR V. ALCAZAR
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto
G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five
days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds
went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad
Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, RESPONDENT LEFT FOR RIYADH, KINGDOM
OF SAUDI ARABIA, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh,
respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent
for FIVE TIMES but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a
co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her.
Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for ANNULMENT OF THEIR MARRIAGE PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 5,
ARTICLE 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of
reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical
PSYCHOLOGIST NEDY L. TAYAG (TAYAG) as witnesses.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder
clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long
lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners Complaint for annulment of her
marriage to respondent.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove
respondents psychological incapacity. Other than petitioners bare allegations, no other evidence was
presented to prove respondents personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATONS.
RULING OF COURT: At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before
the RTC was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.[16] Incapacity to consummate denotes
the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.
There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling
petitioners marriage to respondent. Petitioners Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented by
petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latters psychological incapacity
to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the FILING OF THE ERRONEOUS COMPLAINT BEFORE THE RTC TO HER
FORMER COUNSELS MISTAKE OR GROSS IGNORANCE.[19] But even said reason cannot save
petitioners Complaint from dismissal.
Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies, merely established that respondent left
petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a
year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad.
THESE TESTIMONIES THOUGH DO NOT GIVE US MUCH INSIGHT INTO RESPONDENTS
PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE.
Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioners cause. It must be
noted that TAYAG WAS NOT ABLE TO PERSONALLY EXAMINE RESPONDENT. Respondent did not
appear for examination despite Tayags invitation.[25] Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state,
had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and
thorough in her evaluation of respondents psychological condition, SINCE HER SOURCE OF
INFORMATION, NAMELY, PETITIONER, WAS HARDLY IMPARTIAL.
We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a
marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.[34]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint inCivil
Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the
preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the
time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent
Conchita Delizo.
...was based on the GROUND OF FRAUD, it being alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita
Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein PETITIONER FERNANDO
AQUINO, on December 27, 1954, CONCEALED FROM THE LATTER THAT FACT THAT SHE WAS
PREGNANT BY ANOTHER MAN, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful
wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
Through a verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the
certificates of birth and delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents,
according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru EXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE. The petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the COURT OF APPEALS, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's
inability to present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a
quo erred in denying the motion for reception of additional evidence.
... and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant
when he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT.

RULING OF COURT: After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's
abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the
abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower
part of the abdomen.
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual
intercourse before they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is
purely conjectural and finds no support or justification in the record.
The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because
defendant failed to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of
collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered to represent the Government precisely to prevent
such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes, the same can best be
determined only after hearing evidence.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial.
Without costs.
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant, vs.. Luida MANGONON OF BUCCAT, defendantappellee.
The applicant seeks the annulment of her marriage with the defendant been Luida Buccat Mangonon of the
November 26, 1938 in Baguio City on the grounds that, in consenting to the marriage, he did so because the
defendant had assured him that she was virgin.
On 26 November the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in the Catholic catedrla Baguio City.
Desoues of living maritally for about eighty-nine days, the defendant gave birth to a child of nine months,
the February 23, 1939. As a result of this event, the defendant abandoned plaintiff and did not return to
do her marital life.
We do not see any reason to overturn the original ruling. Indeed, it is improbable the plaintiff and appellant's
allegation that the suspect had not even gravido status of the defendant, being this, as is proved, very advanced
in pregnant condition. So it is not necessary to estimate the fraud who speaks the appellant.
Finding the original ruling consistent with the law, should be confirmed, as it hereby confirm it, in its entirety,
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is NOT FABRICATED OR SUPPRESSED.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, NO JUDGMENT SHALL BE BASED UPON A

STIPULATION OF FACTS OR CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. (88A)

CASE:
RP V. IYOY
Procedural History:
This case is a petition for review by the RP represented by OSG on certiorari praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA
affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus and Fely Iyoy null and void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines.
Facts:
Crasus and Fely Iyoy married on December 16, 1961 which they had five children. In 1984, Fely went to the United States and at
the same year sent divorce papers to Crasus asking the latter to sign them. In 1985, Crasus found out that Fely married an American
Citizen named Stephen Micklus and eventually bore him a child.
Fely went back to the Philippines occasionally, including once when she attended the marriage of one of her children where she
freely used the surname of her second husband in the invitations.
On March 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity in their marriage in the ground of psychological incapacity since
Fely unambiguously brought danger and dishonor to the family.
Fely however filed a counterclaim and avouched therein that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, and jobless, the reason forced
the former to left for the United States. Furthermore, Fely argued her marriage to Stephen Micklus valid since she
s already an American Citizen and therefore not covered by our laws.
Issue:
I.

Whether or not the abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

No since the evidences presented by the respondent failed to prove psychological incapacity as the Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES,
CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES, EMOTIONAL IMMATURITY ANDIRRESPONSIBILITY, PHYSICAL ABUSE,
HABITUAL ALCOHOLISM, SEXUAL INFIDELITY OR PERVERSION, AND ABANDONMENT, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article
II.

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which
she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino
spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III
The SOLICITOR GENERAL is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking ARTICLE 48 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT CRASUS
ARGUED THAT ONLY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY OR FISCAL ASSIGNED TO THE RTC MAY
INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF THE STATE IN PROCEEDINGS FOR ANNULMENT OR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGES; HENCE, THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL HAD NO PERSONALITY TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION ON BEHALF OF THE
STATE. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the SOLICITOR GENERAL AS THE
PRINCIPAL LAW OFFICER AND LEGAL DEFENDER OF THE GOVERNMENT .[33] His Office is
tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring
the services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the
Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such
proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the SOLICITOR GENERAL IS AUTHORIZED TO BRING OR
DEFEND ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
ONCE THE CASE IS BROUGHT BEFORE THIS COURT OR THE COURT OF APPEALS.[35]
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes
over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible
for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical
that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already
exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also
apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles
40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with
the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the
date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the
properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime. (n)
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
CASE:
VALDEZ VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during the marriage
were five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their
marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin were placed in
the custody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner
and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
Arguments:
Petitioner: Petitioner argues that:
(1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated,
(2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of
the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses
(3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the

psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129,
(4) It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.
Respondent: Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the PROPERTY
RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES ARE GOVERNED BY THE RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP (Art 147
Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
CONSIDERED AS HAVING CONTRIBUTED THERETO jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family.

LEGAL SEPARATION:
LAWS INVOLVED:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption. (9a)
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting
the ground for legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription. (100a)
Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the
cause. (102)

Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition. (103)
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the
spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. (101a)
Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately
from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a
third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator
appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
(104a)
Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply
to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children. (105a)
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not
be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of
Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the
provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the
innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a)
Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations
made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary
in any INSURANCE POLICY, EVEN IF SUCH DESIGNATION BE STIPULATED AS
IRREVOCABLE. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places
where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the
recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or
change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the
insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought WITHIN FIVE YEARS FROM THE
TIME THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION BECOME FINAL. (107a)
Art. 65. If the spouses should RECONCILE, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by
them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation. (n)
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences:

(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage;
and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, UNLESS THE
SPOUSES AGREE TO REVIVE THEIR FORMER PROPERTY REGIME.The court's order
containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. (108a)
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be
executed under oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for
legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall,
in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper
registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not
notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim.

CASES:
Pacete vs Cariaga
Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for
LEGAL SEPARATION (BETWEEN ALANIS AND PACETE), accounting and separation of property. In
her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they
had a child named Consuelo;
...that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North
Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 1979;
...that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land,
fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his
name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that Pacete ignored
overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a motion for an extension
of twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court GRANTED the
motion.
On 18 December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the defendants filed a second motion for an
extension of another thirty (30) days from 20 December 1979. On 07 January 1980, the lower court granted
the motion but only for twenty (20) days to be counted from 20 December 1979 or until 09 January 1980.
Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on 05 February 1980, again filed another motion
(dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the expiration of the 30-day
period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, or on 06 February 1980, the court

DENIED THIS LAST MOTION ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS "FILED AFTER THE ORIGINAL
PERIOD GIVEN . . . AS FIRST EXTENSION HAD EXPIRED."
Issue: Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal separation.
Ruling: Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to
possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed
intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedy, whether
principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance,
with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.
An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court
should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLASABALONES, respondents.
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties,
petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the
administration of some of their conjugal, properties for FIFTEEN YEARS.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their
children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and belonging to the
conjugal partnership.
Private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the
house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children and that they were depending for
their support on the rentals from another conjugal property, a building and lot in Forbes Park which was
on lease to Nobumichi Izumi.
In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their
conjugal properties, with FORFEITURE OF HER HUSBAND'S SHARE THEREIN BECAUSE OF HIS
ADULTERY. She also prayed that it ENJOIN the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants of
the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties.
After trial, Judge Mariano M. Umali, found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage on
October 5, 1981, with Thelma Cumareng. The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was NOT
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM HIS RESPONDENT WIFE.
This decision was appealed to the respondent court. The respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park. She alleged inter alia that he had harassed
the tenant of the Forbes Park property by informing him that his lease would not be renewed. She also
complained that the petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal properties in the United States

in favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife and children.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, GRANTED THE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION.
The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other
because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family Code
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the HUSBAND'S DECISION SHALL PREVAIL, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
He further notes that the respondent court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets as mandated
by Art. 61 of the Code, thus:
Art. 61 After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately
from each other.
The court, in the ABSENCE OF A WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SPOUSES,
SHALL DESIGNATE EITHER OF THEM OR A THIRD PERSON TO ADMINISTER THE
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY. The administrator
appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of
Court.
RULING OF COURT: We agree with THE RESPONDENT COURT that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife
to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the
hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution of the
appeal.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in
the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals
when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things
subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff
respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit.
In her motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the respondent wife alleged that the petitioner's
harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of
the income therefrom on which they depend for their subsistence. The private respondent also complained
that on June 10, 1991, the petitioner executed a quitclaim over their conjugal property in Apple Valley, San
Bernardino, California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma Cumareng, to improve his paramour's luxurious lifestyle to
the prejudice of his legitimate family.
These allegations, none of which was refuted by the husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect
the interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has NOT PERMANENTLY INSTALLED the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the
properties in the meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the
administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. It is so ordered.

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S.
GANDIONCO, respondents.
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, on the GROUND OF
CONCUBINAGE, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a
complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October 1986 as CRIMINAL
CASE
On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision
in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The
respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE.
ISSUE 1: Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto,
such as, application for support pendente lite, SHOULD BE SUSPENDED IN VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL
CASE FOR CONCUBINAGE filed against him the private respondent. In support of his contention,
petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the
civil action to ENFORCE THE CIVIL LIABILITY arising from the offense as contemplated in the first
Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same
offense SHALL BE SUSPENDED, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered.
The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil
action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all proceedings
related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the
criminal case.
RULING OF COURT 1: Petitioner's contention is not correct.
Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action;
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)

The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to be suspended, with
or upon the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense".
In other words, in view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, MAY PROCEED AHEAD OF, OR SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such
civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as,
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from
inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil actions to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule
111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111,
(1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."
As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the
conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles 7 to
108, of the Civil Code."
ISSUE 2: Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the
action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged
offense of concubinage.
RULING OF COURT 2: decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. 3 NO CRIMINAL PROCEEDING OR
CONVICTION IS NECESSARY.
ISSUE 3: Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, as the grant of
supportpendente lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by the petitioner as
a disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing the respondent Judge's alleged manifest
partiality to private respondent.
RULING OF COURT 3: Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge
hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to
disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in this
case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's motions to be sound and well-taken.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ,
petitioner-appellant,vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY,
respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L.,J.:
DOCTRINE:
An action for legal separation is purely personal. Being personal in character, the DEATH OF ONE
PARTY TO THE ACTION CAUSES THE DEATH OF THE ACTION ITSELF.The right to the dissolution

of the conjugal partnership of gains, the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits
earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the
innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by
the innocent one,are all rights and disabilities that are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses and
by their nature, such claims and disabilities are not assignable or transmissible.
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio . She alleged that they
were married civilly on 9/21/1934 and had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943when her
husband abandoned her. They had no child.
She prayed for the issuance of a decree which would order defendant Eufemio to be deprived of his share
of the conjugal partnership profits
EUFEMIO alleged affirmative and special defenses and counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity
ab initio o f h i s m a r r i a g e w i t h C a r m e n
b e c a u s e o f h i s p r i o r a n d s u b s i s t i n g m a r r i a g e , celebrated according to Chinese law and customs,
with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
During trial, petitioner CARMEN DIED IN A VEHICULAR ACCIDENT on May 1969.
Eufemio moved to DISMISS THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION ON 2 GROUNDS that the:
(1) petition for legal separation was filed beyond the 1-year period provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code; and
(b)death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz
Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
The court dismissed the case and stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be
resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved
in the negative.
Petitioner filed a petitioner for
r e v i e w o f t h e o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l , b u t t h e o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l w a s affirmed.
ISSUES:
Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate theaction? YES
RULING: An action for legal separation involves nothing more than the bed-andboard separation of thespouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes in
Article 100 allows only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation and in
Article 108 ,by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of
oneparty to the action causes the death of the action itself.
Changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree
of legal separation. Hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree

AN ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION IS ABATED BY THE DEATH OF THE PLAINTIFF, even i
f property rights areinvolved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.
Regarding Eufemios petition for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no
further interest in CONTINUING THE SAME AFTER HER DEMISE, THAT
AUTOMATICALLY DISSOLVED THE QUESTIONED UNION
KIAM V. ONG
Ong Eng Kiam, AKA William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at
the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now
all of the age of majority.
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family
Code[4] alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly
abusive conduct.[5]
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with
physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like putang ina mo, gago,
tanga, and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her
whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or
their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle
of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box
her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go
to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, it is none of your business;
On December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and
William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and
she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave
the house; she then went to her sisters house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and
brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parents doctor, Dr. Vicente
Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.[6]
William for his part DENIED that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against
her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt.
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby RENDERED DECREEING THE LEGAL
SEPARATION OF PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT, WITH ALL THE LEGAL EFFECTS
ATTENDANT THERETO, PARTICULARLY THE DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES, for which purpose the parties are hereby ordered
to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division,
such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated October 8, 2001, the

CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation
under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against
Lucita, were adequately proven.
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR
EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL
AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE SAME TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR
EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE
AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.[13]
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,[16] as well as a Memorandum where he averred
for the first time that SINCE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT, THE PETITION FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION SHOULD BE DENIED FOLLOWING ART. 56, PAR. (4) OF THE FAMILY
CODE.[17] Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning
the family simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed
in the administration of petitioners in-laws, NO DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION SHOULD BE
ISSUED IN HER FAVOR.
RULING OF COURT: We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In
such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of
the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by
filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could control the properties he worked hard
for.
As aptly stated by the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts
of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is
already beyond her endurance.
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wifebeater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his
reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave
Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel
with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for
not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal
separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment

referred to by the Family Code is abandonment WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE for more than one year.
[40] As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute
abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
LUIS MA. ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, as judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI and EMMA BENITEZ ARANETA, Respondents
The main action was brought by Petitioner against his wife, one of the Respondent herein, for legal separation
on the GROUND OF ADULTERY.
After the issues were joined Defendant therein filed an OMNIBUS PETITION to secure
custody of their three minor children,
a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport,
to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her,
and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action.
Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that Defendant had
abandoned the children;
alleging that conjugal properties were worth only P80,000, not one million pesos as alleged by
Defendant; denying the taking of her passport or the supposed vexation, and contesting her right to
attorneys fees.
Plaintiff prayed that as the petition for custody and support cannot be determined without evidence, the
parties be REQUIRED TO SUBMIT THEIR RESPECTIVE EVIDENCE. He also contended that
Defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she had abandoned them and had committed adultery,
that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children.
As to the claim for support, Plaintiff claims that there are no conjugal assets and she is not entitled to
support because of her infidelity and that she was able to support herself.
The Respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition.
Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari against said
order and for mandamus to compel the Respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before
deciding the omnibus petition.
RULING OF COURT: We granted a writ of preliminary injunction against the order.
The main reason given by the judge, for refusing Plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced
on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition.
It may be noted that since more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition the question
offered may not be allowed. It is, however, believed that the reasons for granting the preliminary injunction
should be given that the scope of the article cited may be explained.
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a
COOLING OFF PERIOD to make possible reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances
against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker

has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient,
necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the
circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the
court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in
justice may be caused.
Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to
the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, EVIDENCE NOT AFFECTING THE
CAUSE OF THE SEPARATION, LIKE THE ACTUAL CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, the means
conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these SHOULD BE ALLOWED
that the court may determine which is best for their custody.
The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to
proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion. The courts order
fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed. Without costs.
JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of ADULTERY.
The COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA DISMISSED it. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
We granted certiorari to consider the application of articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code, which for
convenience are quoted herewith:
ART. 100.The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been
no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. 101.No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a STIPULATION OF FACTS
OR BY CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.
The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it described
their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose
Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.
Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above. The fiscal
examined the defendant under oath, and then reported THERE WAS NO COLLUSION.
In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining
illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas.
Having found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June

1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said
city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952,
when defendant had finished studying her course, SHE LEFT PLAINTIFF AND SINCE THEN THEY HAD
LIVED SEPARATELY.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the
name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
RULING OF COURT 1: The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of
the defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas HAD PRESCRIBED, because his action was not filed within one
year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil Code) We must agree
with the Court of Appeals on this point.
As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the
husband upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation and
defendant readily agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court,
she reiterated her conformity to the legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual relations with
Nelson Orzame.
Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art.
101, legal separation could not be decreed. As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any
admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation
upon a confession of judgment.
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left
him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered
that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men.
Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not
have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her
husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision
and DECREE A LEGAL SEPARATION BETWEEN THESE SPOUSE, all the consequent effects. Costs of
all instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.

ANTONIO MACADANGDANG, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; HONORABLE

ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao,
16th Judicial District, Sala 1, Tagum, Davao del Norte; FILOMENA GAVIANA, MACADANGDANG;
and ROLANDO RAMA, respondents.
From the records, it appears that respondent Filomena Gaviana and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
contracted marriage in 1946. From a humble buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation in Davao
City, the spouses moved to Mawab Davao del Norte where, through hard work and good fortune, their small
business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business,
abaca stripping, real estate and others. They were blessed with six children. With their established businesses
and accumulated wealth, their once simple life became complicated and their relationship started to suffer

setbacks. BOTH ACCUSED EACH OTHER OF INDULGING IN EXTRAMARITAL RELATIONS.

Married life for them became so intolerable that they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu
for good. When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. Then
and there, she decided to take the initial action.
On April 28, 1971, private respondent (plaintiff therein) instituted a complaint for legal separation in the Court
of First Instance of Davao.
The trial court handed down its decision, the dispositive portion of which states thus:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the legal separation of plaintiff and the defendant,
xxx with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly THE DISSOLUTION AND
LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. Since there is no complete
list of the community property which has to be divided, pending the dissolution of the conjugal
property, the defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff P10,000.00 for her support, for any way he had
been disposing some of the properties or mortgaging them without sharing the plaintiff any part of the
fruits or proceeds thereof until the court can appoint an administrator, as prayed for by plaintiff in a
separate petition, who will take over the administration and management of all the conjugal
partnership properties, and act as guardian of the minor children; to protect said properties from
dissipation, and who will submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a
just division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
On October 23, 1973, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration praying therein that the orders of
September 20, 1973 and October 13, 1973 be reconsidered by not proceeding with the appointment of an
administrator of the conjugal properties of the parties [p. 137, rec].
Respondent Judge denied the aforesaid second motion for reconsideration in his order of November 19, 1973,
reiterating therein his ruling that the decree of legal separation had become final.
The COURT OF APPEALS, in its resolution of December 21, 1973, ruled that the questioned January 4, 1973
decision of the lower court had become final and, consequently, the appointment of an administrator was
valid and that the petition was not sufficient in substance, since the applicable law and jurisprudence afford the
petitioner no valid cause to impugn the three questioned orders. The appellate court accordingly dismissed the
petition.
On February 6, 1980, counsel for petitioner, through a NOTICE OF DEATH AND MOTION TO DISMISS,
informed this Court that petitioner Antonio Macadangdang died on November 30, 1979 and as a consequence
thereof, this case and Civil Case No. 109 of the Court of First Instance of Davao have BECOME MOOT AND
ACADEMIC.
In effect, private respondent agrees with petitioner's counsel that her husband's death has rendered the instant
petition moot and academic.
Issue: Did petitioner's death on November 30, 1979 render the case moot and academic?
RULING OF COURT: WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the questioned decision had not
become final and executory SINCE THE LAW EXPLICITLY AND CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR THE
DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS OF THE
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation.
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:

2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved
and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property regime of the spouses upon
finality of the decree of legal separation. SUCH DISSOLUTION AND LIQUIDATION ARE NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FINAL DECREE. This legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto
or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separationfor the purpose
of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who was declared the guilty spouse by the trial court,
before the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected, poses a new problem which can be resolved simply
by the application of the rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of the deceased
petitioner.
Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under the aforecited
provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation
became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the law governing the effects of the final
decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever
remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves details which properly
pertain to the lower court.
The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal
assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession in Special Proceedings No. 134.
WHEREFORE, THIS PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER'S
ESTATE.
TITLE III
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. (109a)
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of DISAGREEMENT, THE COURT
SHALL DECIDE.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family. (110a)
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the
income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such
obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties. (111a)
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for
such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (115a)
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend
to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for
RELIEF.(116a)
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity WITHOUT
THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper; and

(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who
has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendantappellee.
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she
perform UNCHASTE AND LASCIVIOUS ACTS ON HIS GENITAL ORGANS; that the plaintiff spurned the
obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that
the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous
demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated
the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face
and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to
desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode
and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by
General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. Upon the
termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. To this extent a
marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract.
Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may
make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines
from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the
new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the
benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable.
Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the
Philippine Islands
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of
the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and
protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile
or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife
may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home.
May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the
pension?
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897,

November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish
subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right
would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause
morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be
understood as being thereby restricted.
RULING OF COURT: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the
act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However,
this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendantappellee.

Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been married for 10 years when Dolores decided to
leave their domicile with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano thus
initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The
defendant answered that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband and
thus she filed:

A cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation,

a liquidation of conjugal partnership,

and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital
relations with him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant.

Plaintiff appealed.

Issues:

(1)

Whether or not the abandonment by the wife of the marital home was with sufficient justification

NO. IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE TALES OF CRUELTY ON THE PART OF THE HUSBAND
WERE NOT PROVEN;

(2)

Whether or not cross complaint conclusively proves that the plaintiff has forfeited his right to the
marital society of his wife.

The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized and
is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143, CC. Accordingly, where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial
abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her
separate maintenance; and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorneys fees, necessarily
incurred in enforcing such obligation. Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large
require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance
of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spousesa state which is
abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision
should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband. Facts of
the case show that the plaintiff has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and she is
under a moral and legal obligation to return to the common home and cohabit with him.

(3)

Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the wife to
return to the matrimonial home and live with him as his dutiful wife

Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient
cause and that it is her duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the PURELY PERSONAL RIGHT OF
CONSORTIUM.

Thus, that the plaintiff in this case is NOT ENTITLED TO THE UNCONDITIONAL AND ABSOLUTE
ORDER for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint.

HELD: Judgment appealed from in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that
Dolores has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is
her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-complaint.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February 1996]

FACTS:
Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins secretary, FORCIBLY
OPENED THE DRAWERS AND CABINET IN HER HUSBANDS CLINIC AND TOOK 157
DOCUMENTS consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized
FOR USE IN EVIDENCE IN A CASE FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE WHICH ZULUETA had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS AND FOR
DAMAGES against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the TRIAL
COURT RENDERED JUDGMENT FOR MARTIN, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of Martins Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to
Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees;
and to pay the costs of the suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for
review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply
even to the spouse of the aggrieved party.

HELD:
The DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed
by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
The INTIMACIES BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE DO NOT JUSTIFY ANY ONE OF THEM IN
BREAKING THE DRAWERS AND CABINETS OF THE OTHER AND IN RANSACKING THEM
FOR ANY TELLTALE EVIDENCE OF MARITAL INFIDELITY. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share
what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the

other.

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN
DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
Erlinda and Potenciano were married on July 11, 1942.They had six children.
Potenciano is a lawyer who owns extensive properties valued at millions of pesos. He was a lso the
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
After 30 years of living together, the spouses separated on the year 1972; they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium Manila and when in Baguio, at Ilusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club while Erlinda lived in Antipolo city.
On Dec. 30, 1997, Potenciano lived with Erlinda at Antipolo after his arrival from the US.
Their children alleged that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of Zoloft. She gave 200 mg instead of
the 100 mg antidepressant drug prescribed by the latters doctor in New York.
Because of the overdose, Potencianos health deteriorated.
On 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petititon for the guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latters advanced aged, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 1998, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo city after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
city. He lived in Cleveland Condo Makati.
On March 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that the respondents prevented her from visiting her husband and
preventing the latter from going home to Antipolo.
Court of Appeals denied the petition of Erlinda for writ of habeas corpus. However, the CA granted
visitation rights.
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and
the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
RULING OF COURT: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or
by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for
such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THERE WAS NO ACTUAL AND EFFECTIVE DETENTION OR
DEPRIVATION OF POTENCIANOS LIBERTY THAT WOULD JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the
right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. OTHERWISE, HE
WILL BE DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so

without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any
other process.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of
habeas corpus is denied.
Romualdez-Marcos V. COMELEC
Separate Opinions PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has
clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 WE CANNOT
DISQUALIFY HER AND TREAT HER UNALIKE, FOR THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled
in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to
school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin
and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor;
and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it
was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the
family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied) In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained
why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the
theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from
the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and
secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with
this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos
ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her MARRIAGE BY
ITSELF ALONE DID NOT CAUSE HER TO LOSE HER TACLOBAN DOMICILE. Article 110 of the
Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the
husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains
unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we
held in de la Via, 6 . . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the
acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own
independent domicile. . . . It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different
domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The
domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil
Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the
husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only

because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and
public policy. In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the
family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular
point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since
petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was NOT AFFECTED in 1959 when her
husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It
was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace,
and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member
of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the
incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her
husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any
such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own
domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what
she believes or intends." 7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former
President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two
(2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities. 8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the
wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change. I do not subscribe to this
submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient
common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified the
domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own
separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The
first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the
family unit governed by the same law." 11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased
husband is an extension of this common law concept. Xxx As the result of statutes and court decisions, a
wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister." 20 IN THE CASE AT
BENCH, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that
demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away
from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women.
XXX
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property
owned in common by the married couple EVEN IF the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner.
XXX OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO THE CASE AT BENCH is ARTICLE 69 OF THE FAMILY
CODE which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it
JOINTLY to the husband and the wife, thus: Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live
together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife

may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:

28 (2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and
they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated
his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and
at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive
control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned.The wife and the
husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. THEY ARE NOW JOINT ADMINISTRATORS OF
THE FAMILY PROPERTIES AND EXERCISE JOINT AUTHORITY OVER THE PERSONS AND
PROPERTIES OF THEIR CHILDREN. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no
longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied) In
light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated
by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of
her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been
repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to
resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by
the domiciliary determination of her dead husband. Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to
consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal protection of law. 30 It can
HARDLY BE DOUBTED THAT THE COMMON LAW IMPOSITION ON A MARRIED WOMAN OF
HER DEAD HUSBAND'S DOMICILE EVEN BEYOND HIS GRAVE IS PATENTLY
DISCRIMINATORY TO WOMEN. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the
objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with
our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it
explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men."
To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and
shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and
essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment. Prescinding
from these premises, I RESPECTFULLY SUBMIT THAT THE BETTER STANCE IS TO RULE THAT
PETITIONER REACQUIRED HER TACLOBAN DOMICILE UPON THE DEATH OF HER
HUSBAND IN 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile
DID NOT CONTINUE after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate
the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the
right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now
recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the
common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her
Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased

husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. HER HUSBAND IS DEAD AND HE CANNOT RULE
HER BEYOND THE GRAVE.
XXX she intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also
cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her
undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall
be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her. xxx xxx xxx 43. I WAS
NOT PERMITTED, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I
wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San
Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and
live there. It is then clear that in 1992 PETITIONER REESTABLISHED HER DOMICILE IN THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF LEYTE. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in
San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the
constitutional requirement of residence ". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections. The evidence presented by the private respondent to
negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed
with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that
her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's
Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a nonprejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. IN THE CASE AT BENCH, the reference is the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's
statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she
has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the
First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in
her favor. It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995
cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested
alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and
her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless
contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify
petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the
case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against
petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Ley te. XXX
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in
the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both
Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District. All these attempts to misuse our laws and
legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal
access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the
meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner
who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for
all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the

Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness. Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that
the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can
claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she
cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the
electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one
(70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833)
votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is
not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical
considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political
judgment. A final point. THE CASE AT BENCH provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the
inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the
domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and
Constitution. TO RULE THAT A MARRIED WOMAN IS ETERNALLY TETHERED TO THE
DOMICILE DICTATED BY HER DEAD HUSBAND IS TO PRESERVE THE ANACHRONISTIC AND
ANOMALOUS BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE OF A HUSBAND OVER HIS WIFE. We should not allow
the dead to govern the living even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The
Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what
has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it. I vote to grant the petition. Bellosillo and
Melo, JJ., concur.
Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured,
the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said
obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. (131a)
CASES:
BONIFACIA MATEO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. GERVASIO LAGUA, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of
his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the
couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donors name.
In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived
with the father-in-law CIPRIANO LAGUA who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first,
Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the
said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus
damages.
On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his YOUNGER SON,
herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to
petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondents name by

the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered
cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and
Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending,
CIPRIANO DIED IN 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years.
When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area
of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could
have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Ciprianos other heir, Gervacio.
The DONATION WAS THUS DECLARED INOFFICIOUS AND HEREIN PETITIONERS WERE
ORDERED TO RECONVEY TO GERVACIO A PORTION OF 494.75 SQ. M. FROM ANY
CONVENIENT PART OF THE LOTS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being
inofficious.
HELD:
Decision of CA based on UNSUPPORTED ASSUMPTIONS set aside; trial courts order of
dismissal sustained.
Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

...then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes. CERTAINLY, IN ORDER THAT A DONATION MAY BE
REDUCED FOR BEING INOFFICIOUS, THERE MUST BE PROOF THAT THE VALUE OF THE
DONATED PROPERTY EXCEEDS THAT OF THE DISPOSABLE FREE PORTION PLUS THE
DONEES SHARE AS LEGITIME IN THE PROPERTIES OF THE DONOR. In the present case, it can
hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness
of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the
respondents.

Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be VOID, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give
each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (133a)
CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse,

herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or SIX YEARS AFTER
THE DEED of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, FELIX DIED.
Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her
in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon.
The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation WAS VALID inasmuch as it was made at the time
when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law
relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a DONATION BETWEEN THE SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
REQUIRES THAT THE SAME PROHIBITION SHOULD APPLY TO A COMMON-LAW
RELATIONSHIP.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having
exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the
surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
MERCEDES CALIMLIM- CANULLAS, petitioner, vs. HON. WILLELMO FORTUN, Judge, Court of
First instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, and CORAZON DAGUINES, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas and Fernando Canullas were married in 1962, with 5 children, and
were living on a house situated on a land inherited by the latter.
In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family and lived with Corazon Daguines.
In 1980, Fernando sold the house and lot to Daguines, who initiated a complaint for quieting of title.
Mercedes resisted, claiming that the house and lot were CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, and the sale was null
and void for she had not consented thereto.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of the husband ipso
facto gave the land the character of conjugal property
(2) Whether or not the sale of the lot together with the house and improvements thereon was valid under the
circumstances surrounding the transaction
Held:
(1) The determination of the first issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to the second paragraph
of Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of
the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse
who owns the same.
Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership BUT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
IS INDEBTED TO THE HUSBAND FOR THE VALUE OF THE LAND. The spouse owning the lot
becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES
since MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale.
(2) The contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was
made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home
where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the
stability of the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
The law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to certain exceptions.
Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because:
a.) If transfers or con conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the
system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law.
b.) It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well
as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law.
c.) The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage, otherwise,
"the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union."
Those provisions are dictated by public interest and their criterion must be imposed upon the wig of the parties.

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C.

TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA,
RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located

at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. ZOSIMA DIED
in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the LATTER WAIVED HER SHARE CONSISTING OF OF THE PROPERTY IN
FAVOR OF FRANCISCO.
Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked:
Leticia, his niece,
Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and
CIRILA ARCABA, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Franciscos house as well
as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room.
On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila
was his mistress.
However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the masters bedroom when
Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with
Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco
who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was
provided with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified
that Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos where he
ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same.
THE LARGER PORTION OF 268 SQ M. WAS LEFT UNDER HIS NAME. This was made in
consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty. Lacaya notarized the deed and was later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and
assessed value of P28,550. THE DECEDENTS NEPHEWS AND NIECES AND HIS HEIRS BY
INTESTATE SUCCESSION ALLEGED THAT CIRILA WAS THE COMMON-LAW WIFE OF
FRANCISCO.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a SUFFICIENT PROOF OF COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP wherein
donation is not valid.
The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of
Cirila Comille such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may
no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding
themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, THE DEED OF DONATION BY FRANCISCO IN FAVOR OF CIRILA IS VOID UNDER ART.
87 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which
shall be divided EQUALLY BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE, UNLESS a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
SOICHI V. GOZON ET. AL.

Procedural History
There are of two separate petitions for review assailing the 7 July 2005 Decision and the 30 September 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447. The property involved in this case is a 30,000
sq. meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 5357 located in Malabon, Metro Manila. It is REGISTERED
UNDER THE NAME OF ALFREDO GOZON, who is MARRIED TO ELVIRA GOZON.
Statement of Facts
On August 31, 1993, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell the property. At
that time, Elviras filed petition for legal separation as well as a notice of lis pendens, annotated with TCT
No. 535, were still pending at the Cavite City Regional Trial Court (Cavite RTC).
Mario demanded an affidavit to be executed by Elvira, which in effect would ESTABLISH THAT THE
PROPERTY IS AN EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION of Alberto and that it should be excluded from their
conjugal property. Nonetheless, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations and Mario proceeded with
paying P5 Million earnest money as partial payment. After the payment, HE TOOK POSSESSION OF
THE LAND in September 1993.
Consequently, the CAVITE RTC UPON THE JUDGMENT RENDERED DECREEING THEIR LEGAL
SEPARATION also held that the property is DEEMED CONJUGAL PROPERTY.
On August 22, 1994 Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favor of their daughter
Winifred Gozon.

On October 26, 1994, Alfredo by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred,
SOLD THE PROPERTY TO INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC. (IDRI) FOR P18 MILLION. The
company paid in full thereafter.
Mario then filed with the Malabon Regional Trial Court a complaint for Specific Performance and Damages,
Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibition Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order. The rendered judgment of Malabon RTC integrated that enjoining defendants
should respect plaintiffs possession of the property, that the DEED OF DONATION entered into by and
between Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon is NULL AND VOID along with actual and compensatory
damages for the plaintiff (Mario) and for Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Malabon RTCs decision but with modification as follows; that
sale of the subject land by defendant Alfred Gozon to plaintiff-appellant Siochi is NULL AND VOID
because the conveyance was done WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ELVIRA GOZON, that Alfredo Gozons one-half undivided share is forfeited in favor of his daughter
Winifred Gozon by virtue of legal separation and that defendants Alfredo and Winifred must pay the pro-rated
moral and exemplary damages.

Issue
1. Whether or not Marios Agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Plaintiff prays for the court to direct Alfredo and
Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale.
2. On the side of IDRI, whether or not the court should uphold the validity of IDRIs TCT No. M-10976 over
the property since it is a buyer in good faith.
Answer
1. NO, Marios Agreement should not be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse.
2. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith.

Reasoning
Since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is
the Family Code. Article 124 of the Family Code elaborates:

The essence that in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance WHICH MUST HAVE THE
AUTHORITY OF THE COURT OR THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER Spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

The court ruled that the ABSENCE OF THE CONSENT OF ONE OF THE SPOUSE RENDERS THE
ENTIRE SALE VOID, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted
the sale. With regards to Marios contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
Elviras acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by
Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.

As found by the RTC of Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
FACTS and circumstances which should impel a cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendors
title to the property. Thus IDRI could not feign ignorance of the Cavite RTC decision declaring the property as
conjugal.
Thus, among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and
liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the NET PROFITS earned by the
conjugal partnership. IT IS ONLY ALFREDOS SHARE IN THE NET PROFITS WHICH IS
FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF WINIFRED.
Article 102(4) of the Family Code provides that
[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2)
and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.
Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal partnership property but
MERELY IN THE NET PROFITS of the conjugal partnership property.

Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of
conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions
in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article
256. (n)

Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a)
CASES:
CONCEPCION FRANCISCO V. FELIZARDO FRANCISCO
FACTS On 1963 parties herein got married, their marriage was attended by constant arguments due to
respondents inadequate financial contribution despite being an executive at Caltex and due to such petitioner
exhausted all of her inheritance. In addition, petitioners mother-in-laws constant interference and that when
they stayed in the petitioners ancestral home the RENTS FROM THEIR CONJUGAL HOME WENT TO
MOTHER OF RESPONDENTS.
That it was she who spent for the childrens education and that respondent insisted that his massage
parlor does not make any money.
Also it was alleged that the respondent had a paramour who was the daughter of the manager of massage
parlor and that said paramour studied in the same school as her children in assumption.
What prompted her to leave the conjugal home was due to a quarrel between the RESPONDENTS
MOTHER AND THEIR MAID. In 1995 Concepcion filed for separation of property against Felizardo
because there is no longer any hope of reconciliation.
Petitioner also alleged that when she demanded her share from the Conjugal properties the respondent made
an unfair offer and that respondent did not share his retirement pay.
The RTC granted the decree for separation of properties. However both of them appealed on different
grounds
I.

Petitioner appealed the declaration that Lot 19 was respondents exclusive property

II.

Respondent appealed the declaration that the following were considered as conjugal property:
(3)1. Lot 20
2. Fishpond in Bulacan
3. Retirement pay

ISSUES:
1. Is Lot 19 conjugal?
2. Is Lot20, Fishpond and retirement pay conjugal?
HELD: (NEITHER APPEAL IS MERITOUS)
Family Code governs the property relations even if marriage was contracted prior to the Family Code. Since the
presumption is that they are conjugal, the burden of proof rest upon the party claiming they are not
conjugal.
It was error to assume that the properties were acquired during marriage due to the indication in the TCT that
they are married. This is because the SC already ruled that acquisition is different from registration.
1. NO. Lot 19 was NOT CONJUGAL PROPERTY because it was RECEIVED IN GRATUITY and
although they gave money to the respondents mother as payment for aforesaid lot SUCH WAS NOT

ACKNOWLEDGED.
Furthermore respondent presented a notarized deed indicating that Lot 19 was indeed given by gratuity
and as such it is indeed an exclusive property. On the contention that respondent is in estoppels, Estoppel
does not apply in the determination of the nature of the property because estoppel is limited in supplying the
deficiency in statutory law.
2. YES. Even though he bought the rights to purchase Lot 20 before his marriage, the TITLE BECAME
VESTED AFTER MARRIAGE. And although it is true that that petitioner did not contribute to the
installment payment thereto it is also equally true that respondent showed no evidence that the payment
was made through his own exclusive funds.
As for the FISHPOND it is CONJUGAL BECAUSE IT WAS ACQUIRED THROUGH PURCHASE
AND NOT BY DONATION.
The RETIREMENT PAY was likewise conjugal because it was RECEIVED DURING THE
MARRIAGE notwithstanding Art 115, because Art 115 needs to be correlated with Art 116.Therefore the
burden of showing that it is not conjugal rest with the respondent and that such burden was not overcome.

Section 4. Charges Upon and Obligations of

the Conjugal Partnership
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them WITH THE
CONSENT OF THE OTHER;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other
activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course
or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage SHALL NOT BE CHARGED TO THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES PARTNERSHIP except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be
enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have
been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but
at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purpose above-mentioned. (163a)

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING, respondents
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC).
RESPONDENT ALFREDO CHING, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and
March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered
judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests.
Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy
sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their
conjugal properties on May 1982.
Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan DID NOT
REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE SAID CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP.
CA issued a TRO enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent spouses conjugal properties.
A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband ALONE is considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and NOT FOR THE BENEFIT
OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF CHING.
Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they
happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the DEBT WAS A CORPORATE DEBT and

right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a SURETY or GUARANTOR, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. CHING ONLY SIGNED AS A SURETY FOR THE LOAN CONTRACTED WITH
AIDC IN BEHALF OF PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession,
it is NOT embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have resulted when
the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the
loan. It must not be a MERE BY PRODUCT OR A SPIN-OFF of the loan itself.
Foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the following conclusions:
1. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he DIRECTLY RECEIVED THE
MONEY and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls
within the term . . . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
2. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband
acted only as a SURETY OR GUARANTOR, that CONTRACT CANNOT, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family.
VICENTE G. VILLARANDA, petitioner, vs. Spouses HONORIO G. VILLARANDA and ANA MARIA Y.
VILLARANDA; and COLORHOUSE LABORATORIES, INC., respondents.
DOCTRINE:
Under the Civil Code 166 and 173, the husband cant alienate or encumber any real property of the
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP WITHOUT THE WIFES CONSENT. This is VOIDABLE, NOT VOID. An
action to annul such alienation may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within 10 years from the
transaction.
"Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the HUSBAND CANNOT ALIENATE OR ENCUMBER
ANY REAL PROPERTY OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP WITHOUT THE WIFES
CONSENT. x x x
"Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, AND WITHIN TEN YEARS FROM THE
TRANSACTION QUESTIONED, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
the property fraudulently alienated by the husband."

Petitioner VICENTE and respondent HONORIO VILLARANDA are brothers who INHERITED LAND
from their parents. In 1976, they executed a DEED OF EXCHANGE, wherein Vicente agreed to
convey his portion to Honorio in exchange for property in Macasandig (Honorio).
H o n o r i o a n d h i s w i f e , A n a , b r o u g h t a n A C T I O N F O R S P E C I F I C PERFOR
MANCE TO COMPEL VICENTE TO FULFIL HIS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DEED.
VICENTE NEVER IDENTIFIED OR DELINEATED HIS UNDIVIDED PORTION OF THE
PROPERTY. Vicente claims the Deed was revoked by both parties.
RTC ruled in favor of Honorio and Ana.
On appeal, the CA held that the Civil Code was applicable since t h e D e e d w a s e n t e r ed i n t o
i n 1 9 7 6 . T H E AB S E N C E O F T H E W I F E S SIGNATURE MADE IT VOIDABLE, NOT
VOID .
Also, Ana was aware of the Deed but never brought action for its annulment within
10years from its execution. The prescriptive period for the cause of action r a n n o t f r o m t h e e x e c u t i o n
o f t h e D e e d b u t f r o m w h e n Vic e n t e refused to transfer his title to Honorio, some 2 months before the
filing of the case. CA again ruled in favor of Honorio and Ana.
ISSUE:
WON the Deed is valid without the signature of Ana
RULING OF COURT:
YES
The Deed was entered into on 1976, before the Family Code. The Civil Code applies. The Macasandig lot was
part of Honorio and Anas conjugal property. Under the Civil Code 166 and 173, the husband cant alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. THIS IS VOIDABLE,NOT
VOID. An action to annul such alienation may be instituted bythe wife during the marriage and within 10
years from the transaction. The Deed is valid until annulled. There is no evidence that any action to annul the
transfer was brought by Ana within 10 years from the transaction. Her right to bring an action has prescribed.
The Deed is still valid and enforceable.

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them WITH THE
CONSENT OF THE OTHER;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal
partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate
property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other
activity for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course
or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (161a)
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
JOINTLY. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court OR the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be VOID.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a CONTINUING OFFER on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,
G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005

FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was
declared for tax assessment purposes. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed ONLY IN FAVOR
OF THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. AS VENDEE thereof to the exclusion of his wife.

Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the
latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be SECURED by the spouses
Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As
security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject
property in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor
of Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and consent of RESPONDENT.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of
Sale was issued IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the
property being redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, MARCELINO DAILO, JR. DIED. In one of HER visits to the subject property, Miguela
learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford
sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that SHE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE MORTGAGE constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil Case for Nullity of
Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner.

In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.

After trial on the merits, the TRIAL COURT rendered a Decision declaring the SAID DOCUMENTS NULL
AND VOID and further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to
the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorneys fees,
moral and exemplary damages.

The APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMED the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED
BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF
THE FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE
SETTLEMENT, the SYSTEM OF RELATIVE COMMUNITY or CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
GAINS governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.

The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino
even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income
from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT
OF HIS WIFE, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the SUBJECT PROPERTY, WHICH
FORMED PART OF THEIR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the ABSENCE OF (COURT) AUTHORITY or WRITTEN CONSENT of the other spouse,
any DISPOSITION OR ENCUMBRANCE OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY SHALL BE VOID.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does.

ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.

2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1)

Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the

family may have been benefited; . . . .

Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity
and well-being of the family as a unit.

The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with
the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the
late Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his
family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

NOTE:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that
the subject property was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. NOWHERE in the answer filed
with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on
appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan.

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.

FACTS:
DR. ERNESTO JARDELAZA suffered stroke that rendered him COMATOSE. GILDA, wife of the latter,
filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as SOLE ADMINISTRATOR OF THEIR CONJUGAL
PROPERTY and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to
SELL THEIR PROPERTY IN LOT 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities.
RTC RULED IN FAVOR OF GILDA contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that
the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, TEODORO, filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION contending that the
petition made by her mother was essentially a PETITION FOR GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND
PROPERTIES of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should FOLLOW THE RULES GOVERNING SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS in the
Revised Rules of Court REQUIRING PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PARTICULARLY THE NEED FOR
NOTICE AND A HEARING ON THE MERITS. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under
the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a situation where both spouses
are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her DAUGHTER AND SON IN LAW.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA REVERSED THE DECISION of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him
comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal
property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
HELD:
SC RULED IN FAVOR OF TEODORO.
The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated
or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that subject spouse WAS INCOMPETENT
who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract. Hence, the PROPER REMEDY
IS A JUDICIAL GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING UNDER THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. The
law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a
guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property,
must observe the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary
judicial proceedings under FC.
SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and
void on the GROUND OF LACK OF DUE PROCESS.

G.R. No. 118784 September 2, 1999

HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and VIENA MALABONGA,
respondents.
FACTS:

Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September 24, 1961.

The couple resided in Manila but they OPERATED A MACHINE SHOP in Lucena City. This
business was managed by Rafael Ayuste.
The couple purchased on AUGUST 1982 a PARCEL OF LAND WITH AN AREA OF 180
SQUARE METERS on which a residential house was built situated at Lucena City for Mr. Ayustes
temporary residence.
A DEED OF SALE was executed and signed by the parties and filed with the Register of Deeds of
Lucena City. The property was purchased from spouses Pedro and Aida David.
On February 1987, Mr. Ayuste, WITH THE VITIATED CONSENT of Mrs. AYUSTE SOLD THE
SAID PARCEL OF LAND FOR P40,000 TO MALABONGA.
Mr. Ayuste died on 1989 and Christina Ayuste found out that the parcel of land WAS SOLD BY
HER DECEASED HUSBAND WITHOUT HER KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT.
In 1990, she filed a petition to for the annulment of the sale, cancellation of the title issued in the
name of private respondent and for the payment of moral, exemplary and actual damages. In her
complaint Christina Ayuste alleges that her signature on the deed of SALE WAS FORGED.

The RTC granted the petition of Mrs. Ayuste.

The CA however, REVERSED THE DECISION INVOKING ART. 173 CC, holding that the right
of Christina to bring an action for the annulment of the sale is barred for failure to file the same during
the existence of the marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste
without the consent of Christina Ayuste?

HELD:
The trial court erred in giving due course to the action for annulment of sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale
executed on February 27, 1987 by and between defendant-appellant and plaintiff-appellants husband is
declared VALID and BINDING upon the plaintiff-appellant.
The only issue which remains to be resolved is whether petitioners are entitled to the annulment of the contract
of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste without the consent of Christina Ayuste.
Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership WITHOUT HIS WIFES
CONSENT, subject only to certain exceptions specified in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case
her husband should dispose of their conjugal property without her consent is laid down in Article 173 of the
Civil Code which states that:
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is
VOIDABLE. The action for annulment must be brought DURING THE MARRIAGE and within ten years
from the questioned transaction by the wife.
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on October 13,
1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with the lower court
asking for the annulment of the sale. Although the action was filed within ten years from the questioned
transaction, IT WAS NOT BROUGHT DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE which was
dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989. Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina Ayuste
was barred for having been filed out of time.
The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her husband is not material.
VITUG., J, concurring opinion;
The questioned sale was concluded on 27 February 1987, before the Family Code took effect; accordingly,

the transaction could still be aptly governed by the then governing provisions of the Civil Code. Under this
Code, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property (acquired by the partnership
after the effective date of the Civil Code) without the consent, express or implied, of the wife 1 (Art. 166, Civil
Code; Bautista vs. Lovina, 98 Phil. 1006, 1956), otherwise, said the Supreme Court in Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals (130 SCRA 433, 1984), reiterating Tolentino vs. Cardenas (123 Phil. 517, 1966), the disposition would
be void. I share the view of my colleagues that such a contract, absent the wife's consent should be considered
merely voidable consistently with article 173 2 of the Civil Code under which provision, THE WIFE COULD,
DURING THE MARRIAGE AND WITHIN 10 YEARS FROM THE QUESTIONED TRANSACTION,
SEEK ITS ANNULMENT (Felipe vs. Heirs of Maximo Aldon, 120 SCRA 628 [1983]; Reyes vs. De Leon, 20
SCRA 369 [1967]; see Roxas vs. CA, 198 SCRA 541, 1991 which applied Art. 173 to a lease contract). Failing
to do so, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, could demand the value of the property alienated
(Art. 173, Civil Code). It might not be amiss to say that an unauthorized sale by the husband of conjugal real
property, not being the administrator thereof, or of the exclusive parapherna of the wife, not having obtained
her prior consent thereto, could be void under the provisions of Article 1874 3 of the Civil Code.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal (or community) property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by an entirely different rule that now treats such a disposition to be void if done without
the conjoint consent of the spouses or, in case of a spouse's inability, the authority of the court (see Art. 124,
4 Family Code). The declaration that the disposition by just one of the spouses is void settles the apparent
conflict in some of the rulings during the regime of the 1950 Civil Code, in construing the provisions of said
code found in Articles 161, 162, 166, 171 and 173, in relation to Articles 1390, 7403 and 1874, thereof.
The Family Code has also abandoned the 1950 Civil Code concept of having the husband, absent a contrary
statement in a marriage settlement or in a public instrument executed by the husband or an order of a court
(Arts. 168, 190 and 196, Civil Code), as the statutory administrator of the conjugal partnership of gains (Art.
165, Civil Code) that permitted suits to bind the conjugal partnership even where the wife was not named as a
party defendant along with the husband (Stosa, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 862). Article 124 of the
Family Code, like the rule established in the system of absolute community of property (see Arts. 96-98, Family
Code), instead confers the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal property on the spouses jointly. The
marriage settlement, however, may provide for the administration of the property by one of the spouses, the
provisions of the Family Code on conjugal partnership of gain being merely suppletory thereto. In case of
disagreement in the joint administration and enjoyment of the partnership property, the husband's decision shall
prevail but the wife may avail herself of the "proper remedy" in court "within five years from the date of the
contract implementing the decision."
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners, vs. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE,
for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA
ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA
ABRILLE,Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have FOUR
CHILDREN, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, adjacent to a parcel
of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single (TCT No. T-26471.)
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the development bank of the philippines
(DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s but the
spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their
movables to support the family and the studies of her children.

By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, PATROCINIA AND
WILFREDO RAVINA.
Mary Ann OBJECTED AND NOTIFIED the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the
house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5].
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together
with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance
with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They
waited OUTSIDE THE GATE UNTIL EVENING UNDER THE RAIN. They sought help from the Talomo
Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann
alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at
school.
ISSUE:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x THE SALE OF LOT COVERED BY TCT
NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES RAVINA, TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE THEREON, AS NULL
AND VOID SINCE IT IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA
AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, THE SAME BEING
CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA
AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW
AND EVIDENCE.10
RULING: Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the exclusive property of
Pedro having been acquired by HIM THROUGH BARTER OR EXCHANGE.11 They allege that the subject
lot was acquired by Pedro with the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties. Allegedly, Pedro and
his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange their exclusive lots covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No.
T-26472, respectively. Later, however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca Teh
Ting and purchased the property of Carmelita using the proceeds of the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-88674, was
issued thereafter. Thus, petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an exclusive property of Pedro as it
was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or money of the latter.
We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides,
"ALL PROPERTY of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of
Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No.
T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to

show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature
of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.1
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if
done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses inability, the
authority of the court.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale WITHIN FIVE (5) YEARS from
the date of sale and execution of the deed.
On the second issue, Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was
married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Anns conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that
petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were
apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the
property without Mary Anns written consent.
On the last issue of award of damages, the claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which
respondent and her children were REMOVED FROM THE FAMILY HOME DESERVES OUR
CONDEMNATION. While respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in
connivance with the petitioners[21] surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The
respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.[22]When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly,
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. [23] It is patent in this case that petitioners
alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to
the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property,
or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property
relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has
failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.

CASE:
PARTOSA-JO V. CA
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the LEGAL WIFE OF JOSE JO, herein private respondent. The latter
admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children.
Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was consolidated.
RTC decision was a definite disposition of the complaint for support BUT NONE OF THAT FOR THE
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY.
Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation
of property WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION on the ground that separation by
agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code.
Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her PREGNANCY and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to be
separated permanently. She even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.
The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:
ARTICLE 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not
affect the conjugal partnership, except that:
Xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may
petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership
property or separation of property.
The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code, which states:
ARTICLE 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, or for authority to be the soleadministrator of the conjugal partnership property,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or
property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without
any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months
or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima
facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD:
SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary MODIFICATION instead of
dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The fACT THAT JO DID NOT ACCEPT
HER DEMONSTRATES THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF RESUMING THEIR CONJUGAL
RELATIONSHIP. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the
petitioner, sufficed to CONSTITUTE ABANDONMENT as a ground for the judicial separation of their
conjugal property.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
ARTICLE 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:
xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal
PROPERTY OF THE SPOUSES BE DIVIDED BETWEEN THEM, SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE. The
division will be implemented after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal
partnership including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the persons.

Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order.
Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN
FACTS:
Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once had a blissful married life.
They were blessed to have one son.
Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgilio discovered that private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour.
The petitioner filed a case of adultery against private respondent Dita Maquilan and the paramour.
Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer
imprisonment.
Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on 2001.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Partial settlements are as follows:
P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be
withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the
deposit in the joint account of the parties. The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at
P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and divided equally by the parties;
The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodega shall
be for the defendant. The defendant shall be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of
the store in full settlement thereof.
The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by the
plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the defendant;
The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant the sum of P75,000.00
as,his share thereon and in full settlement thereof;
The house and lot shall be to the common child.
The PETITIONER FILED FOR OMNIBUS MOTION PRAYING FOR THE REPUDIATION OF THE
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT HIS PREVIOUS LAWYER DID NOT
INTELLIGENTLY AND JUDICIOUSLY APPRISE HIM OF THE CONSEQUENTIAL EFFECTS of the
said agreement.

The RTC and CA dismissed the petition of Mr. Maquilan.

ISSUE:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, CAN

STILL SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM
WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL SEPARATION IS A PREREQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE
DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM
SHARING IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION.

HELD: The petitioner contends that the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS VOID because it circumvents the
law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the

conjugal property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner said that her share should
be FORFEITED in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.

But nevertheless, the spouses voluntarily separated their property through their Compromise Agreement with
court approval under Article 134 of the Family Code:

Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except
by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for
sufficient cause.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to DISQUALIFY THE SPOUSE CONVICTED OF
ADULTERY from sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, IT
NEVER BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil
Code and argues that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore
void. These arguments are specious.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided the
properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a
marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
Article 2035 reads:
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)
Furthermore, Art. 43 only pertains to cases falling under SUBSEQUENT marriages.
Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence DO NOT IMPOSE SUCH DISQUALIFICATION. The conviction of adultery DOES NOT
CARRY THE ACCESSORY OF CIVIL INTERDICTION.
Neither could it be said that the PETITIONER WAS NOT INTELLIGENTLY AND JUDICIOUSLY informed
of the consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the
Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous counsel
about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now
claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident.

Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the
latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community. (213a)

CASE:
VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs and appellees, vs. EUGENIO JOSE, THE
ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and ROSALIA ARROYO, defendants and appellants.
FACTS: Herein respondent owned and operated a jeepney which got involved in an ACCIDENT
OF COLLISION, with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways that took place on November 23,
1969 causing death to 7 and physical injuries to.
That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been COHABITING WITH ROSALIA ARROYO,
defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife.
Herein petitioner was held by the lower court to be JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE (with
respondent), as respondents paramour/common-law wife, to the damages arising from the accident TO THE
HEIR OF THE DECEASED, VICTOR JUANIZA.Lower court based their decision on
Art. 144,NCC:
When a man and woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on ownership
ISSUE:
WON petitioner can be held liable for the obligations arising from the accident to which respondents property
was involved; or
WON common-law relationship, WHERE ONE PARTY IS INCAPACITATED TO MARRY, automatically
adopts co-ownership by virtue of the CCRuling:RULING: NO. RESPONDENT SHALL NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THEDAMAGES.
RATIO:- Art. 144 pertains only to those common-law relationships where neither of the parties suffer from
any legal impediment to marry.Herein respondent is legally married to another woman and is thus incapacitated to marry herein petitioner.Co-ownership cannot apply to the relationship.- Herein respondent is not considered a co-owner of the
jeepney.Moreover, the jeepney was registered only under the name of Jose.

Chapter 7. Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each

other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage OR under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the PROPERTY acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, UNTIL AFTER THE
TERMINATION OF THEIR COHABITATION.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their COMMON CHILDREN. In case of default of or waiver by any
or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon TERMINATION OF THE COHABITATION. (144a)
CASES:
MARGARET MAXEY assisted by Santiago Magbanua; FLORENCE MAXEY assisted by Ofrecinio
Santos; and LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
SPOUSES BEATO C. MACAYRA and ALACOPUE MONDAY,respondents.
This petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired in 1912 principally through
the EFFORTS OF THE MAN she was living with and at a time when the two were not yet legally married.
The record reveals that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales lived together as husband and wife in
Banganga, Davao; that out of said union were born six (6) children, among them are the herein plaintiffs.
During the period of their cohabitation, or in 1911 and 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired
the parcels of land. Melbourne Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey, sold in favor of the
DEFENDANTS-SPOUSES IN 1953 the parcels of land under litigation which fact of sale was not
controverted by the parties; that since thereof, THE DEFENDANTS-SPOUSES HAVE TAKEN
IMMEDIATE POSSESSION THEREOF CONTINUOUSLY UP TO THE PRESENT.

Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying
for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession
thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid
REALTIES WERE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THEIR PARENTS, having been acquired during their
lifetime and through THEIR JOINT EFFORT AND CAPITAL; and that the sales of the of the said lands in
favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by
their father, Melbourne Maxey, WITHOUT THEIR KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT; and that they came to
know of the above mentioned sales only in 1961.
On the other hand, defendants-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint and assert by way of

affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of the properties 'm question
having purchased the same in good faith and for value from Melbourne Maxey during his lifetime in 1953,
based upon the REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE LATTER IS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE
OWNER OF THE SAID PARCELS OF LAND And that since then, they have been in possession thereof
openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of owners.

Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in
1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, SOLD THE PROPERTIES TO
THE RESPONDENT SPOUSES, MR. AND MRS. BEATO C. MACAYRA.
THE TRIAL COURT applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband and wife, justice demands that the
woman should be entitled to the share of the property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere adornment or
only for man's comfort and passion."

The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive properties of the late Melbourne
Maxey.
XXX"there appears no evidence to prove her alleged contribution or participation in the, acquisition of the
properties involved therein." (Id. p. 1069). In the case at bar, besides the absence of any evidence showing
that Regina Morales contributed by her efforts to the acquisition of these properties in controversy, both
plaintiffs and defendants' evidence show that it was through Melbourne Maxey's efforts ALONE that these
properties were acquired. Indeed, that Regina Morales had no means at all to have contributed in any manner
to all its acquisition.XXX

RULING OF COURT: The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument
that Act No. 3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal.

The other issue raised in this Petition questions the Court of Appeals' finding that the parcels of land in question
were exclusive properties of the late Melbourne Maxey.
The petitioners argue that even assuming that the marriage of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales took place
only in February 17, 1919, still the properties legally and rightfully belonged in equal share to the two
because the acquisition of the said properties was through THEIR JOINT EFFORTS AND INDUSTRY.
The second and third errors mentioned by the petitioners are grounded on the alleged wrong interpretation
given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts". The petitioners suggest that their mother's efforts in
performing her role as mother to them and as wife to their father were more than sufficient contribution to
constitute the parcels of land in question as common properties acquired through the joint efforts to their

parents.

The Court of Appeals, however, was of the opinion that Article 144 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the
properties in question citing the case of Aznar et al. v. Garcia (102 Phil. 1055) on non-retroactivity of codal
provisions where vested rights may be prejudiced or impaired. And, assuming that Article 144 of the Civil Code
is applicable, the Court of Appeals held that the disputed properties were exclusively those of the petitioner's
father because these were not acquired through the joint efforts of their parents. This conclusion stems from
the interpretation given by the Court of Appeals to the phrase "joint efforts" to mean "monetary contribution".

The requirement of non-impairment of vested rights is clear. It is the opinion of the Court of Appeals that
vested rights were prejudiced. WE DO NOT THINK SO. Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on
August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married
and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and
industry during cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court.
With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial precedents
but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry. EVEN IF IT IS ONLY THE MAN WHO WORKS, THE
PROPERTY ACQUIRED DURING THE MAN AND WIFE RELATIONSHIP BELONGS THROUGH A
FIFTY-FIFTY SHARING TO THE TWO OF THEM.
Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "YES" because there is NO
SHOWING THAT VESTED RIGHTS WOULD BE IMPAIRED OR PREJUDICED THROUGH ITS
APPLICATION.

The properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was already in full force and effect. Neither can
this be said of the rights of the private respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties
are concerned as this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina Morales to a
share under the applicable law.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina
Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00
purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of onehalf of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of
P650.00 on the other.

VALDEZ VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married January 5, 1971. Begotten during the marriage
were five children. In a petition, dated June 22, 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of marriage

pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their
marriage null and void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin were placed in
the custody of their mother and the older children chose which parent they want to stay with. The petitioner
and respondent are also directed to start proceedings in the liquidation of their property as defined by Article
147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
Issue:
Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
Arguments:
Petitioner: Petitioner argues that:
(1) Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological
incapacitated,
(2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of
the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses
(3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129,
(4) It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay.
Respondent: Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the PROPERTY
RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES ARE GOVERNED BY THE RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP (Art 147
Family Code). Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
CONSIDERED AS HAVING CONTRIBUTED THERETO jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family.
MERCADO-FEHR VS FEHR October 23, 2003
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, Elna left Cebu and moved in with Bruno in Manila.
They had their first child in December the same year. THEY PURCHASED A CONDOMINIUM UNIT
(Suite 204) at LG Ccondominium by a contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983.
THEY GOT MARRIED IN MARCH 1985.

In 1998, TRIAL COURT declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno,void ab initio under FC
36 and subsequently ordered the liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
However, the court found after a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the
Court finds the following properties to be EXCLUDED FROM THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES, namely:
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-137232, considering that the same
is owned by petitioners parents, Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and
b) SUITE 204 OF THE LCG CONDOMINIUM covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
14735, considering that the same was purchased on instalment basis by respondent with his exclusive
funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx
Suite 204 was said to be EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF BRUNO because it was purchased on
instalment basis using Brunos exclusive funds prior to the marriage. Their properties were also
divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG
Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment
basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with ARTICLE
147 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
ISSUE:
WON Suite 204 is Brunos exclusive property
HELD: No
RATIO:
FC 147 applies in this case because:
1) both of them were capacitated to marry each other;
2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and
3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. Evidence shows
that the property was acquired during their cohabitation and in applying FC 147, the rules on
co-ownership should govern.
The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983,
at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as
COMMON PROPERTY OF PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT.
3-way partition of properties does not apply also. Property regime should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-ownership. As regards the settlement of the common properties of
petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their ACTUAL JOINT CONTRIBUTION of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP EXISTING IN SUCH VALID MARRIAGE.
If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a)

CASES:
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA
CRUZ, respondents.

Facts: Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the church at Pangasinan. A few
months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their union was born Herminia Palang, respondent.
Miguel returned to the Philippines but he stayed in Zambales with his brother during the entire duration of his
year-long sojourn, not with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
returned for good, HE REFUSED to live with his wife and child.
When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a NINETEEN YEAR OLD
ERLINDA AGAPAY, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both JOINTLY PURCHASED A PARCEL
OF AGRICULTURAL LAND located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise purchased allegedly by
Erlinda as the sole vendee.
To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a Deed of Donation as a form
of COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six
parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel died. Thereafter, Carlina
filed a complaint OF CONCUBINAGE on the previous party. Respondents sought to get back the riceland
and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner contended that she had already given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the
HOUSE AND LOT IS HER SOLE PROPERTY having bought with her OWN MONEY. RTC affirmed in
favor of the petitioner WHILE CA REVERSED the said decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage
is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties
through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective

contributions. It is required that THERE BE AN ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION. If actual contribution is not

proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to
joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. (144a)

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari
store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she ACTUALLY CONTRIBUTED MONEY to but the
subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who
was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering her youthfulness, its unrealistic
how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the coownership with Miguel over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial
order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements. The
judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and should not be so
inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
property revealed the falsehood of Erlindas claim that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22
years old. The lawyer testified that MIGUEL PROVIDED THE MONEY for the purchase price and
directed Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void and
inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the
prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union.

GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES

FERNANDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were the plaintiffs in an ACTION FOR EJECTMENT filed before Branch
82 of the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila AGAINST GUILLERMA TUMLOS, TOTO TUMLOS AND
GINA TUMLOS.
In their complaint the said spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an APARTMENT
BUILDING; that through tolerance they had allowed the Tumloses to occupy the apartment building for the
LAST SEVEN YEARS, since 1989, without the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that after a few
months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay P1,600.00 a month while the other defendants promised to
pay P1,000.00 a month both as RENTAL, which agreement was NOT COMPLIED WITH by the said
defendants; that they have demanded several times the defendants to VACATE THE PREMISES, as they
are in need of the property for the construction of a new building. Spouses have also demanded payment
incurred for the last seven years. Such demands were unheeded thus this present action of the spouses.
The MTC promulgated its decision on January 22, 1997.
The defendants appealed to the RTC, alleged in their memorandum on appeal that Mario Fernandez and
Guillerma had an AMOROUS relationship, and that they ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
AS THEIR LOVE NEST. It was further alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with
their two (2) children for around then (10) years, and that Guillerma administered the property by collecting
rentals from the lessees of the other apartments, until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulment of his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996 when Mario accused her of being unfaithful
and demonstrated his baseless jealousy.
ISSUE: WON Guillerma Tumlos is a Co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.
HELD: The Supreme Court REJECTED the claim that Guillerma Tumlos and Mario Fernandez were coowners of the disputed property. The claim of co-owenrship was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma. No
other evidence was presented to validate such claim, except for the said affidavit/position paper. As previously
stated, it was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that she cohabited with the petitioner-husband without
the benefit of marriage, and that she bore him two children. Such contentions and documents should not have
been considered by the RTC, as they were not presented in her affidavit/position paper before the trial court
MTC.
Even if the said allegations were true, the claim of co-ownership still fails. MARIO FERNANDEZ IS
VALIDLY MARRIED TO LOURDES FERNANDEZ, Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to marry
each other. Thus, the property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is that FOUND IN ARTICLE
148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other,[22] or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void [23] from the beginning.[24] It
does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a coownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful
wife.[

It is clear that actual contribution is required by its provision, in contrast to Article 147 of the Family Code
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions

to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. Such provision
is not included in article 148 of the Family Code.
If actual contribution of the party is not proven then there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares as stated in Agapay,
On the Support issue, petitioner contends that since Respondent Mario Fernandez failed to repudiate her claim
regarding the filiation of his alleged sons, Mark Gil and Michael Fernandez, his silence on the matter
amounts to an admission. Arguing that Mario is liable for support, she advances the theory that the childrens
right to support, which necessarily includes shelter, prevails over the right of respondents to eject her.
We disagree. It should be emphasized that this is an ejectment suit whereby respondents seek to exercise their
possessory right over their property. It is summary in character and deals solely with the issue of possession of
the property in dispute. Here, it has been shown that they have a better right to possess it than does the
petitioner, whose right to possess is based merely on their tolerance.

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE andGINA S. REY, respondents.
FACTS:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was MARRIED, but separated de facto from her husband, when she met and
cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation.
Private RESPONDENT FILED A COMPLAINT FOR PARTITION AND RECOVERY OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY WITH RECEIVERSHIP against the petitioner. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her CONTRIBUTION TO THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THEIR HOUSE, be reimbursed to her.
The court ordered petitioner to file the pre-trial brief but he failed to do so. The trial court declared him in
default. He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Gina was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
A decision was rendered in favor of Gina. The CA affirmed the decision and ruled that the propriety of order
which declared the petitioner in default became moot and academic in view of the effectivity of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. It explained that the new rule now requires the filing of pre-trial brief and the defendants
non-compliance entitles the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte.

ISSUE: I. WON there are actual contributions from the parties;

II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Gina to present evidence ex parte.
HELD:
I. It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto WERE NOT capacitated to marry each other because the former
was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime
therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, (which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man). Under this regime, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions PROOF OF ACTUAL
CONTRIBUTION IS REQUIRED.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because this provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the HOUSE AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES of the parties.
She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an
entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture
and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole
owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00
However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record
are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, NO
SUFFICIENT PROOF OF THE EXACT AMOUNT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SHARES THEREIN.
Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties respective
contribution, their share shall be PRESUMED TO BE EQUAL.
II.

Under Seciton 6 of Rule 18 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file
a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, the plaintiff may
present evidence exparte and court shall render judgment on the basis thereof.
The remedy of the defendant is to file amotion for reconsideration showing his failure has a valid
and meritorious defense. In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file pre-trial is justified because he
was not represented by counsel.

The justification is not sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidence ex parte,
in as much as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to berepresented by counsel. Even without the assistance of a
lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion for extension to file answer, the required answer stating therein the special
and affirmative defenses, andseveral other motions. If it were true that petitioners did not understand the importance of
order directing him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the court and file a motion for extension of time to file the
brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a
partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive reason to

relax the application of the rules. In civil cases, while assistance of a lawyer is desirable, it is not indispensable.

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondents.
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been married to the
latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children, namely, Natividad, Angela,
Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they
acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu.
Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited
from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of
approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, PACITA VILLANUEVA, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.
Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties.
Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore, cannot walk anymore and they have to raise him
up in order to walk. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because they visited him at
the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the
present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas illegitimate children who has been receiving the
income of these properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time
their father Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told defendant, Procopio that their
father was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the
time to talk about the matter.
Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was
reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were made by plaintiff,
through her counsel, to the defendants, including the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement
was reached by the parties.
Further, plaintiffs witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of land covered by tax declaration
marked Exhibit T was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the time of
purchase of the property, defendant PACITA VILLANUEVA HAD NO MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 16 February 1994 in favor of Eusebia.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the findings of the trial court. The appellate court found that Pacita
failed to rebut the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that the subject properties are conjugal.
The appellate court dismissed Pacitas defense of prescription and laches since she failed to have the issue
included in the pre-trial order after raising it in her answer with her co-petitioners.
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the

contrary is proved.

RULING OF COURT: The only issue proper for resolution is the question of whether the subject properties
are conjugal. Petitioners claim that the subject properties[16] are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for
Lot No. 152, which they claim is Pacitas exclusive property.
The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a
factual issue. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in fact acquired
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are
not conjugal.
Petitioners also point out that all the other tax declarations presented before the trial court are in the name
of Nicolas alone. Petitioners argue that this serves as proof of Nicolas exclusive ownership of these properties.
Petitioners are mistaken. The TAX DECLARATIONS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT PROOF TO
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION UNDER ARTICLE 116 OF THE FAMILY CODE. all property
acquired by the spouses DURING THE MARRIAGE, regardless in whose name the property IS
REGISTERED, IS PRESUMED CONJUGAL unless proved otherwise.
Petitioners point out that Pacita had the means to buy Lot No. 152. Even if Pacita had the financial capacity,
this does not prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money. To rebut the presumption that Lot No.
152 is conjugal, petitioners must prove that Pacita used her own money to pay for Lot No. 152. Petitioners
failed to prove this.
Petitioners further argue that since Nicolas and Pacita were already cohabiting when Lot No. 152 was
acquired, the lot cannot be deemed conjugal property of Nicolas and Eusebia. Petitioners keep belaboring this
point in their petition and memorandum. Petitioners argument is flawed. The cohabitation of a spouse with
another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.[33]
Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code[34] is misplaced. A reading of Article 148
readily shows that there must be proof of actual joint contribution by both the live-in partners before the
property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of
contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that
actual joint contribution is proven first.

BELCODERO V COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
1. Alayo Bosing married Juliana Oday in 1927 and they had 3 children.
In 1946 he abandoned them and lived with Josefa Rivera (whom he acknowledged as common law wife

Josefa Bosing). They had one child, Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
2. He married Josefa Bosing in 1958, while STILL MARRIED TO JULIANA.
3. Alayo purchased parcel of land on installment basis in1949 and his deed he named Josefina Bosing as his
wife and transferred lot in her name. Final deed executed in 1959.
4. Alayo died March 1967. In 1970 Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extra-judicial partition
and sale of the lot, which was described as CONJUGAL PROPERTY. Josefas share went to Josephine for
P10,000, so Josephine Belcodero had full ownership. Notice was published.
5. In October 1980 Juliana (real widow) and 3 children filed for reconveyance of property. Trial Court and
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Juliana.
ISSUES:
1. The husband acquired ownership while living with a paramour, after deserting his wife. Property bought
prior to effectivity of 1950 Civil Code but the final deed was ensued after. And the Family Code took
effect1988.
Old Civil Code (Article 1407), all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
a. Whether the property was acquired in 1949 when he first started paying installment or in1959 when
the deed was finalized, RESULT IS THE SAME. Property belongs to conjugal partnership of Alayo
and legal wife Juliana.
Under old and new Civil Code all property is presumed to belong to conjugal partnership unless it
is provided that it is exclusive to either spouse.
b. Property acquired by Alayo, he merely had the title transferred to Josefas name. She implicitly
recognized Alayos ownership when she and Josephine filed extrajudicial partition of the said property
the partition would have conformed with partition in intestacy had they been sole and legitimate heirs of
Alayo.
2. Common law spouses
a. In Art 144 and in Maxey v. CA the co-ownership rule had been repudiated when either of the spouses
had impediments to marry
b. Art 147 and 148 of Family Code did not deviate from old rules. Art 148 says that: when one of the
parties is validly married to another, his or her share of the co-ownership shall accrue to the
conjugal property of the VALID MARRIAGE. But the provisions cant apply to this case without
interdicting prior vested rights, so the provisions dont apply.
3. Constructive trust
a. Acc to Art 1456: If property is acquired by mistake the person obtaining it is trustee for implied trust
b. The applicable reconveyance period is ten years. Under the Torrens System the prescriptive period
starts when transaction is registered and a Certificate of Title is issued. Josephine Belocdero got the
Certificate in1974 and Juliana filed the case in 1980.
4. New evidence
a. Juliana married again, but no legal separation was brought to Alayo during his lifetime this holds no

relevance
DECISION:
Trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that
. . . Josephine

Bosing executed a deed of reconveyance of the property in question to the legal heirs of
the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages by
way of attorney's fees and expenses in litigation, TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages, pus TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS exemplary damages to prevent future frauds.
The defendants went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's order for reconveyance but
reversed the decision on the award for damages, thus
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as defendant Josephine
Bosing is ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance of the property granting the same to the legal heirs
of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and REVERSED insofar as it awards actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
SC- Affirmed, property goes to Juliana.
LUPO ATIENZA V. YOLANDA DE CASTRO

In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, LUPO, a MARRIED MAN,
COHABITED WITH YOLANDA AS HUSBAND AND WIFE. During their coverture, they allegedly
acquired a real property (BEL-AIR MAKATI) and registered it under the name of Yolanda.
Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they parted.
He filed an action for partition contending that they owned it in common under the concept of limited coownership.
Yolanda contended that SHE ALONE WAS THE OWNER AS SHE ACQUIRED IT THRU HER OWN
SAVINGS AS A BUSINESSWOMAN.
The RTC declared the property subject of co-ownership, BUT THE CA REVERSED IT AS HE FAILED
TO PROVE MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION IN THE ACQUISITION OF THE SAME.
On appeal, he contended that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the
property because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article 484,
NCC, FOR AS LONG AS THEY ACQUIRED THE PROPERTY DURING THEIR EXTRAMARITAL
UNION, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rule on coownership.
Held: It is not disputed that the PARTIES HEREIN WERE NOT CAPACITATED TO MARRY EACH

OTHER BECAUSE LUPO ATIENZA WAS VALIDLY MARRIED TO ANOTHER WOMAN at the time of
his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION IS REQUIRED.
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion TO THEIR RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
In 1983, or way before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before
Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, THERE WAS NO PROVISION GOVERNING PROPERTY
RELATIONS OF COUPLES LIVING IN A STATE OF ADULTERY OR CONCUBINAGE. Hence, even
if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.
The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. CONTENTIONS MUST BE PROVED BY
COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND RELIANCE MUST BE HAD ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
PARTYS OWN EVIDENCE AND NOT UPON THE WEAKNESS OF THE OPPONENTS DEFENSE.
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount
needed therefore.
The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate
his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say
so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the PETITIONER
FAILED TO OVERCOME HIS BURDEN OF PROOF. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, PETITIONERS EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
OF HIS CLAIM IS EITHER INSUFFICIENT OR IMMATERIAL TO WARRANT THE TRIAL
COURTS FINDING THAT THE DISPUTED PROPERTY FALLS UNDER THE PURVIEW OF

ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO
PRESENT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE OF HER SOLE OWNERSHIP. There can clearly be no coownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the
property from earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency
trading, money lending and jewelry retain. She PRESENTED HER CLIENTELE AND THE
PROMISSORY NOTES EVINCING SUBSTANTIAL DEALINGS WITH HER CLIENTS. SHE ALSO
PRESENTED HER BANK ACCOUNT STATEMENTS AND BANK TRANSACTIONS, WHICH
REFLECT THAT SHE HAD THE FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO PAY THE PURCHASE PRICE OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

TITLE V
THE FAMILY
Chapter 1. The Family as an Institution
Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy
cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or
agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a)
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. (217a)
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)
Chapter 2. The Family Home
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support. (226a)
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have

rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)
Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be
constituted by an unmarried head of a family ON HIS OR HER OWN PROPERTY.
Title XIV. - COMPROMISES AND ARBITRATIONS
CHAPTER 1
COMPROMISES
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)
RUFINO MAGBALETA, ROMANA B. MAGBALETA, AND SUSANA G. BALDOVI, petitioners, vs.
HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG AND CATALINO MAGBALETA, respondents
Petition for certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, against the orders of
respondent judge denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint filed against them notwithstanding
that PRIVATE RESPONDENT is the BROTHER of petitioner Rufino Magbaleta.
The suit is to have a parcel of land in the NAME OF RUFINO, declared to be the property of private
respondent, who claims in said complaint that SUSANA G. BALDOVI is trying to take possession of said land
from his representative, contending she had bought the same from the spouses Rufino and Romana.
Said orders having been issued allegedly in violation of Article 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16
of the Rules of Court, there being no allegation in respondent's complaint that his suit, being between members
of the same family, EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPROMISE HAVE BEEN MADE BEFORE
THE SAME WAS FILED.
Respondent judge premised his refusal to dismiss the complaint upon the sole ground that one of the
defendants, petitioner Susana G. Baldovi, the alleged buyer of the land in dispute, IS A STRANGER.
RULING OF COURT: The Court holds that this ruling of respondent judge is correct.
As pointed out by the Code Commission "it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same family" hence, "it is necessary that every effort should be made toward
a COMPROMISE BEFORE A LITIGATION IS ALLOWED TO BREED HATE AND PASSION IN
THE FAMILY" and "it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates DEEPER BITTERNESS
THAN BETWEEN STRANGERS".
These considerations DO NOT, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise
should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action WHENEVER A STRANGER TO
THE FAMILY IS A PARTY THERETO, whether as a necessary or indispensable one.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON,
respondents.
On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City
In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan,
Province of Capiz. That petitioners were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the
land registration case; that such income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of
P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter;
And that private respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of the land from
petitioners in bad faith.
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were MARRIED and alleged that private respondent
Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived
petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of
possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Mambusao,
the return thereof having been received by petitioners' counsel; that since then, petitioners have been directly
receiving rentals from the tenants of the land, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did
not allege that EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPROMISE had been made, considering
that petitioner AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT GREGORIO
HONTIVEROS ARE BROTHERS;

That the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and
void since it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial court;
That petitioners' claim for damages was barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there
were no rentals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value;
And that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to private
respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject property.
Private respondents PRAYED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT and for an order against
petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the
subject land to private respondents.
ISSUE:
T h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t p a l p a b l y e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e complaint on the ground
that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made prior to the
filing thereof as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT on the ground
that, although it alleged that earnest efforts had been made toward the settlement of the case but they

proved futile, the complaint was not verified for which reason the trial court could not believe the
veracity of the allegation. T h e a b s e n c e o f t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e d i n Ar t . 1 5 1 d o e s n o t
a f f e c t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t o v e r t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e complaint.
The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to
s e c u r e a n a s s u r a n c e t h a t m a t t e r s w h i c h a r e a l l e g e d a r e t r u e a n d correct.
If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among
members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already
ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverified p l e a d i n g s o r a c t o n i t a n d w a i v e
strict compliance with the rules
ino r d e r t h a t t h e e n d s o f j u s t i c e m a y b e s e r v e d .
O t h e r w i s e , m e r e suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the
allegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a compromise b u t t h e p a r t i e s ' e f fo r t s
p r o v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l i s n o t a g r o u n d f o r t h e dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that
such efforts had not r e a l l y b e e n e x e r t e d w o u l d t h e c o u r t b e j u s t i f i e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e action.
Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the
suit is not exclusively among the family members. Citing several cases decided by this Court, petitioners
claim that whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the
f a m i l y m e m b e r s , t h e r e q u i s i t e s h o w i n g t h e e a r n e s t e f f o r t s t o compromise is
n o l o n g e r m a n d a t o r y.
T h e y a rg u e t h a t s i n c e p r i v a t e respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros
family the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes t h e c a s e o u t o f t h e a m b i t o f Ar t . 1 5 1 o f t h e
Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase
" m em b e r s o f t h e s a m e f am i l y " r e f e r s t o t h e husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants
and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood.
As this Court held in Guerrero v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI:
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this
jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondentH o n t i v e r o s , a n d p e t i t i o n e r M a r i a H o n t i v e r o s , w h o i s a d m i t t e d l y t h e spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art.
151.
APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ, petitioners, vs.
RODOLFO G. MARTINEZ, respondent.
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a PARCEL OF LAND.
The former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed
to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr.
In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on

September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to
them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of
the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT.
Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so.
This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. THIS MATTER WAS
REFERRED TO THE BARANGAY FOR CONCILIATION AND SETTLEMENT BUT NONE WAS
REACHED. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made but the same proved futile.
On February 21, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Martinez.
The trial court declared that the spouses Martinez had substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family
Code of the Philippines[17] based on the allegations of the complaint and the appended certification to file
action issued by the barangay captain.
On November 27, 2003, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the decision of the
RTC. The appellate court ruled that the spouses Martinez HAD FAILED to comply with Article 151 of the
Family code. The CA also held that the defect in their complaint before the MTC was not cured by the filing of
an amended complaint because the latter pleading was not admitted by the trial court.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law WAS one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The PETITIONER
IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE SAME FAMILY AS THAT OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND AND THE
RESPONDENT. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150.
It should also be noted that the PETITIONERS WERE ABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF ARTICLE 151 BECAUSE THEY ALLEGED IN THEIR COMPLAINT THAT THEY HAD INITIATED
A PROCEEDING AGAINST THE RESPONDENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER IN THE
KATARUNGAN PAMBARANGAY in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable
settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122,
Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO, Respondent.
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a
complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe
and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for CANCELLATION OF MORTGAGE
contending that he did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of

mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones
that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have
executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply
with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out and to Declare
Defendants in Default. He argues that in cases WHERE ONE OF THE PARTIES IS NOT A MEMBER of the
same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege in the complaint that
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a
ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts that since three of the party-defendants are not members of his
family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable.
On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss.
On May 7, 2002, the RTC issued the second assailed Order denying petitioners Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
RULING OF COURT: At the outset, the Court notes that the instant Petition for Certiorari should have been
filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to its failure to comply with the
principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before
the CA. On this basis, the instant petition should be dismissed.
And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by petitioner, THE INSTANT PETITION
LIKEWISE FAILS FOR LACK OF MERIT.
Restating its arguments in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioner argues that what is applicable to the
present case is the Courts decision in De Guzman v. Genato[18] and not in Magbaleta v. Gonong,[19] the
former being a case involving a husband and wife while the latter is between brothers.
Hence, ONCE A STRANGER BECOMES A PARTY TO A SUIT INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE
SAME FAMILY, THE LAW NO LONGER MAKES IT A CONDITION PRECEDENT THAT
EARNEST EFFORTS BE MADE TOWARDS A COMPROMISE BEFORE THE ACTION CAN
PROSPER.
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a
case between brothers. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make
the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in the abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband and
his wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil
Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits involving members of the same family as
contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code.
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter

provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER
ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA
respondents.
FACTS: The sheriff levied on a PARCEL OF RESIDENTIAL LAND located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao
del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a PARCEL OF AGRICULTURAL
LAND located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name.
A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the RESIDENTIAL LAND IS WHERE THE
FAMILY HOME IS BUILT SINCE 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is EXEMPT
FROM EXECUTION, FORCED SALE OR ATTACHMENT under Article 152 and 153 except for
liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family
home is not one of those enumerated.
With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential
house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 IS NOT WELL-TAKEN. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides
that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT ARTICLE 152 AND 153 SHALL HAVE A RETROACTIVE
EFFECT such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE and are
EXEMPT from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code.
The said article simply means that ALL EXISTING FAMILY RESIDENCES at the time of the effectivity of
the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment WAS INCURRED
PRIOR the effectivity of the Family Code. This DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE EXEMPTIONS FROM
EXECUTION PROVIDED IN THE FC.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under

Article 153 of the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the
petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.
Manacop vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased RESIDENTIAL LOT WITH A
BUNGALOW. Private Respondent E & L MERCHANTILE, INC. filed a complaint against petitioner and
F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila TO COLLECT
INDEBTEDNESS. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT with private respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the
parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. Private respondent filed a motion for execution which
the lower court granted. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on
several vehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. These chattels were sold at public auction for
which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from
continuing to enforce them on the ground that the JUDGMENT WAS NOT YET EXECUTORY. Private
respondent opposed the motion. The lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the
prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. FINDING THAT PETITIONER
AND HIS COMPANY HAD NOT PAID THEIR INDEBTEDNESS EVEN THOUGH THEY COLLECTED
RECEIVABLES, THE LOWER COURT HELD THAT THE CASE HAD BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly
constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of
the Family Code be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of Family
Code.
RULING: The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 FC have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the FC and are exempt from execution for the payment
of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the FC. Art. 162 simply means that all existing family
residences at the time of the effectivity of the FC, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said
provisions are applicable. (n)
Equitable PCI Bank vs. OJ- Mark trading
G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010
Villarama, Jr., J:
FACTS:

Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank,
Inc. in the aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00. As security for the said amount, A REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE (REM) WAS EXECUTED OVER A CONDOMINIUM UNIT WHERE THE SPOUSES ARE
RESIDING. Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of the
registered owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.

Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation; thus, they offered to settle
their indebtedness with the assignment to the Bank of a commercial lot, which at that time, was not
transferred in their name. While petitioners officers held a meeting with respondent Martinez, the latter
however failed to submit the required documents such as certificates of title and tax declarations so that the
bank can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt via dacion en pago. Consequently, petitioner
initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.

On the other hand, respondents filed a civil case for TRO and annulment of the extrajudicial sale. They
alleged, among others, that the REM is void for having been illegally notarized; that the petitioner acted
in BAD FAITH because it did not officially inform them of the denial or of their proposal to settle the
loan obligation by dacion.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the TRO. The same was affirmed by the CA, the latter
holding that respondents have sufficiently shown their proprietary right over the condominium unit sought to be
foreclosed, entitling it to the questioned TRO. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 contending as follows:
1) it has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage because the respondents failed to settle their obligations;
2) there respondents have no right to an injunction because they have no clear right to a dacion en pago.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public
auction of the third-party mortgagors property.

HELD: The Court REVERSED the decision of the CA. The Court held that respondent spouses are NOT
entitled to an injunctive writ because their rights are merely contingent and not in esse. According to the Court:
1. Respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which the
writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.

On the face of their clear admission that they were unable to settle their obligations which were secured by

the mortgage, petitioner has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage. Foreclosure is but a necessary
consequence of non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the principal
obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the
property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation.
This Court has denied the application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction that would enjoin an extrajudicial
foreclosure of a mortgage, and declared that foreclosure is proper when the debtors are in default of the
payment of their obligation.

2. There was no bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

The respondents position, therefore, that petitioners act of initiating extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding while
they negotiated for a dacion en pago was illegal and done in bad faith is without merit. As respondent-spouses
themselves admitted, they failed to comply with the documentary requirements imposed by the petitioner for
proper evaluation of their proposal. In any event, petitioner had found the subdivision lots offered
for dacion as unacceptable, not only because the lots were not owned by respondents as in fact, the lots
were not yet titled but also for the reason that respondent Oscar Martinezs claimed right therein was
doubtful or inchoate, and hence not in esse.
Requests by debtors-mortgagors for extensions to pay and proposals for restructuring of the loans,
without acceptance by the creditor-mortgagee, remain as that. Without more, those proposals neither
novated the parties mortgage contract nor suspended its execution. In the same vein, negotiations for
settlement of the mortgage debt by dacion en pago do not extinguish the same nor forestall the creditormortgagees exercise of its right to foreclose as provided in the mortgage contract.

3. Respondent-spouses alleged proprietary right in the mortgaged condominium unit appears to be

based merely on respondents averment that respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation.

However, there is neither allegation nor evidence to show prima facie that such purported right, whether as
majority stockholder or creditor, was superior to that of petitioner as creditor-mortgagee. The rule requires that
in order for a preliminary injunction to issue, the application should clearly allege facts and circumstances
showing the existence of the requisites. It must be emphasized that an application for injunctive relief is
construed strictly against the pleader.

4. The contention that the family home is exempt from execution sale does not hold water.

The contention that the family home is exempt from execution is entirely inconsistent with the clear
contractual agreement of the REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes

respondents family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code
allows the execution or forced sale of a family home FOR DEBTS SECURED BY MORTGAGES ON THE
PREMISES BEFORE OR AFTER SUCH CONSTITUTION. Respondents thus failed to show an ostensible
right that needs protection of the injunctive writ.

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal
support. (226a)
Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head
of the family for a period of ten years OR for as long as there is a MINOR beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (238a)
Patricio vs Dario G.R. No. 170829
FACTS:
M a r c e l i n o V. D a r i o d i e d i n t e s t a t e . H e w a s s u r v i v e d b y h i s :
1 . Wif e , p e t i t i o n e r P e r l a G . P a t r i c i o
2. Their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario Jr. and
3. Marcelino G. Dario III. (private respondent)
H e l e f t a r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s e a n d a p r e - s c h o o l b u i l d i n g s i t u a t e d a t C u b a o , Quezon City.
Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extra judicially settled the estate of Marcelino V.
Dario.
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to
PARTITION THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AND TERMINATE THE CO-OWNERSHIP.

Private responded refused to partition the property.

Petitioner and Marcelino Marc filed an action for partition before RTC Quezon City

Trial court ordered the partition of the property.

Private respondents motion for reconsideration denied.
Appeal to the Court of Appeals denied:

Upon motion for reconsideration, CA DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR

PARTITION.
I t h e l d t h a t f a m i l y h om e s h o u l d c o n t i n u e d e s p i t e t h e d e a t h o f o n e o r b o t h
spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary

t h e r e o f . T h e h e i r s c o u l d n o t p a r t i t i o n t h e p r o p e r t y u n l e s s t h e court found
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. [ Son of the private respondent was a minor
beneficiary of the family home]
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home of the surviving heirs
of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10th year from the date of death of the
decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were
already of age at the time of the death of their father,[8] hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak
of.
ISSUE:
Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the CO-OWNERS R E F U S E
t o a c c e d e t o s u c h p a r t i t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t a m i n o r b e n e f i c i a r y s t i l l resides in the said
home.
HELD: Petition granted as the minor son does not satisfy all the requisites to be considered as a
beneficiary of the family home.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for
legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is
a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor.
This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries who
survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10 years,
there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home may be preserved for a
minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the
family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home.
After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until that
minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests
of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether
the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term DESCENDANTS contemplates all descendants of the
person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus,
private respondents minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first
requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private
respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or
within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal

grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is
the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of
the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
MARCELINO LORENZO R. DARIO IV IS DEPENDENT ON LEGAL SUPPORT NOT FROM HIS
GRANDMOTHER, BUT FROM HIS FATHER.
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under
Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Chapter 1. Legitimate Children
Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. (n)
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a
donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the
birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the
child. (55a, 258a)
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided
in this Code. (n)
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification
of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)

Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its

legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)

Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within THREE
HUNDRED days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof
to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred
days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred
days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a)
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination
of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a)

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his
heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and
three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or
his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact
of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a)
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)
Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during MINORITY or in a state of INSANITy. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and
sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil
Code. (264a)
Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (289a)
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)
Chapter 4. Legitimated Children
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, WERE NOT DISQUALIFIED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY each other may be
legitimated. (269a)
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (270a)
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (272a)
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a)
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their

descendants. (274)
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years
from the time their cause of action accrues.(275a)

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEAS,
plaintiffs, vs. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.
Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the
CIF of Camarines Sur for the RECOVERY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF A PARCEL
OF LAND situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of
Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having
acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS executed
by the latter in favor of the former.
Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house
to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak that he
could hardly move and get up from his bed. MARIA DUEAS, HIS WIFE, ELOPED WITH FELIX, and
both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as
husband and wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. Maria
Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.
The LOWER COURT RENDERED JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiffs:
(a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in
question;
(b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and
(c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.
Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano.
RULING: MARIANO IS THE LEGITIMATE SON OF EMILIANO.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed
to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife. It is already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living
together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within
300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than
that the issue is legitimate. It is also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was
physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof.
Republic Act No. 9255
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1 Series of 2004
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the
Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, Otherwise Known as the "Family Code of the

Philippines")
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A.
ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, respondents.

In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for
the latter to RECOGNIZE AND SUPPORT ROSENDO AS HIS BIOLOGICAL SON. Herrera denied
Armis allegations.
In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to
establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba.
However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered
widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is
unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.

HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing
doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, IN 2002 there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA
test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case
of People vs Vallejo (2002).

In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other
hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which
is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data:
1. HOW THE SAMPLES WERE COLLECTED,
2. HOW THEY WERE HANDLED,
3. THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTAMINATION OF THE SAMPLES,

4. THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN ANALYZING THE SAMPLES,

5. WHETHER THE PROPER STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES WERE
FOLLOWED IN CONDUCTING THE TESTS,
6. AND THE QUALIFICATION OF THE ANALYST WHO CONDUCTED THE
TESTS.

The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts before
admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:

1.

Whether the theory or technique can be tested,

2.

Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,

3.

Whether the rate of error is acceptable,

4.

Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that IN FILIATION CASES, before paternity inclusion can be had,
the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological
father. HOWEVER, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) DOES NOT
IMMEDIATELY RESULT

IN

THE

DNA TEST

RESULT

BEING

ADMITTED

AS

AN

OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged
father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a
refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.

What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological
father?

Then the evidence is merely corroborative.

Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an

exclusion of evidence TAKEN FROM HIS BODY when it may be material. There is no testimonial
compulsion in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.
There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a
prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the
putative father and child.
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information
directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained
from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that person;
(e) DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA
from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information
obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable
certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates
from the same person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons
(kinship analysis); and
(f) Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative
parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a given
population.
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne Diaz
G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007
Facts:
Nov 1993 Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted, and the friendship blossomed into
love.- J i n k y h o w e v e r , w a s a l r e a d y m a r r i e d t o H a s e g a w a K a t s u o , a J a p a n e s e nation
al, in spite of this, the lovers lived together out of which JOANNE DIAZ was born on Feb 25,
1998R o g e l i o i n i t i a l l y re c o g n i z e d J o a n n e a s h i s , O N LY T O A B A N D O N T H E FAM I LY
o n Sept 1998, Jinky thereafter files a complaint
J u d g m e n t r e n d e r e d i n f a v o r o f J i n k y , R o g e l i o f i l e s a n e w m o t i o n a n d i s granted.
RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelios admission that he was the one
w h o s h o u l d e r e d h o s p i t a l b i l l s d u r i n g J o a n n e s b i r t h a n d t h a t o n s o m e instances
he continued visiting Jinky after the birth of Joanne.
R o g e l i o g o e s t o t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , d u r i n g t h e p e n d e n c y o f t h e t r i a l , HOWEVER HE
DIES, and is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong.- CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA
analysis to finally determine the paternity of Joanne, hence the petition
Issue:
W/n the court erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that said analysis is no
longer feasible given that Rogelio Ong is dead
Held:
No, decision of the appellate court is affirmed.- Case discusses DNA testing again, see Herrera vs Alba.- The

new rules on DNA testing allows for the application of DNA testing for as long as biological samples
of Rogelio Ong is
presento B i o l o g i c a l s a m p l e s a n y o rg a n i c m a t e r i a l o r i g i n a t i n g f r o m t h e p e r s o n s body, even if
found on inanimate objects- Thus, even if Rogelio is dead, biological samples may be available and used for
DNA testing- A s h e l d i n Tec s o n v s C o m e l e c : A n y p h ys i c a l r e s i d u e o f t h e l o n g d e a d
parent could be resorted to.
Presently, DNA testing has evolved into a dependable and authoritative
formo f e v i d e n c e g a t h e r i n g , t h e C o u r t t h e r e f o r e r e i t e r a t e s i t s s t a n d t h a t D N A testing is a
valid means of determining paternity
Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. (n)
Tison vs. CA

FACTS: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are NIECE AND NEPHEW OF THE
DECEASED TEDORA DEZOLLER GUERRERO, who appears to be the sister of their father
Hermogenes Dezoller . The present action for RECONVEYANCE INVOLVES A PARCEL OF LAND
WITH A HOUSE AND APARTMENT which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 WITHOUT ANY ASCENDANT OR DESCENDANT,
and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father,
Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an
AFFIDAVIT OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT ADJUDICATING UNTO HIMSELF,
ALLEGEDLY AS SOLE HEIR, THE LAND IN DISPUTE.
Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter.
MARTIN GUERRERO DIED. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that
THEY ARE ENTITLED TO INHERIT ONE-HALF OF THE PROPERTY in question by right of
representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the
complaint for reconveyance .[7]
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented
by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible
and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of Hermogenes
HELD: NO. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the
rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

ONLY THE HUSBAND CAN CONTEST THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD BORN TO HIS WIFE. He
is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he
should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be
admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time
they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since
the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.
The PRIMARY PROOF that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered
a DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE WHICH IS ADMISSIBLE, as an EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
EVIDENCES PRESENTED: (a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller;
certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of
Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date
and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of
Martin and Teodora Guerrero.[4] Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these
exhibits to which a Comment[5] was filed by herein private respondent.)
All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs evidence should have been, as
it is hereby, denied.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.
Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli Corazon Angeles MAGLAYA
FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind 4 parcels
of land and a building, among other valuable properties.
Respondent Corazon claims that as the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF THE DECEASED AND
GENOVEVA MERCADO (former wife) has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required
of an administrator.
Petitioner Belen claims, as Franciscos second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made
administratix of Franciscos estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for,
although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, THE CORRESPONDING BIRTH
CERTIFICATE WAS NOT SIGNED BY HIM. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of

being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract
between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. She also said that
she and Francisco adopted a child.
Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938
records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 FranciscoGenoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing
to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the
RTC at Caloocan.
Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child. FOUR OTHER WITNESSES testified on her behalf, and she also offered in evidence her BIRTH
CERTIFICATE which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo,
Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word YES APPEARS
ON THE SPACE BELOW THE QUESTION LEGITIMATE? (Legitimo?). Pictures taken during
respondents wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T.Maglaya; a copy of her marriage contract, and her
scholastic and government service records, were also offered as evidence.
Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,[11] the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove
her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29, 2002,[13]
reversed and set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as
administratrix of the estate of Francisco
ISSUE: WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado?
HELD: NO. CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of, and, t
herefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 164). However, the presumption of legitimacy
under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs
parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF FRANCISCOS MARRIAGE TO
GENOVEVA, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented WAS NOT
SIGNED BY FRANCISCO against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only
signed by the attending physician making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child.
The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it CANNOT BE MADE DEPENDENT
ON THE DECLARATION OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE, OR THAT OF THE
MOTHER OF THENEWBORN CHILD. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove
filiation or recognition.
Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their
child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter
of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondents legitimate filiation to Francisco
and the latters marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated
between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the
latter.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the deceased.

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a
donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the
birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the
child. (55a, 258a)
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or
Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE,
respondents.
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in
December 1989, and begotten a child named JOSE GERARDO in December 1990.
The husband filed on December 1991, a PETITION TO HAVE HIS MARRIAGE ANNULLED ON THE
GROUND OF BIGAMY since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom
according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC.
Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of
an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the SURNAME OF THE SON CHANGED FROM
CONCEPCION TO ALMONTE, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers
surname.
After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo
but of Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied.[18]
Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child
who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against

its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE,
respondents.
HELD: The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception.[28] To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code,
it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that THERE WAS NO ACCESS THAT COULD HAVE
ENABLED THE HUSBAND TO FATHER THE CHILD.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.[30
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation
between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible
for them to engage in the marital act.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her
illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is
the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. AN ASSERTION BY THE MOTHER AGAINST THE
LEGITIMACY OF HER CHILD CANNOT AFFECT THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD BORN OR
CONCEIVED WITHIN A VALID MARRIAGE.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma.
Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them.
All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively
lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.[37] A MOTHER HAS NO RIGHT TO DISAVOW A
CHILD BECAUSE MATERNITY IS NEVER UNCERTAIN.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by
law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that HER OFFSPRING IS ILLEGITIMATE.[39] The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean
toward the legitimacy of children.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the
child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall
have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code
on surnames. GERARDO CANNOT THEN IMPOSE HIS SURNAME TO BE USED BY THE CHILD,

SINCE IN THE EYES OF THE LAW, THE CHILD IS NOT RELATED TO HIM IN ANY WAY.

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.

FACTS:
-Presentacion (petitioner THEN) filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of Birth of Teofista
(respondent) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. Presentacion asserted that she was the only surviving child of
the late Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa.
-Months after the spouses' death, a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the spouses' house and the baby's
mother, Flora Guinto, and the housemaid simulated that the baby girl was the spouses' child.
-Petitioner personally witnessed Flora give birth to Teofista as contested that the birth certificate of Teofista
Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false
entries, and it was medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child because:
1.) Hermogena was already 54 years old;
2.) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born.
-Teofista contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 of the Family Code states that
the CHILD'S FILIATION CAN BE IMPUGNED ONLY BY THE FATHER OR, IN SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES, HIS HEIRS. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
She averred that she was always known as Teofista Babiera, and she and petitioner are full-blood sisters.
CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH, CERTIFICATE OF BAPTISM AND STUDENT'S REPORT CARD ARE
SHOWN with Hermogena's signature are Teofista's proof. She also pointed out that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.
-CA DEEMED INAPPLICABLE ARTICLES 170 AND 171 OF THE FAMILY CODE, which stated that
only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It
held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the
wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being
void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the mother.

ISSUES:
1. Does Presentacion have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal?
2. Is the special proceeding on appeal improper and is barred by the statute of limitation (prescription)?
3. Has CA failed to hold that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral
testimony of respondent?

RULING:

1. This argument is incorrect. Presentacion has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section
2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of Presentacion
in the civil status of Teofista stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. THE
CASE CONCERNED THE PROPERTIES INHERITED BY RESPONDENT FROM HER PARENTS.

2. The PRESENT ACTION INVOLVES THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONER'S BIRTH

CERTIFICATE; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the
Family Code DOES NOT APPLY. Verily, the action to NULLIFY THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE DOES
NOT PRESCRIBE, because it was allegedly void ab initio.

3. While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of
regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during
trial, sufficiently negate such presumption.

First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was NOT SIGNED
BY THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR. More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the
MOTHER'S SIGNATURE THEREIN WAS DIFFERENT from her signatures in other documents
presented during the trial.

Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's
real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and
doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to
the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.
Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible
for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home ,
when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of HERMOGENA BABIERA WHICH
STATES THAT SHE DID NOT GIVE BIRTH TO PETITIONER, and that the latter was not hers nor her
husband Eugenio's.
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO
AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian HAD VARIOUS PROPERTIES. Isabel died in 1982 while
his husband died in 1989 (BOTH INTESTATE). The special proceedings for administration of the properties
were filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister VICTORIA B. LIRIO FILED FOR ISSUANCE OF

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION IN FAVOR OF THE NEPHEW.

Marissa opposed the petition, saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is capable of
administering his estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the spouses
TREATED HER AS THEIR OWN DAUGHTER.
The relatives of Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence, that THE SPOUSES FAILED TO
BEGET A CHILD during their marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological
child of the spouses who were unable to physically procreate.
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of Marissa.
On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological
child of the late spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the late spouses.
RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. The above
provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain
couple.
In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;

(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification
by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which the husband or any of his heirs should
file an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was
not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that HE AND HIS
BROTHER-IN-LAW ARE THE SOLE HEIRS OF THE ESTATE.
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during MINORITY or in a state of INSANITy. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (289a)

BERNABE VS ALEJO
Doctrine:
Procedural laws do not create vested rights. Test for determining whether rule is substantive/procedural: If
the rule merely regulates procedure, that is the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties, and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them, it is merely PROCEDURAL.
But if the rule creates a right, such as the right to appeal, it is SUBSTANTIVE. However, if it operates merely as a
means to implementing an existing right, then the rule merely deals with PROCEDURE.
Facts:
Fiscal Bernabe (married to Rosalina) fathered a SON WITH HIS SECRETARY ALEJO.
In 1993, Fiscal Bernabe and his legitimate wife Rosalinda died, leaving their only daughter Ernestina as heir.
In 1994, Secretary Alejo filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared and acknowledged as Fiscal
Bernabes son and thus be given a share in his estate.
Relevant CC and FC provisions:
CC 285: The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1)If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the EXPIRATION OF FOUR YEARS FROM THE ATTAINMENT OF
HIS MAJORITY;
(2)If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case,
the action must be COMMENCED WITHIN FOUR YEARS FROM THE FINDING OF

THE DOCUMENT.
FC 172: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private hand written instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
FC 173: The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority orin a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by
the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both ofthe parties.
FC 174: Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as
legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Procedure:
RTC: Dismissed the complaint.
Death of putative father barred the action because under the FC, if the putative father had not acknowledged the
child in writing, the action should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father. In this case, father
is already dead.
CA: Allowed the complaint to proceed.
Since Adrian was born in 1981, his rights are governed by CC, not FC, which allows an action for recognition to
be filed within 4 years after the child has attained age of majority. The enactment of the FC did not take
away that right.
Issue/s:
1. (TOPICAL) When is the period to file an action for recognition? CC must be applied, hence,
4 years after child attains age of Majority.
2. (IRRELEVANT) Whether CC 285 is limited to natural children? NO.
3. (IRRELEVANT) Whether the complaint must fail for failure to implead CA. NO.
Held/Ratio:
1. CC provision at BAR IS A SUBSTANTIVE LAW (not merely procedural) which gives rise to a vested
right which cannot be imparied by the retroactive applicaton of the FC.
The FC provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to itsenactment should not be prejudiced
or impaired (FC 255). Adrians right to an action or recognition under the CC is a VESTED RIGHT
(definition of vested right: that which is absolute and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists
and is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.)
IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE
: Respondent argues that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and as a general rule, no vested

right may attach or arise from procedural laws.

The SC in this case held that the provision at bar is SUBSTANTIVE LAW, and not merely procedural. Hence,
vested right may attach.
FABIAN VS DESIERTO
: the SC laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive/procedural: If the rule merely regulates
procedure, that is the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties, and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them, it is merely PROCEDURAL. But if the rule creates a right, such as the right
to appeal, it is SUBSTANTIVE. However, if it operates merely as a means to implementing an existing right, then the rule merely
deals with PROCEDURE.2.CC 285 is not limited to natural children.
Definition of natural children: one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal
impediment from marrying each other.
While CC 285 explicitly refers to natural children, it has been applied by the SC liberally.
The new Rules of Court no longer requires the lower judges/courts to be impleaded as
petitioner/respondent. Hence, failure to implead CA is not an error, it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
ARUEGO VS. CA
The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article
285 of the Civil Code.
FACTS: Private respondent Antonia & Evelyn Aruego, as represented by her mother Fabian, filed a petition, in
the RTC, compelling the Aruego children of Torres to recognize and acknowledge them as compulsory heirs
of the deceased Jose. M. Aruego; on the grounds that they possess an open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children to wit:
(a)The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his
children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad different
paternal ways.
(b)The plaintiffs are thus, in CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS
OF (ILLEGITIMATE) CHILDREN of the deceased Jose M.Aruego who showered them, with the
continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above outlined.
Petitioner denied all these allegations.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondent, declaring Antonia Aruego as
illegitimate daughter of Jose M. Aruego.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging that the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the
complaint by virtue of the passage of Family Code of the Philippines. The motion was denied the lower court.
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Respondent Court of Appeals. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. A motion for

reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the respondent court.
ISSUES: Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
W/N the provisions of the Family Code be applied.
W/N the application of the Family Code in this case impairs nay vested rights of the private respondent such
that it should not be given retroactive effect.
DECISION:
The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The action brought by private
respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was
filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, MUST BE GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 285 OF THE CIVIL
CODE and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; x x x.
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application
will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article285 of the Civil
Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and
its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT
CUYUGAN, respondent
Herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor CHAD D. CUYUGAN,
filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the
administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo.
Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time,
plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence
thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest

of said Atty. Ocampo

Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5,
1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for
being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein plaintiff
Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his
deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs
The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo ARE HIS CHILDREN, namely:
Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose
behalf this instant complaint is filed.
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an
inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine
and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the ESTATE OF THE DECEASED; AND TO GIVE HIM
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that
the action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and
judicial personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action;
and that there is improper joinder of causes of action
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, 6 petitioner filed on
December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and
enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on
the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the motion
to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses
RULING OF COURT:
the case at bar is that AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT THEREIN, THE
PETITIONER IN THAT CASE HAD ALREADY REACHED THE AGE OF MAJORITY, whereas the
claimant in the present case is still a minor.
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the
putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege
in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the
putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure
of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, BUT THE PRESCRIPTION OF
THE ACTION.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by
herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the
deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as
one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to
claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

If the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the
child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the ACTION MAY
BE BROUGHT DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE CHILD. However, if the action is BASED ON THE
OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION BY THE CHILD OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that
the ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE ALLEGED PARENT. 13
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been
filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the
alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from
the attainment of majority of the minor child.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. 1
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all surnamed UYGUANGCO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA and GRACIANO BACJAO
UYGUANGCO, respondents. 178 SCRA 684 (1989)

Facts: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975.

He left his wife and 4 legitimate children (petitioners) some properties which they divided among themselves.
GRACIANO BACJAO UYGUANGCO filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners, alleging
that as the illegitimate son of the deceased and Anastacia Bacjao, he mus t not be left out of the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
Petitioners moved to DISMISS THE CASE on the ground that Graciano could not prove his alleged
filiation having none of the documents mentioned in Art. 278, CCrecord of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Neither may he resort to Art. 285,
CC which provides that the action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in certain case. Because he IS ALREADY AN
ADULT when his alleged father died and his claim did not come under the exceptions, he could not resort to
Art. 285.
H e h o w e v e r i n s i s t s t h a t h e h a s r i g h t t o s h o w u n d e r A r t . 2 8 3 t h a t h e i s i n continuous
possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct actsof the latter or of his family.
The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. 1 The latter court held
that the trial judge had not committed any grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in
ALLOWING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PROVE HIS FILIATION. Moreover, the proper remedy
was an ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for a reversal of these rulings on
the ground that they are not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Issue: WON Graciano may adequately prove filiation

RULING:
NO. Present petition granted & complaint for partition dismissed
The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified by the Family Code which
is now controlling.
Since illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same waya nd on the same evidence
as legitimate children (Art 175), Graciano may establish his filiation by the means given in Art. 172.
Thus while he has no record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment or an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument AND SIGNED BY THE
PARENT concerned, he insists that he has nevertheless been IN AN OPEN AND CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, WHICH IS ADMISSIBLE AS
EVIDENCE OF FILIATION UNDER ART. 172.
As proof to this open and continuous possessionhe claims that he lived with his father from 1967 til 1973,
received support from him, used the name Uyguangco without objection, a special power of attorney executed
in his favor by Apolinarioswife, and another one by Suplcio Uyguangco, shared in the profits of the
copra family business of the Uyguangcos and was even given a share in his deceased fathers estate as
found in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners.
However, since his father has already died, HIS ACTION IS NOW BARRED AS ART. 172
SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES THAT WHEN THE ACTION IS BASED ON OTHER PROOFS OF
FILIATIONS SUCH AS OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION, THE ACTION MUST BE
BROUGHT DURING THE LIFETIMEOF THE ALLEGED PARENT.
Rationale for the rule:
It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children
are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.
Who then can be sure of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the
legitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be
given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she
is already dead.
Gracianos complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario, whose estate is
the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be proved in an action
for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue
of Gracianos filiation is being raised only collaterally.
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he SEEKS TO PROVE HIS FILIATION
UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE, HIS ACTION IS
NOW BARRED BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED FATHER'S DEATH IN 1975. The second paragraph of this
Article 175 reads as follows:
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
However, the Court expressed the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement based

on fraternal and moral ties that will allow Graciano an equitable share in the disputed estate.
CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUACAO, respondents. (G.R.

NO. 86302)
FACTS: Private respondent Teopista Toring Tuacao alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930 to
Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana
Barrientos.
She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according to her
the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically DENIED the plaintiff's allegations and set-up a
counter claim for damages and attorney's fees.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was
Casimiro. When she married Vallentin Tuacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to
drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her
and her husband. In 1977. Casimiro allowed his son, LolitoTuacao, to build a house on his lot and later he
gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring.
On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor.
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, both relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio said he was a cousin of
Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in a salt-bed in Opao. Casimiro
himself told him she was his sweetheart.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's
brother, and his grand mother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint WARRANTS for compulsory recognition.
HELD: YES, the complaint warrants for compulsory recognition.
All illegitimate child to be entitled to support and successional rights from his putative or presumed
parents must prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be established by the voluntary or compulsory
recognition of the illegitimate child. It is COMPULSORY WHEN BY COURT ACTION THE CHILD
BRINGS OUT HIS RECOGNITION.
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and Special Laws", according to the Family Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that
the defendant is her father", according to the Civil Code.
Statements of Gaudencio and Isaac falls on Rule 130, Section 39 of the Rules of Court pertaining to Acts or
Declaration of pedigree. Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended
from the rejection of such proof than from its admission". If we consider the other circumstances narrated under
oath by the respondent and her witnesses, WE CAN REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT TEOPISTA WAS
THE ILLEGITIMATE DAUGHTER OF CASIMIRO MENDOZA.
Judgement is hereby rendered declaring Teopisto Toring Tuacao to be the illegitimate child of the late

Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.
Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and
that she was the ONE SUPPORTING THE CHILD. She recounted that after her husband left her in the
early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as
petitioners household help.
It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where
they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The
sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was
pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where
he rented a house for her.
He testified that HE WAS A SUGAR PLANTER AND A BUSINESSMAN. Sometime in December, 1981, he
hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her
husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioners wife, hence she
was told to look for another job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Years Eve in Cadiz
City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While
they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later,
they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse.

While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with
the child of her husband.

After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that
she MISREPRESENTED HERSELF AS A WIDOW when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in
favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, BASED ON THE
PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF THE CHILD THEN THERE CAN NEVER BE A DOUBT THAT THE
PLAINTIFF-MINOR IS THE CHILD OF THE DEFENDANT with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia

Regodos.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

RULING OF COURT: Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation.[6] An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
PATERNITY OR FILIATION IS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.[

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is NO SHOWING THAT THE PUTATIVE FATHER HAD A HAND IN THE PREPARATION
OF SAID CERTIFICATE.

The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a
third person.

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate court
brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both
courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony.

We disagree.

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the
policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in
Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents petition for recognition and
support is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO v ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
Procedural History:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a
Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against BenHur Nepomuceno (petitioner).
By Order of July 4, 2001, Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, granted Arhbencels prayer for support pendente
lite in the amount of P3,000 a month.

On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007, reversed the trial courts
decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008, petitioner comes
before this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Statement of Facts:
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner
with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a
HANDWRITTEN NOTE dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her
financial support in the amount ofP1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15,
1999.

Arguing that HER FILIATION TO PETITIONER WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE HANDWRITTEN

NOTE, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to:
(1) recognize her as his child,
(2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and
(3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.

By Order of July 4, 2001, Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioners handwritten note
which it treated as contractual support since the issue of Arhbencels filiation had yet to be determined
during the hearing on the merits, GRANTED ARHBENCELS PRAYER FOR SUPPORT pendente lite in the
amount of P3,000 a month.

The petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7, 2006, whereu
the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007, reversed the trial courts
decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioners illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to
give Arhbencel financial support in the increased amount of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month,
or a total of P8,000 a month.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008, petitioner comes
before this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the note would be sufficient for filiation of an illegitimate child?
Answer:
NO. As demand for support is dependent on the determination of her filiation (Art. 195 par. 4). The
note not containing any statement on As filiation to C does not fall under Art. 172(2) vis--vis Art. 175 which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
Reasoning:
The note does not contain any statement about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the
ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent EVIDENCE OF
ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION AN ADMISSION OF FILIATION IN A PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN
INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY THE PARENT CONCERNED.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to
in Herrera case for it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no
probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the LATTER NOT HAVING SIGNED THE SAME.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The
Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)
ANN BRIGITT LEONARDO as represented by her parents GLORIA LEONARDO and EDDIE
FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TOMAS AFRICA, et al., respondents.
Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was on July 14, 1993 born in Manila to common-law-spouses Eddie B.
Fernandez and Gloria C. Leonardo.[1] In her birth certificate, her given surname is that of her mother,
Leonardo.[2]
As petitioners parents later wanted her to carry the surname of her father, the latter executed an
AFFIDAVIT[3] of July 29, 1994 to this effect and wrote a letter[4] of August 1, 1994 to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila requesting for the change of petitioners registered surname.
The Local Civil Registrar of Manila Lucena D. Dacuan DENIED THE REQUEST OF PETITIONERS
parents on the ground that petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry her mothers surname as provided under
ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE[5] which took effect on August 3, 1988.[6] Dacuan also cited
Article 412 of the New Civil Code which provides that NO ENTRY IN THE CIVIL REGISTER SHALL BE
CHANGED OR CORRECTED WITHOUT A JUDICIAL ORDER.
Petitioners parents appealed the denial of their request for change of petitioners surname to the Civil
Registrar General, they citing, among others, the following provision of Title XIII:
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of
the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent.
Petitioners parents thus sought before the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) the
review of the Civil Registrar Generals decision denying their appeal.
Undaunted, petitioners parents appealed to the Office of the President which, by letter[9] of May 11, 1995,
upheld the decision of the Civil Registrar General and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that the cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry must be brought directly before courts of law.
In the case at bar, the PRIMARY ISSUE to be resolved before determining petitioners available remedy under

the facts of the case is whether an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code has the
right to use her fathers surname.
RULING OF COURT: This Court rules in the negative.
Article 176 of the Family Code reads:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local
Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child
using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latters consent.
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the
father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate, thereby
eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Since petitioner was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to use her
fathers surname.
WHEREFORE, upon the ground discussed above, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, WERE NOT DISQUALIFIED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY each other may be
legitimated.
REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW
MARRYING AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AS AMENDED
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines",
as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
former, WERE NOT DISQUALIFIED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY EACH OTHER, or were so
disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, MAY BE
LEGITIMATED."
"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation."
Section 2. Implementing Rules. The civil Registrar General shall, in consultation with the chairpersons of the
Committee on Revision of Laws of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Youth, Women and
Family Relations of the Senate, the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the

Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine
Association of Civil Registrars (PACR) and the UP Law Center, issue the necessary rules/regulations for the
effective implementation of this Act not later than one (1) month from its effectivity.
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE
SANTOS, respondents.
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter,
herein petitioner MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS. After some time, their relationship became strained to
the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, CONCHITA TALAG, PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HEREIN. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce
decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been
cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967,
Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, ANTONIO AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CONTRACTED A MARRIAGE IN TAGAYTAY CITY celebrated under Philippine laws.
On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court 1 asking for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that
the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and
petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was granted.
AFTER SIX YEARS of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus,
in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter alia that PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
CHILDREN WERE ILLEGITIMATE.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the court a quo
passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and
declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
RULING OF COURT: Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that
since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.
This argument is tenable.
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
are natural.
In the case at bench, there is NO QUESTION THAT ALL THE CHILDREN BORN TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AND DECEASED ANTONIO DE SANTOS WERE CONCEIVED AND BORN WHEN

THE LATTER'S VALID MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER'S MOTHER WAS STILL SUBSISTING.

It creates another category of illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are
void from the beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as
"ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and
obligations as such kind of children.
The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children, depending on their
filiation: use of SURNAME, SUCCESSION, AND SUPPORT.
Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. 2 Thus, they "shall principally use
the surname of the father," 3 and shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants and
descendants, 4 as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents, 5 and to
other successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as effects of legitimacy cannot be
renounced."
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by
legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much
more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner
in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that
her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only
half of her share.
The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the corresponding gradation of their rights may
conceivably be shattered by elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate
children to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their
parents blessed their union with a valid marriage.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of the Civil
Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate.
"Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated
November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de
Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos and, as such,
entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
SO ORDERED.

ADOPTION
Art. 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights MAY ADOPT, provided he
is in a position to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of
the family.
ONLY MINORS MAY BE ADOPTED, EXCEPT in the cases when the adoption of a person of majority
age is allowed in this Title.
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be adopted, UNLESs the

adopter is the PARENT BY NATURE OF THE ADOPTED, OR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE LEGITIMATE
PARENT of the person to be adopted. (27a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the
termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative
by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 185. Husband and wife must JOINTLY adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. (29a, EO and PD 603)
Art. 187. The following MAY NOT BE ADOPTED:
(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to
the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child
DURING MINORITY.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded.
(30a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be NECESSARY:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over,
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent, if living with said parent and
the latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (31a, EO 91 and PD 603)
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both

shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the SURNAME OF THE ADOPTERS;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in
the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted,
parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. (39(1)a, (3)a,
PD 603)
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall
INHERIT FROM THE ADOPTED, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession;
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the
adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the
other half, by the adopters;
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall
divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the
adopted and the other half, by the adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they
shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third
by the surviving spouse, and one-third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and
(6) When ONLY COLLATERAL BLOOD RELATIVES OF THE ADOPTED SURVIVE, THEN THE
ORDINARY RULES of legal or intestate succession shall apply. (39(4)a, PD 603)
Art. 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the ADOPTION MAY BE JUDICIALLY
RESCINDED UPON PETITION of any person authorized by the court or proper government instrumental
acting on his behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the adopted
is at least eighteen years of age, HE MAY PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RESCISSION OF THE ADOPTION
ON THE SAME GROUNDS PRESCRIBED FOR DISINHERITING AN ASCENDANT. (40a, PD 603)
Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the
following cases:
(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting ground for disinheriting a descendant; or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one year,
or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption. (41a, PD 603)
Art. 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the
adoption, the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature,
unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the
person and property of the minor. If the adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court
shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both.
Judicial RESCISSION OF THE ADOPTION SHALL EXTINGUISH ALL RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE ADOPTERS AND THE ADOPTED arising from the relationship of parent

and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his
surname prior to the adoption.

The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries. (42a, PD 603)

Republic Act No. 8552 February 25, 1998

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF
FILIPINO CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 4. Counseling Service. The Department shall provide the services of licensed social workers to the
following:
(a) Biological Parent(s) Counseling shall be provided to the parent(s) before and after the birth of
his/her child. No binding commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before the birth of his/her
child. A period of six (6) months shall be allowed for the biological parent(s) to reconsider any decision
to relinquish his/her child for adoption before the decision becomes irrevocable. Counseling and
rehabilitation services shall also be offered to the biological parent(s) after he/she has relinquished
his/her child for adoption.
Steps shall be taken by the Department to ensure that no hurried decisions are made and all alternatives
for the child's future and the implications of each alternative have been provided.
(b) Prospective Adoptive Parent(s) Counseling sessions, adoption fora and seminars, among others,
shall be provided to prospective adoptive parent(s) to resolve possible adoption issues and to prepare
him/her for effective parenting.
(c) Prospective Adoptee Counseling sessions shall be provided to ensure that he/she understands the
nature and effects of adoption and is able to express his/her views on adoption in accordance with
his/her age and level of maturity.
ARTICLE III ELIGIBILITY
Section 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to
support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16)
year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological
parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her
country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the
Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to
adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity
or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse; or
(c) The GUARDIAn with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her
financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

Republic Act 8043

"AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES TO GOVERN INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION OF FILIPINO
CHILDREN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act. the term:
(a) Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a
FOREIGNER OR A FILIPINO CITIZEN permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed,
the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the
Philippines.
xxx
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995."
ARTICLE III PROCEDURE Sec. 7. Inter-Country Adoption as the Last Resort. The Board shall ensure
that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-country
adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that
steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before the child is placed for inter-country adoption:
Provided, however, That the maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six
hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years.
Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. In
order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the
Board:
(a)Child study; (b)Birth certificate/foundling certificate; (c)Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of
abandonment/death certificate of parents; (d)Medical evaluation /history; (e)Psychological evaluation,
as necessary; and (f)Recent photo of the child.
Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. An alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an
application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be
adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the
spouse of such parent;
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national
laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;

(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to
all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains
a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and
(i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable
Philippine laws.
Republic Act No. 9523 March 12, 2009
AN ACT REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS
A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DOMESTIC
ADOPTION ACT OF 1998, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

(A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC)

A. Domestic Adoption
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule covers the domestic adoption of Filipino children.
Sec. 2. Objectives.
(a) The best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration in all matters relating to his care,
custody and adoption, in accordance with Philippine laws, the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights
of the Child, UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children
with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption, Nationally and Internationally, and the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption.
(b) The State shall provide alternative protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every
child who is a foundling, neglected, orphaned, or abandoned. To this end, the State shall:
(i)

(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his parents and is provided with love,
care, understanding and security for the full and harmonious development of his personality. Only
when such efforts prove insufficient and no appropriate placement or adoption within the childs
extended family is available shall adoption by an unrelated person be considered.
safeguard the biological parents from making hasty decisions in relinquishing their parental
authority over their child;
prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his biological parents;
conduct public information and educational campaigns to promote a positive environment for
adoption;
ensure that government and private sector agencies have the capacity to handle adoption
inquiries, process domestic adoption applications and offer adoption-related services including,
but not limited to, parent preparation and post-adoption education and counseling;
encourage domestic adoption so as to preserve the childs identity and culture in his native

(vii)

land, and only when this is not available shall inter-country adoption be considered as a last resort;
and
protect adoptive parents from attempts to disturb their parental authority and custody over their
adopted child.

Any voluntary or involuntary termination of parental authority shall be administratively or judicially declared
so as to establish the status of the child as legally available for adoption and his custody transferred to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any duly licensed and accredited child-placing or childcaring agency, which entity shall be authorized to take steps for the permanent placement of the child.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Child is a person below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the filing of the petition for
adoption.
(b) A CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION refers to a child who has been voluntarily or
involuntarily committed to the Department or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing or childcaring agency, freed of the parental authority of his biological parents, or in case of rescission of
adoption, his guardian or adopter(s).
(c) Voluntarily committed child is one whose parents knowingly and willingly relinquish parental
authority over him in favor of the Department.
(d) Involuntarily committed child is one whose parents, known or unknown, have been permanently
and judicially deprived of parental authority over him due to abandonment; substantial, continuous or
repeated neglect and abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities.
(e) Foundling refers to a deserted or abandoned infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are
unknown; or a child committed to an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with unknown
facts of birth and parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a foundling.
(f) Abandoned child refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose parents
have deserted him for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and has been judicially declared
as such.
(g) Dependent child refers to one who is without a parent, guardian or custodian or one whose parents,
guardian or other custodian for good cause desires to be relieved of his care and custody and is
dependent upon the public for support.
(h) Neglected child is one whose basic needs have been deliberately not attended to or inadequately
attended to, physically or emotionally, by his parents or guardian.
(i) Physical neglect occurs when the child is malnourished, ill-clad and without proper shelter.
(j) Emotional neglect exists when a child is raped, seduced, maltreated, exploited, overworked or made
to work under conditions not conducive to good health or made to beg in the streets or public places, or
placed in moral danger, or exposed to drugs, alcohol, gambling, prostitution and other vices.
(k) Child-placement agency refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the Department to
provide comprehensive child welfare services including, but not limited to, receiving applications for
adoption, evaluating the prospective adoptive parents and preparing the adoption home study report.
(l) Child-caring agency refers to an agency duly licensed and accredited by the Department that
provides 24-hour residential care services for abandoned, orphaned, neglected or voluntarily
committed children.
(m)Department refers to the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(n) "Deed of Voluntary Commitment refers to the written and notarized instrument relinquishing
parental authority and committing the child to the care and custody of the Department executed by
the childs biological parents or in their absence, mental incapacity or death, by the childs legal
guardian, to be witnessed by an authorized representative of the Department after counseling and other

services have been made available to encourage the biological parents to keep the child.
(o) Child Study Report refers to a study made by the court social worker of the childs legal status,
placement history, psychological, social, spiritual, medical, ethno-cultural background and that of his
biological family needed in determining the most appropriate placement for him.
(p) Home Study Report refers to a study made by the court social worker of the motivation and
capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to provide a home that meets the needs of a child.
(q) Supervised trial custody refers to the period of time during which a social worker oversees the
adjustment and emotional readiness of both adopters and adoptee in stabilizing their filial relationship.
(r) Licensed Social Worker refers to one who possesses a degree in bachelor of science in social work
as a minimum educational requirement and who has passed the government licensure examination for
social workers as required by Republic Act No. 4373.
(s) Simulation of birth is the tampering of the civil registry to make it appear in the birth records that
a certain child was born to a person who is not his biological mother, thus causing such child to lose
his true identity and status.
(t) Biological Parents refer to the childs mother and father by nature.
(u) Pre-Adoption Services refer to psycho-social services provided by professionally-trained social
workers of the Department, the social services units of local governments, private and government
health facilities, Family Courts, licensed and accredited child-caring and child-placement agencies and
other individuals or entities involved in adoption as authorized by the Department.
(v) Residence means a persons actual stay in the Philippines for three (3) continuous years
immediately prior to the filing of a petition for adoption and which is maintained until the adoption
decree is entered. TEMPORARY ABSENCES FOR PROFESSIONAL, BUSINESS, HEALTH, OR
EMERGENCY REASONS NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY (60) DAYS IN ONE (1) YEAR DOES
NOT BREAK THE CONTINUITY REQUIREMENT.
(w) Alien refers to any person, not a Filipino citizen, who enters and remains in the Philippines and is in
possession of a valid passport or travel documents and visa.

TEOTICO VS DEL VAL

GR NO. L18753, MARCH 26, 1965
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among
the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs niece,
Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the
ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses.
Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed by will.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was OPPOSED BY ANA DEL VAL CHAN,
claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged
natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), Ana Del Val Chan filed and opposition alleging that the
will was not executed as required by law, the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the
will, and the will was executed under duress.

The probate court allowed the opposition, who further alleged that the legacy to Dr. Teotico was void, him
being the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last illness. The question whether the oppositor has
the right to oppose as well as the validity of the will are the main issues of the case.
ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.
HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that
he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor.
Under the terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate
either as HEIR, EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR because it did not appear therein any provision
designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a
legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE.
Even if her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that RELATIONSHIP ESTABLISHED BY
ADOPTION IS LIMITED SOLELY TO THE ADOPTER AND ADOPTED and does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of
the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LEONOR VALENCIA, AS NATURAL

MOTHER AND GUARDIAN OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO;
AND THE HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU, BRANCH XI.
Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. (special proceedings)
The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in
the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors,
those harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation
of parents, etc., and NOT CHANGES OR CORRECTIONS INVOLVING CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY,
OR CITIZENSHIP WHICH ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTROVERSIAL.
The trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the
Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City and Go Eng.

Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the
petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to
"Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother
from "married" to "single" the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do
the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss granting the instant petition and ordering the Local Civil
Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction.
ISSUE: The petitioner Republic of the Philippines raises a lone error for the grant of this petition, stating that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S
CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS OF HER MINOR
CHILDREN BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO.
RULING: The petitioner premises its case on precedents from the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic (94
Phil. 321) to the 1981 case of Republic v. Caparosso (107 SCRA 67), that entries which can be corrected under
Article 412 of the New Civil Code as implemented by Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court refer to those
mistakes that are clerical in nature or changes that are harmless and innocuous.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding- One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the
latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding."
Changes or corrections in the entries in the civil registry were governed, at first, by Act No. 3753 (Civil
Registry Law) which placed these matters exclusively upon the sound judgment and discretion of the civil
registrars. With the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, these matters were governed by
Article 412 thereof which prescribes judicial order before an entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected. This requirement was deemed necessary to forestall the commission of fraud or other mischief in
these matters.
But even then, it is not any correction that can be considered under Article 412 of The Civil Code. The nature of
the corrections sought has to be considered and if found to refer only to clerical errors the same may be allowed
under said article which was construed to contemplate only a summary proceeding.
The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth
about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or
approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system.
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, THE SUIT OR PROCEEDING IS
APPROPRIATE.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order
fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can
no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed
either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled
and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary
proceedings.
We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CANG VS COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were MARRIED , begot three children. During
the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
N o t l o n g t h e r e a f t e r, h o w e v e r, A n n a M a r i e l e a r n e d o f h e r husband's alleged extramarital
affair.
Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted . They had an
agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the
written consent of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US.
M e a n w h i l e , t h e b r o t h e r a n d s i s t e r - i n - l a w o f A n n a Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor
Cang children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the
petition for adoption was granted by the court.
Issue:
C a n m i n o r c h i l d r e n b e l e g a l l y a d o p t e d w i t h o u t t h e written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
A r t i c l e 2 5 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e p r o v i d e s f o r i t s retroactivity "insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or a c q u i r e d r i g h t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e C i v i l
C o d e o r o t h e r laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision
o n c o n s e n t f o r a d o p t i o n n o w r e a d s : Ar t . 1 8 8 .
Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be NECESSARY:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over,

(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent, if living with said parent
and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
T h e w r i t t e n consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2)the parents by nature of the
child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality.
B a s e d o n t h e f o r e g o i n g , i t i s t h u s e v i d e n t t h a t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e a m e n dm e n t s t o
t h e l a w, t h e w r i t t e n consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for
its validity. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In the instant case, records disclose
that petitioner's c o n d u c t d i d n o t m a n i f e s t a s e t t l e d p u r p o s e t o f o r e g o a l l p a r e n t a l d
u t i e s a n d r e l i n q u i s h a l l p a r e n t a l c l a i m s o v e r h i s children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained
regular communication with hiswife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send
packages by mail and catered to their whims.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET
ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang,
by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
PEOPLE V. TOLEDANO
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a FORMER
FILIPINO WHO BECAME A NATURALIZED US CITIZEN, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a
minor who is EVELYN'S YOUNGEST BROTHER.
The trial court granted the petition.
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in
granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt
Held:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of
the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph
Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified
to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph
Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision.
In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America.
In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child
of his spouse.
In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph
Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost
her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of
Article 184 of E.O. 209. SHE WAS A FORMER FILIPINO CITIZEN. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
NOTE:
The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998). The

Supreme Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to adopt jointly, each one of
them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However, the American husband must comply with the
requirements of the law including the residency requirement of 3 years. Otherwise, the adoption will not be
allowed.
REPUBLIC VS. MILLER, GR NO. 125932, APRIL 22, 1999
(Special Proceedings Adoption by aliens, vested rights)
Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified
petition to adopt a Filipino child under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows
aliens to adopt. They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling out of their union on account of a
medical problem of the wife." (Claude A. Miller was a member of the United States Air Force, as airman first
class, assigned at Clark Air Base since January 26, 1985.)

The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD
recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation.

On August 3, 1988, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.
The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.
As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court

Issue: WON aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the
time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent
enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

Vested right include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption
from new obligations created after the right has vested.

LAHOM VS. SIBULO

Facts:
Mrs. Lahom COMMENCED A PETITION TO RESCIND THE DECREE OF ADOPTION in which
she averred, that, despite the proddings and pleadings of the petitioner and her husband, RESPONDENT
REFUSED TO CHANGE HIS SURNAME FROM SIBULO TO LAHOM, to the frustrations of petitioner

particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he HAD MADE KNOWN HIS
DESIRE TO REVOKE RESPONDENTS ADOPTION, but was prevented by petitioners supplication,
however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to
respondent in the future.
Issue: May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
Ruling:
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s):
(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
(c) sexual assault or violence; or
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
ADOPTION, BEING IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT
TO RESCISSION BY THE ADOPTER(S). HOWEVER, THE ADOPTER(S) MAY DISINHERIT
THE ADOPTEE FOR CAUSES PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 919 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the
decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of
an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its
earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the
FIVEYEAR BAR RULE UNDER RULE 100 OF THE RULES OF COURT and that the adopter would lose
the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
It must also be acknowledged that a PERSON HAS NO VESTED RIGHT IN STATUTORY PRIVILEGES.
While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a right, the PRIVILEGE TO ADOPT IS ITSELF
NOT NATURALLY INNATE OR FUNDAMENTAL BUT RATHER A RIGHT MERELY CREATED BY
STATUTE. It is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action
given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the
termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative
by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)
Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)
REPUBLIC VS CA AND BOBILES
GR NO. 92326, JANUARY 24, 1992
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a PETITION TO ADOPT Jason Condat who had been living with her family
since 4 months old.
Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with copies of the order
finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also posted on the bulletin
board of the court. NOBODY APPEARED TO OPPOSE THE PETITION.
The judgment declared that surname of the child be changed to Bobiles.
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the
law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a
petition for adoption may be filed by EITHER OF THE SPOUSES OR BY BOTH OF THEM.
However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law,
joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
ISSUE: WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition.
HELD:
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code),
where such PETITION MAY BE FILED EITHER OF THE SPOUSES OR BOTH OF THEM. After the
trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family Code took
effect WHERE JOINT ADOPTION OF BOTH SPOUSES IS MANDATORY.
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will have
retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the petition, she
was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and thus vested and
must not be prejudiced. A PETITION MUST NOT BE DISMISSED BY REASON OF FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH LAW NOT YET IN FORCE AND EFFECT AT THE TIME.

Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in
adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to make
him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid
adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.
Hence, Petition was denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 62, Angeles
City and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City[1] to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old,
respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air Force, is an
American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who
became a naturalized American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural
parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring
Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption.[2]Respondent Regional Trial Court
disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three
months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation
of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child.
ISSUE: The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye
are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due.
RULING: The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it.
Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors
Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by
the law. He is NOT A FORMER FILIPINO CITIZEN who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor
does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by
consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the
time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not
provide for an alien who is married to a FORMER FILIPINO CITIZEN SEEKING TO ADOPT JOINTLY
WITH HIS OR HER SPOUSE A RELATIVE BY CONSANGUINITY, as an exception to the general rule that
aliens may not adopt.
"Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child;
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other."
None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's
child but her brother and sister.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City in Special Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Maricel
R. Due and Alvin R. Due), dated September 10, 1990 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALS
James Hughes, a NATURAL BORN CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
married Lenita Mabunay, a FILIPINO CITIZEN,who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of
that country.
The spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt the minor niece and nephews of Lenita,
who had been LIVING WITH THE COUPLE EVEN PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION. The
minors, as well as their parents, GAVE CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION .
The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition.
A petition for Review onCertiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue
: Can the spouses adopt the minors?
Held
:While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases
enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph
(3)(a).
Lenita may not thus adopt
a l o n e s i n c e A r t i c l e 1 8 5 r e q u i r e s a j o i n t a d o p t i o n b y t h e husband and the
wife , a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Art. 185. Husband
and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1)When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
A s a m e n d e d b y E x e c u t i v e O r d e r 9 1 , Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus
made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law
was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.
T h e F a m i l y C o d e h a s r e s o l v e d a n y p o s s i b l e uncertainty. Article 185 thereof
now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances:
(1)When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the
C o d e , o n t h e s u b j e c t o f p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y, c a n a p t l y f i n d governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of
the other, joint p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y s h a l l b e e x e r c i s e d b y t h e s p o u s e s i n
accordance with this Code.
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the
termination of their guardianship relation;

(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her Filipino
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

TITLE VIII
SUPPORT
Art. 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, EVEN BEYOND THE AGE OF
MAJORITY. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of
work. (290a)
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other
to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a)
Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are LIKEWISE
BOUND TO SUPPORT EACH OTHER to the full extent set forth in Article 194, EXCEPT only when the
need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or
negligence. (291a)
Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and
sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give
support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the ABSOLUTE
COMMUNITY OR THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, IF FINANCIALLY CAPABLE, shall advance the
support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute
community or of the conjugal partnership. (n)
Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of
nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual
support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty
spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a)
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same

shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.

However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to
furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share
due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to
give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding
article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental
authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. (295a)
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a)
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately,
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to furnish the same. (297a)
Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Payment shall be made within THE FIRST FIVE DAYS of each corresponding month OR WHEN THE
RECIPIENT DIES, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a)
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive
support. THE LATTER ALTERNATIVE CANNOT BE AVAILED OF IN CASE THERE IS A MORAL OR
LEGAL OBSTACLE THERETO. (299a)
Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such
support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. (302a)
Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the
latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention
of being reimbursed. (2164a)
Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently
needed by the latter, ANY THIRD PERSON MAY FURNISH SUPPORT TO THE NEEDY
INDIVIDUAL, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall
particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support
or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)
Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for
legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to
changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. (n)
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC

March 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON PROVISIONAL ORDERS

R ES OLUTIO N
Section 2. Spousal Support. - In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the following
rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the spouses may

be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of time as the
court may deem just and reasonable based on their standard of living during the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse seeking support is the
custodian of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside
employment; (2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the spouse
seeking support to find appropriate employment, and that spouse's future earning capacity; (3) theduration of the marriage; (4) the comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their
comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse; (6) the
contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in home-making, child care,
education, and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the
physical and emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give
support, taking into account that spouse's earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and
standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
Section 3. Child Support. - THE COMMON CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES SHALL BE SUPPORTED
FROM THE PROPERTIES OF THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount
necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in PROPORTION to the
resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following factors:
(1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical
and emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the
child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care
and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.

ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendantappellee.

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
That the defendant, ONE MONTH AFTER he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her
that she PERFORM UNCHASTE AND LASCIVIOUS ACTS ON HIS GENITAL ORGANS; that the plaintiff
spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made similar lewd
and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the

plaintiff exasperated the defendant and INDUCE HIM TO MALTREAT HER BY WORD AND DEED and
inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was unable by
any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was
obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her PARENTS.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by
General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. Upon the
termination of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. To this extent a
marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract.
Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a
relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they may
make. The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law determines
from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the
new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon principles of public policy for the
benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable.
Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the
Philippine Islands
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix the duties and obligations of
the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to, assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and
protect his wife. The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes his domicile
or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the husband who is obliged to support his wife
may, at his option, do so by paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home.
May the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be compelled to pay the
pension?
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions dated May 11, 1897,
November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish
subsistence, between paying the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered wherein, either because this right
would be opposed to the exercise of a preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause
morally opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of selection must be
understood as being thereby restricted.
RULING OF COURT: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the
act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However,
this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she CAN THEREFORE CLAIM SUPPORT FROM THE HUSBAND for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MA. VERSOZA, JR., CHARLES JOHN
VERSOZA and VIRGINIA FELICE VERSOZA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOSE MA. VERSOZA,
defendant-appellee.
On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint, later amended, for P1,500.00 monthly support, support in arrears,
and damages, and custody of children, with a petition for support pendente lite1 was lodged AGAINST
JOSE MA. VERSOZA by his wife, Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza, and their three minor children, Jose
Ma. Versoza, Jr., Charles John Versoza and Virginia Felice Versoza. Reasons given are that defendant has
abandoned plaintiffs without providing for their support and maintains illicit relations with another woman.
Defendant's answer attacked the complaint on the claim that it is premature and/or that it states no cause of
action. Because, the complaint which involves members of the same family2 does allege earnest efforts toward
a COMPROMISE BEFORE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED.
Then followed defendant's motion for preliminary hearing on jurisdiction. Defendant there argued that
compliance with Article 222 of the Civil Code aforesaid was a condition precedent and should have been
alleged in the complaint.
It there resolved to dismiss the complaint without prejudice, upon the ground that there was no showing that
efforts have been exerted to settle the case amicably before suit was started.
Plaintiffs filed a second motion for the reconsideration of the orders of February 22, and March 30, 1965.
Plaintiffs at the same time sought admission of their second amended complaint in which the required
averment was made to obviate the objection to their complaint. They there alleged that before starting the
present suit, they sought amicable settlement but were unsuccessful.
On June 22, 1965, the second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the lower court "(f)or lack of
merit."
The dismissal orders are now the subject of appeal.
RULING:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
Article 2035 firmly maintains the ancient injunction against compromise on matters involving future support.
And this is as it should be. For, even as Article 222 requires earnest efforts at a compromise and inability to
reach one as a condition precedent to the filing and maintenance of a suit "between the members of the
same family", that same article took good care to add: "SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS IN ARTICLE
2035."

Plaintiffs ask for SUPPORT PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE. There is also the prayer for alimony pendente
lite. Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on future
support is prescribed,14 then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support
and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. It NEED NOT BE
ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT. The very opening statement in Article 2035 unmistakably confirms our
view. It says that "(n)o compromise upon the following question shall be valid: ... (4) FUTURE
SUPPORT."15 We cannot afford to give a loose view to this controlling statute.
We, accordingly, hold that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint.
But even on the assumption that it was error on the part of plaintiffs to have failed to so allege, plaintiffs
should not be barred from making an amendment to correct it.
Parenthetically, after a responsive pleading has been served, amendments may be made only upon leave of
court.17 But, in the furtherance of justice, the court "should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to
avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their
rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay."
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed amendment seeks
to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does
not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or without this amendment, the subject-matter of the action
remains as one for SUPPORT, CUSTODY OF CHILDREN, AND DAMAGES, COGNIZABLE BY THE
COURT BELOW.
For the reasons given
(1) the orders of the lower court of February 22, 1965, March 30, 1965, and June 22, 1965 are hereby set aside;
and
(2) the record of this case is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IX,
with instructions to admit the second amended complaint and to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent
with the opinion herein. Costs against defendant. So ordered.
MANUELA ADVINCULA, represented by her guardian-ad-litem, Pura Borbon, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
MANUEL ADVINCULA, defendant-appellee.
Sometime in 1956, Manuela Advincula filed Civil Case No. 3553, CFI of Iloilo, against Manuel Advincula,
for acknowledge MERIT AND SUPPORT. On motion of both parties, said case was DISMISSED.
On January 16, 1961, Manuela Advincula FILED THE COMPLAINT UNDER CONSIDERATION
AGAINST THE SAME MANUEL ADVINCULA, also acknowledgment and support, Civil Case No. 5659,
SAME COURT.
Instead of filing his answer, the DEFENDANT FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS, ALLEGING THAT
THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3553 BARRED THE FILING OF THE SECOND
COMPLAINT.
The TRIAL COURT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT on the ground that as the dismissal of Civil Case No.
3553, was without reservation, THE SAME WAS WITH PREJUDICE.

ISSUE: The case was brought to this Court on appeal, the lone question of law raised, is whether or not the
dismissal of the former was with prejudice.
RULING:
There is no statement in the order of dismissal of the first case (Civil No. 3553) that the dismissal WAS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In accordance, therefore, with Section 2, Rule 30, such dismissal is without
prejudice. Said rule provides:
Except as provided in the preceding section, as action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance
save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as court deems proper. If a prior
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal
under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.
Notwithstanding the above provision, defendant-appellee and the lower court, are of the impression that the
rule which governs the dismissal of Case No. 3553 is Section 4 of Rule 30, to wit:
Effect of dismissal on other grounds. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an adjudication
upon the merits.
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be
increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and
that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it
be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor (Art. 301).
Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot
be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p.
648, 1956 Ed.).
This being true it is INDISPUTABLE THAT THE PRESENT ACTION FOR SUPPORT CAN BE
BROUGHT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS CASE FILED AGAINST
THE SAME DEFENDANT WAS DISMISSED. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No.
3553, WAS NOT AN ADJUDICATION UPON THE MERITS, as heretofore shown, the right of herein
plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, AS HER NEEDS
ARISE. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring the action for support, for it is only then
that her cause of action accrues. The right to ask support is demandable from the date in which plaintiff was in
need of the same (Marcelo v. Estacio, 70 Phil. 215).
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated up a compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does
civil status of persons and future support, cannot be subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code).
Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking the
same relief against the same defendant.

Moreover, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the case on the grounds alleged in the said motion and the
ground are the "plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in continuing the case against the
defendant", and "the plaintiff has no further evidence to introduce in support of the complaint". The
expression "with prejudice" is not a ground; but it is an effect which movants had intended and/or wanted to
produce, if the court had granted it.
IN VIEW HEREOF, and of the further reason that the grounds for the order of dismissal appealed from are
indubitable, the said order is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin, for further proceedings,
with costs against the defendant-appellee Manuel Advincula.
MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES,
respondents.
The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COURT OF QUEZON CITY a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for
legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff.
Thus it is alleged that on March 10, 1976, the defendant attacked plaintiff, pummeled her with fist blows that
floored her, held her head and with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the cement floor and when she
ran upstairs to her father for protection, the petitioner pushed her at the stairway of thirteen (13) flights and she
fell sliding to the ground floor and defendant gave her a strong swing at her abdomen which floored her half
unconscious and were it not for plaintiff's father, defendant would have succeeded in killing her. 1
It is also alleged that on May 26, 1976, the defendant doused Celia Ilustre-Reyes with a glass of grape juice,
kicked her several times at her back and nape and was going to hit her with a steel tray if it were not for her
driver who came due to her creams for help."
The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, petitioner herein,
OPPOSED THE APPLICATION FOR SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE ON THE GROUND THAT HIS
WIFE HAD COMMITTED ADULTERY with her physician.
The respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer for alimony
pendente litein the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June 1976.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support during the
pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the amount awarded was excessive. The
respondent Judge reduced the amount from P5,000.00 to P4,000.00 a month in an order dated June 17, 1977.
Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1977.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUES:
A. IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION THE WIFE IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE
HUSBAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT A CASE FOR ADULTERY HAD BEEN FILED BY THE
HUSBAND AGAINST HER; AND
B. IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE
COURT ASCERTAIN THE KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE EVEN BY AFFIDAVITS ONLY OR
OTHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE APPEARING IN THE RECORDS.
RULING: It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support HOWEVER, the alleged
adultery of wife must be ESTABLISHED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE. The allegation that the wife has
committed ADULTERY WILL NOT BAR HER FROM THE RIGHT RECEIVE SUPPORT PENDENTE
LITE. Adultery is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action.
In the instant case the petitioner DID NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE ALLEGATION
that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.
The petitioner HAS STILL THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED
ADULTERY OF HIS WIFE WHEN THE ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION IS HEARD ON THE
MERITS BEFORE THE JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT OF QUEZON CITY. It is to
be noted however, that as pointed out by the respondents in their comment, the "private respondent was not
asking support to be taken from petitioner's personal funds or wherewithal, but FROM THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTY.
The contention of the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge granting the private respondent support
pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not supported by the allegations of the complaint for legal
separation and by competent evidence has no merit.
The complaint or legal separation contains allegations showing that on at least two occasions the defendant,
petitioner herein, had made attempts to kill the private respondent.
The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children are in the custody of
the petitioner and are being supported by him.
In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully into the merits
of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem
sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional
character of the resolution to be entered.
MERE AFFIDAVITS MAY SATISFY THE COURT TO PASS UPON THE APPLICATION FOR
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE. 13 It is enough the the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary
evidence appearing in the record. There is no showing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave
abuse of discretion in granting said support.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby denied and the decision of the Council of Appeals sought to
be reviewed is affirmed with the modification that the support pendente lite at the rate of Four Thousand Pesos
(P4.000.00) a month should commence from March 1, 1979 without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006

MANGONON V. CA
FACTS:
1) On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent FEDERICO DELGADO were civilly married by then
City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old
while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required
consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court.
2) 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to
twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny
Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD TOTALLY ABANDONED
THEM.
3) Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner,
together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the
University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western
New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rinawere, however,
FINANCIALLY INCAPABLE OF PURSUING COLLEGIATE EDUCATION because of the following:
a)The average annual cost for college educationin the US is about US$22,000/year or a total
of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina
b)Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the amount of US$3,000.00 per year or a
total of US$6,000 per year.
c) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she
can hardly give general support to Rica and Rina, much less their required college educational support.
d) Neither can petitioners present husband be compelled to share in the general support and college
education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son with petitioner and own daughter(also in
college) to attend to.
e) Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for Federal Student Aid have been rejected by the U.S.Department
of Education.
4) On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and
Rina, a Petition for DECLARATION OF LEGITIMACY AND SUPPORT, with application for support
pendente lite with the RTC MAKATI
5) Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latters father, Francisco,
for general support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters
even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico and respondent
FRANCISCO, THE LATTER BEING GENERALLY KNOWN TO BE FINANCIALLY WELL-OFF.
(In order not to antagonize the two, respondent Federico claimed he did not tell them that he could not be their
father. Even assuming that Rica and Rina are, indeed, his daughters, he alleged that he could not give them the
support they were demanding as he was only making P40,000.00 a MONTH. )
6.) Finding sufficient ground in the motion filed by respondent Federico, the trial court lifted its Order dated
16 June 1994 and admitted his Answer. Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial

court
ISSUE: Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for his granddaughters educational
support
HELD:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica
and Rina, PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT FEDERICO ARE PRIMARILY CHARGED TO SUPPORT
THEIR CHILDRENS COLLEGE EDUCATION BUT BEING RESTRICTED BY THEIR FINANCIAL
INCOMERespondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents, it having been established that respondent Francisco has the
financial means to support his granddaughters education.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who
has a right to receive support.
The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support.
Respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could
perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that RICA AND RINA
SHOULD MOVE HERE TO THE PHILIPPINES TO STUDY IN ANY OF THE LOCAL UNIVERSITIES.
Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the
family dwelling. This option cannot be availed of in this case since there are circumstances, legal or moral,
between respondent and petitioner which should be considered.
Respondent Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as
support pendent lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this
amount given his various business endeavors, thus the amount of support should be proportionate to the
resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca
Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable
for support pendente lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this Decision.
**Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of
the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award support
pendente lite inarrears to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their
respective studies.
NOTES:**mayaman si lolo kasi (respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board

of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations,
substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the
majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with
Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real properties
in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication
Co. and he owns shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties here and abroad. )
What is SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the
judgment or final order, a verified application for support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the
grounds for the claim and the financial conditionsof both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or
other authentic documents in support thereof.
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM V. MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of
her minor children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore
Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their
children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family business, which provided
him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all
minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak
in what the trial court described a very compromising situation.
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to
PROVIDE MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P6,000 PENDENTE LITE.
RTC: On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly
provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance
of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT. On the
issue material to this appeal, that is, whether there is basis to hold petitioners, as Edwards parents, liable with
him to support respondents, the Court of Appeals held:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their
legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to
the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides that
should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other
PERSONS ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 199 in its order shall provide the necessary support.
THE ISSUE: is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

RULING: We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners
liability to the AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT NEEDED BY RESPONDENTS LESTER
EDWARD, CANDICE GRACE AND MARIANO III ONLY.
Relying on provisions[11] found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
theorize that THEIR LIABILITY IS ACTIVATED ONLY UPON DEFAULT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY,
CONCEIVABLY EITHER BY ITS TERMINATION[12] OR SUSPENSION[13] DURING THE
CHILDRENS MINORITY. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children,[14] petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring
ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the scope of
familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII
of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both
areas share a common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to provide legal
support,[15] they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and its concurrence
among relatives of differing degrees.[16] Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from
parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,[17] THE SAME OBLIGATION ARISING FROM
SPOUSAL AND GENERAL FAMILIAL TIES IDEALLY LASTS DURING THE OBLIGEE'S LIFETIME.
However, PETITIONERS PARTIAL CONCURRENT OBLIGATION EXTENDS ONLY TO THEIR
DESCENDANTS AS THIS WORD IS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TO RELATIVES, BY
BLOOD OF LOWER DEGREE. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim
family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.[20] Unfortunately, Cheryls share
from the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records.
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as
amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners
Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners.
Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future;
however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, IS THE SCENE OF HER
HUSBANDS INFIDELITY. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge
against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its
occurrence AMOUNTS TO A MORAL IMPEDIMENT bringing the case within the ambit of the exception
clause of Article 204, precluding its application.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April
2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and
Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III,
all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, for further
proceedings consistent with this ruling.
The Civil Code of the Philippines
Title XII. - CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
Art. 356. Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual
development.

Art. 357. Every child shall:

(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding substitute parental authority;
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training;
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same.
Art. 358. Every parent and every person HOLDING SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY shall see to it
that the rights of the child are respected and his duties complied with, and SHALL PARTICULARLY, by
precept and example, imbue the child with highmindedness, love of country, veneration for the national
heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.
Art. 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the
government will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught
as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;
(2) Puericulture and similar centers;
(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
(4) Juvenile courts.
Art. 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the
municipality. It shall, among other functions:
(1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
(2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans;
(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
(7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children, and secure their
cooperation.
Art. 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large
municipality.
Art. 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper
case be judicially admonished.
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. NO MOTHER SHALL BE SEPARATED FROM HER CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF
AGE, UNLESS THE COURT FINDS COMPELLING REASONS FOR SUCH MEASURE .
Family Code
TITLE IX
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Chapter 1. General Provisions
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY SHALL INCLUDE THE
CARING FOR AND REARING THEM FOR CIVIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND EFFICIENCY AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR MORAL, MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTER AND WELL-BEING.
(n)
Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases
authorized by law. (313a)
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, UNLESS THERE IS A
JUDICIAL ORDER TO THE CONTRARY.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as
long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental

authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children,
UNLESS the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the CHOICE OF THE
CHILD OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, UNLESS THE PARENT CHOSEN IS UNFIT. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY SHALL BE EXERCISED BY THE SURVIVING GRANDPARENT. In case several
survive, THE ONE DESIGNATED BY THE COURT, taking into account the same consideration mentioned
in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
grandparents, except when such TESTIMONY IS INDISPENSABLE IN A CRIME against the descendant or
by one parent against the other. (315a)
Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same
order of preference shall be observed.(349a, 351a, 354a)
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated,
parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes,
orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)
Art. 218. The SCHOOL, ITS ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS, OR THE INDIVIDUAL, ENTITY
OR INSTITUTION ENGAGED IN CHILD are shall have SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility SHALL APPLY TO ALL AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES WHETHER INSIDE
OR OUTSIDE THE PREMISES OF THE SCHOOL, ENTITY OR INSTITUTION. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall BE PRINCIPALLY
AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor.
The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall
be SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph sHALL NOT APPLY IF IT IS
PROVED THAT THEY EXERCISED THE PROPER DILIGENCE REQUIRED UNDER THE
PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority
Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated
children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, selfdiscipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under
their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best
interests of the child so requires. (317)
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental
authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for
disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice
or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall
be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the
petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of
parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not
more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by
the proper government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed
but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the
commitment of the child whenever just and proper. (391a)
Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon
the Property of the Children
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the
unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the
father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than
ten per centum(10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the
obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child
resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any
part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute
parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on
guardianship shall apply. (320a)
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous
or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's
support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's
support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an
unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a
reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the
administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds

thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime. (322a)
Chapter 5. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority
Art. 228. Parental authority terminates permanently:
(1) Upon the death of the parents;
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a)
Art. 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:
(1) Upon adoption of the child;
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian;
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose;
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority;
or
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority.
(327a)
Art. 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of
a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon
service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a)
Art. 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if
the parent or the person exercising the same:
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example;
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of
the parent or the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the
guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose
or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. (33a)
Art. 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to
sexual abuse, such person shall be PERMANENTLY DEPRIVED BY THE COURT OF SUCH
AUTHORITY. (n)
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of
the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC March 4, 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON PROVISIONAL ORDERS
R ES OLUTIO N
Section 4. Child Custody. - In determining the right party or person to whom the custody of the child of the
parties may be awarded pending the petition, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and shall
give paramount consideration to the material and moral welfare of the child.
The court may likewise consider the following factors:
(a) the agreement of the parties;
(b) the desire and ability of each parent to foster an open and loving relationship between the child and

the other parent;

(c) the child's health, safety, and welfare;
(d) any history of child or spousal abase by the person seeking custody or who has had any filial
relationship with the child, including anyone courting the parent;
(e) the nature and frequency of contact with both parents;
(f) habitual use of alcohol or regulated substances;
(g) marital misconduct;
(h) the most suitable physical, emotional, spiritual, psychological and educational environment; and
(i) the preference of the child, if over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
The court may award provisional custody in the following order of preference:
(1) to both parents jointly;
(2) to either parent taking into account all relevant considerations under the foregoing paragraph,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit;
(3} to the surviving grandparent, or if there are several of them, to the grandparent chosen by the child
over seven years of age and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent is unfit or disqualified;
(4) to the eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;
(5) to the child's actual custodian over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; or
(6) to any other person deemed by the court suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the child.
The custodian temporarily designated by the" court shall give the court and the parents five days notice
of any plan to change the residence of the child or take him out of his residence for more than three days
provided it does not prejudice the visitation rights of the parents.
Section 5. Visitation Rights. - Appropriate visitation rights shall be provided to the parent who is not awarded
provisional custody unless found unfit or disqualified by the court.
Section 7. Order of Protection. - The court may issue an Order of Protection requiring any person:
(a) to stay away from the home, school, business, or place of employment of the child, other parent or any other
party, and to stay away from any other specific place designated by the court;
(b) to refrain from harassing, intimidating, or threatening such child or the other parent or any person to whom
custody of the child is awarded;
(c) to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety, or
welfare of the child;
(d) to permit a parent, or a person entitled to visitation by a court order or a separation agreement, to visit the
child at stated periods;
(e) to permit a designated party to enter the residence during a specified period of time in order to take persona!
belongings not contested in a proceeding pending with the Family Court;
(f) to comply with such other orders as are necessary for the protection of the child.
SAGALA-ESLAO V. CA
G.R. No. 116773
January 16, 1997
Facts:
- Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with
Teresita Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple HAD TWO CHILDREN NAMELY LESLIE AND
ANGELICA.
Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her
parents at Teresita's house.

- Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place but Teresita prevailed and
entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie.
- Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US
with him. A year after the marriage, MARIA RETURNED TO THE PHILIPPINES TO BE REUNITED
WITH HER CHILDREN AND BRING THEM TO US. The petitioner then informed the respondent about
her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. Ouye, expressed his
willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education.
Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days old
and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.
- THE TRIAL COURT rendered a decision where Teresita was directed to cause the immediate transfer of
custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's decision.
Issue:
Does the Teresita have the right to the custody of the child?
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of ADOPTION, GUARDIANSHIP AND SURRENDER TO A
CHILDREN'S HOME OR AN ORPHAN INSTITUTION. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law
still disallows the same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company.
In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was
merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
DAISIE T. DAVID V. COURT OF APPEALS AND RAMON R. VILLAR
G.R. No. 111180 (November 16, 1995)
This case reflects Philippine societys regard for mothers as the PRIMARY CAREGIVERS, especially to
very young children. While one might regard this provision as a form of gender bias against the fathers, it is
important to consider that an advocacy for the neutralization of this preference must entail other changes
that must necessarily be affected. Support structures must also be in place. For instance, joint parenting
which is already encouraged under the legal framework of the Family Code must find support in other
laws and policies such as extended paternal leave, programs on gender orientation, child rearing, as both a
mother and a father role, as contrasted to child-bearing which is a sex role assigned to women only. Until and
unless other supportive measures are in place, a change in Art. 213 to favor a father might not be effective.

Conversely, unless some measures are done, this provision can also be argued as perpetuating a gender bias that
women should be considered the primary caregivers, just because they are the ones capable of bearing children.
Facts: Petitioner David had an illicit affair with her married employer, private respondent Villar. Together
they had three children who were all accepted into the respondents legal family.
The refusal of the respondentto return their eldest son, after obtaining the consent of petitioner to take the
child to Boracay with his familygave rise to the problem regarding the custody of the child. Villar said
he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.

The decision was reversed by the respondent court, deeming the habeas corpus case to be improper.

Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas
corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This
is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority over their
legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody
of their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar xxx
Held: Rule 102, 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband
and is entitled to the custody of her child, and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested
with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
Article 213 of the Family Code provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The fact that the private respondent is
well-off is not sufficient reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering
that she has been able to independently raise and support all three children since birth.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to
deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him
temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate
action.

DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents.
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth[2] to GARDIN FAITH BELARDE TONOG,
her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student
while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private
respondents parents and sister in the latters house inQuezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a
welcome addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she found work
as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal
grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith. On March 9,
1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor,
Gardin Faith.
Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 only
on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on May 27, 1992, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. In a resolution
dated September 15, 1992, the trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner to file her
opposition to private respondents petition. The latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a related
incident, petitioner filed on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.
Trial court issued a resolution denying private respondents motion for reconsideration and granting
petitioners motion for custody of their child, Gardin. Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the said
resolution.
Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35971, questioning the actuations of the trial court. On March 21, 1995, the APPELLATE COURT
DISMISSED the petition on the ground of lack of merit. However, after private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, the APPELLATE COURT ISSUED A RESOLUTION[3] DATED AUGUST 29, 1995
MODIFYING ITS DECISION
We discern a good ground to let physical custody of subject child, Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, continue
under the petitioner, with whom the said child had been living, since birth.
While it is understandable for private respondent, as mother, to assert and seek enforcement of her legal
and natural rights as the natural guardian of her child, the emotional and psychological effects upon the
latter of a change in custody should be considered. To be sure, transfer of custody of the child from
petitioner to private respondent will be painful for the child who, all her life, has been in the company of
petitioner and her paternal grandparents.
Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as
the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate
minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of
seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that GARDIN FAITH IS NOW TWELVE YEARS
OLD.
RULING: In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith,
since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no
pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the
welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her

father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child
should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether A MOTHER IS A FIT PARENT FOR HER CHILD IS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE
PROPERLY ENTERTAINED IN THE SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[13] It
should be recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the
best position to assess the parties respective merits vis--vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of
seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should
have the custody over her person.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to immediately proceed
with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long
as the children are under parental authority. (311a) chan robles virtual law library
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless
the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into
account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)
SANTOS V CA (G.R. 113054)
FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
MARRIED IN ILOILO CITY IN 1986. Their union beget only one child, LEOUEL SANTOS, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been
in the care and custody of his MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged
that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private
respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her
son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where
three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions,
petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where
three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions,
petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel

Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an exparte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the
child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his
minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code,
substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or
unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.
ISSUE:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
RULING:
THE MINOR SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE LEGITIMATE FATHER. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents'
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor.
Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father
is still preferred over the grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present
time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it
cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his EFFORTS
TO KEEP HIS ONLY CHILD IN HIS CUSTODY MAY BE REGARDED AS SERIOUS EFFORTS TO
RECTIFY HIS PAST MISDEEDS. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and
son.
The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So
many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the
natural guardians of their children.
Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
ZENAIDA MEDINA, assisted by her husband, FELICIANO CASERO, petitioner-appellant, vs. DRA.
VENANCIA L. MAKABALI, respondent-appellee.
Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy, JOSEPH CASERO, was sought to be enforced by habeas
corpus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in its Special Proceeding No. 1947. After
hearing, the writ was denied by the Court, and the case was appealed directly to this Supreme Court exclusively

on points of law.
On February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the
Makabali Clinic in San Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali,
single, who assisted at the delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero.
The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her
own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he
recovered his health; and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the REAL MOTHER NEVER
VISITED HER CHILD, AND NEVER PAID FOR HIS EXPENSES.
The trial disclosed that petitioner Zenaida Medina lived with Feliciano Casero with her two other children
apparently with the tolerance, if not the acquiescence, of Caseros lawful wife who resides elsewhere, albeit the
offspring of both women are in good terms with each other; that Casero makes about P400.00 a month as a
mechanic, and Zenaida herself earns from 4 to 5 pesos a day.
The Court, upon calling Joseph on the witness stand, observed that the boy is fairly intelligent as a witness. He
never knew his mother, Zenaida. He was calling the respondent his "Mammy". The Court informed him that
his real mother is Zenaida. He was asked with whom to stay with his real mother or the respondent. The boy
pointed to the respondent and said "Mammy!" The Court asked him, "Why do you choose to stay with your
"Mammy?" He answered, "She is the one rearing me." This confrontation was made in the presence of the two
women, Zenaida, the petitioner, and the respondent, Dra. Makabali, in open court.
After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he
reaches the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster mother
and denied the writ prayed for.
RULING: WE SEE NO REASON TO DISTURB THE ORDER APPEALED FROM. While our law
recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that
"in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of CHILDREN, THE LATTER'S WELFARE
SHALL BE PARAMOUNT" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that FOR COMPELLING
REASONS, EVEN A CHILD UNDER SEVEN MAY BE ORDERED SEPARATED FROM THE MOTHER.
As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not
only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the child could
derive from being coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and
witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife.l

No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary, the appealed order being justified in fact and law, we
hold that said order should be, and hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.
ESPIRITU VS. CA

GR 115640, MARCH 15, 1995

FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while
in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to
Pittsburgh for a TEMPORARY POST. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind.
After a year, they WENT BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES FOR A BRIEF VACATION WHEN THEY ALSO
GOT MARRIED. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald.
In 1990, they decided to SEPARATE.

Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children
and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister.
She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch
with her children.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for
bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was
actually rendered only on September 29, 1994.
When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, she filed a PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AGAINST REYNALDO AND HIS SISTER TO GAIN CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN.

The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over
Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have SOLE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER THEM BUT
WITH RIGHTS OF VISITATION TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES AND TO BE APPROVED
BY THE COURT.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera
concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to
Reynaldo.
ISSUE: WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be the paramount

concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother for
compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age
is strong but not conclusive.
At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The CHOICE OF THE
CHILD TO WHOM SHE PREFERRED TO STAY MUST BE CONSIDERED. It is evident in the records
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional shock
caused by her mothers infidelity.
Furthermore, there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying
his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to
extend.
On the other hand, the mothers conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already
caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-9214206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is
reinstated. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
PEREZ V CA (G.R.No. 118870, March 29, 1996)
Facts:
Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a registered
nurse. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth to RAY
PEREZ II IN NEW YORK ON JULY 20, 1992.
Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife,
however, HE HAD ONLY A TOURIST VISA AND WAS NOT EMPLOYED.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had
round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to
follow her with the baby.
According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was
in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately
after winding up her affairs there.
When NERISSA CAME HOME A FEW DAYS BEFORE RAY IIS FIRST BIRTHDAY, THE
COUPLE WAS NO LONGER ON GOOD TERMS. They had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near
her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager income of P5,000.00.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his

profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to live here since they have their own home and a
car. Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.
NERISSA FILED A PETITION TO SURRENDER THE CUSTODY OF THEIR SON TO HER.
(Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son)
The trial court issued an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and held that granting
custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare.
Issue:
Who should have rightful custody of a child?
Held:
Nerissa. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar
provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:
SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated.
Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other,
and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage
is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care,
custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to
choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its
mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor. (Italics supplied)
The provisions of law quoted above cLEARLY MANDATE THAT A CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OF
AGE SHALL NOT BE SEPARATED FROM HIS MOTHER UNLESS THE COURT FINDS
COMPELLING REASONS TO ORDER OTHERWISE. The use of the word shall in Article 213 of the
Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother finds its reason in
the basic need of a child for his mothers loving care. ONLY THE MOST COMPELLING OF REASONS
SHALL JUSTIFY THE COURTS AWARDING THE CUSTODY OF SUCH A CHILD TO SOMEONE
OTHER THAN HIS MOTHER, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental
authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest
of the child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child
provides: In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated
that they have ample means. Nerissas present work schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of
quality time with her son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away from home for longer periods of
time are still able to raise a family well, applying time management principles judiciously. Also, delegating

child care temporarily to qualified persons who run day-care centers does not detract from being a good mother,
as long as the latter exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are often brought up by housemaids
under the eagle eyes of the mother.
Although Ray is a general practitioner, the records show that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies
on retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and care that a mother gives to his
child.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated September
27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 1995 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order
of the trial court dated August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is
awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This decision is immediately executory.
CANG VS COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children . During
the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
N o t l o n g t h e r e a f t e r , h o w e v e r , A n n a M a r i e l e a r n e d o f h e r husband's alleged extramarital
affair. Anna Marie subsequently filed a PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WHICH WAS
GRANTED .

They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into
agreements without the written consent of Herbert.
Petitioner then left for the United States where he SOUGHT A DIVORCE FROM ANA MARIE. He was
issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation
at all reasonable times and places to petitioner.
M e a n w h i l e , t h e B R O T H E R A N D S I S T E R - I N - L AW O F A N N A MARIE FILED FOR THE
ADOPTION OF THE 3 MINOR CANG CHILDREN.

Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it.
Before the COURT OF APPEALS, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it would
be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of
parental authority because:
(a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption;
(b) he never abandoned his children;
(c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and
(d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption

Issue:
C a n m i n o r c h i l d r e n b e l e g a l l y a d o p t e d w i t h o u t t h e written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Held:
A r t i c l e 2 5 6 o f t h e F a m i l y C o d e p r o v i d e s f o r i t s retroactivity "insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or a c q u i r e d r i g h t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e C i v i l

C o d e o r o t h e r laws."
As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision o n c o n s e n t f o r a d o p t i o n n o w r e a d s :
A r t . 1 8 8 . T h e w r i t t e n consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(2) the parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality.
B a s e d o n t h e f o r e g o i n g , i t i s t h u s E V I D E N T T H A T NOT WIT HS TAN DING T H
E A M E N D M E N T S T O T H E L AW, T H E W R I T T E N CONSENT OF THE NATURAL
PARENT TO THE ADOPTION HAS REMAINED A REQUISITE FOR ITS VALIDITY. As clearly
inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE NATURAL
PARENT IS INDISPENSABLE FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE DECREE OF ADOPTIO n.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is "INSANE OR HOPELESSLY INTEMPERATE."In the instant
case, records disclose
that petitioner'sc o n d u c t d i d n o t m a n i f e s t a s e t t l e d p u r p o s e t o f o r e g o a l l p a r e n t a
l d u t i e s a n d r e l i n q u i s h a l l p a r e n t a l c l a i m s o v e r h i s children as to, constitute abandonment.
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamountto abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained
regular communication with hiswife and children through letters and telephone. He used to
send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The questioned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE
thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the
spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

BONDAGJY VS. FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001
Facts: Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on February
3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites.
On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by conversion.
However, the conversion was not registered with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989,and Amouaje,
born on September 29, 1990. The children were born in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
At the time of their marriage, unknown to petitioner, respondent was still married to a Saudi Arabian
woman whom he later divorced. After their marriage, the couple moved in with respondent's family in Makati
City. In 1990, the parties migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they lived for more than two
years.
Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile Street,
Ayala Alabang. FOUZI ALLEGED THAT HE COULD NOT SEE HIS CHILDREN UNTIL HE GOT AN
ORDER FROM THE COURT. EVEN WITH A COURT ORDER, HE COULD ONLY SEE HIS
CHILDREN IN SCHOOL AT DE LA SALLE-ZOBEL, ALABANG, MUNTINLUPA CITY .

On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the children baptized as Christians and their names changed from
Abdulaziz Bondagjy to Azziz Santiago Artadi and from Amouaje Bondagjy to Amouage Selina Artadi.
Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila,and
that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing are detestable under
Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee
of P40.00after the children come home from school.
Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in
his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from school.
On March 11, 1996, RESPONDENT FOUZY ALI BONDAGJY FILED WITH THE SHARI'A DISTRICT
COURT,MARAWI CITY, AN ACTION TO OBTAIN CUSTODY OF HIS TWO MINOR CHILDREN,
ABDULAZIZ, AND AMOUAJE.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City an action for nullity of marriage,
custody and support, ordered the parties to maintain status quo until further orders from said court.
On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed another motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case since P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to Muslims. On March 3, 1999, Fouzi filed
an opposition to the motion to dismiss and argued that at the inception of the case, both parties were Muslims,
Fouzi by birth and Sabrina by conversion.
The Shari'a District Court held that P.D. No. 1083 on Custody and Guardianship does not apply to this case
because the spouses were not yet divorced. The Shari' a District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her
children.
However, the Sharia District Court found petitioner unworthy to care for her children. Thus A married woman, and a mother to growing children, should live a life that the community in which
she lives considers morally upright, and in a manner that her growing minor children will not be socially
and morally affected and prejudiced. It is sad to note that respondent has failed to observe that which is
expected of a married woman and a mother by the society in which she lives. xxx
The evidence of this case shows the extent of the moral depravity of the respondent, and the kind of concern for
the welfare of her minor children which on the basis thereof this Court finds respondent unfit with the custody
of her minor children.
Under the general principles of Muslim law, the Muslim mother may be legally disentitled to the custody of her
minor children by reason of wickedness when such wickedness is injurious to the mind of the child, such as
when she engages in zina (illicit sexual relation); or when she is unworthy as a mother; and, a woman is
not worthy to be trusted with the custody of the child who is continually going out and leaving the child
hungry.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and converted back
to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her fitness
to be the custodian of her children?
Ruling:

The Supreme Court in the case stated that the welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the
issue. The Court also said that the factors that determine the fitness of any parent are:
[1] the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and
[2] the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into
consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents.

The standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof, however, is NOT RESTRICTED TO MUSLIM
LAWS. The FAMILY CODE SHALL BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION in deciding whether a nonMuslim woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code
now that she is not a Muslim.
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
parents.
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their common children. Similarly, P.D. No. 1083 is clear that where the parents are not
divorced or legally separated, the father and mother shall jointly exercise just and reasonable parental authority
and fulfill their responsibility over their legitimate children.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision in Spl. Proc. No. 13-96 is hereby SET
ASIDE. Petitioner SABRINA ARTADI BONDAGJY shall have custody over minors Abdulaziz, and Amouaje
Bondagjy, until the children reach majority age. Both spouses shall have joint responsibility over all expenses
of rearing the children.
The father, FOUZI ALI BONDAGJY, shall have visitorial rights at least once a week and may take the children
out only with the written consent of the mother.
LAXAMANA V.LAXAMANA
Sept. 31, 2002, Ynares-Santiago,
Facts: Reymond married Ma. Lourdes and had three children.
Reymond became a DRUG DEPENDENT, was confined, and eventually released as drug-free.
Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence
WORSENED AND IT BECAME DIFFICULT FOR RESPONDENT AND HER CHILDREN TO LIVE
WITH HIM.
Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically assaulted respondent.
Thus, on June17, 1999, respondent and her 3children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house
of her relatives.
Reymond filed a case to have custody over his children.
A month later, his wife filed a petition to annul the marriage. Parties reached an agreement with Reymond
being granted visitation rights and both spouses to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination.

On Jan. 14, 2000, trial court awarded custody to the wife.

Reymond filed an instant petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON the lower courts decision erred when it resolved the issue of custody without trial.
Held/Ratio:
Yes. The paramount interests of the children were not given due consideration. Instead, the court a quo
relied on the basis of the psychological report of the spouses conditions to render its decision. This is held
to being sufficient to justify awarding custody to the mother.
The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet "completely cured" may render him unfit to
take custody of the children, BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT IS UNFIT
TO PROVIDE THE CHILDREN WITH ADEQUATE SUPPORT, EDUCATION, AS WELL AS MORAL
AND INTELLECTUAL TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT.
Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision,
yet the COURT DID NOT ASCERTAIN THEIR CHOICE AS TO WHICH PARENT THEY WANT TO
LIVE WITH. It is clear that - every child [has] rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on
the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents'
say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts
must step in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law.
The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the
records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on
the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine the
fitness of each parent tobe the custodian of the children.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 107, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and
respondent to take custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of this case, custody shall
remain with respondent but subject to petitioners visitation rights in accordance with the December 7,
1999 order of the trial court.
SO ORDERED.

PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005
The case below upholds the right of the mother to exercise custody over her child under Article 16(1)(d) of
CEDAW. Parents should not be denied of their parental and custodial rightsin this case, a mother, just
because she has a non-heterosexual gender identity.
Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son,
RAFAELLO, whom his wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice.
A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of

the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out
that the wife is having LESBIAN RELATIONS.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of the
child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art
213 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.
Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided:
Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent des
granted by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice
of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise,
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision
governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c
reads:

Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reason for such measure.
The best interest of the child pervades Philippine cases involving adoption, guardianship, support,
personal status, minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In choosing the parent to whom
custody is given, the welfare of the minors is always the paramount consideration.
Courts are mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that bear upon the childrens wellbeing and development. Aside from material resources and moral and social situations of each parent, other
factors may be considered, among which are: the previous care and devotion shown by each parent; religious
background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; and the childrens emotional and
educational needs.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the
fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of
her minor child.[51] To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses
have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising

proper parental care.

It is, therefore, NOT ENOUGH FOR THE FATHER TO SHOW MERELY THAT THE MOTHER WAS A
LESBIAN. HE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT SHE CARRIED ON HER PURPORTED RELATIONSHIP
WITH A PERSON OF THE SAME SEX IN THE PRESENCE OF THEIR SON OR UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES NOT CONDUCIVE TO THE CHILDS PROPER MORAL DEVELOPMENT. There is
no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and
psychological development suffered as a result.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner , v. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,Respondent
.
G.R. No. 168785 : February 5, 2010
CARPIO,J.:
Facts:
Herald, American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one
DAUGHTER, STEPHANIE, born on September 21, 1995.
In June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court). In its ruling, the ILLINOIS COURT DISSOLVED THE MARRIAGE
OF PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT, AWARDED TO RESPONDENT SOLE CUSTODY
OF STEPHANIE and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On January 28, 2002, both executed in Manila a contract for joint custody over Stephanie.
In 2004, HERALD FILED ACASE AGAINST SHARON ALLEGING THAT SHARON HAD EXERCISED SOLE
CUSTODY OVER STEPHANIE contrary to their agreement.
o The trial court held that:
(1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of
jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to
respondent;
(2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this
jurisdiction; and
(3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting
COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS ON JURISDICTION AND DISMISSED THE CASE.
Issue:
WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the
joint custody of the parties child
Held/ Rationale: The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement
which is void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioners suit and
call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanies custody.
The trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its
thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded.
What the Illinois court retained was jurisdictionx x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.

At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was
under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no
longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law
on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law[15] (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) is also undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x
x.[16] (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody[17] to the mother is mandatory,[18] grounded on
sound policy consideration,[19] subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. 20]) Clearly then
the Agreements object to ESTABLISH A POST-DIVORCE JOINT CUSTODY REGIME BETWEEN
RESPONDENT AND PETITIONER OVER THEIR CHILD UNDER SEVEN YEARS OLD
CONTRAVENES PHILIPPINE LAW.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother
when she refused to allow joint custody by the father.
Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the postdivorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, THE ACTION LIES BEYOND THE ZONE OF
THE ILLINOIS COURTS SO-CALLED RETAINED JURISDICTION.

Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents,
except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the
other. (315a)

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION

AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH
EMMA K. LEE V. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE,
LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEEVANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD
LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented
by
RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,
Facts: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines
in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to
serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh
household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee

(collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and
Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to investigate the matter.

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo Lee
(who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already
38 years old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother,
when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lees other
children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other
children, numbering eight.
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions,
one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City[2]in Special
Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner
Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the
name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance
of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify
in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming
that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule
on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees stepmother.

The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may
be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tius advanced age alone does not render her
incapable of testifying.

Issue: Whether or not the stepmother can properly invoke Section 25 Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against
his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

Ruling:
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in
criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds
of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The
privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family
tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965
thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with
those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 218. The SCHOOL, ITS ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS, OR THE INDIVIDUAL, ENTITY
OR INSTITUTION ENGAGED IN CHILD are shall have SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility SHALL APPLY TO ALL AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES WHETHER INSIDE
OR OUTSIDE THE PREMISES OF THE SCHOOL, ENTITY OR INSTITUTION. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF THE
UNEMANCIPATED MINOR. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental
authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph sHALL NOT APPLY IF IT IS
PROVED THAT THEY EXERCISED THE PROPER DILIGENCE REQUIRED UNDER THE
PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. (n)

ROBERTO AMADORA VS. CA

GR NO. L47745, APRIL 15, 1988
FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was MORTALLY HIT BY A GUN BY
PABLITO DAFFON (classmate) RESULTING TO THE FORMERS DEATH.
Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.
The victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST COLEGIO DE

SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with
Daffon and 2 other students.
Complaints against the students were dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum
of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees .
Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the
following reasons:
1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades
2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended
3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and
4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations
in maintaining discipline.
Petitioners on the other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD:
The TIME ALFREDO WAS FATALLY SHOT, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the
school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose.
On the other hand, the RECTOR, HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND THE DEAN OF BOYS CANNOT
BE HELD LIABLE because none of them was the TEACHER-IN-CHARGE as defined in the provision.
Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted
by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, DEAN OF BOYS SHOULD PROBABLY BE HELD LIABLE
CONSIDERING THAT HE HAD EARLIER CONFISCATED AN UNLICENSED GUN FROM A

STUDENT AND LATER RETURNED TO HIM WITHOUT TAKING DISCIPLINARY ACTION OR

REPORTING THE MATTER TO THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES. Though it was clear negligence on his
part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because ONLY THE
TEACHER OR THE HEAD OF SCHOOL OF ARTS AND TRADE is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora
that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under
the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
AMADORA V. CA [1988]
CRUZ, J.
Facts:
April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATING STUDENT
OF C O L E G I O D E S A N J O S E R E C O L E T O S w e n t t o s c h o o l t o f i n i s h a P h y s i c s
experiment.
However, while he was in the auditorium, HIS CLASSMATE PABLITO DAFFON FIRED A GUN THAT
HIT HIM . He died at 17.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Amadoras parents filed a civil action for damages under CC Art. 2180
against the: school, its rector, HS principal, dean of boys & Physics teacher, plus Daffon
& 2 other students thru their parents. Complaint against students was later dropped.
CFI Cebu: DEFENDANTS WERE LIABLE IN THE SUM OF P294,984.00 (death
compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages &
attorneys fees)
CA: REVERSED, ALL DEFENDANTS ABSOLVED COMPLETELY.
1 . A s p e r R u l e s o f C o u r t ( R O C ) R u l e 4 5 , C C A r t . 2 1 8 0 i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e since
the school was an ACADEMIC INSTITUTION OF LEARNING & NOT A SCHOOL OF ARTS &
TRADES.
2. Students were NOT IN CUSTODY OF THE SCHOOL AT THE TIME OF THE
INCIDENT since the semester had already ended
3. No clear identification of the fatal gun.
4. Defendants exercised necessary diligence in preventing injury.

Petitioners claim their son was still UNDER SCHOOLS CUSTODY because he went to school to comply
w/a requirement for graduation.
Respondents: Amadora went to school to submit a Physics report & he was no longer in their custody since the
semester was over.
A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, DEAN OF BOYS, from Jose Gumbanon April 7, 1972.
It was an unlicensed pistol w/c was later on returned to Gumban w/o reporting such to the principal
or taking further action. Gumban was one Daffons companions when the incident happened.
Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son w/c respondents rebutted by saying THERE
WAS NO PROOF THAT THEY WERE ONE AND THE SAME.
ISSUE & RATIO: WON respondents are liable. NO.
Exconde v Capuno: Capuno, a student of Balintawak Elementary School & a
b o y s c o u t a t t e n d e d a R i z a l D a y p a r a d e o n c i t y s c h o o l s u p e r v i s o r s instructions.
Afterwards, Capuno boarded a jeep & drove it recklessly that it turned turtle killing 2 passengers. SC
exculpated school in obiter dictum (it was not party to the case) since it was not a school of arts & trades.
Some justices dissented claiming that liability under CC Art. 2180 applied to teachers in general &
heads of schools of arts & trades in particular.
Mercado v. CA: a student cut a classmate w/a razor blade at the Lourdes Catholic School, QC. Exconde ruling
reiterated. Custody requirement was defined as a situation where student lives & boards w/teacher
such that control, direction & influences on pupil supersede those of parents.
Palisoc v. Brillantes: a 16-yr old student was killed by a classmate w/ fist blows in the lab of Manila
Technical Institute. Court ruled that even if offender was already of age & not boarding in the
school, the head & teacher-in-charge were solidarily liable w/him. Custody was defined as the protective &
supervisory custody that school, its heads & teachers exercise
Lastly, TEACHERS OR HEADS OF ESTABLISHMENTS OF ARTS & TRADES SHALL BE LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR PUPILS & STUDENTSOR APPRENTICES SO LONG AS THEY REMAIN IN THEIR
CUSTODY.
(CC Art. 2180) over students for as long as they are at the attendance in the school including recess
time. No such requirement as actual living & boarding in the school before such liability is attached. It set aside
Mercado ruling. Even students of age were still covered by provision since theyre equally in
custody of school & subj to its discipline.
CC Art. 2180 APPLIES TO ALL SCHOOLS WHETHER ACADEMIC OR NON-ACADEMIC.
In the former, teacher-in-charge of student is the person responsible (general rule). Whereas in the latter (arts &
trades), it is the head (exception). SC agrees w/dissent in Exconde, saying that while the child is in school,
parentis not supposed to interfere w/discipline of school nor w/authority & supervision of teacher.
W/o authority, there can be no responsibility. No reason to differentiate the vigilance expected from teachers
from academic institutions and non-academic ones.
History of disparity:
a . h e a d o f s c h o o l o f a r t s & t r a d e s e x e r c i s e d c l o s e r t u t e l a g e o v e r h i s students

who apprenticed to their master, the school head. He was personally involved in teaching
his students who usually boarded w/him& thus he exercised constant control, supervision & influence.
b.Head of academic school: exercised only administrative duties over teachers who were
directly dealing w/students. Thus, teacher is liable.
CC Art. 2180s custody requirement is not limited to boarding w/school authorities. Its not coterminous w/sem. It includes periods of registration or before graduation during w/c,
student is still subj to the disciplinary authority of the school. There is custody for as long as hes under
control & influence of school & w/in its premises regardless of time and for as long as student can show that he
is in school in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, exercise
& enjoyment of a legitimate student rt/privilege. It includes relaxing in the campus.
Under similar circumstances, teacher-in-charge should be liable for his students torts. He need
not be physically present or in a position to prevent the injury. Custody refers more to his influence on the child
& the discipline instilled. Applicable as well to head of school of arts & trade. Teacher is liable regardless of
students age. Teacher should be liable & not school itself unless he can prove that he exercised the diligence of
a good father such as by employing sufficient no. of security guards, etc. This defense is made available to the
teacher considering that his responsibility/influence over the child cannot be equated to that of the parents.
Parents can expect more obedience from the child since kid depends more on parents. Parent can instill more
lasting discipline on child than teacher & thus, should be held to a greater accountability for tort committed by
kid. WRT liability for kids of the age of majority, leniency should be observed in assessing
teachers responsibility considering that parents are no longer liable for the acts of their emancipated children.
HOLDING: Petition denied.
1. Rector, principal & dean not liable because they are not teachers-in-charge. They only had general authority over
students.
2. Teacher-in-charge: not disclosed by evidence. Just because Amadora went to school in
connection w/a physics report doesnt necessarily make physics teacher the teacher-in-charge.
Besides, theres no showing that the teacher was negligent in any manner. He was not even required to
report to school on that day thus, his absence cannot be considered as negligence. On the contrary, they
have proven that they exercised due diligence.
3. Dean of boys no proof that the gun he released was the same gun that killed Amadora.
PSBA V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: A stabbing incident caused the death of Carlitos Bautista, a third year student, while on the
SECOND-FLOOR PREMISES OF THE PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
(PSBA).
The parents of the deceased filed a suit for damages against the PSBA AND ITS CORPORATE
OFFICERS FOR THEIR ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND LACK OF SECURITY
PRECAUTIONS, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
The assailants were not members of the schools academic community but were elements from outside the
school. The suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President),
Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of
Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano(Assistant Chief of Security).
Defendants sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint state sno cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject
is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-

stated article.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss;
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The CA primarily anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as
enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. According to the CA, the law holds the teachers and
heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of
Article2180 by 'proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage.'
ISSUE: Could PSBA and its officers be held liable for Arts. 2176 and 2180?
HELD: No. But they could be held liable for breach of contractual obligation and for tort, in conjunction
with Art. 21 of the Civil Code, even if there is a contractual obligation.
Ratio:
1.Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in
loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently,
in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals.
In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for
the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this MATERIAL SITUATION DOESNOT EXIST IN THE PRESENT CASE FOR, AS
EARLIER INDICATED, THE ASSAILANTS OF CARLITOS WERE NOT STUDENTS OF THE PSBA,
for whose acts the school could be made liable. However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such
material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.
2. Because the circumstances of the prese nt case evince a contractual relation between the
PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the RULES ON QUASI-DELICT DO NOT REALLY GOVERN. A perusal of
Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants
to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
3. Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
knowledge. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to MAINTAIN PEACE AND
ORDER WITHIN THE CAMPUS PREMISES AND TO PREVENT THE BREAKDOWN THEREOF.
4. It has already been determined by this Court that although there is a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista,obligations from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, may arise. Remember Air France v. Carrascoso? In that case, the Court referred to the petitionerairline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is
authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort.

5. It can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be
violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. A contractual
relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently on the contract, unless then negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of
the Civil Code.
6. In this case, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the
private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the
trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold. The complaint should be tried on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila,
Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the
petitioners.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS ET. AL
Facts: For the school year 1995-1996, St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrolment drive
through visitation of other schools where prospective high school enrollees were studying. Among the
students of SMA who took part in the campaign was SHERWIN AND JAMES. Sherwin and other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva and driven by James, then 15 years
old. On their way to Dapitan City, the JEEP TURNED TURTLE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF
SHERWIN.
The parents of Sherwin thus SUED JAMES AND HIS PARENTS, VICENTE AND SMA. At the trial, the
traffic investigator testified and submitted his report showing that the jeep turned turtle because the steering
wheel guide of the jeep was detached. This report and the testimony of the traffic investigator was not disputed
by any of the parties.
After trial, THE LOWER COURT HELD THAT THE SCHOOL IS PRIMARY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
AS IT HAD SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. The parents of Dino
were found to be only subsidiarily liable and were ordered to pay only in the event of insolvency of the school.
Dino was absolved for being only a minor under the special parental authority of the school. Vivencio,
the vehicle owner was not held liable at all.
Issue:
Was the lower court correct?

Held:
No.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody:
(1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or
(2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
This SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES TO ALL AUTHORIZED
ACTIVITIES, WHETHER INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE PREMISES OF THE SCHOOL, ENTITY OR
INSTITUTION. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of
the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
PARENTAL AUTHORITY ARE PRINCIPALLY AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR DAMAGES CAUSED
BY THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF THE UNEMANCIPATED MINOR WHILE UNDER THEIR
SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION, OR CUSTODY.
However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the death or injury sustained. Injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is
that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
In this case, the PARENTS OF SHERWIN FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE SCHOOL AUTHORITIES. They admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of SMA or the reckless driving of James, but the
DETACHMENT OF THE STEERING WHEEL GUIDE OF THE JEEP. Hence reliance on Art. 219, of the
Family Code is unfounded.
Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed the minor James to drive the
jeep at the time of the accident. The SCHOOL DID NOT ALLOW JAMES TO DRIVE THE JEEP. So
whether the accident was caused by the reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events which it had no control. If the
school may be considered negligent, it was only the remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause

and the injury, there intervened the NEGLIGENCE OF THE MINORS PARENTS OR THE
DETACHMENT OF TH ESTEERING WHEEL GUIDE OF THE JEEP.
At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep, IT IS NOT THE SCHOOL BUT THE REGISTERED OWNER OF THE VEHICLE WHO
SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES FOR THE DEATH OF SHERWIN. Registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to
third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. (St.
Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos et. al G.R.143363, February
St. Marys Academy vs. Carpetanos
GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from
where prospective enrollees were studying. SHERWIN CARPITANOS JOINED THE CAMPAIGN. Along
with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same
school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle.
Sherwin died due to this accident.

Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys
Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
ISSUE:
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the petitioner.

HELD:
CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was
pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor
students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the ACT OR OMISSION TO BE CONSIDERED
NEGLIGENT MUST BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE INJURY CAUSED thus, negligence needs
to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any

efficient intervening causes.

The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses
Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner
allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school
has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin.
Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein
petitioner.
ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE ET AL V. MIRANDA

On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph Colleges [SJCs] premises, the class
to which [respondent Jayson Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of
sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner] Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject
teacher and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jaysons] class is x x x Estefania Abdan
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any
untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one
of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass.
The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson].
At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit [Jaysons] eye
and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jaysons] EYES WERE
CHEMICALLY BURNED, PARTICULARLY HIS LEFT EYE, FOR WHICH HE HAD TO UNDERGO
SURGERY AND HAD TO SPEND FOR HIS MEDICATION. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court,
[Jaysons] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Lukes Medical
Center for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to his
teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube until the compound had cooled off.
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision had not
been impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in [Jaysons] discharge,
Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jaysons] father, requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing
[Jaysons] hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the
request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it
should shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further
arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel

for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand
because the accident occurred by reason of [Jaysons] failure to comply with the written procedure for the
experiment and his teachers repeated warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less look into,
the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Jayson] and against
[petitioners]
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25 as actual damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered to
reimburse [petitioner] St. Joseph College the amount of P26,176.36 representing the advances given to
pay [Jaysons] initial hospital expenses or in the alternative to deduct said amount of P26,176.36 from
the P77,338.25 actual damages herein awarded by way of legal compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as mitigated moral damages;
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the
ruling of the RTC
RULING: We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were
NEGLIGENT SINCE THEY ALL FAILED TO EXERCISE THE REQUIRED REASONABLE CARE,
PRUDENCE, CAUTION AND FORESIGHT TO PREVENT OR AVOID INJURIES TO THE
STUDENTS.
Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was his own negligence in disregarding the
instructions given by Tabugo prior to the experiment and peeking into the test tube. Petitioners invoke our
ruling in St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos[9] which absolved St. Marys Academy from liability for the
untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned activity, declaring that the negligence of petitioner St.
Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
We are not convinced.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, the lower courts conclusions are borne out by the records of this case. Both
courts correctly concluded that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to
Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause.
ALL OF THE [PETITIONERS] ARE EQUALLY AT FAULT AND ARE LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE
BECAUSE ALL OF THEM ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXERCISING THE REQUIRED REASONABLE
CARE, PRUDENCE, CAUTION AND FORESIGHT TO PREVENT OR AVOID INJURIES TO THE
STUDENTS. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their
students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being.
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her students, including
Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off.
Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student,
herein respondent Jayson.
We disagree.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners
to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners

were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the
school, its administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority
on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
TITLE X
EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY
Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of twenty-one years.
Emancipation also takes place:
(1) By the marriage of the minor; or
(2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent
exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be
irrevocable.(397a, 398a, 400a, 401a)
Art. 235. The provisions governing emancipation by recorded agreement shall also apply to an orphan minor
and the person exercising parental authority but the agreement must be approved by the court before it is
recorded. (n)
Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the
child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. (412a)
Art. 237. The annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage of a minor or of the recorded agreement
mentioned in the foregoing. Articles 234 and 235 shall revive the parental authority over the minor but shall
not affect acts and transactions that took place prior to the recording of the final judgment in the Civil
Register. (n)

Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings

TITLE XI
SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW
Chapter 1. Prefatory Provisions
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as
regards separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents
involving parental authority. (n)
Chapter 2. Separation in Fact
Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks
judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing
facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in
detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any
case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n)
Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated only in a
separate action. (n)
Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised by the
proper court authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its equivalent sitting
in the place where either of the spouses resides. (n)
Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the
transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be
granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by
a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned. (n)
Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge personally without the parties being
assisted by counsel. After the initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be assisted by
counsel at the succeeding conferences and hearings. (n)
Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall inquire into the
reasons for his failure to appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n)
Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not secured, the court may
proceed EX PARTE AND RENDER JUDGMENT AS THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES MAY
WARRANT. In any case, the judge shall endeavor to protect the interests of the non-appearing spouse. (n)
Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary
hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the
court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their
testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses.(n)
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.(n)
Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate property of the
abandoning spouse and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be governed
by these rules. (n)
Chapter 3. Incidents Involving Parental Authority
Art. 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code involving parental authority shall be

verified. (n)
Art. 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed in the proper court of the place WHERE THE CHILD
RESIDES. (n)
Art. 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the parents or, in their absence or incapacity,
the individuals, entities or institutions exercising parental authority over the child. (n)
Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter insofar as
they are applicable. (n)
Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings
Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed
under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are applicable. (n)
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an estimated value
of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein RESPONDENT MARIETTA CALISTERIO.
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds
on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having
priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein PETITIONER ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, a surviving sister of
Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT MARIETTA
ESPINOSA CALISTERIO BEING ALLEGEDLY BIGAMOUS and thereby NULL AND VOID. She
prayed that HER SON SINFRONIANO C. ARMAS, JR., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the
estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would
have been settled.
Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and
respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now
assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a
new one entered declaring as follows:

"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;

XXX
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, prompting her to
interpose the present appeal.
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the deceased Teodorico
and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
RULING OF COURT: Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the
New Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
UNTIL DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY A COMPETENT COURT."
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second
marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during
the regime of the Civil Code, SHOULD THUS BE DEEMED VALID NOTWITHSTANDING THE
ABSENCE OF A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF JAMES BOUNDS.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another
property regime between the spouses, PERTAINS TO THEM IN COMMON. Upon its dissolution with the
death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the
surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is AFFIRMED
except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner
are likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion
of her own children. No costs.