MANGILA vs.

JUDGE PANGILINAN
FACTS:
Anita Mangila was charged with seven criminal complaints with
syndicated estafa in violation, and Migrant Act. The complaints arose from the
recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the
collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and online application without
authority. Allowing the preliminary investigation conducted by judge Pangilinan of
MTCC in Perto Princesa, a warrant of arrest was issued against Mangila and her
cohorts without bail. By virtue of the arrest warrant, Mangila was arrested in Manila
and detained. Mangila filed a petition for habeas corps before the CA to obtain her
release. He argued that Judge Pangilinan had no authority to conduct he PI, that the PI
was not yet completed when the arrest warrant was issued and that there was no
finding of probable case prior to the issuance of arrest warrant. The CA denied
Mangilas petition.
ISSUE:
What is the nature of habeas corpus and WON the writ of habeas corps
was the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
HELD:
NO. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 176 of the Rules of Court, as amended. It was held that
Habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character. It sees the enforcement of
civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the
complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. the rule applies even
when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a sit and prosecutes a
case in that court. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the
question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null
and void. the writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies
in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover,
habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial
must be pursued and the remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where
exceptional circumstances are e9tant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus
cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities not involving the questions of : jurisdiction occurring during the course
of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of humanlife and
liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint
is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the
proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases,
there restraint is not illegal. In this case, the resolution of the investigating judge was
not final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor who had the
power to order the release of the detainee if no probable case should be found against
her.

REPUBLIC vs. KHO

FACTS:
Carlito Kho (Kho) and his family applied for the correction of various
details in their birth certificate. Kho petitioned for (1) change the citizenship of his
mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete John from his name; and (3) delete
the word married opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction
was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificatesof respondents
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. The petition from a non-adversarial nature
of the change is premised on Republic Act No. 9048, which allows first name
and nickname in birth certificates without judicial order. The Municipal officer
approved of thechange. The Solicitor General objected to the correction on the ground
that the correction not merely clerical but requires an adversarial proceeding. The
Court of Appeals found in favor of Kho.
ISSUE:

WON Khos request for change in the

certificate requires an adversarial proceeding

details of

their birth

HELD:
YES. It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought
to change the citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and
delete the married status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the
correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the
changes entail substantial and controversial amendments. For the change involving
the nationality of Carlitos mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and
important matter that has a bearingand effect on the citizenship and nationality not
only of the parents, but also of the offspring. Further, the deletion of the entry that
Carlitos and his siblings parents were married alters their filiation from
legitimate to illegitimate, with significant implications on their successional and
other rights. Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding.
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as An Act
Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct A
Clerical or Typographical Error In An Entry and/or Change of First Name
or Nickname in the Civil RegisterWithout Need of Judicial Order, has been
considered to lend legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial
corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected
through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the
entries of the civil register is satisfied

BRAZA V CIVIL REGISTRAR

FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Cristinas husband, Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a
vehicular accident in Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his
remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular began introducing her corespondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son.
Petitioner thereupon made inquiries with the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental. On the annotation of Patricks birth certificate reflects
Patrick as having been acknowledged by Pablo (or Pablito) as son on January 13,
1997, that he was legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22,
1998 at Manila, and that he shall be known as Patrick Titular Braza. Ma. Cristina
likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were
married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners (her three legitimate
children with Pablo) to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth
record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. Contending that Patrick could not have
been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage
being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina
and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth
record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his
acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; (2) a directive to Leon,
Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and (3) the declaration
of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. TC
dismissed the petition, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction
over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of
Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy
should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action. MR was denied. Hence, this
petition for review.
ISSUE:

WON the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil
registrar.

HELD:
NO. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which
an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk

or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a

correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial
proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly
observed. The petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo
and Lucilles marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy,
which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively,
hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo. Petition Denied.

REPUBLIC vs. SILVERIO

FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, born and registered as a male,
underwent sex reassignment in Bangkok, Thailand, the fact of which was certified
here in the Philippines by virtue of a medical certificate issued by one Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz. He then lived his life as a woman. On November 26, 2002, Rommel
filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex before the RTC of Manila. The
court having underwent the jurisdictional requirements, and there having no
opposition, the court proceeded with the hearing where Rommel presented his
American Fiance as witness. RTC gave due course to his petition, ruling based on
equity, that petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own
doing and should not be taken against him and that no harm, injury or prejudice will
be caused to anybody if the petition were to be granted. His name was thus changed
to Mely, and sex to female. Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. The
appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
and RA 9048.
HELD:
NO. Change of Name is primarily Administrative in nature. Section 1
of RA 9048 provides in essence that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors, which
can be changed by concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The
jurisdiction therefore is primarily lodged with these officers. The intent and effect of
the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change of Name) and 108(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change
of name is first filed and subsequently denied. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial. Hence, the venue to which petitioner filed is improper. RA 9048 provides the
grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: 1) petitioner finds the first
name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; 2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name
or nickname in the community; or 3) The change will avoid confusion. From these
grounds, it can be gleaned that RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications. Before a person
can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.

REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN

FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of
Live Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and
was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has
no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary
male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen.
According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of
Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her
first name be changed to Jeff.
ISSUE:

WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:
YES. The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex
the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this
case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces
high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.

REPUBLIC vs. UY
FACTS:
Dr. Anita Sy filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Birth
Certificate. She impleaded as respondent the Local Registr at of Gingoog City. In her
petition, she asked that her name, Anita Sy be changed to Norma S. Lagunay, her
status be changed from legitimate to illegitimate, and her citizenship from Chinese to
Filipino, contending that her parents were never married and her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. After Anita Sys compliance with
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation of the notice of
hearing of the said petition, the RTC granted the same.
On appeal, CA affirmed RTCs judgment on the ground that respondents failure to
implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order
setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the Local Civil Registrar,
the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office.
ISSUE:

WON petition is dismissible for failure to implead the indispensable

parties?

HELD:
Yes. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the
petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. Summons must,
therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. In this case, Anita
Sy should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her
parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes
or corrections respondent wanted to make, in compliance with Rule 108, Rules of
Court

TAPUZ vs. DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:
The Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC of BaruangaMalay, Aklan for forcible entry with damages against the Tupazs (Tupaz family and
about 120 John Does). The Sansons allege that they own 1 hectare of land as
evidenced by the TCT in their name. That the Tupazes, came in the morning of April
16, 2006, came in to the property armed with bolos and suspected firearms, with force
and intimidation, took possession of the disputed property of the Sansons and built a
nipa and bamboo structure. The MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons, finding that the
latter had previous possession of the disputed land since1993 up to 2006 when the
land was taken. The MCTC issued the injunction prayed for. The petitioners
(Tupazes) appealed to the RTC. Upon motion of the Sansons, the RTC granted the
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and also issued a writ of demolition
against the Tupazes. The MR filed by the Tupazes was denied. So the Tupazes went to
the CA through rule 42, to have the Injunction and Writ of Demolition reviewed.
While in the CA, the sheriff of Aklan served the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition
to the Tupazes. Thus, the Tupazes came before the SC praying for 3 remedies:
Certiorari under Rule 65, the issuance of the writ of Habeas Data and the issuance of
the writ of Amparo.
ISSUE:

WON Writ of Amparo may be issued for the Tupazes in this case?

HELD:
NO. The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail
the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to
life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. Under
these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the
petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and
focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of
ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of
the writ of amparo.

CANLAS vs. NAPICO

FACTS:
The petitoners seek the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. Theyclaim that
they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and
embodied in our Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as
of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court
judgment. They claimed that fraudulent and spurious land titles were issued by certain
Land Officials. These Land Officials should be summoned to answer their
participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, now, in the hands
of
the
Private
Respondents
ISSUE :

Whether

or

not

the

writ

of amparo applies

in

this

case.

Held :
NO. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of
a final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated
in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made
available.

CASTILLO VS CRUZ
FACTS:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her
husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio
Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by
the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize
it for local projects. Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights
over the property. The pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the
MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion
for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was already
implemented before the TRO issuance. On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police
Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in
compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing
him to protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property, entered the
property.Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however.
Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from
repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause
their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Thus,
respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
ISSUES:
(1)WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
(2) WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already
filed.
HELD:
On the 1st issue: Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats
of unlawful acts or omissions Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: As
the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: What it
is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it
a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. To thus be covered
by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that
their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or
omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between
the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between
the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security,
the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property. It bears
emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will
not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail

for the offenses a day after their arrest. On the 2nd issue: Respondents filing of the
petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto
and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be
set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and
habeas data.

ROXAS vs. GMA

FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the
United States, enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which
she is a member. On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her
companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While
Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes
forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from
the van, she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of
Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). She was then
separated from her companions and was brought to a room, from where she could
hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction
bustle. She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to
abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named RC that those
who tortured her came from the Special Operations Group and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle. On 25 May 2009,
Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim card. She was
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something
untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to
receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw
the phone and the sim card. Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the
issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading
the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the
belief that it was the government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The Court
of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the
court a quo absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that the
respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas. Aggrieved,
Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened

violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim
is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be extended.

HELD:
Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before
the privilege of the writ may be extended An indispensable requirement before the
privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence,
of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened
violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found
to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference

regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to
privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime,
strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

BURGOS vs. ESPIRON

FACTS:
At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was
forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever
Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. On April 30, 2007, the
petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas
was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the
person abducted was her son Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and Land
Transportation Office (LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB
194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B.
Mudlong. The said vehicle was seized and impounded on June 24, 2006 for
transporting timber without permit. However, in May 2007, right after Jonas
abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991
Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were
cannibalized. The police was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches of two
of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. On August 29, 2007,
the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNPCIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka
Carlo, and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that
elements of the New Peoples Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. In its
July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for the
Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioners motion to declare the
respondents in contempt; and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in
favor of the petitioner. Essentially, the CA found that the evidence the petitioner
presented failed to establish her claimed direct connection between the abductors of
Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of investigation.
ISSUE:
WON the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and
meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance
of their duties is a fatal to the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
HELD:
Yes. Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive
and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties Considering the findings of the CA and our review of
the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far
failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance
of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of
their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these
investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful
investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.