The Writ of Amparo The Philippine Experience So Far - CD

1
Copyright 2012 Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna
ISBN 978-971-0361-08-3
Published by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Padre Faura Street, Ermita 1000
Manila, Philippines
A special publication
of the Research, Publications and Linkages Office,
Philippine Judicial Academy, Supreme Court.
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Hon. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
Hon. ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Hon. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, Jr.
Hon. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Hon. ARTURO D. BRION
Hon. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Hon. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Hon. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Hon. ROBERTO A. ABAD
Hon. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, Jr.
Hon. JOSE P. PEREZ
Hon. JOSE C. MENDOZA
Hon. BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Hon. ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Preface
Preface
On November 12, 2012, retired Supreme Court Justice and PHILJA
Chancellor Adolfo S. Azcuna delivered his lecture on the topic The

Writ of Amparo: The Philippine Experience So Far before an august
body of retired and incumbent members of the judiciary,
government officials, the academe, representatives of PHILJAs
development partners, private practitioners, and law students, in
connection with his selection as the first recipient of the Founding
Chancellor Emeritus Ameurfina A. Melencio Herrera Award for the
Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer. Justice Herrera and her
family graced the occasion held at the PHILJA Training Center in
Tagaytay. This was a fitting opportunity to honor Justice Herrera
on the occasion of her 90th birthday on May 11, 2012.
Justice Azcunas comprehensive lecture focuses on the
recent development in the implementation of the Writ after the
Supreme Court issued on September 25, 2007, its En Banc Resolution
in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. He
narrates his first encounter with amparo while he was serving as a
member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He had then readily
grasped the noble intent of amparo to protect citizens from specific
acts violating their freedoms and had been moved to seek its
inclusion in the Philippine Constitution. As he continued to track the
spread of amparo in other countries of the Western Hemisphere,
he further saw the opportunity, as a member of the Constitutional
Commission to draft the 1987 Constitution, to infuse the rule in the
fundamental law of the land. His unwavering efforts to make this
protection of rights available to Filipinos have earned him recognition
at different legal fora as the Father of the Writ of Amparo.
Justice Azcuna takes his audience through a journey of

events that introduced amparo into the realm of our nations legal
consciousness, such as when our political and military institutions
needed to address the increasing number of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances that threatened the fragile peace and
order situation in our country. He relates that, in due time, he joined
efforts with Justice Antonio T. Carpio in preparing a short draft of
the rule on amparo which was submitted to the Chief Justice. What
transpired five years later included an unprecedented National
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances that
helped pave the way to the promulgation of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo by the Supreme Court.
It is our hope that this publication will serve as another
tool to enhance the capacity of judges and other stakeholders in
addressing the phenomenon of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
Sedfrey M. Candelaria
Head, Research, Publications and Linkages Office
Philippine Judicial Academy
Profile
Profile
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Holder, 2007 Metrobank Foundation
Professorial Chair in International
and Human Rights Law
Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy
Associate Justice (Ret.),
ustice Adolfo S. Azcuna was born in Katipunan, Zamboanga Del Norte,

J
on February 16, 1939, the son of Felipe B. Azcuna and Carmen S. Sevilla.
He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts, with academic honors, at the
Ateneo de Manila in 1959 and the degree of Bachelor of Laws, cum laude,
at the same institution in 1962. He was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1963, placing 4th in the 1962 Bar Examinations. He forthwith embarked
on a government career as Assistant Private Secretary of then Presiding
Justice Jose P. Bengzon of the Court of Appeals in 1963 and, thereafter,
upon the appointment of the latter to the Supreme Court in 1964, as his
Private Secretary.
Justice Azcuna taught International Law at his alma mater, Ateneo
de Manila, from 1967 to 1986. In 1982, he completed post-graduate
studies in International Law and Jurisprudence at the McGeorge School
of Law in Salzburg, Austria. Representing Zamboanga Del Norte, he was
elected as member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Subsequently,
he was appointed as a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
He held several government posts during the term of President

Corazon C. Aquino, first as Presidential Legal Counsel, then as Press
Secretary and subsequently, as Presidential Spokesperson. In 1991,
he was appointed chairperson of the Philippine National Bank. On
October 17, 2002, he was appointed Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
In his opening remarks delivered at the Lecture Forum on
the Writ of Amparo before the RTC judges of the NCJR on October
15, 2007, then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno said, In 1987, Justice
Adolf Azcuna, then one of the commissioners tasked by President
Corazon Aquino to draft the 1987 Constitution, embedded in its
backbone a provision giving the Supreme Court the extra power to
promulgate rules which would give life to the writ of amparo to
protect the constitutional rights of our people. Through his initiative,
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court was expanded to
complement the awesome power of Congress to make laws.
Historically, it is the parliament that protects the rights of people
through its lawmaking power. Justice Azcuna allowed the Supreme
Court to have a share in the exercise of this power by expanding its
rule-making power.
He retired from the Supreme Court on February 16, 2009,
and was appointed on June 1, 2009, as Chancellor of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, a post he holds at the moment.
Justice Azcunas major publications include International
Sales of Goods, Transnational Law Practice, International Law
Teaching in the Philippines, Doing Business in the Philippines,
Foreign Judgment [Monetary] Enforcements in the Philippines,
Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity: From Willets to Santos,
ASEAN Conflict of Law, The Supreme Court and Public
International Law, International Humanitarian Law: A Field Guide
to the Basics, and his two Supreme Court books: Seeing Reality in
Todays World and Seeking Justice in Todays World.
Justice Azcuna is married to Maria Asuncion Aunario,
former Dean of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the St. Scholasticas
College. They are blessed with four children and four grandchildren.
Contents
Contents
v PREFACE
Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria
vii PROFILE
Chancellor Adolfo S. Azcuna
1 PROGRAM
REMARKS
3 OPENING
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
INTRODUCTION
Court Administrator
Jose Midas P. Marquez
THE WRIT OF AMPARO:
12 THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

53 RESPONSE
Atty. Florentino M. Herrera III
55
CLOSING REMARKS
55 Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (Ret.)

APPENDIX A
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
59
Administrative Matter No. 07-9-12-SC
Rationale
Annotation
APPENDIX B
Writ of Amparo:
112 The
A Remedy to Enforce Fundamental Rights
Adolfo S. Azcuna

Philippine Judicial Academy
in partnership with the
Children of PHILJA Chancellor
Emeritus Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera
present the
Founding Chancellor Emeritus

Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera
Award for the Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer
November 12, 2012, Monday, 2:00 p.m.
PTC Auditorium
PHILJA Training Center
Tagaytay City
Program
Doxology
Philippine National Anthem
Supreme Court Hymn
PHILJA Choir
Opening Remarks
Honorable Antonio T. Carpio
Senior Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines
Musical Number
PHILJA Choir
Introduction of the Lecturer
Honorable Jose Midas P. Marquez
Court Administrator, Supreme Court of the Philippines
LECTURE
The Writ of Amparo: The Philippine Experience So Far

by
Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna

Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy
Award for the Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer
endowed by the
Children of Chancellor Emeritus Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera
Presentation of Paper
Presentation of Endowment to the
Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer
Presentation of Plaques of Appreciation
Response
Founding Partner, Herrera Teehankee and Cabrera Law Offices
Closing Remarks
Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (Ret.)
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines
Philippine Judiciary Hymn
Master of Ceremonies
Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria
Head, Research, Publications, and Linkages Office, PHILJA
Dean, Ateneo Law School
THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR
Opening Remarks
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., my esteemed colleagues on the Court, other retired Justices
of the Court present here this afternoon, Justice Adolfo Azcuna, Justice Ameurfina A.
Melencio Herrera, Atty. Florentino Herrera III, Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez,
Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals; the faculty and officials of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, officials of the Supreme Court; judges of first and second level courts; my
co-workers in the judiciary and in government; members of the Bar; fellow students of the
law; friends good afternoon to everyone.
I welcome you all to this first-ever lecture The Founding Chancellor Emeritus Justice
Ameurfina Melencio Herrera Award for the Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer. This
annual lecture is endowed by the children of Justice Melencio Herrera, the founding
chancellor of the Philippine Judicial Academy. On behalf of the Court and PHILJA, I thank
the Children of Justice Melencio Herrera for this generous endowment.
Our distinguished lecturer this afternoon, Justice and PHILJA Chancellor Adolfo S.
Azcuna, or Justice Adolf as we fondly call him, has a lifelong passion for the Writ of Amparo.
For the longest time Justice Adolf has been the foremost advocate for the adoption of the
Writ of Amparo in the Philippines. In 1971, as a youthful member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, then ConCon Delegate Adolf filed a resolution for the adoption of the Writ of
Amparo in the proposed Constitution. Well, the members of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention simply ignored Delegate Adolfs resolution, and the idea of the Writ of Amparo
never entered the consciousness of the legal community. That was more than 40 years ago,
when I was still a freshman in law school.
In 1986, as a middle-aged member of the Constitutional Commission, then
Commissioner Adolf filed not one, not two but three resolutions for the adoption of the
Writ of Amparo in the proposed Constitution. The first resolution was to provide for a
constitutional writ of amparo, the second to provide judicial review of violations of the
Constitution, and the third to provide judicial review of the exercise of emergency powers
by the President. The members of the 1986 Convention simply ignored Commissioner Adolfs
OPENING REMARKS I ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. C ARPIO
second and third resolutions. However, the first resolution gained traction, not expressly as
the writ of amparo, but as a rule-making power of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, what
came out was of tectonic magnitude just the same.
Justice Adolf was able to insert a new provision in Section 5(5), Article VIII on the
Judiciary. As explained by Commissioner Roberto Concepcion the former Chief Justice
in his response to a query by Commissioner Fely Aquino during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Convention:
x x x if the Commissioner will go over Section 7(5) [eventually Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution], she will notice that this provision says:
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights x x x. Note also that this is the first part of the paragraph. This was
introduced upon the request of Commissioner Azcuna in order to stress that
constitutional rights are not merely declaratory but also enforceable. That is
why this phrase which did not appear in the 1973 Constitution is an innovation.
What is the nature and meaning of this innovative provision, which Justice Adolf
successfully inserted in the 1987 Constitution? The answer to this question goes back 171
years ago, to what Manuel Crescencio Rejon inserted in the 1841 Constitution of the
independent State of Yucatan in Mexico. Manuel Rejon is acknowledged in legal history as
the originator or creator of the Writ of Amparo. As drafter of the 1841 Yucatan Constitution,
Manuel Rejon wrote in Article 62 of the Yucatan Constitution that a citizen has the right to
amparo, that is, protection from the Supreme Court of Yucatan when his constitutional
right is violated by the government. In short, the writ of amparo protects the constitutional
rights of a citizen, making all constitutional rights not only declaratory but also judicially
enforceable. In the Yucatan Constitution, the Writ of Amparo was self-executory, judicially
enforceable without need of any implementing legislation.
In 1847, when a republican Mexico re-adopted its 1824 Constitution, it also included
the Writ of Amparo as an amendment to the 1824 Constitution, borrowing from Manuel
Rejons 1841 Yucatan Constitution. The Writ of Amparo in the Mexican Constitution protected
constitutional rights with a difference. The Writ of Amparo in the 1847 Amendment [to the
1824 Mexico Constitution], as well as the Writ of Amparo in the later 1857 Mexican
Constitution, was not self-executory but needed implementing legislation, unlike the Writ of
Amparo in the Yucatan Constitution, which was self-executory. However, what is important
is that the Writ of Amparo in both the Yucatan and Mexican Constitutions was written
expressly to protect constitutional rights of citizens, so that constitutional rights are not
only declaratory but also judicially enforceable.
Now we can see clearly what Justice Adolf intended when he successfully inserted
in Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution the innovative provision that the Supreme
Court shall have the power to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of
Justice Antonio T. Carpio

delivers the opening
remarks at the PHILJA
Founding Chancellor
Emeritus Justice Ameurfina
Melencio Herrera Award
for the Most Outstanding
Professorial Lecturer held
on November 12, 2012, at
the PHILJA Training Center,
Tagaytay City.
constitutional rights. Justice Adolf actually inserted the Writ of Amparo in the 1987
Constitution without naming it the Writ of Amparo. In fact, Commissioner Suarez expressly
admitted this during the ConCom deliberations when he stated:
I remember that one of our distinguished colleagues, Commissioner Azcuna,
precisely submitted for the consideration of the Committee on the Judiciary
the consideration of the so-called writ of amparo, meaning, that one has the
right to demand the enforcement of a constitutional right. This is now a
constitutional right.
That the phrase Writ of Amparo does not appear in the 1987 Constitution is
immaterial. The Writ of Amparo by any other name, or even nameless, with the substance
the same, is still the Writ of Amparo. Undeniably, the power of the Supreme Court to protect
and enforce constitutional rights under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution is the
Philippine version of the Writ of Amparo. In an article he wrote in the Ateneo Law Journal in
1993, or 14 years before the Supreme Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in 2007, Justice
Adolf stated:
The Philippine Constitution provides the basis for the Philippine writ of amparo,
by introducing a new provision in Article VIII, Section 5(5), that empowers the
Supreme Court to: Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights x x x. x x x.
The Writ of Amparo in the 1987 Constitution is practically the same as the Writ of
Amparo in the Yucatan and Mexican Constitutions. They all protect constitutional rights, so
that constitutional rights are not only declaratory but also judicially enforceable. The only
significant difference is this: the Writ of Amparo in the Yucatan Constitution was selfexecutory, under the Mexican Constitution it needed implementing legislation, and in our
1987 Constitution it needs an implementing rule from the Supreme Court.
OPENING REMARKS I ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. C ARPIO
Of course, we all know that when the Puno Court adopted in October 2007 the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo, Justice Adolf, together with then Chief Justice Reynato Puno, was a
leading member of the committee that drafted the Amparo Rule. For his lifelong advocacy
for the Writ of Amparo, and most importantly, for actually introducing in the 1987
Constitution the Writ of Amparo, I can say with confidence that Justice Adolf is truly the
father of the Writ of Amparo in the Philippines.
In 1991, Justice Adolf, as the Bar examiner in Political Law, asked the question: What
is the Writ of Amparo? In 1991, just like almost all the bar examinees then, I would have
answered, I have not yet met, nor been invited or summoned by, Amparo. Now I know
better the Writ of Amparo is the power of the Supreme Court to protect and enforce
constitutional rights, as introduced by ConCom Commissioner Adolf Azcuna in Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The present Amparo Rule is only the start of what could be a series of Supreme
Court promulgated rules to protect all constitutional rights enshrined in the Constitution.
What Justice Adolf inserted in the Constitution is not only for the protection of the right to
life, liberty, or security in cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, but more
significantly, for the protection of all constitutional rights without qualification. Thus, the
Supreme Court, through its rule-making power, can apply the Amparo provision in Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution to other rights, whether civil, political, social or economic
rights, as long as these rights are declared in the Constitution. That is why I say that the
Amparo provision introduced by Justice Adolf in the 1987 Constitution has tectonic
ramifications on Philippine society.
Today, five years after the adoption of the present Amparo Rule by the Supreme
Court, and almost 25 years after the insertion of the innovative Amparo provision in the
1987 Constitution, Justice Adolf will report to us on the Philippine experience, so far, on his
lifelong love affair with the Writ of Amparo. I am sure we will all be enlightened.
Thank you and welcome once again to this lecture.
Introduction
CA Jose Midas P. Marquez
Amparo first gained popularity, or infamy, during the 1991 Bar Examinations. What is
the Writ of Amparo and what, if any, is the basis for it in the Philippine Constitution?
was the first question of the first exam of the 1991 Bar Examinations. Of course, the
examiner then in Political Law was no less than our awardee-lecturer today, Justice
Adolfo S. Azcuna, or simply JASA to his colleagues, friends, and even staff. Incidentally,
the Chairperson of the 1991 Bar Examinations was then Associate Justice, later Chief
Justice, Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who will be delivering the closing remarks later.
In his address before the 2004 graduates of the Ateneo de Manila University
College of Law, Justice Azcuna narrated that when he was formulating the questions for
the 1991 Political Law Bar Exams, he felt that he had run out of questions after question
No. 49, and so he decided to throw in a question on the writ of amparo as question No.
50, almost sure that the Chairperson of the Bar Exams would not give it much attention.1
However, Chief Justice Davide chose it and even made it question No. 1(A),
surprising a good number of the bar examinees. Justice Azcuna recounted that only
about 20 percent managed a correct answer, having possibly read a speech of then
Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan that mentioned it, or the book of Professor de Leon that
also dealt with it. The rest either left it blank or said it was the writ of habeas corpus.
Two years later, in 1993, after amparo became a huge buzz in the academe and
the legal profession, Justice Azcunas article, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce
Fundamental Rights was published in the Ateneo Law Journal. It has now become the
source of various studies on amparo, and was even cited in the Supreme Courts
Annotation on the Rule of Writ of Amparo.
Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, A Field Guide to a New Kind of Lawyering, delivered at the
Commencement Exercises, Ateneo de Manila University School of Law, April 25, 2004,
Meralco Theater, Pasig City.
INTRODUCTION I COURT ADMINISTRATOR J OSE MIDAS P. M ARQUEZ
Some attribute the promulgation of the Amparo Rule to then Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno and consider Chief Justice Puno as the Father of Amparo. If that is so, we might
as well call Justice Azcuna the Grandfather of Amparo, for it was Justice Azcuna who
first introduced the concept of amparo into the Philippine legal system as a flexible
remedy to enforce and protect constitutional rights, first during the 1971 Constitutional
Convention where he was elected as a young delegate at 32 from Zamboanga del Norte,
and again in the 1986 Constitutional Commission where he was appointed as a
commissioner.2
Thus, in his speech The Legacy of a Legal Luminary, Chief Justice Puno disclosed
that the Court leaned heavily on the foreknowledge of Justice Azcuna in drafting the
rule on the Writ of Amparo for it was he who first introduced this writ of liberty to the
mainstream of Philippine legal thought.3
In another speech, Chief Justice Puno said that Justice Azcuna, as a member of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission tasked to draft the 1987 Constitution, embedded
in its backbone a provision giving the Supreme Court the extra power to promulgate
rules which would give life to the writ of amparo to protect the constitutional rights of
our people. Through his initiative, the rule-making power of the Supreme Court was
expanded to complement the awesome power of Congress to make laws. Historically, it
is the parliament that protects the rights of people through its lawmaking power. Justice
Azcuna allowed the Supreme Court to have a share in the exercise of this power by
expanding its rule-making power.4
Hence, in the initial meeting of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of
Rules to draft the rules on amparo, Chief Justice Puno himself emphatically called Justice
Azcuna as the father of amparo.5
A native of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, Justice Azcuna received his Bachelor
of Arts degree, with academic honors, from the Ateneo de Manila in 1959, and obtained
See Felipe Enrique M. Gozon, Jr. and Theoben Jerdan C. Orosa, Watching the Watchers: A
Look into the Drafting of the Writ of Amparo, PHILIPPINE L AW JOURNAL, Vol. 82, No. 4 (2008)
Annie A. Laborte and Gleo Sp. Guerra, Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna: Love is the Secret, Benchmark
Online February 2009 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/publications/benchmark/2009/02/020903.php>.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Opening Remarks on Lecture Forum on the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo <http://ca.judiciary.gov.ph/index.php?action=mnuactual_contents&ap=j60130&p=y>.
Ibid.
Court Administrator
Jose Midas P. Marquez
introduces the Speaker at
the PHILJA Founding
Chancellor Emeritus
Justice Ameurfina
Melencio Herrera Award
for the Most Outstanding
Professorial Lecturer
held on November 12,
2012, at the PHILJA
Training Center,
Tagaytay City.
his Bachelor of Laws degree, cum laude, from the same institution in 1962. He then
placed 4th in the 1962 Bar Examinations. Among those who topped the 1962 Bar Exams
were San Beda Law Dean Virgilio B. Jara, No. 5; the late Haydee B. Yorac, No. 8; and
noted constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, No. 9. Incidentally, since Chief Justice
Puno is not around anyway, because of a prior commitment, he also took the 1962 Bar
Exams.
Justice Azcuna right away joined the government in 1963 as a law clerk of then
Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Jose P. Bengzon. He then joined PJ Bengzon when the
latter was appointed to the Supreme Court a year later.
Justice Azcuna also taught International Law at his alma mater for almost two
decades, from 1967 to 1986. In 1982, he completed his post-graduate studies in
International Law and Jurisprudence at the Salzburg University in Austria.
Justice Azcuna held other sensitive government posts. In 1986, during the term
of President Corazon C. Aquino, he was first Presidential Legal Counsel, then Press
Secretary, and eventually Presidential Spokesperson. It was during this time that he
met with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, which he considers historic and as one of his
best experiences.
In 1991, he was appointed Chairperson of the Philippine National Bank, and in
2002, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. In 2009, upon retiring from the Supreme
10
INTRODUCTION I COURT ADMINISTRATOR J OSE MIDAS P. M ARQUEZ
Court after reaching the mandatory age of 70, Justice Azcuna was appointed as the
second Chancellor of the Philippine Judicial Academy.
A photography afficionado, Justice Azcuna has a huge collection of important
vintage cameras, including Leicas and Nikons, and loves to take pictures. Some of his
works have in fact been exhibited abroad.
A certified linguist, Justice Azcuna can speak German, Spanish, and French, in
addition to English, Filipino, and of course Chavacano. He likes to read, loves to eat, and
enjoys hot chocolate. An Obama fan and a mall habitu, he updates his Facebook page
and checks on others regularly, and also tweets every so often.
A loving husband to Mariasun for almost half a century, doting father to Rhina
and Alvi, Bea, Agoo and Andy, and Miguel, and an adoring grandfather to Angelo, Andres,
Luci and Ari, Justice Azcuna does yoga and still manages to do a headstand to improve
his blood circulation.
TLC, a Discovery company, describes aquarian Justice Azcuna, who was born
on February 16, as easygoing and generous. He gives freely of his time and talents, and
has a seeming laid-back attitude that endears him to everyone. But despite a pleasant
facade, he is a perfectionist. When he involves himself in a project, he gives it everything.
Known for his ability to see the bigger picture, he is equally at home with details. His is
a temperament that wins peoples affection and respect.
In fine, there is no person more fitting to deliver a lecture on the Writ of Amparo,
which has been described as a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners
behind secret walls,6 other than Justice Azcuna.
Friends, ladies and gentlemen, let us all please welcome the first awardee of the
PHILJA Founding Chancellor Emeritus Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera Award for
the Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer, retired Supreme Court Justice and PHILJA
Chancellor, Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1.
11
12
LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
The Writ of Amparo:

The Philippine Experience So far*
I first learned of the Writ of Amparo from an article in an international law journal by the
Mexican professor Hector Fiz Zamudio. This was around the time of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in which I represented, with two others, the lone district of Zamboanga del
Norte as an elected Delegate.
From Fiz Zamudios article, I learned what I later recounted in an article in the Ateneo
Law Journal and which is best summarized in the first decision of the Philippine Supreme
Court on amparo, Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo.1 Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
speaking for a unanimous Court, laid out the nature and origin of amparo, thus:
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the
recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit
on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court
on July 1617, 2007. The Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and factbased perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, hence representatives from all sides of the political and social
spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system participated in
mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in
the light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which made its
maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino
experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed
Philippine Copyright 2012 by Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna.
G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1.
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial

proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by
a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means
protection in Spanish. In 1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in America
became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the
practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. One of
them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native
state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the
enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated
into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the
exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this
Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks
by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state
governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the
specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning
the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican

constitutionalism. If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional
right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the officials
superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore
the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus
combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the
limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting
individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power
to make law for the entire nation.
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere,
gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of
each country. It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal
Supreme Court, one piece of Mexicos self-attributed task of conveying to the
worlds legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her
own painful history conceived. What began as a protection against acts or
omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved
for several purposes:
13
14
(1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom,

equivalent to the habeas corpus writ;
(2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality
of statutes;
(3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality
and legality of a judicial decision;
(4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative
actions; and
(5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights derived from
the agrarian reform process.
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries
adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional
rights, including socio-economic rights. Other countries like Colombia, Chile,
Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ
of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly
provide for the writ of amparo, several of the above amparo protections are
guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo
casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review,
which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse
Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies
may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve
a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo
Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditionsborne out
of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abusesoffers
15
a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats

thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It
is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission
of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and
action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to
deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
I proposed before the Convention the adoption of amparo as a remedy to enforce

the Social and Economic Rights which were in turn proposed by Delegates Roco and others
under a Bill of Social and Economic Rights in addition to the traditional Bill of Rights (Civil
and Political).
This was not to be, as the idea of a separate Bill of Social and Economic Rights
incorporating a writ to amparo was not adopted by the Convention.
Subsequently, 15 years later, I again had a chance to insert amparo in the Bill of
Rights, as one of the 48 members of the Constitutional Commission appointed by President
Corazon C. Aquino to draft a Charter after the EDSA People Power Revolution swept away
the 1971 Constitution as amended by President Marcos.
This time, however, upon the sage counsel of the late Chief Justice Roberto C.
Concepcion, I proposed to put it simply as among the powers of the Supreme Court in
providing for the rules of court.
This strategy worked and the proposal was approved and is now Article VIII, Section
5, subsection 5 of the Constitution:
xxxx
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
16
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
It is this provision that was asked in the 1991 Political Law Bar Examinations where
I was the examiner: What is the Writ of Amparo and what if any is the basis for it in the
Philippine Constitution?
Amparo, then, is a special Constitutional remedy provided for by the Constitution to
enforce and protect rights other than the right of physical liberty that is already covered by
the writ of habeas corpus. Its basis is the new provision on the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court quoted above.
For over 20 years, however, the Supreme Court saw no need to exercise this new
power. It felt that there were sufficient existing remedies such as prohibition, mandamus,
certiorari, injunction and the like, to achieve the same purpose.
Then, in 2007, a spate of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances plagued
the country. We were pilloried all over the world and the United Nations sent a special
envoy to investigate the Philippine situation. As a result, the Supreme Court decided to act
on the crisis. It designated a number of courts to try extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. For these courts, Justice Antonio T. Carpio and I drafted a short Rule on
Amparo and submitted it to the Chief Justice. It was, however, decided to call an
unprecedented National Summit as mentioned in the Mariano brothers case. The present
Rule on Amparo was thereafter adopted effective on October 24, 2007.
The Rule is fairly straightforward: It has 27 sections. The Sections provide for the
nature of the remedy, who can file an action to get it, how this is done, where it is filed, what
the judge/Justice does after receiving it, the service on the respondent, the reply, the summary
hearing, the interim reliefs, the defenses available, the judgment and the privilege of the
writ, the appeal and other incidental matters.
After five years of amparo, what is the score?
The record of the Court Administrator gives the following picture:
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
TOTAL CASES FILED PER COURT
TOTAL PETITIONS PER REGION
25
PR
IN
G
OV
ISI
DI O
SM NA
ISS LLY
ED
W P
RI ET
T O IT
F A ION
PA MP FO
GR RT AR R
AN IAL O
TE LY
D
W PE
ITH T
DR ITIO
AW N
N
RE
OT -RA
HE FF
R B LED
RA TO
NC
H
PR SUS
OC PE
EE ND
DI ED
NG
S
ND
PE
ED
ISS
SM
DI
DE
CI
DE
ED
IV
CH
AR
26
STATUS OF CASES
27
The Supreme Court, however, is the focus of this study since it is the source of the
Rule and we are interested in how the Rule has played out in its decisions so far.
The first and landmark case is Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo earlier
mentioned.
Simply, the facts are:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following
causes of action, viz:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof
required, viz:
SEC . 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxxx
SEC . 18. Judgment. x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings
of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in
Sitio Muzon, Barangay Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, on February
14, 2006, and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13,
2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were
narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner.
His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents harrowing
experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses
and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: Sumilip ako sa
isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel. (N)ilakasan ng
mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig
ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang
28
hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin
ang mga kadena. Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako
makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na
nakatira sa malapit na lugar.
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on
respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:
x x x the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were
sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be
military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the
six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door
were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army
boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members
of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and
the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU
members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was
sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the
abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent
incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners,
validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction
was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or
sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking
for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of
petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into
the abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of
the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the onesided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness
might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only
into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost
Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the
CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated x x x.
Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also
established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In
fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm
claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a
safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their
parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal
role in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge
of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at
the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his
indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not
merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of
law and without probable cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the former
Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman,
Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente) found no
clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario
had anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilarios
involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline
Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the
petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did
not testify (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p.
52).
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove
the white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away
from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that
Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of
the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from
Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment
in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, where they were detained for at
least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205)
and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San
Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside
the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less
three months (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205). It was there where the
petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren
also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the
petitioners parents, where only Raymond was presented to the
parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join any
more rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they
would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to
denounce human rights violations (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205 206).
Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being
Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on
the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the
medicines for his health (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206). There were other
occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in
their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the
abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was
established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman,
Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them
personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the
evidence of their participation is overwhelming.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos

statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces
of evidence. Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the
affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports
prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by
29
30
the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents

accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalos familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as
shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division
Training Unit, firms up respondents story that they were detained for some
time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala, a case decided by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence,
among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted
and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister
Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commissions
findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements,
written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. These statements
were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when
she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.
She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the
111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek
coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while
in detention.
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture
perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the
information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves,
and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness
in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated
by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered
or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where
powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface
and testify against them comes as no surprise.
The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the
writ of amparo. The Court resoundingly set forth its rationale:
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of
amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have
escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they
are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not
free in every sense of the word as their movements continue to be restricted
for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified
against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents
rights to life, liberty and security (emphasis supplied). Respondents claim
that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even
killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.
Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point

out that this right is often associated with liberty; it is also seen as an
expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and
unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly
mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights
to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary
detention places fall under the general coverage of the right to security of
person under the writ of amparo. They submit that the Court ought to give an
expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State
Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The
State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security
of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile that the right
to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by
the State on the exercise of that liberty such as a requirement to report
under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty or
being put under monitoring and surveillance.
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the
threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has
indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right
to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge x x x.
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including

the extensions of his/her personhouses, papers, and effectsagainst
government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states power over a
persons home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy
and sanctity of the person himself. The purpose of this provision was enunciated
by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz:
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in
person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the
home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted
(Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]).
The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether
it be of home or of persons and correspondence (Taada and Carreon,
Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional
31
32

inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable
searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer
to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of
his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the
best causes and reasons. (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially
the right to be alive upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life
lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a
powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government
he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and
property. The ideal of security in life and property x x x pervades the whole
history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence. In a broad sense,
the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and
it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are
necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and
lawful desires of the individual.
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various
permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its
whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate
that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially
an individual international human right. It is the right to security of person
as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
(emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for
the right to security of person, viz:
1.
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one

shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
(emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is
the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to
well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination,
strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo
context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the
freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation
Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation
of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded
without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion
of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life
itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security
of a person.
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily
integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to
admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion
of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2)
No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other

means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense).
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that

vitiate the free willalthough not involving invasion of bodily integrity
nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of
freedom from threat as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses
of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of
enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all
the more be protected from these degradations.
33
34
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a

right against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
in the recent case of Popov v. Russia. In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully
detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison,
thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law x x x
(emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that (n)o one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was
found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding,
viz:
x x x the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of
domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have
been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and
to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxxx
x x x the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to
comply with the procedural obligation under Art. 3 to conduct an
effective investigation into his allegations. (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against

Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity
of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
x x x gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment
by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general
international law or under specific human rights conventions is
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include x x x the right to liberty and security of
person.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of

ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this
right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article
III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights
under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights
to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government
does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or

enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner
and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as
its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the
government.
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of

government protection has been interpreted by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee in not a few cases involving Article 9 of the ICCPR. While the
right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty
under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person
can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be
invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia, a case involving death threats to a
religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views
differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held,
viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph.
Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the
right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention.
The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first
sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other
provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in
article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to
security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in
separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only
reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9,
there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of
the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty.
At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the
rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a
matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons
under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or
otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An
interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore
threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its
jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the
Covenant. (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia, which involved a

political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated,
35
36
harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention.
In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import:
Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, involving discrimination, intimidation and
persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,
involving the abduction of the complainants husband who was a supporter of
democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola, involving the murder of the
complainants partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because
of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia, involving an
assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted
the right to security not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily
depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection
of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the right to security of person
under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading
case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey. In this case, the claimants
son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The
familys requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts
proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her sons
right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
x x x any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in
conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national
law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article
5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness x x x. Having
assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the
authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason,
Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective
measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to
conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that
a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.
(emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to

the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of
respondents right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to
respondents life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they
escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymonds narration,
he was tortured and poured on with gasoline after he was caught the first
time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain Mam,
who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat
to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free
from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or
voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the
end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained
in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them that they
were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond
Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga
3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay
dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o
hindi.
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye

while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their
life is apparent, more so now that they have surfaced and implicated specific
officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in
those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their
life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to
limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to
show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or
written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances
of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support
a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the
government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection
to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and
torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of
respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report
of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th
Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited,
superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the
six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the
investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his
subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound
a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility.
He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated
persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
37
38
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that

in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action
in the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any
members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity
of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence;
identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination
of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance;
identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death
or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent
court. Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting
that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued
a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of
the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to
respondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was
issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007,
respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which
they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant
the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom
from threat is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security
of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection
on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which
petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial
reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except
those already on file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of
official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals
all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006, until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that
the production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of
a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production
order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense;
and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce. In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other
than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond
Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents
seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other
supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be
produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the
involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under
the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the
demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the
production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of
any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action
is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody
or control x x x.
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad, the respondent

judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material
Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena
on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck
down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure
that cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited
by the Constitution x x x.
39
40
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself

undertook to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been
sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that
the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical
personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution
of the petition for a writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily
compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of
military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat
of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of
M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both
directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is
relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of
territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these
military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to
any investigation and action for violation of the respondents rights. The list of
medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical
history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when
applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and
security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys
of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
The next case is that of Reverend Father Robert P. Reyes v. Court of Appeals,
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice,
and Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Immigration,2 an en banc case penned by Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro.
G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 580.
41
The facts are:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated February 4, 2008, which dismissed the petition for the issuance
of the writ of amparo.
Petitioner Fr. Robert P. Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula
Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. He was charged with the crime of Rebellion under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code.
The RTC dismissed the charge against Reyes for lack of probable cause.
Reyes filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, claiming that despite the
dismissal of the rebellion case, his name remains in the Hold Departure List of the BID officials
in NAIA. He further alleged that the respondents violated his constitutional right to travel.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the privilege of the writ of
amparo.
Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied.
The issue was whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or
threatened by the issuance of the Hold Departure Order (HDO), which would entitle him to
the privilege of the writ of amparo.
The Court held that the petition must fail. The Amparo Rule is confined to instances
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The rights that fall
within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are
the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. The right to travel
refers to the right to move from one place to another.
Furthermore, it was held that the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a
consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful.
Petitioners direct recourse to the Court is inappropriate; he should have filed with the RTC
a motion to lift the HDO. The Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene in
civil cases pending before the trial courts through the writ of amparo. Petitioners
apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO is merely speculative. He
failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo.
The petition was therefore DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
was AFFIRMED.
42
Then came a landmark case in amparo: Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., et al. v. Mary
Jean B. Tagitis represented by Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, Jr., Attorney-in-Fact,3 penned by Justice
Arturo D. Brion.
The facts are:
Engineer Morced Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was abducted
by burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives in Jolo, Sulu, and was never seen
again.
When his wife, respondent Mary Jean Tagitis, went to look for him, she met with
Col. Kasim in Camp Katitipan in Davao City who informed her that her husband is in good
hands and that he was abducted because he is under custodial investigation for allegedly
being a liaison for the known terrorist group J.I. or Jemaah Islamiah.
Respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo with the Court of Appeals (CA)
which subsequently confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engr. Tagitis and granted the
writ relying heavily on the pronouncements made by Col. Kasim to respondent when they
met in Davao City.
Petitioners appealed the CA decision before the Supreme Court and assailed in the
main, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was abducted and
that the CIDG-Zamboanga City was responsible for it.
Resolving the appeal, the Court was not persuaded. It recognized the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in cases of enforced disappearance owing to its unique nature. Because
of these, the Court avers that rules must be reduced to the most basic test of reason thus
even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
There being no direct evidence of Tagitis disappearance, Col. Kasims testimony
assumed critical materiality. All that is gleaned from these pieces of evidence is a consistency
in the governments denial of any complicity in Tagitis disappearance disrupted only by the
report made by Col. Kasim to respondent.
The Court concluded that his disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
unequivocally points to some complicity in the disappearance. The Court in this case stated
that the writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance.
The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the CA decision.
Subsequently, resolving a motion for reconsideration, the Court issued a Resolution
ordering the military authorities to exert diligent efforts in a continuing search for the missing
Engineer and to report the progress of its search to the judicial authorities.
G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 598.
43
The third case is the joined cases of Arthur Balao, et al. v. Gloria MacapagalArroyo et al. and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. v. Arthur Balao, et al.,4 penned
by Justice Martin S. Villarama.
These consolidated cases are about the abduction of James Balao in Benguet by
unidentified armed men believed to be members of the military. Balao, one of the founding
members of the militant Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), was allegedly under military
surveillance and was in fact previously arrested and charged with a violation of the AntiSubversion Law which charge was eventually dismissed.
Believing their brother to be in the custody of the military and after having failed to
locate his whereabouts, the Balao siblings filed a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of
Amparo in favor of James before the Regional Trial Court of Benguet which subsequently
GRANTED the writ of amparo but DENIED their prayer for the issuance of the Inspection,
Production and Witness Protection Orders.
In so ruling, the trial court stated among others that more likely than not, the
motive for James disappearance is his activist/political leanings and that his case is one of
enforced disappearance as defined under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and that the
government unmistakably violated James right to security of person. It also found the
investigation conducted by respondent PNP and CIDG very limited, superficial and onesided.
Both parties appealed before the Court on the threshold issue of whether the
totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule to establish
an enforced disappearance.
The Court REVERSED the trial courts grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo
stating that the documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counterinsurgency program by itself does not fulfill the evidentiary standards provided in the Amparo
Rule to establish an enforced disappearance. It also negated the application of the doctrine
of command responsibility saying that it does not determine guilt or pinpoint criminal
culpability.
It AFFIRMED the trial courts DENIAL of the prayer for Inspection and Production
Orders without prejudice to the subsequent grant thereof in the course of the hearing and
other developments in the investigations it has ORDERED the PNP, AFP and the CIDG to
conduct on the matter. The case was REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio and then Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (now Chief
Justice) disagreed with the majority opinion saying that in disposing of cases involving
G.R. Nos. 186050 and 186059, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 312.
44
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances for which the writ is sought, the Court
must always go back to its pronouncement in Secretary of National Defense, supra,
emphasizing the twin roles of the writ of amparo as a preventive and curative tool to address
these human rights violations.
Another case is that of Rodolfo Noel Lozada, Jr., Violeta Lozada and Arturo Lozada
v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA), Eduardo Ermita, Avelino Razon, Angel
Atutubo and SPO4 Roger Valeroso,5 penned by Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (now
Chief Justice).
This case is rooted on the alleged NBN-ZTE corruption scandal where petitioner
Lozada, who, while serving as unofficial consultant to the government, supposedly discovered
several anomalies which the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee sought to investigate. He was
unable to attend the Senate hearing due to a purported official trip to London and was thus
cited for contempt.
Trouble ensued upon his return, when he was met by several government agents at
the airport. Lozada claimed that these agents ignored his request to be brought to his house
and instead deposited him in the care of the La Salle brothers in Greenhills where he was
placed under heavy guard.
Consequently, his wife Violeta and his brother Antonio filed before the Court
Petitions for Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo with a Prayer for its issuance as well as
for the issuance of a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders with respect to documents
ordering his alleged abduction.
The Court consolidated the petitions and directed the Court of Appeals (CA) to hear
the same. The CA dismissed the petitions, finding that petitioners were unable to prove
through substantial evidence that petitioners right to life, liberty and security were violated.
Petitioners sought recourse before the Court alleging that the CA committed an
error in dropping PGMA as a respondent in the Amparo case and in denying their Motion for
the Issuance of a Subpoena Ad Testificandum. They also brought in issue whether they should
be granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the denial of the privilege of
the writ of amparo by the CA ruling that there is nothing in the records that would sufficiently
establish the link of PGMA to the events surrounding Lozadas alleged abduction as well as
to the subsequent threats that he and his family supposedly received.
G.R. Nos. 18437980, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 545.
45
The Court likewise ruled that the CA correctly denied petitioners Motion for the
Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses
sought to be presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case.
The Amparo petition does not involve the investigation of the NBN-ZTE deal. It affirmed the
CAs denial of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo because the totality of the evidence
adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence.
It was held that in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by
substantial evidence and cannot merely rely on the supposed failure of respondents to prove
their defense or their exercise of extraordinary diligence.
To round up this review, the following cases are also of interest:
Gen. Alexander B. Yano, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; Lt. Gen. Victor S.
Ibrado, Commanding General, Philippine Army, And Maj. Gen. Ralph A. Villanueva,
Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army v. Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana
Medina,6 an en banc Decision penned by Justice Conchita Carpio Morales.
Cleofas Sanchez filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with a Motion
for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and then Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
The Court resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a
verified return of the writ before Court of Appeals Justice Edgardo Sundiam.
The petition was amended to include Marciana Medina as additional petitioner and
other military officers as therein additional respondents. Sanchez and Medina alleged that
their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson Medina disappeared on September 18,
2006. Their neighbor, Antonina Galang, alleged that she saw the two men inside Camp
Servillano Aquino on September 21, 2006.
In their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They
also opposed the request for the issuance of an inspection and production orders, positing
that national security will be compromised and that these orders partake of the nature of a
search warrant.
The appellate court, after hearing, absolved Gen. Esperon, Lt. Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen.
Gomez, and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of evidence linking them to the disappearances. In
addition, the appellate court granted the following reliefs: inspections of certain military
camps in Tarlac City, and a thorough and impartial investigation regarding the disappearances.
G.R. No. 186640, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 347.
46
The remaining impleaded military officers filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
stating that the appellate court should not have granted those reliefs; which the appellate
court denied.
Respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the appellate courts
Decision.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for review of the appellate courts assailed
issuances.
The Court found merit in the petition. The Court held that the evidence adduced in
the present case failed to measure up to the required standard of proof substantial evidence
in resolving amparo petitions. Moreover, the Court ruled that the failure to establish that
the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not
result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ.
The provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to still order the inspection
of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the
disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is not in order. The
reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that
petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims.
The petition was GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it granted the assailed earlier-quoted reliefs were SET ASIDE.
Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.,7 penned by Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr.
On April 3, 2007, petitioner Lourdes Rubrico, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para
sa Gawa Adhikain was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and
Security Squadron (AISS) and after having been subjected to what amounts to verbal abuse
and mental harassment she was released after she was made to sign a statement that she
would be a military asset.
Thereafter, petitioner was continuously harassed by being followed around by
motorcycle-riding men in bonnets. Consequently, she filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman a Criminal Complaint for Kidnapping and Arbitrary Detention and Administrative
Complaint for Gross Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct against her abductors.
G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 233.
47
She also filed a Petition for a Writ of Amparo before the Supreme Court on October
25, 2007. The Supreme Court issued the writ and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
for hearing and appropriate action. After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered
Partial Judgment DISMISSING the petition with respect to respondent-officials of the AFP
and PNP and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals DIRECTED the heads of the AFP and the PNP to
ensure that the investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the
perpetrators to justice. They were further directed to regularly update petitioners and the
Supreme Court on the status of such investigation.
On appeal, the Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED this petition for review as
follows:
a. Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as a partyrespondent;
b. Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Esperon and
Gen. Razon insofar as it tended to attach accountability and
responsibility to them under the command responsibility principle;
Affirming the dismissal with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman
for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case
against that body for the abduction of petitioner and the harassment
that followed;
c. Directing the concerned officials to ensure that the investigations already
commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction of
petitioner Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats to her family
are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by the Amparo
Rule.
While the doctrine of command responsibility has recently been codified in the
Rome Statute of the ICC (International Criminal Court) to which the Philippines is a signatory,
x x x there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.
[The Philippines has since ratified the Rome Statute and enacted Republic Act No. 9851 that
recognized the command responsibility principle in cases covered by that Statute.] The
Supreme Court found no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts determination
of the answering respondents role in the alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner
Rubrico and the threats to her familys security.
The Supreme Court referred back the case to the Court of Appeals for the purpose
of monitoring the investigations and the actions of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police.
48
Separate Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion:

Justice Brion concurs with the ponencia and its results but wrote a separate opinion
to express his views on the alternative approach as more effective in achieving the
objectives of a Writ of Amparo.
He is in agreement with the ponencias dismissal of the petition against President
Macapagal-Arroyo because of her immunity from suit during her term. He likewise agreed
with the conclusion that the petition against the Ombudsman should be dismissed for having
no cause of action under the Amparo Rule.
Justice Brion drew attention to then recently enacted Republic Act No. 9851 on
December 11, 2009. Section 10 thereof explicitly makes superiors criminally liable under the
doctrine of command responsibility. This new development stresses that the doctrine of
command responsibility has limited application to the Amparo Rule.
Justice Brion concurs in dismissing the petition against P/Dir. Gen. Razon and Gen.
Esperon who were impleaded in their capacities as Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief
and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, respectively. As a matter of judicial
notice, they are no longer the incumbents of the abovementioned positions and cannot
therefore act to address the concerns of a Writ of Amparo.
Justice Brion notes that very significant gaps exist in the handling of the
investigationamong them, the failure to identify and locate the respondents Major Darwin
Reyes/Sy, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Captain Angelo Cuaresma and a certain Jonathan
to the point that the petition was not even served on these respondents. x x x No search and
certification was ever made on whether they are AFP personnel or in other branches of the
service. No significant follow-through was also made in locating and properly placing Darwin
Reyes/Sy within the jurisdiction of the court despite the evidentiary leads provided.
Therefore, further investigation and monitoring should indeed be undertaken.
Justice Brion holds that needed additional actions should be undertaken by the Court
of Appeals; however, he suggests an alternative way based on the combined application of
Sections 20 to 23 of the Amparo Rule. The Court can consolidate the investigative and factfinding aspects with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the Ombudsman. In
this manner the Court continues to exercise jurisdiction over the Amparo petition and any
interim relief issue that may arise, taking into account the Ombudsman investigative and
fact-finding recommendations.
Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales:
Justice Carpio Morales concurs with the ponencia in all respects, except in the
treatment of the doctrine of command responsibility.
49
According to Justice Carpio Morales, the Court should take judicial notice of the
core element that permeates the formulations of the doctrine of command responsibility
a commanders negligence in preventing or repressing his subordinates commission of the
crime, or in bringing them to justice thereafter.
She reiterated that the proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not
determine criminal, civil or administrative liability [and] should not abate the applicability of
the doctrine of command responsibility.
Finally, Justice Carpio Morales concludes that while there is a genuine dearth of
evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon
accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the ponencias hesitant application
of the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to the rationale behind the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo.
Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio, and Andrew Buising v. Virginia Pardico, for and in behalf
and in representation of Benhur V. Pardico,8 an en banc case penned by Justice Mariano C.
Del Castillo.
The facts are:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July
24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, which granted the
Petition for Writ of Amparo.
Two uniformed guards took Enrique Bong Lapore and Benhur Ben Pardico
because allegedly a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps
in Grand Royale Subdivision.
Petitioners, who work as security guards at the Asian Land security department,
claim that Bong and Ben admitted they took the lamp to transfer it to the post near their
house; that Ben and Bong were subsequently released as the complainant was no longer
interested in filing a case against them; and that they affixed their signatures on a logbook
to affirm that they were released unharmed and without any injury.
According to Virginia Pardico, wife of Ben Pardico, her husband and Bong were
physically assaulted by petitioners. Bong was subsequently released, but Ben had to stay as
his case would be forwarded to the barangay.
The following day, Ben could not be located anywhere; so, Virginia reported the
matter to the police. Thus, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of
Malolos City.
G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012.
50
The trial court issued an Order directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of
amparo and the production of the body of Ben before it. The court likewise issued a
Temporary Protection Order prohibiting petitioners, or any persons acting for and in their
behalf, under pain of contempt, from threatening, harassing, or inflicting any harm to
respondent, his immediate family, and any member of his household.
A summary hearing was conducted and the court granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo. It also directed the NBI to immediately conduct a deep and thorough investigation
of petitioners; and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the
circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of Ben.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court.
The issue was whether Bens disappearance falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-912-SC and relevant laws.
The Court held that Virginias Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and
must be dismissed. While Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides for the coverage of the
Rule, it does not define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The Committee
which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through substantive law as may be promulgated by Congress.
Eventually, the Court defined enforced disappearances in Razon v. Tagitis (606 SCRA
598). It applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances
definition of enforced disappearances, as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other
form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Then, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9851 on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g)
thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:
(g) Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons means the arrest,
detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization support
or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal
to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
In probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo in relation to RA No. 9851.
51
According to the Court, from the statutory definition of enforced disappearance,

the elements that constitute it can be derived as follows:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation
of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
In sum, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
Proof of disappearance is not enough; it is essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct and indirect authorization, support, or
acquiescence of the government.
Government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element
in an amparo case. However, State participation is wanting in this case. The petition did not
allege State complicity and no evidence were presented to show that government or any of
its agents is responsible for Bens disappearance.
Wherefore, the Decision of the RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for
Writ of Amparo is DISMISSED.
Armando Q. Canlas, Miguel D. Capistrano, and Marrieta Pia v. NAPICO Homeowners
Association, IXIII, Inc. et al.,9 an en banc resolution penned by Justice Ruben T. Reyes.
A petition was filed seeking issuance of a Writ of Amparo. Petitioners allege that
their dwellings have either been demolished or about to be demolished pursuant to a court
judgment. Ultimately, petitioners seek the reversal of this Courts dismissal of the petitions
in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, and 177038.
The Court held that petitioners claim to their dwelling does not constitute right to
life, liberty, and security; hence, there is no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
9
G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 208.
52
The Court reiterated that the new remedy of the writ of amparo is intended for
the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life,
liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time
and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
Wherefore, the Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo is DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, I CONCLUDE that the remedy of amparo has become a reality in our
legal system and is no longer a theory or academic subject. It has been availed of by aggrieved
parties who obtained reliefs under its procedure.
As a newly provided remedy, the first necessity is still its introduction to all
stakeholders so that they will be familiar with its coverage and procedure.
Secondly, the judges must propose to be trained in their role of adjudicating this
remedy. They should not be too strict, for instance, in applying the hierarchy of the persons
who may file the petition, as some even refuse birth certificates of children suing on behalf
of a missing father.
Finally, as the dissenting opinion of a number of Justices of the Supreme Court pointed
out, it must be remembered that the remedy is intended to prevent as well as to cure and
that one need not wait for the violation to take place as the rule clearly includes threats
of such violation.
On the whole, I would commend our people and our courts for responding well and
positively to this innovative remedy as an additional safeguard to our fundamental rights.
Thank you and good day.
53
Response

Good afternoon, everybody.
Please forgive me for I have never spoken before such a body before. I would not
know how to greet all the justices, jurists, and all the very important people who have come
here today. Please allow me to just acknowledge the jurists who are in the center front row
and my uncle the former Prime Minister of the Philippines Cesar Virata. Thank you, thank
you.
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna,
Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, my mother Justice
Amor Herrera, ladies and gentlemen:
My mothers 90th birthday was on May 11, 2012. My sisters and I did not know what
gift to give her; what could we do to make her 90th birthday a milestone. So, in connivance
with Justice Azcuna and Justice Marina Buzon, we maneuvered this donation, this endowment.
I do not really know what to call it, but what pleases me so much is that Justice Azcuna,
Justice Buzon, and I managed to do it in complete secrecy. My mother had no idea that we
were implementing this kind of gift. So, Justice Azcuna, who also spoke for PHILJAs Academic
Council and to the PHILJAs Board of Trustees, graciously accepted and decided to establish
this very long title The Founding Chancellor Emeritus Justice Ameurfina Melencio Herrera
Award for the Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer for each year. As Justice Azcuna
said, he was not really meant to be the very first recipient, but because he is the current
Chancellor, we felt that Justice Azcuna deserved it. So, to support this award, my sisters and
I deposited the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3 million) in the BPI Family Savings Bank, as
trustee, with a guaranteed return of at least a hundred thousand pesos a year. But, because
we did very well, the return as of today was One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P130,000).
We were told subsequently by Justice Azcuna that at the luncheon hosted by my
mother and the PHILJA for her 90th birthday, the award and donation were announced. My
mother was, to say the least, quite shocked. She was so shocked that after the ceremony,
and perhaps as most mothers would do, she called me to say thank you and then at the
same time scolded me for such a maneuver and for pulling off such a surprise. And I said,
Ma, leave it be... this is meant to honor you, this is meant to help PHILJA for which you
have devoted so much of your life.
So, on a very personal note now, I have always tried to live by a Latin phrase
Uberrimae fidae which means absolute trust and confidence in your partners. And, that is
why I was so pleased when Justice Azcuna, Justice Buzon, and the other members of the
54
MESSAGE I ATTY . FLORENTINO M. HERERRA III
Atty. Florentino M. Herrera

III delivers the Response at
the PHILJA Founding
Chancellor Emeritus Justice
Ameurfina Melencio Herrera
Award for the Most
Outstanding Professorial
Lecturer held on November
12, 2012, at the PHILJA
Training Center,
Tagaytay City.
PHILJA used the words in partnership with the children of Justice Herrera. This had such a
special connotation, and meaning, for us. We would like to think that we are truly partners
of PHILJA. In fact, my motherobviously being my mother and mother to my sisters
could also be said to be the mother of PHILJA. She helped give birth to this institution. So,
we are partners, we are family members, and I am just so honored to be here with you
today.
The second principle that I adhere to, and I think most of you know that I am a
corporate lawyer, is that my clients and I always ensure that when we spend one peso, we
get the appropriate return for that peso. If we pay one peso, we expect a product back. If
we spend one peso we get a service back. But, there is perhaps, the best kind of expenditure
when you do not really expect anything back except good public service or a donation for a
worthy cause. And having heard what I have heard today, having seen what I have seen
today, having felt what I have felt today, this donation of Three Million Pesos is certainly
more than worth it.
As I had said to you, Justice Azcuna, when I gave you your check, you have set the
bar very high. We hope that all future recipients of this Award will do as well as you; that
their lectures will be as deep, as profound as yours, and even as humorous as yours; and
that they will be able to share experiences with us to make it easier to understand what they
are lecturing about.
I told Chief Justice Davide I had never heard of the Writ of Amparo till I read about
it in the newspapers. So, I would have flunked that 1991 Bar Exams.
So, again, members of the PHILJA family, we look at you as our partners, maybe
even our family members. I would just like to say, Justice Azcuna, if you will allow us again,
I am so pleased and honored that, perhaps, in time you will allow us children of Justice Amor
to put up a second award.
So, thank you very much! Good day to you all!
55
Closing Remarks
Ch ief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (Ret.)

Founding Chancellor Ameurfina A. Melencio Herrera
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio
Incumbent and Retired Justices of the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals
Officials of the PHILJA, Judges, Members of the Academe
Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good afternoon to all of you. This afternoons event is but one of a series of special blessings
not only for the Supreme Court, the Philippine Judicial Academy and the awardee, but also
for the constitutional history of the Philippines. I salute the Philippine Judicial Academy and
the children of PHILJAs Founding Chancellor Madame Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio Herrera
for making this possible.
Delivering the Closing Remarks in any program is a difficult task because of the
temptation to make it short or long and even to make it the keynote address. This is the
reason why in my 39 years of public service, I accepted only a few of such assignment,
despite persistent requests for whatever reasons.
But for this program, a confluence of compelling reasonsboth just and valid under
any principlemade acceptance of the request to deliver the Closing Remarks a joy
unspeakable.
The first reason: This is my first official visit to this new PHILJA Training Center which
was primarily built from a grant of the Government of Japan for which, modesty aside, I
worked very hard to obtain. I even breached diplomatic protocol with the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) which initially offered to assist to fund the project. The breach
turned out to be a blessing in disguise when the Japanese Government finally decided to
make the grant on a special basis. The grant was approved a month before I retired.
The second reason: The award is named in honor of Justice Ameurfina Melencio
Herrera, the Founding Chancellor of PHILJA, who served as Chancellor for more than a
decade. She was the PHILJA for the many years she served as Chancellor. During my watch
for more than seven years as Chief Justice, she expressed many times her desire not to be
reappointed. But having worked with her for seven years in the Board of Trustees and having
56
CLOSING REMARKS I CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. (RET.)
known her as a great lady and a quintessential justice, I pleaded that she should continue to
serve because she is the life of the PHILJA which she had served with all her heart, mind,
soul, strength and resources. Her love for the PHILJA was, and remains to be, unparalleled.
Truly, it is but fitting and proper that the award for the Most Outstanding Professorial Lecturer
be in her honor. And it is more fitting and proper yet that her children Atty. Florentino Herrera
III, Dr. Victoria Lourdes Herrera-Ruiz and Dr. Milagros Herrera-Arroyo have taken the initiative
to establish a Three Million Peso (P3 million) endowment in her name. This was their very
precious gift to her on her 90th birth anniversary last May. What a perfect demonstration of
love for a mother! An example difficult to follow. With Atty. Herrera are his two daughters,
Ana and Amor, who are lawyers. Also with them are their relatives who I greet: former
Prime Minister Cesar Virata and ConCom Commissioner Fely Aquino Arroyo, my favorite
colleague in the ConCom of 1986.
The third reason: the aims of the award are of special importance to achieve the
vision of PHILJA and to promote its national and even international prestige, namely, to
develop and enhance PHILJA programs in judicial education and to publish treatises
introducing innovative concepts and approaches in designated areas of law which will
promote competence, excellence, and efficiency in the Philippine Justice System.
The fourth reason: The awardeemy good friend Chancellor Justice Adolfo S.
Azcunais best qualified to receive the award. On the professorial level itself, he is the best
I know of especially on topics his expertise are most outstanding, including photography.
Upon my request or at his own instance when in the mood, he lectured to me on many
occasions during our days in the Constitutional Convention of 1971, the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, and in the Supreme Court. He was always convincing, even if,
sometimes, I was not convinced. As a brilliant lecturer and a product of the Ateneo, he
knew too well if I was not convinced.
The fifth reason: His lecture this afternoon is on a primary subject which Chancellor
Azcuna alone, I very respectfully submit and with due respect, to quote the title of the PDI
column of retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, is the most authoritative in the
Philippines. While Justice Carpio considers Chancellor Azcuna as the father of the writ of
Amparo, I proclaim him the legitimate father and mother of the writ of Amparo in the
Philippines. He was the only Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
only Filipino for that matter, who insisted in the incorporation in the Constitution of the writ
of Amparo. In the Commission he filed a resolution docketed as Proposed Resolution No.
18, entitled, Resolution to Provide for Constitutional Writ of Amparo,1 which was referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary on the second plenary session of the Commission on
June 2, 1986.
Vol. 1, Record of the Constitutional Commission, p. 14.
57
Chief Justice Hilario G.

Davide, Jr. (Ret.) delivers
the closing remarks at
the PHILJA Founding
Chancellor Emeritus
Justice Ameurfina
Melencio Herrera
Award for the Most
Outstanding Professorial
Lecturer held on
November 12, 2012, at
the PHILJA Training
Center, Tagaytay City.
While the Committee on the Judiciary chaired by Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion
did not decide to specifically include the writ of Amparo by name, its Committee Report,
docketed in the Commission as Committee Report No. 18, specifically mentions that the
basic concept or substance of Commissioner Azcunas Proposed Resolution No. 18 was
approved and indicated as one of the sources of Section 7, paragraph (5) of the proposed
Article on the Judiciary. This is now paragraph (5), Section 5 of Article VIII of our 1987
Constitution. Section 5 enumerates the power of the Supreme Court and paragraph 5 thereof
is the power to, among others, promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights.2 In his answer to the interpellation of Commissioner Felicitas
Aquino, Chairman Concepcion answered that this part of the paragraph was introduced
upon the request of Commissioner Azcuna in order to stress that constitutional rights are
not merely declaratory but are also enforceable. That is why this phrase which did not appear
in the 1973 Constitution is an innovation.3 These facts must be a part of the Philippine
experience on the writ of amparo.
The sixth reason, but certainly not the last: Chancellor Azcuna as then the examiner
in Political and Public International Law of the 1991 Bar Examinations submitted to me, as
Chairman of the Bar Committee, 50 questions written in his own hand, from which I would
choose which should be the final questions on the subject. One of them is: What is the
Constitutional writ of amparo and what is the basis for such remedy under the Constitution?
I selected this as the number one question for the 1991 Bar examinees in Political and Public
International Law. I knew that only a handful of examinees could correctly answer the
Vol. 1, Record of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 430433.
Id. at p. 459.
58
CLOSING REMARKS I CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. (RET.)
question and I intended it to be a shocker to test their mental equanimity and ability to
quickly respond to difficult situations, as are demanded of lawyers. Many could not answer
the question, many were in tears. Blame Examiner Azcuna for their misfortune. Unfortunately,
the examinees who did not know the writ of Amparo blamed me. They thought that Amparo
was the given name of Mrs. Davide who I love very much. This misfortune to the 1991 Bar
examinees must also be a part of the Philippine experience on the writ of amparo.
I would say that this ceremony this afternoon is the celebration of three famous
names Azcuna, Herrera and Amparo whose acronym AHA is an interjection that expresses
triumph as well as satisfaction. Or, the famous given names Adolfo, Ameurfina and Amparo
whose acronym is AAA. A triple A is a sign of perfection and completeness. Or, more
appropriately perhaps, it means Accelerating the Achievement of the Agenda of the PHILJA.
Their convergence in our midst enriches our Constitutional history and nurtures the vision
and values of PHILJA.
Congratulations to Founding Chancellor Herrera and Chancellor Azcuna. Viva
Amparo!
Undoubtedly, ours has been the honor and privilege to witness the convergence.
I thus close with a prayer and hope that what Founding Chancellor Herrera has
sown and cultivated in PHILJA, Chancellor Azcuna will nurture with love, compassion and
devotion, perhaps in a measure higher than that for Amparo or even for Maria Asuncion his
beloved wife.
God bless us all.
59
Appendix A
Administrative Matter No. 07-9-12-SC
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO
(As amended by the Resolution of the
Court En Banc dated October 16, 2007)
Effective October 24, 2007
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
SEC. 2. Who May File. The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified
person or entity in the following order:
a. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents
of the aggrieved party;
b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned
in the preceding paragraph; or
c. Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other authorized
parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the petition by an authorized party on
behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others, observing the order established
herein.
SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any time with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of
its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court,
or any justice of such courts. The writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
60
APPENDIX A I THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO I ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. 07-9-12-SC
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ shall be returnable
before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices,
it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court
of the place where the threat, act or omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before
such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or
any of their justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or
omission was committed or any of its elements occurred.
SEC. 4. No Docket Fees. The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, justice or judge shall docket the
petition and act upon it immediately.
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the
following:
a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
b. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent
may be described by an assumed appellation;
c. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such
threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
d. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
e. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission; and
f.
The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court
61
shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or
the judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or
person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which
shall not be later than seven days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who refuses to
issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall
be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary
actions.
SEC. 8. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial
officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on
which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the
respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 9. Return; Contents. Within five working days after service of the writ, the respondent
shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among
other things, contain the following:
a. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten
with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through
any act or omission;
b. The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for
the threat, act or omission;
c. All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the
threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
d. If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state
the actions that have been or will still be taken:
i.
to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of

the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the
person or persons responsible;
iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death
or disappearance;
62
iv. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or

disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought
about the death or disappearance;
v. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The period to file a return cannot be extended except on highly meritorious ground.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution
and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. (as amended
by the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated October 16, 2007).
SEC. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall be raised in the return,
otherwise, they shall be deemed waived.
SEC. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and motions are
prohibited:
a. Motion to dismiss;
b. Motion for extension of time to file, opposition, affidavit, position paper and
other pleadings;
c. Dilatory motion for postponement;
d. Motion for a bill of particulars;
e. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
f.
Third-party complaint;
g. Reply;
h. Motion to declare respondent in default;
i.
Intervention;
j.
Memorandum;
63
k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and

l.
Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order

(as amended by the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated October 16, 2007).
SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file a return, the
court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the
court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority as
petitions for habeas corpus.
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment,
the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
a. Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member
of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an accredited
person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the
petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section
2(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions
that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party
and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which
it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the
rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
b. Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated
land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It
shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party.
64
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the

privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a
hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to
make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the
inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights
of all parties. The order shall expire five days after the date of its issuance,
unless extended for justifiable reasons.
c. Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after
due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or
contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit
their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of
the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect
the constitutional rights of all the parties.
d. Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu
proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to
the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other
government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions capable
of keeping and securing their safety.
SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. Upon verified motion of the
respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue an inspection order
or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the preceding section.
A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the defenses of the respondent.
65
SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses to
make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise disobeys or resists
a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be
imprisoned or imposed a fine.
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish
their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within 10 days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five working days from the date of notice of the adverse
judgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.
SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall
archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of
petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that
shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival when ready for further
proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute the
case after the lapse of two years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the
case.
66
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a
consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of January of
every year.
SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This Rule shall not preclude the filing of separate
criminal, civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been commenced,
no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by
motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available
under the writ of amparo.
SEC. 23. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition
for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition
for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to apply to the
disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights recognized and protected by the Constitution.
SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and appellate
courts.
SEC. 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following its publication
in three newspapers of general circulation.
67
THE RATIONALE FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO

INTRODUCTION
The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction,
is the first and only object of good government.
Thomas Jefferson
Human rights, collectively, is a concept that has long been constantly evolving throughtout
history. It is intricately tied to laws, customs and religions throughout the ages, and in
Constitutions and international instruments in modern times. Experience is the life of the
law and history is the cauldron of human rights. As early as 4000 B.C.E. the Sumerian King
Hammurabi codified laws to arrest arbitrariness and impose a sense of universal fairness to
all his subjects.
In ancient Greece, human rights began to take a greater meaning than mere
prevention of arbitrary persecution. Human rights became synonymous with natural rights
or those rights that spring from natural laws. Human rights deriving from the philosophical
ideal of natural rights meant that the innate rights of individuals are present even if there is
no legal system in place to protect them. According to the Greek tradition of Socrates and
Plato, natural law is that which reflects the natural order of the universe, essentially the will
of the gods who control nature. A classical example of this was when Creon approached
Antigone for defying the gods. The idea of natural rights continued in ancient Rome, where
the Roman jurist Ulpian believed that natural rights belonged to every personwhether
they be Roman citizens or not. Another Roman jurist, Justinian, published his Codex of various
laws in the early sixth century, setting the precedent for further codifications.
The recognition by Thomas Hobbes (15881679) of the idea of positive law saw
natural law as being overshadowed for having been too vague and subject to so many
different interpretations. Legal positivism, with Jeremy Bentham in the forefront, dealt
natural law a fatal blow, when he argued that under positive law, right is a child of law, from
real laws come real rights, but from imaginary law, from laws of nature, come imaginary
rights x x x natural rights is simple nonsense.
Abstract ideas regarding human rights and their relation to the will of nature were
transformed into concrete laws, as exemplified best by various legal documents such as the
British Magna Carta (1215);1 the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789);2 the
American Bill of Rights (1789) and the Geneva Convention (1894).
1
Magna Carta of 1215, Fordham University Medieval Sourcebook, available at <http://

www.fordham.edu/hall/souce/mcarta.html> (last accessed September 11, 2007).
Declaration of the Rights of Man, The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, available at <http:/
/www.yale.edu//lawwed/avalon/rightsof.htm> (last accessed September 11, 2007).
68
APPENDIX A I THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO I RATIONALE
Historically, human rights legislation dramatically increased after the Magna Carta
and many countries, the Philippines being one of them, followed the liberal individualist
ideas of the American Bill of Rights, which restated and affirmed many human rights in the
English tradition. These liberal-individualist thoughts flowed from the West to the East and
now form a larger part of the prevailing human rights doctrines, legislation, norms and
theories. But it is in the individual experience of every state where human rights find context
and application.
This paper will trace the legal history and explore the rationale bases for the
application of the writ of amparo, a writ to protect constitutional rights, in the Philippines.
Part I will cover the early legal history of the writs that protect human rights. Part II will
discuss the prevailing trend of internationalization of human rights. Part III will discuss the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and the measures implemented
in Latin America. Part IV will discuss the Philippine experience.
I. EARLY LEGAL HISTORY

The belief that everyone, by virtue of ones humanity, is entitled to certain human rights is
fairly new. Its roots, however, lie in earlier tradition and documents of many cultures. It
took the catalyst of World War II to propel human rights onto the global stage and into the
global conscience.
A. The Magna Carta
In England, during the medieval times, the monarch was the sovereign. This absolutist
sovereignty advanced in the 12th century and the English king by the end of the 12th century
became one of the most powerful monarchs in Europe. But when King John of England was
crowned in the early 13th century, a series of failures at home and abroad, combined with
perceived abuses of the kings power, led the English barons to revolt and attempt to restrain
what the king could legally do. This was the beginning of constitutionalism in the modern
worldthe dogma of absolutism was at an end.
By 1215, some of the most important barons in England had had enough, and they
entered London in force on June 10, 1215, with the city showing its sympathies with their
cause by opening its gates to them. They forced King John to agree to the Articles of the
Barons, to which his Great Seal was attached at Runnymede on June 15, 1215. In return,
the barons renewed their oaths of fealty to King John on June 19, 1215. A formal document
to record the agreement was created by the royal chancery on July 15; this document is
what will soon be known as the Magna Carta or the Great Charter.
When King John died during the war, on October 18, 1216, his nine-year-old son,
Henry III, was next in line to the throne and was swiftly crowned in late October 1216.
Henrys regents reissued the Magna Carta in his name on November 12, 1216. When he
69
turned 18 in 1225, Henry III himself reissued the Magna Carta, this time in a shorter version
with only 37 articles. Henry III ruled for 56 years (the longest reign of an English monarch in
the medieval period), so that by the time of his death in 1272, the Magna Carta had become
a settled part of English legal precedent. The Parliament of Henry IIIs son and heir, Edward
I, reissued the Magna Carta for the final time on October 12, 1297, as part of a statute called
Confirmatio Cartarum (25 Edw. I), reconfirming Henry IIIs shorter version of the Magna Carta
from 1225.
The Magna Carta is the progenitor of the modern Constitution. Basic rights such as
the right to due process can be found therein
Clause 29 is foretelling:
29. No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or be disseized of his Freehold,
or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will sell to no man,
we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.3
For modern times, the most enduring legacy of the Magna Carta is the right of habeas
corpus. As previously provided in the 1297 version:
36. Henceforth nothing shall be given or taken for a writ of inquest in a matter
concerning life or limb; but it shall be conceded gratis, and shall not be
denied.
xxxx
38. No bailiff, on his own simple assertion, shall henceforth put any one to his
law, without producing faithful witnesses in evidence.
39. No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any way harmednor will we go upon or send upon him
save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
40. To none will we sell, to none deny or delay, right or justice.4
Clauses 36, 38, 39 and 40 collectively defined the right of habeas corpus. Clause 36
required courts to make inquiries as to the whereabouts of a prisoner, and to do so without
charging any fee. Clause 38 required more than the mere word of an official, before any
person could be put on trial. Clause 39 gave the courts exclusive rights to punish anyone.
3
Magna Carta of 1297, UK Law Database available at <http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/

content.aspx?activeTextDocID=1517519> (last accessed September 9, 2007).
Magna Carta of 1297, UK Law Database available at <http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/

content.aspx?activeTextDocID=1517519> (last accessed September 9, 2007).
70
Clause 40 disallowed the selling or the delay of justice. Clauses 36 and 38 were removed
from the 1225 version, but were reinstated in later versions. The right of habeas corpus, as
such, was first invoked in court in the year 1305.
B. The Habeas Corpus
In common law, habeas corpus5 has historically been an important instrument for the
safeguarding of individual freedom against arbitrary State action.
Blackstone noted:
If any person be restrained of his liberty by order or decree of any illegal court,
or by command of the kings majesty in person, or by warrant of the council
board, or of any of the privy council; he shall upon demand of his counsel,
have a writ of habeas corpus, to bring his body before the court of kings bench
or common pleas; who shall determine whether the cause of his commitment
be just, and thereupon do as to justice shall appertain. And by the habeas
corpus act [of 1679], the methods of obtaining this writ are plainly pointed
out and enforced, that, so long as this statute remains unimpeached, no subject
of England can be long detained imprison, except in those cases in which the
law requires and justifies such detainer x x x.6
In early common law, much of the business of the courts began with the issuance of
one of several writs, many of which have survived to this day. The writs were a series of
written order forms, issued by the court in the name of the king, commanding the individual
to whom they were addressed to return the writ to the court for the purpose stated in the
writ. The purpose was generally reflected in the name of the writ itself. Thus, for example,
a subpoena ad testificandum was a command to return the writ to the court at a specified
time and place, sub poena, that is, under penalty for failure to comply; and ad
testificandum that is, for the purpose of testifying.
5
The writ of habeas corpus is often referred to in full in legal texts as habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum or more rarely ad subjiciendum et recipiendum. The name derives from the
operative words of the writ in Medieval Latin: Praecipimus tibi quod corpus A.B. in prisona
nostra sub custodia tua detentum, ut dicitur, una cum die et causa captionis et detentionis
suae, quocumque nomine praedictus A.B. censeatur in eadem, habeas coram nobis x x x ad
subjiciendum et recipiendum ea quae curia nostra de eo adtunc et ibidem ordinare contigerit
in hac parte. Et hoc nullatenus omittatis periculo incumbente. Et habeas ibi hoc breve.
(Translation: We command you, that the body of A.B. in Our prison under your custody
detained, as it is said, together with the day and cause of his taking and detention, by
whatsoever name the said A.B. may be known therein, you have at our Court x x x to undergo
and to receive that which our Court shall then and there consider and order that in behalf.
Hereof in no way fail, at your peril. And have there this writ.)
I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 131 (italics in the original) (transliteration provided) (1st ed. 1765
1769).
71
Also known as The Great Writ, a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is a court
order addressed to a prison official (or other custodian), ordering that a prisoner be brought
before the court so that the court can determine whether that person is serving a lawful
sentence or should be released from custody. The prisoner, or some other person in his
behalf (for example, when the prisoner is being held incommunicado), may petition the court
or an individual judge for a writ of habeas corpus.
The right of habeas corpusor rather, the right to petition for the writhas long
been celebrated as the most efficient safeguard of the liberty of the subject. Dicey wrote
that the Habeas Corpus Acts declare no principle and define no rights, but they are for
practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty.
There are several types of habeas corpus:7
1. Habeas corpus ad deliberandum et recipiendum, a writ for bringing an accused
from a different country into a court in the place where an offense had been
committed for purposes of trial, or more literally to return holding the body for
purposes of deliberation and receipt of a decision.
2. Habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum, a writ of a court of superior
jurisdiction to a custodian to return with the body being held in confinement
pursuant to the order of a lower court for purposes of receiving the courts
decision and of doing with the prisoner what the court instructed.
3. Habeas corpus ad faciendum, subjiciendum et recipiendum, or more simply,
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, a writ ordering a custodian with a prisoner for
the purposes of submitting the question of confinement to the court, of
receiving its decision, and of doing what the court instructed with the
prisoner.
4. Habeas corpus ad prosequendum, a writ ordering return with a prisoner for the
purpose prosecuting him before the court.
5. Habeas corpus ad respondendum, a writ ordering return to a court of superior
jurisdiction of a body under the jurisdiction of a lower court for purposes of
allowing the individual to respond with respect to matters under consideration
in the high tribunal.
6. Habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum, a writ ordering return with the body of a
prisoner for satisfaction or execution of a judgment of the issuing court.
7
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 715 (7th ed. 1999); 1 BOUVIERS LAW DICTIONARY, 1400408
(11th ed. 1914); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 958 (1807); for English history of
habeas corpus see DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS, 1294 (1980);
IX HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 10425 (2nd ed. 1938).
72
7. Habeas corpus ad testificandum, a writ ordering return with the body of a prisoner
for the purposes of testifying; and
8. Habeas corpus cum causa, a writ ordering return with the body of a prisoner and
with the cause of his confinement so that the issuing court might pass upon
the validity of continued confinement and issue appropriate additional orders.
Blackstone cites the first recorded usage of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum in 1305,
during the reign of King Edward I. However, other writs were issued with the same effect as
early as the reign of Henry II in the 12th century. Blackstone explained the basis of the writ,
saying the King is at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of any of his
subjects is restrained, wherever that restraint may be inflicted.8 The procedure for issuing
writs of habeas corpus was first codified by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, following judicial
rulings which had restricted the effectiveness of the writ. A previous act had been passed in
1640 to overturn a ruling that the command of the King was a sufficient answer to a petition
of habeas corpus.
Then, the writ of habeas corpus was issued by a superior court in the name of the
Sovereign and commanded the addressee (a lower court, sheriff, or private subject) to
produce the prisoner before the royal courts of law. A habeas corpus petition could be
made by the prisoner himself or by a third party on his behalf and, as a result of the Habeas
Corpus Acts, could be made regardless of whether the court was in session, by presenting
the petition to a judge.
Since the 18th century, the writ has also been used in cases of unlawful detention by
private individuals, most famously in Somersetts Case (1771), in which the black slave
Somersett was ordered to be freed, in the famous words being quoted: The air of England
has long been too pure for a slave, and every man is free who breathes it.
At about the same time, in France, the clamor for freedom was also being heard,
but a more serious onethat of political freedom and the fall of the monarchyculminated
in the revolution of 1789. In another continent, the people of the New World were also
clamoring for their independence from their colonizersa shout that would be heard the
world over.
C. The United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights
In 1776, the United States of America declared independence. The United States Declaration
of Independence9 (Declaration) was an act of the Second Continental Congress, adopted
on July 4, 1776, which declared that the Thirteen Colonies were independent of Great Britain.
8
I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 133.
U.S. Declaration of Independence, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in

Washington, D.C.
73
The document, formally entitled The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States
of America and written chiefly by Thomas Jefferson, explained the justifications for
separation from the British crown, and was an expansion of Richard Henry Lees Resolution
(passed by Congress in July 2), which first proclaimed independence.
The Declaration is considered to be a founding document that preceded the later
formed United States of America, where July 4 is celebrated as Independence Day. At the
time the Declaration was issued, the American colonies were united in declaring their
independence from Great Britain, but were not yet declaring themselves to be a single nation.
That union would evolve and take shape during the next few years after the Declaration was
issued. John Hancock was the first to sign the Declaration of Independence.
The Declaration proclaimed that: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.10
U.S. President Abraham Lincoln succinctly explained the central importance of the
Declaration to American history in his Gettysburg Address of 1863:
Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a
new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men
are created equal x x x.11
These first principles were further enshrined in what would be considered a

codification of rightsthe United States Bill of Rights.
The United States Bill of Rights consists of the first 10 amendments to the United
States Constitution. These amendments limit the powers of the federal government in
protecting the rights of all citizens, residents and visitors on United States territory. Among
the enumerated rights these amendments guarantee are: the freedoms of speech, the
press, and religion; the peoples right to keep and bear arms; the freedom of assembly;
the freedom to petition; and the rights to be free of unreasonable search and seizure;
cruel and unusual punishment; and compelled self-incrimination. The United States Bill
of Rights also restricts Congress power by prohibiting it from making any law respecting the
establishment of religion and by prohibiting the federal government from depriving any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In criminal cases, it requires indictment
by grand jury for any capital or infamous crime, guarantees a speedy public trial with an
impartial and local jury, and prohibits double jeopardy. In addition, the United States Bill of
Rights states that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed
10
N.B.: The original handwritten text ended on the phrase the pursuit of property rather
than the pursuit of Happiness but the phrase was changed in subsequent copies, in part
because it was broader. The latter phrase is used today.
11
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address of 1863 (emphasis supplied); see also CARL F. WIECK,
LINCOLNS QUEST FOR E QUALITY: THE ROAD TO GETTYSBURG (2002).
74
to deny or disparage others retained by the people, and reserves all powers not granted to
the Federal government, to the citizenry, or the states.
These amendments came into effect on December 15, 1791, when ratified by threefourths of the states. Most were applied to the states by a series of decisions applying the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was adopted after the American
Civil War.
Initially drafted by James Madison in 1789, the United States Bill of Rights was written
at a time when ideological conflict between Federalists and anti-Federalists, dating from
the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, threatened the ratification of the Constitution.
The United States Bill of Rights was influenced by George Masons 1776 Virginia
Declaration of Rights, the 1689 English Bill of Rights, works of the Age of Enlightenment
pertaining to natural rights, and earlier English political documents such as the Magna Carta
(1215). The Bill was largely a response to the Constitutions influential opponents, including
prominent founding fathers, who argued that it failed to protect the basic principles of human
liberty.
The English Bill of Rights (1689), one of the fundamental documents of English law
whose roots can be traced to the Magna Carta of 1225, differed substantially in form and
intent from the United States Bill of Rights, because it was intended to address the rights of
citizens as represented by Parliament against the Crown. However, some of the basic tenets
of the English Bill of Rights are adopted and extended to the general public by the United
States Bill of Rights, including the right of petition; an independent judiciary (the sovereign
was forbidden to establish his own courts or to act as a judge himself); freedom from taxation
by royal (executive) prerogative, without agreement by Parliament (legislators); freedom
from a peace-time standing army; freedom [for Protestants] to bear arms for self-defence;
freedom to elect members of Parliament without interference from the Sovereign; freedom
of speech in Parliament; freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail,
and freedom from fines and forfeitures without trial.
Also borrowing from the traditions of the English legal system and the libertarian
philosophies of the French Revolution, the United States Constitution specifically included
the English common law procedure in the Suspension Clause, located in Article One, Section
9. It states: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when
in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.12
Furthermore, the amendments that would soon become the Bill of Rights
strengthened the individual liberties and highlighted the interplay between the government
and the individuals, with the Constitution being the contract of governance.13
12
U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, Sec. 9.
13
IRVING G RANT, THE BILL
OF
RIGHTS: I TS ORIGIN
AND
MEANING (1965).
75
D. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man

A month after the storming of the Bastille in 1789, the French National Assembly was
convened and the La Dclaration des Droits de lHomme et du Citoyen (The Declaration of
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) was promulgated. La Dclaration is one of the
fundamental documents of the French Revolution, defining a set of individual rights and
collective rights of all the estates as one. Influenced by the doctrine of natural rights, these
rights are universal: they are supposed to be valid at all times and places, pertaining to
human nature itself. The last article of the Declaration was adopted August 26, 1789, by the
Assemble Nationale Constituante (National Constituent Assembly), as the first step toward
writing a Constitution. While it set forth fundamental rights, not only for French citizens but
for everyone without exception, the First Article [states]Men are born and remain free
and equal in rights. Social distinctions can be founded only on the common utility.
The principles set forth in the declaration are of constitutional value in present-day
French law and may be used to oppose legislation or other government activities.
E. World Wars I and II
The end of the 19th century saw the rise of prominent countries adopting human rights
principles as part of their Constitutions. Efforts in the 19th century to prohibit slavery and to
limit the devastations of war, especially in terms of loss of lives both of combatants and
noncombatants are prime examples. These concerns on human rights provided impetus to
the formation of the League of Nations, to protect minority groups; and to the International
Labour Organization (ILO) to protect the rights of workers.
This trend of protecting human rights was cut short when World War I erupted. The
League of Nations floundered because it failed to prevent Japans invasion of China and
Machuria (1931) and Italys attack on Ethiopia (1935). The refusal of the United States to
join aggravated the weakness of the League of Nations.
In 1939, the World War II finally gave the death blow to the triumph of peace through
international cooperation. The war, however, demonstrated the need for greater protection
of human rights of people, especially against attacks by their own governments. It took this
bloody World War to jumpstart the internationalization of human rights.
F. The Birth of the United Nations
The Hitler governments extermination of over six million Jews, Sinti and Romani,
homosexuals, and persons with disabilities horrified the world. So did the cruel excesses of
the Japanese in the conduct of war. Trials were held in Nuremberg and Tokyo after the
Second World War, and officials from defeated countries were charged with and punished
for committing war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. It was
76
the first time the concept of crimes against humanity was used to bring to justice officials
who could have escaped liability if they had been prosecuted on the basis of their domestic
laws.
The result boosted the campaign for human rights. From across the globe came the
calls for human rights standards to protect citizens from abuses by their own governments,
standards against which nations and ruling governments could be held accountable.
Worldwide, people demanded that never again would anyone be unjustly denied life, liberty
and their basic social and economic necessities.
Responding to these demands for internationalization of human rights, U.S.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in his 1941 State of the Union Address, called for a new
world order founded on four essential freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of religion,
freedom from want, and freedom from fear. The voice of arguably the most powerful
country in the world precipitated the cascade of calls for nations to come together under
one more effective organization.
In 1945, in San Francisco, California, a historic meeting was held that would give life
to a document creating the United Nations. Member-States of the United Nations pledged
to promote respect for the human rights of all. To advance the goal, the United Nations
established a Commission on Human Rights and charged it with the task of drafting a document
spelling out the meaning of fundamental rights and freedoms proclaimed in the charter. The
commission was guided by the able leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt.
In The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era
(2003), written by Micheline Ishay, Director of the Human Rights Program of the Graduate
School of International Studies of the University of Denver, there is an anecdote regarding
the role of the Philippines in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Professor Ishay traced the beginnings of human rights and revealed very significant
yet little known battles on the final wording of the Declaration. They were little known,
because they were fought on the sidelinesand not on center stage, which was dominated
by such figures as Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin and the big powers they represented. Professor
Ishay narrated how the UN was almost formed with a weak commitment to the enhancement
of human rights. The tragedy was averted, thanks to the off-center stage efforts of less
powerful countries, which included the Philippines.
The proposal for a United Nations organization was not accepted without
vociferous protests from small and medium states. Two months before the
meeting in San Francisco, Latin American states held a conference assembling
twenty nations at Chapultepec, Mexico, to exert pressure agaisnt the
prominence of great power influence in the new international organization,
and they submitted recommendations to be discussed at the San Francisco
conference. At the San Francisco meeting, Australia, New Zealand, India and
77
the Philippines joined the chorus of disenchanted countries. With Chile, Cuba
and the Panama initially in the forefront, the protesting countries called for a
stronger human rights commitment. Joining Gandhis effort, Carlos Romulo
of the Philippines (18991985), Ho Chi Minh, Kwame Nkrumag, and the
American black leader W.E.B. Du Bois (18681963) all condemned the proposal
for ignoring human rights in general, and specifically for overlooking the rights
of minority and indigenous people living under colonial control.
xxxx
x x x Days later, the United States, along with Britain, France and the
USSR, conceded and backed the NGOs human rights proposals. The charter
would now include the statement that [w]e the people of the United Nations
[are] determined x x x to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, followed
by several passages with clear human rights references, and ending with a
recommendation for the formation of a Trusteeship Council system as a main
organ (Articles 7591) designed to oversee the rights of the people of the
colonies and work toward their self-determination. The revised charter thus
marked an important success for human rights activists.14
On December 10, 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was
adopted by the 56 members of the United Nations. While not legally binding, it urged member
nations to promote a number of human, civil, economic and social rights, declaring these
rights are part of the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. The
Declaration was the first international legal effort to limit the behavior of states and press
upon them duties to their citizens following the model of the rights-duty duality. In the
words of Eleanor Roosevelt, the UDHR was the international Magna Carta,15 and how a
government treats its own citizens is now a matter of legitimate international concern, and
not simply a domestic issue. The international Magna Carta claims that all rights are
interdependent and indivisible.
The impact of the United Nations and the UDHR was far-reaching. Its principles
have been incorporated into the Constitutions of the more than 185 nations who are now
members of the United Nations. The Universal Declaration gained the status of customary
international law, as people regarded it as a common standard of achievement for all people
and all nations.16
14
MICHELINE ISHAY, THE HISTORY

218223 (2003).
15
Eleanor Roosevelt, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, December 9, 1949, in
Paris, France available online at <http://www. americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
eleanorrooseveltdeclarationhumanrights.htm> (last accessed September 11, 2007).
16
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING
OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES
TO THE
GLOBALIZATION ERA 1618,
AND INTENT
(1999).
78
II. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Many states were spurred to go beyond a declaration of rights and create legal covenants
to put greater pressure on governments to follow human rights norms. Some states, however,
disagreed on whether this international covenant should contain economic and social rights
(which usually require greater resources and effort to fulfill on the part of individual states),
so two treaties were prepared.
In 1950, the first multilateral treaty on human rights the European Convention
on Human Rights was adopted and ratified by a majority of the nations of the European
region.
In 1966, two international treaties were erected based on the UDHR. Because the
UDHR contained both first-generation civil and political rights and second-generation
economic, social, and cultural rights, it could not garner the international consensus necessary
to become a binding treaty. Particularly, a divide developed between capitalist nations such
as the U.S.A., which favored civil and political rights, and communist nations, which favored
economic, social and cultural rights. To solve this problem, two binding Covenants were
created instead of one: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
The ICCPR is a United Nations treaty based on the UDHR, created in 1966 and entered
into force on March 23, 1976.17 The ICCPR currently has 160 States-Parties and five further
signatories (pending ratification).
The ICESCR is also a multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations General
Assemby on December 16, 1966, and in force from January 3, 1976. It commits StatesParties to work toward the granting of economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) to
individuals. It was introduced as a second-generation human rights treaty developing some
of the issues contained in the UDHR, at the same time as ICCPR. As of July 2007, there were
157 States-Parties to the ICESCR. Four other states have also signed the treaty, but have
not ratified it.
A most significant part of the ICCPR is its imposition upon the signatory states, which
include the Philippines, of the duty to adopt the necessary laws to give effect to the rights
enumerated in the covenant. Articles 2 and 3 mandated the signatory states (a) to ensure
that persons whose rights or freedoms are violated shall have an effective remedy, even if
the violation has been committed by those acting in an official capacity; (b) to ensure that
persons claiming such a remedy shall have their rights thereto determined by competent
17
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI). 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). A country-by-country list of declarations
and reservations made upon ratification, accession or succession can be seen at <http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm> (last accessed September 7, 2007).
79
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority

provided by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of a judicial remedy;
and (c) to ensure that when granted, the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies.
Complementing the movement towards the internationalization of human rights
was the broadening of the scope of those responsible for their violation. Originally, human
rights were protected only from violations by the State; hence, in international covenants,
the bearer of the duty was always the State. In other words, the right of an individual citizen
is not protected from an unlawful act or omission by another individual, but only from State
intrusion. There was a right to sue, but only against the State.
Expressed otherwise, the internationalization of rights resulted in a change of
concepts as to the holders of the right and the bearers of the duties or the personalities of
those who could sue and be sued. For instance, the third-generation human rights, which
include the right to a healthy environment, does not belong only to an individual; it belongs
to the entire populace and can be claimed even by the international community.
Correspondingly, the duty to preserve a healthy environment is demandable by the people
as a collectivity against a State, an individual, a group, or a community. Pollution, for example,
prejudices individuals, communities, and the State; its ill effects could even cross over to
other countries. For these reasons the irreversible trend now is to hold both the State and
individuals accountable for violation of international human rights.
In addition, the United Nations has adopted more than 20 principal treaties enhancing
human rights. These include conventions to prevent specific abuses like torture18 and
genocide;19 and to protect vulnerable populations such as refugees,20 women,21 and
children.22
18
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, adopted by resolution 39/46 2 of December 10, 1984 at the thirty-ninth session
of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
19
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved and
proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A
(III) of December 9, 1948, entry into force January 12, 1951, in accordance with article XIII.
20
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on July 28, 1951, by the United
Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons
convened under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of December 14, 1950, entry into
force April 22, 1954, in accordance with article 43.
21
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted by

UN General Assembly on December 18, 1979 (resolution 34/180), and entered into force on
September 3, 1981.
22
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and
accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20, 1989, entry into force
September 2, 1990, in accordance with article 49.
80
III. THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Over a period of 50 years, the nations of the Western Hemisphere developed a relatively
sophisticated and progressive system of human rights protection for the citizens.23 Though
the region is often thought of as Latin America, the system also comprises the independent
nations of the Carribean, including Spanish-speaking Cuba and the Dominican Republic,
French-speaking Haiti, and about a dozen English-speaking island nations, plus Englishspeaking United States and Canada.24
A. Supranational and National Protection of Human Rights
The development of mechanisms of supranational protection has been made possible
because, since 1948, a regional, political and diplomatic body the Organization of
American States (OAS) has afforded an appropriate forum to condemn violations and
seek their redress. The Charter of the OAS and the first human rights instrument for the
Americas the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man were signed in the
same conference in Bogota in 1948.25 Subsequently, in 1959, a resolution of the General
Assembly of the OAS created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Commission), where complaints can be brought alleging violations by the authorities of
rights enumerated in the American Declaration. A multilateral human rights treaty, the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), also known as the Pact of San Jose, Costa
Rica, which reinforced the treaty underpinnings of the Commission, was signed in 1969, and
it entered into force a decade later.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Commission was besieged with urgent
complaints about arrests conducted in secret, in which the authorities denied any
responsibility or knowledge of the fate and whereabouts of the victims.26 Inquiries
before domestic agencies and resort to habeas corpus writs proved ineffective. There
was also little hope that an abducted person could be found via the long and cumbersome
procedures for case complaints outlined in the ACHR. 27 This tragic phenomenon came
to be known as forced disappearance of persons. The Commission had to find a way
to deal effectively with the problem, as more and more military dictatorships violated
their peoples right to life, liberty and security.
23
Juan E. Mendez, The Inter-American System of Protection: Its Contributions to the

International Law of Human Rights, p. 111.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 112.
26
Id. at 120.
27
Id.
81
The Commission realized that there had to be a quick response, because it was
in those early hours following a deniable detention that the authorities decided the
fate of the detainee. The person could be released, sent into legalized detention,
killed and the body disposed of secretly, or held in clandestine detention centers
where the detainee could be tortured or interrogated.28
The first adversarial cases to reach the Inter-American Court were about
involuntary disappearances. 29 The Commission decided to bring these cases against
Honduras, as a way of highlighting the seriousness of the violation and obtaining support
from the Court in the struggle to solve the problem of desaparecidos. In Velasquez and
Godinez, the Court held that such disappearances constituted crimes against humanity
under international law; and that, as a result, governments had an affirmative duty to
investigate them and to prosecute and punish whoever may be responsible.30 The Court
also found that, because the purpose of a disappearance was to eliminate traces of the
governments role in a serious crime, the standard of proof and burden of persuasion
must, after an initial presentation by the Commission, shift to the government to
demonstrate that it had done all in its power to redress the wrong.31 The Court based this
reasoning on its dictum that states have an obligation to organize their whole apparatus
so that human rights may be adequately protected.32
This ruling resulted in the trend towards the incorporation of the international
law of human rights into the text of domestic constitutions. In some cases, the full text
of all treaties ratified by the country is reproduced as constitutional text, and special
majorities of Congress are required to denounce a human rights treaty. 33 In other cases,
international instruments that have been ratified are incorporated by reference into the
new constitutional text. Whatever the case may be, various court procedures were
developed to accord protection to human rights.
Among the different procedures that have been established, the primary ones
that provide direct and immediate protection are habeas corpus and amparo. 34 The
28
Id.
29
Id. at 121.
30
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velasquez Rodriguez case, and Godinez Cruz case,
judgment of January 20, 1989.
31
Mendez, at 121.
32
Id.
33
See Article 74, Sec. 11, Constitution of the Argentine Republic, as amended, 1994.
34
Adolfo S. Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce Fundamental Rights, 37 A.L.J.
14.
82
difference between these two writs is that habeas corpus is designed to enforce the right
of freedom of a person, whereas amparo is designed to protect those other fundamental
human rights enshrined in the Constitution but not covered by the writ of habeas corpus.35
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico, where it was provided for in the
Constitution of the State of Yucatan in 1841 and later in the Federal Constitution of
1857. 36 Initially, the Mexican amparo was a narrowly constructed procedural device
designed to protect citizens rights in certain circumstancesamparo comes from
amparar which means to protect. In the beginning, the term was used by judges to
take action when a citizen was being illegally conscripted into the military or improperly
detained or condemned to death by a firing squad because of an alleged political crime.
Gradually, and through experience and jurisprudence, the Mexican amparo
procedure developed to protect citizens in many more ways and eventually blossomed
to cover the whole range of constitutional rights. A plaintiff could bring a proceeding in
the Supreme Court, and eventually the intermediate appellate courts, to protect
constitutional rights; to test unconstitutional laws; and to challenge certain judicial
decisions (amparo casacion).
The success met by the writ of amparo in championing human rights in Mexico
led other Latin American countries to follow suit and adopt this extraordinary writ in their
Constitutions. As practiced, the amparo has been found to be so flexible to the particular
situations of each country that, while retaining its essence, it has developed various
procedural forms.37 These forms differ according to the scope of protection given. Briefly,
these are as follows:
a. In some countries, amparo is regarded solely as an equivalent to habeas
corpus, being available only to protect the individual from unlawful acts or
from irregularities in criminal proceedings. This is the meaning it has in Chile,
and the same holds in the transitional provision of the 1951 Venezuelan
Constitution which uses the term amparo de la libertad personal as a synonym
of habeas corpus. 38
b. In Argentina, Venezuela, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, and
very recently, in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay, as well as in Mexico, amparo,
has come to mean an instrument for the protection of constitutional rights
35
Zamudio, Latin American Procedures for the Protection of the Individual, J. Intl Com. Jurists
86 (1968).
36
Azcuna, at 13.
37
Id. at 15.
38
Id.
83
with the exception of freedom of the person, which is protected by the

traditional habeas corpus.39
c. A third group of countries also uses amparo as a petition for judicial review
to challenge unconstitutional laws, as in Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua.40
Amparo, therefore, has been said to have done for the social and economic rights
what habeas corpus has done for the civil and political rights. 41
The following is an examination of the amparo procedure as embodied in the
various Constitutions of the countries in Latin America:
As the birthplace of amparo, Mexico provides in Article 107 of its Constitution an
exhaustive substantive and procedural method for the enforcement of the different types
of amparo, viz:
All controversies mentioned in Article 103 shall be subject to the legal forms
and procedure prescribed by law, on the following bases:
I.
A trial in amparo shall always be held at the instance of the injured

party.
II.
The judgment shall always be such that it affects only private individuals,
being limited to affording them redress and protection in the special
case to which the complaint refers, without making any general
declaration as to the law or act on which the complaint is based.
A defect in the complaint may be corrected, whenever the act
complained of is based on laws declared unconstitutional by previous
decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice.
A defect in the complaint may also be corrected in criminal
matters and in behalf of workers in labor disputes, when it is found that
there has been a manifest violation of the law against the injured party
who is left without defense, and in criminal matters, likewise, when the
trial has been based on a law not precisely applicable to the case.
In trials in amparo which contest acts that resulted or could
result in depriving ejidos or population groups, or members of an ejido
or communal holders having a de facto or de jure communal status,
from ownership or possession and enjoyment of their lands, waters,
pastures, and woodlands, defects in the complaint must be corrected as
39
Id.
40
Id. at 16.
41
Id. at 14.
84
provided in regulations; and there shall be no abandonment,

discontinuance due to inactivity, or lapse of the legal action, if the rights
of ejidos or communal population groups are affected.
III. In judicial civil, criminal, or labor matters a writ of amparo shall be
granted only:
a. Against final judgments or awards against which no ordinary recourse
is available by virtue of which these judgments can be modified or
amended, whether the violation of the law is committed in the judgments
or awards, or whether, if committed during the course of the trial, the
violation prejudices the petitioners defense to the extent of affecting
the judgment; provided that in civil or criminal judicial matters
opportune objection and protest were made against it because of refusal
to rectify the wrong and that if (the violation) was committed in first
instance, it was urged in second instance as a grievance.
b. Against acts at the trial, the execution of which would be irreparable
out of court, or at the conclusion of the trial once all available recourses
have been exhausted.
c.
Against acts that affect persons who are strangers to the trial.
IV. In administrative matters, amparo may be invoked against decisions

which cause an injury that cannot be remedied through any legal
recourse, trial, or defense. It shall not be necessary to exhaust these
remedies when the law that established them, in authorizing the
suspension of the contested act, demand greater requirements than
the regulatory law for trials in amparo requires as a condition for ordering
such suspension.
V.
Except as provided in the following section, a writ of amparo against

final decisions or awards, for violations committed therein shall be
applied for directly to the Supreme Court of Justice, which shall render
its decision without other evidence than the original complaint, a certified
copy of the claims of the aggrieved party, which shall be added to those
made by the third party affected, the latters complaint submitted either
by the Attorney General of the Republic or his designated agent, and
that of the responsible authority.
xxxx
Art. 28 (15) of the Ecuadorian Constitution provides:
Without prejudice to other inherent rights of the individual, the State
shall guarantee x x x the right to demand judicial amparo against any
violation of constitutional guarantees, without prejudice to the duty of
the public power to ensure the observance of the Constitution and the
laws.
Article 77 of the Constitution of Paraguay provides:
Any person who considers that a right or guarantee to which he is
entitled under this Constitution or under law has been or is in imminent
danger of being seriously injured by an individual and who, because of
the urgency of the case, cannot have recourse to the ordinary remedies
may file a petition for amparo with any judge of first instance. The
proceedings shall be short, summary, free and held in public, and the
judge shall be empowered to safeguard the right or guarantee or to
restore immediately the legal position infringed. Regulations governing
the procedure shall be laid down by law.
Article 43 of the Constitution of Argentina provides:
Any person shall file a prompt and summary proceeding regarding
constitutional guarantees, provided there is no other legal remedy,
against any act or omission of the public authorities or individuals which
currently or imminently may damage, limit, modify or threaten rights
and guarantees recognized by this Constitution, treaties or laws, with
open arbitrariness or illegality. In such case, the judge may declare that
the act or omission is based on an unconstitutional rule.
Article 49 of the Venezuelan Constitution provides:
The courts shall protect all inhabitants of the Republic in the exercise of
the rights and guarantees established by the Constitution, in accordance
with law. The procedure shall be brief and summary and the judge shall
have the power to immediately restore the legal situation alleged to be
infringed.
Article 48(3) of the Costa Rican Constitution provides:
To maintain or restore the enjoyment of the rights laid down in this
Constitution (other than freedom of the person which is protected under
paragraph 1 of the Article by habeas corpus) everyone shall also have
the right of amparo in such courts as the law may determine.
Article 19 of the Bolivian Constitution provides:
In addition to the right of habeas corpus, to which the preceding article
refers, amparo lies against illegal acts or omissions of officials or private
individuals that restrict or deny the individual rights and guarantees
recognized by the Constitution and the law.
85
86
This examination shows, it is submitted, that no other institution has the prestige,
roots and traditions as that of amparo to provide a coherent procedure with uniform
bases for the protection of fundamental rights set forth in various Constitutions. 42
B. Judicial Development of the Writ of Amparo Against Human Rights Abuses
Unlike the Mexican writ of amparo and which was mainly developed through legislative
fiat, the emergence and metamorphosis of the Argentine writ of amparo was much more
dramatic as the remedy was mainly fashioned through judicial activism.
Before 1957, there existed no summary devise for the protection of constitutional
rights in Argentine law or jurisprudence.43 Although at this time, the habeas corpus or as
it is known in Argentina the recurso de amparo de la libertad, was already operative in
Argentine legal arenas, its protection is limited to the traditional unlawful restraints on
personal liberty or mobility. 44 The absence of such a remedy was made more emphatic
against the background of rapid progress in the development of the same remedy in
neighboring Brazil and Mexico. Attempts to include within the protective coverage of the
habeas corpus other constitutional rights were rebuffed by the courts in the absence of
specific statutory authority. 45
By 1957, the seeds of amparo protection had already been transplanted in the
various state constitutions of Argentina. 46 It took the Supreme Court of Justice of
Argentina, despite the absence of clear and express statutory authority, in the two leading
cases of Siri and Samuel Kot to adopt and define a national amparo, finding support in
its charge of protecting rights embodied in the Constitution.
In the Siri case,47 Angel Siri, publisher of the newspaper Mercedes, invoked the
writ of habeas corpus and sought judicial redress for the protection of his constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and of work, when his newspaper company was shut
down by police authorities for no apparent reason. The court of first instance and the
court of appeals rejected the petition on the ground that it protects physical liberty only.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and ruled that it may not be alleged to the
42
Zamudio, at 89.
43
Robert E. Biles, The Position of the Judiciary in the Political Systems of Argentina and Mexico,
8 LAW AM 287 at 307 (1976).
44
Id.
45
KARST
46
The Argentine amparo first appeared in Article 17 of the Constitution of the Province of
Santa Fe, in Article 22 of the Constitution of the Province of Santiago de Estero and in
Article 33 of the Constitution of the Province of Mendoza.
47
239 Fallos 459, 1958-II J.A. 478, 89 La Ley 532 (1957).
AND
ROSENN, LAW
AND
DEVELOPMENT
IN
LATIN AMERICA: A CASE Book 138139 (1975).
87
contrary that there is no law regulating the guarantee. Individual guarantees exist and
protect individuals by virtue of the single fact that they are contained in the
Constitution, independently of regulatory laws x x x.48
The Samuel Kot case,49 innocently enough, began as a labor dispute. The textile
firm of Samuel Kot was involved in a row with its laborers when the latter staged a strike
which was initially declared illegal by the provincial department of labor which ordered
the laborers to return to work. The company, however, refused to reinstate two union
officials, invoking the amparo protection enunciated in the Siri case.
The Supreme Court granted protection and redress for the violation of the
constitutional right of work and property, ruling:
Whenever it is clear and obvious that any restriction of basic human rights
is illegal and also that submitting the question to the ordinary administrative
or judicial procedures would cause serious and irreparable harm, it is proper
for the judges immediately to restore the restricted right through the swift
method of the recourse of amparo.50
The Supreme Court fearlessly proceeded to give form to it, proclaiming that the
amparo protection covers not only illegal actions of government but also of private
persons or social groups:
There is nothing in either the letter or the spirit of the Constitution that
might permit the assertion that the protection of human rights so called
because they are the basic rights of man is confined to attacks by official
authorities. Neither is there anything to authorize the assertion that an
illegal, serious, and open attack against any of the rights that make up
liberty in the broad sense, would lack adequate constitutional protection
because of the single fact that the attack comes from other private persons
or organized group of individuals x x x. 51
The Supreme Court concluded with an impassioned affirmation of the need for
a summary remedy such as the amparo procedure, viz:
In these conditions, it is not appropriate to require the affected party to
claim the return of his property through ordinary procedures. If, every time
that a group of persons physically occupied a factory, a private teaching
48
Id. at 463.
49
241 Fallos 291, 1958-IV J.A. 227, 92 La Ley 626 (1958).
50
Id. at 257.
51
Id. at 450.
88
institution, or any other establishment, in connection with a conflict, the

owners had no other recourse for defense of their constitutional rights than
to bring a possessory action or one of ejectment, with multiple citations for
each and every one of the occupants to appear in the action, with the power
of each of the occupants to name his own attorney, to contest notices and
documents, to offer and produce evidence, etc., anyone can see how the
protection of rights given by the laws would be diminished and how the
juridical order of the country would be subverted. In such situations, x x x
judicial protection of constitutional rights does not tolerate or consent to
such a delay. 52
Judicial fashioning of the Argentine amparo proceeded without letup. The Moris
case53 established the amparo as the remedy if resort to ordinary legal channels would
render any protective grant illusory and cause irreparable damage to the complainant.
Consistent with the Siri case which relied on the implicit guarantees for the grant of the
protection even on those rights not explicitly enumerated, mere legitimate interest, not
necessarily clear and incontestable right, suffices to fix legal personality on the petitioner
for the amparo protection.
IV. THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE

A. The Philippines Under Spain
The Spanish crown governed the Philippines through the regional government of Mexico.
This continued until the Mexican independence from Spain in 1821, when Philippine
governance shifted to Council of the Indies in Spain. In 1837, the abolition of the Council
of the Indies shifted Philippine governance into the Council of Ministers and again in 1863
shifted to the Ministry of Colonies.
The Royal Audiencia established in 1583 acted as the Supreme Court of the
Philippines. Under the Royal Audiencia were two Territorial Audiencia established in 1893
in Cebu and Vigan. Regular Courts began to be established in the provinces in 1886.
Justice of the Peace Courts began to be established in 1885 throughout the country.
Religious matters where usually handled by a special ecclesiastical court, whereas military
matters were often handled in a specialized military court.
Under Spanish laws, representation in the courts was denied Filipino natives among
many other rights. In the late 1800s, Filipino students who were able to imbibe Western
ideals formed propaganda movements, notably, the La Solidaridad, under Marcelo H. Del
Pilar, the aims of which were to include active Filipino participation in the affairs of the
52
Id.
53
1962-I J.A. 442 (1961).
89
government; freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly; wider social and political
freedoms; equality before the law; assimilation; and representation in the Spanish Cortes,
or Parliament.
Spanish rule on the Philippines was briefly interrupted in 1762, when British troops
occupied Manila as a result of Spains entry into the Seven Years War. The Treaty of Paris
of 1763 restored Spanish rule and in 1764 the British left the country fearing another
costly war with Spain.
Spain and the United States sent commissioners to Paris to draw up the terms of
the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War. The Filipino representative,
Felipe Agoncillo, was excluded from sessions as the revolutionary government was not
recognized by the family of nations.54 Although there was substantial domestic opposition,
the United States decided neither to return the Philippines to Spain, nor to allow Germany
to annex the Philippines. In addition to Guam and Puerto Rico, Spain was forced in the
negotiations to hand over the Philippines to the United States in exchange for
US$20,000,000, which the latter later claimed to be a gift from Spain.55 The first
Philippine Republic rebelled against the U.S. occupation, resulting in the PhilippineAmerican War (18991913).
B. The United States Occupation
Most of the rights recognized by the United States were transplanted in the Philippines.
The controversial Insular Cases56 were in essence the U.S. Supreme Courts resolution to
a major issue of the United States presidential election, 1900 and the American AntiImperialist League, summarized by the phrase Does the Constitution follow the flag?
Essentially, the U.S. Supreme Court held that not all constitutional rights extended to
areas under American control. In 1898, the United States annexed Hawaii. In the same
year, the Treaty of Paris ended the Spanish- American War and the United States gained
54
L EODIVICO CRUZ L ACSAMANA, P HILIPPINE HISTORY AND G OVERNMENT 1267 (1990); see also TEODORO
AGONCILLO, HISTORY OF THE FILIPINO P EOPLE, (1990 ed.).
55
W ALTER M ILLIS , T HE M AR TIAL S PIRIT (1931) available at <http://www.spanamwar.com/

McKinleyphilreasons.htm> (last accessed September 7, 2007).
56
DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Armstrong
v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. New
York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901);
Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197 (1903); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138 (1904); Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Dowdell v. United States,
221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258
U.S. 298 (1922). They are collectively referred to as the insular cases, meaning, those which
are island-related.
90
the islands of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam. At the time, there was a debate on
how to govern these new territories in view of the silence of the United States Constitution
on the matter. In the Insular Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court established the framework
for applying some of the Constitution to these islands.
In Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States,57 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the Philippines, after its cession to the United States by Spain, was not a foreign country
for purposes of the tariff laws of the United States, following De Lima v. Bidwell.58 It held
that:
By the 3d (sic) article of the treaty Spain ceded to the United States the
archipelago known as the Philippine islands, and the United States agreed
to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000 within three months. The treaty was
ratified; Congress appropriated the money; the ratification was proclaimed.
The treaty making power, the executive power, the legislative power,
concurred in the completion of the transaction.
The Philippines thereby ceased, in the language of the treaty, to be
Spanish. Ceasing to be Spanish, they ceased to be foreign country. They
came under the complete and absolute sovereignty and dominion of the
United States, and so became territory of the United States over which civil
government could be established. The result was the same although there
was no stipulation that the native inhabitants should be incorporated into
the body politic, and none securing to them the right to choose their
nationality. Their allegiance became due to the United States, and they
became entitled to its protection. 59
This was the legal background when the 1935 Philippine Constitution was adopted.
The 1935 Philippine Constitution was approved and adopted by the Commonwealth of
the Philippines (19351946) and later used by the Third Republic of the Philippines (1946
1972).
Echoing the first principles of the French egalitarianism, the right-based
Constitution of the United States and the limitation-centered Magna Carta, the 1935
Philippine Constitution in its preamble reads:
57
Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 46 L.Ed. 138, 22 S.Ct. 59 (1901).
58
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 45 L.Ed. 1041, 21 S.Ct. 743 (1901) which held that Puerto
Rico after its cession to the United States was not a foreign country for purposes of the
tariff laws of the United States, which required payment of duties on goods moving into the
United States from a foreign country. In the absence of congressional legislation, the United
States Government could not collect customs duties on sugar from Puerto Rico shipped to
other parts of the United States by classifying Puerto Rico as a foreign country.
59
Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. at 180.
91
The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divine Providence, in order to

establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop
the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime
of justice, li berty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate this
constitution. 60
The 1935 Philippine Constitution adopted most of the Bill of Rights as embodied
in the amendments of the United States Constitution. Article II, Section 1(14) of the 1935
Philippine Constitution explicitly recognized the writ of habeas corpus, bringing to the
Philippines the English law concept of the remedial enforcement of the right to liberty of
a person.
The United States, as provided in the Jones-McDuffie Law of 1934, granted
independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946.
C. Martial law years and the drafting of the 1987 Constitution
The Philippine legal history of human rights operates under the experience of a presidential
form of government which is the only form so far known in Philippine history. 61 In
particular, the powers granted to the Executive branch of government by the organic law
of the land have influenced and shaped the present remedies and safeguards against the
violations of human rights. The experience of how powerful the presidency can be was
specially marked during the martial law era when President Marcos tested the limits of
the power of the presidency. 62
Amidst the rising wave of lawlessness and the threat of a Communist insurgency,
Marcos declared martial law on September 21, 1972, by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081.
Marcos, ruling by decree, curtailed press freedom and other civil liberties, closed down
Congress and media establishments, and ordered the arrest of opposition leaders and
militant activists, including his staunchest critics senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito
Salonga and Jose Diokno. The declaration of martial law was initially well-received, given
the social turmoil the Philippines was experiencing. Crime rates plunged dramatically
after a curfew was implemented. Many political opponents were forced to go into exile.
A constitutional convention, which had been called for in 1970 to replace the
colonial 1935 Constitution, continued the work of framing a new constitution after the
60
1935 P HILIPPINE CONSTITUTION preamble.
61
See JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY
(2003 ed.); see also Joaquin G. Bernas, From One-Man Rule to People Power, 46 ATENEO
LAW JOURNAL 44 (2001).
62
Id. at 45.
92
declaration of martial law. The new constitution went into effect in early 1973, changing
the form of government from presidential to parliamentary and allowing Marcos to stay
in power beyond 1973.
From the experience of the martial law years, the members of the 1986
Constitutional Commission tasked with drafting the new Constitution were keenly aware
of the need to protect the people through the organic law against another powerful
dictator. Hence, the pronounced effort of the Commission to provide within the
constitutional structure of government a remedy against the emergence of another
dictator by not only providing checks and balances within the three co-equal branches of
government but also by providing for other legal means for the protection of human
rights.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the rule-making powers of the Supreme Court have
been expanded. In Article VIII, Section 5(5) it is stated that the Supreme Court shall have
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 63
The power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, refers to a traditional
power granted to the Supreme Court. 64 Chief Justice Puno, in his ponencia of the case of
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice65 characterized the nature of this rule-making power,
designed under the present Constitution to provide a stronger and more independent
judiciary by taking away from Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
of court promulgated by the Supreme Court. In the words of Chief Justice Puno,
The rule-making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for
the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts
63
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (emphasis supplied).
64
JOAQUIN BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

ed.).
65
G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999, which idea is reiterated in People v. Lacson, G.R. No.
149453, April 1, 2003. The case of Republic v. Judge Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, however,
provided that Congress may repeal a rule of the Court involving substantial rights. Justice
Puno registered his dissent in this case.
OF THE
REPUBLIC
OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 969 (2003
93
and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution

took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. 66
On July 1617, 2007, Justices, activists, militant leaders, police officials, politicians
and prelates attended the two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings
and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, held
at the Manila Hotel in Manila City to map out ways to put an end to the string of
extrajudicial killings in the Philippines.
In the said event, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno explained that If there are
compelling reasons for this Summit, one of them is to prevent losing eye contact with
these killings and disappearances, revive our righteous indignation, and spur our united
search for the elusive solution to this pestering problem. The questions surrounding
the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances and their seeming resurgence refuse
to go quietly and simply be rationalized. While a large number in society are concerned
with this issue, the frequency of its occurrence and the media focus only seem to
anesthetize their sense of shock. While there are no easy solutions, this Summit is an
embodiment of the untiring and ceaseless effort to overcome what may often seem to
be insurmountable challenges to resolve this issue.
The Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the
issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Representatives from all sides
of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system,
have been invited in the hope that this summit will point to the right direction in resolving
this crisis. In so doing, the commitment to uphold respect for life and human rights is
enforced and revitalized.
The 1987 Constitution gave the judiciary two very prominent powers: (1) the
expanded judicial power to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to likewise determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government; and (2) the expanded rule-making power in
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights to more effectively check the
abuses in human rights. Citing his opinion in the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,67
the Chief Justice submitted that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed the Court from passivity to activism.
66
67
Id.
G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995, 249 SCRA 628.
94
The expanded rule-making power, on the other hand, can provide for a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. This enhanced rule-making
power proved providential two decades later as the country was once again plagued by
the scourge of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. This issue had
inadvertently exposed the frailties of our freedom, the inadequacy of our laws if not the
inutility of our system of justice. In view thereof, the Judiciary has decided to unsheathe
its unused power to enact rules to protect the constitutional rights, primordial of which
is the right to life.
In the Summit, a recurring proposition to the effect that the writ of amparo be
operationalized in the Philippines was heard. The first proposal in the Summary of
Recommendations,68 the output of the Summit, was to the effect that the Judiciary [to]
undertake a serious study of the Writ of Amparo to see how it can be availed of, as
protective and remedial tool, for the greater protection of the constitutional rights of the
victims; to undertake a study on how to attain a more creative and resourceful application
of the writ of habeas corpus.69
68
NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE SUMMIT ON E XTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS AND E NFORCED DISAPPEARANCES, SUMMARY OF

R ECOMM END ATIONS (2007); avai lable online at Supreme Court Website <http://
www.supremecourt.gov.ph/publications/summit/SummaryRecommendations.pdf> (last
accessed September 7, 2007).
69
Summary of Recommendations, p. 2.
95
ANNOTATION TO THE WRIT OF AMPARO

The Writ of Amparo. The nature and time-tested role of amparo has shown that it is an
effective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of constitutional rights.1 Amparo,
literally to protect, originated in Mexico and spread throughout the Western Hemisphere
where it has gradually evolved into various forms, depending on the particular needs of
each country.2 It started as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in
violation of constitutional rights. Later, however, the writ evolved for several purposes:3
1. For the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ
(called amparo libertad);
2. For the judicial review of the consitutionality of statutes (called amparo contra
leyes);
3. For the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision
(called amparo casacion);
4. For the judicial review of administrative actions (called amparo administrativo);
and
5. For the protection of peasants rights derived from the agrarian reform process
(called amparo agrario).
The writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted by Latin American countries,
except Cuba, to protect against human rights abuses especially during the time they were
governed by military juntas. Generally, these countries adopted the writ to provide for a
remedy to protect the whole range of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.
In the Philippines, the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo.
However, several of the amparo protections are available under our Constitution. Thus,
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the definition of judicial
power was expanded to include the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
1
Adolfo S. Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce Fundamental Rights, 37 ATENEO
LAW JOURNAL 15 (1993).
See Article 107 of the Constitution of Mexico; Article 28(15) of the Constitution of Ecuador;
Article 77 of the Constitution of Paraguay; Article 43 of the Constitution of Argentina;
Article 49 of the Constitution of Venezuela; Article 48(3) of the Constitution of Costa Rica;
and Article 19 of the Constitution of Bolivia.
Supra note 1.
96
APPENDIX A I THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO I ANNOTATION
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The second clause otherwise
known as the Grave Abuse Clause, accords the same general protection to human rights
given by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion and amparo administrativo.
Amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion and amparo administrativo are also recognized
in form by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Specifically, under Article VIII, Section 5, the
Supreme Court has explicit review powers over judicial decisions akin to amparo casacion.
To wit, Section 5(2) provides that the Supreme Court shall have power to [r]eview, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts.4 And in paragraph (a) of Section 5(2)
it is also explicitly provided that the Supreme Court shall have, like amparo contra leyes, the
power to review x x x [a]ll cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.5
Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus. Our Rules of Court
has adopted the old English rule on the writ of habeas corpus to protect the right to liberty
of individuals. There are also constitutional provisions recognizing habeas corpus, i.e. Article
III, Sections 13 and 15;6 Article VII, Section 18;7 and Article VIII, Section 5, Paragraph 1.8
The Rules of Court provide the procedure to protect constitutional rights. Rule 65
embodies the Grave Abuse Clause, while Rule 102 governs petition for habeas corpus.
Notably, the various socio-economic rights granted by the Constitution are enforced by
specific provisions of the Rules of Court, such as the rules on injunction, prohibition, etc.
The 1987 Constitution enhanced the protection of human rights by giving the Supreme
Court the power to [p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights x x x.9 This rule-making power unique to the present Constitution, is
the result of our experience under the dark years of martial law regime. Heretofore, the
protection of constitutional rights was principally lodged with Congress through the enactment
of laws and their implementing rules and regulation. The 1987 Constitution, however, gave
the Supreme Court the additional power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce rights
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land.
In the light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances, the
Supreme Court resolved to exercise for the first time its power to promulgate rules to protect
4
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2).
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2)(a).
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Secs. 13 and 15 .
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 18.
97
our peoples constitutional rights. Its Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court
agreed that the writ of amparo should not be a comprehensive and all-encompassing as the
ones found in some American countries, especially Mexico. These nations are understandably
more advanced in their laws as well as in their procedures with respect to the scope of this
extraordinary writ. The Committee decided that in our jurisdiction, this writ of amparo
should be allowed to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws
as they may be promulgated by Congress.
The highlights of the proposed Rule, section by section, are as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof.
Philippine Version. Since the writ of amparo is still undefined under our Constitution
and Rules of Court, Section 1 enumerates the constitutional rights protected by the writ,
i.e., only the right to life, liberty and security of persons. In other jurisdictions, the writ
protects all constitutional rights. The reason for limiting the coverage of its protection only
to the right to life, liberty and security is that other constitutional rights of our people are
already enforced through different remedies.
Be that as it may, the Philippine amparo encapsulates a broader coverage. Whereas
in other jurisdictions the writ covers only actual violations, the Philippine version is more
protective of the right to life, liberty and security in the sense that it covers both actual and
threatened violations of such rights. Further, unlike other writs of amparo that provide
protection only against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials or employees, our writ
covers violations committed by private individuals or entities. Entities refer to artificial
persons, as they are also capable of perpetrating the acts or omission.
The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Extralegal killings10 are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. As such, these will include the illegal taking of life
regardless of the motive, summary and arbitrary executions, salvagings even of suspected
criminals and threats to take the life of persons who are openly critical of erring government
officials and the like.11 On the other hand, enforced disappearances12 are attended by the
10
As the term is used in United Nations Instruments.
11
Such as media persons for example.
12
As defined in the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
98
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government

official or organized groups or private individuals acting with direct or indirect acquiescence
of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.
SEC. 2. Who May File. The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by
any qualified person or entity in the following order:
a. Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and
parents of the aggrieved party;
b. Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of
those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
c.
Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is

no known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved
party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of

all other authorized parties to file similar petitions. Likewise, the filing of the
petition by an authorized party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends
the right of all others, observing the order established herein.
Who May File. This section provides the order which must be followed by those
who can sue for the writ. It is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. First, the
right to sue belongs to the person whose right to life, liberty and security is being threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity (the aggrieved party). However, in cases where the whereabouts of the aggrieved
party is unknown, the petition may be filed by qualified persons or entities enumerated in
the Rules (the authorized party). A similar order of priority of those who can sue is provided
in our rules implementing the law on violence against women and children in conflict with
the law.
The reason for establishing an order is to prevent their indiscriminate and groundless
filing of petitions for amparo which may even prejudice the right of life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party. For instance, the immediate family may be nearing the point of
successfully negotiating with the respondent for the release of the aggrieved party. An
untimely resort to the writ by a nonmember of the family may endanger the life of the
aggrieved party.
The Committee is aware that there may also be instance wherein the qualified
members of the immediate family or relatives of the aggrieved party might be threatened
from filing the petition. As the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, this
99
section shall not preclude the filing by those mentioned in paragraph (c) when authorized by
those mentioned in paragraphs (a) or (b) when circumstances require.
SEC. 3. Where to File. The petition may be filed on any day and at any time
with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission
was committed or any of its elements occurred, or with the Sandiganbayan,
the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, or any justice of such courts. The
writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
When issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, the writ
shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of
their justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof,
or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission
was committed or any of its elements occurred.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be
returnable before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the
Sandiganbayan or the Court of Appeals or any of their justices, or to any
Regional Trial Court of the place where the threat, act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred.
Day and Time of Filing. Due to the extraordinary nature of the writ which protects
the mother of all rights the right to life the petition may be filed on any day, including
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays; and at any time, from morning until evening.
Courts Where Petition May Be Filed. This section is basically similar to the Rule on
petitions for the writ of habeas corpus. It is, however, different because it includes the
Sandiganbayan for the reason that public officials and employees will be respondents in
amparo petitions. It will be noted that the amparo petition has to be filed with the Regional
Trial Court where the act or omission was committed or where any of its elements occurred.
The intent is to prevent the filing of the petition in some far-flung area to harass the
respondent. Moreover, allowing the amparo petition to be filed in any Regional Trial Court
may prejudice the effective dispensation of justice, as in most cases, the witnesses and the
evidence are located within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court where the act or
omission was committed.
Designation. Originally, the draft Rule required the petition to be filed in the RTC
that had jurisdiction over the offense. However, the Committee felt that the use of the
word jurisdiction might be construed as vesting new jurisdiction in our courts, an act that
can only be done by Congress. The use of the word jurisdiction was discontinued, for the
Rule merely establishes a procedure to enforce the right to life, liberty or security of a person
and, undoubtedly, the Court has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern
proceedings in our courts without disturbing their jurisdiction.
100
SEC. 4. No Docket Fees. The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment
of the docket and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court, justice
or judge shall docket the petition and act upon it immediately.
Liberalized Docket Fees. The Committee exempted petitioners from payment of

docket and other lawful fees in filing an amparo petition, for this extraordinary writ involves
the protection of the right to life, liberty and security of a person. The enforcement of
these sacrosanct rights should not be frustrated by lack of finances.
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and verified and
shall allege the following:
a. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
b. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for
the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
c.
The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
d. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal

circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals,
as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with
any report;
e. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
f.
The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
Contents of the Petition. The petition should be verified to enhance the truthfulness
of its allegations and to prevent groundless suits.
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are necessary to identify the petitioner and the respondent.
The respondent may be given an assumed appellation such as John Doe, as long as he or
she is particularly described (descriptio personae). Paragraph (c) requires the petitioner to
allege the cause of action in as complete a manner a possible. The requirement of affidavit
was added, and it can be used as the direct testimony of the affiant. Affidavits can facilitate
the resolution of the petition, consistent with the summary nature of the proceedings.
Paragraph (d) is necessary to determine whether the act or omission of the respondent
101
satisfies the standard of conduct set by this Rule. Paragraph (e) is intended to prevent the
premature use, if not misuse, of the writ for a fishing expedition.
SEC. 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice
or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought
to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or
in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may issue the writ in his
or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the
petition which shall not be later than seven days from the date of its issuance.
Issuance. The writ is issued as a matter of course when on the face of the petition
it ought to issue. The writ will require respondent to file his return, which is the comment or
answer to the petition. If the petitioner is able to prove his cause of action after the hearing,
the privilege or the writ of amparo shall be granted, i.e., the court will grant the petitioner
his appropriate reliefs.
The provision requires that the writ should set the date of hearing of the petition to
expedite its resolution. The amparo proceedings enjoy priority and cannot be unreasonably
delayed.
SEC. 7. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. A clerk of court who
refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses
to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for contempt
without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.
Penalties. The provision is a modified version of a similar provision in Rule 102,

governing petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.
SEC. 8. How the Writ is Served. The writ shall be served upon the respondent
by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice or judge
who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ
cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted
service shall apply.
Manner of Service. The writ should be served against the respondent, preferably in
person. If personal service cannot be made, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
This will avoid the situation where the respondent would be conveniently assigned on a
secret mission to frustrate personal service.
SEC. 9. Return; Contents. Within 72 hours after service of the writ, the
respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting
affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
102
a. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
b. The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat, act or omission;
c.
All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining

to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
d. If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further

state the actions that have been or will still be taken:
i.
to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or

disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid
in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning
the death or disappearance;
iv. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance;
v.
to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death

or disappearance; and
vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.

The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation,
its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
Contents of the Return. The section requires a detailed return. The detailed return
is important, for it will help determine whether the respondent fulfilled the standard of
conduct required by the Rule. It will also avoid the ineffectiveness of the writ of habeas
corpus, where often the respondent makes a simple denial in the return that he or she has
custody over the missing person, and the petition is dismissed. The requirements under
paragraph (d) are based on United Nations standards.13
13
See Art. III, United Nations Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extralegal,
Arbitrary and Summary Executions.
103
No General Denial. No general denial is allowed. The policy is to require revelation

of all evidence relevant to the resolution of the petition. A litigation is not a game of guile
but a search for truth, which alone is the basis of justice.
SEC. 10. Defenses not Pleaded Deemed Waived. All defenses shall be raised
in the return, otherwise, they shall be deemed waived.
Waiver. This section is in consonance with the summary nature of the proceedings
and to prevent its delay.
SEC. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. The following pleadings and
motions are prohibited:
a. Motion to dismiss;
b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position
paper and other pleadings;
c.
Dilatory motion for postponement;
d. Motion for a bill of particulars;

e. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
f.
Third-party complaint;
g. Reply;
h. Motion to declare respondent in default;
i.
Intervention;
j.
Memorandum;
k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders;

and
l.
Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory

order.
Prohibited Pleadings. The enumerated pleadings and motions are prohibited, so

that the proceedings in the hearing shall be expedited. The Committee noted that since the
right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed.
This section is similar to that found in the Rule on Violence Against Women and
Children in Conflict with the Law (VAWC).14 However, unlike in VAWC, this Rule allows the
14
See A.M.No. 04-10-11-SC, Sec. 22.
104
filing of motions for new trial and petitions for relief from judgment. The Committee decided
that the denial of these remedies may jeopardize the rights of the aggrieved party in certain
instances and should not be countenanced.
No Motion to Dismiss. The filing of a motion to dismiss even on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties is proscribed. The reason is to avoid
undue delay. The grounds of a motion to dismiss should be included in the return and resolved
by the court, using its reasonable discretion as to the time and merit of the motion.
SEC. 12. Effect of Failure to File Return. In case the respondent fails to file a
return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
Ex Parte Hearing. The Committee decided that the hearing should not be delayed
by the failure of the respondent to file a return, otherwise the right to life, liberty and security
of a person would be easily frustrated.
SEC. 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary.
However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to
simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations
and admissions from the parties.
The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the
same priority as petitions for habeas corpus.
Summary Nature. The amparo hearing is summary in nature and held from day to
day until completed for time cannot stand still when life, liberty or security is at stake. Be
that as it may, the court, justice or judge using reasonable discretion, may conduct a
preliminary conference, if such conference will aid in the speedy disposition of the petition.
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. Upon filing of the petition or at any time before final
judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
Interim Reliefs. The interim reliefs available to the parties are distinct features of
the writ of amparo. Some of these reliefs can be given immediately after the filing of the
petition motu proprio or at any time before final judgment.
a. Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion
or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party
and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government
agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping
and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association
or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may
be extended to the officers concerned.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or
105
the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in

accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with
the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or
judge.
Temporary Protection Order. The grant of a temporary protection order to the

petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family is essential
because their lives and safety may be at higher risk once they file the amparo petition.
The temporary protection order and witness protection order are distinguishable
from the inspection order and production order in that there is no need for verification of
these motions. Moreover, unlike the latter, the temporary protection order and witness
protection order may be issued motu proprio or ex parte, without need of a hearing in view
of their urgent necessity.
To make the temporary protection order as broad and as effective as possible, the
Committee decided to include not only government agencies, but also accredited persons
and private institutions. For reasons of their own, some aggrieved persons refuse to be
protected by government agencies; hence, the need to add persons and private institutions.
To ensure their capability, the Supreme Court shall accredit these persons and private
institutions.
b. Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a
designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be
inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of
the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or
violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons
authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place and manner
of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect
106
the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five days
after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
Inspection Order. The sensitive nature of an inspection order requires that it shall
be the subject of a motion and shall be duly heard. It may be availed of by both the petitioner
and the respondent. To prevent its misuse, the Rule requires that the motion also state in
sufficient detail the place or places to be inspected. It should also be under oath and should
have supporting affidavits. The inspection order shall specify the persons authorized to
make the inspection as well as the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection.
Other conditions may be imposed to protect the rights of the parties. The order has a
limited lifetime of five days, but can be extended under justifiable circumstances.
If the court, justice or judge gravely abuses his or her discretion in issuing the
inspection order, as when it will compromise national security, the aggrieved party is not
precluded from filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which under the
Constitution, may not be deprived of its certiorari jurisdiction.
c.
Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control
of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic
form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or
the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security
or of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the court,
justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the
merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to
protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
Production Order. Like the inspection order, the production order is available to
both the petitioner and respondent and, considering its sensitive nature, is only granted
upon motion and after hearing. The phrase objects in digitized or electronic form was
added to cover electronic evidence, since the documents involved may be stored in digital
files.
d. Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon motion or
motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the Department of Justice for
admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
107
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other
government agencies, or to accredited persons or private institutions
capable of keeping and securing their safety.
Witness Protection Order. The witness protection order may be issued upon motion
or motu proprio. The witness may be referred to the DOJ pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
If the witness cannot be accommodated by the DOJ or the witness refuses the protection of
the DOJ, the court, justice or judge may refer the witness to another government agency or
to an accredited person or private institution.
SEC. 15. Availability of Interim Reliefs to Respondent. Upon verified motion
of the respondent and after due hearing, the court, justice or judge may issue
an inspection order or production order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of the
preceding section.
A motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the
defenses of the respondent.
Interim Reliefs of Respondent. This section enumerates the interim reliefs that
may be availed of by the respondents, which are the inspection and production orders.
The interim reliefs will ensure fairness in the proceedings, since there may be
instances in which the respondents would need to avail themselves of these reliefs to protect
their rights or to prove their defenses, i.e., when they allege that the aggrieved party is
located elsewhere, or when vital documents proving their defenses are in the possession of
other persons.
SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent
who refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person
who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to
be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a
fine.
Contempt. The power to cite for contempt is an inherent power of a court to

compel obedience to its orders and to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. A finding of
contempt of court may result from a refusal to make a return; or, if one is filed, it is false and
tantamount to not making a return; disobedience to a lawful order; and resistance to a
lawful process. A fine or an imprisonment may be imposed on a person found guilty of
contempt of court in accordance with the Rules of Court.
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
108
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that

ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade
responsibility or liability.
Diligence Standard. The distinction is made between a private and a public

respondent to highlight the difference in the diligence requirement for a public official or
employee. Public officials or employees are charged with a higher standard of conduct
because it is their legal duty to obey the Constitution, especially its provisions protecting the
right to life, liberty and security. The denial of the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed is in accord with current jurisprudence on custodial interrogation and
search warrant cases.
SEC. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within 10 days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition
are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied.
Speedy Judgment. The court, justice or judge is obliged to render judgment within
10 days after submission of the petition for decision. The short period is demanded by the
extraordinary nature of the writ.
SEC. 19. Appeal. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to
the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or
law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five working days from the date of notice
of the adverse judgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as habeas corpus cases.
Appeal. The provision allows an appeal from final judgments or orders through
Rule 45. The Committee considered Rule 41 as a mode of appeal, but consensus was reached
that Rule 45 would best serve the nature of the writ of amparo. The Rule 45 appeal here,
however, is different because it allows questions not only of law but also of fact to be raised.
The Committee felt that an amparo proceeding essentially involves a determination of facts
considering that its subject is extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, hence, a review
109
of errors of fact should be allowed. The disposition of appeals dealing with amparo cases
shall be prioritized like habeas corpus cases.
SEC. 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not dismiss the
petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a
valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to
threats on their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo
court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their revival
when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with
prejudice upon failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two years
from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator
a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule, not later than the first
week of January of every year.
Liberalized Rule on Dismissal. The rule on dismissal due to failure to prosecute is

liberalized. If petitioners cannot proceed to prove their allegations for a justifiable reason
like the existence of a threat to their lives or the lives of their witnesses, the court will not
dismiss the petition but will archive it. The parties will be notified before a case is archived,
as the order has to be justified by a good reason, to be determined after hearing. Archiving
can be ordered only during the pendency of the case. The case may be revived within two
years from its archiving. After two years, it may be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Since
it is the petitioner who would be prejudiced by its final dismissal, the two-year prescriptive
period is reckoned from the date of notice to the petitioners of the order of archiving. Two
years is deemed a reasonable time for the aggrieved parties to prosecute their petition.
SEC. 21. Institution of Separate Actions. This Rule shall not preclude the
filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
Prerogative Writ. The writ of amparo partakes of the nature of a prerogative writ.
It is not criminal, civil or administrative suit. Hence, it does not suspend the filing of criminal,
civil or administrative actions.
Originally, the Committee included a provision allowing a claim for damages. It
dropped the provision for fear that such a claim would unduly delay the proceeding,
considering the possibility of counterclaims and cross-claims being set up. Delay would defeat
the summary nature of the amparo proceeding. It was decided that the aggrieved party
should instead file in a claim in a proper civil action.
Similarly, the amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature and will not determine the
criminal guilt of the respondent. However, if the evidence so warrants, the amparo court
may refer the case to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.
110
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under
the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the
reliefs available under the writ of amparo.
Effect of Criminal Proceeding. This section contemplates the situation where a

criminal action has already been filed, in which case the commencement of the amparo
action is barred. This is to avoid the difficulties that may be encountered when the amparo
action is allowed to proceed separately from the criminal action. Two courts trying essentially
the same subject may issue conflicting orders.
The amparo reliefs, however, are made available to the aggrieved party through
motion in the court where the criminal case is pending. The disposition of such reliefs shall
continue to be governed by this Rule.
SEC. 23. Consolidation. When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the
filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal
action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent
to a petition for a writ of amparo, the latter shall be consolidated with the
criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to
apply to the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
Consolidation. In case a petition for the writ of amparo is filed prior to the institution
of a criminal action, or prior to a criminal action and a separate civil action, the petition
shall be consolidated with the criminal action. This Rule shall continue to govern the
disposition of the reliefs for amparo after consolidation.
SEC. 24. Substantive Rights. This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights recognized and protected by the Constitution.
No Diminution, Increase or Modification of Substantive Rights. The rule-making

power of the Supreme Court has been expanded in Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution. It provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to [p]romulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights [which] shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights x x x.15
The Supreme Court clarified what constitutes procedural rules in Fabian v. Desierto,
viz:
15
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (emphasis supplied).
111
[T]he test whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the
rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right
such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if
it operates as a means of implementing an existing right, then the rule deals
merely with procedure.16
SEC. 25. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court
shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. The Rules of Court shall supplement
the Rule on amparo as far as it is applicable. This new Rule will prevail and will not be
affected by prior inconsistent rules, resolutions, regulations or circulars of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in
the trial and appellate courts.
Remedial Nature of the Writ. Since the writ is remedial in nature, it is applicable to
pending cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, both in
the trial and the appellate courts.
SEC. 27. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 24, 2007, following
its publication in three newspapers of general circulation.
Date of Effectivity. The last section marks the date of effectivity of the Rule and its
publication requirement. The Committee deemed it proper that the birth of the Rule in the
Philippines should coincide with our celebration of United Nations Day, to manifest a strong
affirmation of our commitment towards the internationalization of human rights.
(Sgd.) PUNO, CJ; QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTTIEREZ, CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, VELASCO, Jr., NACHURA, REYES, JJ.
16
G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998, at 2223 citing 32 AM. JUR . 2d, Federal Practice and
Procedure, Sec. 505, at 936; People v. Smith, 205 P. 2d 444.
112
APPENDIX B I THE WRIT OF AMPARO: A REMEDY TO ENFORCE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Appendix B
THE WRIT OF AMPARO:
A REMEDY TO ENFORCE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS*
Adolfo S. Azcuna**
I. INTRODUCTION
The writ of amparo1 originated in Mexico, where it was provided for in the Constitution of
the State of Yucatan in 1841 and later in the Federal Constitution of 1857.
Noteworthy it is that it was also in Mexico that the modern trend of incorporating
fundamental social and economic rights in the Constitution started. The Mexican Constitution
of February 5, 1917, which is still basically in force, opened up new perspectives. It was
more advanced than even the German Constitution of October 1919, thus antedating the
latter by two years in establishing as constitutional a number of fundamental social rights.2
The social transcendence of human rights was thus constitutionally recognized. And
in addition to those rights that have traditionally been granted to the individual, others have
arisen that put him in a new dimension: his integration into the various social groups of
which contemporary society is made up. Speaking on the new Constitutions of the world, B.
Mirkins Guetzevitch aptly observed that, in the 20th century, the social purpose of law is not
only a doctrine or a school of legal thought but the very essence of life.3
*
This Article was published in the 37 ATENEO LAW JOURNAL 13 (2nd Issue, 1993) and ATENEO
LAW JOURNAL 39 (60th Commemorative Issue, 2011).
**
A.B. 59, Ll. B. 62 Cum Laude, Ateneo de Manila University, Postgraduate Studies 82, Salzburg
University; Partner, Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua Law Offices; Member, 1971
Constitutional Convention and 1986 Constitutional Commission; 19871990 Presidential
Legal Counsel and Spokesman; Editor in Chief, Ateneo Law Journal (19611962).
Amparo is a word meaning protection, from amparar meaning to protect.
P. ROUSIX, G ENESIS DE LOS ARTICULOS 27 Y 12 DE LA CONSTITUCION P OLITICA DE 1917 27 ET. SEG. (2D ED.
1959).
LAS NUEVAS CONSTITUCIONES DEL MUNDO 34 (1931).
113
Recently, however, contemporary jurists as well as facts of history have shown that
human rights cannot be effectively safeguarded by incorporating them in the Constitution.
And many constitutional lawyers today consider that human rights can be effectively
guaranteed by specific procedures for their protection.
Now among the different procedures that have been established for the protection
of human rights, the primary ones that provide direct and immediate protection are habeas
corpus and amparo. The difference between these two writs is that habeas corpus is designed
to enforce the right of freedom of the person, whereas amparo is designed to protect those
other fundamental human rights enshrined in the Constitution but not covered by the writ
of habeas corpus.4
Amparo, therefore, has been said to have been done for the social and economic
rights what habeas corpus has done for civil and political rights. Speaking of the effectiveness
of amparo, the Director of the Institute of Legal Research at the National University of
Mexico says: Amparo is, in my view, the most effective remedy for the specific protection
of the human rights set out in the Constitution.5
After Mexico, the first country to introduce amparo was El Salvador, in its Constitution
of August 13, 1886. It was followed by Honduras, in its Constitution of 1894, Nicaragua on
November 10, 1911, Guatemala on March 11, 1921, Panama on January 2, 1941, Costa Rica
on November 7, 1941, Argentina in the Constitution of the Province of Santa Fe of August
13, 1921, and more recently, Venezuela in its Constitution of 1967.
It has also spread to other parts of the world, such as India, whose Constitution of
1965considered a model in progressive and modern constitution-makingprovides in Part
III, Section 32, Subsections 1 4, a Right to Constitutional Remedies to enforce
Fundamental Rights embodied in said portion of the Constitution.
Finally, the writ of amparo was raised to the international level by its inclusion in
Article XVIII of the Inter-American Declaration of Human Rights, a regional convention
approved at Bogota on May 2, 1948. These landmark provisions state:
Every person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights.
There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby
the courts will protect (amparo in Spanish) him from acts of authority that,
to his prejudice, violate any fundamental constitutional rights.
4
Zamudio, Latin American Procedures for the Protection of the Individual, J. INTL COM JURISTS
86 (1968).
Id. at 77.
114
Finally, amparo first found expression in a multilateral instrument of universal

application in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration
states:
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
Constitution or by the law.
II. DIFFERENT FORMS OF AMPARO

The nature and time-tested role of amparo has shown that it is an effective and inexpensive
instrument for the protection of human rights enshrined in the Constitution.
As practised, amparo has been found so flexible to the particular situations of each
country that, while retaining its essence, it has developed various procedural forms. There is
therefore a Mexican amparo, an Argentinian amparo, a Chilean amparo, and so on.
The forms of amparo mainly differ according to the scope of protection given. Briefly,
these are as follows:
(a) In some countries, amparo is regarded solely as an equivalent to habeas corpus,
being available only to protect the individual from unlawful acts or from
irregularities in criminal proceedings. This is the meaning it has in Chile, and the
same holds in the Transitional Provision 5 of the 1951 Venezuelan Constitution
which uses the term amparo de la libertad personal as a synonym of habeas
corpus.
(b) In Argentina, Venezuela, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, and very
recently, in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay, as well as in Mexico, amparo, has
come to mean an instrument for the protection of constitutional rights with
the exception of freedom of the person, which is protected by the traditional
habeas corpus.
(c) A third group of countries also uses amparo as a petition for judicial review to
challenge unconstitutional laws, as in Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua.
III. SURVEY OF PROVISIONS OF AMPARO IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONS

The Venezuelan Constitution of January 1961 provides for amparo in Article 49:
The courts shall protect (ampararan in Spanish) all inhabitants of the Republic
in the exercise of the rights and guarantees established by the Constitution, in
accordance with law. The Procedure shall be brief and summary x x x.
115
Article 48(3) of the Constitution of Costa Rica, of November 7, 1949, lays down
rules for amparo:
To maintain or restore the enjoyment of the rights laid down in this Constitution
(other than freedom of the person which is protected under par. 1 of the Article
by habeas corpus) everyone shall also have the right of amparo in such courts
as the law may determine.
Article 19 of Bolivias Constitution of February 2, 1967, provides:

In addition to right of habeas corpus, to which the preceding article refers,
amparo lies against illegal acts or omissions of officials or private individuals
that restrict or deny the individual rights and guarantees recognized by the
Constitution and the law.
The Constitution of Ecuador, of May 25, 1967, provides for amparo in Article 28 (15)
in the following terms:
Without prejudice to other inherent rights of the individual, the State shall
guarantee x x x the right to demand judicial amparo against any violation of
constitutional guarantees, without prejudice to the duty of the public power
to ensure the observance of the Constitution and the laws.
The Constitution of Paraguay, of August 25, 1967, provides for amparo in Article 77:
Any person who considers that a right or guarantee to which he is entitled
under this Constitution or under law has been or is in imminent danger of
being seriously injured by an individual and who, because of the urgency of
the case, cannot have recourse to the ordinary remedies may file a petition for
amparo with any judge of first instance. The proceedings shall be short,
summary, free and held in public, and the judge shall be empowered to
safeguard the right or guarantee or to restore immediately the legal position
infringed. Regulations governing the procedure shall be laid down by law.
Since the Revolution of 1955, amparo has found a place in a large number of
Argentinian provincial Constitutions.
Article 58 of the Constitution of Honduras, of June 3, 1965, in Paragraph 1 states
that amparo may be sought by an aggrieved party or by any person on his behalf, for the
following purpose: (a) to maintain or restore the enjoyment of the rights and guarantees
established by the Constitution x x x.
As stated, the Constitution of India provides for a writ of amparo in its Part III,
Section 32, Subsections 14.
116
The success of the land reform program of Mexico was due in large measure to the
writ of amparo, which, under the Constitution of Mexico, is available to challenge decisions
of agricultural authorities that affect the rights of their farming cooperatives there, called
ejidos, or rights of their farming members, called ejiditarios, under the Constitutionallyestablished agrarian reform system of said country.6
Professor Zamudio attests: An examination of the various procedures for protecting
fundamental human rights, shows, it is submitted, that no other institution has the prestige,
roots and traditions of amparo (or its equivalent, the Brazilian mandado de seguranza) to
provide a coherent procedure with uniform bases for the protection of fundamental rights
set forth in various x x x Constitutions.7
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE WRIT

As earlier mentioned, constitutional lawyers around the world believe that human rights
can be effectively safeguarded only if, in addition to their being embodied in the Constitution,
a specific procedural device to protect them is likewise provided for in the Constitution. The
reason is obvious. By including in the Constitution a right to an effective remedy to protect
social and economic rights, we spare them from the possible curtailment or destruction by
the vagaries of shifting political majorities in the legislature. After all, these are human rights,
deemed to spring from and adhere to the very nature, person, and dignity of man. They are
not within the competence of society to abrogate even by majority vote; they are in fact
sometimes called rights over society.
Furthermore, there can be no clearer way of showing the degree of seriousness and
determination to see the realization and fulfillment of the social and economic rights
enshrined in the fundamental law than to provide for an effective procedural remedy to
enforce them.
The Philippine Constitution provides the basis for the Philippine writ of amparo, by
introducing a new provision in Article VIII, Section 5(5), that empowers the Supreme Court
to: Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
x x x. This formulation was the idea of former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee of the Constitutional Commission, in connection with the proposal
for a writ of amparo.
See Id. at 86.
Id. at 89 (emphasis supplied).

The Writ of Amparo The Philippine Experience So Far - CD

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Writ of Amparo The Philippine Experience So Far - CD

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

Copyright 2012 Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna

Supreme Court of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES

Chancellor Adolfo S. Azcuna delivered his lecture on the topic The

Justice Azcuna takes his audience through a journey of

ustice Adolfo S. Azcuna was born in Katipunan, Zamboanga Del Norte,

He held several government posts during the term of President

THE WRIT OF AMPARO:

12 THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

55 Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (Ret.)

Supreme Court of the Philippines

Founding Chancellor Emeritus

The Writ of Amparo: The Philippine Experience So Far

Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio

OPENING REMARKS I ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. C ARPIO

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

Justice Antonio T. Carpio

OPENING REMARKS I ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. C ARPIO

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

INTRODUCTION I COURT ADMINISTRATOR J OSE MIDAS P. M ARQUEZ

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

INTRODUCTION I COURT ADMINISTRATOR J OSE MIDAS P. M ARQUEZ

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

The Writ of Amparo:

Philippine Copyright 2012 by Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna.

G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1.

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

(1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom,

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats

I proposed before the Convention the adoption of amparo as a remedy to enforce

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

TOTAL CASES FILED PER COURT

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

TOTAL PETITIONS PER REGION

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents

THE WRIT OF AMPARO: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE SO FAR

Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person, including

LECTURE I CHANCELLOR ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the

Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one