August 8, 2009

United States Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Criminal Section, PHB
Washington, D.C. 20530

To Whom It May Concern;

My name is Baron Montero Jones, and I would like to file a complaint under the
Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. I believe
my constitutional rights were deprived and violated. Particularly, Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-25221, under
my 4th and 5th amendments.

Basis For Complaint

The parties concerning this complaint are the Honorable Marilyn Justman Kaman,
a Hennepin County District Court Judge; Mr. Stephen L. Redding, and Ms. Rachelle
Drakeford, two Hennepin County District Attorney’s; and Mr. Gregory Mulligan,
Defense Trial Counsel. Hennepin County District Court, File No. 03071227.

Baron was found guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the third-degree Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344, subd. 1(d), 2. In order for him to have been convicted, Mr. Redding and Ms.
Drakeford had to prove to the jury that Baron knew or had reason to know, that the
conjectured woman was in an intoxicated state; that she was physically and mentally
incapacitated and could not communicate the words yes or no2.

Prior Statement
On the night of the alleged incident, Baron’s statement3 was being surreptitiously
recorded4 on a digital recorder5 after the conjectured event by a security guard named

1 Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, to regulate the
interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. Recognizing the prevalent danger of organized
crime, and that the threat to privacy rights would result from the unrestricted use of those devices. Pub. L.
No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 217 (codified in U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (West 2009 & Supp 2009); Forty-four other
states and the District of Columbia adopted their own versions in the prohibition and disclosure of those
communications, including Minnesota where Baron was convicted, M.S.A. §§ 626A.01-626A.33. See
Attachment M, Senate Report 1097, 90th Cong 2d Session (Majority Report of the U.S. Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968), 1968 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 2177, 2182.
2 See Attachment A, “Jury Instructions Requested By The State”.
3 See Attachment C, Prior Statement Transcript.
4 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 275-276
5 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 281
Josef Garcia; who actually recorded everyone’s statement6. And was in college at the
time to be a police officer7, and represented himself as an officer. These statements were
not made known until the pre-trial hearing8.

Mr. Redding stated that him and Ms. Drakeford did not find out about these
statements until a week before trial9; trial started Jan. 5, 2004. He received them by
email. Mr. Redding further stated that there was nothing in the security guards report
concerning these statements.10

However, Mr. Redding filed a Notice11 indicating that the prosecution has
“[e]vidence obtained as a result of a search, search and seizure, wiretapping, and other
forms of electronic an mechanical eavesdropping.” This is similar wording used in Title
III. Baron’s statement is considered an “oral communication” as defined in 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2510 (12). Title III authorizes the interception of private wire and oral
communications, but only when law enforcement officials are investigating specified
serious crimes and receive prior judicial approval that may not be given except upon
compliance with stringent conditions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (1)-(8). The statute is
particular when one is a party to a communication, and is insistent that even a third party
to the communication gives prior consent, 18 U.S.C. § 251112.

All of Baron’s oral communications obtained through unauthorized interceptions

are crimes and those that violate its provisions can be prosecuted, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511,
2512, 2515. And by Baron being the “aggrieved person,” 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (11), of such
interceptions, disclosures, and uses, he is entitled to recover civil damages of actual and
punitive damages, attorney’s fee, and any or other cost, against judge Kaman13, Mr.
Redding14, Ms. Drakeford, and Mr. Mulligan, 18 U.S.C. § 2520. See also Alderman v

6 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 18

7 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 267 and 269
8 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 4-5, and 18
9 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 17-18.
10 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 18
11 See Attachment D, NOTICE OF PROSECUTIONG ATTORNEY OF EVIDENCE AND
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO RULE 7.01.
12 The insistence upon “prior” consent precludes the authorities from illegally wiretapping or bugging
someone’s conversations and then coercing the victim into consenting to the divulgence of his
conversations. “Retroactive authorization would not be possible” (Weiss v United States, 398 U.S. 321, 84
L.Ed. 298, 60 S.Ct. 269 (1939) Senate Report 1097, 90th Cong 2d Session (Majority Report of the U.S.
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968), 1968 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2177, 2182; See also Wiretapping and Eavesdropping 2d § 6:1, pp.6-3 - 6-4.

13 Allowing punishment of a federal judge who disclosed sensitive information concerning statutorily
authorized wiretap. United States v Aguilar, 585 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132, L.Ed.2d 520 (1995); Often
dishonesty charges arise when a judge misrepresents the facts to be forthcoming in the investigation of
judicial misconduct. See Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1, Honesty, p.21; removal was
necessary because actions were undertaken in judge’s official capacity and therefore directly harmful to
judicial system itself. Id., see also p.22; In re Carpenter, 17 P.3d 91 (Ariz. 2001); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520(a),
(b)(1)-(3), (f), and (g), and § 2521; ABA Standards for Crim. Justice, Vol. I, Standard 2-2.1 and 2-2.2; 18
U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1983(3); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a), (1)(b)-(d), (1)(e)(I)-(iv),
(2)(d).
14Id.; see also Imbler v Patchman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), 47 L.Ed.2d, 96 S.Ct. 984, prosecutor who while
United States, 394 U.S 165, 89 S.Ct. 961 (1969).

Baron can move to suppress that oral communication 18 U.S.C. §2518 (10)(a).
Title III also bars the use of that oral communication as evidence in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in a Federal or State court, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (9)-(10). See also
Gelbard, supra.

Baron’s trial attorney Mr. Mulligan, objected to the use of these statements in the
pre-trial hearing15, but judge Kaman was unaware of any case law supporting his motion16
and asked for additional cases, and would review them the following day17. The next day
Mr. Mulligan failed to present any supporting case law or statutes for the suppression of
Baron’s statement and judge Kaman believed that the case cited by the state was a better
position, and denied suppression motion18. Mr. Mulligan objected again to the use of
those statements, after learning that Mr. Garcia was a state employee and training to be a
police officer19. However, judge Kaman said that the Court’s ruling at the pre-trial
hearing is maintained20.

Present Testimony
Baron also provided a statement while in custody to Sergeant Carlson21. For
purposes here, which you will see, we will title Baron’s oral communication as “prior
statement“, and this statement he gave to Sgt. Carlson as “present testimony”. Both of
Baron’s prior statement22 and his present testimony23 were played before the court.
However Jones decided to take the Fifth24 and chose not to take the stand; evidently, that
was not adhered to.

Prior to Baron knowing about this prior statement, his attorney filed a motion to
suppress any evidence as a result of a said search and seizure25 on Nov. 3, 2003. A lot of
judicial procedures were not acknowledged in Baron’s case.

Before I forget, in the pre-trial hearing Mr. Redding and judge Kaman were
conversing in regards to Baron’s previous criminal history, and Mr. Redding was giving a
notice that the state would impeach him, disclosing that he is a felon and has prior

acting within scope of duties willfully deprives accused of his constitutional rights is subject to criminal
punishment 18 U.S.C. § 242. Id; “the tendency of those who execute the criminal laws should find no
sanctions in the judgements of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the
constitution.” Gelbard v U.S., 408 U.S. 41, 33 L.Ed.2d 179, 92 S.Ct. 2357 (citing Weeks v United States,
232 U.S. 383, 392 L.Ed. 632, 34 S.Ct. 341.
15 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 4-5 and 38
16 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 5
17 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 38
18 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 42-43
19 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 277-278
20 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 278
21 See Attachment E, Present Testimony Transcript
22 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 280.
23 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 345
24 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 445
25 See Attachment F, NOTICE OF MOTION AND OMNIBUS MOTION.
convictions, should he decide to take the stand26. Further disclosing, Mr. Redding stated
“in terms of…the credibility of a witness is crucial to a jury’s determination, for the jury
to be able to see,…Jones…[as a] whole person”.27

Jury Instructions
Judge Kaman, in her instructions for jury deliberations, instructed something that
was of bad form. This is what she said:

“In determining the believability and weight to be given the testimony of a

witness, you may consider, one, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
crime. You may consider whether the kind of crime committed indicates the
likelihood the witness is telling or not telling the truth.

“You also may consider evidence of a statement by the witness on some prior
occasion that is inconsistent with present testimony. Evidence of any prior
inconsistent statement should be considered only to test the believability and
weight of the witness’s testimony.”28

This “charge to [the]…jury, when considered in its entirety,” if it “correctly states

the law, the incorrectness of one paragraph or phrase alone is generally not considered to
be reversible error. Indeed, a misstatement of the law by a trial judge that ‘dilutes the
specific intent requirement’ is not reversible error if the instruction as a whole suggest the
appropriate standard to be applied.” U.S. v Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, at 1084 (5th Cir, 1991)
(quoting United States v Durnim, 932 F.2d 1297, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980). But by judge
Kaman explicitly giving “two instructions that are in direct conflict and one is obviously
prejudicial, that is reversible,” because “the jury” obviously “ha[d] followed her
erroneous instruction[s]”, because jurors are reasonable, and generally follow the
instructions that they are given. Yates v Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, at 403, 113 S.Ct. 1884, at
1893 (1991) (citing Richardson v March, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1709, 95
L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)).

Structural Error
Which accumulates to a “structural error.” A “structural error” is an error that
“affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in
the trial process itself.” Arizona v Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113
L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Such errors “call into question the very accuracy and reliability of
the trial process and thus are not amenable to harmless error analysis, but require
automatic reversal.” McGurk v Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 1998); see Fulminante,
594 U.S., at 309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246). Such Structural defects include a judge who is not
impartial. Juarez v Minnesota, 217 F.3d 1014, at 1017 (8th Cir. 2000)(citing Fulminante,
299 U.S., at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246). Because a judge who is not impartial affects “[t]he
entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end.” Fulminante, 499 U.S., at 309, 111
S.Ct., at 1265.

26 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 10-12

27 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 12
28 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 445-446
Procedural History
As you can tell Baron is very familiar somewhat when it comes to drafting
petitions. The reason for this is because he has argued these issues here in this complaint
and more, since he was sentenced. Baron did a direct appeal to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals and filed a pro se brief; the appellate court affirmed the district courts decision
on May 12, 200429. His public defender then petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court;
that review was denied on July 19, 200530. Baron then did a pro se State Habeas Corpus
28 § 2254; the Report And Recommendation, recommended that the petition be
dismissed with prejudice; He Objected to The R & R; the Court then adopted the
Magistrate’s R & R, and that the petition be denied on October 31, 200631. Baron then
applied for a Certificate of Appealablity (C.O.A.) 28 U.S.C. § 2253 to the United States
Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit; on June 13, 2007 that application was denied
and dismissed32. Around the time he was preparing for his C.O.A., Baron found out that
judge Kaman was bias and impartial in his trial, so he petitioned for a pro se state post-
conviction Minn. Stat. 59033; that petition was denied by judge Kaman on March 15,
2007. He then appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals; and was denied by them on
May 9, 200834.

Baron was released from prison November 5th, 2007. He had a paralegal helping
him with his case to get back in the courts when he was denied this past time; the
paralegal eventually took off with his money around June or July of 2008. Baron
violated his agents directive and his parole was revoked and spent the following months
incarcerated: Sept. 8, 2008-Sept. 14, 2008, Sept. 18,2008-Feb.19,2009 and March 10,
2009-July20, 2009. While incarcerated Baron sifted through which appellate avenues he
would pursue now. One of them is a federal Writ In The Nature of Mandamus 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651, and a federal Civil Suit 18 U.S.C.A § 2520; he is currently working on them; all
of them pro se. He is disabled and receive a limited amount of funds each month, and is
unable to afford a paid attorney.

Conclusion
One of the most peculiar things about Baron’s case that sticks out the most, is that
none of the reviewing courts he has been through has mentioned or even acknowledged
Title III in their opinions. Which will automatically overturn his conviction if they were
to. As you can see Baron is a fighter and will keep fighting; and he files this petition in
hopes of finally receiving some recognition and shedding some light upon his federal
statues and federal constitutional rights. But particularly, Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, which was drafted by
congress to protect national security interest and to regulate the threat of organized crime
in the public, and in its public servants: “Political leaders, legislators, police officers,
prosecutors, and judges have been tainted by organized crime, and the public is the victim

29 See Attachment G, Minnesota Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion

30 See Attachment H, Minnesota Supreme Court
31 See Attachment I, United States District Court District of Minnesota
32 See Attachment J, United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit
33 See Attachment K, Order Denying Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
34 See Attachment L, Minnesota Court of Appeals (second time)
because there can be no true liberty or justice under a corrupt government.”35

Cordially,
I Baron Montero Jones declare under
penalty of perjury that the
aforementioned and the following is true
and correct to the best of my knowledge
and ability pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1746

P.S. Baron remembers at the end of trial that only five jurors got up and said guilty, he
instinctively remembers that he was about to get up and say “mistrial” but he trusted he
Mr. Mulligan’s judgment; however, the trial transcripts say all twelve jurors got up and
said guilty36

35 See Attachment M, Senate Report 1097, 90th Cong 2d Session at 71

36 See Attachment B, Trial Transcript at 461-464
 Attachment A

Jury Instructions Requested By State

 Attachment B

Trial Transcripts, pp 1-48, 261-292, 341-349, 438-453, and 460-467

 Attachment C

Prior Statement Transcript

 Attachment D

NOTICE OF PROSECUTIONG ATTORNEY OF EVIDENCE AND IDENTIFICATION

PROCEDURES PURSUANT TO RULE 7.01.
 Attachment E

Present Testimony Transcript

 Attachment F

NOTICE OF MOTION AND OMNIBUS MOTION

 Attachment G

Minnesota Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion

 Attachment H

Minnesota Supreme Court

 Attachment I

United States District Court District of Minnesota

 Attachment J

United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit

 Attachment K

Order Denying Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

 Attachment L

Minnesota Court of Appeals (second time)

 Attachment M

Senate Report 1097, 90th Cong 2d Session at 71