1

Canon 19: represent

bounds of the law

with

zeal

within

FERNANDO V. NOVERO JR (SEE FULL

TEXT; 4 PAGES)
ONG V. UNTO
FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Alex
Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for
malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of
a lawyer.
It is evident from the records that he tried to
coerce the complainant to comply with his
letter-demand by threatening to file various
charges against the latter. When the
complainant did not heed his warning, he made
good his threat and filed a string of criminal
and administrative cases against the
complainant. They, however, did not have any
bearing or connection to the cause of his client,
The records show that the respondent offered
monetary rewards to anyone who could
provide him any information against the
complainant just so he would have leverage in
his
actions
against
the
latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Untos acts
constitute
malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers
to represent their clients with zeal but within
the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further
commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate, or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.
Long Digest:
FACTS:
The complainant received a demand-letter
from the respondent as legal counsel of one

Nemesia Garganian claiming for the support of

the alleged child of the complainant with the
latter. A few days thereafter, the respondent
wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno
(Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In
this letter, the respondent listed down the
alleged additional financial demands of Ms.
Garganian against the complainant and
discussed the courses of action that he would
take against the complainant should the latter
fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms.
Garganian and her son.
It was alleged that the real father of Ms.
Garganians son was the complainants brother
and that the complainant merely assumed his
brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian
who was threatening to sue them. The
complainant then did not comply with the
demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a
complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal (now
Prosecutors Office) of Dumaguete City against
the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one
Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail
Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy
Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another
criminal complaint against the complainant,
Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged
violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced
administrative cases against the complainant
before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation,
and
the
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General. According to the complainant, these
cases were subsequently denied due course
and dismissed by the aforesaid government
agencies.

The foregoing prompted the complainant to file

the present case for disbarment. The records
show that the respondent offered monetary
rewards to anyone who could provide him any
information against the complainant just so he
would have a leverage in his actions against
the latter. The complainant branded the
respondents tactics as highly immoral,
unprofessional and unethical, constituting
malpractice of law and conduct gravely
unbecoming of a lawyer.

truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course

of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private
capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers
may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the
Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and
comport himself in such a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of

malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of
lawyer.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY.

ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of five (5) months and sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.

HELD: YES.
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
mandates lawyers to represent their clients
with zeal but within the bounds of the
law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges
to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
We find the respondents action to be malicious
as the cases he instituted against the
complainant did not have any bearing or
connection to the cause of his client, Ms.
Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has
violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule
19.01. His behavior is inexcusable. His tactic
is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a
lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding and he shall
not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin
lawyers to act with the highest standards of

COSMOS V. LO BU
Facts: After Cosmos Foundry Shop was
burned , Ong Ting established Century
Foundry Shop where he and his family resided
in the premises. After several attempts to settle
a pending unfair labor practice case proved
unsuccessful, Ong Ting sold all his business,
including equipment and rights in the New
Century Foundry Shop to his compadre Lo Bu,
for Php20,000.
On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained
from the Court of Industrial Relations the third
alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and
enforcement of the judgment in its favor.
Thereafter, writ was served January 17 and 18,
1973, levying on the personal properties of the
Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century
Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting
the public auction sale.
Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to
recall writ of execution, asserting lack of

jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations

(CIR). The CIR, in its order dated Feb 23,
1973, denied his motion. So likewise was the
motion for reconsideration.
Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court
denied this petition in its resolution dated July
17, 1993. In the meanwhile, there was a
replevin suit by Lo Bu in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Manila covering the same
properties.
Upon receipt of order from the Court denying
certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a second
motion to dismiss complaint. After the
complaint was dismissed by the lower court,
decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner Labor union has
made out a case for certiorari and prohibition.
(2) Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente
performed his obligation as an officer of the
court while sustaining the dignity of the
profession while acting as counsel for Lo Bu.
Held:
Writ of certiorari is granted and the order of
Respondent CA reinstating appeal is nullified
and set aside.

judgment in an unfair labor controversy. There

was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad
faith, Lo Bu, which was dismissed by the CFI
Manila. What is worse, private respondent Lo
Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance , as he
himself was the petitioner in the certiorari
proceedings before this Court. He was a
prinicipal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate
the award in favor of the petitioner labor union.
Rule that certiorari will not be granted where
petitioners have plain and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law will not be enforced
where it would result in further delay in
satisfaction of judgment that ought to have
been enforced years ago. It is about time that a
halt be called to the schemes utilized by
respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable
efforts to defeat labors just claim.
A legal counsel is expected to defend a clients
cause but not at the expense of truth and in
defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws. For
even such case, Atty Busmente had not
exculpated himself. He ought to remember that
his obligation as an officer of the court, no less
than the dignity of the profession, requires that
should not act like an errand-boy at the beck
and call of his client, ready and eager to do his
every bidding. If he fails to keep that
admonition in mind, then he puts into serious
question his good standing in the bar.

The writ of prohibition is likewise granted,

respondent CA being perpetually restrained
from taking any further action in such appeal,
except that of dismissing it.

CANON 20: CHARGE ONLY FAIR &

REASONABLE FEES
METROBANK V. CA (not so sure with this
digest, parang bitin or kulang haha)
FACTS:

Courts should dismiss a suit which has all the

earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to
for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a

Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review

on certiorari after the Court of Appeals ruled
that petitioner should pay the certain

amountbased on the charging lien on the civil

case filed against them which resulted to
dismissal. In the dismissed case, private
respondent filed a motion to fix its attorneys
fees, based on quantum meruit, which
precipitated an exchange of arguments
between the parties. Petitioner manifested that
it had fully paid private respondent, Arturo
Alafriz and Associates. Private respondent
countered and attempted to arrange a
compromise with petitioner in order to avoid
suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
ISSUES: Whether or not: (1) respondent is
entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien
for payment of its attorneys fees; (2) a
separate civil suit is necessary for the
enforcement of such lien, and (3) private
respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%)
percent of the actual and current market values
of the litigated properties on a quantum
meruit basis.
HELD:
(1) NO.
(2) YES.
to separate trial.

(3) Ruling subject

RATIO:
[A] charging lien, to be enforceable as security
for the payment of attorneys fees, requires as
a condition sine qua non a judgment for money
and execution in pursuance of such judgment
secured in the main action by the attorney in
favor of his client
The persons who are entitled to or who must
pay attorneys fees have the right to be heard
upon the question of their propriety or
amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a
hearing is beyond cavil.
[I]n fixing a reasonable compensation for the
services rendered by a lawyer on the basis
of quantum meruit, the determination of

elements to be considered would indispensably

require nothing less than a full-blown trial.
ALBANO V. COLOMA*
ANGEL ALBANO vs. ATTY. PERPETUA
COLOMA (not so sure with this digest)
Facts: This proceeding for disbarment was filed
by complainant Angel Albano against
respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of
the Philippine Bar. In a letter dated June 20,
1962 addressed to this Court, complainant
alleged that during the Japanese occupation
his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the
services of respondent as counsel for them as
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After which came
the accusation that after liberation and
long after the courts had been reorganized,
respondent failed to expedite the hearing and
termination of the case, as a result of which
they had themselves represented by another
lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed
that respondent intervened in the case to
collect her attorney's fees. It was then alleged
that during the hearing they were surprised
when respondent presented in exhibit a
document showing that they as well as their
co-plaintiffs in the case promised to pay her
a contingent fee of 33-/3% of whatever could
be recovered whether in land or damages.
Issue: May a lawyer be removed for her failure
to comply with her obligations as counsel as he
served faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to
the best of her knowledge and capacity?
Held: no, a lawyer is removed without just
cause. The Solicitor General could thus
rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty
of bad faith in this case "it is complainant and
his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who,
after benefiting from the valuable services of
respondent in said case, tried to renege on
their agreement for the payment of the latter's
contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as

their counsel after she had already won for

them said case in the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn
the authenticity and genuineness of their
written agreement for the payment of attorney's
fees, . . . ."Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy
of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed
for his services. With his capital consisting
solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired
at tremendous cost not only in money but in
the expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal
against any attempt on the part of a client to
escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic
if after putting forth the best that is in him to
secure justice for the party he represents, he
himself would not get his due. Such an
eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It
views with disapproval any and every effort of
those benefited by counsel's services to
deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium.
Such an attitude deserves condemnation
Corpus V. CA
MENDOZA-PARKER V. CA
RESEARCH AND SERVICES REALTY INC. V.
CA
YU V. BONDAL
MIRANDA V. CARPIO
Attorneys Fees as contract and as award
for damages
Traders Royal Bank Employees UnionIndependent V. NLRC
Attorneys Lien, When and Where Claimed
QUIRANTE V. IAC
FACTS:

In the case of Dr. Casasolas claim against its

erring building contractor, the trial court ruled in
favor of the former who eventually died.Here,
petitioner Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the
trial court for the confirmation of his attorneys
fees. According to him, there was an oral
agreement between him and the late Dr.
Casasola with regard to his attorneys fees, as
confirmed in writing by the latters surviving
spouse and two daughters to be computed as
follows:
1.

In case of recovery of the P120,000.00

surety bond, the attorneys fees of the
undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall
be P30,000.00;
2.
In case the Honorable Court awards
damages in excess of the P120,000.00
bond, it shall be divided equally between
the Heirs of Dr. Casasola, Atty. John C.
Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for
confirmationdespite an opposition thereto.In
the petition for review on certiorari, the
respondent court (IAC) ruled that the
confirmation of attorneys fees is premature.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled
of the attorneys fees.
HELD:
NO. Ruling of respondent court affirmed.
RATIO:
Since the main case from which the petitioners
claims for their fees may arise has not yet
become final, the determination of the propriety
of said fees and the amount thereof should be
held in abeyance.
The orderly administration of justice dictates
that such issue be likewise determined by the
court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily
involves the same contingencies in determining
the propriety and assessing the extent of
recovery of attorneys fees. The alleged

confirmation to attorneys fees should not

adversely affect the non-signatories in the
petition, since it is also premised on the
eventual grant of damages to the Casasola
family.
CADALIN V. POEA
CANON 21: CLIENT CONFIDENCE AND
SECRETS
REGALA ET.AL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
VERY LONG Digest: (21 pages yung full text)
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines
instituted
a
Complaint
before
the
Sandiganbayan (SB), through the Presidential
Commission on Good Govt (PCGG) against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the
principal defendants, for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares
of stocks in the named corps. in PCGG Case
No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo
Cojuangco, et al."
Among the defendants named in the
case are herein petitioners and herein private
respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law
Offices. ACCRA Law Firm performed legal
services for its clients and in the performance
of these services, the members of the law firm
delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the client's equity holdings.
In the course of their dealings with their
clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as
well as their personal and business
circumstances. As members of the ACCRA
Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent
Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies
included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as
nominees-stockholders of the said corporations
involved in sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd
Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended
Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the

complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as

partydefendant, Roco having promised hell
reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom
he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case # 33.
Petitioners were included in 3rd
Amended Complaint for having plotted,
devised, schemed, conspired & confederated
w/each other in setting up, through the use of
coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate
framework & structures that led to
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20 other
coconut levy funded corps, including the
acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its
institutionalization
through
presidential
directives of the coconut monopoly. Through
insidious means & machinations, ACCRA
Investments Corp., became the holder of
roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital
stock of UCPB.
In their answer to the Expanded
Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that
their participation in the acts w/ w/c their codefendants are charged, was in furtherance of
legitimate lawyering
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had
separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the
complaint implicating him in the alleged illgotten wealth.
Petitioners then filed their "Comment
&/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG
exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco.
PCGG set the ff. precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the
lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its clients
covering their respective shareholdings.
Consequently,
PCGG
presented
supposed proof to substantiate compliance by
Roco of the same conditions precedent.
However, during said proceedings, Roco didnt
refute petitioners' contention that he did
actually not reveal the identity of the client
involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he
undertaken to reveal the identity of the client
for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.

In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion

of petitioners, for their refusal to comply w/ the
conditions required by PCGG. It held, ACCRA
lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have
begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the
client.
ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was
denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the
petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini,
likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also
denied thus, he filed a separate petition for
certiorari, assailing SBs resolution on
essentially same grounds averred by
petitioners, namely:
SB gravely abused its discretion in
subjecting petitioners to the strict application of
the law of agency.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not
considering petitioners & Roco similarly
situated &, thus, deserving equal treatment
SB gravely abused its discretion in not
holding that, under the facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
from revealing the identity of their client(s) and
the other information requested by the PCGG.
SB gravely abused its discretion in not
requiring that dropping of partydefendants be
based on reasonable & just grounds, w/ due
consideration to constitutional rts of petitioners
PCGG, through its counsel, refutes
petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not w/in
the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they
are evidence of nominee status.
RULING (pulled out only the pertinent sections
):
WON
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
PROHIBITS
PETITIONERS
FROM
REVEALING THE IDENTITY OF THEIR
CLIENT(S) & THE OTHER INFORMATION
REQUESTED BY THE PCGG
YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship
is premised on the Roman Law concepts of
locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease
of services) where one person lets his services

and another hires them without reference to

the object of which the services are to be
performed, wherein lawyers' services may be
compensated by honorarium or for hire, and
mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend
on whom reliance could be placed makes a
contract in his name, but gives up all that he
gained by the contract to the person who
requested
him.
But
the
lawyer-client
relationship is more than that of the principalagent and lessor-lessee
An attorney is more than a mere agent
or servant, because he possesses special
powers of trust and confidence reposed on him
by his client. An attorney occupies a "quasijudicial office" since he is in fact an officer of
the Court & exercises his judgment in the
choice of courses of action to be taken
favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client
relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct
and duties that breathe life into it, among
those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of
a very delicate, exacting and confidential
character, requiring a very high degree of
fidelity and good faith, that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest based
on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking
legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is
fatal to the administration of justice.
Attorney-client privilege, is worded in
Rules of Court, Rule 130:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases: xxx An
attorney cannot, without the consent of his
client, be examined as to any communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined,
without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity.
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
states: Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e)
to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
of his client, and to accept no compensation in

connection with his client's business except

from him or with his knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in
Canon 17, CPR (A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.)
Canon 15, CPE also demands a lawyer's
fidelity to client.
An effective lawyer-client relationship is
largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and
client which in turn requires a situation which
encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange
and flow of information. Thus, the Court held
that this duty may be asserted in refusing to
disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the
case at bar.
The general rule is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or identity of his client.
Reasons advanced for the general rule:
Court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought
to be protected is flesh and blood.
Privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been
established.
Privilege generally pertains to subject
matter of relationship
Due process considerations require that
the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary.
Exceptions to the gen. rule:
Client identity is privileged where a
strong probability exists that revealing the
client's name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice.
Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and
Zweig: The subject matter of the relationship
was so closely related to the issue of the
client's identity that the privilege actually
attached to both.
Where disclosure would open the client
to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldnt
reveal name of his client as this would expose
the latter to civil litigation.

Matter of Shawmut Mining Company:

We feel sure that under such conditions no
case has ever gone to the length of compelling
an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant,
to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature
of the transactions to w/c it related, when such
information could be made the basis of a suit
against his client.
Where the government's lawyers have
no case against an attorney's client unless, by
revealing the client's name, the said name
would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name is
privileged.
Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be
forced to reveal the names of clients who
employed him to pay sums of money to govt
voluntarily in settlement of undetermined
income taxes, unsued on, & w/ no govt audit
or investigation into that client's income tax
liability pending
Apart from these principal exceptions,
there exist other situations which could qualify
as exceptions to the general rule:
if
the
content
of
any
client
communication to a lawyer is relevant to
the subject matter of the legal problem
on which the client seeks legal
assistance
where the nature of the attorney-client
relationship
has
been
previously
disclosed & it is the identity w/c is
intended to be confidential, the identity
of the client has been held to be
privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the
entire transaction.
Summarizing these exceptions, information
relating to the identity of a client may fall within
the ambit of the privilege when the client's
name itself has an independent significance,
such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.
Instant case falls under at least 2
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure
of the alleged client's name would lead to
establish said client's connection with the very
fact in issue of the case, which is privileged

information, because the privilege, as stated

earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be no
attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal
offense and the legal advice or legal service
sought was duly established in the case at bar,
by no less than the PCGG itself as can be
seen in the 3 specific conditions laid down by
the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket
to non-prosecution should they accede thereto.
From these conditions, particularly the
third, we can readily deduce that the clients
indeed consulted the petitioners, in their
capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial
and corporate structure, framework and set-up
of the corporations in question. In turn,
petitioners gave their professional advice in the
form of, among others, the aforementioned
deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
Petitioners have a legitimate fear that
identifying their clients would implicate them in
the very activity for which legal advice had
been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.
Secondly, under the third main
exception, revelation of the client's name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the
prosecution to build its case, where none
otherwise exists.
While the privilege may not be invoked
for illegal purposes such as in a case where a
client takes on the services of an attorney, for
illicit purposes, it may be invoked in a case
where a client thinks he might have previously
committed something illegal and consults his
attorney. Whether or not the act for which the
client sought advice turns out to be illegal, his
name cannot be used or disclosed if the
disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the
hands of the prosecution, which might lead to
possible action against him.
The Baird exception, applicable to the
instant case, is consonant with the principal
policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the
purpose of promoting freedom of consultation
of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of
compelled disclosure from attorneys must be
eliminated. What is sought to be avoided then

is the exploitation of the general rule in what

may amount to a fishing expedition by the
prosecution.
In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections
ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the
prosecution has a case against their clients,
the latter's case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own
sources and not from compelled testimony
requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals
much about the nature of the transaction which
may or may not be illegal.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the
protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is
evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but
extends even after the termination of the
relationship.
We have no choice but to uphold
petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of
their clients under pain of the breach of
fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the facts
of the instant case clearly fall w/in recognized
exceptions to the rule that the client's name is
not privileged information. Otherwise, it would
expose the lawyers themselves to possible
litigation by their clients in view of the strict
fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in
exercise of their duties.
Short Digest:
Facts: PCGG wants to build up their case
against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies
in the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants
petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was
a client of their firm, as well as other
information
regarding
Cojuangco.
Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to
divulge
its
clients
name?
Held:

NO.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity

should not be shrouded in mystery. The
general is that a lawyer may not invoke the

10

privilege and refuse to divulge the name or

identity
of
his
client.
1) the court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be
protected
is
flesh
and
blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client
relationship
has
been
established. The attorney-client privilege does
not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject
matter
of
the
relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that
the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. A party suing or sued is
entitled to know who his opponent is. He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown
forces.
Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the clients
name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyers
advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to
civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no
case against an attorneys client unless, by
revealing the clients name, the said name
would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the clients name is
privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those
instances where a strong probability exists that
the disclosure of the client's identity would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity
for which the lawyers legal advice was
obtained.
NATAN V. CAPULE

HILADO V. DAVID
In April 1945, Blandina Hilado filed a complaint
to have some deeds of sale annulled against
Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon
represented Hilado. Assad was represented by
a certain Atty. Ohnick.
In January 1946, Atty. Vicente Francisco
replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad and
he thenafter entered his appearance in court.
In May 1946 or four months later, Atty. Dizon
filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be
disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that
in June 1945, Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion
regarding her case and for which Atty.
Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his
disqualification. In his opposition, he said that
no material information was relayed to him by
Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilados story,
Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will
not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned
with a copy of the Complaint prepared by Atty.
Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned,
Atty. Francisco was not around but an
associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty.
Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava attended to
Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the
legal documents, Atty. Agrava then prepared a
legal opinion letter where it was stated that
Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that
Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter;
that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as
Atty. Agrava said that it was merely a letter
explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilados
case.
Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not
paid for his advice; that no confidential
information was relayed because all Hilado
brought was a copy of the Complaint which
was already filed in court; and that, if any,
Hilado already waived her right to disqualify
Atty. Francisco because he was already
representing Assad in court for four months in
the said case.
Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of
Atty. Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should
be disqualified in the said civil case.
HELD: Yes. There already existed an attorneyclient relationship between Hilado and Atty.

11

Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act

as counsel against Hilado without the latters
consent.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute
an attorney-client relationship, it is not
necessary that any retainer should have been
paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it
material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to
his business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults with his attorney in his professional
capacity with the view to obtaining professional
advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment
must be regarded as established.
Further:
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged
in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his clients
preliminary statement of his case, or when he
is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when
he is drawing his clients pleadings, or
advocating his clients cause in open court.

divested by
employment.

expiration

of

professional

Anent the issue of what information was

relayed by Hilado to Atty. Francisco: It does not
matter if the information relayed is confidential
or not. So long as the attorney-client
relationship is established, the lawyer is
proscribed from taking other representations
against the client.
Anent the issue that the legal opinion was not
actually written by Atty. Francisco but was only
signed by him:It still binds him because Atty.
Agrava, assuming that he was the real author,
was part of the same law firm. An information
obtained from a client by a member or
assistant of a law firm is information imparted
to the firm, his associates or his employers.
Anent the issue of the fact that it took Hilado
four months from the time Atty. Francisco filed
his entry of appearance to file a
disqualification: It does not matter. The length
of time is not a waiver of her right. The right of
a client to have a lawyer be disqualified, based
on previous atty-client relationship, as counsel
against her does not prescribe. Professional
confidence once reposed can never be

Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How

about conflict of interests?

PALM V. ILEDAN
Facts:
Palm is the president of Comtech, which
hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She
filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan
for breach of the attorney-client privilege and
conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach
occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed
that the stockholders meeting cannot take
place via teleconferencing because they have
yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to
allow such mode of communications. Palm
claims this was a breach of the attorney-client
privilege of confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests
stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of
Soledad who was filed with an estafa case by
Comtech.
Issue:

Held:
No. Although the information about the
necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may
have been given to respondent, it could not be
considered a confidential information. The
amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws
may be effected by the board of directors or
trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the
owners of at least a majority of the outstanding
capital stock, or at least a majority of members
of a non-stock corporation.It means the
stockholders are aware of the proposed
amendments to the by-laws.
Further,
whenever any amendment or adoption of new
by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or
the new by-laws are filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
attached to the original articles of incorporation
and by-laws.The documents are public records
and could not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of
attorney and client does not raise a

12

presumption of confidentiality. The client must

intend the communication to be confidential.
Since the proposed amendments must be
approved by at least a majority of the
stockholders, and copies of the amended bylaws must be filed with the SEC, the
information could not have been intended to be
confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by
respondent during the stockholders meeting
could not be considered a violation of his
clients secrets and confidence within the
contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Court also finds no conflict of
interest when respondent represented Soledad
in a case filed by Comtech. The case where
respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa
case filed by Comtech against its former
officer. There was nothing in the records
that would show that respondent used
against
Comtech
any
confidential
information acquired while he was still
Comtechs retained counsel.
Further,
respondent made the representation after the
termination of his retainer agreement with
Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a
former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyers employment with
the client. The intent of the law is to impose
upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients
interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated

CANON 22: READ BOOK