SAFETY & QUALITY POLICY

The Management of Aegean Airlines & Olympic Air is committed to the conduct of our aviation activities to the highest possible safety standard. A management system is implemented which provides for the
compliance with all applicable regulatory requirements, meets all applicable standards and always consider
best practices, while monitoring safety compliance of all systems and established procedures. The safety
of our employees and customers relies on the commitment of management to a systematic and pro-active
attitude towards managing risk, identifying hazards and preventing damage/injuries.
Safety is the prime consideration and Aegean Airlines & Olympic Air recognize the importance of applying human factor principles in order to achieve it. It is the duty of each staff member to understand the
corporate self-disciplines required by Compliance Monitoring/Quality and Safety Standards and to participate in our goal for continuous self-improvement.
Each employee is responsible for cooperating with Quality Unit in order to identify non-conformances
and to the Safety Department so as to communicate any information that may affect the integrity of safety.
To promote a timely, uninhibited flow of information, Aegean Airlines & Olympic Air have promoted
and established a Just Culture which ensures no blame will be apportioned to individuals following their
reporting of mishaps, operational incidents or other risk exposures. Incidents or occurrences with elements
of wilful misconduct, gross negligence or criminal acts however, will be met with disciplinary and/or legal
action.
Our commitment is to:

Enforce safety as one of the primary responsibilities of all Heads of Functional Areas / Nominated
Persons / Managers;
Ensure that compliance with applicable regulation and standards is the responsibility of all personnel;
Support the Just Culture policy;

Implement an effective management system to ensure that customer and regulatory requirements are
met, and ensure that all employees are aware that Safety and Compliance is everyones responsibility;

Ensure safety and risk considerations are incorporated in its business, through a documented
management of change process;

Establish and implement hazard identification and risk management processes, including a hazard
reporting system, in order to eliminate or mitigate the safety risks associated with our operations

Achieve continuous safety improvement through continuous monitoring and measurement, and
adjustment of safety objectives and performance standards and achievement of these;

Develop the skills of employees to ensure that the Safety Management System can be maintained
through a process of recurrent training and an awareness program; and

Ensure that the necessary human and financial resources are available in order to allow our activities
to be carried out in accordance with Aegean Airlines & Olympic Air standards and this Safety and
Quality Policy Statement.

Dimitris Gerogiannis
Managing Director & Accountable Manager

Is issued every six months by the Safety

Department of Aegean and Olympic Air.
It provides information of Safety related matters and it is devoted to improve flight safety.
It includes articles either original or reprinted
from other sources, collected by individuals and
conveying their own experience or knowledge
from the aviation industry.
SafeLines is open to everyone who wants
to participate with articles, photos even recommendations or ideas for a safer operation.
SafeLines is of informative nature and in
no case substitute regulatory publications and
company procedures.
Capt. Stavros Christeas

contents
04 > EDITORIAL
06 > ARE JETS SAFER THAN TURBOPROPS?

AEGEAN & OLYMPIC AIR Safety Manager

AEGEAN Safety Department

Capt. Stavros Christeas
Safety Manager
Capt. Nikos Chrysanthopoulos
Deputy Safety Manager
Capt. Alexandros Mosialos
Chief Safety Investigator
Capt. Stavros Siannis
Gate Keeper
Mr. Antonis Kanakis
F.D.M Analyst
Mrs. Kalliopi Trachana
Safety Specialist
Mrs. Charalambia Anastasiou
Safety Specialist
SCCM Panagiotis Kritikos
Cabin Safety Coordinator
Avionic Eng. Konstantinos Kouris
Maintenance Safety Coordinator
Dimitris Passakos
Safety Representative Ground
Tel.: +30 210 3550623
Fax: +30 210 3550179
e-mail: safety@aegeanair.com
Olympic Air Safety Department
Capt. Stavros Christeas
Safety Manager
Capt. Panagiotis Kostopoulos
Deputy Safety Manager
Capt. Dimitris Malamos
Safety Coordinator
Capt. Giorgos Maragkakis
Gate Keeper
Mr. Antonis Kanakis
F.D.M Analyst
SCCM Anastasios Liakatos
Cabin Safety Coordinator
Antonis Konstantinidis
Maintenance Safety Coordinator
Dimitris Passakos
Safety Representative Ground
Tel.: +30 210 3550679
Fax: +30 210 3550349
e-mail: safetygroup@olympicair.com
Artwork and production
by TRIBUTE - CHROMOANALISI
e-mail: xromoana@otenet.gr
www.chromoanalysi.gr

08 > COMPOSITE MATERIALS FOR AIRCRAFT

STRUCTURES
14 > TRAVELING WITH A PET
03

17 > DEGREE OF EMERGENCY

18 > THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT IN
AVIATION
22 > HUMAN FACTORS VS ACCIDENT
CAUSATION
25 > INCIDENT FORUM
26 > WING TIP DEVICES
30 > REPORT
34 > NEW ENTRIES IN OUR FLEET
Safety Department would like to thank our photographer, Vassilis Porgiazis.

EDITORIAL

Safety Culture in aircraft ground handling

Dear colleagues

04

What is culture? This is probably among the most complex and most debated questions of the social science. Addressing the
concept of culture is like opening Pandoras Box unleashing most social science concepts and, as a consequence, a host of
analytical and definitional issues.
The word culture stems from the Latin colere, which means to grow or to process. Culture has to do with those aspects of human life that are not aspects of biology or unprocessed physical environment. This is culture in its broadest definition everything that is not nature has to be seen as culture.
Within the aviation society the concept usually refers to the values that the members of a group share, the norms they follow
and the procedures they create. As far as organizational culture is concerned it does not imply that it is necessarily attributable to an organization as a whole. On the contrary, organizations, depending on size and complexity, usually consist of
multiple cultures associated with different departments, hierarchical layers, occupations and so on.
In Ground Operations we see culture as the frames of reference through which information, symbols and behavior are interpreted and the conventions for behavior, interaction and communication are generated.
Ground Operations involves all aspects of aircraft handling at airports as well as aircraft movement around the airport,
except when on active runways. The safety challenges of ground operations arise in part, directly from those operations. Even
more important, ground operations concern the preparation of aircraft for departure in such a way that the subsequent flight
will be safe and according to legislation/company procedures; for example correct loading of cargo and baggage, sufficient
and verified fuel of adequate quantity and quality, etc..
Once again, last year a great effort has been done to minimize safety related incidents on the Ground. Safety Department
along with Ground Operations worked on a continued plan, focused on the improvement of the Safety Culture during aircraft
ground handling, which consisted of training sessions, station assessments and audits from our ground safety coordinator and
our QA auditors, one to one briefings, group meetings and close supervision.
On ramp handling training, special attention was particularly given to (a) Loading Height Limitations, on aircraft where violation of loading height limits is considered to be safety critical and (b) the proper securing of load, where bulk compartment
nets have to be properly secured and any defective items must be reported.
In addition to training and education we have successfully changed processes and procedures in order to improve safety on the
ground. Working closely with the Safety Departments of our ground handling providers we have placed in most of the airports
safety chains to restrict passenger access under aircraft wings.
The efforts made were intended to send out again our message, AEGEAN CARES FOR SAFETY. The measurable results of
this campaign were that safety events were reduced greatly.
Our effort continues this year with the campaign under the title: Important Notes for Safe Aircraft Loading. Apart from training sessions to major airports from our Airport Services trainers we are going to place a poster with the campaign name in
all ramp handling personnel briefing and rest areas. This poster has a check list of actions, describing correct procedures and
processes of loading with very simple words and images:
1. Bags loaded in accordance to the loading instructions
2. Cargo controlled by AWB number and destination
3. HEA/HER completely lashed and secured
4. Special loads (HUM/AVIH) loaded, lashed and secured
5. No Bags/cargo is loaded over cargo hold height limitations
6. Ramp agent to inform in writing Load Control about any change to the loading instructions prior to loadsheet release.
We believe that the above will contribute towards the further improvement of
our safety culture and add awareness during loading to ground personnel.
We still have to be extremely vigilant during turnaround activities.
Thank you for your cooperation in the development of our Safety Culture
during aircraft ground handling and maintaining our good safety record.
Panos Nicolaidis
Ground Operations Director

05

ARE JETS SAFER

THAN TURBOPROPS?

Source: Schubach Aviation

By Capt. Filippos D. Zervos

One of the most common concerns people have when

hopping on an aircraft with propellers is that it lacks the
safety of a jet without propellers. Why the fear? Perhaps
the concern is related to the additional noise produced
by turboprops. Could it also be that the sight of a propeller on an engine renders a perception of an amateur
or more antiquated aircraft? Well, lets clear the air for
those who are unsure.

field. When you get up to takeoff speed, if something

were to go wrong, how quickly could you stop? In a nutshell, this is what we consider when talking about balanced field. Turboprops are able to respond and stop
much more quickly because the propellers provide extra
drag. Thus, the propellers help the aircraft stop when
needed.
WHAT IS THE REAL SAFETY QUESTION?

Myth Busted: Turboprops are equally as safe as jet

engines. In fact, turboprops and jets both have turbine
engines and are virtually the same thing.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

A TURBOPROP AND A JET ENGINE?
Turboprops and jets are both built with turbine, or jet,
engines. Jets have turbine engines encased with fan blades
while turboprops have a propeller on the outside. This is
much different than with piston engines, which also have
propellers, but are much different mechanically. Turbine
engines are safer and more reliable than piston engines,
which are typically found in smaller aircraft.

06

07
Now that we understand that a turboprop is a turbine
(or jet) engine with a propeller on it, lets talk about the
questions I like to ask.
The real question!!!
Which is safer? The turbine or the piston engine?

WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES OF

TURBOPROP AIRCRAFT?
Turboprops might be a little louder, but they are actually safer than jets when going into smaller runways.
Turbine engines and two engines on an airplane. TurWhy? It is related to the turboprops capabilities under bines and the redundancy of two engines present much
short runway conditions. One of the things we look at more of an assurance of safety than pistons and single
when planning a flight is something called balanced engine aircraft.

> Lets clear the air for those who are unsure.

A Q400 Turboprop Engine view by a passenger window.

COMPOSITE MATERIALS
FOR AIRCRAFT STRUCTURES

By Agathoklis Logothetis,
Line Maintenance Engineer

Source: Skybrary

Aerospace engineering is changing. Airplanes have traditionally been made out

of metal, usually alloys of aluminum; now however, composite materials
are quickly becoming recognized as the most advance substance
for fabrication of aircraft parts.
INTRODUCTION
Fibrous composite materials were originally used in
small quantities in military aircraft in the 1960s, and
within civil aviation from the 1970s. By the 1980s,
composites were being used by civil aircraft manufacturers for a variety of secondary wing and tail components such as rudder and wing trailing edge panels.
However, it is with the advent of the latest generation
of airliners, such as the Airbus A380, the worlds largest passenger aircraft, that these materials have been
deployed extensively in primary load-carrying structure. The A380 uses composite materials in its wings,
which helps enable a 17% lower fuel use per passenger
than comparable aircraft.

08

WHAT ARE COMPOSITES?

The term composite is used to describe two or more
materials that are combined to form a structure that is
much stronger than the individual components. The
constituents or elements that make up the composite
retain their individual identities. In other words, the

individual elements do not dissolve or otherwise merge

into each other. Each can be physically identified and
exhibits a boundary between each other.
In aircraft construction, most currently produced
composites consist of a reinforcing material to provide
the structural strength, joined with a matrix material
to serve as a bonding substance. In addition, adding
core material saves overall weight and gives shape to
the structure. The three main parts of a fiber-reinforced
composite are the fiber, matrix and interface or boundary between the individual elements of the composite.

REINFORCING FIBERS
When combined with a matrix, the reinforcing fibers
give the primary strength to the composite structure.
There are three common types of reinforcing fibers:
fiberglass, aramid and carbon/graphite. Other fibers
that arent quite as common include ceramic and boron.
All of these fibers can be used in combination with one
another (hybrids), woven in specific patterns (fiber science), in combination with other materials such as rigid

> Composites are years ahead of traditional aluminum alloy and are
the closest thing yet to an ideal aircraft material.

A Q400 just got airborne out of Athens.

09

foams (sandwich structures), or simply in combination

with various matrix materials. Each particular composite combination provides specific advantages.

Fiberglass

strength is approximately four times greater than

alloyed aluminum. However, the objective in
aviation is not necessarily to have stronger part,
but rather to have a part that weighs much less.
By using a Kevlar reinforcing fiber, a component
can be fabricated with the strength of a metal
counterpart, at a fraction of the weight. Aramid
is an ideal material for use in aircraft parts that
are subject to high stress and vibration.

Carbon / Graphite

10

Fiberglass is made from small strands of molten

silica glass (about 2300F) that are spun together
and woven into cloth. There are many different
weaves of fiberglass available, depending on the
particular application. Its widespread availability and its low cost make fiberglass one of the
most popular reinforcing fibers. One of the disadvantages of fiberglass is that it weighs more
and has less strength than most other composite fibers. Recently, however, when used with
the newer types of matrices and with the proper
use of fiber sciences, fiberglass is one of the best
reinforcing fibers used in todays advanced composite applications.

Aramid

An aramid, or aromatic polyamide fiber, is

usually characterized by its yellow color, light
weight, tensile strength, and remarkable flexibility. Kevlar is a registered trademark of the
El DuPont Company and is the best known and
most widely used aramid. Kevlar will ordinarily
stretch a great deal before it breaks, as its tensile

Carbon fiber, also known as graphite fiber, is a

very strong, stiff reinforcement. For many years,
American manufacturers used the term graphite,
while European manufacturers used the term
carbon. Carbon describes the fiber more correctly, since it contains no graphite structure. This
black fiber is very strong, stiff and used for its
rigid strength characteristics. Carbon fiber composites are used to fabricate primary structural
components, such as ribs and wing skins. Carbon
is stronger in compressive strength than Kevlar,
but it is more brittle. Carbon fibers are electrically conductive, have low thermal expansion
coefficients, and have high fatigue resistance.
The impact resistance of carbon fibers is less
than other composite materials and may splinter or crack with high impact. Also, they have
the problem of being corrosive when bonded to
aluminum, so special corrosion techniques are
employed when carbon materials are in contact
with aluminum components.

of carbon composites, it is essential to direct the

fibers in the direction of the main stress. For
example, the wing of an aircraft bends during
take-off, landing and flight, meaning that it is
subject to stress across its span. To support this,
engineers orient up to 60% of the fibers along
the wing skins and the span-wise internal stiffeners. In addition, wing skins are subject to parallel
stresses known as shear stresses; to combat this,
plies are directed at 45. Components inside the
wing, such as spars and ribs that are designed
to bear shear stresses, are made of up to 80% of
45 plies. In this way, the direction at which the
plies are laid ensures that material volume, and
hence weight, is kept to a minimum consistent
with adequate strength.

MATRIX MATERIALS
The function of the matrix in a composite is to hold
the reinforcing fibers in a desired position. It also gives
the composite strength and transfers external stresses to
the fibers. The strength of a composite lies in the ability
of the matrix to transfer stress to the reinforcing fibers.
A wide range of resin systems are used for the matrix
portion of fiber reinforced composites. Resin is an
organic polymer used as a matrix to contain the reinforcing fibers in a composite material. The newer
matrix materials display remarkably improved
stress distributing characteristics, heat resistance,
chemical resistance and durability. Most of the
newer matrix formulas for aircraft are epoxy resins.
Resin matrix systems are a type of plastic. Some companies refer to composites as fiber reinforced plastics.
There are two general categories of plastics: thermoplastic and thermoset. By themselves, these resins
do not have sufficient strength for use in structural
applications, however, when used as a matrix and
reinforced with other materials, they form the high
strength, lightweight structural composites used today.
Thermoplastic resins use heat to form the part into the
desired shape. However, this shape is not necessarily
permanent. If a thermoplastic resin is reheated, it will
soften and could easily change shape. One example

Fiber Science
The selective placement of fibers needed to
obtain the greatest amount of strength in various applications is known as fiber science. The
strength and stiffness of a composite depend on
the orientation of the plies to the load direction.
In order to derive maximum benefit from the use
Airbus A318/A319/A320/A321 Composite Structure.

11

Airbus A380 Structure.

of a thermoplastic resin is Plexiglas. Thermosetting

resins use heat to form and irreversibly set the shape of
the part. Thermosetting plastics, once cured, cannot be
reformed even if they are reheated.

12

CORE MATERIALS
Core material is the central member of an assembly.
When bonded between two thin face sheets, it provides
a rigid, lightweight component. Composite structures
manufactured in this manner are sometimes referred to
as sandwich construction. Two popular core structures
are foam and honeycomb. The core material gives a
great deal of compressive strength to a structure. For
example, the sheet metal skin on a rotor blade has a
tendency to flex in flight as stress is applied. This constant flexing causes metal fatigue. A composite blade
with a central foam core, or honeycomb, will eliminate
most flexing of the skin because the core is uniformly
stiff throughout the blade. Honeycomb core structure
has the shape of natural honeycomb and has a very
high strength-to-weight ratio. Characteristics of honeycomb cores, when used in sandwich core construction,

have a high strength-to-weight ratio, high compression strength, a uniform distribution of stress, rigidity,
thermal and acoustical insulation and are fire resistant.
Honeycomb cores may be constructed of aluminum,
Kevlar, carbon, fiberglass, paper, Nomex, or steel.
The most common types used in aviation manufacturing are aluminum and Nomex. Foam core structures are
available in many different types, depending on the specific application. There are different densities and types
of foams for high heat applications, fire resistance,
repair foams, structural foams etc. When using foams
in the repair operation it is important to use the proper
type and density.
USES
Composites today are being used throughout the
world, on helicopters, military aircraft, commercial aircraft and homebuilt. Composites are being used in the
powerplants as well as the airframe designs.
Applications of composites on aircraft include:
Fairings
Flight control surfaces
Landing gear doors
Leading and trailing edge panels on the wing
and stabilizer
Interior components
Floor beams and floor boards
Vertical and horizontal stabilizer primary
structure on large aircraft
Primary wing and fuselage structure on new
generation large aircraft
Turbine engine fan blades
Propellers.

Airbus A380 Production Line using Composites.

ADVANTAGES
The greatest advantage of using composites is the high strength-to-weight
ratio. Since weight is the one of the key
considerations for the use of any material in aircraft construction, if it can be
saved, more cargo, fuel or passengers
can be carried. A composite part can be
designed as strong as a metal part, but
with considerable weight savings. Typically 20 percent or more weight reductions are achieved when aluminum parts
are replaced with composite structures.
Composites also lend themselves well to
the formation of complex, aerodynamically contoured shapes. The parts do not
have to be flat, but can have smooth, sweeping contours that would be difficult and
expensive to fabricate from sheet metal.
The reduced drag produced by these contoured shapes,
in combination with the weight savings, enables an aircrafts range to be extended significantly. The number
of parts and fasteners may be reduced by the use of composites, as well, simplifying construction and reducing
cost. In some cases, very large structures can be manufactured in one piece, eliminating the riveting and seams.
Composites are becoming increasingly cost effective
as materials and manufacturing technologies mature
They may be designed to be very flexible, resisting vibrations, thus eliminating the problem of stress
fatigue found in metal structures. Moreover, they
dont corrode like metal does. However, they do have
their own problems, as they are not indestructible.
Reduced wear is another advantage of using composites. They will flex in flight without producing

Airbus Composites Material Evolution.

stress cracks like metal. For example propeller or

helicopter rotor blades in flight have many stresses
imposed on them. When made of composites, the
wear is less, because the fibers can take the bending
and twisting forces without developing metal fatigue.
In short, composites are years ahead of traditional aluminum alloy and are the closest thing yet to an ideal
aircraft material.
References
JEPPESEN Advanced Composites by Cindy Foreman
JEPPESEN A&P Technician Airframe Textbook
FAA Aviation Maintenance Technician Handbook -
Airframe
Composite Materials Revolutionize Aerospace
Engineering by Tim Edwards.

Airbus A380 Composite Structure.

13

TRAVELING WITH A PET

14

By CCM Milka Djajic Oikonomou,

Doctor of Veterinary Medicine & National
Kinology judge (II FCI Group)

Before you decide to travel with your pet you should see
if your pet is of some race, if this race can travel with the
airline company that you have chosen and if it is welcome
in the country that you have chosen to visit. Aegean prohibits transport of some races, which are referred to the list
that you can find on Aegean official site (Travel information,
Travel preparation, Travelling with pets). When you have
checked the above information you can start your pet preparation for the trip.
The first you should check is your pet documentation, its
passport with number of chip (ID microchip) and its health
book.Your pet must have done the Anti-Rabies vaccine, and
it must been done at least three weeks before the trip even if
it is its first time or the yearly repetition. Furthermore by the
time you collect its papers, you should see if the destination
country requires any specific or other type of vaccination.
One of the necessary papers to travel with a pet is also
the certification by a veterinary doctor that your pet is in a
good and healthy condition to make the journey. Once you
have done with the paperwork you will have to deal with the
necessary details in the case that your pet have any health
issues, which it doesnt necessary risk your pets life during
the journey and also for the period of your stay at your destination. Make sure that for that period you have enough

pharmaceutical material.
Once you have finished with the necessary health documents, before you start with the details like choosing which
type of its toy you will take with you, you must make sure
that the transport case is one which will not only be approved
by the airline company you choose to travel, but it will also
be comfortable for your pet. Whether your flight is long or
not, whether your pet is small size or not, the best dimensions and those which are required are those that allow the
pet to stroll round, comfortably sit and lie in transport cage.
And for this, the maximum permitted weight for a cabin pet,
including the cage, is 8 kg and that cage dimensions allow
comfort and safe trip, having it under the front sit.
If your pet is traveling into Cargo, is forbidden to have
inside the case toys and edibles. Because they could cause
health problems during the flight, once the pet will deal with
them, and thats why if pet is not under your supervision is
prohibited to have them. If you want it to feel more comfortable you can have with it its favourite mat or blanket.
Water is also prohibited to be in the cage since during
the flight it is possible to pour and make the cage unsuitable
for travelling. If there is any external drinker it will be suitable for long journeys. Whether your pet is traveling with
you in the cabin or lonely in the Cargo, 12 hours before the

> The first you should check is your pet documentation, its passport with
number of chip (ID microchip) and its health book.

A pet traveling in the Cabin.

15

By Capt. Alexandros Mosialos,

Chief Safety Investigator
Source: CAA Safety Regulation Group

16

DEGREE
OF EMERGENCY

17
Pets and Airplanes can coexist.

journey do not feed it, so that there is time for digestion and
to relieve the organism from sickness, nausea etc. during the
trip. Also and the water will be limited and only periodically
small quantities.
The thing that will help your pet to get easier the journey
is the walk before it. Take a long walk with it, so its organism feels that need to take rest.
If your pet have a hyperactive character, sedative pill,
depending from its kilos, before the trip (always with advice
and veterinary prescription) will help it.Upon entering the
airplane, with pets traveling in the cabin of aircraft, it is
important to follow the instructions of aircraft crew.
For its safety it is important to your pet be placed under
the front seat and you sit next to the window, on this way you
will not hinder the exit of another passenger and also it will
have tranquility.
For the whole flight duration is very important to your
pet remain inside the cage, which is already known for it,
from the house remains, so by transferring into it and having
the feeling that you are next to it, it will feel secure and safe.
If you open its cage, and remove it out, it will understand
that the outdoor area is completely unknown so or it will
want to explore that or it will gain insecurities so it will want
to get inside your hug, and thats why is so important to
avoid every inconvenience.

The destination is also something that you should study

well before you get your pet with you on journey. If you are
going from warm to quite a cold climate and have a short hair
pet, particularly small size pet, it would be good to have with
you and the appropriate its clothing, which will help him to
adapt more easy. Other way, a long hair pet with which you
change climate from cold to warm, its not recommended to
clipping ago, only at the destination if your stay will be long
and you see that there is a problem in the adaptation.
If you forgot its medicines, wherever you are, dont panic. A
veterinary doctor who can help you and give you the appropriate medicine with the same active substance, you will find. In
emergency case any pharmacy also can be very useful.
If you cant get enough of its food for the time that you
two will be away, take much as you need for 3-4 days in
order to reach until you find something that can replace it.
A little bit chicken, rice and cheese with the new food is
always a good choice to change food. Cookies for it, with
extra vitamins will also help extra its organism.
Arriving at a new place, sprinkle at different parts of new
home its toys so when it start researching home, to not look
completely unknown space for it.
And in the end, be prepared that your pet will need you
more than usual.
Wish you well trips with your favorite and best friends!

> Once the

situation and its
implications are
understood, a
PAN/MAYDAY
may be declared.

THREAT AND ERROR

MANAGEMENT IN AVIATION

By F/O Alexandros Pappas

Source: SkyBrary

18

19

Flock of birds at Sofia Airport.

> Checklists only work if flight crews use them, the autopilot only works
when engaged in the correct mode.

Threat and Error Management (TEM) is a safety concept regarding aviation operations and human performance. TEM is both a safety philosophy and a practical
set of techniques. The easiest way to understand TEM is
to liken it to defensive driving for a motorist.
The purpose of defensive driving is not to teach
people how to drive a vehicle but to emphasize in driving
techniques people can use to minimize safety risks. TEM
does not teach pilots how to technically fly an airplane,
instead it promotes a proactive philosophy and provides
techniques for maximizing safety margins.

Philosophy of the Model:

Anticipation > Recognition > Recovery
Key to anticipation is accepting that while something
is likely to go wrong, you cant know exactly what or
when. Anticipation builds vigilance; vigilance is the key

to recognize adverse events and errors.

Recognition leads to recovery. In some cases recovering safety margins has to be the first line of action.
Recover first, analyze the causes later. An example
would be as follows.
A flight crew selects a wrong approach in the
Flight Management System (FMS). The flight crew
identifies the error during a crosscheck prior to the
Final Approach Fix (FAF). However, instead of using
a basic mode (e.g. heading) or manually flying the
desired track, both flight crew become involved in
attempting to reprogram the correct approach prior to
reaching the FAF. As a result, the aircraft stitches
through the localiser, descends late, and goes into an
unstable approach. This would be an example of the
flight crew getting locked in to error management,
rather than switching to undesired aircraft state management.

The 3 components of Threat and

Error Management
Threats (e.g. adverse weather)
Errors (e.g. pilot selecting a wrong automation
mode)
Undesired Aircraft States (e.g. altitude deviation)

Threats

20

Anticipated Threats
Threats which can be expected or known to
the flight crew. For example, flight crews can
anticipate the consequences of a thunderstorm
by briefing their response in advance, or prepare
for a congested airport by making sure they stay
vigilant for other aircrafts during the approach.
Unexpected Threats
Threats which can occur unexpectedly, such
as an in-flight aircraft malfunction that happens
suddenly without warning. In this case, flight
crews must apply skills and knowledge acquired
through training and operational experience.
Latent Threats
Threats which may not be obvious to flight
crews and may need to be uncovered by safety
analysis. Examples of latent threats include
equipment design issues, optical illusions even
shortened turn-around schedules.
Threats can be managed. Threat management is
defined as how crews anticipate, then respond to threats
and is considered as the most proactive option to maintain
safety margins in flight operations. Some of the tools and
techniques used in commercial aviation to manage threats

and prevent crew errors are:

Reading weather advisories
Turning on weather radar early.
Thorough walk-arounds during pre-departure
inspection.
Briefing an alternate runway in case of a late
runway change.
Loading extra fuel when the destination airport
is in question due to poor weather conditions.

Errors
Flight crew actions or inactions which lead to deviations from intentions or expectations of another crew
member or procedures, reduce safety margins and
increase the probability of adverse events on ground or
during flight.

3 Error categories:
Aircraft handling
Deviations associated with the direction, speed,
configuration of the aircraft. They can involve
automation errors, such as dialing an incorrect
altitude, or hand-flying errors, such as getting
too fast and high during an approach.
Procedural
Deviations from regulations, flight manual
requirements or Standard Operating Procedures.
Communication
Involve a miscommunication between the pilots,
or between the crew and external agents such
as ATC controllers, flight attendants or ground
personnel.

Titanic event Threat end Error.

Undesired Aircraft State

Defined as flight crew induced aircraft deviations of
position or speed, misapplication of flight controls, incorrect systems configuration associated with a reduction in
safety margins. Undesired aircraft states that result from
ineffective threat and error management, may lead to
compromising situations. They are often considered at
the cusp of becoming an incident or accident. Examples
given are the following:
Lining up in the runway during approach to
landing (runway incursion).
Exceeding ATC speed restrictions during an
approach.
Landing long on a runway requiring maximum
braking.

Techniques employed inside TEM

(Safeguards)
Flight crews, as part of their daily duties, employ countermeasures to maximize safety margins in flight. Some
countermeasures flight crews employ, called hard safeguards, are provided by the aviation system and they are
already in place before flight crews report for duty.
The following are examples of hard safeguards:
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS)
Soft safeguards are other countermeasures employed
by flight crews directly related to human contribution to
the safety of the flight. These are checklists, SOPs, operational checks as well as personal strategies and tactics,
Threat and Error Management.

including skills, knowledge and attitudes developed by

Crew Resource Management (CRM) training.

Conclusion
TEM is not a revolutionary concept, but one that has
evolved gradually as a consequence of the constant drive
to improve the margins of safety in aviation through practical integration of Human Factors. Regardless of the type
of error, the effect on safety depends on whether the flight
crew detects and responds to the error before it leads to an
undesired aircraft state and unsafe situation.
An important learning and training point for flight
crews is the on-time switching from error management to
undesired aircraft state management and the illustration
of how easy it is to get locked-in to the error management
phase. It is of outmost importance to mention that despite
having in place the hard and soft TEM safeguards,
the last line of defense against threat, error, and undesired
aircraft states, is still, ultimately, the flight crew.
Even the best designed equipment is not enough to
ensure adequate Threat and Error Management performance. Checklists only work if flight crews use them, the
autopilot only works when engaged in the correct mode.
Effective crew coordination is the best way to manage
abnormal events in multi-pilot cockpits. Review, evaluation of plans, inquiry, is essential to manage a flight.
Last but not least, crews that exhibit good monitoring
and cross-checking, strong leadership, employ effective
workload management, develop contingency plans tend
to have fewer mismanaged threats as well as undesired
aircraft states and commit fewer errors compared to other
crews.

21

Human Factors
vs Accident Causation

22

By Capt. Alexandros Mosialos,

Chief Safety Investigator

Accidents are caused by active failures or

and latent conditions which can lead to human
error or violations. Active failures are the acts or
conditions precipitating the incident situation.
They usually involve the front-line staff, the consequences are immediate and can often be prevented by design, training or operating systems.
Latent conditions are the managerial influences and social pressures that make up the
culture (the way we do things around here),
influence the design of equipment or systems,
and define supervisory inadequacies. They tend
to be hidden until triggered by an event. Latent
conditions can lead to latent failures: human
error or violations. Latent failures may occur
when several latent conditions combine in an
unforeseen way. We all make errors irrespective of how
much training and experience we possess or how motivated we are to do it right. Considering the active failures
and latent conditions in an organisation the model of accident where human error is main cause of accident can be
shown in figure below.

Human Error is main cause of accident.

> Latent failures provide great, if not a greater, potential danger to health
and safety as active failures.

People can cause or contribute to accidents (or

mitigate the consequences) in a number of ways:
Though a failure of a person can directly cause
an accident. However, people tend not to make
errors deliberately. We are often set up to fail
by the way our brain processes information, by
our training, through the design of equipment
and procedures and even through the culture of
the organisation we work for.
People can make disastrous decisions even when

Source: DMI Disaster Management Institute

Aegean Flight Crew.

they are aware of the risks. We can also misinterpret

a situation and act inappropriately as a result.
Both of these can lead to the escalation of an
incident.
On the other hand we can intervene to stop
potential accidents. Many companies have
their own anecdotes about recovery from a
potential incident through the timely actions of
individuals. Mitigation of the possible effects
of an incident can result from human
resourcefulness and ingenuity.
The degree of loss of life can be reduced by
the emergency response of operators and their
colleagues in a team. Emergency planning
and response including appropriate training can
significantly improve rescue situations.
The consequences of human failures can be immediate or delayed and the failures can be grouped in to
the following categories:
Active failures have an immediate consequence and
are usually made by front-line people such as drivers,
control room staff or machine operators. In a situation
where there is no room for error these active failures have
an immediate impact on health and safety.
Latent failures are made by people whose tasks are
removed in time and space from operational activities,
e.g. designers, decision makers and managers. Latent
failures are typically failures in health and safety management systems (design, implementation or monitoring).

23

Latent failures provide great, if not a greater, potential

danger to health and safety as active failures. Latent failures
are usually hidden within an organisation until they are triggered by an event likely to have serious consequences.
After an accident involving human failure the investigation into the causes and contributing factors often
makes little attempt to understand why the human failures
occurred. Finding out both the immediate and the underlying causes of an accident is the key in preventing similar
accidents through the design of effective control measures.

James Reason Swiss Cheese Model.

Examples of latent failures are:

Poor design of plant and equipment;
Ineffective training;
Inadequate supervision;
Ineffective communications;
Inadequate resources (e.g. people and
equipment); and
Uncertainties in roles and responsibilities
Poor SOPs.

Contributing Factors to Human Error.

INCIDENT
FORUM
F R O M AV I AT I O N I N D U S T R Y
AIR SAFETY REPORTS FROM AIRLINES OPERATIONS

TYPE OF A/C

EVENT

A310

ATC PROBLEM

An A310 was being vectored for an ILS on to runway 00 at ZZZ. The A310
was cleared to and correctly read back a clearance to descend to 2500 feet
but subsequently descended below cleared level to approximately 1500 feet.
The ZZZ controller detected the error and instructed the A310 to climb back
to 2500 feet due to a 1200 feet. Probable cause of the event was altimeter
setting error.

B747-400F

FUSELAGE
DAMAGE UNSECURED
NOSE CARGO
STRAP

On arrival at destination the right side of the fuselage was found to be

damaged in the vicinity of pitot / static probes. The damage was caused by
the nose cargo safety strap which had become trapped outside the aircraft
while closing the nose cargo door prior departure.

B737-800

EGPWS
ACTIVATION

Initially a VOR approach on runway 00 was flown. This has a steep slope and
following a tight and fast approach the aircraft was high and a go-around
was carried out. After that the crew decided to carry out an NDB approach
on rwy 00. There were CBs in the vicinity and the NDB needle fluctuated a
lot. At some point the fluctuation was such that the crew perceived this as
'station passage' and started the final descent. An EGPWS warning was
received and a go-around carried out.

EMB 145

WINDSHEAR

The aircraft was on its second approach into XXX following a hold due to
severe winds. At approx 1000ft AAL, speed was seen to rapidly fall by 20kts
as severe turbulence was encountered. The aircraft rolled rapidly to the
right and an uncommanded autopilot disconnect occurred. A go-around was
flown and the aircraft diverted to other airport.

24
B777

TURBULENCE
PROBLEMS

In the cruise at FL380, turbulence was felt along with speed fluctuations of
+/-20kts. Altitude dropped rapidly to FL376 accompanied by an EICAS
'Altitude Alert' warning, altitude then rapidly increased to FL382. Speed was
contained with manual thrust lever inputs and the autopilot remained
engaged throughout, with instruments monitored and controls covered. ATC
were immediately informed of the altitude deviation and a descent to FL350
was given to avoid further encounters. An immediate PA was made for
passengers to be seated (the signs were already ON). One passenger
suffered a shoulder injury and two cabin attendants bumped their heads.
The wind was observed to vary from approx 300/90 to 300/175 within two
minutes.

A320

HARD LANDING

The crew flew a VOR/DME approach to Runway 00. The tower reported the
wind on the ground as variable 190/300. In the flare the aircraft touched
down on the runway hard and bounced. A TOGA go-around commenced as
the Captain took control but the engines were slow to spool-up and the
aircraft settled on runway more softly. There was sufficient runway
remaining to stop, so the thrust levers were closed and the aircraft stopped
on the runway.

A330

MAINWHEEL
TYRES
DEFLATED

Prior to departure to XXX, an instruction to carry out a high speed taxi test
was complied with. This was to verify that remedial action had been
successful, following a report of the aircraft pulling left during the take-off
run. Two high speed runs were carried out, but unfortunately the brake
temperatures rose rapidly, causing several main wheel tyres to deflate.

AIRBUS A321 GROUND

& BOEING 777 COLLISION

Olympic Air Flight & Cabin Crew.

SUMMARY

The A321 stopped short of its intended parking position on stand 000, due to
the stand guidance system not being ON. ATC were reportedly informed.The
B777 was pushed back from stand XXX and its left wing struck the fin of the
stationary A321 causing substantial damage to both aircraft.The flight crew
of both aircraft declared a PAN and the Emergency services attended.
There were no reported injuries.

25

WING TIP DEVICES

26

By Capt. Nikolaos Nikitakis

The idea of a beneficial wingtip appendage, or wingtip device, has been around since the early 20th century,
when theoretical calculations first indicated that a vertical
endplate added to a wingtip would reduce the induced drag.
Early on, however, reality did not live up to the theoretical promise. The simple flat endplate turned out to be a
disappointment in practice because the added viscous profile drag more than offsets the saving in induced drag, and
the device fails to produce a net benefit. Whitcomb seems
to have been the first to recognize that it is possible to reap
the induced-drag benefit of an endplate, and at the same
time to realize a net benefit, by keeping the additional profile drag to a minimum through good aerodynamic design
practice.
The direct result of Whitcombs work is the classic
near-vertical winglet. Less directly, Whitcombs paradigm
of applying good design practice to keep the profile drag
low has also contributed to the development of concepts
other than the winglet. Both winglets and tapered horizontal span extensions have been put into commercial service,
and several other device concepts have also been proposed
and brought to varying levels of development.

Nature leads us.

The Benefits of Wingtip Devices

From an aerodynamicists point of view, the motivation behind all wingtip devices is to reduce induced drag.
Beyond that, as Whitcomb showed, the designers job is to
configure the device so as to minimize the offsetting penalties, so that a net performance improvement is realized. For
any particular airplane and tip device, the performanceimprovement can be measured relative to the same airplane
with no tip device. The positive factors and offsetting factors that contribute to the performance improvement can be
listed as follows:
Positive factors:
Induced drag is reduced at
takeoff and cruise.
Shock drag is sometimes
reduced a little at cruise due
to the change in spanload
produced by the device.

> A reduction in induced drag is the major positive factor contributing to

any net benefit for a tip device.
Examples of Wing Tip Devices.

Offsetting factors:
Profile drag is increased due to:
- Increased wetted area.
- Junction flows, high sectional
loadings, etc.
Weight is increased due to:
- The weight of the device itself.
- The weight of attachment
fittings.
- Increases in the weight of the
existing wing structure due to
increases in static loads and to
meet flutter and fatigue
requirements.

27

A net performance improvement is satisfying to an

engineer, but for an airplane manufacturer or operator the
objective is to realize the kind of bottom-line benefits that
translate into dollars. Here is a list of the potential bottomline benefits of tip devices, in rough order of importance,
and some offsetting factors:
Benefits:
Improved performance:
Reduced fuel burn.
Increased maximum range.
Reduced takeoff field length due to improved
second segment climb.
Increased cruise altitude due to improved buffet
boundary.
Increased cruise speed due to modest increase in
MDD
Reduced takeoff noise.
Meet gate clearance with minimal performance penalty.
Appearance and product differentiation.
Offsetting factors:
Increased cost (development, recurring and purchase).
Increased development risk.

28

Another possible benefit that has sometimes been put forward is that tip devices can reduce the strength of the vortex
wake, with the implication that this could lead to improved

Airbus A350 Sharklet.

safety or reduced separation distances on landing approach

or takeoff. This one is not included on our list because the
reduction in vortex strength is typically very small, and the
resulting benefit is insignificant.
The main positive factor that makes the benefits possible
is the reduction of induced drag. In the next section we discuss the physics of induced-drag reduction and its implications for the configuration of effective wingtip devices.

Conclusions and Observations

When evaluating the benefits of wingtip devices it is
not sufficient to look at just the reduction in drag, or the
improvement in L/D or tops-down efficiency. The real
measure of the performance improvement is in bottomline performance objectives such as fuel-burn or maximum range, taking into account the weight penalty of the
installation, as well as the drag reduction. Which device

A Boeing 777 produces vortices during approach at Heathrow.

Aegean A320 during flight test at Toulouse.

configuration and device size turn out to be optimum will

depend on which performance objective is sought and on
the design details of the baseline airplane.
A reduction in induced drag is the major positive factor
contributing to any net benefit for a tip device. Unfortunately, there are in common circulation some misunderstandings of induced drag and induced-drag reduction,
mostly stemming from mistaken ideas regarding the role
of the vortex wake. To evaluate tip-device candidates correctly and to understand what is likely to work and what
isnt, we must keep the correct physics in mind. The classical Trefftz-plane theory isnt perfect, but it is always a
good place to start. Any tip-device performance claim that
is out of line with Trefftz-plane theory is probably wrong.
Ideal-induced-drag theory (the theory of minimum
induced drag for a given total lift, based on Trefftz-plane
theory) is useful conceptually for understanding the relative drag-reduction potentials of different device configurations, but it is a poor guide to the net level of benefit
that can be achieved. The actual induced-drag reduction is
always significantly less than ideal, substantially so in retrofit and derivative applications, and increases in viscous

drag and weight generally offset some of the induced-drag

reduction. The structural-weight impact is always a major
player in the design trades. The magnitudes of all of the
offsetting factors depend strongly on the design details of
the baseline airplane and the device.
A variety of tip-device configurations have been identified as potentially beneficial, and analyses that take all the
relevant factors into account have not found any one configuration to have any pronounced general advantage over
the others. Inherent differences in optimized net benefit
are small, on the same order as differences that could arise
due to detailed design execution. This may be one of few
places on an airplane configuration where a design decision can, at least sometimes, be based on styling without
a major impact on performance. A raked tip extension will
often be the most cost-effective option, unless it exceeds a
gate-clearance limit or requires expensive beefing up of the
shear webs of an existing wing.
Reference:
National Test Pilot School
Aerodynamics of Wing devices
Doug McLean PhD.

Line drawing of wing tip vortices, in a non wing tip wing and in a blended (sharklet) tip device.

29

> REPORT

Airbus A300-600 contacted trees

and touched down outside airport

30

31

On August 2013, flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600,

NXXXX, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer
non precision approach to runway 18 at BirminghamShuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham,
Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured,
and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post
crash fire.
The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an
instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual
flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable
instrument meteorological conditions with a variable
ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach
course at the time of the accident. The flight originated
from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field,
Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time.
A Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) in effect at the time of
the accident indicated that runway 06/24, the longest

runway available at the airport and the one with a precision approach, would be closed from 0400 to 0500 CDT.
Because the flights scheduled arrival time was 0451, only
the shorter runway 18 with a non precision approach was
available to the crew. Forecasted weather at BHM indicated that the low ceilings upon arrival required an alternate airport, but the dispatcher did not discuss the low
ceilings, the single-approach option to the airport, or the
reopening of runway 06/24 about 0500 with the flight
crew. Further, during the flight, information about variable
ceilings at the airport was not provided to the flight crew.
The Captain was the pilot flying, and the First Officer was the pilot monitoring. Before descent, while
on the direct-to-KBHM leg of the flight, the Captain
briefed the localizer runway 18 non precision profile
approach, and the First Officer entered the approach
into the airplanes flight management computer (FMC).
The intended method of descent (a profile approach)

Crash Site Diagram.

used a glidepath generated by the FMC to provide vertical

path guidance to the crew during the descent from the final
approach fix (FAF) to the decision altitude, as opposed to
the step-down method (dive and drive) that did not provide vertical guidance and required the crew to refer to the
altimeter to ensure that the airplane remained above the
minimum crossing altitude at each of the approach fixes.
When flown as a profile approach, the localizer approach
to runway 18 had a decision altitude of 1,200 ft. mean sea
level (MSL), which required the pilots to decide at that
point to continue descending to the runway if the runway
was in sight or execute a missed approach.
As the airplane neared the FAF, the air traffic controller
cleared the flight for the localizer 18 approach. However,
although the flight plan for the approach had already been
entered in the FMC, the Captain did not request and the
First Officer did not verify that the flight plan reflected

only the approach fixes; therefore, the direct-to-KBHM1

leg that had been set up during the flight from Louisville
remained in the FMC. This caused a flight plan discontinuity message to remain in the FMC, which rendered the
glideslope generated for the profile approach meaningless.
The controller then cleared the pilots to land on runway
18, and the First Officer performed the Before Landing
Checklist. The airplane approached the FAF at an altitude
of 2,500 ft. MSL, which was 200 ft. higher than the published minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft.
Had the FMC been properly sequenced and the profile approach selected, the autopilot would have
engaged the profile approach and the airplane would
have begun a descent on the glidepath to the runway.
However, this did not occur. Neither pilot recognized the
flight plan was not verified. Further, because of the meaningless FMC glidepath, the vertical deviation indicator

32

Birmingham, ALA LOC Rwy 18 Approach Chart.

(VDI), which is the primary source of vertical path correction information, would have been pegged at the top
of its scale (a full-scale deflection), indicating the airplane
was more than 200 ft. below the (meaningless) glidepath.
However, neither pilot recognized the meaningless information even though they knew they were above, not
below, the glideslope at the FAF. When the autopilot did
not engage in profile mode, the Captain changed the autopilot mode to the vertical speed mode, yet he did not brief
the First Officer of the autopilot mode change.
Further, by selecting the vertical speed mode, the approach
essentially became a dive and drive approach. In a profile
approach, a go-around is required upon arrival at the decision altitude (1,200 ft.) if the runway is not in sight; in a
dive-and-drive approach, the pilot descends the airplane
to the minimum descent altitude (also 1,200 ft. in the case of
the localizer approach to runway 18 at BHM) and levels off.
Descent below the minimum descent altitude is not per-

mitted until the runway is in sight and the aircraft can make a normal descent to the runway. A
go-around is not required for a dive and drive
approach until the airplane reaches the missed
approach point at the minimum descent altitude
and the runway is not in sight. Because the airplane was descending in vertical speed mode
without valid vertical path guidance from the
VDI, it became even more critical for the flight
crew to monitor their altitude and level off at the
minimum descent altitude.
About 7 seconds after the First Officer completed the Before Landing Checklist, the First
Officer noted that the Captain had switched
the autopilot to vertical speed mode; shortly
thereafter, the Captain increased the vertical descent rate to 1,500 feet per minute (fpm).
The First Officer made the required 1,000 ft
above airport elevation callout, and the Captain
noted that the decision altitude was 1,200 ft.
MSL but maintained the 1,500 fpm descent rate.
Once the airplane descended below 1,000 ft. at a
descent rate greater than 1,000 fpm, the approach
would have violated the stabilized approach criteria defined in the company flight operations
manual and would have required a go-around.
As the airplane descended to the minimum
descent altitude, the First Officer did not make
the required callouts regarding approaching and
reaching the minimum descent altitude, and the
Captain did not arrest the descent at the minimum
descent altitude.
The airplane continued to descend, and at 1,000
ft. MSL (about 250 ft above ground level), an
enhanced ground proximity warning system
(EGPWS) sink rate caution alert was triggered.
The Captain began to adjust the vertical speed in
accordance with companys trained procedure,
and he reported the runway in sight about 3.5 seconds
after the sink rate caution alert.
The airplane continued to descend at a rate of about 1,000
fpm. The First Officer then confirmed that she also had
the runway in sight. About 2 seconds after reporting the
runway in sight, the Captain further reduced the commanded vertical speed, but the airplane was still descending rapidly on a trajectory that was about 1 nautical mile
short of the runway. Neither pilot appeared to be aware
of the airplanes altitude after the First Officers 1,000-ft
callout. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) then recorded
the sound of the airplane contacting trees followed by an
EGPWS TOO LOW TERRAIN caution alert.
Probable Cause & Contributing Factors
On June 2015 the NTSB released a companion video
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dsr8C9fsYjo and
the Final Report.

The National Transportation Safety

Board determines that the probable
cause of this accident was:
The flight crews continuation of an
unstabilized approach and their failure
to monitor the aircrafts altitude during
the approach, which led to an inadvertent
descent below the minimum approach
altitude and subsequently into terrain.
Contributing Factors to the accident
were:
The flight crews failure to properly
configure and verify the flight management
computer for the profile approach.
The Captains failure to communicate
his intentions to the First Officer once it
became apparent the vertical profile was
not captured.
The flight crews expectation that they
would break out of the clouds at 1,000
feet above ground level due to incom
plete weather information.
The First Officers failure to make the
required minimums callouts.
The Captains performance deficiencies
likely due to factors including, but not
limited to, fatigue, distraction, or
confusion, consistent with performance
deficiencies exhibited during training.
The First Officers fatigue due to acute
sleep loss resulting from her ineffective
off-duty time management and circadian
factors.
Pictures of the aircraft involved, upon touchdown.

33

34

35

36

Safety Dpt. Contacts

e-mail: safety@aegeanair.com tel: +30 210 35.50.623 fax: +30 210 35.50.179
e-mail: safetygroup@olympicair.com tel: +30 210 35.50.679 fax: +30 210 35.50.349