Democratic Movement in Korea

The Democratic Movement in Korea
Introduction
South Koreas journey to democracy was one long struggle since it had a long history of
centralized authority and autocratic rule under the Korean monarchy till 1910, which was
followed by a thirty-five-year Japanese Occupation and finally by another more than twenty-five
years of military rule in South Korea after the Second World War. The drive towards democracy
however began much earlier when South Koreas first president Syngman Rhee (1948-60) after
coming to office in 1948 wanted to build South Koreas democracy from scratch1, by creating
the necessary government structure, bureaucracy and political institutions congenial to
democracy. However since he had little experience in administration and with the approach of
the Korean War, Rhee became engrossed in his own political struggles for survival and thus
governed more like a monarch of the past, rigging elections, whimsically dismissing competent
government officials who displeased him and brought an end to the voice of people by stifling
the press. Thus little effort was made to develop the institutions and procedures of democracy
and although the end of Rhees office was followed by the Democratic Party coming to power,
the nation was still decades away from establishing democracy.
The delay to democracy in the early years was primarily because during and after the Korean
War, communism from the North was seen as a constant threat and therefore a staunch leader in
form of a dictator was given much credence. Also the South Korean social system being rooted
in Confucianism, created a hierarchical political and social structure that made obedience to the
leader mandatory.2 However all this started to change from the mid-60s as people set aside their
1 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig. South Korea since 1980. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 13.
2 Heo and Roehrig, 5.
docile temperament and voiced out their opinion in the workings of the state, reaching a climax
in 1979-80 and finally transitioning to democracy in 1987.
Park Chung-hee (1961-1979)
President Park, originally a Major-General, came to power through military coup with a bid to
end the corruption that was rife among the politicians, and even pledged to return to the barracks
with his military men, when the political and economic house was put back in order. Not only
that Park also managed to hoodwink the people by stating that the military revolution was
necessary to establish a true, free democracy in Korea-certainly not for the establishment of a
new dictatorship and totalitarianism.3 Although Park imposed some restrictions on the press,
intellectuals and opposition politicians in the early 60s, they were still able to criticize the
government and hold organizations. Thus in 1965 when the government normalized its
relationship with Japan which had for so long occupied the nation and sent combat troops to
South Vietnam at US bidding, the general mass, particularly the students were not happy with
these proceedings. Thus there were numerous student demonstrations against these which the
government kept a check on without leading to any casualties. 4 However when Park was reelected for the third time, he tightened his control over the country by proclaiming national
emergency and forcing the National Assembly to grant him complete power to control, regulate
and mobilize the people, economy and press.
It is important to note that South Koreas economy rapidly grew under the Park regime.
Government programs to modernize and industrialize Korea gained momentum and
industrialization fueled urbanization as South Korea transformed its agrarian based economy into
one concentrated in export goods. The high rate of domestic migration during this time
corresponded to the growth of urban centers and their populations. However, contrary to the
argument that economic development and democratization are positively correlated, the political
system in Korea became increasingly autocratic with the growth of the national economy.5 This
was further exacerbated with the drafting of a new constitution called Yusin or Revitalization
4 Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds., South Korea- A Country Study (Washington D.C.:
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 39.
Constitution. Though Park had organized and headed the Democratic Republican Party in 1963
to mobilize mass support behind his military regime, by 1962 he had discarded the party through
enacting of the constitution6. Thus as part of the Yusin system, Park shut down all colleges and
universities and enforced strict censorship of the media, while dissolving the National Assembly
and banning all political parties. Not only that this new constitution concentrated political
power in the executive branch and all future presidents were to be appointed by the National
Council for Unification which was headed by Park. Presidential tenure for single terms was also
extended to six years and limit on the number of terms was lifted. Park had the additional power
to appoint one third of the National Assembly, effectively ensuring his strong hold over the
legislation. Most importantly, the Yushin Constitution allowed the president to declare special ad
hoc Emergency Decrees, whereby he could pass a quick law anytime which would remain
unchallenged and this allowed Park the flexibility to amend national law as he deemed fit. In
short, the Yushin Constitution in all practicality transformed the presidency into a legal
dictatorship7
In retaliation, the students and intellectuals conducted a national campaign to revise the Yusin
Constitution in the fall of 1973. As the student campaign gained momentum, the president issued
his first emergency decree, outlawing all such campaigns. This was followed by successive
emergency measures, imposing further restrictions on other aspects of the society and later the
harshest emergency decree was issued in May 1975 which made it a crime to even criticize the
constitution. The student demonstration was unable to achieve fruition in its protest not just
because of Parks harsh suppression but primarily because the movement itself was loosely
organized and espoused diverse ideologies and programmes. For instance, while one section
confined their agenda to the curbing of the Yusin constitution, others demanded a complete
reorganization of politics, national security and the entire economic system and yet one another
5 Gi-Wook Shin et al. South Koreas Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy
Project Report December 2007, < http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf>
(28 April 2015).
6 Savada and Shaw, 53.
7 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. If At First You Dont Succeed: The Puzzle of South Koreas
Democratic Transition, 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kimsubmitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).
group demanded social justice and a spiritual renewal of the state.8 Important personalities from
the university faculties and the Christian Church emerged from this movement but apart from the
persecution and repression it faced from the Korean government, there was little in common
between them.
This lack of unity is also seen in the parliamentary opposition towards the Yushin system which
was only intermittently effective because the opposition was divided into major factions and was
also disunited in terms of the tactics to be employed. Although the main opposition New
Democratic Party (NDP) wanted to confront the government on fundamental issues of
democracy and human rights, when the leadership was replaced by a more Yushin-compliant
person, all attempts to confront the government were halted until original leadership was restored
in 1979. Apart from the fluctuation in resistance, it is important to note that the major challenge
to Yushin came from a relatively small group of activists, rather than the population at large. One
reason for this is the rapid economic growth which secured the public support. Also the situation
of South Vietnam, which by the 1970s was entirely dependent on the US for its survival as a
separate nation, particularly alarmed Republic of Korea (ROK) which had empathized with the
South Vietnamese as the anti-communist half of a divided nation and it was content with how
Park ensured the national security, even at the expense of a dictatorial regime. Thus politically,
the ever-expanding middle class (as a result of industrialization) offered little opposition to the
government as it accepted authoritarianism in exchange for material wealth, law and order and
effective national security.9
Since much of Parks mandate depended on sustained economic growth, when the ROK
economy experienced a sharp decline in 1979, pressures began to mount on the regime. With the
rapid rise of inflation and stagnant wages, Park addressed these issues by adopting economic
measures which paradoxically created a recession producing a succession of bankruptcies and
thus increasing unemployment.10 The turning point in Parks regime grew out of a labour dispute
known as the YH Incident where textile workers began a sit-in protest at their factory, the YH
8 Adrian Buzo, The Making of Modern Korea (London: Routledge, 2007), 124.
9 Buzo, 131.
Trading Company, over large-scale layoffs. Park government sent the police force to break off
the demonstrations, severely beating the protestors resulting in the death of one and arrests of
many more. This was the beginning of the social unrest which was to culminate in more decisive
uprisings of 1979-80.
Also the opposition despite suffering from internal dissension was growing stronger in its
criticism against the government in 1979, following the New Democratic Partys winning a
plurality in the late 1978 general elections for National Assembly. The new leader of the NDP ,
Kim Young Sam began his challenge against the government from June 1979, announcing his
decision to meet the North Korean leader to discuss matters of unification and even delivered a
scathing criticism of the government. Not only that he also argued how the government had
stifled people right to freedom in the name of constitution, stating that the suppression of human
rights had become an international disgrace. Not only that he also voiced out that people should
be permitted to elect their own president through direct elections, and not through electoral
college, and that they should be allowed to live without fear.11 Kims revolutionary ideas were
seen as a threat to the Park regime and the government immediately retaliated by ousting him
from the National Assembly. This sparked outrage among the mass, leading to further unrest and
by October 1979, the conditions were ripe for a transition to democracy as labor unions launched
a wave of strikes and demonstrations and Churches also lent their support to the movement. Thus
the workers, students and clergymen were all united and joined the parliamentary opposition to
give them the strength and support they needed.12
As the chaos intensified, it became clear to Park and his advisors that something decisive must
be done before the protests spiraled out of control. Parks advisors disagreed how to respond with
some suggesting to compromise with their democratic demands while others advocating violent
crushing of the protests to which Park assented. The Park regime was brought to an end on
October 26, 1979 when the head of Korean CIA shot down the president.
Transitional Government
11 Ibid, 42.
With the assassination of Park, although it appeared that Korea was marching its way to
democracy, the journey was extended for a further eight years. The country experienced a
transitory breeze of democracy as the Prime Minister under Park, Choi Kyu-ha was elected
president in December 1979 and stated in his inaugural speech that a new constitution supported
by the majority of the people would be adopted within a year and also promised the nation of a
free and fair general election to be held afterwards. Although Choe did not stay long in power to
bring about these changes he freed several hundred protestors from Parks regime and also
abolished the Emergency Measure Number Nine, whereby the criticizing of the constitution was
considered a crime.
In spite of all this, Choi was mainly a figurehead and had little control over the military.
Lieutenant General Chun Doo Hwan was appointed the head of the Defense Security Command
(DSC) which was the most powerful of South Koreas military intelligence agencies. Also since
the DSC was responsible in dealing with coups and revolts, Chun was given the task to
investigate Parks assassination. Under the pretext of this investigation, Chun managed to uproot
the Park era power elite in order to remove impediments from his future rule. Not only that, he
also used the rife in the military to assert his control in the army by December 1979.13 Chuns
next move to advance his control over the government was in April 1980 when he asked
President Choi to let him take command over the Korean CIA(KCIA). Taking this position was
illegal for Chun unless he resigned from the military which he refused to do and Choi having no
political base was unable to refuse Chun, who had the military at his disposal. Nevertheless the
trend towards democratization continued with the reopening of universities in March 1980. Once
again the students began to voice out issues such as government restrictions on campus
autonomy, the retention of Yushin Constitution, delays in moving towards an open,
representative government and many more. They also demanded broader socio-economic
demands which was restricted by the Yushin system and soon these demonstrations moved off
campus and towards downtown Seoul where protestors met on an almost daily basis leading to
increasingly massive and violent demonstrations.14
14 Buzo, 145.
On the other hand, Chuns ambitions signaled that he was determined to gain entire control over
the ROK government which resulted in the flaring up of widespread protests since the people in
the wake of democracy did not want it to be disrupted by a military takeover. Thus in early May
1980 there was an added issue to the student protest that Chun be removed immediately from
government and on May 14, there was a massive demonstration of tens of thousands protestors,
consisting mainly of students and workers that took place in Seoul.15 Also the leader of the NDP
took part in this movement along with journalists and religious leaders, anticipating a revived
opposition movement, a Seoul Spring, but Chun could not let this challenge to his authority
stand.16 Thus from May 17, Chuns master plan began to surface as he declared martial law and
re-imposed the Yushin-era prohibition on political gatherings, publications, broadcasts, closing
down all colleges and universities and banning all criticisms of past and current presidents. Part
of Chuns plan was not only to quell demonstrations but to destroy the power bases of all
existing political figures and groups. Thus apart from the shutting down the National Assembly
and the headquarters of most political parties, he also arrested student leaders and arrested chief
opposition leaders, completely banning all political activity17. The military leaders were of the
opinion that the harsh response of the army was justified in saving the country from escalating
chaos or disorder.
The Kwangju Uprising
Although the military measures quieted most of the protests in Korea, demonstrated continued in
Kwangju, the southwest portion of the Korean peninsula and the political home of Kim Daejung, who was arrested by Chuns military. Also for years, Kwangju was the base of opposition
to the Park regime and was consequently punished by withholding economic investment. Thus
for the Kwangju people, this nascent democratic movement was not only seen as a means for
15 Savada and Shaw, 54
political rights and freedom, but also seen as a chance to share in the countrys growing
economic prosperity.18 Hence the Kwangju uprising was not easily crushed, despite Chuns
adopting a hard-line policy. On May 18, when Chun sent special forces to stop the unrest, the
protestors were badly beaten by the soldiers, resulting in many deaths. Thus on May 19, student
demonstrations escalated into violent confrontations with the military troops, and though ROK
army paratroopers were sent to restore order, using all the ferocity they could muster the
protests turned into full fledged insurrection19 as the civilians retaliated by seizing control of the
city and forcing the troops to withdraw.
However Chun realized that if he were to consolidate his coup, he could not give himself in to
the Kwangju Incident and thus after several days of deliberations and attempted negotiations, on
May 27, 1980 he sent twenty thousand troops from elite units in the army to a city of only
600,000 people. The poorly armed group of students and citizens were no match for the best
troops in the ROK army and thus the city was taken with brutal force. This event came to be
known as the Kwangju Massacre and is often likened to Chinas Tiananmen Square because of
the magnitude of its impact. It is estimated that the number of civilians was at least several
hundred and remained a considerable source of bitterness for the Koreans, making it impossible
for Chun to establish any sort of legitimacy to his rule. The Kwangju Incident is important in
shaping further revolts in the 80s since it served as a powerful symbol of popular resistance to
military backed authoritarian government20Although the Kwangju Incident appears on the
surface a failure to launch democracy, it paved the way for later movements in the 1980s that
eventually brought democracy to South Korea as will be later discussed.
Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1987)
After the revolts and protest subsided, Chun proceeded to consolidate authoritarian power and in
August 1980 he was elected to a seven-year term as president. Chun just like President Park
18 Ibid.
19 Buzo, 145.
20 Buzo, 145.
announced the drafting of a constitution that would give rise to a democratic Korea and at the
same time also provided the constitutional basis for the reimposition of military-backed
authoritarianism.21 However by 1982, Chun had turned back the forces of democratization and
established a regime firmly based on Yushin system and had thus achieved a secure grip on
power.
However in spite of considerable developments in economy and diplomacy, Chun could never
secure public trust and support, and was regarded by the mass as a usurper of power who had
deprived Korea of its rights to restore democracy. The Kwangju Incident which lingered in the
minds of the people further disqualified his rule. In an attempt to enhance his legitimacy without
reducing his power, Chun held the legislative elections in the National Assembly where the
opposition parties won more vote than the government party, clearly indicating that the people
wanted a change22. Realizing that his electoral tactic was a failure, Chun knew that the opposition
would demand free and fair election with the end of his term in 1987 and thus wanted to install
Roh Tae-woo a friend and an army general in the ROK army, as his successor. However this
could only be achieved if the 1980 constitution was in effect. After having won the legislative
elections, the opposition launched a campaign to revise the constitution in February 1986 and
though initially Chun did not give in, later after extensive protests and rioting he compromised
by forming a special committee in the National Assembly to propose a set of constitutional
revisions. With these proceedings, the streets remained relatively calm as the people anticipated a
transition to democracy with the amendments of the constitution. As talks went on about
constitutional reform, on April 13, 1987, Chun surprised the nation by announcing to suspend all
talk until a new government was established at the end of his term. This declaration marked the
beginning of the democratic movement as the public responded with universal outrage. To make
matters even worse, Chun even announced that he would appoint General Roh as the candidate
for his Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Thus Chun had not only ended the political reforms but
also ensured that another military man would take over the government.23
21 Ibid, 146.
Unlike previous times when students was the driving force behind the movement, this time the
opposition exploded. Although the opposition leaders advocated non-violent protests against the
regime the crowds, led by students attacked the police with fists, blunt objects and gasoline.
Initially the public was indifferent to this confrontation between the student demonstrators and
the government, but the daily chaos in the streets and the never-ending smell of teargas aroused
their anger. Also the news of the torture and death of a student by the police further moved the
people24 and by the spring of 1987, protests intensified as the common people joined the
movement along with a diverse combination of beliefs including Marxism, nationalism,
Catholicism and many more. Although the protest and riots resulted in few fatalities on both side,
the police was becoming rapidly exhausted whereas the students number and energy seemed
inexhaustible.25 Furthermore the government suffered major damage to its credibility when brutal
interrogation methods used against the student leaders were revealed.
Amidst all this on 10 June, when DJP ratified the nomination of Roh Tae-woo as its presidential
candidate, the opposition called out a street demonstration and it proved to be a success as it
combined with the ongoing student protests to produce successive days of street violence which
was unprecedented during Chuns presidential term.26
As the unrest escalated, Chun was faced with the same dilemma Park Chung-hee faced in the
1979 demonstration. Although Chun still had the option of mobilizing the armed forces, this
approach carried the risk of extreme violence, and since his rule was already maligned with the
Kwangju Uprising, Chun did not want to exacerbate it any further. As the riots entered into their
third week, Roh Tae-woo made the first official move from the government by announcing that
he was willing to adopt the oppositions demands. This he outlined in an eight-point plan,
25 David Adesnik and Sunhyuk Kim. If At First You Dont Succeed: The Puzzle of South Koreas Democratic
Transition, 2008, < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnik-kim-submitted090915.pdf> (28
April 2015).
26 Buzo, 149.
maintaining that the constitution should not only be expeditiously amended, but a direct
presidential election must be held under a new Constitution. The democratic overtone of his plan
is clearly seen as he stated that a presidential election system is vital at this juncture in order to
overcome social confusion and achieve national reconciliation since people are the masters of the
country and their will should be placed above everything else.27
Rohs announcement was a turning point in South Korean history as it not only curbed the
protests and demonstrations but also led Chun, the mastermind of the Kwangju Massacre to
adopt a soft policy. Thus a few days later, Chun reversed his position and allowed the
constitution revision committee to continue its work. Roh was quick to realize that the growing
opposition along with the people would be a tough match for the government and therefore
decided to break free from its stance to save his own political future. Also Roh perceived that
although the opposition were united in their effort to drive out the military government and
establish democracy, the two strong leaders in the opposition were also rivals and hence there
was a good chance that they would split the vote, allowing Roh to triumph in the end. The vote
results thus turned out as Roh anticipated, with him winning the election.
Reasons behind the success of the 1987 Democratic Movement
The Activists
A main reason for the success of the 1987 movement is the increased unity of the protest
movement. The four main constituents of the movement students, labor unions, churches and
the parliamentary opposition were the same during both transitions and these constituents
sought to establish umbrella organizations or chaeya, that would effectively coordinate the
strategy and resources of the movement. In 1987, however, the chaeya achieved a much greater
degree of efficiency and solidarity because they learned from the mistakes of the failed transition
in 1979-1980.28 A big factor contributing to these protests were the number of participants which
reached a zenith in 1974 during the Yushin period with about one million participants and the
number did not differ significantly in the 1979-80 revolt. However in 1987, it reached a
staggering over 6 million participants as several new groups, including average citizen and
middle class participated in the democracy movement.29 Although students and labor were
important groups in the late 1970s and their general tendency was to use disruptive tactics such
as demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes, Christians also remained a dominant majority and as their
religion promoted peace and nonviolence, they seldom resorted to violent tactics such as
demonstrations and this contributed to the high number of non-disruptive tactics.
However, in the 1980s students and labor groups became stronger while Christians took a back
seat. The decline of Christian and journalist participation in the 1980s was complemented by the
increasing participation of General Activists and ordinary citizens in protest events towards the
end of the 1980s. General activists began to emerge in the mid 1980s, finally becoming the most
active protest group in the democratic period, followed by ordinary citizens. Students held
numerous demonstrations on campus or in the streets, and workers used sit-ins during their
strikes. The position of the labour movement which had been weakened by the extreme
authoritarianism since the 1960s started to change during the 80s as continued industrial growth
led to the development of a strong labour union movement. These Korean workers, in their
demand for obtaining improved salaries and better working conditions, attracted substantial
support from the chaeya which struggled for human rights and democratization.30 This
development might signify the increasing radicalization of the democracy movement from the
1970s to the 1980s. As the political context changed with the coming of power by Chun Doo
Hwan, dissidents realized they had to use more extreme measures in the 1980s compared to the
Project Report, Stanford University, December 2007, <
http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf> (27 April 2015).
30 Kenneth M. Wells, ed., South Koreas Minjung Movement (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1995), 46.
1970s. The growing increase of general activists and citizens indicates the professionalization
and institutionalization of activist identity.31
Governments treatment of the activists also had a major impact on the protests. For instance
after the Kwangju Massacre in May1980 when students clashed with the police, leading to civil
strife Chun Doo Hwan executed a strict policy of repressing any dissenting voices that would
challenge his rise to power and as a result all protest dwindled from 1980- 1984. However from
1984 onwards Chun Doo Hwan relaxed his repressive policies since the General Elections was
drawing close and the government became confident of their control over the society, having
achieved economic growth and political stability. As the Chun regime continuously suffered from
a lack of legitimacy, it was imperative for them to demonstrate how democratic their regime was
to the voters and the international audience. Therefore, in the spring of 1984 some political
prisoners were freed and the professors and students who had been fired and expelled were
allowed to go back to their schools. The general atmosphere at college campuses became much
freer and it was also conducive for a flourishing of political activism as the governments
relaxing of political control was an opportunity for students to reorganize and to prepare for
further action. It is noteworthy that when Chun announced his decision to hold presidential
elections under the old constitution, it was the students and not the opposition who organized
massive demonstrations, articulating the sentiments of the public who wanted a freely contested
presidential election.32 South Koreas teachers have often been marginalized in this democratic
movement, but they played a major role in establishing a degree of autonomy from the state and
also played a crucial part in disseminating democratic values and promoting greater popular
participation in the government. These teachers even formed associations and so effective they
were in circulating ideas that even after the liberalization of the military regime in 1987, the
government continued to ban all teachers unions other than the government-controlled one.33
31Ibid.
32 Chang Kyung-Sup, ed., South Korea in Transition (New York: Routledge, 2014), 25.
33 Ibid, 26.
Government and the US Involvement
There were many factors, both domestic and international, that led President Chun to acquiesce
in to the democratic demands of the people. One of the main reasons was the very nature of the
protest itself. While during the days of President Park Chung Hee, it was mainly composed of
students, increasingly the demonstrations started to attract a broader cross-section of ROK
society, especially the members of the affluent middle-class and hence the drive towards
democracy was ever stronger. For the government, crushing these protests was far more difficult
when the participants included businessmen, housewives and others from the middleclass.34
Change of demography is also a significant factor in the success of the 1987 movement. While in
1961 a military-backed government superimposed itself over a tiny urban elite in a largely urban
country, by the mid-1980s industrialization, economic growth and growing international contact
led to the explosive growth of the middle class. As the proportion of the white-collar workers
increased, Chuns slogans which echoed that of the Park era such as the necessity to have a strict,
authoritarian government to prevent attacks from the North, failed to convince them of Chuns
legitimacy.
The businessmen bore its very own grudge against the government since as the economy grew
larger and more complex, close government monitoring of business activities was becoming an
increasing burden. ROK businessmen became increasingly convinced that they would flourish
under civilian government because of the liberalization process with the end of the strict controls
of Park-Chun regime.35 With the business class fuming against the government, even the military
was anticipating a change towards democracy and it was no longer cohesive in defending the
existing military government from the challenge. While during the Park regime, the military was
at his disposal which functioned at his bidding, by 1987 the military was gradually accepting the
fact that their time of political domination was coming to an end. This was particularly seen in
their attitude towards the protestors since there were clear indications that the military was
35 Buzo, 151.
unhappy with the prospect of taking yet again a direct role in politics, a role that would
undoubtedly have led to severe domestic and international pressure36 Thus while Chun was
hardly repentant, many officers were ashamed of the military for killing hundreds of the civilians
they were supposed to protect as the younger officers in the ROK military made known to Chun
and Roh their adamant opposition to the use of lethal force against the protesters. It is believed
that the sum of all these pressures led to the swift collapse of military authoritarianism.
Apart from domestic politics, regime change in South Korea reflected the influence of America.
Since the founding of the ROK, South Korean actors have exerted the greatest influence on the
government transitions but American decisions, expressed in terms of both actions and acts of
omission, have made certain outcomes that had both positive and negative effects on the
democratic movement. From the founding of the ROK through the 1970s, the US government
displayed an uneven interest in South Korean democracy. The priority of the US was stability
and thus it tended to favor democratization when it advanced the cause of stability. Thus after
the outbreak of the Korean War, although Syngman Rhees Rhees government became
progressively less democratic, the US government made little effort to restrain Rhee authoritarian
tendencies, being preoccupied with the threat from the North. However when this very
government rigged the 1960 elections and protesters poured into the streets, the US helped ease
Rhee out of office, paving the way for a democratic transition. 37
Up until the 1980s, the U.S. was viewed very positively by most Koreans as they upheld the
popular image of the U.S. as that of a savior who saved South Korea from Japanese colonial
occupation and communist aggression. Thus when US President Gerald Ford visited Korea in
November 1974 dissident groups hoped that the president of the free world would advice Park
36 James Cotton, From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea, in Korea Under Roh Tae-woo
(Canberra: ANU Printery, 1993), 33.
April 2015).
Chung Hees government to stop repressing the democracy movement, but the US President
maintained a neutral position. This same hope was pinned on the visit by U.S. President Jimmy
Carter in 1979 but by this time the dissident groups realized that the government could be using
the U.S. Presidents visit as a strategy to legitimate the dictatorial regime instead. Although the
Carter administration welcomed the democratic movement of 1979 and lent its support to the
interim government, the administration did not ensure the transitions success.38One reason for
this is the turbulence of the US-ROK relationship in 1977 and 1978. The mutual antagonism of
Jimmy Carter and Park Chung Hee resulted in a low point in US-ROK relations. As a candidate
for president, Carter spoke in favor of a phased withdrawal of US forces from Korea. Yet during
his first months in the White House, Carter surprised the ROK by announcing a schedule for the
withdrawal of all US combat forces within 4-5 years. The humiliation for Park was considerable,
even though Carter ultimately abandoned his plans in response to congressional opposition.
Carter also antagonized the Park regime by describing its human rights violations as
repugnant. 39In addition, the crisis in US-Iranian relations made the US administration
extremely averse to any course of action that risked further instability. This crisis started in
1979, at a time when South Korea was about to experience a democratic movement, through
Khomeinis revolution against the Shah, with whom the US had good relations. With the Shah
monarchy being overthrown, Iran not only developed an Anti-American sentiment but the
American embassy was also seized by student radicals and American diplomats taken as
hostages.40 Thus US feared that if Washington were to push too hard, an anti-US government
similar to Iran could come to power in Seoul it would jeopardize US security interests and the
38 Gi-Wook Shin et al. South Koreas Democracy Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project
Report, Stanford University, December 2007, < http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)1.pdf> (27 April 2015).
39 Ibid.
40 Shaul Bakhash. The U.S. and Iran in Historical Perspective, Foreign Policy Research Institute
(FPRI), September 2009, < http://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/09/us-and-iran-historical-perspective> (7
May 2015).
ROK-U.S. alliance. Thus it was very supportive of the Chun regime and developed friendly
relations with the administration.41
The public however did not take this well and there were even allegations that the US were
involved in the Kwangju Massacre. This caused serious suspicion about the true intentions of the
U.S. towards South Korea and the atmosphere was rife with Anti-American sentiment. Dissident
intellectuals and prodemocracy activists began to criticize the U.S. role in the Korean peninsula
in the 1980s and viewed the U.S. international policies as imperialist. They thus believed
national liberation from U.S. imperialism was indispensible for genuine democratization. AntiAmericanism was expressed directly in protest activities as well as intellectual debates. The fact
that all four main U.S. Information Centers in Korea were attacked during democracy
movements in the 1980s illustrates that anti-Americanism became one of the important sources
of prodemocracy activism. The issues raised by the protestors varied from demanding clear
explanation about the alleged U.S. involvement in the Kwangju massacre to criticizing its
imperialist aggression regarding the Korean economy, especially the rice market.42 This placed
Washington in a difficult position since though it was unhappy with Chuns actions, it could not
antagonize the diplomatic relations with him. Also it was reluctant to impose economic sanctions
for fear of making an already bad ROK economy worse. However it might be noted that
Washington was responsible passively for Chuns military coup in 1980. When Chun was
appointed the head of Korean CIA and demonstrations exploded across the country, the U.S.
policymakers were of the opinion that the ROK military could bring law and order, before
moving towards political liberalization. Thus the U.S. ambassador to Korea, William Gleysteen
assured South Korean officials that the United States would not oppose any risk taken by the
government to restore law and order, even if it involves reinforcing the police with the army.
However the U.S. officials did not intend to support any form of extreme violence and on several
occasions asked Chun and his military officials to refrain from it, but Chun took the message of

Project Report, Stanford University, December 2007, <
http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf> (27 April 2015).
the ambassador as a tacit approval, and started to crack down on protests throughout the
country.43
The Reagan administration was the high point in the US-ROK relations. Initially, the Reagan
administration rejected democracy promotion in principle, preferring to focus on the solidarity of
anti-Communist governments, both authoritarian and democratic. This developed a relationship
of trust and confidence between him and Chun Doo Hwan. Yet over time, the administration
came to favor democratic transitions even at the expense of strongly anti-Communist
dictatorships. Thus during Reagans visit to South Korea in November 1983, he withheld direct
criticism of the military regime, but firmly insisted that democracy was the goal towards which
South Korea should strive in spite of the threats from the North. Reagans polite and friendly
manner softened the prodemocracy message given to Chun, which was well-received by him. In
fact Chun even told Reagan that the ROKs turbulent postwar history had led the people [to]
believe that a change of presidents is only possible through violence. This is a very dangerous
way of thinking My term is scheduled to end in 1988 and it will.44 Though a protge of Park
Chung-hee, for Chun the end did not justify the means, especially after the Kwangju Massacre
and thus he was preparing to step down after the end of his term. However the people were not
only looking forward to the end of Chuns term but the end of military government as whole,
hence the widespread protest and revolts following the nomination of Roh Tae-woo, a major
General in the army. The U.S. however supported the Chun regime towards the very end as the
U.S. Ambassador James Lilly attended the electoral convention of DJP in June 1987 where Roh
was nominated and the former even assured both Chun and Roh of Americas friendship.
However Washington was quite unprepared for the public outburst to this nomination and thus it
quickly reverted its position as Reagans letter to Chun asked him to advocate Dialogue,
compromise, and negotiation [which] are effective ways to solve problems and maintain national

April 2015).
unity.45 Only after a couple of hours of receiving the letter, Chun decided not to declare martial
law. Reagans word carried considerable weight precisely because Reagan had embraced Chun
without hesitation during the early and uncertain days of his regime.
Apart from all these factors, Chang Kyung-Sup in South Korea in Transition suggests South
Koreas education fever played a key role in the development of a society based on a sense of
citizenship and active citizen involvement in public affairs.46 They very curriculum of the South
Korean education system reinforced liberal democratic values and concepts such as citizenship
and participatory democracy were taken directly from American textbooks. Korean textbooks
also gave long accounts that traced the rise of democracy and freedom from Ancient Athens and
the Magna Carta to Abraham Lincolns speeches on emancipation. Thus an increasingly
educated public identified with the West in their quest for democratic rights. By the 1980s as
most Koreans identified themselves as middle-class, there was an increasing growth of literate
working-class and the spread of egalitarian ideals. Not only that every year, thousands of South
Koreans sought education in the USA and the government ministries, school systems, media, etc
were staffed with large numbers of America-educated South Koreans. All these developments led
to the educational transformation of South Korea and according to Chang this educational
development prepared the way for democratization through encouragement of a dynamic,
pluralist society of active politically engaged citizens.
Among authors who have scrutinized the South Korean transition, the most widely cited
explanation for Chuns restraint in the June Uprising is that if the violence escalated, the
International Olympic Committee might have called off the 1988 Summer Games or awarded
them to another host.47 The entire South Korea was looking forward to hosting this event to
showcase the economic progress of the country and for Chun, the game symbolized the success
of his effort to transform South Korea into a modern republic. Thus with the international media
45 Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 168.
46 Kyung-Sup, 30.
April 2015).
focused on South Korea, Chun did not want to jeopardize the reputation of the country, hence his
decision to acquiesce, since there was already discussion within the International Olympic
Committee of cancelling or moving the games from South Korea because of potential unrest.48
Conclusion
Thus the June Democratic Movement was an all-encompassing movement which not only had its
representative of the entire South Korean population, but the atmosphere itself was one which
was conducive to the flourishing of the movement, because of the above-mentioned factors. The
personality of President Chun is also an important factor here, since unlike Park Chung-hee he
did not pursue power relentlessly, but instead like a true diplomat took into consideration the
advice and the situation at hand. Ironically, therefore President Chun found himself acting as a
proponent of democracy in a country where all sectors were demanding the establishment of
democratic rights. For the people, however, the movement was not just a mere transition to a
democratic state but it was one which earned them their emancipation and independence at the
cost of thousands of lives.
References
Adesnik, David and Sunhyuk Kim. If At First You Dont Succeed: The Puzzle of South Koreas
Democratic Transition. 2008. < http://www.pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/adesnikkim-submitted090915.pdf> (28 April 2015).
Bakhash, Shaul. The U.S. and Iran in Historical Perspective. Foreign Policy Research Institute
(FPRI). September 2009. < http://www.fpri.org/articles/2009/09/us-and-iran-historicalperspective> (7 May 2015).
Buzo, Adrian. The Making of Modern Korea. London: Routledge, 2007.
Cotton, James. From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea, In Korea Under Roh
Tae-woo. Canberra: ANU Printery, 1993.
Heo, Uk and Terence Roehrig. South Korea since 1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010.
Kyung-Sup, Chang. ed. South Korea in Transition. New York: Routledge, 2014.
Oberdorfer, Don and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas. New York: Basic Books, 2014.
Savada, A. M., and William Shaw, eds. South Korea- A Country Study. Washington D.C.: Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992.
Shin, Gi-Wook, Paul Y. Chang, Jung-eun Lee and Sookyung Kim. South Koreas Democracy
Movement (1970-1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report. December 2007.
<http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/KDP_Report_(final)-1.pdf> (28 April 2015).
Wells, Kenneth M.,ed. South Koreas Minjung Movement. Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1995.

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The Democratic Movement in Korea

Government and the US Involvement

41 Heo and Roehrig, 33.

43 Heo and Roehrig, 33.

48 Heo and Roehrig, 38.

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