Synthese (2012) 184:299317

DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9814-3

What could be caused must actually be caused

Christopher Gregory Weaver

Received: 1 November 2009 / Accepted: 1 September 2010 / Published online: 23 September 2010
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual
world and are such that they could be caused, are also such that they must actually
be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by
Alexander Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Prusss Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies inconsistency with Lewiss semantics
for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, the
argument founders on the fact that Prusss Brouwer Analog has a clear counterexample. I thus turn to a second, Lewisian argument, which requires only an affirmation
of one element of Lewiss analysis of causation and one other, fairly weak possibility claim about the nature of wholly contingent events. The final section of the
paper explains how both arguments escape objections from supposed indeterminacy
in quantum physics.
Keywords Causation Counterfactuals Conditionals Counterfactual logic
Natural laws Quantum physics
1 Introduction
Events which occur and are such that they could be caused, are also events which could
not have occurred without at least a singular cause. Understanding events this way is a
bit audacious, but there are two interesting arguments for just such an understanding.

This, my writing sample to PhD programs in Philosophy, I dedicate to the memory of my Father Gregory
Glenn Weaver.
C. G. Weaver (B)
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, USA
e-mail: christophergweaver@gmail.com

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The first argument appropriates an analog of the Brouwer Axiom in modal logic for
counterfactual logic (the Brouwer Analog). Alexander R. Pruss is the theoretician
responsible for motivating arguments for the Brouwer Analog. His work on the nature
of causation and explanation will be foundational for much of what will be the first
argument (hence my labeling it the Pruss-argument) for the thesis above. The second argument does not utilize Prusss Brouwer Analog, but instead requires that a
necessary condition for causation be counterfactual dependence, and that all wholly
contingent events be such that they could be caused.
I begin in Sect. 2 with an explication of the Pruss-argument, subsequently showing in Sect. 2.1 how an appropriation of the Brouwer-Analog leads to absurdity on
Lewiss semantics for counterfactuals. In Sect. 2.2, I present a counterexample to
Prusss Brouwer Analog, thereby properly motivating the articulation of what I call
the Lewisian argument for my main thesis in Sect. 3. I then (in Sect. 3.1) explain
how the Lewisian argument escapes the counter-example of Sect. 2.2. The final task
(Sect. 4) of the paper is to engage objections to the conclusions of both arguments
from quantum physics.
2 The Pruss-argument
Suppose that, by the phrase Rx y, we mean to pick out the relation x caused or is the
causal explanation of event y.1 The predicate assignment Ox will mean that some event
x occurs or occurred. Assume that, by the expression (p q), we mean (p q),
an entailment relation. Suppose further that, by (p  q), we mean to pick out the
would-counterfactual, if it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q.
Let us also assume that (p q) picks out the might-counterfactual, if it were the
case that p, then it might be the case that q.2 Understand the relationship between two
counterfactual conditionals in the following standard way:
(p  q) (p q)

(1)

(p q) (p  q)

(2)

I will also need to assume: (a) K-semantics for possible worlds and propositional
modal logic (including first-order alethic modal logic)3 , (b) the S5 axiomatiziation for
propositional modal logic (and first-order alethic modal logic) where the accessibility
relation between worlds is understood as an equivalence relation4 , (c) actualism as the

1 I will assume that the types of things which stand in causal relations are events. Furthermore, I will assume
that events are property exemplifications. This view is both explicated and defended in: Kim (1976); reprint
(1993).
2 This notation is similarly used in Lewis (1973); cf. Harper (1981, pp. 2432).
3 cf. Schurz (1999), Schurz (2002, pp. 443444)); cf. Plantinga (1982, p. 2).
4 (Fitting and Mendelsohn, 1998, p. 71); Humberstone (2005, p. 571. no. 44 cf. pp. 572573 esp. no. 46).

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applied semantics and/or interpretation of quantified modal logic5 , and (d) Lewiss
semantics for counterfactual logic.6
With the assumptions above, we can explicate a very interesting argument for a
general causal principle. Assuming that our specified domain or universe of discourse
is events, the first premise of the argument states that:
xy [Rxy (zRzy  Oy)]

[Premise]

(3)

Assuming that we have applied the inference rule universal instantiation to (3), we
can insert the following constants when relevant [x = e, y = e ]. This premise is
intuitively plausible, for it says that es causing e entails that if it were not the case
that there is at least one event z such that z caused e , then e would not have occurred.
Premise (3) is consistent with overdetermination, and so in no way precludes that some
other cause besides e stands in the relevant causal relationship with e . Now consider
the second premise:
y(Oy xRxy)

[Premise]7

(4)

Premise (4) affirms that if e occurs, then it is possibly the case that there is at least
one event x such that x caused e . There is no question that there are objections to
(4), and I will turn my attention to those objections when I employ a similar premise
in the Lewisian version of the argument. I should point out that my thesis is not that
5 Actualism is the thesis that there neither are nor could have been non-existent objects. This is defended
in not a few places: (van Inwagen, 2001, pp. 206242); Plantinga (2003, pp. 103121); Stalnaker (2003, pp.
2554) [though he holds on to counter-part theory]; Melia (2008, pp. 143145); Adams (1974, pp. 211231);
Kripke (1980, pp. 1520; 4353).
6 Lewis (1973); cf. Sider (2010, pp. 252256); Williamson (2007, p. 293ff). I will also be assuming that

there is a fixed domain of possible events, that the very same events are possible in each possible world,
and that the aggregation of events is a species of conjunction. cf. Oppy (2006, pp. 125126).
7 Some might reject this premise on grounds that it might not hold with respect to all events which occur
and are caused by some other event, if there are alien dispositions. Truth-makers for such statements about
alien dispositions are alien properties. Alien properties are properties that are not possessed by any actual
entities, and are not obtainable by means of a conjunction, interpolation, or extrapolation, of some actual
properties. See Lewis (1986: pp. 159165); Heller (1998, pp. 298308); Armstrong (1989a, pp. 5763);
Divers (1999); Divers and Melia (2002). It is thought that such alien properties could serve as truth-makers
for alien disposition statements. But David Lewis reduced disposition statements to counterfactual causal
statements, then to purely counterfactual statements, and ultimately to statements about events in and
similarity relations among possible worlds McKitrick (2009, p. 42). I think Lewiss view can account
for conditional causal statements, and it can answer counter-examples from finkish dispositions cf. Lewis
(1999) I agree with his reductive strategy. On Lewiss view then, alien disposition statements are nothing
above and beyond alien counterfactual causal statements. The truth-makers for such statements are associated with events in and similarity relations among possible worlds. If there are alien properties which make
alien disposition statements true, and such disposition statements entail that certain events are essentially
such that they do not have causes. Fine. My argument here is not concerned with such events, since they
cannot stand in the Rx y relation. Furthermore, as per the Lewisian argument below, Im concerned with
wholly contingent events. If there are alien properties and alien disposition statements about those properties
instantiated by objects, such a fact will be inconsequential to my argument. Since predicating to events that
they are wholly contingent entails that such events are in no way alien.

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every event has a cause, but that every event that could be caused has a cause. Premise
(4) is therefore not as robust as one might have gathered from an initial glance.
Two axioms of Lewiss semantics for counterfactual logic will provide the Prussargument with premises (5) and (6):
[(p q) (p  q)]

[Premise]

(5)

That is to say, p entails q, entails that if it were the case that p, then it would be the case
that q. Premise (5) suggests that entailment relations are stronger than counterfactual
conditionals, assuming that the converse of (5) is false.
[(p  q)&(p  q)] p

[Premise]

(6)

Or, if it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q, and if it were the case
that p, then it would be the case that not-q, entails that p is impossible.
Premises (7) and (8) will be the Brouwer Axiom from propositional modal logic,
and the Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic:
(p  p)

[Brouwer Axiom]

(q & p & p) [p  (p q)] [Brouwer Analog for CFL]

(7)
(8)

Now pick out any event that occurs. Let q be the true proposition that that event, call
it e, occurred. Suppose we let p be the proposition that there is nothing which causes
e i.e., x(Rxe). The rest of the argument can now run as follows:
Assume that p.

[Assumption]

(9)

From the fact that premise (3) states that every event which occurs is such that it could
have had a cause, we can infer that p in our deduction is only contingently true. So:
(p & p)
(q & p & p)

[from (4) and (9)]

(10)
[from our supposition that event e occurred conjoined with (10)]

p (p q) [MP (8), (11)]

(11)
(12)

Suppose though that w is any possible world at which not- p is the case (as the antecedent of (12) has it), then w is also a world at which the event in question (vi z. e)
occurs by virtue of being caused by some event x. This follows because nonexistent
events cannot cause other events to occur, and cannot themselves be caused to occur.
Thus, e occurs at w, and so does the cause of e. Given (3), it follows that it will be
true at w that, were no cause of e to have existed, e would not have occurred (i.e., it is
true at w that (p  q)). Since this is true at every world at which e has a cause,

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(or at every world at which not- p is the case), it follows that:

p (p  q)

[from (3), (12)]

(13)

(p  q) (p q)

[from Lewiss semantics for CFs]

(14)

Recall premise (5) above. That premise states that the proposition p entails q, entails
that if it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q.8 When we consider
(13), with not- p as one proposition, the entailment relation, and then (p  q) as
the other proposition, it should follow (by entailment) that p  (p  q). But
then, by our replacement rule from Lewiss semantics, we get p  (p q).
So we write:
p  (p q)

[from (5), (13) and (14)]

(15)

Now it seems we have a proof that not- p is impossible, since the second of the two axioms we took from Lewiss semantics for counterfactuals (premise (6) above) implies
such an impossibility just as soon as we conjoin (12) and (15) into (16):
[p  (p q)] & [p  (p q)]

[Conj. (12), (15)]

(16)

And now our conclusion follows in the following way:

p

[from (6), (16)]

(p & p)
[from Simp. and Conj. (10), (17)]
p (p & p) [CP from (918)]
p
[Reductio (19)]

(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)

So, given the principles specified above, and the occurrence of any event, the argument
here can run so as to give one the conclusion, that that event could not have been such
that it did not have a cause. Of course, this only follows if that event can stand in the
Rx y relation, i.e., the event one plugs in must have a cause at the actual world only if
it could be caused.
It turns out that Prusss original formulation of an argument for (20), similar to the
one I have given here, is logically invalid. Pruss appropriated premises (6), (12), and
(15) above. The problem is that Pruss, in more than one place, supposed that, from
(6), (12), and (15), one could infer9 :
p

(21)

But this is confused. Lewiss axiom states that when the antecedent of two distinct
would-counterfactuals gets you (by counterfactual implication) inconsistent propositions, one can infer that that antecedent is not even possibly true. What is important
8 Again, on the assumption that the converse is false.
9 You see this from him here: Pruss (2006, p. 243); and Pruss (2009a, p. 67).

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to point out here though, is that the antecedent of (12) and (15) is not- p, not the
proposition that p. Thus, what we can infer from the relevant lines is (17), not the
mistakenly derived (21). So Prusss argument is invalid, and the Pruss-formulation
should be preferred.
2.1 The Brouwer-analog and Lewiss semantics
Pruss has argued for the plausibility of (8).10 For convenience, let us recall that, for
propositional modal logic, the Brouwer Axiom is the following:
(p  p)

[Brouwer Axiom]

(7)

And Prusss Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic is:

(q & p & p) [p  (p q)]

[Brouwer Analog for CFL] (8)

Suppose that p were the event of my hitting a baseball with a baseball bat. Suppose
that q were the event of the baseball shattering a nearby window. Proposition (8)
would then be suggesting that, if I really did hit a baseball, and the window really did
shatter, then, in a nearby possible world w at which I did not hit the baseball, what
actually occurs (i.e., me hitting the baseball) is relevant for any truth evaluation of the
counterfactual claim about what occurs (or would occur) at w.
Lewiss semantics for counterfactuals assumes the following with respect to the
would-counterfactual11 :
(p  q) [p v w (p & q) <@

w1 (p

& q)]12

(22)

This means that the proposition, if it were the case that p, then it would be the case
that q, holds, just in case the antecedent is false at all possible worlds, or some world
w at which both p and q are true, is closer to the actual world than a world at which
p and not-q is true. However, the problem is that, given (22) above, (8) is false.
Assume that the big conjunctive contingent fact (BCCF) just is the aggregate of
all contingently true propositions on the actual world conjoined into one large conjunction.13 Every world, were it actual, would have a respective BCCF. Let Aw0
individuate w0 s BCCF, let q be Aw0 , and let us also assume that w0 is the actual world. The variable p will pick out Aw1 , where w1 is a metaphysically possible world. Assume that (8) above is true. So if (Aw0 & Aw1 & Aw1 ), then
10 Pruss (2006, pp. 243247).
11 Where in premise (22) I use @ = the actual world; p = p is true at a possible world w; and p <
w
w
@
w1 p = a world w at which p is true, is closer to the actual world @, than w1, and let w1 be any world at

which p is true.

12 Lewis (1973, p. 16); Sider (2010, p. 274); Bennett (2003, pp. 152176); cf. Kvart (1986, p. 163).
13 I find the set-theoretic objections to the coherence of something like the BCCF to be unconvincing. See

Weaver (2009).

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[Aw1  (Aw1 Aw0 )]. By modus ponens, we can infer that the consequent (i.e., [Aw1  (Aw1 Aw0 )]) is true. Proposition (22) now suggests the
following:
(Consequence #1): [Aw1 & (Aw1 Aw0 )] <@ [Aw1 & (Aw1 Aw0 )]
However:
(Consequence #2): (Aw1 Aw0 )(Aw1  Aw0 )
The proposition (Aw1  Aw0 ) holds at w1 if and only if a (Aw1 & Aw0 )world is closer to w1 than any (Aw1 & Aw0 )-world is. Since it is quite obvious now
that there is only one (Aw1 & Aw0 )-world, vi z. w0 , and a (Aw1 & Aw0 )-world just
is a world different from w0 and w1 , it follows that (Aw1  Aw0 ) holds at w1
if and only if no other world is closer to w1 than w0 is. This entails:
(Consequence #3): The closest world to any possible world w1 is w0 , the actual
world.14
Instead of abandoning (8) above by deriving consequence #3, some logicians have
taken consequence #3 to be a reductio for Lewiss semantics for counterfactuals.15
However, I think that Lewiss analysis of the would-counterfactual is approximately
correct, the cost of which is consequence #3 (assuming that (8) is true), and that cost
is too high, especially when the counter-example to (8) in Sect. 2.2 is considered. I
therefore recommend abandoning (8).
2.2 A counter-example for Prusss Brouwer analog
The Brouwer Analog states that the conjunction of q and a contingent truth p, materially implies the proposition that, were p false, it would be the case that, were p true,
q might still be true, since things might be as they actually are. This was expressed
formally by proposition (8) above. This premise is potentially problematic.16 Suppose
that the truth of p was guaranteed by natural nomicity at the actual world. Given
this assumption, had p been false, the laws would have been different than what they
actually are. It is very important, however, to say further that the laws would not necessarily be different in such a way that that difference would entail ps falsehood. But
14 For a very similar argument (one that I am indebted to) showing this consequence of Lewiss semantics,
see Pruss (2006, p. 245)); cf. Pruss (2009a, p. 72).
15 Though there are doubtless other problems with Lewiss semantics, cf. Elga (2001) where it is argued
that Lewiss semantics for counterfactuals doesnt yield the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence (i.e.,
that later states of affairs or events depend counterfactually on earlier ones); cf. Rescher (2007, pp. 166
169) who attacks Lewiss semantics on the grounds that its understanding of similarity relations is not well
defined; Loewer (2009) suggested in correspondence that an analysis of natural nomicity which understood
that nomicity probabilistically would be problematic for Lewiss semantics for counterfactuals. However, I
am in complete agreement with Timothy Williamson who admits that the best developed formal semantics
of counterfactuals makes use of the apparatus of possible worlds or situations (alluding of course to the
LewisStalnaker approach). See Williamson (2007, p. 142. cf.).
One logician has even attempted to provide a semantics for counterfactuals that is consistent with (8) above:
cf. Pruss (2009b).
16 Thanks to Ned Hall for correspondence that helped in developing this counter-example.

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now it looks like we have a counter-example to (8). Consider the following principle
for counterfactual conditionals:
(Nomicity Principle: NP): Necessarily, a counterfactual antecedent that is not
contrary to natural nomicity at the actual world should not take us to worlds at
which the laws are different.17
With NP in hand, we can go on to understand the variables of (8) in the following way:
let p be the proposition that, I am not moving faster than the speed of light, will be
a list of the laws of a p-world, and let q therefore be the proposition that the laws are
. Quite obviously, the laws at a p-world are akin to the laws at the actual world. So
now it can be the case that, were I moving faster than the speed of light, then it would
be the case, that were I not moving faster than the speed of light, then it would still be
the case that the laws would not hold. Or we get:
p  (p  q)

(23)

But [p (p q)] is equivalent to [p  (p q)]. And so now,

given the contingent truth of p (me not moving faster than the speed of light), and
the truth of q (the laws are ), we get the claim that not-p leads to inconsistency.
For, on the Brouwer Analog, we should have [p  (p q)], but instead
we have derived [p  (p q)]. And, according to Lewiss semantics
{[(p  q)&(p q)] p}. We can therefore infer p. So now we
have [(q & p & p) p], which further implies that the Brouwer Analog
materially implies a contradiction. So, we should abandon (8) above.
The above argumentation would not be successful against the Pruss-argument if
natural nomicity were understood in such a way that it coincided with metaphysical necessity.18 Pruss is obliged to object to such a view of nomicityin fact, he
must reject such a view since his new cosmological argument will not run without
such a rejection.19 So, he will have to look elsewhere for a proper response to the
counter-example on offer.
One might try to challenge the idea that natural nomicity guarantees the contingent truth of propositions, by denying that there are any such things as laws. Several
accounts of nomicity recommend themselves in this respect: (a) (arguably) Nancy
Cartwrights theoretical realism, (b) Bas van Fraassens rejection of laws, and (c) the
17 This principle was recommended to me by Ned Hall. I should note two further things: (1) Laws can be
different in two ways (a) some law that actually obtains might not obtain, and (b) some law that does not
obtain might obtain. NP is concerned with a difference of the former, i.e., (a), not (b). (2) Originally I thought
that David Lewis would have been rather at home with something like NP, though it is not altogether clear
that he would affirm NP, since he seems to think that small localized miracles are prices to pay for certain
continuity across space-time cf. Lewis (1979, p. 473). However, he does say elsewhere that we should try
to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of Law (Ibid.: 472). I am therefore a bit unsure about
whether or not Lewis would have affirmed NP.
18 This view of laws is defended by a gaggle of scholars: Smith (2001), Bird (2007), Swoyer (1982),
Shoemaker (1998). Though I should add that for Shoemaker it is a contingent fact what laws obtain. Thanks
to Barry Loewer for this correction.
19 cf. Gale and Pruss (1999).

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Plantinga/Ratzsch view of laws.20 It is not at all clear that, on Cartwrights view of

laws, one could not have the guaranteeing of the truth of a proposition by virtue of
what laws are like at the actual world. Cartwrights phenomenological laws are true
in nomological machines, but she does admit that they are sometimes true as found in
nature (as things in and of themselves per se).21 With respect to such naturally situated
nomological machines, it does seem that phenomenological laws could guarantee the
truth of a proposition about the world. The van Fraassen, and the Plantinga/Ratzsch
positions seem to me to be desperate since the latter entails occasionalism, and the
former depends too heavily upon the inference and identification problems. So, there
does not appear to be any escape from the counter-example through appealing to these
exotic accounts of laws, and for those uncomfortable with nomic necessitarianism, an
argument not dependent upon (8) will have to be proffered for my thesis.

3 The Lewisian argument

As was noted previously, Lewiss semantics for counterfactuals does not fare well
with premise (8) of the Pruss-argument. In this section, I present a modified version
of the argument, which gets us the same desired conclusion without invoking Prusss
Brouwer-Analog. I call the argument Lewisian because it starts from the claim that
counter-factual dependence is a necessary condition for causation, and because it is
consistent with Lewiss semantics for counterfactuals.
Consider the following four principles:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

[Counter-Factual Dependence Principle]

x[Cx  (Cx Ox)]22
[Weak Causal Principle]
x(x Cx)23
x(x Ox)
[Predicate Clarification]
(q & p & p) [p  (p q)]
[Principle Alpha]24

The first principle states that, for any event x, if it were the case that x were caused,
then it would be the case that if x were not caused, then it would be the case that x would
not have occurred. A consequence of this principle is that counterfactual dependence is
a necessary condition for causation. This seems very plausible, a fortiori given Lewiss
analysis of causation. I am well aware of the great plethora of objections to principles
such as (1) (e.g., problems related to issues of early, late, and trumping preemption). I
20 Cartwright (1983, pp. 5473) , cf. Hoefer (2008, p. 5ff), van Frassen (1990), Plantinga (2007, p. 132
133), cf. Foster (2007), Ratzsch (1987, pp. 383402). The Plantinga/Ratzsch view takes laws to be true
counterfactuals of divine freedom.
21 Cartwright (1999, pp. 4959).
22 The domain or universe of discourse is once again events. Let Cx mean that x has a cause. Let Ox mean

that x is such that it occurs.

23 The designation x will mean that x is a wholly contingent event. An event of Ss having P at a
metaphysical index I is wholly contingent just in case Ss having P at I could have failed to obtain.
24 This proposition is a schema of sorts.

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think that each of these would-be objections has corresponding responses to them.25
However, due to space constraints, I will be unable to reproduce those responses here,
and can only refer the reader to the relevant literature.
With respect to premise (2), there are several ways we can motivate an affirmation. First, the adherent of the Lewisian version of the argument can simply take her
belief that (2) is true to be properly basic for her.26 If proper basicality is an intelligible notion, then our adherent need only entertain would-be objections to (2) and not
necessarily provide independent non-epistemically circular propositional evidence for
(2). Second, several philosophers have proffered rather plausible arguments for the
claim that all wholly contingent events are such that they could be caused.27
I have limited the admission here in (2) to wholly contingent events, because stating
that every event has a cause leads quickly to absurdity.28 For recall that, at the start
of the paper (note one), I disclosed that I would be assuming that events are property
exemplifications. Surely though, there is an event (on that analysis) that just is all of
reality, or at least the sum of all actual property exemplifications. Or, if we were to
assume mereological universalism, we could posit that, the mereological sum S that
is all of reality, has the property of being such that it is all of reality (call this property
P) at the actual world, is an event proper (call it E).29 Given the idea that all events
have causes, E must have a cause. But, the causing of E must itself be incorporated
by S. It seems that we are caught in a vicious regress.
If we limit our claim to, all wholly contingent events have causes, then we can
escape the reductio above. This is because S is not merely the sum of all wholly
contingent events. We cannot coherently suppose that all of reality is an aggregate of
wholly contingent events. This is easy to show. S having the world-indexed property
being such that it exists at w, at the metaphysical index w, will not be wholly contingent.30 But Ss having that property at w, is a part of S. At every world, S has this
property at w. Since my analysis of a wholly contingent event demands that the event
of Ss having P at a metaphysical index I is wholly contingent just in case Ss having
P at I could have failed to obtain. Ss having the world-indexed property P at w is
not wholly contingent. Thus, S is not merely the sum of all wholly contingent events.
Suppose though, that you were to focus the objection in such a way that you maintained that S should be restricted to the sum of all wholly contingent events. Is it not
25 See some of Lewiss responses in Lewis (2004), cf. Paul (2009), and Ramachandran (2004), though
Ramachandrans final analysis suggests that counter-factual dependence isnt even a sufficient condition
for causation (2004, p. 400).
26 And here Im assuming the following account of warrant and basicality: belief b has warrant for a

cognizer c if and only if c forms b with properly functioning cognitive faculties, faculties which function
in a congenial epistemic environment, an environment with a design plan, and an environment aimed at
truth. Furthermore, there must be no successful defeaters for b. Now b will be properly basic for c when it
is the case that c has not inferred b from propositional evidence, and when the experience of grasping the
conceptual relations of the proposition b is aboutjust is the warrant-contributor for b. Plantinga (1993).
27 Koons (2000, pp. 107119), Pruss (2009b, pp. 6770).
28 I spell out whats meant by a wholly contingent event in note 24 above.
29 Van Cleve (2008, pp. 321333), cf. Markosian (2008, p. 341) who seems to admit that mereological
universalism is somewhat of a majority position among contemporary philosophers.
30 Keeping in mind the Kimian analysis of events as some object S having P at an index I.

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the case that Ss having a cause is itself a wholly contingent event? If it is, then, if C
were a cause of S (and call the event of some cause C causing S, E), then we would
also need a cause of E. As a consequence, it seems we are now stuck in the self-same
vicious regress suggested above.
Following Robert Koons, the best way to respond to this objection is to note that
there is no reason to think that E is a wholly contingent event. The event of the first
cause causing the cosmos, for example, would appear to be composed of two further
events: viz., the first cause on the one hand, and the cosmos on the other. The truth that
the first caused the second, does not represent a third event E in addition to the first
two. Rather, each statement is about single-case causal connections which supervene
upon the cause, the effect, and certain counterfactual dependence relations between
the cause and the effect. Therefore, the wholly contingent part of the causal nexus
which has as its relata C and S, is simply S itself. As Koons notes, we are forced only
to reaffirm that C caused S, and not that there is some further event E which requires a
cause.31 This response does assume that causal truths supervene on non-causal truths,
such as counterfactual dependence relations (or stepwise counterfactual dependence
relations).32
There is a second response to the reductio argument on offer, which does not depend
upon a reductionist counterfactual analysis of causation. Suppose that the cause C,
which brings about S, informs us about the causal activity of a god, or necessary
being. If we agree with Aquinas and other medievals about this god being simple, then
god just is gods activity, in which case gods activity must be necessary itself, being
identical to him. Thus, Cs bringing about S will not be a wholly contingent event that
is a part of the mereological sum that is S.33 It seems then, that the vicious regress is
escaped.
We should therefore limit our claim about possible causation to wholly contingent
events. But is there an argument that all wholly contingent events could have causes?
I have already alluded (cf. footnote 28) to the fact that some philosophers have proffered arguments in support of positive answers to this question. But one argument I
can quickly advance here suggests that support for the claim that all wholly contingent
events possibly have causes comes from empirical considerations. Every success in
science in reconstructing the causal antecedents of particular wholly contingent events
provides substantiation of (2). So there is inductive evidence for (2).34
Some libertarians about free will might object to (2). If the event in question is a
free choice, then, by analysis of what a free choice is, it is metaphysically impossible
for it to be caused.35 So how does the proponent of (2), even the one who claims that
(2) is properly basic for her, respond to the libertarian?
Suppose, as Pruss does, that we could think of agents as the sorts of entities that
could stand in causal relations. Assume that we have an agent a1 who performs an
31 Koons (2000, pp. 118119).
32 Paul (2009, p. 168).
33 See on this Pruss (2009a, p. 76).
34 See Koons (2000, pp. 111112).
35 Thanks to Tomis Kapitan for bringing this objection to my attention.

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action p freely (in the libertarian sense of the term). But now why can we not say
that a1 is the cause of p? Even if you thought that freedom is an intrinsic property
of an action, we could still say that the state of affairs of a1 freely choosing p has a
cause, vi z. a1 . We could also say that a1 s making the choice between p and q while
being impressed upon by reasons r1 rn is the cause of p. So, if this understanding
of agent causation is even possibly true, then it is possible that the relevant event of
a1 s freely choosing p has a cause, and the Lewisian argument can still run in a way
that is applicable to events possibly caused by agents.36
What about principle alpha? The principle says that, when q is necessarily true,
and it is conjoined with a contingent truth p, such a conjunction materially implies
that, were p false, then it would be the case, that were p true, q might still be true. The
would-counterfactual [p  (p q)], if true, is non-vacuously true, since
the antecedent of (4) supposes that p is contingently true. Thus, if p were assumed to
be false, it is only at least false at one possible world and not necessarily false.37 The
proposition [p  (p q)] is true just in case the [p & (p q)]-world
is closer to the actual world than the [p & (p q)]-world is. But, (p q)
is true at no world, since it is quite easy to see how there is a p-world, viz. the actual
world (as the antecedent of (4) grants), that belongs to a sphere S in a system of
spheres centered on itself (call that system centered on the actual world $i, where i is
the actual world). Since q is a necessary truth, every sphere S in $i that contains at
least one p-world, will also contain at least one world where both p and q are true.
Thus, (p q) is always false on Lewiss semantics, given the antecedent of (4)
above. So, the [p & (p q)]-world is closer to the actual world than the [p and
(p q)]-world is. Therefore, [p  (p q)] will be true on Lewiss
semantics for counterfactuals, on the assumption that (q & p & p).
Prior to exploring the Lewisian argument further, I will need to say more about my
view of events. I construe events as property exemplifications, i.e., exemplifications
of properties by objects at an index. With Jaegwon Kim, the indices in question were
temporal indices. However, I affirm an inclusive disjunctive analysis, where events
are exemplifications of properties by objects at an ontological index more broadly. An
ontological index can include any of the metaphysical indices, particularly the indices
of space, time, and world.38 The exemplification of a property by an object at a world
is an event proper, irrespective of the fact that the object does not have a property at a
temporal index.
If one is sufficiently realist in ones ontology about propositions, then every world
would have a corresponding BCCF.39 In fact, a worlds BCCF marks that world out as
distinct from other worlds. On the realist view of propositions I am assuming, propositions can be rightfully understood as objects with properties. Moreover, propositions
would have world-indexed properties. For example, the property truth-in-w charac36 See Pruss (2009a)
37 As a consequence, on Lewiss semantics the proposition [p (p q)] will also be true. See

Lewis (1973, p. 21).

38 Yagisawa (2010, p. 53).
39 The BCCF on a world just is an aggregate of all contingently true propositions on that world. cf.

Plantinga (2003, pp. 229233) for an argument for realism about propositions.

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311

terizes all the propositions that are in fact true (where w is the actual world). Only the
BCCF at the actual world will have the unique property of being such that it is actual,
since the actual worlds BCCF has the unique property of being such that it is true at
the ontologically privileged world (on actualism).40 To illustrate this, one need only
give attention to the fact that, had w been actual and w1 not, the essence of w1 s BCCF
would not have been exemplified. For some object x, the property of being such that
x is actual, entails the property of being such that xs essence is exemplified, where a
property p entails a property q, if it is not possible that p be exemplified by an object
that lacks q. While the essence of the BCCF for w1 exists, it remains unexemplified at
w the actual world. The above follows only if essences are conceived of, as properties
had by objects essentially and incommunicably.41
Give attention with the minds eye to the world at which nothing more than necessarily existent objects exist. Call that world w2. w2 has a respective BCCF, and w2
is the only world at which its BCCF has the property of being such that its essence
is exemplified since the BCCF is a mereological sum of contingently true propositions.42 By consequence, w2 it is the only world at which the essence of its BCCF is
exemplified. In fact, no matter what world w wn is actual, the event of that worlds
BCCF having the property of being such that its essence is exemplified at that world
will be a wholly contingent event. That event could have failed to obtain precisely
because the BCCF in question could have failed to exemplify its essence.
One very interesting consequence of my argumentation is that, for any world w that
we presume is actual, the wholly contingent event of that worlds BCCF having the
property of being such that its essence is exemplified at w, occurs. We can therefore
begin an explication of the Lewisian argument with the following assumption:
(5):

x(x & Cx)

[Assumption]

The ordinary reading of this premise on S5 quantified modal logic is that there is
at least one event x such that x is essentially wholly contingent and x does not have
a cause. I have argued that, no matter what world is actual, there is some event at that
world that is wholly contingent. I have further argued that we can confidently affirm
the left conjunct of (5) with its quantifier, since at the actual world there is some event
that is essentially wholly contingent (viz. (where w is the actual world), ws BCCF
having the property of being such that its essence is exemplified at w).43 We can now
infer the following:
40 In fact, I will use the locutions, being such that it is true at the ontologically privileged world, and

being such that it is actual interchangeably.

41 This view of essences has been defended nicely in Plantinga (2003, pp. 111120).
42 There are contingently true propositions at worlds at which everything that exists is a necessarily existent

being. For example, it will be contingently true that that maximal state of affairs obtained. That is to say
some other world could have been actual. Likewise, at that world, it will be contingently true that Alvin
Plantinga does not exist.
43 This event (call it E) is essentially such that it is wholly contingent in that this event only occurs at w,
since w is the only world at which S can have the property of being such that its essence is exemplified.
Therefore, E only exists at w. On actualism, a property p is essential to an object o, just in case at all worlds
at which o exists, o never fails to have p. Since w is the only world at which E occurs, all the properties it
has at w will be essential to it. Therefore, its being such that it is wholly contingent will be essential to it.

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(6):
(7):
(8):
(9):
(10):
(11):
(12):

( & C)
( C):

C:
(& C & C):
[C  (C )]:
[C  (C O)]:

(13):
(14):

[C  (C  O)]
[C  (C O)]

(15):
(16):
(17):
(18):

C
(C & C):
x(x & Cx) (C & C):
x(x & Cx)

[EI (5)]
[UI (2)]
[Nec. Elim., Simp. (6)]
[MP (7), (8)]
[Conj. (6), (9)]
[DN, MP (3), (10)]
[(3) an events being wholly
contingent entails that it occurs]
[UI (1)]
[from (13) by Lewiss semantics
for CFs]
[Lewiss semantics for CFs44 ]
[Conj. (9), (15)]
[CP (516)]
[Reductio (17)]

And obviously, from (18), we can infer that there is no wholly contingent event
which occurs without a cause:
(19):

x(x & Cx)

[Nec. Elim (18)]

3.1 The Lewisian argument and counterexamples

The reductio argument from Sect. 2.1 will not run per the Lewisian argument, since
the Lewisian argument does not make use of the Brouwer Analog, but instead appropriates principle alpha, which, as I have shown, is thoroughly consistent with Lewiss
semantics for counterfactuals.45 Likewise, the counter-example of Sect. 2.2 will not
be applicable per the Lewisian argument, since that counter-example maintained that
q was the proposition that the natural laws are what they actually are. On non-necessitarian accounts of laws, this is merely contingently the case. Thus, in order for there
to be a strict implication relation between q, and ps contingent truth, q must be a
contingent truth. But, the Lewisian argument affirms principle alpha, and, as a consequence, suggests that q is a necessary truth.46 Therefore, the Lewisian version escapes
the reductio of Sect. 2.2.
4 Objections from quantum physics
I have argued that, it is a consequence of our best logic of counterfactuals, and maybe
our best understanding of at least one necessary condition for causation that, all wholly
contingent events have causes. Some scientists and philosophers, however, think that
this conclusion faces opposition in the physics of quantum mechanics (QM). I want
to turn my attention to such opposition here in this section.
44 The axiom used here to make this inference is: [(p  q) & (p  q)] p .
45 I explained just how it is consistent with those semantics.
46 cf. Principle alpha above.

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313

Is the quantum state of a physical system at the end of a temporal interval, determined by its quantum state at the beginning of the interval? Yes. The evolution of
the state is governed by the famous Schrdinger equation, and this determines the
quantum state at a later time from its form at the beginning of the interval. Supposed
indeterminism is introduced at the stage of determining the values of the outcomes of a
measurement.47 Specifying the observable quantity we use the measurement relevant
physically possible outcomes for the measurement process is fixed (see footnote 47).
But, the quantum state attributed to the system allows one to infer that a given one of
these outcomes will arise with a certain probability. Knowing that a system has been
prepared in a given manner at one time, and even knowing that the system has not
been interfered with in a given time interval, will not generally let us predict that one
and only one value of an observable will be obtained, if that observable is measured
at the end of the time interval (see footnote 47).
Although the quantum state does not fully determine which of the outcomes will
obtain, the outcome that does obtain might be determined by some factor not taken into
account by the quantum state. Quantum states could be less than complete descriptions
of the world, and something outside the quantum state may play a role here. David
Bohms view of QM invoked an idea like this, and his ideas were later sharpened by
John Bell.48 The BohmBell interpretation uses the same empirical content that we
see in QM, and it also utilizes the same mathematical formalism peculiar to QM. The
difference between it and other interpretations is its underlying metaphysic. Bohm
and Bell assumed that every material particle has a perfectly determinate position.49
For Bohm and Bell, the motion of particles is completely deterministic. Probabilities
on this view of QM are merely epistemic. The so-called modal interpretations of QM
are very similar in that they also (arguably) view the probabilities merely epistemically.50 And, in the literature, (despite the brief attraction to von Neumanns proof),
most philosophers of science seem to be comfortable with the claim that there is nothing inconsistent in the postulation of deterministic models of quantum phenomena.
Even the no hidden-variable argument of Kochen51 , will not hold up against viewing the nature of a measured quantity contextually. The Kochen proof attempted to
show that, the interrelationship among measured values predicted by quantum theory, are incompatible with any possibility of these values being fully determined by
underlying values of hidden parameters. Such a conclusion will be false, given the
underlying metaphysic of an interpretation akin to BohmBell, or modal views of
quantum phenomena. So, quantum physics seems to provide my argumentation with
no real defeaters, since the BohmBell interpretation of the phenomena appear to be
at least possibly true.52

47 Sklar (1992, p. 205).

48 Bell (1987).
49 Albert (1992, pp. 134135).
50 Bohm (1952), van Frassen (1991).
51 Kochen (1985, pp. 120).
52 cf. Salmon (1998, pp. 280281).

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I should add that, even if Copenhagen interpretations of quantum phenomena were

correct, I have not specified precisely what I mean by the Rx y relation with respect
to the Pruss-argument. There is a significant group of philosophers of science and
metaphysicians who adhere to probabilistic analyses of causation.53 On such analyses, the presence of spatio-temporally continuous causal processes between events is
not required for real causal connectivity between those two self-same events. On the
probabilistic analyses, what is important to causal relations is the fact that changing
a cause makes a difference to the relevant effect(s), and that such difference making
shows up in probabilistic dependences between cause and effect.54 This is particularly
pertinent because the criticisms of the theories of Good, Suppes, and Reichenbach55
(adherents of probabilistic analyses) lean heavily upon the suggestion that causal relations involve spatiotemporally continuous causal processes which join any two causal
relata in view together. The odd thing is that while folks like Wesley Salmon and
others affirm this, they admit that their demand for such connectivity is moot at the
quantum level.56 But what good is our analysis of causation if it has counterexamples
at the quantum level?
If Salmon and others were to suggest that there just is no such thing as causation in
quantum physics, then we will need an argument not dependent upon the stipulation
that causation requires spatial-temporal contiguity via causal processes between cause
and effect. An appeal to the absence of causation in quantum physics by definitional
fiat, in no way shows that probabilistic analyses (or even counterfactual analyses of
indeterministic causation) are mistaken. For, if the non-classical correlations between
observables in quantum entanglement can be appropriately understood in terms of
one observable being counterfactually dependent upon another, or in terms of one
observable making a difference to the other, and that difference showing up in probabilistic dependence, then it would seem we have causation at the quantum level without spatio-temporally continuous causal processes joining the two causally connected
events or objects together.57
What I have suggested in the above discussion, is that if the counter-example of
Sect. 2.2 can be overcome by advocating a necessitarian view of laws, and furthermore,
if one could provide a semantics for counterfactuals that was consistent with Prusss
Brouwer Analog58 , probabilistic analyses of causation provide the proponent of the
Pruss-argument with good reasons for embracing even indeterministic interpretations
of QM without thereby jettisoning the conclusion of that argument. Moreover, with
53 Good (1961, 1962), Salmon (1998, pp. 208232), Hall (2005, pp. 505506).
54 Williamson (2009, p. 187).
55 Suppes (1984), Reichenbach (1946).
56 cf. Salmons comments in Salmon (1998, pp. 280281).
57 One may still very well have present spatial-temporally continuous causal processes joining the imagined events or observables in question, even in the quantum entanglement case. For on something like
the Bohm-Bell interpretation of QM, a guide wave exists which connects the observables (the particles)
such that the hidden variables are the particles themselves existing as functions of the guide wave. So even
if one thought there should be spatial-temporally continuous causal processes joining causally connected
events, on Bohms interpretation of QM we have just such contiguity even when considering quantum
entanglement.
58 As perhaps what one sees in Pruss (2009b).

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respect to the Lewisian argument, one need only appeal to the possible truth of deterministic interpretations of quantum phenomena in order for the relevant conclusion to
follow.

5 Conclusion
Every event that occurs at the actual world that could be caused must be caused. That
was my audacious thesis. I have provided two deductive arguments for this thesis. One
argument requires a non-standard semantics for counterfactuals, the other argument
does not, since it rests on weaker principles consistent with Lewiss take on counterfactuals, as well as his analysis of causation. The Pruss-argument cannot be affirmed
without embracing an exotic view of natural laws so as to escape an intuitively plausible counter-example to one of its premises. The Lewisian version of the argument
is therefore preferable. Quantum physics is nothing to worry about, since causation
could be probabilistic in nature, and BohmBell interpretations (and perhaps modal
interpretations) of QM are at least possibly true.
Acknowledgment I would like to thank Valia Allori, Joshua Armstrong, Carl Gillett, Ned Hall, Tomis
Kapitan, Timothy OConnor, J. Brian Pitts, Alexander Pruss, Joshua Rasmussen, Michael Sweiger, and
Christina Weaver for their comments on this paper.

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