ABBAS VS.

ABBAS
In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas
Goo, mother of Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a
ceremony which was meant to welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas
is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the ceremony was actually
his marriage with Gloria Goo. Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against
Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo. To prove the validity of their
marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by Abbas as
well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The
marriage contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to
Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar,
which states that the marriage license, based on its number, indicated
in the marriage contract, was never issued to Abbas but to someone
else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC on the ground that there was no diligence to search
for the real source of the marriage license issued to Abbas (for it could
be that the marriage license was issued in another municipality).
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void
ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of
marriage which is the issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil
registrars certification enjoyed probative value as her duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of the local
civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence
it stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it
conclusive that there was in fact a valid marriage license issued to him
nor does it cure the fact that no marriage license was issued to Abbas.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The absence of any
of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio. Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning.

MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner, -versus- MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,

SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and
THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki
filed a petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki,
to file the petition.
ISSUES & RULING:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
is applicable.
No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the
rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a

crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment
is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts
to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties,
or on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen
who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are
limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,

Respondent.
FACTS:

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were

married, as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6,
2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the
pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer
did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the
parties married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she
contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to
pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer
$2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition for
citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
HELD: The marriage between the parties is valid
CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, established the principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the
time they were married.This standard was modified with the passage
of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which
now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was
not ntered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the
United States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading
immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used
purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to
rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a

marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the
United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided erely
because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a
nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be
(1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
A reely givenconsent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud,
force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is
best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply
with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.
GRANTED.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private

respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding
against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an
affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of
2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by
the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the
respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the
complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a
divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is
SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made
permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not
merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to

institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have
the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the
raison detre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged
offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing
at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the
latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the
same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer
the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.