PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
WALPAN
LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL
WARPAN, appellant.

alias

Ponente: PANGANIBAN
FACTS:
The trial court found the appelant guilty of
maintaining a drug den, an offense for which
was
sentenced
to reclusion
perpetua. Appelants guilt was established by
the testimony of Prosecution Witness , who
himself had used the extension house of
appellant as a drug den on several occasions,
including the time of the raid. The formers
testimony was corroborated by all the raiding
police officers who testified before the
court. That appelant did not deny ownership of
the house and its extension lent credence to
the prosecutions story.
The trial court also convicted appellant of direct
assault with multiple counts of attempted
homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused
[of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who
were about to enter his house to serve a
search warrant x x x constituted such complex
crime. Aside from finding appellant guilty of
direct assault with multiple attempted homicide,
the trial court convicted him also of the
separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA
8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant can be convicted
separately of illegal possession of firearms
after using said firearm in the commission of
another crime.
HELD:

NO. The appealed Decision was affirmed with

modifications. Appellant is found guilty only of
two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple
attempted homicide with the use of a weapon
and (2) maintaining a drug den.
RATIO:
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted
of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that no other crime was committed
by the person arrested. If the intention of the
law in the second paragraph were to refer only
to homicide and murder, it should have
expressly said so, as it did in the third
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should [the courts].
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively
exonerates appellant of illegal possession of
an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries
a penalty heavier than that for direct
assault. While the penalty for the first is prision
mayor, for the second it is only prision
correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade
conviction for illegal possession of firearms by
using such weapons in committing an even
lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight
physical injuries, both of which are punishable
by arresto menor. This consequence, however,
necessarily arises from the language of RA
8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the
Courts review. Any perception that the result
reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has
no discretion to give statutes a new meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and
language of the legislature. [The Court's] task
is constitutionally confined only to applying the
law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and
[this Court] have done so in this case.
People vs. LadjaalamG.R. Nos. 136149-51.
September 19, 2000
Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellant: Walpan Ladjaalam alias
WarpanPonente: J. Panganiban

FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant
Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of
which he was found guilty, to wit: 1)
maintaining a drug den in violation of Section
15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as
amended by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3)
direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide. The following information was
provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997,
more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to
the house of appellant and his wife to serve the
search warrant when they were met by a volley
of gunfire coming from the second floor of the
said house. They saw that it was the appellant
who fired the M14 rifle towards them.2) After
gaining entrance, two of the police officers
proceeded to the second floor where they
earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he
noticed their presence, the appellant jumped
from the window to the roof of a neighboring
house. He was subsequently arrested at the
back of his house after a brief chase.3) Several
firearms and ammunitions were recovered
from appellants house. Also found was a pencil
case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils
inside, each containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride.4) A paraffin test was conducted
and the casts taken both hands of the appellant
yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates.5)
Records show that appellant had not filed any
application for license to possess firearm and
ammunition, nor has he been given authority
to carry firearms.
ISSUE:Whether or not such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
HELD:No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially
provides that any person who shall unlawfully
possess any firearm or ammunition shall be
penalized, unless no other crime was
committed. Furthermore, if homicide or

murder is committed with the use of an

unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. Since the crime committed was
direct assault and not homicide or murder,
illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed
an aggravating circumstance.
Criminal Law; Special Penal Laws: CELINO
v. CA, G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007
Brief Facts:
Two separate Information were filed
against the petitioner, Angel Celino: one for
violation of the Comelec gun ban; the other, for
Illegal Possession of Firearm under R.A. 8294.
After pleading not guilty to the former, he filed
a Motion to Quash on the latter contending
that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms x x x if he was also
charged of having committed another crime of
[sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the
same set of facts x x x.
Issue:
Whether the mere filing of an information
for gun ban violation against him necessarily
bars his prosecution for illegal possession of
firearm because of the provision of the law that
"Provided, however, That no other crime was
committed by the person arrested."
Ruling:
Ruling against the petitioner, the High
Court explained that he can be convicted of
illegal possession of firearms, provided no
other crime was committed by the person
arrested. The word committed taken in its
ordinary sense, and in light of the
Constitutional presumption of innocence,
necessarily implies a prior determination of
guilt by final conviction resulting from
successful prosecution or voluntary admission.
Citing the case of People v. Valdez (1999),
the Supreme Court ruled that all pending
cases involving illegal possession of firearm
should continue to be prosecuted and tried if
no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic
Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.
In sum, when the other offense involved is
one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any

information for illegal possession of firearm

should be quashed because the illegal
possession of firearm would have to be tried
together with such other offense, either
considered as an aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element
of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted
coup detat. Conversely, when the other offense
involved is not one of those enumerated under
R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be
prosecuted.
PEOPLE VS RODIL
Facts: Accused Floro Rodil was charged under
an Information that states that on April 24,
1971, with the use of a bladed dagger,
attacked and stabbed to death Philippine
Constabulary Lieutenant Guillermo Masana in
Indang, Cavite. The Information also alleges
that Masana was in the performance of his
official duties when the accused attacked him.
April 24, 1971: Masana, the deceased,
together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel,
Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo
Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang,
Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in
front of the Indang market.
While inside, they saw accused outside
through the glass window of the restaurant.
Rodil was blowing his whistle.
His attention drawn by what Rodil was doing,
Masana,
dressed
in
civilian
clothes,
accompanied by Fidel, went out of the
restaurant. He introduced himself as a PC
officer, and asked Rodil whether the gun
tucked on his waist had a license. Instead of
answering the question, Rodil moved a step
backward and tried to draw his gun. Fidel
immediately grabbed Rodils gun and gave it to
Masana.
The three went inside the restaurant. Masana
and Rodil occupied a separate table. Masana
placed the gun on the table, pulled out a piece
of paper and wrote a receipt for the gun and
signed it. He asked Rodil to countersign it, but
he refused. Rodil even asked Masana to return
the gun to him, and of course Masana did not

grant his plea. As Masana was about to stand

up, Rodil pulled out a double-bladed dagger
and stabbed Masana several times, on the
chest and the stomach which led to his death.
Indang Chief of Police Primo Panaligan was
also inside the restaurant taking his lunch and
helped in wresting the dagger from Rodil.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the specific circumstance of
contempt of, or insult to public authority can be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
(2) Whether or not the specific circumstance of
insult or disregard of rank can be appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance
Held:
(1) YES. In the case at bar, the aggravating
circumstance of, or insult to, public authority
under paragraph 2, Article 14 of the RPC can
be appreciated. Evidence of prosecution
clearly established that Indang Chief of Police
Primo Panaligan was present in the restaurant
as he was having lunch there too when the
incident happened, which belies Rodils
allegations that he went to the municipal police
station and reported the incident as selfdefense to the Chief. As a matter of fact, the
chief of police was the one who embraced or
grabbed Rodil from behind, wrested the dagger
from him and subsequently brought him to the
Indang municipal building. The chief of police
should be considered a public authority or a
person in authority for he is vested with
jurisdiction and authority to maintain peace and
order and is specifically duty bound to
prosecute and to apprehend violators of the
law and municipal ordinances.
(2) YES. The aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank should be appreciated
because the victim identified himself as a PC
officer to Rodil who was merely a member of
the Anti-Smuggling Unit and was therefore
inferior both in rank and social status to the
victim. The difference in official and social
status between a PC lieutenant and a mere
member of an anti-smuggling unit is patent. If
Rodil was charged with the complex crime of
murder with assault against an agent of a

person in authority and not merely murder,

then the aggravating circumstance of disregard
of rank may not be appreciated because that
circumstance will be absorbed into the charge
of assault against an agent of a person in
authority. But in the case at bar, the Information
charges Rodil with murder only. Therefore, the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
may be appreciated in the imposition of
penalties.
EFFECT TO PENALTY IMPOSABLE: With two
aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstance, the appellant is condemned to
suffer the maximum period of reclusin
temporal, the penalty prescribed for homicide.
G.R. No. L-30449 October 31, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs.ANTONIO GARCIA Y CABARSE
alias "TONY MANOK" and REYNALDO
ARVISO V REBELLEZA alias "RENE
BISUGO," defendants-appellants.
Wenceslao B. Trinidad for appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant
Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and
Solicitor Adolfo J. Diaz for appellee.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of April 17,
1969 by the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig,
Rizal, which found the accused guilty of murder
and sentenced them to the death penalty.
The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the
lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Mrs.
Corazon Dioquino Paterno, sister of the
deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. She testified
that at the time of the incident, she resided at
Ventanilla Street, Pasay City. She lived at
Pasay City for about five months before
moving to another dwelling at Timog Avenue,
Quezon City. While residing at Pasay City, she
conceived a child and during this period, it was
not unusual for her, accompanied by her
husband, to step out of the house in the wee

hours of the morning. They set out on these

irregular walks about five times.
During her residence at Pasay City, her brother
Apolonio visited her family for about twenty
times. Sometimes her brother would stay
instead at their parents' house at Muntinlupa,
Rizal. He usually spent his weekends in his
residence at Bo. Balubad, Porac, Pampanga.
Apolonio and her husband were very close to
each other; whenever Apolonio paid them a
visit, he usually slept in the house and sought
their help on various problems.
Before the incident which gave rise to this
case, Corazon's husband informed her that he
saw Apolonio engaged in a drinking spree with
his gang in front of an establishment known as
Bill's Place at M. de la Cruz Street. Pasay City.
In her sworn statement before the Pasay City
Police executed on November 3, 1968,
Corazon surmised that her husband must have
been painting the town red ("nag good time") in
that same place. Upon learning this information
from her husband, Corazon obtained
permission to leave the house at 3:00 a.m. so
she could fetch her brother. At that time, she
had not been aware that Apolonio was in
Pasay City; she had been of the belief that he
was with his family in Pampanga. She went to
fetch him because she wanted him to escape
the untoward influence of his gang. In
explaining the rationale for her noctural
mission, she employed in her sworn statement
the following language: "Dahil itong si Junior ay
meron na kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng
barkada niya sa paggawa ng hindi mabuti."
On her way, as she rounded the corner of P.C.
Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing
a group of about seven persons, including the
two accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo
Arviso. She recognized the two accused
because they were former gangmates of her
brother; in fact, she knew them before the
incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and
"Rene Bisugo, " respectively.
Corazon saw that the chase was led by the two
accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp
instrument. Later, in the course of giving her
sworn statement before the Pasay City Police

on , November 3, 1968, Corazon positively

Identified Antonio and Reynaldo, who were
then at the office of the General Investigation
Section, Secret Service Division, Pasay City
Police Department. She also stated that if she
saw the other members of the group again,
perhaps she could likewise Identify them. At
the trial, Corazon likewise pointed out the two
accused. During the incident, she exerted
efforts to Identify the other group members,
taking care to conceal herself as she did so.
She heard a gunshot which caused her to seek
cover.
When she ventured to look from where she
was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the
group catch up with her brother and maltreat
him. Some beat him with pieces of wood,
others boxed him. Immediately afterwards, the
group scampered away in different directions.
Antonio was left behind. He was sitting astride
the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the
latter in the back with his long knife. Corazon
was not able to observe where Antonio later
fled, for she could hardly bear to witness the
scene.
When Corazon mustered the courage to
approach her brother, she saw that he was
bathed in a pool of his own blood. The incident
threw her in a state of nervous confusion, and
she resolved to report the incident to her
younger sister, who lived at Lakandula Street,
Pasay City. Her sister in turn decided to break
the news to their father at Muntinlupa.
Subsequently, Corazon learned that the police
authorities were searching for her brother's
gangmates for having killed him. She also
learned that the suspects were in hiding. On
the same day October 19, 1968
accompanied by her family, she went at 2:00
p.m. to the Police Department to inquire about
her brother's corpse. They were directed to the
Funeraria Popular, where an autopsy was held.
Sometime later, on November 1, 1968, she
transferred residence to Quezon City.
Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. testified that he
conducted a post-mortem examination on the
cadaver of the decedent Apolonio, and that he
prepared the corresponding Necropsy Report.

Dr. Cueva found that the deceased suffered 22

stab wounds in the different portions of his
hips; in the front portion of the chest and neck;
in the back portion of the torso; and in the right
hand. He testified that the wounds sustained
by the deceased brought about a massive
hemorrhage which caused death. He also
testified that it is possible that the instrument
marked as Exhibit "B" could have been used in
inflicting the multiple stab wounds sustained by
the deceased, except the stab wounds on the
neck.
Both the accused took refuge in the defense of
alibi. Antonio Garcia claimed that at that time of
the incident starting with the chase and
ending with the victim's death in the morning
of October 19, 1968, he was at a place called
Pacita's Canteen which adjoins Bill's Place at
M, de la Cruz Street. Reynaldo Arviso claimed
that in the evening of the preceding night
(October 18, 1968) he went on a drinking spree
with his friends at Pacita's Canteen. He went
home at 10:30 p.m. and slept up to 7:00 a.m.
of October 19, 1968. From 7:00 a.m. of that
day, he performed his duties as a bus
conductor by calling for passengers near
Pacita's Canteen.
The trial court pinpointed the issue as revolving
around the Identity of the persons who
participated in the killing of the deceased. it
banked on the testimony of the witness,
Corazon Dioquino, who positively Identified the
accused as participants in the attack. Noting
that "the defense did not even attempt to
present any evil motive on the part of the
witness," the court concluded that "the two
accused took part in the perpetuation of the
crime charged." It gave short shrift to the
defense of alibi presented by the two accused,
noting that, by their own admission, the two
accused were residents of the vicinity of the
crime.
In respect of the circumstances attending the
crime it said:
But considering the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime; superior strength; and treachery,
which three aggravating circumstances had
been
sufficiently
established
by
the

prosecution, the same cannot be offset by said

voluntary surrender to a person in authority of
his agent, plus the uncontested fact that
deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. suffered no
less than 22 stab wounds, convincing evidence
of the apparent criminal perversity of the
accused, the court, therefore, has no
alternative but to impose the supreme penalty.
And rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court
finds the accused, Antonio Garcia v Cabarse
and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
Murder under Article 248, of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged under Article 248, of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the
information, and considering the aggravating
circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime, each one of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The two accused are further ordered to
indemnify, the heirs of the deceased, Apolonio
Dioquino, Jr. in the amount of TWELVE
'THOUSAND (P12,000,00) PESOS, jointly and
severally and to pay their proportionate share
of the costs.
In their Brief, the accused contended that the
lower court erred: in not considering nighttime
and superior strength as absorbed in
treachery: in finding nighttime as an
aggravating circumstance despite absolute
absence of evidence that nighttime was
purposely sought to insure the execution of the
crime; in finding superior strength as an
aggravating circumstance despite absence of
evidence to sustain such a finding; in finding
treachery as an aggravating circumstance
despite absence of evidence to that effect; in
not stating the qualifying circumstance of the
alleged crime; in holding that the accused
Reynaldo Arviso stabbed and hit the victim
when there is no evidence as to the
participation of the said accused Arviso in the
execution of the alleged crime; and in failing to
consider the material inconsistencies, prejudice
and other circumstances in the uncorroborated
testimony of the only eyewitness, rendering
said testimony not worthy of belief.

The assignment of errors by the accused is

anchored on their attempt to discredit the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution, a function
which, if successfully undertaken, would totally
obliterate the nexus between the accused and
the crime. The defense vigorously maintained
that the testimony of the only eyewitness is a
fabrication, and that she was in fact absent
from the scene which she described in both her
sworn statement and in her testimony at the
trial.
The defense asserted that Corazon Dioquino's
testimony
was
riddled
by
material
inconsistencies. The defense sought to
capitalize on the discrepancy of a sketch made
by Corazon and the sketch made by Pasay
City Electrical Engineer Jaime Arriola.
Corazon's sketch shows Juan Sumulong
Elementary School to be right in front of P.C.
Santos Street; while Arriola's sketch shows that
the school is about 135 meters from the corner
of the street. The defense contended that the
discrepancy was a deliberate falsehood on the
part of the witness,
Corazon testified that she was near the corner
of P.C. Santos Street when she saw her
brother under chase in front of the school, and
that she met the group in front of the school in
a matter of five seconds, more or less. The
defense assailed her testimony on this point as
incredible on the ground that the distance
between the point where she saw her brother
being chased, up to the point where she met
them, is 135 meters, and no human being can
cover that distance in five seconds. Moreover,
Corazon testified that she was 20 meters away
from the place where the accused caught up
with her brother. Again, the defense criticized
her testimony in this respect by pointing out
that the true distance is 175 meters.
The defense insisted that Corazon's sketch of
the locale of the crime (Exhibit "1") constitutes
"the high point of falsity of her testimony." The
defense sought to substantiate this claim by
arguing that from her sketch, it appears that
she never crossed paths with her brother or his
pursuers. The witness testified that she saw
her brother at the point which is four to five
meters from the corner of P.C. Santos Street.

Yet she also testified that she saw the incident

from 20 meters. The witness claimed she hid
after hearing the shot at a point which is 170
meters from the scene of the crime. The
defense argued that she could not have
covered the distance in such a short time, and
that this belies her claim that she was only 20
meters from the scene of the crime. The
defense pointed out that Arriola's sketch
(Exhibit "2") shows that the school is 135
meters from the scene of the crime, and the
point where the witness claimed she viewed
the crime is 170 meters from the scene of the
crime thus giving the lie to her claim that she
was 20 meters away.
The alleged inconsistencies in Corazon's
testimony which the defense makes much of
are not irreconcilable with the physical facts,
At the outset, it should not be overlooked that
Corazon was testifying as an eyewitness to the
traumatic incident by which her brother met a
violent death at the hands of a mob. Naturally,
Corazon can not be expected to deliver a
testimony which passes microscopic scrutiny
and scrupulous armchair analysis of the facts,
conducted under circumstances far removed
from the turbulence and emotional color of the
event as it actually transpired. Al contrario, if
Corazon's
testimony
were
meticulously
accurate with respect to distance covered and
the time taken to negotiate it, an impartial
observer would wonder whether such
exactitude were not the product of previous
rehearsal, if not of fabrication. In times of
stress, the human mind is frequently
overpowered by the ebb and flow of emotions
in turmoil; and it is only judicious to take into
consideration the natural manifestations of
human conduct, when the physical senses are
subdued by the psychological state of the
individual.
Corazon was a resident of Pasay City for only
about five months. She testified that she is not
familiar with the streets along M. de la Cruz
Street. Moreover, Corazon did not categorically
testify that she covered the distance of 135
meters in five seconds. Mole accurately, she
testified that she walked for a period of from
five to ten seconds, more or less. Put in this
way, the period was sufficient to allow her to

negotiate the distance. Moreover, Corazon did

not stay rooted to one spot while the incident
was taking place, but surreptitiously edged her
way up to Magtibay Street, which is closer to
the place of the killing.
The defense also claims that the delay which
Corazon allowed to transpire, before reporting
the crime to the authorities and giving her
sworn statement (on November 3, 1968), is
indicative of fabrication. The killing took place
before dawn of October 19, 1968, In the
afternoon of the same day, Corazon and her
family went to the Police Department to inquire
about the remains of her brother. Corazon
already knew that the police were taking steps
to round up the killers. She incurred no fault in
waiting until the culprits were arrested before
confronting them and giving her statement. It
would have been the better part of legal
procedure if she had given her statement
earlier; but since she was only a 22-year old
housekeeper at that tune, she can not be held
to a higher standard of discretion.
The defense further contends that the failure to
present Corazon's husband in court indicates
that Corazon was not actually at the scene of
the crime at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It the
defense felt that the husband had a
contribution to make in the cause of truth, there
was nothing which prevented them from
compelling his process by summons. This they
failed to do; and their omission should not be
taken to reflect adversely on the prosecution,
who evidently believed that the husband's
testimony was unnecessary,
Finally, the defense claims that it was unnatural
for Corazon, after viewing her brother's body,
to proceed to her sister's house one kilometer
away, instead of returning to her own house,
which was just a block or so away. It is not
unnatural for a witness to a gruesome event, to
choose to confer with a person bound to her by
ties of consanguinity, even if such a conference
necessitates that she traverse a longer
distance. The exercise of judgment, on the
spot, should not be gauged by reason applied
in hindsight with a metrical yard stick.
The next major burden which the defense

undertook to assume was to contend that the

accused Reynaldo Arviso is innocent because
there is no evidence as to his participation in
the execution of the crime. It is claimed that
there is absolute absence of evidence to show
that Reynaldo was a direct participant and that
the only evidence against him is that he was
seen pursuing the victim. However, the finding
of Reynaldo's guilt stems, not from his direct
participation in the criminal execution, but from
his participation in the conspiracy to kill the
deceased. His participation in the conspiracy is
supported by Corazon's testimony that he and
Antonio were the leaders of the pack following
closely at the heels of the victim.
It is well established that conspiracy may be
inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves, when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design. A concerted assault upon
the victim by the defendants may indicate
conspiracy. (PP v. Monroy & Idica, L-11177,
Oct. 30, 1958, 104 Phil. 759). Conspiracy
exists if, at the time of the commission of the
offense, the defendants had the same criminal
purpose and were united in its execution. (PP
v. Datu Dima Binahasing, L-4837, April 28,
1956, 98 Phil. 902). Those who are members
of the band of malefactors by which a murder
is committed and are present at the time and
place of the commission of the crime, thus
contributing by their presence to augment the
power of the band and to aid in the successful
realization of the crime, are guilty as principals
even if they took no part in the material act of
killing the deceased. (US v. Abelinde, No. 945,
Dec. 10, 1902, 1 Phil. 568; People v.
Carunungan, L-13283, Sept. 30, 1960, 109
Phil. 534). To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to previous
agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient
that the malefactors have acted in concert,
pursuant to the same objective. (PP vs. San
Luis, L-2365, May 29, 1950, 86 Phil. 485).
Conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence of acts charged, but may and
generally must be proven by a number of
indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances
which vary according to the purpose to be
accomplished. If it be proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards

accomplishment of the same unlawful object,

each doing a part. so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in
fact
connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy maybe
inferred though no actual meeting among them
to concert is proven (PP v. Colman L-6652-54,
Feb. 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 6). A conspiracy may
be entered into after the commencement of
overt acts leading to the consummation of the
crime. (PP v. Barredo, L-2728, Dec. 29, 1950,
87 Phil. 800). Conspiracy implies concert of
design and not participation in every detail of
execution (PP v. Carbonel, L-24177, March 15,
1926, 48 Phil. 868; PP v. Danan, L-1766,
March 31, 1949, 83 Phil. 252).
When a group of seven men, more or less,
give chase to a single unarmed individual
running for his life, and they overtake him and
inflict wounds on his body by means of
shooting, stabbing, and hitting with pieces of
wood, there is conspiracy to kill; and it does not
detract from their status as conspirators that
there is no evidence of previous agreement, it
being sufficient that their wills have concurred
and they labored to achieve the same end.
The defense submits that the failure of the
lower court to specify the qualifying
circumstance in the crime of murder is violative
of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We
find no such infirmity. Since the principle
concerned is "readily understood from the
facts, the conclusion and the penalty posed.,
an express specification of the statute or
exposition of the law is not necessary." (People
vs. Silo, L-7916, May 25, 1956, 99 Phil. 216).
In the absence of a specification by the trial
court, the defense surmised that the qualifying
circumstance in this case is evident
premeditation: but the defense argued that
evident premeditation was not shown. We
agree. Under normal conditions, conspiracy
generally presupposes premeditation. But in
the case of implied conspiracy, evident
premeditation may not be appreciated, in the
absence of proof as to how and when the plan
to kill the victim was hatched or what time
elapsed before it was carried out, so that it can
not be determined if the accused had

"sufficient time between its inception and its

fulfillment dispassionately to consider and
accept the consequences." There should be a
showing that the accused had the opportunity
for reflection and persisted in executing his
criminal design. (PP v. Custodia, L-7442,
October 24,1955, 97 Phil. 698; PP v. Mendoza
and Sinu-ag, L-4146 and L-4147, March 28,
1952, 91 Phil. 58; PP v. Yturiaga, L-2816, May
31, 1950, 86 Phil. 534; PP v. Lozada, No.
46998, Nov. 16, 1940, 70 Phil. 525; PP v. Upao
Moro, L-6771, May 28, 1957, Phil. 101 Phil.
1226; PP v. Sakam, No. 41566, Dec. 7, 1934,
61 Phil. 27: PP v. Peralta, L-19069, Oct. 29,
1968, 25 SCRA 759; PP v. Pareja, L-21937,
Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693).
Even in the absence of evident premeditation,
the crime of murder in this case might still be
qualified by treachery, which is alleged in the
information. But the defense argued that
treachery was not present. We are so
convinced. It is an elementary axiom that
treachery can in no way be presumed but must
be fully proven. (US v. Asilo, No. 1957, Jan. 30,
1905, 4 Phil, 175; US v. Arciga, No. 1129, April
6, 1903, 2 Phil. 110; PP v. Durante, No. 31101,
Aug. 23, 1929, 53 Phil. 363; PP v. Pelago, L24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027), Where
the manner of the attack was not proven, the
defendant should be given the benefit of the
doubt, and the crime should be considered
homicide only. (Carpio, 83 Phil. 509; Amansec,
So Phil, 424).
In People vs. Metran (L-4205, July 27, 1951,
89 Phil. 543). the aggravating circumstances of
aid of armed men, abuse of superiority, and
nocturnity, were considered as constituting
treachery, which qualified the crime as murder,
since there was no direct evidence as to the
manner of the attack. However, in this case we
believe that the correct qualifying circumstance
is not treachery, but abuse of superiority. Here
we are confronted with a helpless victim killed
by assailants superior to him in arms and in
numbers. But the attack was not sudden nor
unexpected, and the element of surprise was
lacking. The victim could have made a
defense; hence, the assault involved some risk
to the assailants. There being no showing
when the intent to kill was formed, it can not be

said that treachery has been proven. We

believe the correct rule is found in People vs.
Proceso Bustos (No. 17763, July 23, 1923, 45
Phil. 9), where alevosia was not appreciated
because it was deemed included in abuse of
superiority.
We find that abuse of superiority attended the
offense, following a long line of cases which
made this finding on parallel facts Our
jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that
where four persons attacked an unarmed
victim but there was no proof as to how the
attack commenced and treachery was not
proven, the fact that there were four assailants
would constitute abuse of superiority. (People
vs. Lasada, No. 6742, Jan. 26, 1912, 21 Phil.
287; US v. Banagale, No. 7870, Jan. 10, 1913,
24 Phil. 69). However, the information does not
allege the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superiority; hence, this circumstance can only
be Created as generic aggravating. (People v.
Acusar, L-1798, Dee. 29, 1948, 82 Phil. 490;
People v. Beje, L-8245, July 19, 1956, 99 Phil.
1052; People v. Bautista, L-23303, May 20,
1969, 28 SCRA 184).
The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the
morning. It may therefore be said that it was
committed at night, which covers the period
from sunset to sunrise, according to the New
Civil Code, Article 13. Is this basis for finding
that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised
Penal Code, Article 14, provides that it is an
aggravating circumstance when the crime is
committed in the nighttime, whenever
nocturnity may facilitate the commission of the
offense. There are two tests for nocturnity as
an aggravating circumstance: the objective
test, under which nocturnity is aggravating
because it facilitates the commission of the
offense; and the subjective test, under which
nocturnity is aggravating because it was
purposely sought by the offender. These two
tests should be applied in the alternative.
In this case, the subjective test is not passed
because there is no showing that the accused
purposely sought the cover of night time. Next,
we proceed and apply the objective test, to
determine whether nocturnity facilitated the
killing of the victim. A group of men were

engaged in a drinking spree, in the course of

which one of them fled, chased by seven
others. The criminal assault on the victim at
3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover, which
handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and
encouraged impunity by persuading the
malefactors that it would be difficult to
determine their Identity because of the
darkness and the relative scarcity of people in
the streets. There circumstances combine to
pass the objective test, and e find that
nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated
the commission of the offense. Nocturnity
enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their
impulses with the false courage born out of the
belief that they could not be readily Identified.
The information alleges that the crime of
murder was attended by the two qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation. Neither of these qualifying
circumstances was proved; hence, the killing
can not be qualified into murder, and
constitutes instead the crime of homicide,
which is punished by reclusion temporal. It is
not controverted that the accused voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities; they are
therefore
entitled
to
the
mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. This lone
mitigating circumstance offset by the two
generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superiority and nocturnity, produces the result
that in the crime of homicide, one aggravating
circumstance remains.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo
is hereby modified in that the two accused,
Antonio Garcia y Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso
y Rebelleza, are sentenced to undergo an
indeterminate imprisonment of 10 years as
minimum to 18 years as maximum, but in all
other respects affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
SUEENE DISCALSOTA y JUGAR,
appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Without any proven qualifying circumstance,

a killing constitutes homicide which is punishable

by reclusion temporal, not death. Where the attack
was made openly and the victim had ample
opportunity to escape, treachery cannot be
appreciated.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the
Decision[1] dated September 28, 1998, issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City
(Branch 53), finding Sueene Discalsota y Jugar
guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt. The
decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,thecourtfindstheaccusedSueene
Discalsota,aliasRonniedelaPea,GUILTYofthe
crimeofMurder,punishedunderArticle248ofthe
RevisedPenalCodeasamendedbyR.A.7659,of
HerbertSuarnaba.ApplyingArt.63,oftheRevised
PenalCode,paragraph2,No.1,ontheapplication
ofindivisiblepenalties,whichprovidesthat
wheneverthereispresentonlyoneaggravating
penalty,thegreaterpenaltyshallapplied,andthere
isnomitigatingcircumstance.TheCourthereby
imposesupontheaccusedSueeneDiscalsotathe
penaltyofDEATH.
Theaccusedisfurtherorderedtopaytheheirsof
thedeceasedthesumofP50,000.00,ascivil
indemnity;P30,000.00asmoraldamages,and
P25,000.00asactualexpensesforthewakeand
funeral,andcosts.[2]
The Information[3] against appellant reads as
follows:
Thatonoraboutthe24thdayofJanuary,1996,in
theCityofBacolod,Philippines,andwithinthe
jurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theherein
accused,withoutanyjustifiablecauseormotive,
beingthenarmedwithabladedweapon,withintent
tokillandbymeansoftreacheryandevident
premeditation,did,thenandtherewilfully,
unlawfully,andfeloniouslyassault,attackandstab
withsaidweapononeHERBERTSUARNABAY
CATALAN,therebyinflictinguponthepersonof
thelatterthefollowingwounds:
I.W.4cm,leftposteriorlumbararea,levelofL2

L4penetratingRetroperiton[e]alCavitycompletely
transactingleftkidney,inferiorpole,penetrating
abdominalcavitycompletelytransactingpancreas,
body,perforatingposteriorsurfaceofStomach,
punduswithmassivegastricspillage.
CauseofDeath:HypovolemicShock2
whichwerethedirectandimmediatecauseofhis
death.
When arraigned on July 9, 1997, appellant,
with the assistance of counsel,[4] pleaded not
guilty.[5] In due course, the former was tried by
the RTC which found him guilty of murder.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this
wise:[6]
Atabout1:00P.M.ofJanuary24,1996,the
victim,HerbertSuarnaba,16yearsold,alongwith
hisneighborhoodfriends,JennyAplaza(17years
old),PedroRamos(17yearsold)andRowell
Lavega(17yearsold)left6thStreet,BacolodCity
andwenttoPlazaMart,ashoppingmall,where
theyloiteredforaboutanhourortwo.They
decidedtovisittheirfriend,Novieboydel
Rosario,whousedtobetheirneighboratPurok
Pagasabutwhoha[d]sincetransferredtoLibertad
Baybay.Theytook[a]jeepneyandarrivedthereat
around3:00P.M.Theyproceededtotheinner
portionofthebarangay,passingbyseveralhouses
[o]nafootwalktothehouseofNovieboydel
Rosario.Theywerewelcomedbythelatterand
[they]thenlistenedtomusiconthetaperecorder.
WhenNovieboysmotherarrived,sheoffered
themchorizo(sausage)whichshebroughtwith
herfromKalibo.
Whilepeacefullyenjoyingthemselves,theywere
suddenlystartledbyshoutscomingfromagroupof
menoutsidethehouse.Lookingout,theysaw
aboutnine(9)menwiththeirleadershouting:Gua
kamodira,kaypamatyontakamo!Ngaanagsulod
sulodkamodirisaamonteritoryo?Guakamodira

kaypamatyontakamo!(Youthere,getoutandwe
willkillyou!)Thefour(4)teenagerswereterrified
sincetheydidnotknowthemenwhowere
threateningthem.Nordidtheyknowofanygrudge
ormisunderstandingbetweentheirgroupandthe
menoutside.TheythencalledMrs.DelRosario
(Novieboysmother)whoadvisedthemnottogo
outofthehouseandcalledforthepolice.However,
afterwaitingforsometime,nopoliceassistance
came.Mrs.DelRosariothenwentoutandreturned
withfour(4)barangaytanods.Thetanodsentered
thehouseandtalkedtotheteenagersandassured
themthatnoharmwouldcometothemandthat
therewouldbeapoliceBac[k]upwaitingfor
themattheroad.Thegroupwasthenescortedout
ofthehousebythetanodsandwereaccompanied
bytwo(2)ofthemandMrs.DelRosariotowards
thefootpathleadingtothemainroad.Itwas
alreadyduskbythattime.Thementhreatening
themwerestilloutsidewhentheywentoutofthe
houseandtheyfollowedthegroup.Whenthe
groupreachedthemainroad,nopoliceBac[k]up
wasinsightbutMrs.DelRosarioremainedwith
them.
Therewasasingletrisikad(pedicab)outsideand
thefour(4)boardedit.Sincethepedicabcould
onlyaccommodatetwo(2)personsinside,Rowell
Lavegastoodontherailatthebackofthepedicab
whilethevictimsatinfront.
ThepedicabhadnotleftwhenRowellsawaman
runningtowardsthemfromthefootwalk.Hewas
about50metersawaywhenRowellfirstsawhim.
ThefourjumpedoutofthepedicabwhenMrs.Del
Rosarioandthepeoplethereshoutedatthemto
run.Despiteeffortsbythebarangaytanodstostop
him,themanrushedheadlongtowardsRowelland
thevictim.HewasabouttostrikeatRowellwhen
Mrs.DelRosariopushedRowelltorun.WhenMrs.
DelRosariofelldownasiftofaint,thevictim
helpedherstandup.Mrs.DelRosariothentoldthe
victimtorunandheranaroundthepedicabmore
thanafootlong.Whilethevictimwasrunning
awaytryingtoescape,themanholdingtheknife
caughtupwithhimandthrusthisknifeatthe
fleeingvictimwhowashitattheback.Thevictim
fellandcrawled,whilegaspingforbreath,andhe
managedtoenterahousepleadingforhelp.

Rowellsawwhathappenedtohisfriendand
wantedtohelphimbutcouldnotbecausethe
attackerwasstillthere.Afterseeingthevictimfall
down,bloodied,hisattackerrantowardstheinterior
ofthebarangay.Meanwhile,Pedro,Jennyand
Rowellranasfast[as]theycouldbecausethe
companionsoftheattackeralsocamerushingoutof
thefootwalkandwerechargingatthemwithdrawn
knives.Theyescapedbeinghurtwhentheysought
refugeinthehouseofafriendattheoppositeside
ofthebasketballcourt.Mrs.DelRosariofainted
uponseeingtheattackonthevictim.
PedroandRowellrecognizedtheattackerasthe
onewhoearliershoutedatthemwhiletheywere
stillinsidethehouseofMrs.DelRosario.They
stayedforaboutanhourinsidethehouseoftheir
friendwheretheysoughtrefugeandtherethey
learnedthatthemanwhochasedthemandstruck
thevictimwasknownbythenickname,Yawaand
isalsoknownasRonniedelaPeaalthoughhisreal
nameisSueeneDiscalsota.Muchlater,whenthe
policefinallycameandinvestigatedthem,Pedro
wasshownpicturesofthesuspectsandhepicked
outthepictureofaccusedappellant.
LouieGregorio,areluctantwitnesswhotestified
onlyonpainofarrestforcontemptofcourt,
declaredthathewasaliveinpartnerofNieves
delRosario;thatwhilerestingatthehouseof
NievesdelRosarioaround4:00P.M.ofJanuary24,
1996,heconfirmedthatthevictimandthree(3)
otherswereatthehouseandthatnountoward
incidenthappenedwhiletheywereinsidethe
house.Severalminutesaftertheboyswereescorted
outofthehousebyfour(4)barangaytanods,he
learnedthatastabbingincidenthappenedoutside
andwhenhewentouttoinvestigate,hesaw
accusedappellantrunningtowardsthehouseofhis
girlfriend.Hewasonlyaboutfive(5)armslength
fromaccusedappellantwhowascarryinga
bloodiedlongknifewhichhedidnotevenbotherto
conceal.Heheardaccusedappellantshouting,
Naigokogid!(Igothim).Healsoconfirmedthat
RonniedelaPeaisthesameaccusedappellant
SueeneDiscalsota.
ThevictimwasrushedtotheCorazonLocsin
MontelibanoMemorialHospital.Hewasstillalive

whenthepoliceandhismotherarrived.However,
hewasalreadybreathingheavily,inacritical
condition,andcouldnolongerrespond.Afew
minuteslater,hewaspronounceddeadbythe
doctor.
Dr.HildegardB.Madalagconductedtheautopsy
onthebodyofthevictimandsubmittedaReportof
hisfindings(ExhibitD).Heconfirmedhisfindings
inopencourtandfurthertestifiedthatupon
examination,hefoundthekidneyofthevictim
completelytransactedortotallycut.Theknifes
entrypointwasattheback,adirectandstraight
thrustwhichwentthroughthree(3)vitalorgans
pancreas,stomachandthekidney,causingmassive
gastricspillage.Hegavethecauseofdeathinthe
CertificateofDeath(ExhibitE)asHypovolemic
shock.
Despitelackofcooperationfromtheresidentsof
theareawheretheincidenthappened,thepolice
authoritieswereabletoarrestaccusedappellanton
theidentificationofPedroRamosandRowell
Lavega.[7]
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the Public Attorneys
Office narrated appellants version of the incident as
follows:[8]
SUEENEDISCALSOTA,deniedthathewas[the]
onewhostabbedandkilledHerbertSuarnaba.He
testifiedthatintheafternoonofJanuary24,1996,
hewasintheirhouseatPurokKingfisher,Libertad
Baybay,BacolodCity,from3:00to5:00P.M.He
wastendingtheirstorewhereheactedascashier.
HiscompanionthereatwereoldersisterAileenand
youngersisterYvette.Heneverlefttheirstoreeven
after5:00P.M.WhenhismotherLiliaDiscalsota
arrivedfromtheCentralMarketshetookoverthe
choresinthestore.Heonlylearnedthattherewasa
stabbingincidentonthefollowingday(January25,
1996).
Helearnedthathewascharged[with]Murderon
April7,1997,whenhewasarrestedbypolicemen
inthehouseofhiswife,ChristinaatPurokTulihaw,
Brgy.16,BacolodCity.Hewassurprisedwhenthe

policemenpresentedawarrantforhisarrest.The
policementoldhimthathewasinvolvedina
murdercaseinLibertad,Baybay,BacolodCityin
January1996.Hedidnotwanttogowiththe
policemen,butitwasacertainTiyoErwinwho
prevaileduponhimtogowiththearresting
officers.HewasthenbroughttoBac[k]upIand
latertoheadquarters.Hewassubsequentlydetained
attheLockup.
Hefurthertestifiedthathe[did]notknowLouie
Gregorio,oneofthewitnessesfortheprosecution.
He[did]notknowwhetherLouieGregorio[was]
thecommonlawhusbandofNievesdelRosariobut
hemetheronlyattheCityjail,whenshevisitedher
commonlawhusbandMarcialFlores,inJanuary
1998.MarcialFlores[was]hisneighborat
Libertad,Baybay.
DiscalsotaalsodeniedleavingLibertad,Baybay,
BacolodCityaftertheincident.Hewasthereon
January25,1996,andhewasevenabletoleave
theirhousethatday.Hecontinuedstayingintheir
housexxxuntilApril1996.Eventuallytheir
housewasdemolishedin1997andhisfamily
transferredtoTangub.Henevertheless,remained
intheareaandstayedwithhiswifeatherhousein
PurokTulinaw,whichwasjustabout30meters
awayfromthehouseofNievesdelRosario.
Hedeniedmembership[in]anyfraternity,much
lessU2.HedeclaredthatYawa,xxxMing,
MichaelBartolo,Dadan,werenothisneighbors,
butadmittedtheywereresidentsoftheplace.
ThesepersonsaremembersofRedOfraternity.
HedeniedknowingUlyssesTonggoy.Headmitted
knowingxxxAlfonsooneoftheCVOs
mentionedbyprosecutions[witness]Alfonsodela
Cruz.Hementionedthathe[was]notYawabut
oneStephen.
EVETTEDISCALSOTAcorroboratedthe
testimonyofSuenneDiscalsota.Shetestifiedthat
shewastendingtheirstorethewholedayofJanuary
24,1996.Hercompanionsthereatwereherbrother,
Sueene[;]andsister,Aileen.Theirstoreopenedat
7:00A.M.andclosedonthatparticularday,at9:00
P.M.herbrotherSueeneneverleftthestorefrom
7:00A.M.to9:00P.M.Sueenewasthenactingas

thecashieroftheirstore.
Shealsotestifiedthatshedidnotknowthather
brotherSueenewaschargedincourt.Whenher
brotherwasarrestedshewenttothepolicestation
andinquiredwhySueenewasdetainedandshewas
toldhehadacase.Shethentoldthepolicethaton
thedaytheallegedstabbingwascommittedSueene
wasnotabletoleavethehousethewholeday.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC ruled that appellant had positively
been identified by the prosecution witnesses as the
culprit responsible for the death of Herbert
Suarnaba. It gave no credence to the denial and
alibi proffered by appellant. It also appreciated
evident premeditation and treachery as qualifying
and aggravating circumstances, respectively, and
thus sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review before us.[10]
Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, appellant faults the trial court
with the following alleged errors:
I
Thetrialcourtgravelyerredinfindingaccused
appellantguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthe
crimeofmurderaschargedintheinformation
despitethefailureoftheprosecutiontoprovethe
qualifyingcircumstancesofevidentpremeditation
andtreachery.
II
Thetrialcourterredinimposingthedeathpenalty
upontheaccusedappellant.[11]
The Courts Ruling
Theappealispartlymeritorious.
Preliminary Matter

Appellant no longer questions the finding of

the RTC that he stabbed and killed Herbert
Suarnaba. However, an appeal in a criminal case
opens the whole case to review. Thus, we shall still
pass upon the matter.
The prosecution witnesses were one in
identifying appellant as the person who had wielded
a knife and stabbed the victim. Appellant had
nothing to offer in his defense but an alibi
corroborated by his two sisters. A careful scrutiny
of the records shows no reason to disbelieve the
prosecution witnesses and to overturn the court a
quos finding that they were credible.
Basic is the rule that the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
the highest respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance.[12]
Also, the RTC was correct in disregarding the
alibi of appellant. As it aptly ruled, his defense of
alibi crumbles in the face of the positive
identification of the accused by prosecution
witnesses as being present in the scene of the
crime.[13]
First Issue:
Evident Premeditation and Treachery
Appellant contends that evident premeditation
should not have been appreciated by the trial court
as a qualifying circumstance.
It is settled that qualifying circumstances
cannot be presumed, but must be established by
clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as
the killing itself.[14]
[F]orevidentpremeditationtobeappreciated,
theremustbeproof,asclearastheevidenceofthe
crimeitselfofthefollowingelementsthereof,viz:
(a)thetimewhentheaccuseddeterminedtocommit
thecrime;(b)anactmanifestlyindicatingthatthe
accusedhasclungtohisdetermination,and(c)
sufficientlapseoftimebetweenthedetermination
andexecutiontoallowhimselftoreflectuponthe
consequencesofhisact.[15]
In this case, the first two elements of evident

premeditation are present. As found by the RTC,

the time appellant determined to commit the crime
was when he started shouting at the victim and the
latters companions: You, there, get out and we
will kill you! By staying outside the house and
following the victims companions when they came
out, he manifestly indicated that he clung to his
determination.
As for the third element, the prosecution
evidence shows that appellant started shouting
outside Mrs. del Rosarios house at 3:30 p.m.[16]
When the victims group left the house, it was not
yet dark;[17] it was only past four oclock in the
afternoon.[18] The police received information on
the stabbing incident at 4:30[19] p.m. on the same
day. It took less than an hour from the time
appellant evinced a desire to commit the crime, as
manifested by his shouts outside the house, up to
the time he stabbed the victim. The span of less
than one hour could not have afforded the former
full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the
consequences of the crime he committed.
The essence of premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act must be preceded by
cool thought and reflection on the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[20]
Tojustifytheinferenceofdeliberate
premeditation,theremustbeaperiodsufficientina
judicialsensetoaffordfullopportunityfor
meditationandreflectionandtoallowthe
conscienceoftheactortoovercometheresolution
ofhiswillifhedesirestohearkentoits
warning.[21]
Where no sufficient lapse of time is
appreciable from the determination to commit the
crime until its execution, evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated.[22] Hence, the lower court
erred in holding that evident premeditation qualified
the killing to murder.
No Treachery
Appellant also argues that treachery did not
attend the commission of the crime.
There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods, or forms of attack that tend directly and

specially to insure the execution of the crime

without risk arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.[23]
For treachery to exist, two essential elements
must concur: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b)
the said means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted.[24] Treachery cannot be
presumed; it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence or as conclusively as the
killing itself.[25]
In the present case, the victim had the
opportunity to escape or to defend himself. Before
he and his group left the house of Mrs. del Rosario,
they had already been forewarned of violent
aggression from appellant, whose words and stance
while outside the house made its imminence clear.
The mode of attack adopted by appellant was not
without risk to himself; neither was it sudden.
When he began his menacing approach, he was
visible to the victim and the latters companions.
Appellant was out in the open and thus at risk from
any defense which the group might make. The
presence of such risk and the existence of ample
opportunity for the victim to escape or defend
himself negated treachery.
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty

We affirm the RTCs award of P50,000 as

civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
However, the grant of actual damages should be
reduced to P10,890, since this is the only amount
duly supported by a statement of account and
receipts. To justify an award of actual damages, it
is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and on
the best evidence obtainable by the injured party,
the actual amount of loss.[27]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide
and is SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of
10 years of prision mayor medium as minimum to
17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum. The grant of civil indemnity
and moral damages is AFFIRMED, but that of
actual damages is reduced to P10,890. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 138306-07. December 21, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
SPO1
EDUARDO
ANCHETA Y RODIGOL, accusedappellant.
DECISION

In his Brief, appellant further claims to have

been a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime. This matter was, however, not raised during
the trial. Furthermore, in his direct examination
held on June 11, 1998, he stated for the record that
he was a 20-year-old married man. Hence, we
cannot agree to appreciate minority as a privileged
mitigating circumstance.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant

may be convicted of homicide only. Considering
further the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal should be in the medium period[26] and
encompassed by the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol[2] was

originally charged with Homicide in Crim. Case
No. C-44939 and Frustrated Homicide in Crim.
Case No. C-44940. However, upon motion of
private complainant, a reinvestigation was
conducted and the Informations were amended to
charge the accused with Murder in Crim. Case No.
C-44939 and Frustrated Murder in Crim Case No.
C-44940.

Damages

This is an appeal from the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court Caloocan City finding SPO1
accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y
Rodigol guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No. C44939 and of Frustrated Murder in Crim. Case No.
44940.[1]

In the amended Information for Murder, it

was alleged that the accused "with deliberate intent
to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot one Julian Ancheta y Rodigol on
the left temple, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious physical injuries, which injuries caused the
victims death."[3] On the other hand, in the
amended Information for Frustrated Murder it was
alleged that the accused "with deliberate intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot with a gun one Jonathan Aromin y
Cardinez on the right cheek, thus performing all the
acts of execution which would constitute the crime
of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the herein accused, that is, due to
timely, able and efficient medical attendance
rendered to the victim."[4]
During trial, the main witness for the
prosecution, Jonathan Aromin, testified that on the
night of 2 September 1993 he and his neighbor
Julian Ancheta went to the house of the accused
who lived just across them.[5] Julian told Jonathan
to knock on the door first but when no one
answered Julian did the knocking himself.[6] When
the accused opened the door, Jonathan immediately
noticed that SPO1 Ancheta was armed with a gun.
Intimidated, Jonathan began to move away.[7] As
he left the house of the accused, Jonathan suddenly
heard two (2) shots which prompted him to hide
behind the nearest wall. But when he looked back
the accused SPO1 Ancheta was already aiming his
revolver directly at his face and without hesitation
shot him at close range.[8] Stunned by the gunshot
wound, Jonathan momentarily blacked out but soon
regained consciousness when his neighbor, Leonila
Lopez, came to his aid and rushed him to the Jose
Reyes Memorial Medical Center.[9] At the hospital,
the slug that pierced his right cheek was removed
from his left shoulder and was subsequently
released on 7 September 1993.[10]
Leonila Lopez narrated that her house was
right across the house of the accused, separated only
by a narrow alley.[11] At around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening of 2 September 1993 while she was
preparing dinner, she was startled by the sound of
two (2) gunshots coming from the house of the
accused. She immediately told her children to go

inside and as she was about to close her windows

she saw Jonathan Aromin running towards her
house, followed by the accused. She then saw the
accused shoot Jonathan Aromin on the right cheek.
After the accused left, she helped the hapless victim
and brought him to the hospital.[12] She was
approximately a meter away when she witnessed
the shooting.[13]
Virginia Ancheta, wife of Julian Ancheta,
testified that she and her deceased husband had two
(2) children and that she incurred P54,200.00 as
funeral expenses for his burial.[14]
Dr. Roberto Garcia, a Medico-Legal Officer
of the NBI, testified that he autopsied the body of
Julian Ancheta on 3 September 1993. Julian
sustained three (3) gunshot wounds. One (1)
bullet pierced the the back of his left forearm and
exited in front thereof, another entered the rear left
portion of the neck and exited through the right rear
portion thereof, while the fatal bullet pierced the
front portion of the left ear without an exit wound.
[15] However, although Dr. Garcia concluded that
three (3) bullets hit the deceased, he did not
discount the possibility that the three (3) wounds
could have been caused by only two (2) bullets as
the left arm, being a movable part of the body,
might have been in the way when the bullet exited
through the neck of the victim.[16]
Police Officer 3 Feliciano Almojuela of the
Intelligence and Investigation Division, PNP
Station, Caloocan City, claimed that in the early
morning of 3 September 1993 he received a report
of a shooting incident at Block 36, Phase 3-F-1
Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City.[17] Upon reaching
the crime scene he was informed that the slain
victim was S/Sgt. Julian Ancheta of the Philippine
Air Force and the suspect was the deceaseds
brother SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta. When he learned
that another victim was confined at the Jose Reyes
Memorial Medical Center he went there and found
Jonathan Aromin in critical condition. Thinking
that the victim might not survive he immediately
interviewed him and took an "ante-mortem"
statement.[18] In the afternoon of the same day, the
accused voluntarily surrendered himself as well as
his service firearm at the PNP Station in Caloocan
City.[19] At around 11:00 p.m., PO3 Almojuela
brought the accused to the hospital where the latter
was positively identified by Jonathan Aromin as the
assailant.[20]

Dr. Abraham Gonzales, the resident physician

at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center,
testified that he was on duty on 2 September 1993
when Jonathan Aromin was admitted. Upon
examination he observed that the victim sustained a
gunshot wound on the right portion of his jaw and
no exit wound was visible.[21] During treatment,
the lead slug was recovered from the left side of the
neck or from the "trapicious muscle."[22] He added
that were it not for the timely medical intervention
Jonathan Aromin would have died.[23]
In his defense, the accused claimed that on the
night of 2 September 1993 he was sleeping at home
with his wife and son when he was awakened by the
sound of someone banging on his door.[24] After a
brief silence he heard him say: "Pare buksan mo
ito." Sensing danger, the accused took his gun
from under his pillow and ordered the person to
identify himself. But the stranger just kept on
banging the door and insisted that it be opened.[25]
When he finally opened the door, he saw his brother
Julian Ancheta and his neighbor Jonathan Aromin.
Upon seeing them, he inquired as to why his brother
addressed him as "pare" but instead of answering,
Julian Ancheta angrily asked him why he was
holding a gun.[26] To appease his brother, the
accused lowered his pistol and explained that the
gun was only for protection as he had no idea who
was banging his door in the middle of the night. He
then invited them into the house, but when he
turned around his brother suddenly grabbed his
hand from behind to disarm him.[27] As they
grappled, the gun accidentally fired twice and
the next thing he saw was his brother sprawled on
the ground and Jonathan Aromin was nowhere to be
found. He never knew what actually happened to
Jonathan Aromin as his back was turned against him
when the gun went off.[28]
Confused by the startling events, the accused
just took his family to the house of his wifes
cousin. His wife then convinced him to spend the
night with them and postpone his surrender until the
next day.[29] At around 6:00 o'clock p.m.[30] of 3
September 1993 he surrendered at the PNP Station
in Caloocan City. After being taken into custody,
PO3 Almojuela brought him to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital where Jonathan Aromin
identified him as the perpetrator.[31]
On 26 March 1999 the trial court, giving
credence to the prosecution witnesses, found the

accused guilty of both charges.[32] In Crim. Case

No. C- 44939, the accused was found guilty of
Murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He
was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P54,200.00 as
actual and compensatory damages and the costs. In
Crim. Case No. C-44940 the accused was found
guilty of Frustrated Murder and was sentenced to
ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum. He was also
ordered to pay Jonathan Aromin P30,000.00 as
moral damages and the costs.[33]
Accused-appellant, in his brief, raises two (2)
points: First, his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt as the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution failed to establish that
he intended to kill Julian Ancheta and Jonathan
Aromin. Second, the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting him of murder and frustrated murder
since there was no proof that the killing was
attended by evident premeditation or treachery.[34]
The defense of accused-appellant is that the
death of Julian Ancheta and the injury of Jonathan
Aromin were caused by the accidental gunshots
which occurred when he and the deceased grappled
for the gun. Thus, absent any intent to kill the
victims, he could not be convicted of homicide or
murder.
However, the evidence presented proves
otherwise.
The autopsy of Julian Ancheta reveals that he
sustained three (3) bullet wounds: one (1) in the
rear of the left forearm, another on the left rear
portion of his neck and the most fatal one, on the
front portion of his left temple.
On the other hand, Jonathan Aromin sustained
a gunshot wound on his right cheek which would
have caused his death had it not been for the timely
medical attention. Based on the number of bullet
wounds and the location of the injuries sustained by
the victims it is quite impossible to believe that such
wounds were caused by two (2) accidental gunshots
which ensued while the accused and the deceased
wrestled for the gun. On the contrary, the
location of the injuries proves that accusedappellant intentionally shot his own brother to death
and thereafter shot the eyewitness at point blank to

permanently silence him.

Further, Jonathan Aromin categorically and
positively identified accused-appellant as the person
who pursued and shot him at close range. This
Court has no reason to doubt his testimony for even
accused-appellant admitted that he and the witness
were in good terms prior to the incident.[35]
Neither does this Court have any ground to question
the veracity of Leonila Lopezs testimony that she
saw accused-appellant shoot Jonathan Aromin as
there was no proved ill motive on her part. Thus,
where there is no evidence to show any dubious
reason or improper motive why prosecution
witnesses should testify falsely against the accused
or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, such
testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[36]
Besides, it has been an established rule that unless
the trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance
and value, which if considered might affect the
result of the case, appellate courts will not disturb
the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial
court to the testimonies of witnesses.[37] We find
no reason to deviate from this well-entrenched
principle.
But although we affirm the factual findings of
the trial court on the presence of "intent to kill,"
we believe that the killing of Julian Ancheta and the
shooting of Jonathan Aromin were not qualified by
treachery.
While it was established that accusedappellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the
witnesses never saw how the killing started.
Treachery cannot be considered where the witnesses
did not see the commencement of the assault and
the importance of such testimonies cannot be
overemphasized considering that treachery cannot
be presumed nor established from mere
suppositions.[38] And where no particulars are
shown as to the manner by which the aggression
was commenced or how the act which resulted in
the death of the victim began and developed,
treachery can in no way be established.[39] Hence,
without the existence of treachery accused-appellant
can only be convicted of homicide in Crim. Case
No. C-44939.
Neither was treachery established in the
shooting of Jonathan Aromin. Two (2) conditions
must concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the
employment of means of execution that gave the

person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or

to retaliate; and, (b) the means or method of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.
[40] Both these circumstances must be proved as
indubitably as the crime itself.[41]
In the case at bar, however, there is no
sufficient proof to establish with certainty that
accused-appellant deliberately and consciously
adopted the means of executing the crime against
Jonathan Aromin. Furthermore, the victim was
already aware of the danger as he saw accusedappellant carrying a gun and heard two (2)
gunshots prompting him to run and hide behind a
wall.[42] Thus, there could be no treachery since
prior to the attack the victim was forewarned of the
danger to his life and even managed to flee, albeit
unsuccessfully.[43]
Consequently,
accusedappellant can only be convicted of frustrated
homicide in Crim. Case No.C-44940.
It must be noted that the testimonies of the
witnesses show that accused-appellant surrendered
himself on 3 September 1993 at the PNP Station in
Caloocan City. For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance the
following requisites must concur: (a) the offender
had not been actually arrested; (b) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority; and,
(c) the surrender was voluntary.[44] All these
requisites were present in this case as PO3 Feliciano
Almojuela confirmed that on 3 September 1993, the
day after the incident, accused-appellant voluntarily
gave himself up and his service firearm at the PNP
Station in Caloocan City.[45] Thus, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in his favor.
Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance,
namely, voluntary surrender, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its minimum period the
range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum shall be taken from the minimum of the
imposable penalty while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
which is prision mayor the range of which is six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
Article 50 of The Revised Penal Code

provides that the penalty next lower in degree than

that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated
felony. Thus, in Crim. Case No. C-44940, there
also being one (1) mitigating circumstance, the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall
be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period,
the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1)
day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree
which is prision correccional, in any of its periods,
the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial
court appealed from convicting accused-appellant
SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol of Murder in
Crim. Case No. C-44939 and Frustrated Murder in
Crim. Case No. C-44940, is MODIFIED.
In G.R. No. 138306 (Crim. Case No C44939), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y
Rodigol is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6)
years eight (8) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12) years
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal minimum as maximum. He is also
ordered to pay the heirs of Julian Ancheta
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P54,200.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, plus the costs.
In G.R. No. 138307 (Crim. Case No. C44940), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y
Rodigol is found guilty of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of two (2) years two (2) months and
twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum
as minimum to six (6) years four (4) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum.
He is also ordered to pay Jonathan Aromin
P30,000.00 as moral damages plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.
THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINESvs.
APOLONIOAPDUHAN,JR.aliasJUNIOR,ET
AL.
G.R.No.L19491August30,1968
CASTRO,
J.:
Facts:

TheundersignedProvincialFiscalaccuses
ApolonioApduhan,Jr.,aliasJunior,Rodulfo
HuisoandFelipeQuimsonofthecrimeofRobbery
withHomicide,committedasfollows:
Thatonoraboutthe23rddayofMay,1961,at
about7:00o'clockintheevening,inthe
MunicipalityofMabini,ProvinceofBohol,
Philippines,theabovenamedaccusedandfive(5)
otherpersons,allofthemarmedwithdifferent
unlicensedfirearms,daggers,andother
deadlyweapons,conspiring,confederatingand
helpingoneanother,withintentofgain,did
thenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously
enter,bymeansofviolence,thedwelling
houseofthespousesHonoratoMianoandAntonia
Miano,whichwasalsothedwellinghouse
oftheirchildren,thespousesGeronimoMianoand
HerminigildadeMiano;and,onceinside
thesaiddwellinghouse,theabovenamedaccused
withtheirfive(5)othercompanions,did
attack,hackandshootGeronimoMianoandanother
personbythenameofNorbertoAton,
whohappenedtobealsointhesaiddwellinghouse,
therebyinflictinguponthesaidtwo(2)
personsphysicalinjurieswhichcausedtheirdeath;
andthereafterthesameaccusedand
theirfive(5)othercompanions,didtakeandcarry
wayfromsaiddwellinghousecash
moneyamountingtoThreeHundredTwentytwo
Pesos(P322.00),PhilippineCurrency,
belongingtoHonoratoMianoandGeronimo
Miano,
ActcommittedcontrarytotheprovisionsofArt.
294,par.1,oftheRevisedPenalCodewith
thespecialaggravatingcircumstancethatthecrime
wascommittedbyabandwiththeuse
ofunlicensedfirearms(Art.296,Rev.PenalCode),
andotheraggravatingcircumstances,as
follows:
1.Thatthecrimewascommittedinthedwellingof
theoffendedpartieswithoutany
provocationfromthelatter;
2.Thatnighttimewaspurposelysoughttofacilitate
thecommissionofthecrime;and.
3.Thatadvantagewastakenofsuperiorstrength,
accusedandtheircompanions,whowere
fullyarmed,beingnumericallysuperiortotheoffendedparties
whowereunarmedand
defenceless.

Issue:
Whetherornotdwellingwasconsideredanaggravating
circumstance.
Held:YES.
Thesettledruleisthatdwellingisaggravatingin
robberywithviolenceor
intimidationofpersons,liketheoffenseatbar.The
rationalebehindthispronouncementis
thatthisclassofrobberycouldbecommitted
withoutthenecessityoftransgressingthe
sanctityofthehome.Moradaisinherentonlyin
crimeswhichcouldbecommittedinno
otherplacethaninthehouseofanother,suchas
trespassandrobberyinaninhabited
house.ThisCourtinPeoplevs.Pinca,citingPeople
vs.Valdez,ruledthatthe"circumstances
(ofdwellingandscaling)werecertainlynot
inherentinthecrimecommitted,because,the
PEOPLE VS ALFANTA 320 SCRA 357
Thursday, January 29, 2009 Posted by
Coffeeholic Writes

Issue: Whether the crime of rape should

be aggravated by nighttime. Whether
there was ignominy when the accused
forced the victim to engage in anal sex.

Held: The law defines night as being from

sunset to sunrise. By and itself, nighttime
would not be an aggravating
circumstance unless it is specially sought
by the offender or taken advantage of by
him, or it facilitated the commission of
the crime by insuring the offenders
immunity from capture. In the present
case, the accused abducted the victim,
brought her to an abandoned, unlit house
and then unleashed his carnal desire on
her, assured of the stillness of a sleeping
world.

Labels: Case Digests, Criminal Law

Facts: The victim, Nita Fernandez, was

asleep in the residence of a friend when
at around 12 midnight, a man she had
not seen before suddenly entered the
house, boxed her jaw and covered her
mouth with his had. He was pointing a
bolo at her and threatened to kill her if
she will resist. Thereafter, she was taken
and brought to a vacant house where the
stranger succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her. After the first
intercourse, she was ordered to lie face
down while the man sodomized her. Not
satisfied, the accused then inserted his
finger inside her. Thereafter, the man lay
down beside her and again threatened to
kill her. After a while, Nita noticed that
the man was asleep, she then stabbed
the man with the knife and hacked him
with the bolo when the former broke. She
was able to escape and go to the
authorities, who apprehended the man
later on identified as the accused.

With respect to ignominy, Art 14 par 17

of the RPC considers to be aggravating
any means employed or circumstance
that adds disgrace and obloquy to the
material injury caused by the crime. The
case of People vs Saylan is applicable. In
this case wherein the accused entered
the victim from behind, the offender
claimed that there was no ignominy
because the studies of experts have
shown that the position is not novel and
has been resorted to by couples in the
act of copulation. This may well be true if
the sexual act is performed by
consenting partners but not otherwise.

Ignominy- a circumstance pertaining to

the
moral order
, which adds disgrace and obloquy to
thematerial injury caused by the crime.

This aggravating circumstance is

applicable when the crimecommitted is
against
chastity
.
(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book
One)
People vs. Torrefiel
Facts:December 17, 1942, 5:00 p.m.
Torrefiel and Ormeo were on their way to
the USSAFE headquarters inthe
mountains. They passed by Eadys
residence and talked to him at the
balcony to ask for khakis.Eady had none
except what he had on.Ceferina Cordero
also came to the balcony and inquired
about their mission. She scolded Torrefiel
andOrmeo because all their belongings
have been looted by USSAFE soldiers.
Torrefiel threatened her with slapping;
brought out revolver. Eady and Cordero
were charged with being fifth columnists
as theyrefused to give aid to them.
Subsequently they were taken to the
USSAFE headquarters.Torrefiel took
charge of Eady and Ormeo took charge of
Cordero. Their hands were free but
wereblindfolded. Cordero called to Eady
every now and then to know if he was
following. After a while Eadydid not
respond anymore so they stopped to wait
for them. Torrefiel had taken the wrong
way so he went back to a guardhouse
and left Eady there. He tried to find a
way to overtake Ormeo and Corderobut
was unsuccessful. At the guardhouse, he
discovers Eady had escaped. Torrefiel
followed a differentroute enabling him to
find Ormeo and Cordero. Ormeo rushed
back to the guardhouse upon
discoveringthat Eady had escaped;
Cordero was left with Torrefiel.As Cordero
was about to urinate, Torrefiel pushed her
and carried her to a log and laid her on it
andraped her. Torrefiel began to unbutton
his pants and wound cogon leaves
around his genitals. It wasvisible to

Cordero as her blindfold had fallen down

a little. Pressing her neck so she would
remain silent,Torrefiel proceeded to have
intercourse with her. Ormeo, taking
advantage, also had sex with her.
Thesoldiers desisted from bringing
Cordero to their headquarters and
returned her to their house. A
servantinformed Cordero that Eady had
gone away. Upon Eadys return, Cordero
informed him that she wasabused by
Torrefiel.Issues:1) WON witness is
credible, and WON rape was
committed.2) WON there are any
aggravating circumstances.Held/Ratio:1)
YES to both.a. The court sees no
incongruity between the affidavit and
testimony of complainants. The
testimonysufficiently proves Torrefiels
guilt.i. Cordero recognized Torrefiel by his
voice even though she was blindfolded
because it wasfalling.ii. Back at Eadys
house, the soldiers roaming inside the
house is proven by the sound oftheir
footsteps.b. Exertion of force or violence
is implied in the term rape. Pushing
down the victim proves force.Although
for Ormeo, use of force may still be
doubted. Cordero was not hostile towards
him after crime.2) YES.a. Trial Court erred
in accepting the aggravating
circumstance of NOCTURNITY this was
entirelyunexpected as the ordeal started
early in the afternoon.b. IGNOMINY is
present.The novelty of the act of winding
cogon grass on his genitals before raping
the victim