DIGEST OF AGRARIAN-RELATED SUPREME COURT RULINGS (2000-2007)

JURISDICTION, THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DECIDE JUST COMPENSATIO

N CASES REMAINS WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WHILE ONLY THE PRELIMINARY DETER
MINATION THEREOF IS VESTED WITH THE DARAB; RESORT TO THE COURTS CANNOT BE FORECL
OSED ON THE THEORY THAT THE COURTS ARE THE GUARANTORS OF THE LEGALITY OF THE ADM
INISTRATIVE ACTION Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals, The Secretary
of DAR, DARAB, Davao City and Land Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 132767 (Janu
ary 18, 2000)
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao w
hich were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landles
s farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dis
satisfied with the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DARAB,
petitioner filed a petition for determination of the just compensation for its p
roperty with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao on January 26, 199
4. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15day reglamentary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. The Dec
ision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition for Review. Iss
ue:
Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in th
e determination of just compensation Held:

No. To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly Section 50 thereo
f, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides: "Land Valuati
on and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation.
The decision of
the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of
just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought dire
ctly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within f
ifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled
to only one motion for reconsideration."
As we held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, this Rule is an acknowledgement by
the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lan
ds under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the Courts. It is error to think that, becau
se of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the c
ourts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby bee
n transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance
with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in
the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the re
asonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agr
arian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the cour
ts. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and
exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For tha
t matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappeal
able. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that
courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action. Accordingly
, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period
provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial cou
rt correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
order of dismissal. ADMINISTRATOR/OVERSEER AT THE SAME TIME A TENANT, UNDER COMM
ON USAGE IN THE LOCALITY, THE TERM ADMINISTRATOR IS USED INTERCHANGEABLY WITH TE
NANCY Gerardo Rupa Sr. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Magin Salipot G.R.
No. 80129 (January 25, 2000)

Facts:
The case at bar involves an action for redemption with damages filed by Gerardo
Rupa Sr. against Magin Salipot. Rupa claimed that he had been a tenant of a parc
el of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu Lim for more
than twenty (20) years now, sharing the harvests on a 50%-50% basis. Also, that
he is the overseer over four parcels of coconut land owned by the Lim spouses. H
owever, without any prior written notice, the land tenanted by the petitioner wa
s sold to Magin Salipot for P5,000.00 in January 1981. Petitioner averred that h
e only learned of the sale on February 16, 1981, and that he sought assistance w
ith the local office of Agrarian Reform for the redemption of the questioned pro
perty and even deposited the amount of P5,000.00 with the trial court. However,
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
on the ground that Rupa was not a tenant of the subject property and thus, not
entitled to a right of redemption over the same. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
finds, in substance, that there is no clear and convincing evidence to show tha
t plaintiff was a share tenant of the spouses Lim and that Rupa is bound by his
admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U, entitled People of the Philippines. vs. Ma
riano Luzong filed six months after the instant case wherein he admitted that he
was the overseer and administrator of the five parcels of land owned by the Lim
spouses. Thus, negating his claim of tenancy. The CA therefore affirmed on appe
al the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition seeking the reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land or a mere overseer
thereof.
Held:
In the case at bar, we find that there are compelling reasons for this Court to
apply the exception of non-conclusiveness of the factual findings of the trial a
nd appellate courts on the ground that the "findings of fact of both courts is p
remised on the supposed absence of evidence but is in actuality contradicted by
evidence on record." A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, b
oth the trial court and the appellate court overlooked and disregarded the overw
helming evidence in favor of Rupa and instead relied mainly on the statements ma
de in the decision in another case. A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of R
epublic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from wit
hin his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed b
y another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the pr
oduce with the landholder

under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or a
scertainable in produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.
Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1. The par
ties are the landowner and the tenant;
2.
The subject is agricultural land;
3.
There is consent;
4.
The purpose is agricultural production;
5.
There is personal cultivation; and
6.
There is sharing of harvests.
Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, Rupa could avail of the
benefits afforded by R.A. No. 3844, as amended, particularly, Section 12 thereo
f which reads: "SECTION 12. Lessee's right of redemption.
In case the landholding
is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the
latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and conside
ration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided, f
urther, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be ent
itled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultiv
ated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within
two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any ot
her right of legal redemption."
As correctly pointed out by the CA, this right of redemption is validly exercise
d upon compliance with the following requirements: a) the redemptioner must be a
n agricultural lessee or share tenant; b) the land must have been sold by the ow
ner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale given to the lesse
e or lessees and the DAR in accordance with Section 11, RA 3844, as amended; c)
only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; d) the righ
t of redemption must be exercised

within 180 days from notice; and e) there must be an actual tender or valid cons
ignation of the entire amount which is the reasonable price of the land sought t
o be redeemed. The statements made in the decision that "[Rupa] claimed that he
was made administrator by the Lim spouses of their five (5) parcels of land in A
rmenia, Uson, Masbate" and that the "prosecution witnesses in that case, namely,
Pablito Arnilla and Antonieta Rongasan admitted that they were hired laborers o
f Rupa in tilling the land in question" should not have been relied upon by the
CA to conclusively disprove the tenancy relationship. First of all, we must look
at the context in which these statements were made. The admission made by Rupa
as stated in the decision was made, as mentioned earlier, in a criminal case for
malicious mischief which Rupa filed against one Mariano Luzong, son-in-law of S
alipot, on the ground that the latter destroyed the banana and cassava plants gr
owing in Rupa's farm. Said statement was apparently made to prove Rupa's standin
g to file the complaint and to prove how he could have witnessed the destruction
made by said person. Second, in claiming that he was administrator of the prope
rty, Rupa, a farmer of limited education must have used the word "administrator"
in a loose sense to mean one taking care of a certain piece of property by clea
ring and planting on the same. As aptly pointed out by counsel for Rupa during t
he trial, with no objection from the counsel of Salipot, "under common usage in
the locality, the term administrator is used interchangeably with tenancy. Third
, the CA did not bother to explain its finding on the "inherent incompatibility"
between being a tenant-farmer and an administrator or overseer. According to Ru
pa, he was tenant of one parcel of land belonging to the Lim spouses and adminis
trator or overseer of the other four parcels of land owned by the said spouses.
Salipot and his witnesses had interchangeably claimed Rupa to be an overseer and
a copra agent or copra buyer. As overseer, he may have been receiving a fixed s
alary. As tenant under our legal definition, he may have been sharing the harves
ts with the landowner. This may well lead a person to find an incompatibility be
tween the two. However, one could in fact be overseer of a parcel of land, super
vising the laborers therein and receiving a fixed salary for one's services, and
at the same time, act as tenant farmer in another landholding. Fourth, the test
imony of the prosecution witnesses that they were "hired laborers" should not ha
ve been given significant weight by the CA. The rule is well-settled that the ri
ghts of a person cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act or omission of ano
ther, except as provided by the Rules of Court in cases of admission by a co-par
tner, agent, conspirator and privies. The said witnesses do not come under any o
f these exceptions. As regards the certificate issued by the Office of the Treas
urer to the effect that Rupa was a copra buyer from May 19, 1978 to October 10,
1979, we find that this does not necessarily rule out Rupa's claim that he was a
tenant-farmer since 1962. Rupa has satisfactorily explained that "pursuing two
or three lines of work is nothing new. In coconut lands, harvest seasons come fa
r and in between, and the tenant can always engage in the business of copra-buyi
ng in the interim." Moreover, the dates indicated therein

cover only a short period of time as against Rupa's claim that he was tenant fro
m 1963 until his ejectment sometime in 1981. We are therefore constrained to ove
rturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ruled that the records do not establis
h Rupa's status as an agricultural tenant. Indeed, the testimony of Rupa and his
witnesses in open court, in our view, had not been convincingly rebutted and we
have no reason to doubt the veracity of the testimonies of his witnesses. Certa
inly, the passing statements contained in the decision in the criminal case for
malicious mischief cannot overcome the evidentiary value of the testimonies of s
aid witnesses. A meticulous review of the record would have found overwhelming e
vidence in favor of Rupa. A scrutiny of the entire evidence on hand would be in
line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small fa
rmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices. DECEIT/SQUATT
ING, RESPONDENT CANNOT IN GOOD FAITH ALLEGE TO BE A LAWFUL TENANT ONE MOMENT AND
BE AN OWNER THE NEXT
Raymundo T. Magdaluyo vs. Atty. Enrique L. Nace Adm. Case No. 3808 (February 2,
2000)
Facts:
Complainant accused respondent of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct.
Respondent was one of the squatters living in one of the complainant's parcels
of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal. Allegedly, when complainant offered to relo
cate the squatters, the latter refused and instead filed a complaint before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming to be tenants the
rein. Three months later, the squatters again including respondent also filed a
case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for the annulment or cancellati
on of complainant's land titles. This time, claiming to be owners and not mere t
enants of the land. They traced their alleged ownership to an old Spanish title.
Because of the conflicting causes of action, both cases were dismissed. Complai
nant filed a case against respondent accusing him of having deliberately committ
ed a falsehood and of forum-shopping praying that proper disciplinary sanctions
be imposed against the latter. Held:

After referral of the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the
findings of the former are as follows: ". . . while it may be true that differe
nt causes of action are indeed involved, it is their total inconsistency, nay, t
otal opposition with each other which raises doubts about the respondent's since
rity. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how Respondent can, in good
faith, allege to be a lawful tenant one moment, and be an owner the next.
Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the c
ourt of the law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint
the fact that a prior dispute had been existing between the parties before the
PARAB, thus deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciation of fact
s.
Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such
suits as appears to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be h
onestly debatable. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used a
s evidence of land ownership. Yet respondent dares raise the same in his complai
nt to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of title. Any lawyer shou
ld know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the face of
Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of land."
The Court concurs with the IBP's findings and recommendations being fully suppor
ted by evidence on record. Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the C
ode of Professional Responsibility against engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immo
ral or deceitful conduct. He was indeed, less than sincere in asserting two conf
licting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew not to b
e his. As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath not to do falsehood or conse
nt to its commission and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and v
iolation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary ac
tion. Said acts are clearly in violation of his lawyer's oath that the court wil
l not tolerate. RETENTION/EXEMPTION, AN APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION AND AN APPLICA
TION FOR RETENTION ARE DISTINCT REMEDIES IN LAW. FINALITY OF JUDGMENT IN ONE DOE
S NOT PRECLUDE THE SUBSEQUENT INSTITUTION OF THE OTHER Eudosia Daez and/or Her h
eirs, Represented by Adriano D. Daez vs. Court of Appeals, Macario Sorientes, Ap
olonia Mediana, Rogelio Macatulad and Manuel Umali G.R. No. 133507 (February 17,
2000)

Facts:
Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents. DAR Undersecret
ary Jose C. Medina denied the application for exemption upon finding that the su
bject land is covered under LOI 474, the petitioner's total properties having ex
ceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law. The Secretary of DAR, Benjamin T. Le
ong, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order and
disregarded an Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that they are not t
he tenants of the land. Their findings was that the Affidavit was merely issued
under duress. In the meantime, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the res
pondents. Undaunted, Daez next filed an application for retention of the same ri
celand under R.A. No. 6657. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allo
wed her to retain the subject riceland but denied the application of her childre
n to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to prove actual tillage or direc
t management thereof. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Gari
lao but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeal
s again reversed this Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Dec
ision of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. Hence, this Appeal. Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject
landholdings, despite the fact that a previous decision denying the petition fo
r exemption had long become final and executory
Held:
It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application fo
r retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of jud
gment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There wa
s, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for t
he retention of the subject 4.1865 hectare riceland, even after her appeal for e
xemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executo
ry.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject

to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compul
sory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an in
justice against the landowner. A retained area as its name denotes, is land whic
h is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the g
overnment from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landown
er afterwards, which would be a pointless process. The issuance of EPs and CLOAs
to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area
covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1994, an EP or CLOA
may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner
's retained area. TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CAN ONLY BE CREATED WITH THE CONSENT OF T
HE TRUE AND LAWFUL LANDHOLDER WHO IS EITHER THE OWNER, LESSEE, USUFRUCTUARY OR L
EGAL POSSESSOR OF THE LAND Bayani Bautista vs. Patricia Araneta G.R. No. 135829
(February 22, 2000)
Facts:
In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three
(3) hectare parcel of land owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. In April 199
1, a group of armed security guards, allegedly, were sent by herein defendant Pa
tricia Araneta, successor of Gregorio Araneta II and warned plaintiff to vacate
and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. Plaintiff prayed for the issuan
ce of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued e
mployment of threats and harassments against his person, for the issuance of a p
ermanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case, for the mainten
ance of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land. D
efendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated th
at the property belonged to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundati
on Incorporated and leased to defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic far
m and ultimately for the establishment of a training center for bio-dynamic agri
culture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The land also does not fal
l under CARL because it has more than 18% slope. During an ocular inspection, de
fendant learned of the presence of the plaintiff. The former invited the latter
to join the project but he declined and agreed to leave the premises. However, t
he plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at conciliation did
not push through and instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunctio
n was filed by the plaintiff.

The PARAD ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bon
afide tenant. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the said Decision. However, the Cour
t of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB. Hence, this Appeal. Petitioner
contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio A
raneta II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. And that he r
egularly delivered to Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino T
ocio. Petitioner, likewise relies on the certification (ARPT and MARO) that he i
s a tenant on the landholding. Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding
Held:
The Appeal lacks merit. "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor
is misplaced because they do not prove that the landowner made him his tenant. A
s the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they only show that petitioner is in poss
ession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how and why he became a t
enant." In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricu
ltural leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of
Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created wi
th the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the 'owner, lesse
e, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act No. 1199),
and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land s
ubject of the tenancy. . . . To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for fra
udulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawfu
l landholder." Lastly, we can not sustain petitioner's argument that he is a ten
ant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mai
nly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that h
e is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we hel
d that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certa
in person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. T
his Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere
conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence. JURISDICTION/AGRARIA
N DISPUTE/LEASEHOLD RELATIONSHIP, NO AGRARIAN DISPUTE EXISTS IN THE CASE AT BAR.
THE DARAB HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE MAIN ISSUE. CLEARLY, IT FOLLOWS THAT THE
DARAB ALSO HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE ANCILLARY MATTERS INCIDENT THERETO

Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos represented by his widow, Arsenia Garcia vda
. de Santos vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 109992 (March 7, 2000) Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan which was levie
d on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan on October 24,
1989 and subsequently sold at public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman R
ey Santos now substituted by his heirs and represented by his widow Arsenia Garc
ia vda. de Santos, as the sole bidder for P34,532.50. Private respondent Exequie
l Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary peri
od. On April 1, 1992, respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages wit
h an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Departmen
t of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) docketed as DARAB Case No. 369-B
UL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent fr
om gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless". The Pr
ovincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the g
athering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposite
d with the Adjudication Board. Then on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed
a Petition for Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt to
redeem his land. The petition was dismissed. Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio f
iled on May 18, 1992, a Motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that "he is
affected in his rights and interests as the party who tended and had the mango t
rees bear fruits this season". On May 7, 1992 private respondent filed a complai
nt for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages and
Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy Sheriff of
Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. The DARAB suspended the hearing on
Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention pending the resolution of the owner
ship issue. On July 8, 1992, intervenor this time filed with the DARAB, a motion
to withdraw intervenor's deposited share. The Motion was granted and intervenor
was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of the P174,650.00 harvests proceeds wit
h intervenor Antonio being recognized as the duly constituted tenant of the land
. The Court of Appeals affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Hence, the instant pe
tition for review on Certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the PARAD/DARAB has juris
diction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question of ownership is pend
ing resolution with the Regional Trial Courts? Held: Rule II, Section 1 of the R
evised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:

SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.

The Agrarian Reform Adjud
ication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to d
etermine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters
or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Re
public Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other a
grarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP
Law), as: (d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial ar
rangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands dev
oted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or r
epresentation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seekin
g to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under thi
s Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the dispu
tants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowne
r and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contend
ing parties for the ownership of the subject property. In the case of Morta v. O
ccidental, et al., this Court held: For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case,
there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tena
ncy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish al
l its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationshi
p is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the r
elationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultu
ral production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals (19
1 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementa
tion of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure rel
ated problems; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring
or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial,
and other non-agricultural uses.

Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian

relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of
agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the cont
roversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition fo
r injunction in the first place. The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and wh
en they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injun
ction. As such, it is dependent on the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no j
urisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties, necessarily,
the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand. This issue, af
ter all, can be resolved by the trial court, which has the jurisdiction to order
the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with it, consider
ing that an action has already been filed before it on the specific issue of own
ership. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER/WAIVER OF RIGHTS/ABANDONMENT, THE WAIVER OF RIGHTS I
S NULL AND VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO OUR AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS. HOWEVER, VOLUNTA
RY SURRENDER OF THE LANDHOLDING IN FAVOR OF THE SAMAHANG NAYON CONSTITUTES AS A
VALID GROUND FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF RIGHTS UNDER PD 27 Gavino Corpuz vs. Spouses
Geronimo Grospe and Hilaria Grospe G.R. No. 135297 (June 8, 2000)
Facts:
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Trans
fer (OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) who, pursuant to Pr
esidential Decree No. 27, was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over t
wo parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3
hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and formerly owned by
a certain Florentino Chioco. Petitioner mortgaged the subject land to pay for hi
s wife's hospitalization on January 20, 1982 in favor of Virginia de Leon. Upon
the expiration of the contract, he again mortgaged the property to respondent Hi
laria Grospe [wife of Geronimo Grospe] for a period of four years (from December
5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500.00. The parties eve
n executed a "Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the res
pondents to use and/or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. P
etitioner instituted an action for recovery of possession with the DARAB in Caba
natuan City (Region III) against the respondents averring that the latter entere
d the

disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991 and destroyed
the palay planted on the land. Respondents in their answer, claimed that the pe
titioner himself allowed them to take over the possession and cultivation of the
property until the latter has paid his loan. However, instead of paying his loa
n, petitioner had allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights" over
the landholding in consideration in the amount of P54,394.00. Petitioner denied
waiving his rights and claimed that his and his children's signatures appearing
on the waiver were forgeries. The PARAD ruled that petitioner abandoned and sur
rendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon ng Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ec
ija which in turn, had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the realloc
ation of the said lots to the respondent spouses who were the "most qualified fa
rmer(s)-beneficiaries". The DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision
. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Likewise, petiti
oner's appeal and subsequent reconsideration thereof were denied by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition. Issues:
Whether or not the appellate court was correct in finding that the signatures of
petitioner and his sons on the waiver were not forged? Assuming arguendo that t
he signatures in the waiver were genuine, was it (the waiver) null and void for
being contrary to agrarian laws? Did the petitioner abandon his rights as a bene
ficiary under PD 27? Did he (petitioner), by voluntary surrender, forfeit his ri
ght as a beneficiary? Held:
As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those o
f the DARAB
an administrative body which has acquired expertise on the matter
indings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. The presence o
r the absence of forgery was an issue of fact that was convincingly settled by t
he agrarian and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner utterly failed to convince u
s that the appellate court had misapprehended the facts. Quite the contrary, its
findings were wellsupported by the evidence. We have already ruled that the sal
e or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Transfe
r is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or throu
gh hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the
old feudal system in which the

such f

landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus, negating the government's progr
am of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil. In Torres v. Ventura, the
Court clearly held: ". . . As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights t
o possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over th
at particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To
insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, un
der the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by here
ditary succession, to his successors.
. . . [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Cir
cular [No. 7, Series of 1979, April 23, 1979]:
"'Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-ben
eficiaries of PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of
their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their for
mer landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and the
refore, null and void."'
Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or c
laim or to desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that int
ention is expressed or carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a d
eparture, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the ri
ght and the interest that have been abandoned. The CA ruled that abandonment req
uired (a) the tenant's clear intention to sever the agricultural tenancy relatio
nship; and (b) his failure to work on the landholding for no valid reason. The C
A also deemed the following as formidable evidence of his intent to sever the te
nancy relationship: (a) the mortgage and (b) his express approval and conformity
to the Samahang Nayon Resolution installing the private respondents as tenants/
farmers-beneficiaries of the landholding. We disagree. As earlier shown, the Wai
ver was void. Furthermore, the mortgage expired after four years. Thus, the priv
ate respondents were obligated to return possession of the landholding to the pe
titioner. At bottom, we see on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or
irrevocable intent to abandon. His surrender of possession did not amount to an
abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of private respondents t
o return possession upon full payment of the loan. However, the nullity of the W
aiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear showing that he vo
luntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under the pre
sent circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the government, o
f his rights under the agrarian laws.

PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program s
hall not be transferable except through hereditary succession or to the governme
nt, in accordance with the provisions of existing laws and regulations. Section
8 of R.A. No. 3844 also provides that "[t]he agricultural leasehold relation . .
. shall be extinguished by: . . . (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding
by the agricultural lessee . . . ." To repeat, the land was surrendered to the g
overnment, not transferred to another private person. It was the government, thr
ough the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were
declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary surrender
, as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court appro
val as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence.
Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender
or transfer to the government because such action forms part of the mechanism f
or the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who re
fuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80 of the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice from the agrar
ian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be substituted
to all rights and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer. B
esides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong social and econom
ic organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis
the benefits of agrarian reform. JURISDICTION/AGRARIAN DISPUTE/TENANCY RELATIONS
HIP, FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT HAS JU
RISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGRARIAN
DISPUTE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISREGARDED THE DEFENDANT'S ANSWER FOR
HAVING BEEN FILED OUT OF TIME Jaime P. Corpin vs. Amor S. Vivar and the Honorabl
e Court of Appeals G.R. No. 137350 (June 19, 2000) Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against the private respondent with t
he Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan. For failure to timely file his A
nswer with Motion to Dismiss the court deemed the case submitted for judgment an
d rendered a decision ordering private respondent to vacate the land in dispute.
Private respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court and submitted
documents to support his claim that he is a tenant of the petitioner's lot. The
Regional Trial Court in turn, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Subse
quently, petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the said Decision with the Co
urt of Appeals. The latter upheld the Regional Trial Court's finding and dismiss
ed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition. Issues:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the interpretation of Section 7, Ru

le 40 of the Revised Rules of Court as it considered all the documents submitted
by the Private Respondent for the first time together with the memorandum Wheth
er or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was a landlo
rd-tenant relationship between the parties Held:
In the case of Bayog vs. Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that th
e metropolitan circuit trial court, which dismissed defendant's Answer for havin
g been filed out of time and decided the case based on the allegations in the co
mplaint, should not have disregarded defendant's Answer and should have heard an
d received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had jur
isdiction over the case. What were presented to the municipal trial court were l
imited to the following: (1) Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel
Torres, Chairman of the BARC of Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dat
ed April 22, 1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April 22
, 1996; and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22, 1996.
Considering the foregoing, it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing
whereby both parties may present evidence which may shed light on the issue of
the municipal trial court's jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the Region
al Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship betwee
n petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents attached by privat
e respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court only on appeal and wer
e not previously presented to the municipal trial court in the original case, mu
st be set aside. The records of the case must be remanded to the Municipal Trial
Court and hear the issue of jurisdiction. INTERVENTION/PARTIES-IN-INTEREST, ASS
UMING THAT THE LANDS ARE "CARPABLE", IT IS NOT THE PETITIONER BUT THE MEMBERS TH
EREOF WHO ARE THE PROPER PARTIES-IN-INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT CONTROVERSY Kooperat
iba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino, Inc. (KSMP) vs. Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, et al. G.R. No. 139051 (June 26, 2000)

Facts:
The case stemmed from the Order dated May 27, 1975 by then DAR Secretary Conrado
Estrella granting the request for conversion of 1,837.30 hectares of agricultur
al land situated in Nasugbu, Batangas into residential, commercial, industrial a
nd other urban purposes. In essence, the Order stated that the subject land is n
ot economically suited for agricultural cultivation and that if there are any te
nant-tillers, disturbance compensation should be paid to them in accordance with
law. Fifteen (15) occupants assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) cl
aiming to be tenants of a fortyfour (44) hectare portion filed a motion for reco
nsideration of the said Order. But prior to such, former President Ferdinand B.
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 on November 27, 1975 declaring the Municipal
ities of Maragondon and Ternate, Cavite and Nasugbu, Batangas as tourist zones m
ore suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and urban uses. In December
1989, apparently unaware of the conversion orders and presidential proclamation
, then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago issued Notices of Acquisition date
d December 14-27, 1989. Private respondents, Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, filed their
objections to these Santiago notices. Thereafter, on January 22, 1991, Secretar
y Benjamin T. Leong who succeeded Secretary Santiago ruled on the validity of th
e questioned Order issued on May 27, 1975 and denied the Motion for Reconsiderat
ion holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, Maragondon, Ternate and Nasu
gbu are declared as tourist zones. Meanwhile, on May 14, 1991, the private respo
ndents filed a Petition with the DARAB docketed as DARAB Case No. 0335 for the p
urpose of implementing the Conversion Orders which in effect suggested the manne
r of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was contrary to the Leong Order of
January 22, 1991. Petitioner KSMP (Kooperatiba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipi
no, Inc.) filed a complaint-inintervention on the aforementioned case. This was
dismissed by the DAR. Subsequently, KSMP filed a Petition for Certiorari with th
e Court of Appeals docketed as G.R. No. 47813 imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the DARAB. The CA dismissed the same. Hence, this Petition. Held:
We find no error with the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause is lost consi
dering that the Conversion Orders have long become final and executory. There wa
s, therefore, no more case to which it could intervene. The complaint-in-interve
ntion was, therefore, correctly dismissed pursuant to the 1997 Rules of Civil Pr
ocedure.

Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition yet of the conversio
n case, as in fact, DARAB Case No. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents
is untenable. A perusal of the records reveal that DARAB Case No. 0335 was file
d by the private respondents for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orde
rs particularly the fixing of the final disturbance compensation to the legitima
te farmeroccupants. The complaint-in-intervention, however, puts in issue petiti
oner's alleged tenancy relationship and security of tenure which the DARAB does
not have any jurisdiction. Furthermore, petitioner, a juridical entity, has no p
ersonality to file the instant petition to intervene in the case as the real par
ties-in-interest are the members thereof who were not even recognized as the rig
htful tenants occupying the subject land. As observed by the DAR, "members of pe
titioner are merely holding on to an expectancy that they will become the benefi
ciaries assuming that the land is still CARPable." The fact, however, remains th
at the land in question has already been excluded from the purview of the Compre
hensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which had lo
ng become final and executory. TENANCY RELATIONSHIP/LEASEHOLD, BASICALLY, UNLESS
THE PETITIONERS CAN SHOW PROOF THAT THEY SHARED THE HARVESTS WITH THE LANDOWNER
, NO TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CAN EXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlin
da Bejasa vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 108941 (July 6, 20
00)
Facts:
Isabel Candelaria is the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-5
8191 and TCT No. T59172 measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares, more or less, situ
ated in Barangay Del Pilar, Naiyan, Oriental Mindoro. On October 20, 1974, Cande
laria entered into a three-year lease agreement on the land with Pio Malabanan.
The contract stipulated that Malabanan will clear, clean and cultivate the land,
purchase and plant calamansi, citrus and rambutan seeds and make the necessary
harvests of fruits. Sometime in 1973, Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on th
e land and clear it. On May 3, 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufru
ct over the land, modifying their first agreement. Malabanan was under no obliga
tion to share the harvests with Candelaria. In 1983, Malabanan died.

On September 21, 1984, Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her

attorney-in-fact having powers of administration over the disputed property. On
October 26, 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land wit
h Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife, for a period of one year. Meanwhile, the Bej
asas agreed to pay rent to Victoria of P15,000.00 in consideration of an "Aryend
uhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" also for a term of one year. The Bejasas were unable
to pay the full amount of the consideration. After the aryenduhan expired, despi
te Victoria's demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on the la
nd and did not give any consideration for its use. On April 7, 1987, Candelaria
and the Dinglasan again entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land.
The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime Dinglasan was also renewed by C
andelaria on the same date. Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking the eje
ctment of the Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the case. Sometime on June 1987, Jaime f
iled a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro agains
t the Bejasas for "Recovery of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
and Damages". The case was however referred to the DAR who in turn certified tha
t the case was not proper for trial before the civil courts. The trial court dis
missed the complaint including the Bejasas' counterclaim for leasehold and damag
es. The Bejasas then filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for "confir
mation of leasehold and homelot with recovery of damages" against Isabel Candela
ria and Jaime Dinglasan. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Bejasas reasoning
that a tenancy relationship was created between the parties and that as bona-fi
de tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have security of tenure. Respondents appealed the
aforementioned decision. On February 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated
a decision reversing the trial court's ruling. Hence, this Appeal. Issue:
Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship created in favor of the Bejasas?
Held:
The elements of a tenancy relationship are the following: (1) the parties are th
e landowner and the tenant;
(2)
the subject is agricultural land;

(3)
there is consent;
(4)
the purpose is agricultural production;
(5)
there is personal cultivation; and
(6)
there is sharing of harvests.
After examining the three relevant relationships in this case, we find that ther
e is no tenancy relationship between the parties. Malabanan and the Bejasas. Tru
e, Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and c
ultivate the land. However, even if we assume that he had the authority to give
consent to the creation of a tenancy relation, still, no such relation existed.
There was no proof that they shared the harvests. In Chico v. Court of Appeals,
we faulted private respondents for failing to prove sharing of harvests since "n
o receipt, or any other evidence was presented." We added that "Self serving sta
tements . . . are inadequate; proof must be adduced." Candelaria and the Bejasas
. Between them, there is no tenancy relationship. Candelaria as landowner never
gave her consent. The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with
Candelaria. They acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know
of Malabanan's arrangement with them. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowl
edge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease possessed the land. However, the
Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the lan
d to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do no
t agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest
sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for
P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a m
ere civil law lease. Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasan
s had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agr
eement, there is no proof that they did.

Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between
them is the "aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consid
eration to be paid, and the term of the contract. COMPENSATION, RESPONDENT BANK
WAS MANDATED TO PAY THE PETITIONER IN THE MANNER SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6
657. ITS COMPLIANCE WAS NOT AN UNDERTAKING TO PAY IN CASH BECAUSE SUCH ACT WOULD
HAVE BEEN A DEVIATION FROM THE DICTUM OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT, TO WHICH THE EXECU
TION MUST CONFORM. PAYING IN CASH, AS PETITIONER DEMANDS, IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH
SUCH JUDGMENT Edgardo Santos represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Romeo L. Sant
os vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, Jesus Diaz, Roberto Ong and Augusto Aquino
G.R. No. 137431 (September 7, 2000)
Facts:
Petitioners Edgardo Santos is the plaintiff in Agrarian Case No. RTC 94-3206. On
August 12, 1997, the Regional Trial Court sitting as an Agrarian Court fixed th
e amount of P49,241,876.00 as the just compensation for the irrigated and unirri
gated ricelands owned by the petitioner with areas of 36.4152 and 40.7874 hectar
es, respectively. The properties were taken by the government pursuant to the La
nd Reform Program as provided in Presidential Decree No. 27. A preliminary valua
tion in the amount of P3,543,070.66 has been previously released by the Land Ban
k to the petitioner in cash and bonds. Hence, the balance of P45,698,805.34 was
ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance with R.A. No. 6657.
The Land Bank released the amount of P3,621,023.01 in cash, Land Bank No. AR-00
02206 in the amount of P4,128,024.81 to the petitioner and P948,857.52 to the Cl
erk of Court as commission fees. Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a
n alias writ of execution before the Regional Trial Court praying that payment o
f the compensation be in the proportion of P8,629,179.36 in bonds and P32,499,74
5 in cash. Before the motion could be resolved, petitioner moved to withdraw the
same and instead filed a motion for the release of the balance of the garnished
amount in cash or certified check, claiming that payment of the P41,128,024.81
in Land Bank bonds was not acceptable. Land Bank opposed the motion contending t
hat the judgment amount had already been satisfied. The Regional Trial Court iss
ued an Order on March 20, 1998 for the Land Bank to release the balance of P41,1
28,024.81 from the garnished amount in cash or certified check. The Land Bank mo
ved for

reconsideration. Petitioner on the other hand, filed a Motion to hold the Land B
ank in contempt for its refusal to release the balance of the garnished amount i
n cash or certified check. Respondent Regional Court was presided over by a new
judge who resolved the two motions in an Order dated April 24, 1998. To summariz
e, the new judge ruled that the payment of just compensation must be computed in
the manner provided for in Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657 as follows: Total
land value per judgment Amount payable in bonds: 70% (50 has) 75% (excess) P22,3
23,932.75 13,012,907.41 35,336,840.16 P49,241,876.00
Amount payable in cash: 30% (50 has) 35% (excess) P9,567,399.75 4,337,635.81 13,
905,035.56
Less: Preliminary valuation: Commissioner's Fee: Payment to plaintiff on 12-24-9
7 3,621,023.01 P8,112,951.19 P3,543,070.66 948,857.52

P5,792,084.37 The new judge further ruled that by implication, both the Order da
ted March 20, 1997 and the Order dated December 22, 1997 should be deemed recons
idered.

The CA upheld the questioned April 24, 1998 Order of the Trial Court. Hence, thi
s Petition. Issue:
Basis of the determination of how much should be paid in cash and how much shoul
d be paid in bonds. And in relation thereto, whether the April 24, 1998 Order of
Judge Villegas-Llaguno was proper? Held:
The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 jud
gment which had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order did not
revise, correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the Order iterated and made cle
ar the essence of the final judgment. It is clear from the August 12, 1997 judgm
ent that the compensation was to be paid in the manner provided by RA 6657." Pur
suant to Section 18 of the same law, payment was to be in cash and bonds, as ind
icated below: "Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation.
The LBP shall compe
nsate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and th
e DAR and LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 1
7, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the
court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of t
he landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is conc
erned.
Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial i
nstruments negotiable at any time
(b) For lands above twentyFour (24) hectares and
Thirty-percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in

up to Fifty (50) hectares

government financial instruments negotiable at anytime."
Respondent bank was obliged to follow the mandate of the August 12, 1997 judgmen
t. Hence, its compliance with the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishmen
t ought to have been construed as an agreement to pay petitioner in the manner s
et forth in Republic Act No. 6657. Its compliance was not an undertaking to pay
in cash because such act would have been a deviation from the dictum of the fina
l judgment, to which execution must conform. Paying in cash, as petitioner deman
ds, is not compatible with such judgment. Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on
Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final judgment decrees pay
ment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with
R.A. No. 6657. Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire ad
judged amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to
have complied with its duty under Rule 39. EXEMPTION, SECTION 10 OF THE CARL IS
CLEAR ON THIS POINT WHEN IT PROVIDES THAT "ALL LANDS WITH EIGHTEEN PERCENT (18%
) SLOPE AND OVER, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY DEVELOPED SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE COVERA
GE OF THIS ACT" Republic of the Philippines Rep. by the Department of Agrarian R
eform vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Green City Estate Development Corporation G.
R. No. 139592 (October 5, 2000)
Facts:
The five (5) parcels of land in issue with a combined area of 112.0577 hectares
situated at Barangay Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal were ac
quired by private respondent through purchase on May 26, 1994 from Marcela Borja
vda. de Torres. The tax declarations classified the properties as agricultural.
On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject par
cels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R
.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). Private respon
dent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land
from agrarian reform pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994
and DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of 1990. The DAR Regional Director recommended a
denial of the said petition on the ground that private respondent "ailed to sub
stantiate their (sic) allegation that the

properties are indeed in the Municipality's residential and forest conservation

zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable". Priva
te respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP covera
ge, this time alleging that the property is within the residential and forest co
nservation zones and offering a portion of about 15 hectares of land (irrigated
riceland) to sell to farmer beneficiaries or to DAR. On October 19, 1995, the DA
R Secretary issued an Order denying the application for exemption. Private respo
ndent moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied. Appeal was mad
e to the Court of Appeals. The latter in turn created a commission to conduct oc
ular inspection and survey. DAR likewise constituted its own team to conduct an
inspection and thereafter objected to the report filed by the commission. On Dec
ember 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the Assailed D
AR Orders and declaring the mountainous and residential portions of the petition
er's land to be exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). He
nce, this petition for review. Issue:
Whether or not the landholdings subject of this controversy are exempt from CARL
coverage? Held:
There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodie
d in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any furthe
r inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of t
he classification of the land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series o
f 1994 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitte
d when applying for exemption from CARP. In Halili vs. Court of Appeals, we sust
ained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Reg
ulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in th
e tax declaration. The classification of the Board in said case was more recent
than that of the tax declaration and was based on the present condition of the p
roperty and the community thereat. The commissioner's report on the actual condi
tion of the properties confirms the fact that the properties are not wholly agri
cultural. In essence, the report of the commission showed that the land of priva
te respondent consists of a mountainous area with an average 28 degree slope con
taining 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares of which 5 to 6
hectares are planted to palay; and a residential area of 8 hectares. The finding
that 66.5 hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of land of private respondent have
an average slope of 28 degrees provides another cogent reason to exempt these po
rtions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the CARL is clear on this
point when it provides that "all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and ove
r, except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
"

Petitioner DAR and the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) contest the finding
of the Court of Appeals that the subject parcels of land have a mountainous slo
pe on the ground that this conclusion was allegedly arrived at in a manner not i
n accord with established surveying procedures. They also bewail the considerati
on given by the Court of Appeals to the "slope" issue since this matter was alle
gedly never raised before the DAR and the Court of Appeals. Petitioner DAR and t
he OSG thus claim that laches had already set in. As pointed out earlier, the cr
ux of the controversy is whether the subject parcels of land in issue are exempt
from the coverage of the CARL. The determination of the classification and phys
ical condition of the lands is therefore material in the disposition of this cas
e, for which purpose the Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect
and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not object to the creation of a t
eam of commissioners when it very well knew that the survey and ocular inspectio
n would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the subject parcels
of land. It is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The
team of commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed of persons who
were mutually acceptable to the parties. Thus, in the absence of any irregulari
ty in the survey and inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged,
the report of the commissioners deserves full faith and credit and we find no re
versible error in the reliance by the appellate court upon said report. CONVERSI
ON/DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION, IN THE EVENT THAT TENANTED LAND IS CONVERTED PURSUA
NT TO SECTION 36 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3844, THE ONLY RELIEF AVAILABLE TO THE RESP
ONDENTS IS THE PAYMENT OF A DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION EQUIVALENT TO FIVE TIMES TH
E AVERAGE OF THE GROSS HARVESTS OF THE LANDHOLDING DURING THE LAST FIVE PRECEDIN
G CALENDAR-YEARS. IN THIS CASE, THE AWARD OF A 75 SQUARE METER HOMELOT WAS MEREL
Y MADE IN LIEU OF THE AFOREMENTIONED DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION Ernesto Bunye vs.
Lourdes Aquino, et al. G.R. No. 138979 (October 9, 2000)
Facts:
Respondents Lourdes, Cita and Roberto, all surnamed Aquino are the children of t
he late Bartolome Aquino who was instituted in 1967 as a tenant over a 16,974.50
square meter lot located at Ilaya Street, Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila bel
onging to Zoilo Bunye, the father of petitioner Ernesto Bunye. Sometime in 1970,
Zoilo Bunye told Bartolome Aquino to stop cultivating 14,474.50 square meters o
f the land since the former was going to devote the same to commercial uses. No
disturbance

compensation was paid to Bartolome Aquino, but Zoilo Bunye permitted Bartolome A
quino to continue cultivating the remaining 2,500 square meters and promised him
a homelot within the said area. Considering himself aggrieved, Bartolome Aquino
repaired to the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in order to seek judicial rec
ognition of his tenancy status over the remaining 2,500 square meters. The CAR r
endered judgment recognizing Bartolome Aquino as a tenant over 2,500 square mete
rs of the subject property with a fixed annual rental of P140.00. On November 5,
1976, the Court of Appeals affirmed the CAR's decision. Thus, Bartolome Aquino
continued in the possession and cultivation of 2,500 square meters of Zoilo Buny
e's land and he constructed his family home on a 500 square meter area thereon.
The controversy arose when Ernesto Bunye's petition for conversion of the remain
ing 2,500 square meters was approved by the Minister of Agrarian Reform (MAR). P
etitioner was able to eject the respondents from the 2,000 square meters but not
from the 500 square meters they occupied. Respondents filed a complaint with th
e Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator insisting that they are ent
itled to the possession of the 500 square meters of land they occupied as homelo
t, it being part of the compensation for the deprivation of the 16,974.50 square
meters of land originally tenanted by Bartolome Aquino. The Regional Adjudicato
r held that no tenurial relations could exist between the parties as the land ce
ased to be agricultural by virtue of its conversion in 1986. However, petitioner
was ordered to pay respondents disturbance compensation for the latter's dispos
session from the 2,500 square meters homelot to respondents but only as an alter
native relief in the event that the disturbance compensation could not be comput
ed. This Decision was affirmed by the DARAB and the Court of Appeals. However, a
cting upon a motion for reconsideration filed by respondents, the Court of Appea
ls modified its decision by increasing the size of the homelot to 500 square met
ers. Hence, this Appeal. Issue:
The sole issue is with respect to the legality of the appellate court's decision
to increase the size of the homelot awarded to respondents to 500 square meters
? Held:
Notwithstanding any agreement a
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
s to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall co
ntinue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispos
session has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executo
ry if after due hearing it is shown that: (1) The landholding is declared by the
department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be s
uited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Prov
ided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding d
uring the last five preceding calendar years.

Neither petitioner nor respondents questioned the conversion decreed in 1986, wh

ich was a factual finding of both the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Cour
t of Appeals; therefore, it should be presumed that the conversion was validly a
nd legally done. Thus, even before Bartolome Aquino died in 1988, tenurial relat
ions had already been extinguished, leaving respondents without any claim upon t
he homelot allegedly promised by Zoilo Bunye to their father. In the event that
tenanted land is converted pursuant to section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, the
only relief available to respondents is the payment of disturbance compensation
equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding du
ring the last five preceding calendar years. The award of 75 square meters of la
nd originally granted by the Regional Adjudicator and subsequently affirmed by t
he DARAB was made in lieu of disturbance compensation for the dispossession of r
espondents of 2,500 square meters of land. Although the Court of Appeals in its
November 26, 1998 Decision affirmed the grant of 75 square meters of land as rea
sonable, it simultaneously declared that respondents are entitled to disturbance
compensation for the entire 16,974.50 square meters of land originally tenanted
by Bartolome Aquino. From 1976 until 1995, respondents never sought the payment
of disturbance compensation for the 14,474.50 square meters of land. Under sect
ion 38 of Republic Act No. 3844, an action to enforce any cause of action under
such law shall be barred if not commenced within three years after such cause of
action accrued. Unquestionably, respondents' claim for disturbance compensation
for the 14,474.50 square meters of land of which their father was dispossessed
in 1970 has prescribed. Thus, respondents are only entitled to disturbance compe
nsation for their dispossession of 2,500 square meters of land and we find that,
in the absence of adequate data on the land's harvests, the award of 75 square
meters is a fair and adequate alternative relief. JURISDICTION, THE DAR IS VESTE
D WITH PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDICATE AGRARIAN REFORM MATTERS
AND SHALL HAVE THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER ALL MATTERS INVOLVING THE IMPLEME
NTATION OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM ALSO, PARTICIPATION BY CERTAIN PARTIES IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT RAISING ANY OBJECTION THERETO, BARS THEM
FROM ANY JURISDICTIONAL INFIRMITY AFTER AN ADVERSE DECISION IS RENDERED AGAINST
THEM Cipriano Centeno, et al. vs. Ignacia Centeno G.R. No. 140825 (October 13,
2000)

Facts:
The present case for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for restrain
ing order/preliminary injunction is a mere off-shoot of the suit for cancellatio
n of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) filed by herein respondent against herei
n petitioners before the DARAB. That previous case culminated in a decision upho
lding respondent's entitlement to an award of the subject landholdings under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The case at bar is for the maintenance of he
r peaceful possession of the premises and to prevent the petitioners from furthe
r harassing her and disturbing her possession and enjoyment thereof. The PARAD,
the DARAB and the Court of Appeals all rendered a decision in favor of the respo
ndent adverting to the Decision of the DAR recalling and canceling the CLTs issu
ed in favor of the petitioners. The petitioners filed a Petition for Review assa
iling the jurisdiction of the DARAB over the case for maintenance of peaceful po
ssession averring that there is no tenancy relationship nor any agrarian dispute
present in the case at bar which would place the case under the jurisdiction of
the DARAB. Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the instant case for recovery of
possession? Held:
Under Section 50 of R.A 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), th
e DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian r
eform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involvi
ng the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The rule is that the DARAB
has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involvi
ng the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Section 1, R
ule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides: Section 1. Prima
ry, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.
The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board sh
all have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adj
udicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents in
volving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Re
public Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3
844 as amended by Republic Act No 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agr
arian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the foll
owing:

xxx
xxx
xxx
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certifica
te of Landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administra
tive correction thereof; (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, petitioners are barred by estoppel from raising the issue of jurisd
iction of the DARAB. A perusal of the records will show that petitioners partici
pated in all stages of the instant case, setting up a counterclaim and asking fo
r affirmative relief in their answer. This Court has ruled that participation by
certain parties in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection
thereto, bars them from any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision
is rendered against them. RES JUDICATA, RES JUDICATA EXISTS IN THE CASE AT BAR.
"AT THE RISK OF OCCASIONAL ERRORS, JUDGMENTS OF COURTS SHOULD BECOME FINAL AT SO
ME DEFINITE DATE FIXED BY LAW" Ramon D. Ocho vs. Bernardino Calos, et al. G.R. N
o. 137908 (November 22, 2000)
Facts:
The Caloses averred that their parents, Efipanio and Valentina were the original
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 23,7109 hectares located in Valencia
, Malaybalay, Bukidnon covered by OCT No. P2066 and issued by virtue of Homestea
d Patent No. V-42876. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the said land was
placed under the Operation Land Transfer and subsequently distributed to qualifi
ed farmer beneficiaries. The original farmer-beneficiaries, however, allegedly u
nlawfully conveyed their respective rights over the lands granted to them to thi
rd persons. The amended complaint thus sought the nullification of the Emancipat
ion Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title issued to these third persons. Th
e PARAD rendered his decision ordering the revocation/cancellation of all EPs, C
LTs, TCTs and other titles involving OCT No. P-2066 for being null and void ab i
nitio. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the decision and upheld the validity of the
EPs and TCTs issued. This Decision was substantially affirmed by the Court of A
ppeals except on the part of petitioner Ramon Ocho and Vicente Polinar who were
directed "to restore and surrender to the government their landholdings". Petiti
oner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. Henc
e, this petition for review on

certiorari on the basis of the resolution in a previous case docketed as DAR Adm
inistrative Case No. 00690 which the respondents have purportedly allowed to lap
se into finality. Issue:
Whether or not res judicata exists in the case at bar? Held:
There is no question that the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other
agricultural lands had already been passed upon by the proper quasi-judicial aut
hority (the hearing officer of the DAR) in Adm. Case No. 006-90. Said decision b
ecame final and executory when the Caloses failed to file an appeal thereof afte
r their motion for reconsideration was denied. Applying the rule on conclusivene
ss of judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultur
al lands may no longer be relitigated. As held in Legarda vs. Savellano: . . . I
t is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the so
lemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upo
n a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclus
ive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controve
rsy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a mere r
ule of law; more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it
is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of e
very jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date
fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an e
nd to controversies.
The findings of the Hearing Officer in Adm. Case No. 006-90, which had long atta
ined finality, averring that petitioner is not the owner of any other agricultur
al lands, foreclosed any inquiry on the same issue involving the same parties an
d property. The CA thus erred in still making a finding that petitioner is not q
ualified to be a farmer-beneficiary because he owns other agricultural lands. TE
NANCY RELATIONSHIP CANNOT EXIST ON THE MERE BASIS OF AN "INSIDIOUS SALE" OR TRAN
SFER OF TENANCY RIGHTS MADE BY THE FORMER LESSEE Angel Chico vs. Court of Appeal
s G.R. No. 134735 (December 5, 2000)

Issue:
Whether or not a tenancy relationship can exist on the mere basis of an "insidio
us" sale or transfer of tenancy right by the former lessee (Eugenia Esguerra) to
the petitioner (Angel Chico)? Held:
No. Jurisprudence has established pre-requisite conditions in order that an agri
cultural leasehold relationship can be said to be extant; to wit: (1) The partie
s are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2)
The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
(3)
There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4)
The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5)
There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and
(6)
The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lesse
e.
The matter of whether or not such an agreement exists between petitioner and pri
vate respondents (the owners) over the parcel of land in question is a factual q
uestion. Each of the elements hereinbefore mentioned is essential to create a de
jure leasehold or tenancy relationship between the parties. This de jure relati
onship, in turn, is the terra firma for a security of tenure between the landlor
d and the tenant. The leasehold relationship is not brought about by a mere cong
ruence of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties
to that relationship should be primordial.

RETENTION/DUE PROCESS, THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS IS SIMPLY AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE

HEARD OR, AS APPLIED IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING, AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK A REC
ONSIDERATION OF THE ACTION OR RULING COMPLAINED OF ALSO, THE ISSUANCE OF AN EMAN
CIPATION PATENT DOES NOT BAR THE LANDOWNER FROM RETAINING THE AREA COVERED THERE
BY
Lucia Mapa vda. de dela Cruz, et al. vs. Adjuto Abille G.R. No. 130196 (February
26, 2001) Facts:
To cut a long story short, Herminio Abille filed a Petition for Exemption under
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings alleging that he had been depr
ived of his constitutional right to due process since DAR did not notify him or
his representatives of the OLT coverage of his lot. On April 19, 1989, DAR Regio
nal Director Antonio Nuesa, Region I, San Fernando, La Union issued an Order den
ying the petition for exemption and instead merely granted Herminio Abille a rig
ht of retention of not more than seven (7) hectares. On July 24, 1989, Herminio
Abille selected the sevenhectare retention area which included the area covered
by CLT No. 0-064711, hence, said CLT was automatically cancelled. Even the Tax D
eclaration issued in the name of Balbino dela Cruz was cancelled and re-issued i
n favor of Herminio Abille. Meanwhile, petitioners who are the compulsory heirs
of Balbino dela Cruz filed with the DAR a petition for issuance of Emancipation
Patent. In his comment, respondent Adjuto Abille representing Herminio Abille pr
ayed for the dismissal of the petition by reason of the DAR Order dated April 19
, 1989. On the basis of such, on October 21, 1992, Regional Director Eligio P. P
acis issued an Order denying the petition for issuance of Emancipation Patent. P
etitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that another Order be issu
ed declaring as null and void the Order dated April 19, 1989 on the basis of abs
ence of due process of law. They sought the reinstatement of CLT No. 0-064711 an
d the issuance of an emancipation patent in their favor as compulsory heirs of t
he late Balbino dela Cruz. The motion for reconsideration was treated as an Appe
al and elevated to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform who render
ed a Decision dismissing the instant motion for lack of merit and instead ordere
d the preparation of Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (CALs) to the tenant
s as lessees thereat. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was den
ied. They filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which was also d
ismissed by the CA in a Decision promulgated on December 5, 1996. Petitioners mo
ved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for issuance o
f emancipation patent filed by the heirs of Balbino dela Cruz? Held:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that although the petitioners were not given
the opportunity to be heard when Regional Director Antonio Nuesa in his Order da
ted April 19, 1989 ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No.
0-064711 on the retained area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of a
n emancipation patent, petitioners were given such opportunity as they raised in
issue the validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which was resolved by D
AR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated October 21, 1992, and al
so in their (petitioners') motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an a
ppeal by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order dated June 2
0, 1994. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of (emphasis supplied). In the case of Daez v
. Court of Appeals, where the Certificates of Land Transfer of farmer beneficiar
ies over some four (4) hectares of riceland were issued without the landowner ha
ving been accorded her right to choose what to retain among her landholdings, we
held that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued on the basis of Certificates
of Land Transfer issued to the farmer-beneficiaries cannot operate to defeat th
e right of the heirs of the deceased landowner to retain the said riceland. Even
the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner from retainin
g the area covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides:
"Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agraria
n reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian
laws, rules and regulations. This includes cases of lands which are found to be
exempted/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of th
e landowner's retained area." (emphasis supplied.)
The earlier cases of Locsin, et al. v. Valenzuela, et al. and Quiban v. Butalid,
which were cited by the petitioners, did not involve any issue of retention rig
hts of the landowner, hence, the said cases are not applicable to the case at ba
r. Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud, collu
sion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake on the part of a departme
nt head, in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of substantial
evidence to support the same, such administrative decisions are entitled to gre
at weight and respect and will not be interfered with.

APPEAL, CERTIORARI CANNOT BE RESORTED TO AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE LOST REMEDY OF

APPEAL. AN APPEAL IS A STATUTORY PRIVILEGE AND IT MAY ONLY BE EXERCISED IN THE M
ANNER PROVIDED BY LAW
Roberto Mito vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 126099 (March 12, 2
001)
Facts:
In an Administrative transfer action in May 1985, the Gapan-Penaranda Agrarian R
eform Team Office No. 077, with station at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, cancelled a Certi
ficate of Land Transfer (CLT) in the name of Leonardo Flores, now deceased. Subs
equently, it was re-issued in the name of petitioner, Roberto G. Mito. Private r
espondent Victorino Flores, brother of Leonardo Flores, filed a letter-complaint
with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region III, alleging that the tran
sferred lot was actually his and that its transfer to petitioner was unlawful. D
AR dismissed the claim of private respondent Flores, declared petitioner Mito as
a tenant-beneficiary of the land and directed the MARO to issue a CLT or an Ema
ncipation Patent in favor of Mito. Private respondent appealed to the DARAB, whi
ch promulgated a decision reversing the order of the Regional Director. It order
ed the DAR Provincial Office to issue an Emancipation Patent in favor of private
respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Aggri
eved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
was dismissed due to petitioner's failure to utilize the correct remedy, specif
ically a petition for review without necessarily impleading the agency a quo and
for violation of SC Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 on the filing of c
ertified true copies of the material portions of the record referred to be submi
tted. Hence, this petition. Issue:
Whether or not the Order dated January 4, 1990 of the Regional Director of DAR i
s supported by substantial evidence? Held:

We note that at the time of the promulgation of the DARAB decision on June 1, 19
95, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR were governed by Supreme C
ourt Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91). As ruled by t
he Court of Appeals, the remedy should have been a petition for review, filed by
petitioner in seven legible copies, without impleading the DARAB, the agency a
quo, as required by Circular No. 1-95. As found by the respondent court, not onl
y did petitioner implead the DARAB, all his annexes other than the assailed reso
lutions of the DARAB were not certified true copies. In addition, it did not sta
te the date petitioner received a copy of each resolution, such that it could no
t be determined if the appeal was filed on time. Petitioner's failure to comply
with the requirements for perfecting an appeal merited the dismissal of his peti
tion before the Court of Appeals. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitu
te for the lost remedy of appeal. An appeal is a statutory privilege and it may
only be exercised in the manner provided by law. CIVIL LAW LEASE, ALL THE REQUIS
ITES OF A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP MUST BE PRESENT, OTHERWISE, THERE IS NO AGRICULTU
RAL LEASEHOLD EXISTING BETWEEN THE PARTIES BUT A MERE CIVIL LAW LEASE Anastacio
Victorio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Dominador Fernandez G.R. No. 110
012 (March 28, 2001)
Facts:
Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez (as lessor),
the fathers of herein petitioner Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Domin
ador Fernandez, respectively entered into a lease contract over a fishpond locat
ed in Brgy. Balangobon, Lingayen, Pangasinan for a 10-year period. After the sai
d contract expired in 1977, the same was renewed, albeit verbally, for another 1
0 years until 1987 but adopting the terms and conditions of the original contrac
t. When the second contract expired, private respondent repeatedly asked petitio
ner to vacate the premises but the latter adamantly refused. Consequently, a cas
e for ejectment was filed by respondent against petitioner but was consequently
dismissed by the trial court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, t
he regional trial court revised the decision holding that the lease contract is
a civil law lease agreement and ordering petitioner to vacate the fishpond in qu
estion and surrender peaceful possession thereof. Petitioner having been rebuked
on reconsideration, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on a petition f
or certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals turned down the appeal, in effect,
ratiocinating that the court is strongly convinced and hereby finds and holds th
at the agreement entered into by the parties is a civil law contract of lease an
d not one under the agricultural leasehold system as expressly termed under R.A.
No. 3844, as amended. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844
and thus entitled to security of tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere
civil lessee whose right over the subject premises ceased upon the expiration o
f the contract of lease? Held:
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is con
sent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisite
s must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties (Chi
co vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 [1198]; Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCR
A 235 [1997]; Odsique vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos
vs. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 223 [1995). Petitioner's right to the fishpond e
manated from the lease contract between his father and private respondent's fath
er wherein petitioner's father was designated as a "lessee" and not as a "tenant
". Petitioner cannot, therefore, be more than a lessee like his father because "
the spring cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no stipulati
on regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One o
f the essential requisites for existence of tenancy relationship is sharing by t
he landowner and tenant of the produce, and no proof of this fact has been shown
in this case. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was
for the petitioner to pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an adv
ance payment of 3 years' rental. This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy rel
ationship where the parties share in the produce of the land as this falls due,
or as it becomes available, during harvest time. CERTIORARI/APPEAL/EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, IN THE CASE AT BAR, CERTIORARI WILL LIE IF THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR OR THE APPEAL TO THE SECRETARY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM WILL NOT PROVE TO BE A SPEEDY OR ADEQUATE REMEDY Heirs of Ped
ro Atega, represented by Veronica Atega-Nable vs. Ernesto Garilao, et al. G.R. N
o. 133806 (April 20, 2001)
Facts:
The land owned by the Heirs of Pedro Atega with an area of 129.4615 hectares was
made the subject of compulsory acquisition and distribution pursuant to R.A. No
. 6657, otherwise known as the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The Heirs protested to the MARO who ignored t
he same considering that the PARO had already sent a Notice of Land Acquisition
and Valuation. Petitioners then filed an application for exemption with the Regi
onal Director who denied the application on the basis of the lack of approval by
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) as required by DAR Administra
tive Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90. Petitioners the
reafter filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court
of Appeals which was dismissed for prematurity on the ground that the former fa
iled to first exhaust all available administrative remedies. Petitioners moved f
or reconsideration but the motion was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the petition on the ground of prematurity (for f
ailure to first file a motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of responden
t Regional Director or an Appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform) was proper
? Held:
In sum, we rule that certiorari will lie because a motion for reconsideration be
fore the Regional Director or an appeal to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform will
not prove to be a speedy or adequate remedy. However, we find that the Regional
Director did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' a
pplication for Exemption of their property from the CARP. According to DAR Adm.
Order No. 6-94 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 44-90, an Application for E
xemption from the coverage of CARP filed before the Regional Director must be ac
companied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance
has been approved by the Board prior to 15 June 1988, the date when the CARL too
k effect. In the instant case, no such accompanying certification from the HLURB
was filed by petitioners. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, THE PROCEDURAL
SHORT-CUT TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER FINDS NO JUSTIFICATION BOTH IN LAW AND IN JUR
ISPRUDENCE Lilia Gonzalez vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 106028 (May 09,
2001)
Facts:

Petitioner received two (2) orders from the DAR Regional Director directing her
to surrender the titles to her land and to submit the other requirements of Land
Bank for her to be paid the aggregate amount of P55,690.74 as compensation for
two parcels of land owned by her. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals to restr
ain the enforcement and to annul the said two Orders of the DAR Regional Directo
r on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction. The former alleged that she n
ever filed a land transfer claim and that she was not notified, nor heard of in
the execution of the final survey plans and the valuation of her land. After req
uiring the respondents to file a comment, the Court of Appeals rendered a decisi
on dismissing the petition for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrat
ive remedies. The Court of Appeals held that Certiorari cannot be used to substi
tute for Appeal. Hence, this Petition. Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in dismi
ssing the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies Whether or not
respondents DAR Director and LBP acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the availed Orders dated November 27, 1990 and April 22, 1991 Held:
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the cour
ts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and disch
arge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective com
petence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunit
y to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous
error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenien
ce prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by admini
strative agencies. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fat
al to the cause of action of the petitioner. After a careful perusal of the reco
rds, we find the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to be applica
ble in this case. It may be reasonably concluded that the issuance of the assail
ed orders pursuant to the operation land transfer and tenant emancipation progra
m of the government is within the authority and jurisdiction of the DAR Regional
Director. However, questions as to the propriety of the issuance could have sti
ll been raised before the proper administrative forum. Instead of going directly
to the Court of Appeals on certiorari, the petitioner should have sought redres
s in the DARAB, and the latter's officials should have been given an opportunity
to review the matter and resolve the controversy.

The petitioner raises the following exceptions to the doctrine of Exhaustion of

Administrative Remedies as applicable to the case at bar: (1) where the question
ed order is a patent nullity; (2) where there is a deprivation of the petitioner
's fundamental right to due process; and (3) where the question involved is a pu
rely legal one. We are not convinced that any of the exceptions obtains here. As
above stated, the Orders issued by the Regional Director pursuant to law are no
t patent nullities, and the alleged denial of the petitioner's right to due proc
ess is intertwined with the question of notice upon the petitioner which raises
basically a factual matter, i.e., whether three notices were properly served upo
n petitioner. This issue is not to be resolved by the Court of Appeals in the fi
rst instance on certiorari. We do not see how the controversy raises a purely le
gal question. The proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to
move for a reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go dire
ctly to the DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional A
grarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort to these administrative bodies
will not only satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may
likewise prove advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted
by experts, and will not be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evi
dence. From there, the petitioner has yet another forum available
the Special Agra
rian Courts which are the final determinants of cases involving land valuation o
r determination of just compensation. Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by th
e petitioner which finds no justification both in law and in jurisprudence must
be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Accordingly, we rule th
at the Court of Appeals committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certio
rari and Prohibition. OLT COVERAGE OF A LAND SUBJECT OF UNREGISTERED DEED OF DON
ATION, AN UNREGISTERED DEED OF DONATION CANNOT OPERATE TO EXCLUDE THE SUBJECT LA
ND FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE OPERATION LAND TRANSFER PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT Ig
nacio Gonzales, et al. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 110335 (J
une 18, 2001)
Facts:
The deceased spouses Ignacio and Marina Gonzales were the registered owners of t
wo (2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 551-C and 558-A containing 46.97 hecta
res and 37.5735 hectares, respectively. Marina Gonzales died intestate. On the o
ther hand, Ignacio Gonzales executed a Deed of Donation on July 12, 1972 conveyi
ng his share of the property, specifically Lot No. 551-C in favor of his 14 gran
dchildren. However, the said donation was not registered. Thus, when Presidentia
l Decree No. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the landholdings of the spouses
were placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) and private respondents were ac
cordingly issued EPs and CLTs. On March 5, 1974, the administratix Lilia Gonzale
s filed an application for retention with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform

requesting that their property be excluded from the coverage of OLT. The applica
tion was initially denied but was finally granted by DAR Secretary Benjamin Leon
g. Aggrieved, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari. The CA re
versed the action of the DAR and upheld the issuance of the certificates of land
transfer and emancipation patents. A motion for reconsideration was filed but t
he same wad denied by the CA. Hence, this Appeal. Issues:
Whether the property subject of the deed of donation which was not registered wh
en P.D. No. 27 took effect should be excluded from the Operation Land Transfer P
rogram? Held:
Article 749 of the Civil code provides inter alia that "in order that the donati
on of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifyin
g therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the
titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not dul
y inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third p
ersons." It is actually the act of registration that operates to convey register
ed land or affect title thereto. Thus, Section 50 of Act No. 496 (Land Registrat
ion Act), as amended by Section 51 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decre
e), provides: SECTION 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner
. . .
But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purpo
rting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or
bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as e
vidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned. Further, it is an entrenched doctrine in
our jurisdiction that registration in a public registry creates constructive no
tice to the whole world (Olizon vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148 [1994]). Thus
, Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529, provides
: SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration Every conveyance, mortgage, le
ase, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered
land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of De
eds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constru
ctive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or enterin
g.

The ineluctable conclusion drawn is that the unregistered deed of donation canno
t operate to exclude the subject land from the coverage of the Operation Land Tr
ansfer of P.D. No. 27, which took effect on October 21, 1972. To rule otherwise
would render ineffectual the rights and interests that the tenantsfarmers immedi
ately acquired upon the promulgation of P.D. No. 27, especially so because in th
e case at bar, they have been cultivating the land even before World War II. JUR
ISDICTION OF THE DARAB, IN ORDER "TO ACHIEVE A JUST, EXPEDITIOUS AND INEXPENSIVE
DETERMINATION OF EVERY ACTION OR PROCEEDING BEFORE IT", THE DAR IS MANDATED "TO
ADOPT A UNIFORM RULE OF PROCEDURE" (SECOND PARAGRAPH, SECTION 50, R.A. NO. 6657
), WHICH IS, AT PRESENT, THE DARAB REVISED RULES THERE IS A DISTINCT DELINEATION
OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DARAB/RARAD/PARAD AND THE DAR REGIONAL OFFICE, THUS, TH
E THEORY OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION MUST BE REJECTED Victoria P. Cabral vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 101974 (July 12, 2001)
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of several parcels of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1670 of the Registry of Dee
ds of Bulacan among which is a parcel of land described therein as Lot 4 of Plan
Psu-164390. As early as July 1973, petitioner had already purportedly applied f
or the reclassification or conversion of the land for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The applicati
on for conversion, however, was not acted upon. Instead, on April 25, 1988, Eman
cipation Patents and thereafter, Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in f
avor of private respondents. Petitioner sought the cancellation of the TCTs with
the BARC on January 16, 1990 and on January 19, 1990, filed another petition fo
r the cancellation of the said Emancipation Patents and Torrens Title. The said
petition was dismissed in an Order dated February 11, 1990 by then Regional Dire
ctor Eligio Pacis. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appe
als questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and claiming denial of
due process. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied prompting the petitioner to turn to the
Supreme Court for relief. Also, on April 21, 1993, petitioner filed with the Co
urt an urgent Motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order alleging
that respondent Gregoria Adolfo had already conveyed the land awarded to her to
the Aqualand Development Corporation and the Sta. Rita Steel Resources Corporati
on

for the conversion of the land from agricultural to commercial and industrial pu
rposes. In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, the Court issued the temporary restr
aining order prayed for. Issue:
Who has jurisdiction over the instant controversy, the Department of Agrarian Re
form Adjudication Board (DARAB) as contended by the Petitioner or the Regional D
irector? Held:
Petitioner is correct. Whatever jurisdiction the Regional Director may have had
over the cancellation of emancipation patents is lost with the passage of subseq
uent laws. Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 (Providing for the Mechanism fo
r the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program) granted DAR q
uasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters, to wit: "SECTION 17.
Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.
The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial po
wers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have exclusi
ve original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian r
eform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department o
f Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR
)."
Executive Order No. 129-A (Modifying Executive Order No. 129 Reorganizing and St
rengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for other purposes) subsequent
ly provided for the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board, granting
it the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform
cases: "SECTION 13. Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
There is hereby created a
n Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The Boar
d shall be composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2) Undersecretaries as ma
y be designated by the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs, and
three (3) others to be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Se
cretary as members. A Secretariat shall be constituted to support the Board. The
Board shall assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases under Executive Order No. 229 and this Executive Order. T
hese powers and functions may be delegated to the regional office of the Departm
ent in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board."

Congress substantially reiterated Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 in Republic Act No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Law of 1988 (CARL). Section
50 thereof states: "SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.
The DAR is here
by vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involvin
g the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusiv
e jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Envir
onment and Natural Resources (DENR).
CARL took effect on June 15, 1988, after it was published in two newspapers of g
eneral circulation. In order "to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive det
ermination of every action or proceeding before it," the DAR is mandated "to ado
pt a uniform rule of procedure" (Second par., Section 50, RA. No. 6657), which i
s, at present, the DARAB Revised Rules. The Rules were promulgated on December 2
6, 1988. The Court of Appeals has underscored the fact that Section 13 of E.O. N
o. 129-A authorizes the DARAB to delegate its powers and functions to the region
al office in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board.
The authority purportedly provides additional justification for the Regional Of
fice's jurisdiction over the case. Precisely, however, the DARAB, through its Re
vised Rules, has delegated such powers and functions to the RARADs and the PARAD
s, which, under Section 3 of the Rules, "are deemed to form part of the DAR Regi
onal Office where they are stationed." It is evident from the foregoing that the
DAR, like most administrative agencies, is granted with a fusion of governmenta
l powers, in this case, a commingling of the quasi-judicial and the executive. T
he growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of gove
rnmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws have
impelled this constantly growing tendency toward such delegation. In delegating
these powers, it would hardly seem practical to allow a duplication of functions
between agencies. Duplication results in confusion between the various agencies
upon whom these powers are reposed, and in the public that the agencies are sup
posed to serve. It divides the agencies' resources and prevents them from devoti
ng their energy to similarly important tasks. The intention to avoid this very s
ituation is evident in the various laws' distinct delineation of the functions o
f the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD and the DAR Regional Office. Accordingly, the Court must
reject the theory of concurrent jurisdiction between the former and the latter.
We hold that the DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case.
INTERVENTION, FOR SUCH A MOTION FOR INTERVENTION TO BE ENTERTAINED, TWO (2) REQ
UISITES MUST CONCUR: FIRST, THE WOULD BE INTERVENOR MUST SHOW THAT HE HAS A SUBS
TANTIAL RIGHT OR INTEREST IN THE CASE AND THAT, SECOND, IT CANNOT BE ADEQUATELY
PURSUED AND PROTECTED IN ANOTHER PROCEEDING

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al. vs. Tropical Homes Inc. G.R. No. 136827
and 136799 (July 31, 2001)
Facts:
Carlos Iigo was the registered owner of four (4) parcels of land located in Bago Iig
o, Toril, Davao City with an aggregate area of more or less one million five hun
dred thirty two thousand four hundred fifteen (1,532,415) square meters. On July
17, 1971, Iigo and respondent Tropical Homes Inc. (Tropical for brevity) entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement for the development of the property into a reside
ntial area which was later known as the "Better Living Subdivision". Tropical ev
en filed with the City Council of Davao an application for reclassification of t
he area from agricultural to residential. On October 2, 1972, the City Council o
f Davao, through Resolution No. 558 declared the site of the Better Living Subdi
vision as a residential area. Carlos Iigo died. On February 14, 1975, the aforemen
tioned properties were divided among his heirs through a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition. The old titles were cancelled and new ones issued in the name of the
heirs. When the Joint Venture Agreement initiated by the late Carlos Iigo and resp
ondent Tropical pushed through with the Notice and Manifestation of conformity o
f the Heirs, the new titles were again cancelled and replaced by new titles all
registered in the name of Tropical. However, the DAR through its Davao Office su
bjected the aforementioned properties under CARP coverage. DAR issued three (3)
Notices of Acquisition to Tropical covering one million thirty seven thousand tw
o hundred seventy two (1,037,272) square meters of the land. Thereafter, TCT No.
T184249 was issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently
, DAR through Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 301148 distributed
the landholding to the identified farmer beneficiaries. Tropical filed a petitio
n with the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) for the cancellation of the CLOA on th
e ground that the landholding was outside the coverage of the CARP. While the pe
tition was pending, a Motion for Intervention was filed by Rolando B. Bersamin,
et al., alleging that they are the bona fide residents of the landholding but we
re excluded in the CLOA. The PARAD ruled in favor of Tropical and denied the Mot
ion for Intervention ruling that the issue in intervention can be threshed out i
n a separate proceeding. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD. On December 11, 1
997, Tropical filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeal
s and an urgent Motion for the issuance of a TRO. The TRO was granted and later
replaced by a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Later, the Court of Appeals render
ed a Decision in favor of Tropical. Both Petitioners and Petitioners-Appellants
moved for reconsideration. The first motion was denied for having been filed bey
ond the fifteen (15) day reglementary period while the second motion was ordered
expunged from the rollo on the ground that they were not parties to the

case and that at no point in the legal process from the PARAD to the CA were the
y allowed to intervene. Hence, the present petitions. Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the Motions for Recons
ideration filed by petitioners/appellants? Held:
Not having perfected their appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by l
aw, the decision of the Court of Appeals had become final and executory. Such a
failure carries with it the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdic
tion to review the case. However, it is true that we have recognized certain exc
eptions to this rule. In Ramos v. Bagasao, we excused the delay of four (4) days
in the filing of a notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the tria
l court was served upon appellant at a time when her counsel of record was alrea
dy dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four (4) days after the pres
cribed reglementary period was over. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we allowed
the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six (6) days t
o prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since it stood to lose hundreds of hect
ares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for educ
ational purposes. In Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, we accepted
a tardy appeal considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been
judicially settled, with finality, in another case. The dismissal of the appeal
would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same
reparation to the appellee. Unfortunately, we find no reason to make this case
an exception. Our ruling in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson has been in fo
rce for fifteen (15) years. It is hard to believe that petitioners were not awar
e of this ruling, or assuming that they were, their utter disregard of it is sim
ply unacceptable. The petitioners-appellants in G.R. No. 136799 likewise committ
ed a procedural error fatal to their cause of action. When they filed their Moti
on for Intervention on November 25, 1996, the DARAB New Rules of Procedure was a
lready in effect. Rule IX, Sec. 3 thereof states
"SECTION 3. Intervention.
g of a motion for intervention shall be discouraged. Such motion shall be entert
ained only upon a clear showing by the would-be intervenor that he has a substan
tial right or interest in the case that cannot be adequately pursued and protect
ed in another proceeding."
Thus, for such a motion for intervention to be entertained, two (2) requisites m
ust concur. First, the would-be intervenor must show that he has a substantial r
ight or interest in the case and that, second, it cannot be adequately pursued a
nd protected in another proceeding. The absence of even one requisite

The filin

will warrant its denial. Acting on this provision, the PARAD in fact denied the
motion for intervention, ruling that "their (petitioners-intervenors) rights ove
r the property . . . can be properly threshed out in a separate proceeding duly
instituted for the purpose". In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, we held that the disc
retion of a court (in this case a quasi-judicial agency) to allow intervention,
once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save
in instances where such discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary or capric
ious manner. Petitioners-appellants have not shown that the exercise of this dis
cretion was made in the manner above-described. Hence, it behooves this Court to
leave the denial of the motion for intervention to the wisdom of the PARAD. Bes
ides, the theory of petitionersappellants that as bona fide occupants of the lan
dholding, they automatically acquire a substantial right or interest in the case
is unmeritorious. The right or interest here referred to is generally required
to be direct and not consequential, and one properly determinable in the action
in which intervention is sought. The issue of whether or not they were improperl
y excluded from the CLOA is an issue totally different from that in G.R. No. 136
827, which is whether the City Council of Davao, through Resolution No. 558, val
idly reclassified the landholding from agricultural area to residential area, he
nce, rendering it outside the coverage of the CARP. If indeed it was validly rec
lassified, then there would be no CLOA to speak of. Petitioners-appellants would
have had no cause of action. Conversely, if the reclassification was invalid, t
hen the CLOA's legality would merely be affirmed. It must be borne in mind that
the alleged substantial right or interest of petitioners-appellants is based not
on the legality or illegality of the CLOA brought about by the supposed questio
nable reclassification done by the City Council of Davao through Resolution No.
558, rather, it is based on their claim that they were improperly excluded from
it. Thus, their interest is not one properly determinable in the action in which
intervention is sought. To further complicate the case by adding parties who ha
ve totally separate interests which can be the proper subject of a separate proc
eeding, will simply delay the expeditious resolution thereof. It has been settle
d that the right to intervene is not an absolute right, for the statutory rules
or conditions for the right to apply must be shown. As the two (2) requisites we
re not met, petitioners-appellants have no standing to intervene. At this point,
the proper course of action was simply to have filed a separate proceeding alto
gether. It is indeed lamentable that the two (2) instant petitions must be denie
d for failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in the Rules
of Court. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it
is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the presc
ribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. VESTE
D RIGHT, A PARTY CANNOT CLAIM THAT HE HAS A VESTED RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PROPER
TIES WHEN THERE IS CLEARLY NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW Graci
ano Palele vs. Hon. Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) and Tomas Sobrevias G.R. No
. 138289 (July 31, 2001)
Facts:

The properties involved in this case form part of a larger tract of land referre
d to as Lot No. 707 consisting of 9,939 meters in Dinalupihan, Bataan. The origi
nal holder-cultivator of the lot was respondent Tomas Sobrevias' father, Daniel wh
o had worked on the lot as a tenant since the 1920s. Tomas succeeded to the poss
ession of the said lot. On May 2, 1962, private respondent filed an application
with the Department of Agrarian Reform for the purchase of Lot No. 707. He paid
the purchase price of P810.66 in five installments and completed full payment on
September 7, 1973, however, no deed of sale was issued to him and the lot remai
ned the property of the government. In 1981, the lot was subdivided into four (4
) parcels of lands. On September 23, 1990, petitioner Graciano Palele applied fo
r the purchase of two of the lots. Subsequently, DAR issued two (2) CLOAs coveri
ng the two lots applied for. Private respondent being unaware of these incidents
continued paying the real estate taxes on Lot No. 707 and upon learning of the
issuance of the CLOAs in favor of the petitioner, filed a petition for cancellat
ion of the certificates on August 18, 1992. On September 23, 1993, the PARAD ren
dered judgment for the petitioner. This Decision was affirmed by the DARAB. Howe
ver, on appeal, the said Decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The CLOA
s were ordered recalled and cancelled. Hence, this petition for review on certio
rari. Issue:
Whether or not private respondent has acquired a vested right on the subject lan
dholdings Held:
At the time private respondent applied to purchase Lot No. 707 on May 2, 1962, t
he law in effect was R.A. No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of the Philippines, which took effect on August 30, 1954. Pursuant to the sa
id law, the then Land Tenure Administration, the implementing agency of the gove
rnment, issued Administrative Order No. 2, which was approved on May 10, 1956. S
o far as pertinent to this case, Sections 14 and 16 of the Order provided: SECTI
ON 14. Persons Qualified to Purchase; Number of Lots Granted.
Subject to the provi
sions of Section 16 hereof, any private individual who is qualified to acquire a
nd own lands in the Philippines and who will personally cultivate and/or occupy
the lot or lots which may be sold to him, may be allowed to purchase not more th
an one (1) home lot and/or farm lot except that in case of farm lots with areas
less than six (6) hectares, more than one (1) lot may be purchased provided, how
ever, that the total area of the lots which may be sold to one person shall not
exceed six (6) hectares.

The cultivation of a farm lot by the husband or wife of the purchaser thereof, a
nd by the members of the family of said purchaser who are dependent upon him or
her for support shall be considered as his or her cultivation for the purpose of
this section and of Sections 24 and 25 hereof.
Section 16. Right of Preference to Purchase of Bona-fide Tenant, Bona-fide Occup
ant and Other Persons.
The bona-fide tenant and in his absence or if he fails to q
ualify under Section 14 hereof, the bona-fide occupant of a subdivision lot in a
private agricultural land acquired by the government shall have the right of pr
eference to purchase said lot. In the absence of the bona-fide tenant and/or bon
afide occupant or in case said tenant and occupant fail to qualify under Section
14 hereof and subject to the provision of said section, the following persons s
hall be preferred in the purchase of a farm lot and/or home lot, in the order in
which they are named:
(1) A person who is the purchaser of a farm lot or lots in an agricultural land
acquired by the government, the production of which yields a net profit insuffic
ient to maintain a decent standard of living provided, however, that he will be
preferred only as to the portion of the farm lot applied for in the same agricul
tural land which if added to the area of the lot or lots already sold to him wil
l not exceed six (6) hectares;
(2) A person who is a resident of the municipality where the lot applied for is
located.
These provisions clearly require that the applicant should personally cultivate
and/or occupy the land subject of the purchase. This requirement is reiterated i
n Sections 23 and 24 of the same order.
It cannot be denied that private respondent had ceased to personally occupy and
cultivate Lot No. 707 at least on August 8, 1963. Only a year after his applicat
ion and before he had fully paid the purchase price of the land, private respond
ent had already instituted tenants on the said lot. This is clearly indicative o
f his circumvention of applicable agrarian reform laws. The fact that in 1992 he
was surprised to know that the lot had already been subdivided into smaller par
cels since 1981, and that two of which had already been awarded to petitioner, i
ndicates quite clearly that he was not personally cultivating Lot No. 707. Thus,
the Land Tenure Administration, and later the Land Authority, was justified in
refusing to issue a deed of sale in favor of respondent even though he paid in f
ull the purchase price of the lot. While it is true that due process protects ve
sted rights, and this Court would be the first to stress this basic principle, i
t is no less true that the guarantee cannot be invoked when, as in the case at b
ar, no right has been acquired at all because of non-compliance with the require
ments of the law.

SECURITY OF TENURE, THE PREVAILING PARTY IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE CANNOT DISP
OSSESS ONE CLAIMING TO BE AN AGRICULTURAL TENANT THEREIN AND WHOSE SECURITY RIGH
TS ARE STILL PENDING DETERMINATION BEFORE THE DARAB Heirs of Roman Soriano vs. T
he Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 128177 (August 15, 2001)
Issue:
May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor
thereof, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before
the DARAB? Held:
A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the po
ssessor of the land whose security of tenure rights are still pending determinat
ion before the DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land registr
ation case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied
by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the la
tter's occupancy was unlawful. TENANCY RELATIONSHIP MAY BE ESTABLISHED EITHER VE
RBALLY OR IN WRITING, EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY Pevet Adalid Felizardo, et al. vs.
Siegfredo Fernandez G.R. No. 137509 (August 15, 2001)
Facts:
To summarize, the petitioners in the case at bar are the registered owners of a
parcel of land originally tilled by the father of the respondent. Even during th
e lifetime of his father, respondent was already the one doing the duties of a t
enant until the latter's death in 1995. However, petitioners would like to insti
tute the elder sister of respondent as tenant of the land despite the allegation
of respondent that by virtue of successional tenancy rights, he was already the
declared tenant of the land. Issue:

Whether Siegfredo has acquired the status of agricultural tenant which would pre
clude petitioners from exercising their right to choose Asuncion (elder sister o
f respondent) as Policarpio's successor after the latter's death? Held:
The undisputed fact, as found by the DARAB, is that respondent worked on the lan
d since 1981 because his father could no longer do so. Respondent did not merely
aid his father in the latter's farm work, but completely took over that work si
nce Policarpo was already very old and incapable to continue farming. Section 5
(p) of R.A. No. 1199 defines "incapacity" as any cause or circumstance which pre
vents the tenant from fulfilling his contractual obligations. Respondent fully a
ssumed his father's leasehold obligations for 15 years precisely because Policar
po could no longer perform his duties as petitioners' tenant and respondent is t
he only member remaining of the original tenant's immediate farm household. The
Regional Adjudicator correctly took judicial notice of the fact that at the age
of 74, Policarpo was not able and could not reasonably be expected to till the l
and anymore. Petitioners were not unaware of this circumstance since they alread
y dealt with and received the land's proceeds from respondent. The incapacity of
Policarpo to attend to farm work had been evident to petitioners. The prevailin
g situation in the farm and the length of time which had lapsed from the time re
spondent assumed the tenancy work until his father's death amply support that co
nclusion. A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writin
g, expressly or impliedly, in accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199. As apt
ly held by the Regional Adjudicator: . . . the transfer and/or delegation of suc
h tenancy obligations to herein complainant [respondent] was in conformity to th
e general practice among farmers, especially so in the case of complainant who h
ad been assisting his father in the farmworks (sic). When defendants failed to i
ntervene or object to this development, and continued to accept their shares as
proffered by the new cultivator, they have thereby impliedly consented to it giv
ing rise to the new tenancy relationship with the complainant.
Although petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relatio
n with respondent, in our view petitioners consented to the tenancy albeit impli
edly by allowing respondent to cultivate the landholding in question and by rece
iving from him the landowner's share of the harvest over a considerable length o
f time. While it is true that Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 gives the lessor/landow
ner the right to choose a tenant successor in case of death or incapacity of the
original tenant, in this case we agree that said right could no longer be exerc
ised by petitioners. Not only have they allowed the lapse of a long period of ti
me

before attempting to exercise said right, it was also found that the successor t
hey had allegedly chosen, Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, was not qualified to succ
eed Policarpo because (a) she was no longer a member of the latter's immediate f
arm household; and (b) she could not and did not, at any time, personally cultiv
ate the land as shown by her unexplained absence during the harvests subsequent
to respondent's dispossession. Note also that in 1995, she was already 65 years
old. CARP COVERAGE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS, TWO NOTICES ARE REQUIRED: FI
RST, THE NOTICE OF COVERAGE AND LETTER OF INVITATION TO A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE
AND, SECOND, THE NOTICE OF ACQUISITION TO BE SENT TO THE LANDOWNER EXEMPTION, M
ORE THAN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND AS PARK IS THAT SAID LAND FORMS
A VITAL PART OF A WATERSHED AREA AND HAS SLOPES OF 18% AND OVER WHICH ARE EXEMPT
UNDER SECTION 10 OF R.A. NO. 6657 Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 112526 (October 12, 2001)
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the r
egistered owner of two parcels of land situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Lag
una covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 81949 and 84891 with a t
otal area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are wa
tersheds which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang Community and ninety
(90) light industries located in the area. Petitioner alleged that respondents
usurped its rights over the property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Responde
nts filed a civil case with the RTC of Laguna seeking an easement of a right of
way to and from Barangay Casile. Petitioner countered by seeking the ejectment o
f the respondents and filed separate complaints for forcible entry against the r
espondents before the Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. After the filing o
f the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the DAR for the compulsory acquisi
tion of the SRRDC property under CARP. Eventually, after a long and arduous proc
ess, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) not
ices of acquisition to petitioner and placed the properties under the Comprehens
ive Agrarian Reform Program despite the protest made by SRRDC that the property
was not appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area being rugged in terrain
with slopes of 18% or over and that the occupants of the land were squatters not
entitled to any land as beneficiaries. SRRDC further averred that the propertie
s were exempt from CARP coverage because it had been classified as watershed are
a and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion. Later, the cas
e was referred to the DARAB for summary land valuation.

In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24 rendered a De
cision finding that the private respondents illegally entered the SRRDC property
and ordered them evicted. On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong iss
ued a Memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust acco
unt in favor of SRRDC for P5,637,965.55 as valuation for the SRRDC property. On
December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated its Decision which, among others, dismissed
the petitioner's protest against compulsory coverage for lack of merit, ordered
the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay SRRDC the amount of P7,841,997.64 for t
he landholdings covered by the two titles and ordered the DAR through the MARO t
o take immediate possession of the landholding after transfer of the titles in t
he name of the Republic of the Philippines for the immediate issuance of Emancip
ation Patents to farmer-beneficiaries. On January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, B
ranch 24 rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. B-2333 ruling that private respon
dents were builders in bad faith. On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals, a petition for review of the DARAB decision. The CA promulgat
ed a decision affirming the Decision of the DARAB. Hence, this petition. Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP considering that it f
orms part of a watershed area and has slopes of 18% and over Held:
First, under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of privat
e land, Compulsory and Voluntary. In compulsory acquisition of private lands, th
e landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified.
After identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the landown
er, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place
in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is l
ocated. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the l
andowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his accept
ance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delive
rs a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate
of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of transfer, th
e Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the l
andowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summ
ary administrative proceedings to determine just

compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other inter
ested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from
notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and in
form the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. The DAR has
made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec. 1
6 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of
the land, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries. However, the law is sile
nt on how the identification process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26
, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set th
e operating procedure in the identification of such lands. Administrative Order
No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO
) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his ar
ea of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares
a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The
MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation
" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends inv
itations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Bar
angay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) a
nd other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the proper
ty and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At t
he meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area. For a valid i
mplementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1) the notice of c
overage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landown
er, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer-beneficiaries and other interest
ed parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the notice of ac
quisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance of
the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the letter of invitation t
o a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps des
igned to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The impleme
ntation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power of
eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the l
andowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private pr
operty in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulat
ion, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area all
owed, there is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking conte
mplated is not a mere limitation on the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all benefic
ial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. In the case
at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payme
nt of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. T
he law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust accounts as was done
by DAR. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Ag
rarian Reform, we held that "The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer
of possession and ownership of the land to the

government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the depos

it by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownersh
ip is contemplated either." Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a r
iver and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it
from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man
, so why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simp
le. At the time of the titling, the Department of Environment and Natural Resour
ces had not declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Bara
ngay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municip
ality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Bo
ard. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued Resolut
ion 26 voiding the Zoning classification of the lands at Barangay Casile as Park
and declaring that the land was now classified as agricultural land. The author
ity of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning classification is an
exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinan
ce is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future projection of needs." In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs
. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that lands classified as nonagricultura
l prior to the effectivity of the CARL, may not be compulsorily acquired for dis
tribution to farmer beneficiaries. However, more than the classification of the
subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that
the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area. The defin
ition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most importan
t product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human neces
sity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for futur
e generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but c
ause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an "intergenerational responsibi
lity" that needs to be answered now. Another factor that needs to be mentioned i
s the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Ca
sile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the cover
age of CARL. R.A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides: "Section 10. Exemptions and Ex
Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary
clusions.
for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breedi
ng grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuse
s including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers
, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cem
eteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, governme
nt and private research and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen perc
ent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from co
verage of this Act."

Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed pa
rcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP b
ecause of its very high slopes. To resolve the issue as to the nature of the par
cels of land involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct
a re-evaluation of the issue. JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB IS LIMITED TO CASES INV
OLVING TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES Rodrigo Almuete and Ana Almuete
vs. Marcelo Andres and The Court of Appeals G.R. No. 122276 (November 20, 2001)
Facts:
Petitioner Rodrigo Almuete was awarded a 72,587 square meter parcel of land loca
ted at San Vicente, Angadanan, Isabela by the then National Resettlement and Reh
abilitation Administration (NARRA) on March 25, 1957. Since then, Almuete and hi
s family farmed the subject property peacefully and exclusively. However, unknow
n to petitioner, an Agrarian Reform Technologist by the name of Leticia Gragasin
on August 17, 1979 filed false reports making it appear that Almuete has waived
his right as awardee and made it appear that one Marcelo Andres was the actual
occupant of the land from 1967 to date. Said Gragasin further recommended that t
he award in favor of petitioner Almuete be cancelled and the land be awarded to
respondent Marcelo. Consequently, DAR issued OCT No. P-52521 in the name of resp
ondent who, in turn, accompanied by ten persons armed with bolos, immediately en
tered the subject property claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession.
Almuete complained to the DAR and wasted no time in filing an action for reconv
eyance and recovery of possession against Marcelo Andres with the RTC of Cauayan
, Isabela, Br. 20 docketed as Civil Case No. Br-20-530. The Trial Court rendered
a Decision in favor of Almuete which became final and executory upon Marcelo An
dres's failure to appeal. The latter filed a petition for certiorari to prevent
the implementation of the writ of execution which was entertained by the Court o
f Appeals. Hence, this Petition. Issue:
Who between the petitioner and the respondent has a better right to the subject
property considering that both of them are awardees of the same property?

Held:
No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and res
pondent, let alone that which would so characterize the relationship as an agrar
ian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent were contending parties for the
ownership of the same parcel of land. Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Procedure of the DARAB, provides: "Section 1. Primary, Original and Appellate J
urisdiction.
The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdictio
n, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian dispute
s, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation o
f the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executi
ve Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic A
ct No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules an
d regulations.
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No 6657, as: "(
d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agr
iculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representati
on of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrang
e terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under thi
s Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the dispu
tants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowne
r and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to
cases involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The following eleme
nts are indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship: (1) The parties are t
he landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2)
The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

(3)
There is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4)
The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5)
There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and
(6)
The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lesse
e.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, gravely erred when it granted the petition for
certiorari and held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject ma
tter of the action between petitioners and respondent. The action filed by petit
ioners was cognizable by the regular courts. Consequently, the Regional Trial Co
urt of Cauayan, Isabela was competent to try and decide Civil Case No. 20-530. I
ts decision was, thus, valid and can no longer be disturbed, after having attain
ed finality. Nothing more can be done with the decision except to enforce it. LE
ASEHOLD TENANCY, THE QUESTION REGARDING RESPONDENT'S TENANCY STATUS IS FACTUAL I
N NATURE AND NORMALLY IS NOT PROPER IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW WHERE ONLY QUESTION
S OF LAW MAY BE ENTERTAINED. HOWEVER, IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, WHEN THERE APPEARS T
O BE COMPELLING REASONS TO MODIFY SUCH, THE SAID FACTUAL FINDINGS MAY BE THE SUB
JECT OF REVIEW
Felix Pascual vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Victor Solis G.R. No. 13878
1 (December 3, 2001) Facts:
On March 5, 1992, petitioner brought an action for "Maintenance of Peaceful Poss
ession with Prayer for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction" against respond
ent Victor Solis before the DARAB Region III in Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner all
eged that respondent tried to enter into possession and cultivation of the above
described agricultural lots thus disrupting petitioner's peaceful possession an
d personal cultivation of the same. Respondent in his answer averred that he is
a lawful tenant of the lots and insisted that as a legitimate tenant, he enjoyed
security of tenure and cannot be ejected from the land except upon authority of
the

court. To substantiate his assertion, respondent presented two (2) agricultural

leasehold contracts as well as two (2) Certificates of Agricultural Leasehold (C
ALs). Petitioner countered by averring that respondent abandoned the first lot a
nd voluntarily surrendered the second lot upon payment of a disturbance compensa
tion of P18,000.00. Furthermore, as a consequence of the voluntary surrender mad
e by the respondent, petitioner was able to sell the second lot to the spouses J
ose Bernardo and Rosa Payumo as evidenced by a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" (
Venta Absoluta) dated December 11, 1985. Thus, the issue of respondent's status
as lessee should be properly addressed to the new owners. In due course, the Pro
vincial Adjudicator rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and
against defendant (respondent) Victor Solis, ruling that respondent was not a t
enant of the disputed lots. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the findings of the PA
RAD and declared Victor Solis as a legitimate tenant and entitled to security of
tenure. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB. Petitioner mov
ed for reconsideration but the same was likewise denied. Hence, this petition. I
ssue:
Whether or not respondent was a tenant of the lands belonging to petitioner and
consequently entitled to security of tenure? Held:
Initially, the question regarding respondent's tenancy status is factual in natu
re which is not proper in a petition for review, where only questions of law may
be entertained. However, after a careful examination of the evidence on record,
there appears a compelling reason to modify the factual findings below, since i
t appears that the appellate court and the DARAB failed to take into account cer
tain important considerations extant in the records. The appellate court and the
DARAB erred in rendering judgment on the assumption that these lots are one and
the same. To repeat, the second contract and CAL 022 do not pertain to Lot No.
2025. Hence, respondent cannot be declared a tenant of Lot No. 2025. No lease ag
reement or certificate was adduced to prove that Lot No. 2025 is the same lot de
scribed in the second contract and CAL 022. Furthermore, there is an apparent ab
sence of the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship betwee
n the parties over Lot No. 2025. For this relationship to exist, it is necessary
that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricu
ltural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of
rental.

The findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the ocular inspection indicate th
at respondent did not personally cultivate the riceland portion of Lot No. 2025
or share its harvest proceeds with petitioner. Petitioner did not consent to a l
easehold agreement with respondent over Lot No. 2025, as shown by petitioner's f
iling of complaint below to enjoin respondent from encroaching and planting ther
eon. Accordingly, respondent is not a de jure tenant of Lot No. 2025, thus, he i
s not entitled to security of tenure relative to this lot. As to the 1.3-hectare
land subject of the second contract and CAL No. 022, petitioner contends that t
his lot was already sold to the spouses Payumo in 1985. Therefore, the issue of
respondent's tenancy status over the 1.3 hectare agricultural lot covered by the
second contract and CAL 022 is not proper for disposition in this case. Petitio
ner is no longer the owner of this lot and will not, thus, be benefited or preju
diced by any declaration made herein, recognizing respondent as its bona fide te
nant. The claim of tenancy over this lot should be directed against the new owne
rs/vendees, who are subrogees to the rights and obligations of the agricultural
lessor/vendor. JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB, THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT ADJUDGE CIVIL M
ATTERS THAT RELATE TO THE AGRARIAN RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTIES. THESE ARE MATTER
S BEYOND ITS COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION AND ARE EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE D
ARAB Leonarda L. Monsanto vs. Jesus and Teresita Zerna and the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 142501 (December 7, 2001)
Held:
The filing of a criminal case carries with it the civil liability arising from t
he offense. However, the trial court cannot adjudge civil matters that are beyon
d its competence and powers. Thus, while a court may have authority to pass upon
the criminal liability of the accused, it cannot make any civil awards that rel
ate to the agrarian relationship of the parties because this matter is beyond it
s jurisdiction. In the present case, the RTC had jurisdiction to decide the crim
inal case against private respondents; however, it acted beyond its jurisdiction
when it effectively ruled on the agricultural tenancy relationship between the
parties. Private respondents had raised before it the issue of tenancy by way of
defense, and apparently interwoven with the agrarian dispute, were the acts com
plained of by petitioner: the harvesting of the coconuts, their conversion into
copra and, later, the sale thereof. Thus, the RTC should have confined itself to
the determination of whether private respondents were guilty of qualified theft
, instead of automatically awarding the proceeds of the copra sale to petitioner
. Such matter, being an offshoot of the agrarian dispute between the parties, is
cognizable exclusively by the DARAB.

PETITION FOR REVIEW, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN ARE E
NTITLED TO BE FARMER-BENEFICIARIES/TENANTS OF THE LAND IS A QUESTION OF FACT AND
IS NOT THE PROPER SUBJECT OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 Spouses Benny
Calvo and Jovita S. Calvo vs. Spouses Bernardito and Angelina Vergara, et al. G.
R. No. 134741 (December 19, 2001)
Facts:
Milagros Lebumfacil was the owner of several lots located in Matab-ang Toledo Ci
ty which were placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the DAR.
Two of the tenant farmers therein, Egmidio Baguio and Josefa Apan, due to poor
health and senility waived their rights over the said lots. This prompted the DA
R to reallocate the same to other beneficiaries including the herein respondents
who were given a 750 square meter portion as their homelot. Despite the coverag
e under OLT program, Lebumfacil still sold the land to the herein petitioners wh
o in turn filed a complaint for illegal detainer praying for the eviction of the
respondents from their homelots. The MTC forwarded the case to the PARAD who up
held the validity of the OLT program but declared the CLT Transfer Action No. CE
B-VII-184-91 involving the reallocated lots as null and void. On appeal, the DAR
AB modified the decision and upheld the validity and legality of the coverage of
the subject 750 square meters. The CA likewise affirmed the said Decision of th
e DARAB. Hence, this petition. Issue:
Whether private respondents are tenant-farmers and are thus qualified as realloc
atees of OLT areas under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80, series of 1980 and are en
titled to a homelot under Letter of Instruction No. 705 Held:
In Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110207, 258 SCRA 651, 658 (1996), we dis
tinguished between the two types of questions: there is a question of law when t
he doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain stat
e of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the trut
h or falsity of alleged facts. Being a question of fact, it is beyond the office
of this court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Co
urt, where only questions of law may be raised. Although there are exceptions, p
etitioners did not show that this is one of them.

LEASEHOLD TENANCY, ORDINARILY, TENANCY IS A FACTUAL ISSUE WHICH MAY NOT BE REVIE
WED ON CERTIORARI, BUT BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF THE DARAB UPHELD BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (PAR
AB) ON THE ISSUE OF TENANCY, THE SUPREME COURT IS OBLIGED TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS The Heirs of Jose Juanite, et al. vs. The Court of Appe
als, et al. G.R. No. 138016 (January 30, 2002)
Facts:
The Spouses Edilberto Romero and Felisa Romero owned a piece of agricultural lan
d in Alegria, Surigao del Norte. On different dates, the Romeros sold separate p
ortions thereof to Efren Pania, Macario Sanchez and Pio Yonson. Claiming to be t
he agricultural tenants of the land in question, Jose Juanite (now deceased) and
his wife, Nicolasa O. Juanite, filed a complaint with the Provincial Agrarian R
eform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), against t
he spouses Edilberto and Felisa Romero and their vendees above-named for the can
cellation of the sales adverted to and for the Juanites to exercise their right
of redemption pursuant to R.A. No. 3844. Edilberto Romero, et al. as defendants,
in their answer alleged that the Romeros, being the owners of the property, had
the perfect right to sell any portion thereof to any person. They also strongly
denied the allegation of the Juanites that the latter were their tenants. The P
ARAD rendered a decision declaring the Juanite spouses as tenants, directing the
MARO to prepare the leasehold contract in their favor, declaring the aforementi
oned Deed of Sale executed by the parties null and void and directing the latter
to vacate the premises. On Appeal, the DARAB reversed the decision and declared
that the Juanites were not tenants of the land, hence, had no right of redempti
on. Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, di
smissed the petition. Hence, this Appeal. Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are tenants of the Romero spouses (respondents) a
s to entitle them to the right of redemption Held:

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the essential requisites of a tenancy re
lationship are the following: (2) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(3)
the subject is agricultural land;
(4)
there is consent;
(5)
the purpose is agricultural production;
(6)
there is personal cultivation; and
(7)
there is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship betwe
en the parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land
, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a pers
on has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to securit
y of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under
existing tenancy laws.
However, we agree with the petitioners that with the landowners' admission that
petitioners were tenants on the subject landholding, the element of "sharing har
vest" is assumed as a factual element in that admission. We note that petitioner
s alleged in the complaint filed with the PARAB that: "6. That in the year 1971,
the herein defendants, informed plaintiffs that the land which, Hermogena Merca
do-Mondonedo and which is hereto described, as follows, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx

and that the land was sold to her and husband, Edilberto Romero by Hermogena Mer
cado-Mondonedo and that since then, plaintiffs continued in possession and culti
vation of the land above described, as tenant and sharing the fruits and product
s of the land to defendants, spouses Edilberto and Felisa Romero."
In their answer to the complaint, respondents denied the tenant and landlord rel
ationship, but failed to rebut the evidence adduced by petitioners that they wer
e tenants. BENEFICIARIES UNDER CARP, THE IDENTIFICATION AND SELECTION OF CARP BE
NEFICIARIES ARE MATTERS INVOLVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARP,
A MATTER EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE DARAB Lolihala Saberon Lercana vs. Por
ferio Jalandoni, et al. G.R. No. 132286 (February 1, 2002)
Facts:
Gregorio Pajuelas, grandfather of petitioner Lolihala S. Lercana, was the owner
of an agricultural land with an estimated area of nineteen (19) hectares, locate
d in Barangay Salug, Siaton, Negros Oriental. It was mortgaged by Lolihala's mot
her, Bruna Saberon, and was redeemed by Rodolfo Aspilla, who planted sugarcane a
nd hired respondent Porferio Jalandoni, among other laborers, to work on the lan
d. In 1976, Aspilla's sugarcane production failed. Aspilla then appointed Jaland
oni as overseer and authorized him to install the other respondents as tenant-ti
llers who devoted the property to corn production. Respondents gave Aspilla, thr
ough Jalandoni, the owner's shares of the corn products in "tercio" basis, in fa
vor of the tenants. Jalandoni also gave to Aspilla the owner's share from the co
pra produce on the same "tercio" basis. Aside from corn, respondents planted aux
iliary crops like cassava and other vegetables. On August 21, 1972, Aspilla mort
gaged the subject property to the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) as security for
a loan. Because Aspilla failed to redeem the mortgage, it was foreclosed on Oct
ober 25, 1978. On June 26, 1980, the title covering the property was consolidate
d under TCT No. HT-1906 in the name of PVB.

Not knowing about the ownership transfer, respondents continued to give to Aspil
la his share of the harvest until 1984, when Aspilla led for Kuwait. Thereafter,
the share was given to Aspilla's children, who visited the property every harve
st rime. In August 1989, petitioner appeared, claimed ownership of the land for
allegedly having bought it from PVB and demanded from each of the respondents th
e owner's share of the land produce. Not satisfied, petitioner and her relatives
eventually took over and cultivated the land. Respondents as plaintiffs below w
ere constrained to file a complaint for reinstatement and damages against petiti
oner before the PARAD, Negros Oriental. However, the case was dismissed. Respond
ents appealed to the DARAB which reversed and set aside the decision of the PARA
D. The gist of the Decision by the Board is that the disputed property has been
offered to the DAR through CARP through the VOS scheme. As such, it was not true
that petitioner acquired ownership thereof. Further, that application papers fo
r potential CARP beneficiaries have been processed since September 19, 1989. Pet
itioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. However, the Appe
llate Court resolved the issue in favor of the respondents. It rendered a modifi
ed decision affirming the decision of the DARAB but deleting the award of P20,00
0 as exemplary damages. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was de
nied. Hence, this petition. Issues:
The issues concern (1) the occupation and tillage over the eastern portion of th
e land by petitioner and her relatives; and (2) their qualification as beneficia
ries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Held:
On the first issue, regarding respondents' tenancy, the Court of Appeals affirme
d the DARAB's finding that respondents were the actual occupants and tillers of
the entire subject landholding. This finding, according to petitioner, is in com
plete variance with the PARAD's finding that respondents were not tenants nor ag
ricultural lessees on the disputed property. Petitioner asserts that she and her
relatives have always remained on the one-half eastern portion of the land, cul
tivating the same peacefully, openly and uninterruptedly, before and after the w
estern portion was mortgaged. This, according to petitioner, is supported by Jal
andoni's testimony that in 1976, when Aspilla gave Jalandoni the authority to in
stall tenants, Jalandoni occupied three (3) hectares while Mahinay, Mayorga and
Ege, the other installed tenants, occupied one hectare each. This means that Asp
illa occupied a total area of only 6 hectares, confirming petitioner's contentio
n that only one-half of the entire subject landholding was mortgaged. Petitioner
adds that respondents' submissive acceptance, when told by petitioner that she
had become the owner of the land, was a manifestation of respondents' own doubt
on their status.

Lastly, DARAB Sheriff Edwin L. Badon, who also actually conducted an ocular insp
ection of the property, declared that an estimated area of 8 hectares, which for
med part of the entire 19 hectare-landholding, was under the tillage of Lolihala
and relatives. All these substantially prove, said petitioner, that she and her
relatives had remained on the eastern portion of the property. Coming now to th
e present controversy, in our view, the finding of the appellate court, affirmin
g the DARAB's own findings, that respondents are the tenants of the entire prope
rty in question, is supported by the evidence on record. The testimony of Galoy
Ezoy, petitioner's own witness and a neighbor of the Pajuelas, shows that the di
sputed property was originally owned by Gregorio Pajuelas and later on by Dodong
Aspilla. Aspilla then appointed Porferio Jalandoni and company to work on the l
and. Ezoy further testified that petitioner and her relatives started to work on
the land only when the case was filed. His testimony was not refuted by petitio
ner. Furthermore, the certifications of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (
BARC) Chairman and Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Barangay Salag, Siaton,
Negros Oriental, state that petitioner and her relatives were not the actual occ
upants and tillers on the subject landholding, and that they only took over the
property in 1990 when they entered and occupied it by force and threats. These c
ertifications carry the presumption of regularity in their issuance, but petitio
ner did not show any evidence to overcome that presumption. Also, the certificat
ion of DARAB Sheriff Edwin L. Badon cited by petitioner to contradict the abovec
ited two certifications, merely attest to the actual cultivation and occupation
of petitioner and her relatives at the time of the pendency of the case at the D
ARAB, but not of the time when they actually started cultivating the land. Said
certification did not concern, much less corroborate, petitioner's allegation th
at she and her relatives have always remained in the eastern portion of the prop
erty, even after the mortgage. Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeals' find
ing, adopting that of the DARAB, was sufficiently supported by evidence on recor
d. On the second issue tendered by the petition, it appears to us that the prope
r administrative official must resolve first the question of beneficiaries under
CARP. The Court of Appeals, in adopting the findings of the DARAB, did not decl
are respondents as beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) in relation to the disputed landholding. The DARAB, in the dispositive p
ortion of its decision, left to the concerned DAR Offices the determination of w
ho are or should be the CARP beneficiaries. At this juncture, petitioner ought t
o be reminded that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are ma
tters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, a matter
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, a
nd beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB. JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEM
ENTATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS, P.D. NO. 946 PROVIDES THAT MATTERS INVOLVING T
HE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSFER OF THE LAND TO THE TENANT-FARME
R UNDER P.D. NO. 27 AND AMENDATORY AND RELATED DECREES, ORDERS, INSTRUCTIONS, RU
LES AND REGULATIONS SHALL BE EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa in his capacity as the Regional Director of DAR Re
gion III and Restituto Rivera vs. Hon. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 132048 (March 6, 2002)

Facts:
On May 25, 1972, the then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an "Order of Award
" in favor of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural land, Lots 1932
and 1904 of the Buena Vista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and
19,808 square meters on condition which substantially states that within a peri
od of six (6) months the awardee shall personally cultivate or otherwise develop
at least one fourth of the area, occupy and construct his/her house in case of
residential lot and pay at least the first installment xxxx failure on his/her p
art to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient cause for cancellation o
f this Order. On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years, private respondent
(Jose Verdillo) filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Ref
orm for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditi
ons of the said Order. Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter prote
st against private respondent claiming that he is the one in possession of the l
and and cultivating the same. A representative of the DAR Regional Office undert
ook an investigation on the conflicting claims and found that the subject landho
ldings were in the possession/cultivation of other persons other than Jose Verdi
llo and that it was crystal clear that Jose Verdillo had culpably violated the t
erms and conditions of the Order of Award. On the basis of such, DAR Regional Di
rector Antonio Nuesa promulgated an Order canceling the Order of Award in favor
of Jose Verdillo, declaring the lots vacant and open for disposition and allowin
g the processing of Restituto Rivera's application to purchase the said lots. Ag
grieved, private respondent then filed a Petition with the PARAD. Petitioners co
untered by filing a Motion to Dismiss the Petition instead of an Answer on the g
round that the proper remedy in the case at bar is to file an Appeal to the Secr
etary of Agrarian Reform under DAR Memorandum Circular No. 587 and not by a peti
tion with the DARAB. The PARAD chose to render a decision on the merits, denied
the Motion to Dismiss the Petition and reversed the Order of the Regional Direct
or. Petitioner Rivera filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. He t
hen interposed an appeal with the DARAB but the Board affirmed the Decision of t
he PARAD. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
but it was denied due course and was ordered dismissed. Hence, this petition fo
r review. Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners' claims that in
this case, the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to l
ack or excess of jurisdiction? Held:
We agree with petitioners that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the DARAB and its officials have not committed grave abuse of discretion tantam
ount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in this case. P.D. 946 provides that matt
ers involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land to t
he tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, i
nstructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secre
tary of Agrarian Reform, including: . . . (5) issuance, recall or cancellation o
f certificates of land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No. 816. Th
e revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by th
e Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the DAR.
The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneou
sly and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then ov
erturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on the
merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case. As hel
d by this Court in Centeno vs. Centeno, "the DAR is vested with the primary juri
sdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agra
rian reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction
"to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and m
atters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian R
eform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as am
ended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementi
ng rules and regulations." Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 (CARP Law), "agra
rian dispute" is defined to include "(d) . . . any controversy relating to tenur
ial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over land
s devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or s
eeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes
any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and o
ther terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworker
s, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenan
t, or lessor and lessee." In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent
had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have
brought this controversy between them within the ambit of the abovecited provis
ion. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should
not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition in the first place.

While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have

acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters ar
e accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, due care should be
taken that administrative actions are not done without regard to the jurisdictio
nal boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent
DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal
boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera an
d private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of
the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining DARAB's un
justified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or exces
s of its jurisdiction. JURISDICTION (BELATED INVOCATION THEREOF), THE ENDS OF JU
STICE AND EQUITY REQUIRE THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DEFEAT THE TE
NANT'S RIGHT BY BELATEDLY RAISING THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION Jose Oca, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals and Sergio O. Abalos G.R. No. 144817 (March 7, 2002)
Facts:
Petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca are the co-owners of a fishpond known in th
e locality as the "Purong" property situated in Bolosan, Dagupan City. The four
petitioners are the civil law lessees of another called the "Salayog" property.
Petitioner Jose Oca is also the sole and exclusive owner of two fishponds common
ly called the "Perew" and the "Fabian" properties. Respondent Sergio O. Abalos c
laims to be the "share tenant-caretaker" of the above fishponds, asserting that
he had been in peaceful possession, cultivation and care of the aforesaid fishpo
nds from the time he received the same from the petitioners Oca brothers until t
he first week of May 1992 when he requested from them the share of the harvest a
nd instead of acceding, petitioners demanded that he vacate the lands. A complai
nt for Peaceful Possession, Leasehold and Damages with Motion for the Issuance o
f Interlocutory Order was filed by the respondent against the petitioner with th
e PARAD. Petitioners in their answer denied that the respondent is a caretaker/t
enant of the land. They acknowledged that the respondent is merely an industrial
partner who had waived his right as such, in consideration of the amount of P14
0,000.00.

After due proceedings, the PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent
declaring him as a bona fide tenant of the subject fishponds. The above Decision
was appealed by the petitioners to the DARAB but the Board affirmed in toto the
Decision of the PARAD. Petitioners sought relief with the Court of Appeals and
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Appellate Court modified the Deci
sion ruling that the private respondent cannot be a tenant of the "Salayog" prop
erty, he having sold his share and interest and had consequently, waived any int
erests he had thereon. Hence, the instant petition, raising as a new argument th
e supposed lack of jurisdiction of the PARAD over the subject fishponds. Issue:
Can they (petitioners) be permitted to impugn for the first time the jurisdictio
n of the Provincial Adjudicator at this stage of the case? Held:
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determi
ned exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the v
oluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waiv
ed or enlarged or diminished by, their act or omission; neither is it conferred
by acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts no
r the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in
character. An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to
at any instance, as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to ta
ke cognizance of the action. This kind of defense can be invoked even for the fi
rst time on appeal or after final judgment. Such is understandable as this kind
of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily determined. This rule on timing, howe
ver, is not absolute. In highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances, estop
pel or waiver may operate as a shield to prevent a party from belatedly resortin
g to this form of defense. Thus, we have held in the leading case of Tijam v. Si
bonghanoy that a party may be barred by estoppel by laches from invoking this pl
ea for the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in
the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We defin
ed laches as "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of t
ime, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been do
ne earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable t
ime, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned i
t or has declined to assert it."

In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches. In the
first place, they never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator
at any stage of the proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the DAR
AB, or the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the presence of numerous opportunit
ies in the various stages of this case to contest the adjudicator's exercise of
jurisdiction, not once did they register a hint of protest. Neither can they cla
im that they were prevented from contesting its jurisdiction during the eight ye
ars this case was under litigation. The ends of justice and equity require that
petitioners should not be allowed to defeat the tenant's right by belatedly rais
ing the issue of jurisdiction. Permitting petitioners to assail the jurisdiction
of the Provincial Adjudicator at this late stage of the case would mean renderi
ng useless all the proceedings held below. A great deal of time, effort and reso
urces would be put to waste both on the part of the litigants and of the State.
This is especially oppressive for the respondent, a tenant who cannot afford the
discomforts of a protracted litigation. BENEFICIARIES UNDER CARP/SUFFICIENCY OF
SERVICE, THE APPELLATE COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT QUALIFIED
BENEFICIARIES UNDER CARP IS JUST AN OBITER DICTUM AND NOT NECESSARY IN THE RESO
LUTION OF THE ISSUES Deogracias Musa, Romeo and Andro Musa as represented by the
ir Attorney-in-fact, Marilyn Musa vs. Sylvia Amor G.R. No. 141396 (April 9, 2002
)
Facts:
This case involves an agricultural landholding with a total area of 9.9611 hecta
res located at Dancalan, Donsol, Sorsogon formerly owned by one Antonio Dasig, t
wo hectares of which are ricelands and the rest are devoted to coconuts. When An
tonio Dasig migrated to the United States, his mother, Rosario Dasig, acted as a
dministratrix of the said property. On March 5, 1993, Rosario, representing her
son, sold the subject property to herein respondent Sylvia Amor for the total am
ount of P300,000.00. This prompted petitioners, claiming to be tenants of the la
ndholding, to file a case for redemption against respondent and Rosario Dasig wi
th the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Adjudicator. Later on, respondent
tried to eject petitioners from the property so the latter withdrew the case for
redemption and filed against respondent a complaint for annulment of sale, rein
statement and damages with a prayer for preliminary injunction, docketed as DARA
B Case No. 05-154-S. The RARAD ruled in favor of petitioners declaring them as t
enants of the landholding and nullifying the deed of absolute sale between Rosar
io Dasig and respondent.

On Appeal, the DARAB modified the ruling and declared the petitioners as bonafid
e tenants entitled to security of tenure. Not satisfied, respondent brought the
case on appeal to the Court of Appeals which in turn rendered a decision modifyi
ng the DARAB's ruling only insofar as petitioners' status is concerned and holdi
ng that they "should not be considered tenants of the subject landholding". The
decision of the DARAB was affirmed in all other respects. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the petitioners not tenan
ts of the land and not qualified beneficiaries under the provision of the CARP?
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing respondents petition bef
ore the forum for failure to cite an explanation as to the modes of service? Hel
d:
It should be pointed out that identification of actual and potential beneficiari
es under CARP is vested in the DAR Secretary. Administrative Order No. 10, Serie
s of 1989 provides: ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 10 Series of 1989
SUBJECT: RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE REGISTRATION OF BENEFICIARIES
I.
PREFATORY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Section 15, Chapter IV, of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, the DAR, in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC
), as organized pursuant to R.A. 6657, shall register all agricultural lessees,
tenants and farmworkers who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. This Admini
strative Order provides the Implementing Rules and Procedures for the said regis
tration.
II.
OBJECTIVES.

A.
General
1. Develop a data bank of potential and qualified beneficiaries of the CARP for
the effective implementation of the program.
B.
Specific
1.
Identify the actual and potential farmer-beneficiaries of the CARP. (Emphasis ou
rs.)
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is significant to note that on September 3, 1993, the DAR Secretary through t
he Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing t
he entire agricultural landholding, including the subject property, under CARP.
Such being the case, the appellate court's pronouncement that petitioners are no
t qualified beneficiaries under CARP is just an obiter dictum and not necessary
in the resolution of the issues. Petitioners also allege that the Court of Appea
ls should not have given due course to the petition because the respondent faile
d to attach thereto a written explanation why personal service was not done, the
reby violating Section 11, Rule 13, of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals
found the service of petition by registered mail sufficient notwithstanding the
absence of an explanation why service by mail was resorted to. Citing the case o
f Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, it declared that "the Rules of Court shall not be
applicable in agrarian cases even in suppletory character." The issue of suffici
ency of service of pleadings pertains to the proceedings of the Court of Appeals
which are governed by the Rules of Court. Section 11, Rule 13 of said Rules pro
vides: "SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing.
Whenever practicable,
the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. E
xcept with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes m
ust be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not do
ne personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as no
t filed."
As the above-quoted provision requires, service and filing of pleadings must be
done personally whenever practicable. The Court notes that in the present case,
personal service would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the
Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the

petition was posted, clearly, the service by registered mail was sufficient notw
ithstanding the absence of an explanation why service by mail was resorted to. A
written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfl
uous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may," signifying pe
rmissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to c
onsider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are neces
sary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid applicatio
n of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substant
ial justice. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND VALIDITY OF P.D. NO. 27 AND DAR MEMORANDUM CI
RCULAR NO. 6, SERIES OF 1978 Rolando Sigre vs. Court of Appeals and Lilia Y. Gon
zales as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay G.R. No. 109568 (August
8, 2002)
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Lilia Y. Gonzales as co-ad
ministratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay G.R. No. 113454 (August 8, 2002)
Facts:
Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales as administratrix of the Estate of the late
Matias Yusay filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus docketed as CA-GR SP
No. 28906 seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accep
ting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner Rolando
Sigre) and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the rentals previously re
mitted to it by Sigre. Ernesto Sigre is a tenant of the private respondent's irr
igated riceland located in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously pay
ing a lease rental of sixteen (16) cavans per crop or thirty-two (32) cavans per
agricultural year. In the agricultural year 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his
rentals and instead remitted the same to the LBP pursuant to the Department of
Agrarian Reform's Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978 on the guidelines of
the payment of lease rentals by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer pr
ogram of P.D. No. 27.

According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DAR had already fixe
d the 3-year production prior to October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per
hectare and pegged the value of the land at thirteen thousand four hundred five
pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P13,405.67). Thus, the petition filed with the
Court of Appeals assailing not only the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 bu
t also the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27. The appellate court in its decision
dated March 22, 1993 declared Memorandum Circular No. 6 null and void and direc
ted LBP to return to private respondent the lease rentals paid by Sigre. The lat
ter was also directed to pay the rentals directly to private respondent. The App
ellate Court ruled that the said Circular is in conflict with PD 816 and that PD
27 is unconstitutional in laying down the formula for determining the cost of t
he land. It sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just com
pensation. Hence, this present recourse, which is a consolidation of the separat
e petitions for review filed by Rolando Sigre and by LBP. Issue:
Validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and Constitutionality of Presidential Decr
ee No. 27. Held:
The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement t
he broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that i
s required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity
with the standards prescribed by the law. One such administrative regulation is
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel, emancipation
is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by transfer
ring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they are tilling. The ratio
nale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court
when it stated that "(T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain that
the lease rental payments of the tenantfarmer are applied to his amortizations
on the purchase price of the land x x x x . The circular was meant to remedy the
situation where the tenant-farmer's lease rentals to landowner were not credite
d in his favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus, making h
im a perpetual obligor for said purchase price." Since the assailed Circular ess
entially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore vali
d. Such being the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect
. The Court cannot see any "irreconcilable conflict" between P.D. No. 816 and DA
R Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the ten
ant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until
the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the

landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, impleme
nted in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental
after the value of the land has been determined. In Curso v. Court of Appeals, i
nvolving the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was categorically ruled that there i
s no incompatibility between these two. That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constit
utional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by this
Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited case of De Chav
ez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and pa
rcel of the law of the land, viz.: "There is no doubt then, as set forth express
ly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part
and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitution itself.
Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be
to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our
duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the car
dinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It i
s also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this b
asic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with
the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners
of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratif
ied by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objectiv
e could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawn
ed in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can b
e no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical
norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and n
ot thwarting fundamental policy goals."
Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally involves private respond
ent and counsel in the case at bench, the Court emphatically declared that "Pres
idential Decree No. 27 has survived the test of constitutionality." Then, in 198
2, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial imprimatur in Association of R
ice & Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Counci
l, to wit: ". . . If as pointed out in the opening paragraph, the validity of Pr
esidential Decree No. 27 was assumed as early as 1974, on the first anniversary
of the present constitution, in De Chavez v. Zobel and specifically upheld in Go
nzales v. Estrella five years later, there cannot be any justification for holdi
ng that it is unconstitutional on its face without any factual foundation."
Lastly, in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 a
nd 229, and R.A. 6657, any other assault on the validity of P.D. 27 was ultimate
ly foreclosed when it was declared therein that "R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No.

27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the const
itutional objections raised in the herein petition." SUCCESSION IN AGRARIAN CASE
S/FINDINGS OF FACTS/LEASEHOLD TENANCY FIRST, THE APPELLATE COURT CANNOT MAKE ITS
OWN FINDINGS OF FACT AND SUBSTITUTE THE SAME FOR THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DA
RAB SECOND, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS SHOULD NOT CONFUSE THE LAW ON SUCCESSION PROVI
DED FOR IN THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH SUCCESSION IN AGRARIAN CASES X
X X X X IN AGRARIAN LAWS, THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF THE DECEASED TENANT SHALL P
ASS ON TO ONLY ONE (1) HEIR Dionisia L. Reyes vs. Ricardo L. Reyes, et al. G.R.
No. 140164 (September 6, 2002)
Facts:
The instant case stemmed from a complaint for reinstatement with damages filed w
ith the DARAB Region III Office by Dionisia Reyes on April 22, 1991 against her
four younger brothers, herein respondents. She alleged that her father, the late
Felizardo Reyes, was the tenant of a two-hectare agricultural lot in Parulan, P
laridel, Bulacan, owned by Marciano Castro. After her father's death on February
17, 1989, she and Marciano Castro, through the latter's son and attorney-in-fac
t, Ramon R. Castro, executed a leasehold contract naming her as the agricultural
lessee of the property. However, sometime before the start of the planting of t
he dry season crop in 1989, herein respondents forcibly entered the area and occ
upied a one-hectare portion of the property. They claimed to be the tenants ther
eof. Respondents then paid rent to Castro's overseer, Armando Duran, and continu
ed to occupy half of the property to petitioner's damage and prejudice. Responde
nts in their answer averred that they inherited the lease rights from their fath
er and that petitioner was a woman who could not possibly work or till the land
by herself. Hence, petitioner's claim to be the lawful agricultural lessee has n
o basis in fact and in law. The PARAD rendered a decision in favor of the petiti
oner. Respondents seasonably appealed the decision to the DARAB Central Office.
In turn, the DARAB affirmed the decision of the PARAD and dismissed the case for
lack of merit. Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which in t
urn, reversed the decision of the DARAB ruling that an "implied tenancy" existed
between the respondents and the landowner. The Appellate Court then went on to
rule that by virtue of this "implied tenancy", the leasehold contract between th
e Castros and the petitioner could only be made effective on the one-hectare por
tion of the disputed property. Hence, the instant petition. Issued:

Did the Court of Appeals err in disregarding the substantial evidence rule with
respect to the DARAB findings? Did the appellate court commit a reversible error
of law in finding that respondents has satisfactorily met the requirements of a
tenancy relationship? Held:
In Malate vs. Court of Appeals, we held that: In appeals in agrarian cases, the
only function required of the Court of Appeals is to determine whether the findi
ngs of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations are supported by substantial evid
ence. And substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absen
ce is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct o
r circumstantial, and where the findings of fact of the agrarian court are suppo
rted by substantial evidence, such findings are conclusive and binding on the ap
pellate court.
Stated differently, the appellate court cannot make its own findings of fact and
substitute the same for the findings of fact of the DARAB. A perusal of the ass
ailed decision clearly shows that nowhere did the Court of Appeals rule that the
findings of fact of the DARAB Region III Provincial Adjudicator or the DARAB-Ce
ntral Office were unsupported by substantial evidence. Nor did the appellate cou
rt hold that said findings were made with grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the agrarian quasi-judicial agencies. An examination of the record categorica
lly shows that the findings of fact of the DARAB were supported by substantial e
vidence. Perforce, the Malate ruling must apply to the instant case. The finding
of the DARAB that petitioner, by virtue of the contract of agricultural leaseho
ld entered into between her and the Castros, is the substitute tenant of the lat
ter in lieu of her deceased father, is binding upon the appellate court and this
Court. Equally conclusive upon the court a quo and this Court is the finding by
the DARAB that respondents were mere usurpers who failed to present any proof a
s to the existence of a tenancy relationship between them and the Castro family.
On the second issue, we find respondents contentions far from persuasive. The p
resent dispute involves an agricultural leasehold. The governing law is R.A. No.
3844, which, except for Section 35 thereof, was not specifically repealed by th
e passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657), but
was intended to have suppletory effect to the latter law. Under R.A. No. 3844, t
wo modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold rela
tions:

(1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by
oral or written agreement, either express or implied. By operation of law simply
means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system and the conversion
of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The other method is the ag
ricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing. In the in
stant case, it is not disputed that an agricultural leasehold contract was enter
ed into between petitioner and Ramon Castro. Respondents, however, insist that a
n agricultural leasehold contract over a one-hectare portion of the landholding
arose as a result of the actions of Ramon's overseer, who must be viewed as the
latter's agent. They conclude that because of his implied leasehold, the applica
tion of the contract between petitioner and the landowner should be limited to t
he remaining portion of the property. Respondents' reasoning is flawed. While un
doubtedly Duran was an agent of Ramon, he was not a general agent of the latter
with respect to the landholding. The record shows that as overseer, Duran's duti
es and responsibilities were limited to issuing receipt(s), selling mangoes and
bamboo trees and all other things saleable. Thus, by his own admission, Duran wa
s a special agent under Article 1876 of the Civil Code. Duran's duties and respo
nsibilities as a special agent do not include the acceptance of rentals from per
sons other than the tenant so designated by the landowner. Duran's authority as
a special agent likewise excludes the power to appoint tenants or successor-tena
nts. Clearly, Duran acted beyond the limits of his authority as an agent. We can
not agree with the Court of Appeals that since Duran had been the overseer of th
e Castros for 16 years, he had thereby made respondents believe he had full auth
ority from the Castro family relative to the administration of the subject prope
rty. Regardless of the number of years that Duran had been the overseer of the C
astros, there is absolutely no showing that he was ever authorized to appoint te
nants or successor-tenants for the Castros, nor to accept rentals from the perso
ns he would appoint. Absent substantial evidence to show Duran's authority from
the Castros to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relationship, his actio
ns could not give rise to an implied tenancy. In fact, Duran admitted that he wa
s aware of the existence of the leasehold contract between petitioner and the Ca
stros, naming the former as the successor-tenant to the property. Since an impli
ed tenancy between the same landowners and respondents is incompatible with this
express and written leasehold contract and given the absolute lack of substanti
al evidence to support the existence of an implied tenancy, the express tenancy
contract must be maintained. One final note. Respondents original stance before
the DARAB that they had inherited or succeeded to the tenancy rights of their la
te father is likewise erroneous. As correctly found by the DARAB: Defendants-App
ellants should not confuse the law on succession provided for in the Civil Code
of the Philippines with succession in agrarian cases. In the former, (the) statu
te spreads the estate of the deceased throughout his heirs; while in agrarian la
ws, the security of tenure of the deceased tenant shall pass on to only one (1)
heir in the manner provided for in Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844.
APPEAL/PETITION FOR REVIEW, THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FOR THE DECISIONS RENDERED
BY THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS (SACs) IS BY WAY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW AND NO
T BY AN ORDINARY NOTICE OF APPEAL

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon G.R. No. 14
3275 (September 10, 2002)
Facts:
Petitioners-appellees Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered own
ers of a parcel of land situated at San Agustin, Concepcion, Tarlac covered by T
CT No. 163051 with a total area of 50.1171 hectares. The property was voluntaril
y offered for sale to the government pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 at P50,000.00 per
hectare. However, the DAR only made a counter-offer of P17,656.20 per hectare/t
otal of P884,877.54 and later, P1,565,369.35. In view of the petitioners-appelle
es' failure to respond to the new offer made by DAR, the DARAB took cognizance o
f the case pursuant to Section 16 (d) of R.A. No. 6657. Subsequently, the DARAB
issued an Order directing respondent-appellant LBP to recompute the value of the
subject property in accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1
992. An aggregate amount of P2,491,731.65 was arrived at but this was again reje
cted by the petitioners-appellees. In a Petition dated October 27, 1994, petitio
ners asked the Regional Trial Court, Br. 63, Tarlac (the designated special agra
rian court in the area) to fix the just compensation of the property. The court
rendered a summary judgment on December 19, 1997, fixing the compensation of the
subject property at P1,260,000.00 for the 16.69 hectares of riceland and P2,957
,250.00 for the 30.4160 hectares of sugarland. Respondent-appellant moved for re
consideration but the same was denied by the court. DAR filed a petition for rev
iew with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner LBP also filed a notice of appeal of t
he said decision. The Third Division of the Appellate Court gave due course to t
he petition for review. The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, on the othe
r hand, dismissed petitioner LBP's ordinary appeal for lack of merit reasoning t
hat the mode of appeal followed by petitioner LBP was erroneous. Considering tha
t Sec. 60 of R.A. No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
mandates that Appeals from Special Agrarian Courts should be by petition for rev
iew. LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition questioning the resolution of the Fourth Division of the Court of Appe
als. Issue:
What indeed is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Co
urts, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, in the determination of just compensat
ion
an appeal by way of a petition for review or an ordinary appeal? Held:

Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for t
hree modes of appeal, to wit: "Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal.
The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Re
gional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken b
y filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record
on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases or mu
ltiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such case
s, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
(b) Petition for Review.
The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by th
e Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by
petition for review in accordance with Rule 42.
(c) Appeal by Certiorari.
In all cases where only questions of law are raised or i
nvolved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on cert
iorari in accordance with Rule 45.
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effect
ing an appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agra
rian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the lan
downers concerned. Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly and categorically states
that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a contrary
interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for con
struction, but only application. The reference to the Rules of Court means that
the specific rules for petitions for review in the Rules of Court and other rele
vant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of Appeals shall be followed i
n appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Considering that R.A. No. 6657
cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for review shall be
conducted, a suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court is necessary. In fact, Section 61 uses the word "review" to designate the
mode by which the appeal is to be effected. The reference therefore by Section 6
1 to the Rules of Court only means that the procedure under Rule 42 for petition
s for review is to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases.

As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically

prohibits the adoption of the procedure for petitions for review of decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts. Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 and the provisions of the
Rules of Court can be harmonized and can co-exist. Moreover, the same Section 5(
5), Article VIII, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution quoted by the petitioner s
tates that "(r)ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies sha
ll remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court." Section 60 is obvi
ously a special procedure. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, it cannot be
otherwise merely because it was formulated by the legislature and not by any sp
ecial body. As long as the said section provides for a particular process for th
e governance of the special court concerned, the provision is accurately classif
ied as a special procedure. Subject to constitutional limitations, the statutory
enactment of a special procedure cannot be said to encroach on the power of thi
s Court to formulate rules of procedure for the reason that we have not yet prov
ided for a particular process specifically governing agrarian courts. Unlike an
ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of
appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted.
A petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowner
s for the government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary ap
peal. This is exemplified by the case at bar in which the petition for review be
fore the Special Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was disposed of way
ahead of the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth (4th) Division (CA-G.R. CV
No. 60365) in the Court of Appeals. Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by p
etitioner LBP did not stop the running of the reglementary period to file a peti
tion for review, the time to appeal the decision of the Special Agrarian Court h
as lapsed, rendering the said decision final and executory. SECURITY OF TENURE/L
EASEHOLD TENANCY/RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION, THE SALE EXECUTED BY THE BANK IN FAVOR OF
THE PETITIONER WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF P.D. NO. 27 AND ITS IMPLEM
ENTING GUIDELINES AND MUST, THUS, BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID The Heirs of Guiller
mo A. Batongbacal vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 125063 (September 24
, 2002)
Facts:
Juana Luciano was the registered owner of an agricultural land planted to rice a
nd corn measuring 16,555 square meters, situated in Brgy. Bolakan, Bocaue, Bulac
an and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1338. Luciano mortgaged th
e parcel of land to the Philippine Banking Corporation and subsequently failed t
o redeem the same. Thus, the bank became the absolute owner of the land and was
issued Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-123404. The bank sold the property to petitioner Guil
lermo Batongbacal. It also executed an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy to enable the pe
titioner to register the land under his name. However, when the petitioner tried
to register the Deed of Absolute Sale, he discovered that Certificate of Land T
ransfer No. 0-025760 was already issued in the name of private respondent Catali
no Santos also covering the same property. Petitioner filed a complaint with the
DAR Team Office in Sta. Maria, Bulacan which endorsed the case to the Adjudicat
or of Bulacan. After due proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision in favor of
Catalino Santos (now represented by his son Severino Santos). Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration but both
were denied by the RARAD in an Order dated August 17, 1989. On appeal, the DARA
B affirmed the said Decision. Petitioner passed away and was substituted by his
heirs, Rosario Batongbacal, et al. The said heirs filed a petition for review wi
th the Court of Appeals. However, the Appellate Court rendered judgment denying
the petition. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was likewise de
nied. Hence, this petition. Issue:
Who between the parties are lawfully entitled to the ownership and possession of
the subject landholding? Held:
Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844 states that once the agricultural leasehold relation
is established, the same shall confer upon the lessee the right to continue work
ing on the landholding until such relation is extinguished, and the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be
ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court and for causes provided by law
. It is worthy to note that the sale or alienation of tenanted land is not among
the causes of extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation provided un
der the law. In Endaya v. Court of Appeals, we held that, "Transactions involvin
g agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in c
hange of ownership will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee." In
Tanpingco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we stated that, "Security of tenure
is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself an
d deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their means
of livelihood." When P.D. 27 took effect on October 21, 1972, the land was alrea
dy owned by Philbanking, but the tenancy relations remained in force. By virtue
of this law, "tenant farmers are deemed owners of the land they till, subject to
the rules and regulations to be hereafter promulgated. Pursuant to the mandate
of P.D. 27, a Certificate of Land Transfer was issued to private respondent Cata
lino Santos on January 22, 1981, and was registered on February 1, 1981 with the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan.

During all this time, private respondent continued tilling the land and paying r
entals to Juana Luciano, and after her death, to her representatives. The sale b
etween Philbanking and petitioner took place on January 11, 1985. At about this
time, Juana Luciano's representatives began to refuse accepting the rentals from
private respondent. Thus, private respondent deposited the rentals with a certa
in Crispin Santiago, a rice mill owner in nearby Tuvo, Bocaue, through the media
tion of the Barangay Captain. Under the circumstances, we find that private resp
ondent complied in good faith with the obligations incumbent upon him as an agri
cultural lessee. Philbanking, on the other hand, was remiss in its duties as an
agricultural lessor when it sold the subject land to a third person, without giv
ing notice to private respondent and giving him the opportunity to exercise his
right of preemption as an agricultural lessee. Section 11 of R.A. 3844 provides:
"Section 11. Lessee's Right of Preemption.
In case the agricultural lessor decide
s to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential r
ight to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions: Provided, That the e
ntire landholding offered for sale must be preempted by the Department of Agrari
an Reform upon petition of the lessee or of any of them: Provided, further, That
where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to sai
d preferential right only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him.
The right of preemption under this section may be exercised within one hundred e
ighty days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the owner on all les
sees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform." (Emphasis provided)
Clearly, therefore, Philbanking committed a breach of obligation as an agricultu
ral lessor. As the records show, private respondent was not informed about the s
ale between Philbanking and petitioner, and neither was he privy to the transfer
of ownership from Juana Luciano to Philbanking. As an agricultural lessee, the
law gives him the right to be informed about matters affecting the land he tills
, without need for him to inquire about it. Department Memorandum Circular No. 8
, series of 1974, implementing P.D. 27, provides: 4. No act shall be done to und
ermine or subvert the intent and provisions of Presidential Decrees, Letters of
Instruction, Memoranda and Directives, such as the following and/or similar acts
:
xxx
xxx
xxx
f.) Transferring ownership of tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21,
1972, except to the actual tenant-farmers or tillers but in strict conformity wi
th the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 27 and the requirements of the Depa
rtment of Agrarian Reform . . . .

In other words, transfer of ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after
October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers thereon.
Hence, the sale executed by Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of petitio
ner was in violation of the aforequoted provision of P.D. 27 and its implementin
g guidelines, and must thus be declared null and void. TENANCY RELATIONSHIP IS I
NCONSISTENT WITH THE ASSERTION OF OWNERSHIP OF BOTH PARTIES Rodolfo Arzaga and F
rancis Arzaga vs. Salvacion Copias and Prudencio Calandria G.R. No. 152404 (Marc
h 28, 2003)
Facts:
The case involves a complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed by th
e petitioners as coowners and purchasers of Lot No. 5198 in a tax delinquency sa
le and against the respondents who assert that they are amortizing owners of the
same, having been issued Emancipation Patents as tenant beneficiaries of one Ca
ridad Fuentebella who was purported to be the previous owner of the land. The ca
se was filed in the RTC and dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
court ruling that the case was cognizable by the DARAB because it involved poss
ession and ownership of agricultural lands as well as issuance of emancipation p
atents. On appeal, the CA affirmed the said resolution. Issue: Jurisdiction of t
he Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) over a dispute invol
ving a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 5198 located at Inabasan, San Jose,
Antique.
Held:
In Monsanto vs. Zerna (G.R. No. 142501, 07 December 2001), it was held that for
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a disput
e, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1
) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subje
ct matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent betw
een the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is
to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on th
e part of the tenant or agricultural lessee and (6) the harvest is shared betwee
n the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In the case at bar, the e
lement that the parties must be "the landowner and the tenant or agricultural le
ssee", on which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is absent
. Tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both p
arties. Petitioners claim to be the owners of the

entire Lot No. 5198 by virtue of a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Proper
ty, while private respondents assert ownership over Lot Nos. 5198-A, 5198-B and
5198-D on the basis of an Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title.
Neither do the records show any judicial tie or tenurial relationship between t
he parties' predecessors-in-interest. The questioned lot is allegedly declared f
or taxation purposes in the name of petitioners' father, Dalmacio Arzaga who doe
s not appear to have any connection with the private respondents nor with their
alleged predecessor-in-interest, Caridad Fuentebella. xxx xxx xxx
The basic rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defen
dant. From the averments of the complaint in the instant case, it is clear that
the petitioners' action does not involve an agrarian dispute but one for recover
y of possession which is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (CARP COVERAGE), IN SOME EXCEPTIO
NAL CASES OF COMPULSORY ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS, THE LANDOWNER NEED NOT EXHAUST
ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE SEEKING RELIEF BEFORE THE COURTS Department o
f Agrarian Reform vs. Apex Investment and Financing Corporation G.R. No. 149422
(April 10, 2003)
Facts:
Respondent Apex Investment and Financing Corporation (now SM Investments Corp.)
owns several lots located at Barangay Paliparan, Dasmarias, Cavite covered by Tran
sfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T72491, T-90474, T-90475, T-90476 and T-904
77. The MARO initiated compulsory acquisition proceedings over these lots but re
spondent denied having received any such notice (because it was no longer holdin
g office at the address where the notice was sent). Respondent only learned of t
he compulsory acquisition proceedings over TCT No. T-90476 in the December 11, 1
997 issue of BALITA. Respondent filed a Protest with the PARO rejecting DAR's of
fered compensation of P229,014.33 for the 23,614 square meter property, assertin
g that the subject landholding had already been classified as residential even p
rior to the effectivity of the law. In support of the protest, respondent attach
ed copies of its land titles, tax

declarations, location map and other supporting documents. It was only after mor
e than one year before the PARO forwarded to petitioner DAR the said protest tog
ether with the records of the compulsory acquisition proceedings. However, despi
te the pendency of the protest, the Register of Deeds still cancelled one of its
titles and issued a new one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and
thereafter TCT No. CLOA-2473 was issued in the name of one Angel Umali who is a
farmerbeneficiary allegedly occupying the land. Respondent filed a Petition for
Certiorari and prohibition praying that the compulsory acquisition proceedings b
e declared null and void and for TCT No. CLOA2473 issued to Angel Umali to be ca
ncelled. Petitioner opposed on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative r
emedies. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. Pe
titioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA. Hence, thi
s Appeal. Issues:
a) That respondent Apex violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative r
emedies; and
c) That the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the subject parcels of lan
d are residential and not covered by R.A. No. 6657
Held:
On the first assigned error. This Court has consistently held that the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depen
ding on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial setting
s of a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case: (a) there a
re circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and (b) the ad
ministrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdi
ction. xxx xxx xxx
In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 103302, August 12,
1993, 225 SCRA 278), we held that the aggrieved landowners were not supposed to
wait until the DAR acted in their letterprotests (after it had sat on them for
almost a year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official indiffer
ence which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners
had to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for cert
iorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their protests. In t
he same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR t
o resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously, petitione
r might continue to alienate respondent's lots during the pendency of its protes
t. Hence, the Court of

Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this
case, respondent need not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its
petition for certiorari and prohibition. On the second assigned error. Responde
nt vehemently insists that its lots have been classified as residential prior to
June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. As earlier mentioned,
Engineer Gregorio Bermejo, Municipal Engineer and Deputized Zoning Administrator
of Dasmarias, Cavite, certified that respondent's lands are within the residentia
l zone of Dasmarias, based on the Land Use Plan of that municipality duly approved
by the HLURB in its Resolution No. R-42-A-3 dated February 11, 1981. We observe
, however, that this factual issue was never determined below. Thus, we cannot c
onclude that respondent's parcels of land are residential. CIVIL LAW LEASE, THE
CIVIL LAW LESSEE, ALTHOUGH A LEGAL POSSESSOR, MAY NOT INSTALL TENANTS ON THE PRO
PERTY UNLESS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY THE LESSOR ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS A SPECIFI
C PROVISION IN THE CONTRACT OF LEASE PROVIDING FOR SUCH Victor G. Valencia vs. C
A, et al. G.R. No. 122363 (April 29, 2003)
Facts:
Victor Valencia is a government retiree who owns two parcels of land situated at
Barangay Linothangan, Canlaon City, Negros Oriental. One with an area of 23.727
9 hectares and covered by TCT No. H-T-137 and another covering 6.4397 hectares u
nder Homestead Application No. HA-231601. Valencia entered into a ten-year civil
law lease agreement with a certain Glicerio Henson. And later, into a five-year
civil law lease agreement with Fr. Andres Flores. The agreement was subject to
a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering and against installing a leaseho
ld tenant without Valencia's consent. Henson instituted Cresenciano Frias and Ma
rciano Frias while Fr. Andres Flores designated fourteen others together with th
e Friases to cultivate the land. Of the farmworkers, twelve became recipients of
CLTs. Upon the expiration of the lease agreements, Valencia demanded that the r
espondents vacate the premises but to no avail. Valencia wanted to gain possessi
on of his landholdings and had in fact designated Bernie Bautista to be his over
seer. Valencia filed a letter of protest but it was too late, the property was p
laced under the Operation Land Transfer Program of the government and the CLTs w
ere issued to the respondents. Valencia again protested but to no avail. However
, in February 1988, petitioner Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a profi
t sharing agreement. No other respondent entered into any kind of agreement with
the petitioner, Henson or Fr. Flores. Twelve years after the filing of the prot
est, an administrative investigation was finally conducted. The report revealed
that from 1975 to 1983, it was only Bautista who received the shares in the prod
uce. Respondents only stopped paying when Bautista refused to issue a receipt fo
r such. Valencia

did not receive a single cavan for the said years. to aggravate matters, some of
the respondents have even subleased their properties despite the pending protes
t of Valencia. While all this was transpiring, Valencia and Catalino Mantac ente
red into a leasehold contract over a 0.0425 hectare of the 23.7279 hectares cove
red by TCT-H-T-137. Valencia's protest was dismissed. The respondents were maint
ained in the landholding, prompting Valencia to appeal to the Office of the Pres
ident. However, the Order was affirmed with the modification that the Homestead
be excluded from the coverage of P.D. No. 27. Valencia appealed to the CA but it
was dismissed for having been filed out of time. His Motion for Reconsideration
was also denied. Hence, Valencia filed a Petition for Review or Certiorari unde
r Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Issue:
Can petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the subject pr
emises without express authority to do so under Article 1649 of the Civil Code,
more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited from doing so, as in the instant
case? Held:
A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a t
enant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. An extensive and correc
t discussion of the statutory interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as a
mended, is provided by the minority view in Bernas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No
. 85041, 05 August 1993, 225 SCRA 119). When Section 6 provides that the agricul
tural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the landh
olding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and
the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is already
an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., tenant or agricultural lesse
e already works the land. The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties
to Agricultural Leasehold Relations", which assumes that there is already a leas
ehold tenant on the land; not until then. xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law les
see cannot automatically institute tenants on the property under Section 6 of R.
A. No. 3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil
law lessee, although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property
unless expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is st
ipulated in the

contract of lease, the occupants of the property are merely civil law sublessees
whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement. TE
NDER OF PAYMENT, "CERTIFICATION TO FINANCE REDEMPTION OF ESTATE UNDER RA NO. 384
4, AS AMENDED" ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP)
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A VALID TENDER OF PAYMENT AS REQUIRED BY OUR AGRARIAN LAWS S
ps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al. G.R. No. 106615 (Jan
uary 15, 2004)
Ignacio Arcega, et al. vs. Hon. Norberto Ponce, RTC, et al. G.R. No. 108591 (Jan
uary 15, 2004)
Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al. G.R. No. 109452 (Ja
nuary 15, 2004)
Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al. G.R. No. 109978 (Ja
nuary 15, 2004)
Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al. G.R. No. 139379 (Ja
nuary 15, 2004)
Facts:
The instant consolidated petitions involve a parcel of agricultural land over wh
ich 14 tenants vigorously assert their right of redemption. Arcega, et al. are a
gricultural lessees of landholdings planted to sugarcane described as Lot 3364 o
f the San Fernando Cadastre. The lot was originally owned by the spouses Roberto
and Asuncion Wijangco under TCT No. 27507-R and mortgaged to PNB to secure a lo
an.

Eventually, for their failure to pay their loan, the PNB foreclosed the mortgage
. In the auction sale that followed, PNB was the highest bidder. On July 10, 198
0, the spouses Eligio and Marcelina Mallari purchased the two lots from PNB with
out any indication that the same was tenanted. The agreed purchase price was P2,
365,000.00 with P473,000.00 as 20% down-payment and the balance payable in three
installments. On July 22, 1981, Arcega, et al., who were occupying portions of
the land, filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations, San Fernando, Pampanga a P
etition for Redemption against the spouses Wijangco, PNB and the spouses Mallari
. With the abolition of the CAR, the case was automatically absorbed by the RTC,
Br. 46 of San Fernando, Pampanga. Eligio Mallari informed the tenants that they
bought the lot from PNB. The tenants tried to redeem their respective landholdi
ngs at P5,000.00 per hectare but the spouses rejected the offer considering that
they purchased the lot from PNB at P18,000.00 per hectare. To summarize, RTC or
dered Arcega, et al. to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for
the tenants' failure to make a tender of payment and/or consignation of the rede
mption price. Instead of tendering payment, Arcega, et al. presented a certifica
tion entitled "Certification to Finance Redemption of Estate under R.A. No. 3844
, As Amended". The RTC dismissed the Petition ruling that: 1) Arcega, et al., fa
iled to exercise their right of redemption within the prescribed 180-day period;
and 2) The Land Bank certification does not constitute a valid tender of paymen
t and/or consignation of the redemption price. On appeal, the CA reversed the de
cision of the RTC and remanded the case for further proceedings. Aggrieved, the
spouses Mallari filed a Petition for Review. The Supreme Court ruled that the ri
ght of the tenants to redeem the property has "not yet prescribed because no not
ice in writing of the sale was ever given by the vendee upon (them) as agricultu
ral lessees of the land, as required by law". The only issue left to be resolved
is as regards the intrinsic or inherent validity of the Land Bank Certification
. Issue: Whether or not the tenants have validly tendered or consigned payment o
f the redemption price for the purpose of exercising their right of redemption u
nder Section 12, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended through their presentation of
a document entitled, "Certification to Finance Redemption of Estate Under R.A.
No. 3844, as Amended" issued by the President of the Land Bank of the Philippine
s.
Held:
First and foremost, paragraph 2 of Land Bank Circular No. 3 (Rules and Regulatio
ns on the Financing by Land Bank of Acquisition of Landholdings by Agricultural
Lessees Through Pre-emption or Redemption under RA No. 3844, as Amended) has mad
e it a mandatory requirement that "all proposals for Land Bank financing of land
acquisition through pre-emption or redemption must carry the favorable indorsem
ent of the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform". It is likewise required
that the

prescribed form must indicate that the certification has been "issued pursuant t
o a letter-request from the (DAR Secretary) to the Land Bank of the Philippines"
. Secondly, the questioned certification itself declares that the Land Bank's un
dertaking to finance the redemption is conditional. The financing will push thro
ugh "if found in consonance with the provisions of Section 12, Republic Act No.
3844, as amended and with the relevant policies and procedures laid down by the
Land Bank Board of Directors". Certainly, this is contrary to the certification
prescribed by Land Bank Circular Letter No. 3 dated February 25, 1980. Moreover,
the challenged certification does not set aside the specific compensation for t
he redemption of the landholding. Hence, the Mallari spouses were not assured of
the corresponding amount and its payment by Arcega, et al. The right of redempt
ion under RA No. 3844, as amended is an essential mandate of the agrarian reform
legislation to implement the State's policy of owner-cultivatorship and to achi
eve a dignified, self-reliant existence for small farmers. Unfortunately, such l
audable policy could not be effected in favor of Ignacio Arcega, et al. since th
ey failed to tender or consign payment of the redemption price. Thus, spouses Ma
llari should be allowed to continue enjoying their right over the subject proper
ty as purchasers thereof, for the State's commendable agrarian reform policy is
never intended to unduly transgress the rights of innocent purchasers of lands.
MERITS OF THE CASE, CASES SHOULD BE DECIDED ON THE MERITS RATHER THAN ON MERE TE
CHNICALITIES OR PROCEDURAL IMPERFECTIONS Paulina Diaz, Godelito Lapinid, Elecito
Lapinid, Violeta Zamora, Anastacia Lapinid, Evelyn Lapinid, Marivel Lapinid and
Carin Lapinid vs. Carlos Mesias, Jr. G.R. No. 156345 (March 4, 2004)
Facts:
Petitioners are the owners of a 1.2 hectare riceland tilled by the father of res
pondent. Respondent requested that he be granted a homelot. The matter was broug
ht to the BARC then to the MARO. The latter concluded that the respondent was no
t a de jure tenant of the land, he being a mere member of the immediate farm hou
sehold of his father, Carlos Mesias. A Petition was filed with the PARAD who dis
missed the case. Appeal was made to the DARAB who reversed the decision of the A
djudicator a quo. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but to no avail. The ma
tter was then elevated to the Court of Appeals where the latter dismissed the Pe
tition on the ground of defective certification of forum shopping and failure to
attach legible copies of the records and supporting documents under Rule 43. A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the Court of Appeals only reconsidered
insofar as the defective certification of forum shopping. Hence, the instant pet
ition for review on whether or not the petitioners complied with the requirement
s set in Rule 43, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
We agree with the petitioners contention that the dismissal of the petition on p
urely technical grounds was unwarranted. In denying due course to the petition,
the appellate court gave premium to form and failed to consider the substantial
rights of the parties "Cases should be determined on the merits after all partie
s have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses rather
than on technicalities or procedural imperfections. Rules of Procedure are mere
tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matter
s pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in techni
calities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be
avoided. In fact, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court state that the Rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." APPEA
L, RULES OF PROCEDURE: A PARTY CANNOT CHANGE HIS THEORY OF THE CASE OR HIS CAUSE
OF ACTION ON APPEAL Henry L. Mon vs. CA, Hon. Leopoldo Serrano, Jr., DARAB and
Spouses Larry and Jovita Velasco G.R. No. 118292 (April 14, 2004)
Facts:
Petitioner averred that he is the owner-administrator of a parcel of land plante
d to rice and tobacco in Sitio Torite, Brgy. San Cristobal, Bangar, La Union. Th
e spouses Velasco who cultivated the land allegedly stole one sack of palay from
the land's harvest and subleased the land to a certain Boy or Ensong Maala duri
ng the last tobacco season. In the ensuing proceedings, the Regional Office foun
d that Larry Velasco subleased the land to a certain Francisco Maala which is a
ground for ejectment but on the other charge, there was no convincing evidence t
o support this accusation. The respondent-spouses Velasco appealed and the DARAB
reversed the Order of the Regional Office. Petitioner appealed to the CA who af
firmed the decision of the DARAB, hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether or
not a party is entitled to a change of theory of his case (i.e., dispute betwee
n an agricultural landlord and tenant).
Held:

The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change his theory o
f the case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that "Court
s of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." A
judgment that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on w
hich the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-ju
dicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. In th
e present case, the Court must stick to the issue litigated in the DARAB and in
the Court of Appeals, which is whether petitioner has the right to eject the spo
uses Velasco from the land under R.A. No. 3844. EXEMPTION, PROPERTIES OF THE DEP
ARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) LEASED AND USED NOT FOR EDUCATION
AL PURPOSES ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM CARP COVERAGE DAR as represented by its Secretar
y, Roberto M. Pagdanganan vs. DECS G.R. No. 158228 (April 27, 2004)
Facts:
The subject of this controversy are Lot Nos. 2509 and 871-D of Hacienda Fe, Esca
lante, Negros Occidental with an area of 189.2462 hectares. The lands were donat
ed by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS on October 21, 1921 and cons
equently transferred to DECS under TCT No. 167175. DECS in turn, leased the subj
ect landholdings to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop year
s or from 1984-1985 to 1993-1994. Subsequently, the lease was renewed for anothe
r 10 years from 1995-1996 until 2004-2005. On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and s
everal others, claiming to be permanent and regular farmworkers therein filed a
petition for Compulsory Coverage. A "Notice of Coverage" was issued with the app
roval of the Regional Director. DECS appealed to the Secretary of DAR who in tur
n affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. DECS filed a petition for review
with the CA to set aside the Decision of the DAR Secretary. However, the CA affi
rmed the aforementioned Decision. Hence, this Appeal. Issue: Whether or not the
properties (owned by DECS) are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657
, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
Held:

Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of land which are exempted from
the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz.: c) Lands
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national
defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operate
d by public or private schools for educational purposes, x x x x x x shall be ex
empt from the coverage of this Act
Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the c
overage: 1) the land must be "actually, directly, and exclusively used and found
to be necessary" and 2) the purpose is "for school sites and campuses, includin
g experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for education
al purposes." The importance of the phrase "actually, directly and exclusively u
sed and found to be necessary" cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS wo
uld want us to do by not taking words in their literal and technical definitions
. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the "plain meaning rule"
or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the
words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given it
s literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The ruling in Ce
ntral Mindanao University vs. DAR Adjudication Board is inapplicable in the case
at bar. First, in the CMU case, the land involved is not alienable and disposab
le land of the public domain because it was specifically reserved by the late Pr
esident Carlos P. Garcia for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (CMU) unde
r Proclamation No. 476. Second, x x x x x "The retention of the land was found t
o be necessary for the present and future educational needs of CMU. On the other
hand, the lands in this case were not actually and exclusively utilized as scho
ol sites and campuses, as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, no
t for educational purposes but for the furtherance of its business. Also, as con
ceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract of lease and not t
he subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the s
chools in the locality."
APPEAL, THE PERFECTION THEREOF WITHIN THE STATUTORY OR REGLEMENTARY PERIOD IS NO
T ONLY MANDATORY BUT ALSO JURISDICTIONAL Florentino Zaragoza vs. Pedro Nobleza G
.R. No. 144560 (May 13, 2004)
Facts:

On November 15, 1983, petitioner and respondent entered an Agricultural Leasehol

d Contract over a 1.18 hectare parcel of land situated in Brgy. Banguit, Cabatua
n, Iloilo. However, on February 6, 1991, petitioner instituted a complaint for t
ermination of leasehold relationship with damages for violations purportedly com
mitted by the respondent. The PARAD dismissed the case for lack of merit. Petiti
oner appealed the case up to the Court of Appeals. In a Motion for Extension, th
e CA gave the former an "absolutely non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days f
rom March 15, 2000 or until March 30, 2000 within which to file a petition for r
eview". Petitioner appears to have filed via registered mail his petition for re
view only on April 12, 2000. The Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 31,
2000 dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed. First, the petition w
as mailed thirteen (13) days beyond the extended period to appeal and second, tw
o of the annexes to the petition (i.e., two informations) were "mere plain copie
s" in violation of Section 6 (c) of Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. A M
otion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner manifesting that as per June 1
4, 2000 certification issued by Registry Clerk E.P. Villaruel of the Pasig Capit
al Office, Registry No. 7439 allegedly covering the petition for review addresse
d to the CA, it was mailed on March 30, 2000. In the same breath, petitioner ple
aded for a liberal application of the Rules of Procedure given the "overriding i
mportance of the factual and legal issues" raised in his petition. CA denied the
motion. Respondent filed a comment pointing out that like the CA, the petition
addressed to his counsel indicated that it was only mailed on April 12, 2000. Re
spondent also impugned the reliability of the certification of the postal regist
ry clerk, it not having been made under oath. Hence, this Appeal. Held:
The two informations attached to the petition filed before the CA need not, as c
orrectly argued by the petitioner, be certified true copies. Section 6 of Rule 4
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should not be construed as imposing the r
equirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition for review be ce
rtified true copies. In accordance then with the established rule and practice,
in view of the absence of any of the recognized exceptions that would warrant a
review of the findings of facts of the appellate court, the issue raised by peti
tioner as regards the date of the filing of the petition for review will not be
considered by this Court, the resolution thereon by the CA being final. Since th
e perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not onl
y mandatory but also jurisdictional, the failure of petitioner to so perfect his
appeal rendered the questioned decision final and executory. This rule is found
ed upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law
but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in acc
ordance with the provisions of the law.

RETENTION RIGHTS OF REDEMPTIONER-GRANDCHILDREN Samahan ng Magsasaka sa San Josep

represented by Dominador Maglalang vs. Marietta Valisno, et al. G.R. No. 158314
(June 3, 2004)
Facts:
Dr. Nicolas Valisno, Sr. is the registered owner of a 57-hectare property situat
ed in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT
) No. NT-38406. Before the enactment of P.D. No. 27, the land was the subject of
an ejectment suit in 1971, wherein the Valisnos' tenants (herein petitioners) w
ere ejected from the property. On October 20 and 21, 1972, Dr. Valisno mortgaged
12 hectares of his property to Renato and Angelito Banting. Thereafter, the pro
perty was subdivided into ten lots and on November 8, 1972, individual titles we
re issued in the name of the eight children of Dr. Valisno to Angelito Banting a
nd to Renato Banting. The mortgage on the 12 hectare portion was foreclosed and
the property sold at public auction. Four grandchildren of Dr. Valisno redeemed
the property namely Maria Cristina Valisno, Leonora Valisno Yujuico, Benedicto V
alisno Yujuico and Gregorio Valisno Yujuico. At the time of the redemption, only
Benedicto was of legal age, the others were only minors. Redemption was made on
October 25, 1973 but the titles were only transferred to the redemptioners on N
ovember 26, 1998. In 1994, Dominador Malalang in behalf of SMSP filed a petition
for coverage of the subject property. Originally, the petition was dismissed bu
t Secretary Garilao ultimately held that the property was covered by CARP subjec
t to the retention rights of the heirs of Nicolas, Sr. The Valisno heirs specifi
cally the 7 children and the 10 grandchildren including the 4 redemptioners file
d a consolidated Application for Retention and Award under R.A. No. 6657. The Re
gional Director approved the retention of the Valisno children covering 35 hecta
res but placed the excess 19 hectares under Compulsory Acquisition for distribut
ion to qualified beneficiaries. The request for the award to the grandchildren w
as denied for utter lack of merit. The Secretary affirmed the Order. However, on
review with the Court of Appeals, the CA reversed the Order of the DAR Secretar
y and granted the award of one hectare for each of the grandchildren and affirme
d the retention rights of three hectares for each of the redemptionergrandchildr
en or for a total of 12 hectares. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
praying that the 12 hectares be placed under CARP coverage. It was denied. Henc
e, this Appeal. Issue: Whether or not the grandchildren of the landowner are sti
ll entitled to retention rights?
Held:

The relevant laws governing the minors' redemption in 1973 are the general Civil
Code provisions on legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. Article
1327 of the Civil Code provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a
contract. Article 1390 provides that a contract where one of the parties is inc
apable of giving consent is voidable or annullable. Thus, the redemption made by
the minors in 1973 was merely voidable or annullable and was not void ab initio
, as petitioners argue. Any action for the annulment of the contracts thus enter
ed into by the minors would require that: 1) the plaintiff must have an interest
in the contract; and 2) the action must be brought by the victim and not the pa
rty responsible for the defect. Thus, Article 1397 of the Civil Code provides in
part that "(t)he action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all
who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are c
apable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted". The act
ion to annul the minors' redemption in 1973, therefore, was one that could only
have been initiated by the minors themselves, as the victims or the aggrieved pa
rties in whom the law itself vests the right to file suit. This action was never
initiated by the minors. As owners in their own right, the redemptioner-grandch
ildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all the landowners. This right
of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualifi
cation by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implementi
ng the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice aga
inst the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not s
upposed to leave the landowner's dominion, thus, sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowners afterwards, wh
ich would be a pointless process. COVERAGE; ONLY AGRICULTURAL LANDS ARE COVERED
BY CARP Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc., et al. vs. The Hon. Court of A
ppeals, et al. G.R. No. 142359 (May 25, 2004)
Facts:
Petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in C
.A.-G.R. SP No. 49363, which set aside and reversed the decision of the Departme
nt of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and reinstated the decision of
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Trece Martirez City
, which, in turn, ordered the dismissal of the complaint for Maintenance for Pea
ceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Pasong Bayabas
Farmers Association, Inc. (PBFAI).

Sometime in 1964, Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC, for brevity) bought a p

arcel of land with an area of 753,610 square meters (75.3610 hectares) located a
t Barrio Kabilang-Baybay, Carmona, Cavite, covered by Transfer Certificate of Ti
tles (TCT) No. T- 91584 and T-91585. On September 20, 1977, the aforesaid titles
were cancelled by TCT No. T-62972 issued to and in the name of the LDC's succes
sor, the Credito Asiatic, Incorporated (CAI). The property was subsequently subd
ivided into two parcels of land, one of which was covered by TCT No. 116658, wit
h an area of 365,753 square meters, and the other covered by TCT No. 116659 with
an area of 387,853 square meters. The LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hecta
re property into a residential and industrial estate, where industrial sites and
a low cost housing project inceptually called the Tamanli Housing Project would
be established. The property was subdivided into 728 residential lots per the c
onsolidation subdivision plan approved by the Bureau of Lands, each with an aver
age area of 240 square meters. Considering the parcel of land to be not covered
by P.D. 27, it being untenanted and not devoted to the production of palay and/o
r corn as reported by the Agrarian Reform Team Leader concerned and favorably re
commended for conversion by him and further, by the Regional Director for Region
IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, and considering further, that the parcel of land subje
ct hereof was found to be suitable for conversion to residential subdivision by
the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development and considering final
ly, that the herein petitioner was issued a locational clearance by the Human Se
ttlements Regulatory Commission, the instant request of the petitioner is hereby
GRANTED pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 3844, as amended, and P.D. 815. On M
arch 14, 1980, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Cavite (Provincial Board of Cavit
e) passed Resolution No. 40 declaring the midland areas composed of Carmona, Das
marias, parts of Silang and Trece Martirez (where the subject property is situated
) and parts of Imus, as industrial areas. In 1987, the CAI decided to continue w
ith the development of its Hakone Housing Project and contracted with E.M. Arago
n Enterprises for the bulldozing of the property. However, the project was stymi
ed by a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Pr
eliminary Injunction filed on May 22, 1987 against the CAI in the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite. The civil case notwithstanding, the CAI decided to proceed wit
h the third phase of its project. It developed its eleven-hectare property into
a residential property called the Mandarin Homes. The CAI applied for and was gr
anted a separate Order of Conversion on January 2, 1990 by the Department of Agr
arian Reform (DAR). In 1991, the CAI started selling the houses in its Mandarin
Homes Project. On October 27, 1995, Provincial Adjudicator Barbara P. Tan issued
a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the defendant landowner and any/all per
sons acting for and in its behalf or under its authority to cease and desist fro
m further bulldozing the premises in question and committing acts of dispossessi
on or tending to disturb the peaceful possession and cultivation of the complain
ants of the landholdings in question.

On July 15, 1996, the DAR Region IV issued a Cease and Desist Order against the
respondents. The defendants, in a Letter dated July 16, 1996, informed the DAR,
Region IV Office, that the land subject of the cease and desist order was also s
ubject of DARAB Case No. 0285-95 and, as such, was under the jurisdiction of PAR
AD Barbara Tan. The defendants, likewise, raised the issue of forum shopping, pe
r our ruling in Crisostomo v. SEC. After due hearings, PARAD Barbara P. Tan rend
ered a Decision on August 8, 1996 in DARAB Case No. CA0285-95 in favor of the de
fendants. The PARAD held that the plaintiffs were bound by the order of dismissa
l of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13. It declared that the plaintiffs in Civ
il Case No. BCV-87-13 were the kins, siblings or spouses of the complainants in
the case before it. Moreover, the complainants had executed deeds of quitclaim o
r waiver covering the portions of the property which they purportedly occupied.
Thus, the complainants had already waived their rights of possession and cultiva
tion over the portions of the property which they claimed to be occupying. On Ma
rch 15, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the DARAB and
reinstating the decision of the PARAD. The CA ruled that under Section 10 of Re
p. Act No. 6657, all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except th
ose already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of the said Act. Aggrie
ved, the PBFAI filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court o
n April 11, 2000 before this Court. For its part, DARAB filed a motion for exten
sion of time to file a petition for the reversal of the decision in CA-GR SP No.
49363. The same was docketed as G.R. No. 142980. On May 11, 2000, the DARAB man
ifested that it was adopting as its own the petition for review filed by PBFAI.
In our Resolution dated June 28, 2000, we granted the motion of the DARAB and or
dered the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 142980 and 142359. Issues:
Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Ag
rarian Reform Law (CARL)? Whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdict
ion over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent? W
hether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the p
rivate respondent for possession and cultivation of the property in suit? Whethe
r the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar
to the complaint of the petitioners-members of the PBFAI? Whether the appellate
court committed a reversible error in dismissing the petition for review in CAG
.R. SP No. 49363.

Held:
The contention of the petitioners has no merit. Under Section 3(c) of Rep. Act N
o. 6657, agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred i
n the said law and not classified as industrial land. Agricultural lands are onl
y those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it cove
rs all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the ag
ricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. Rep. Act No. 6657 took
effect only on June 15, 1988. When Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. Estrella
confirmed the reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council of Carm
ona to non-agricultural land when he approved, on July 3, 1979, the application
of the private respondent/LDC for the conversion of 35.80 hectares of the proper
ty covered by TCT No. 62972 into non-agricultural land, he did so pursuant to hi
s authority under Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, by P.D. No. 815 and P.D. No. 94
6. It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian Reform Minister declared t
hat the property was not tenanted and not devoted to the production of palay and
/or corn, and that the land was suitable for conversion to a residential subdivi
sion. The order of the Minister was not reversed by the Office of the President;
as such, it became final and executory. By declaring, in its Decision of Septem
ber 2, 1997, that the property subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the p
etitioner DARAB thereby reversed the Order of Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella,
issued almost eighteen (18) years before, and nullified Resolution No. 30 of th
e Municipal Council of Carmona, approved twenty-one (21) years earlier, on May 3
0, 1976, as well as the issuances of the NHA, the HSRC, the HLURB, the Ministry
of Local Government and the National Planning Commission. Thus, the petitioner D
ARAB acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jur
isdiction. With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified
as residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and appellate jurisdi
ction over the property subject of the action of the petitioner PBFAI and its me
mbers. Consequently, the DARAB should have ordered the dismissal of the complain
t. The jurisdiction of a tribunal or quasi-judicial body over the subject matter
is determined by the averments of the complaint/petition and the law extant at
the time of the commencement of the suit/complaint/petition. All proceedings bef
ore a tribunal or quasi-judicial agency bereft of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action are null and void. Since the members of the petitioner PBFA
I were not the tenants of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its me
mbers had no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of th
e landholding to maintain possession thereof and for damages. Besides, when the
complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty-seven (37) members of the pe
titioners had already executed separate

deeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the portions of t
he landholding they respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respo
ndent CAI varied sums of money. In executing the said deeds, the members of the
petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence
, they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the same. JURIS
DICTION; DAR HAS JURISDICTION OVER ALL CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING THE IMPLEMENTATIO
N OF AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Roberto J. Cuenca
G.R. No. 154112 (September 23, 2004) Facts: Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenc
a is the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 816-A and co
vered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy.
Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane
. On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cu
enca placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.
A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). On
29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Cour
t, Branch 63, La Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank o
f the Philippines for 'Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Uncons
titutionality of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With Preliminary Injunction and R
estraining Order.' Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage
be declared null and void ab initio and Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 19
90 be declared unconstitutional. MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss th
e complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the natu
re and subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657. The respondent Judge
issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist
from implementing the Notice of Coverage. In the same order, the respondent Jud
ge set the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction on January 17 and 18, 2000. In an order dated 16 February 2000, the r
espondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunado's motion to dismiss and issued a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his beha
lf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP fro
m proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land. The Depart
ment of Agrarian Reform (DAR) thereafter filed before the CA a petition for cert
iorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into
cognizance that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private respond
ent, which seeks to exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP, is an agrari
an reform matter and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial cour
t. The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely abused its discreti
on by sustaining the writ of injunction issued by the trial court, which is a vi
olation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657. Held: The Petition has m
erit. The issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform, a matter over wh
ich the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of t
he Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) All controversies on the im
plementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), even though they raise
questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. All doubts should be
resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has granted it special and original
authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters Having declared the RTCs to be
without jurisdiction over the instant case, it follows that the RTC of La Carlo
ta City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of Prelim
inary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. Such nu
llity is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of
the CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 382002. Thes
e Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, w
hich reads: "Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference
No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the
.
lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an
d the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program."
JURISDICTION; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT NOT THE DARAB HAS JURISDICTION ON ISSUE OF U
NLAWFUL DETAINER AND FORCIBLE ENTRY OVER RESIDENTIAL LANDHOLDING
Anicia U. Tecson, et al. vs. Dante Gutierrez G.R. No. 152978 (March 4, 2005)
Facts:

The case at bar involved an actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry doc
keted as Civil Case No. 2287 filed by petitioner against respondent before the M
unicipal Trial Court (MTC) on 21 August 1997. Petitioners alleged that they





were the owners of a residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T
CT) No. T-62466 and TCT No. T-62465, which they leased to respondent for and in
consideration of four cavans of palay yearly under an oral lease agreement. The
lots was to be used by the respondent as the site of his dwelling. They declared
that starting the year 1995, respondent failed to pay the yearly rental. Thus,
they considered the lease terminated and made oral and written demands on him to
vacate the property. Respondent, however, stubbornly refused to leave. Petition
er charged him of occupying, since January 1997, a portion of their residential
lot under TCT No. T-62465, without their consent, this lot is adjacent to the su
bject lot of Civil Case of Unlawful detainer. Respondent averred that he was a f
armer beneficiary of a homelot composed of the subject parcels of land. On Augus
t 21, 1998, the MTC decided the Forcible Entry in favor of petitioners. It ruled
that respondent cannot claim entitlement to acquire the subject lot as his home
lot for the following reasons: (1) respondent was not a tenant-farmer of the pet
itioners; (2) the land was residential and not agricultural, and the respondent
was using it for purposes other than agricultural; (3) the subject lot was far f
rom respondent's farm; and (4) no certification was issued by the Department of
Agrarian Reform that the land was respondent's homelot. On August 24, 1998, the
MTC likewise decided the Unlawful detainer case in favor of petitioners based on
the same reasons. The MTC ordered the respondent to vacate the parcel of land a
nd to pay petitioners four cavans of palay or its equivalent per annum beginning
1995 and every year thereafter until he vacates the subject land. Respondent ap
pealed the decisions to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but latter rendered decis
ion affirming in toto the MTC decisions. Respondent elevated the cases to the Co
urt of Appeals in a consolidated petition for review. The latter reversed the ru
lings of the RTC and dismissed the complaint of Unlawful detainer and Forcible E
ntry. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case involved agrarian reform matters
which should be resolved by the DARAB and not by the MTC. The Court of Appeals a
lso declared that the application of agrarian reform laws does not depend on the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties and that an
agrarian reform beneficiary is entitled to a homelot even when the property wher
e the homelot is located belongs to a person other than his landlord.
Issue:

Whether or not the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has
jurisdiction in cases of Unlawful Detainer and Forcible Entry.
Held:





We must point out that this appeal stemmed from ejectment suits wherein the juri
sdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In their complaint for unlawful detainer, petiti
oners alleged that the respondent unlawfully withheld possession of the land des
pite several demands on him to vacate the premises, and that these demands were
made after the latter failed to pay the rent. Likewise, in their complaint for f
orcible entry, petitioners averred that respondent deprived them of physical pos
session of the land by means of stealth and strategy. Based on the averments in
the complaint, the Municipal Trial Court indeed properly acquired jurisdiction o
ver the cases below between herein petitioners and the respondent. Although resp
ondent impugned the validity of petitioners' title over the property and claimed
it to be his homelot, this assertion could not divest the MTC of jurisdiction o
ver the ejectment cases. The court could not be divested of jurisdiction over th
e ejectment cases on the mere allegation that the defendant asserts ownership ov
er the litigated property. Moreover, a pending action involving ownership of the
same property does not bar the filing or consideration of an ejectment suit, no
r suspend the proceedings. The ejectment cases can proceed independently of the
DARAB case. The underlying reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from
trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient o
f asserting ownership over the disputed property. It is settled that the only is
sue for resolution in ejectment suits is the physical or material possession of
the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possessio
n cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the MTC, nonethele
ss, has the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership
for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. Going to the issue
of rightful possession now, our view, petitioners are entitled to possess the p
arcels of land. For respondent failed to show that the land had been awarded to
him by the Department of Agrarian Reform as his homelot. There is , instead, pre
ponderance of evidence shown before the trial court in favor of petitioners' cla
im. They were able to show Transfer Certificate of Titles in their names, wherea
s the respondent had none but bare assertions.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; EMANCIPATION PATENT BEYOND ATTACK AND SCRUTINY; FORFEITURE
OF AMORTIZATIONS IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT
Liberty Ayo-Alburo vs. Uldarico Matobato G.R. No. 155181 (April 15, 2005)

Facts:




The case involves private agricultural land devoted to rice with an area of 1.78
7 hectares, owned by Dr. Victoria Marave-Tiu and located at Brgy. San Pedro, Ala
ngalang, Leyte. The subject property was covered by Operation Land Transfer purs
uant to P.D. No. 27, and was eventually awarded to Estanislao Ayo, who was also
administrator of the property. However, as the latter was already old and sickly
at that time, he requested that it be instead registered in the name of petitio
ner (Liberty Ayo-Alburo). Accordingly, CLT No. D-038564 covering the property wa
s issues in petitioner's name on April 23, 1984. And E.P. No. A-025173 with the
corresponding TCT No. TE-775 covering the property was subsequently issued in pe
titioners' favor on March 5, 1987. Later, respondent (Uldarico Matobato) togethe
r with DAR, Region VIII filed Petition dated April 2, 1996 before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Tanghas, Tolosa, Leyte for cancellation
of the CLT and EP issued in petitioner's favor and for the issuance of a new cer
tificate and patent in respondent's name. Respondent alleged that since 1966 unt
il the filing of the petition before the PARAD, he had been cultivating the prop
erty and giving shares of the harvest as rentals to petitioner. PARAD rendered a
Decision dated Sept. 25, 1996 in favor of respondents ordering cancellation of
TCT No. TE-775 with EP No. A-025173, the process of the reallocation in favor of
Uldarico Matobato, the issuance of new title, and the forfeiture of the land am
ortization payment paid in the name of Liberty Ayo in favor of the reallocatee U
ldarico Matobato. DARAB affirmed in toto the PARAD Decision. Hence, this petitio
n for review on certiorari.
Issues:

Whether or not private respondent was a bona fide tenant of the property. Whethe
r or not the issuance of an emancipation patent put the ownership of the agraria
n reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Whether or not the amortization
payments the petitioner (Liberty Ayo) make to the land should be forfeited in f
avor of respondent (Matobato).
Held:


By admittedly allowing respondent to cultivate the property and viewing the owne
r's share of the produce, petitioner implicitly recognized respondent as tenant.
There thus between them an implied contract of tenancy. A tenancy relationship
may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly. Althou
gh petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with
respondent, in our view petitioners converted to the



tenancy impliedly by allowing respondent to cultivate the landholding in questio
n and by reviewing from him the landowners share of the harvest over a considera
ble length of time. The mere issuances of an emancipation does not put the owner
ship of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation
Patents may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations
. Section 12 (g) of P.D. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of
Agrarian Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of em
ancipation patents issued under P.D. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases
was later lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules o
f Procedure. While the DARAB has jurisdiction to order forfeiture of amortizatio
ns paid by an agrarian reform beneficiary, forfeiture should be made in favor of
the government and not to the reallocatee of the landholding.
CERTIORARI; CERTIORARI LIES WHERE THERE IS NO APPEAL NOR PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQU
ATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pepito Planta, et al. G.R. No. 152324 (Apr
il 29, 2005)
Facts:


Respondent Faustino B. Tobia is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24310 situated in Viga, Ang
adanan, Isabela, with an area of approximately 10.9044 hectares (subject propert
y). He voluntarily offered to sell the subject property to the Government under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. Pursuant
to its mandate under Executive Order No. 405, petitioner LBP determined the valu
ation of the subject property at P107,962.83 per hectare or a total of P1,145,07
5.41. Accordingly, the Government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DA
R) offered to buy the subject property at the purchase price of P1,145,075.41 in
accordance with petitioner LBP's valuation. As he found the valuation too low,
respondent Tobia rejected the offer. In view of respondent Tobia's rejection of
the offer, summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation
for the subject property were conducted before respondent Pepito Planta, in his
capacity as the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adj
udication Board (DARAB). After due proceedings, respondent Provincial Adjudicato
r rendered the Decision dated November 14, 2000 setting aside petitioner LBP's v
aluation of the subject property and fixing the same at P250,000.00 per hectare.






Petitioner LBP sought reconsideration of the said decision but respondent Provin
cial Adjudicator, in the Order dated January 25, 2001, denied its motion. Subseq
uently, respondent Tobia filed a Manifestation and Motion dated April 16, 2001 p
raying for the issuance of a writ of execution for failure of petitioner LBP to
appeal the Decision dated November 14, 2000. Petitioner LBP opposed the same con
tending that the said decision has not attained finality in view of its seasonab
le filing of a petition for judicial determination of just compensation for the
subject property. Despite the pendency of A.C. No. 0634, respondent Provincial A
djudicator issued the Writ of Execution dated June 27, 2001 which was addressed
to the DARAB Sheriff directing him to implement the Decision dated November 14,
2000. Petitioner LBP received a copy of the writ of execution on July 6, 2001 an
d forthwith filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof. Respondent Provincia
l Adjudicator, in the Order dated August 8, 2001, denied the said motion. On Aug
ust 30, 2001, petitioner LBP filed with the CA a motion for extension of time to
file a petition for certiorari to assail the Writ of Execution dated June 27, 2
001 issued by respondent Provincial Adjudicator. In the said motion, petitioner
LBP averred, among others, that it received the Order dated August 8, 2001 denyi
ng its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2001. Without acting directly on
petitioner LBP's motion for extension of time to file its petition for certiora
ri by either granting or denying it, the CA denied due course to the petition fo
r the reason that it was the wrong remedy. Petitioner LBP filed its Motion for R
econsideration and Admission of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated Oc
tober 12, 2001 but the same was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution date
d February 12, 2002.
Issue:

Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in dismissing outr
ight the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner LBP?
Held:


Contrary to the ratiocination of the appellate court, however, Rule 43 does not
apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because the same is not a "fin
al order" within the contemplation of the said rule. As this Court fairly recent
ly explained, "a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is is
sued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order o
r a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment agai
nst the losing party." As such, an order of execution is generally not appealabl
e. On the other hand, certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11, Rule XIII of the
1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, expressly provided, i
n






part, that "the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary de
termination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Boar
d but shall be brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Court
s within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice hereof." In relation to th
is provision, Section 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 prescribes that any party who does
not agree with the decision (in the summary administrative proceedings) may brin
g the matter to the court for final determination of just compensation. Thus, at
the time of the filing of the petition for certiorari with the CA, the remedy o
f appeal was not available to petitioner LBP either to question the decision of
respondent Provincial Adjudicator concerning the land valuation of the subject p
roperty or to assail the writ directing the execution of the said decision. Even
granting arguendo that the remedy of appeal was then available to petitioner LB
P, the same would not have been a speedy and adequate remedy against the executi
on of respondent Provincial Adjudicator's decision. Petitioner LBP, thus, proper
ly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the Writ of Execution dated Jun
e 27, 2001 issued by respondent Provincial Adjudicator and the appellate court c
ommitted reversible error in dismissing it outright. Petitioner LBP urges the Co
urt to reconcile the seeming inconsistency between the period to file certiorari
under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 (within fifteen days from receipt of copy of
the decision, order, award or ruling) and that under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court (sixty days from notice of judgment, order or resolution
). The Court holds that Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 prevails since it is a subst
antive law specially designed for agrarian disputes or cases pertaining to the a
pplication, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian reform law
s. However, the fifteen-day period provided therein is extendible, but such exte
nsion shall not extend the sixty-day period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revi
sed Rules of Court. In this case, petitioner LBP filed its motion for extension
to file petition for certiorari with the CA on August 30, 2001. To recall, petit
ioner LBP received a copy of the writ of execution on July 6, 2001 and forthwith
filed a motion for reconsideration thereof. It received on August 21, 2001 resp
ondent Provincial Adjudicator's order denying reconsideration of the writ of exe
cution. Under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, respondent LBP had fifteen days from
the receipt of the order within which to file the petition for certiorari with t
he CA. Petitioner LBP, thus, seasonably filed its motion for extension of time t
o file a petition for certiorari. However, instead of either granting or denying
petitioner LBP's motion for additional time to file a petition for certiorari,
the CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was
the wrong remedy. The CA committed reversible error in so doing not only because
, as already discussed petitioner LBP properly availed of the remedy of certiora
ri, but also because the outright dismissal of the petition was precipitately ma
de.

JURISDICTION IN DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eli G. C. Natividad G.R. No. 127198 (May 1
6, 2005)
Facts:


On May 14, 1993, private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for
the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in
Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidentia
l Decree No. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank
. With leave of court, the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the
registered tenants of the land. After trial, the court rendered the assailed De
cision the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ren
dered in favor of petitioners and against respondents, ordering respondents, par
ticularly, respondents Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Ph
ilippines, to pay these lands owned by petitioners and which are the subject of
acquisition by the State under its land reform program, the amount of THIRTY PES
OS (P30.00) per square meter, as the just compensation due for payment for same
lands of petitioners located at San Vicente (or Camba), Arayat, Pampanga.



DAR and Land Bank filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied b
y the trial court in its Order dated July 30, 1996 for being pro forma as the sa
me did not contain a notice of hearing. Thus, the prescriptive period for filing
an appeal was not tolled. Land Bank consequently failed to file a timely appeal
and the assailed Decision became final and executory. Land Bank then filed a Pe
tition for Relief from Order Dated 30 July 1996, citing excusable negligence as
its ground for relief. Attached to the petition for relief were two affidavits o
f merit claiming that the failure to include in the motion for reconsideration a
notice of hearing was due to accident and/or mistake. The affidavit of Land Ban
k's counsel of record notably states that "he simply scanned and signed the Moti
on for Reconsideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampa
nga, Branch 48, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing" due
to his heavy workload. The trial court, in its Order of November 18, 1996, denie
d the petition for relief because Land Bank lost a remedy in law due to its own
negligence.



In the instant petition for review, Land Bank argues that the failure of its cou
nsel to include a notice of hearing due to pressure of work constitutes excusabl
e negligence and does not make the motion for reconsideration pro forma consider
ing its allegedly meritorious defenses. Hence, the denial of its petition for re
lief from judgment was erroneous. According to Land Bank, private respondents sh
ould have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation of their properties.
Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they fi
led a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the tria
l court. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD
27 and Executive Order No. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination
of just compensation, and in relying on private respondents' evidence of the va
luation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank
's evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972.
Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in taking cognizance of the case as the det
ermination of just compensation is a function addressed to the Court of Justice?
Held:



In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that there is nothi
ng contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudic
ate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determinati
on of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdictio
n of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just comp
ensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refer
s to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrati
ve law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary
manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform progr
am, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolu
tion of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is
, after all, essentially a judicial function. Thus, the trial did not err in tak
ing cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a functi
on addressed to the courts of justice. It would certainly be inequitable to dete
rmine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 cons
idering the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable
length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with R
A 6657, and not PD 27


or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the exprop
riator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. In this case, th
e trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their
property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the
highway, market value, assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce.
This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of
just compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided by, RA
6657 and existing jurisprudence.
CONVERSION; DISTINGUISHED FROM RECLASSIFICATION; AUTHORITY OF DAR TO APPROVE CON
VERSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS COVERED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 TO NONAGRICULTURA
L USES HAS NOT BEEN PIERCED BY THE PASSAGE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
Jose Luis Ros, Andoni F. Aboitiz, Xavier Aboitiz, Roberto E. Aboitiz, Enrique Ab
oitiz, Matthias G. Mendezona, Cebu Industrial Park Developers, Inc. and FBM Aboi
tiz Marine, Inc. vs. DAR, Hon. Ernesto Garilao, in his capacity as DAR Secretary
, and Dir. Jose Llames, in his capacity as Director of DAR-Regional 7 G.R. No. 1
32477 (August 31, 2005)
Facts:

The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the Region
al Office of DAR Region 7 disallowing the application for conversion filed by pe
titioners, owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili, Balam
ban, Cebu. The application was based on Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by th
e Mun. Council of Balamban, Cebu which reclassified such lands as industrial lan
ds. Said ordinance was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on April 3, 1995
. Because of such disapproval, Petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a c
omplaint for Injunction with application of TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunc
tion. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction ruling that it is DAR
which has jurisdiction citing Section 20 of the Local Government Code.




Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court denied the same.
Hence, Petitioners filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari wit
h application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
. The Supreme Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals thru a Resolut
ion dated 11 November 1996. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the said
Resolution but the same was denied thru Resolution dated 27 January 1997. The Co
urt of Appeals ordered the Public Respondents to file their comments on the Peti
tion. Two sets of comments from Public respondents, one from DAR Provincial Offi
ce and another from the Office of the Solicitor General, were submitted, to whic
h petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply. Court of Appeals rendered a decisi
on affirming the Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC. Petitioners Motion for Re
consideration was denied in a Resolution dated 30 January 1998. Petitioners clai
m that local grants have the power to reclassify portions of their agricultural
lands, subject to the conditions set forth in Section 20 of the Local Government
Code that if agricultural lands sought to be reclassified by the local governme
nt is one which has already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and/or w
hich has been distributed to ARBs, then such reclassification must be confirmed
by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 65 of the CARL, in order for
the reclassification to become effective, that if the land sought to be reclassi
fied is not covered by CARL and not distributed to ARBs, then no confirmation fr
om DAR is necessary.
Issues:


Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by th
e Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has th
e effect of taking such lands out of coverage of the CARL and beyond the jurisdi
ction of the DAR? Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed u
nder the doctrine of primary jurisdiction? Whether or not the Complaint for Inju
nction is an appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining developme
nt works on the subject lands? Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City had authority to issue a writ of injunction against the DAR?
Held:

The petition lacks merit. After the passage of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural lands
, through reclassification, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisd
iction over which is vested in







the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity
of R.A. No. 6657 are exempted from conversion. Reclassification of lands does n
ot suffice. In Alarcon vs. CA (405 SCRA 440) it was ruled that conversion is dif
ferent from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the current use
of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by DAR. Reclassi
fication is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized, for
non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied i
n the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conv
ersion. R.A. No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988 and Municipal Ordinance No. 10
1, which reclassified the subject land, was passed on 25 March 1992, and the Pro
vincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu, which adopted Munici
pal Ordinance No. 101 was passed on 03 April 1995, long after R.A. No. 6657 has
taken effect. To further clarify any doubt on its authority, DAR issued Administ
rative Order No. 12 dated October 1994 which provides for the consolidated and r
evised rules and procedures governing conversion of agricultural lands to non-ag
ricultural uses. The authority of DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lan
ds covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierce
d by the passage of the Local Government Code. The code explicitly provides that
nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any man
ner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. It being settled that jurisdiction
over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint for injunction was c
orrectly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of prima
ry jurisdiction. This Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa vda. de Villena, found occas
ion to reiterate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary j
urisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdi
ction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special competenc
e. For agrarian reform case, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agraria
n Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudica
tion Board (DARAB). Injunction is not the appropriate remedy against the order o
f the DAR enjoining petitions in developing the subject land. Section 68 of R.A.
No. 6657 provides: "Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Inte
rference.
No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issue
d by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Depar
tment of Agriculture (DAR), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the progr
am."
JURISDICTION; PARAD ADJUDICATOR HAS PRIMARY AND EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
IN CASES INVOLVING THE

ISSUANCE, CORRECTION AND CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF CLOAS

Esperanza vda. de Lopez, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 14603
5 (September 9, 2005)
Facts:





The case at bar involved a petition for review filed by petitioner to nullify an
d set aside the decision of Court of Appeals. Subject of this litigation are two
parcels of agricultural land located at Sampaloc (Paligui) Apalit, Pampanga, na
mely: Lot 847 and Lot 845, with the area of 1.0876 and 1.0632 hectares, respecti
vely. Presently, these lots are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 43
04 and 4305, registered in the name of respondent Reynald M. Romero, who is the
holder of Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) Nos. 70690 and 70691 issued
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Formerly, the subject parcels of agricultu
ral land were covered by a CLOA in favor of farmer-beneficiary Leonardo Briones.
InA.R. Case No. 0029 '94 of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Of
fice at Region III, Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga herein petitioners challenge
d the award of subject lots to Briones. During the pendency of A.R. Case No. 002
9 '94, Briones filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PAR
AB) at Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga a petition for the cancellation of his
CLOA because he executed a "Waiver of Rights" in favor of one Erlinda Quintos.
Before this petition for cancellation could be resolved by the PARAB, Briones ex
ecuted another "Waiver of Rights" in favor of herein respondent to facilitate th
e transfer of the two (2) parcels in question to respondent who bought said lots
from Briones for P2M, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Brion
es in favor of respondent. The PARAB Adjudicator Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. granted Br
iones' petition for cancellation of his CLOA. Pursuant thereto, the DAR Secretar
y issued CLOA Nos. 70690 and 70691 in favor of respondent Romero on the basis of
which TCT Nos. 4304 and 4305 were issued in the latter's name. Meanwhile, in A.
R. Case No. 0029 '94, the DAR Regional Office at Region III issued an Order date
d March 7, 1994. However, considering that the subject parcels of land were alre
ady sold and transferred, and titles thereto already issued in favor of responde
nt Romero, the aforesaid Order of March 7, 1994 in A.R. Case No. 0029'94 was not
enforced. Nevertheless, the DAR Regional Office at Region III continued with it
s investigation. Then, on December 13, 1995, DAR Region III Director Eugenio B.
Bernardo, issued an Order dispositively reading, as follows:

REWARDING Lot No. 847 with an area of 1.0376 hectares and a portion of 1.0632 he
ctares of Lot No. 845 all at Sampaloc (Paligui), Apalit, Pampanga in favor of Es
peranza vda. de Lopez and Modesta vda. de Asuncion, and the due issuance of CLOA
s in their favor; DIRECTING Esperanza vda. de Lopez and Modesta vda. de Asuncion
to institute appropriate action before the proper forum for the cancellation of
the CLOAs issued in the name of Reynald Marcelino Romero; and



Upon knowledge of said Order, respondent Romero filed with the Department of Agr
arian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga a
petition for "Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and Annulment/Cancellation of O
rder dated December 13, 1995 with Injunction". Petitioners filed a Motion to Dis
miss, arguing that the PARAB has no jurisdiction to entertain Romero's aforement
ioned petition because the questioned Order dated December 13, 1995 of DAR Regio
n III Director Eugenio Bernardo is administrative in nature and, therefore, shou
ld have been appealed by Romero to the DAR Secretary. On appeal, Court of Appeal
s dismissed petitioner's recourse as well as the motion for reconsideration file
d by petitioner. PARAB Adjudicator Ilao, Jr., denied petitioners' Motion to Dism
iss. Therefrom, petitioner went to the Court Appeals via a petition for certiora
ri. Hence, this instant petition for review.
Issue:

Whether or not PARAB Adjudicator has jurisdiction over a case involving the issu
ance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAS
)
Held:

The pertinent and applicable Rule II, Section 1(a) clearly states that the DARAB
has "primary and exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction" to determine an
d adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving: (1) the implementation of the CARP
under RA 6657, E.O. No. 228, and 129-A, RA No. 3844, as amended by RA No. 6389,
PD No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules; and (2) the rig
hts and obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical where such person i
s engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands cover
ed by CARP and other agrarian laws. Thus, inasmuch as the peaceful possession of
respondent Romero which is being disturbed by the assailed December 13, 1995 Or
der of DAR Region III Director Eugenio Bernardo pertains to an agrarian dispute,
involving, as they do, the rights of respondent Romero as an awardee of a CLOA
over the subject parcels of agricultural land, which are


now registered in his name under TCT Nos. 4304 and 4305, we rule and so hold tha
t the PARAD has the primary and exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction ov
er said order assailed in DARAB Case No. 4098 P'96. Simply put, we find no rever
sible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the PARAD's denial
of petitioners' motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PAR
AB Adjudicator Ilao, Jr. has jurisdiction over DARAB Case No. 4098 P'96 under th
e afore-quoted Rule II, Section 1(a) of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Undoub
tedly, DARAB Case No. 4098 P'96 is an agrarian dispute involving rights of respo
ndent Romero over the subject agricultural lands, which rights were disturbed by
the Order dated December 13, 1995 of DAR Region III Director Eugenio Bernardo b
y disqualifying Romero as farmer-beneficiary of the subject lots and directing p
etitioners to institute appropriate action before the proper forum for the cance
llation of the CLOAs issued in the name of respondent Romero. With respect to pe
titioners' contention that the aforesaid DAR orders had become final and executo
ry on account of respondent Romero's failure to appeal the same to the DAR Secre
tary, suffice it to say that should the PARAD ultimately find said orders to hav
e been issued without jurisdiction, the PARAD is sufficiently clothed with autho
rity and definitely has the jurisdiction to declare the same null and void under
the timehonored principle that void judgments never become final and executory
and cannot be the source of any right whatsoever. FOR
COVERAGE; CARP COVERED PROPERTY DONATED CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION FOR CHARITABLE P
URPOSE
REPEALING LAW; P.D. NO. 27 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS COMPREHE
NSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW REPEALED SPECIAL LAW SECTION 4 OF ACT NO. 3239 POLICE
POWER; EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER PREVAILS OVER OBLIGATION IMPOSED BY PRIVATE CONT
RACT
Hospicio De San Jose de Barili, Cebu City vs. Department of Agrarian Reform G.R.
No. 140847 (September 23, 2005)
Facts:

Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de
ion created as a body corporate in
order to formally accept the offer
h a home for the care and support,
pacitated and helpless persons.

Barili ("Hospicio") is a charitable organizat

1925 by Act No. 3239. The law was enacted in
made by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establis
free of charge, of indigent invalids and inca




The Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an o
rder ordaining that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Op
eration Land Transfer in favor of twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiari
es. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, a land reform law, was cited as legal bas
is for the order. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the ord
er with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary, citing the aforementi
oned Section 4 of Act No. 3239. It argued that Act No. 3239 is a special law, wh
ich could not have been repealed by P.D. No. 27, a general law, or by the latter
's general repealing clause. The DAR Secretary rejected the motion for reconside
ration in an Order held that P.D. No. 27 was a special law, as it applied only t
o particular individuals in the State, specifically the tenants of rice and corn
lands. Moreover, P.D. No. 27, which covered all rice and corn lands, provides n
o exemptions based on the manner of acquisition of the land by the landowner. Th
e Order of the DAR Secretary was assailed in a Petition for Certiorari filed wit
h the Court of Appeals which the latter, the Court of Appeals and hereby, the Co
urt of Appeals affirmed the DAR Secretary's issuance. It sustained the position
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) position that Section 4 of Act No.
3239 was expressly repealed not only by P.D. No. 27, but also by Republic Act No
. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, both l
aws being explicit in mandating the distribution of agricultural lands to qualif
ied beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals further noted that the subject lands did
not fall among the exemptions provided under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6657. T
he appellate court brought into play the aims of land reform, affirming as it di
d "the need to distribute and create an economic equilibrium among the inhabitan
ts of this land, most especially those with less privilege in life, our peasant
farmer." Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeals' Decision, petitioner filed Petit
ion for Review.
Issues:


Whether or not provision in Section 4 of Act No. 3239 prohibiting the sale of th
e properties donated to the charitable organization that was incorporated by the
same law bars the implementation of agrarian reform laws as regards said proper
ties? Whether or not Act No. 3239 was repealed by P.D. No. 27 or Republic Act No
. 6657? Whether or not P.D. No. 1808 impairs the constitutional guaranty of noni
mpairment of obligation contract?
Held:







Under Section 4 of the CARL, place under coverage are all public and private agr
icultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, subje
ct to the exempted lands listed in Section 10 thereof. We agree with the Court o
f Appeals that neither P.D. No. 27 nor the CARL exempts the lands of the Hospici
o or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian reform. Ultimat
ely, the result arrived at in the assailed issuances should be affirmed. Nonethe
less, both the DAR Secretary and the appellate court failed to appreciate what t
o this Court is indeed the decisive legal dimension of the case. Agrarian reform
is justified under the State's inherent power of eminent domain that enables it
to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. It has even been characterized as beyond the traditio
nal exercise of eminent domain, but a revolutionary kind of expropriation. This
characterization is warranted whether the expropriation is operative under the C
ARL or P.D. No. 27, as both laws are keyed into the same governmental objective.
Moreover, under both laws, the landowner is entitled to just compensation for t
he properties taken. The twin process of expropriation of lands under agrarian r
eform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale, which has b
een aptly described in common law jurisdictions as "sale made under the process
of the court, and in the mode prescribed by law," and "which is not the voluntar
y act of the owner, such as to satisfy a debt, whether of a mortgage, judgment,
tax lien, etc." Thus, we can hardly characterize the acquisition of the subject
properties from the Hospicio for the benefit of the tenants as a sale, within th
e contemplation of Section 4 of Act No. 3239. The transfer arises from compulsio
n of law, and not the desire of any parties. Even if the Hospicio had voluntaril
y offered to surrender its properties to agrarian reform, the resulting transact
ion would not be considered as a conventional sale, since the obligation is crea
ted not out of the mandate of the parties, but the will of the law. Regrettably,
the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals failed to apply that sound principle
, preferring to rely instead on the conclusion that Section 4 was repealed by P.
D. No. 27 and the CARL. Nonetheless, even assuming for the nonce that Section 4
contemplates even forced sales such as those through expropriation, we would agr
ee with the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals that Section 4 is deemed repe
aled by P.D. No. 27 and the CARL. The other arguments raised by the Hospicio are
similarly bereft of merit. It wants us to hold that P.D. No. 27 and the CARL, b
oth enacted to implement the urgently needed policy of agrarian reform, violate
the non-impairment of contracts clause under the Bill of Rights. Yet the broad s
weep of this argument ignores the nuances adopted by this Court in interpreting
Section 10 of Article III. We have held that the State's exercise of police powe
rs may prevail over obligations imposed by private contracts.


The rationale for holding that the properties of the Hospicio are covered by P.D
. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657 is so well-grounded in law that it obviates any r
esort to the sordid game of choosing which of the two competing aspirations is n
obler. The body which would have unquestionable discretion in assigning hierarch
ical values on the modalities by which social justice may be implemented is the
legislature. Land reform affords the opportunity for the landless to break away
from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others.
By refusing to exempt properties owned by charitable institutions or maintained
for charitable purposes from agrarian reform, the legislature has indicated a po
licy choice which the Court is bound to implement.
COVERAGE; PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 2052 JURISDICTION; DAR NOT THE COURT HAS
THE JURISDICTION ON ISSUE OF TENANCY
Department of Agrarian Reform, et al. vs. Paulino Franco G.R. No. 147479 (Septem
ber 26, 2005)
Facts:



In the case at bar it involved a petition for review of the Decision of the Cour
t of Appeals affirming the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudic
ation Board ("DARAB") with modification by deleting the disturbance compensation
. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Patrocinia G. Mercado ("MARO Mercado" of
the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR") sent a letter to Paulino Franco ("Fra
nco") through Franco's attorney-in-fact, Plaridel Seno ("Seno") requesting Franc
o to attend a conference to discuss the terms and conditions of bringing under t
he agricultural leasehold system Franco's land located in Babag, Cebu City with
an aggregate area of 36.8 hectares. Franco failed to attend the meeting and mere
ly sent a letter-reply to MARO Mercado, objecting to the placement of his land u
nder the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 ("RA 6657") or the Comprehensive Agra
rian Reform Law of 1988. MARO Mercado prepared the documentation folders for Pro
visional Lease Rentals in favor of the private petitioners herein. Acting Provin
cial Agrarian Reform Officer Buenaventura Pomida ("PARO Pomida") approved the Pr
ovisional Lease Rentals recommended by MARO Mercado. Franco filed with the DARAB
, Region VII, Cebu City a petition to nullify the orders of MARO Mercado and PAR
O Pomida. Franco alleged that the land could not be placed under the agricultura
l leasehold system because Proclamation No. 2052 dated 30 January 1981 and Lette
r of Instruction No. 1256 ("LOI No. 1256") dated 14 July 1982 had already classi
fied the land as non-agricultural.





The Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ("Adjudicator") ruled in favor of Franco, declar
ing the assailed orders void. Citing Proclamation No. 2052, LOI No. 1256, and th
e Order dated 16 September 1992 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, the Adjud
icator held that Franco's land is excluded from the coverage of the Operation La
nd Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Refo
rm Law under RA 6657. On appeal, the DARAB rendered its Decision dated 23 July 1
996 affirming the decision of the Adjudicator. The DARAB held that Franco's land
was not agricultural land at the time the questioned orders were issued. The DA
RAB cited two reasons: (1) Franco's land is within the tourism zone pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2052, promulgated on 30 January 1981, and which preceded the en
actment of RA 6657 which became effective on 15 June 1988; and (2) the purpose o
f Proclamation No. 2052 is manifested in the issuance of LOI No. 1256 which dire
cted the DAR Secretary to exempt the areas situated within the declared Tourist
Zone from the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer, and to suspend or cancel
all processing for coverage of these areas under the land reform program. In the
Decision, one of the members of the DARAB, Lorenzo R. Reyes ("Reyes"), made a h
andwritten note under his signature stating: "Petitioner-appellee [Franco] will
still have to apply for conversion and if granted appellants will be entitled to
disturbance compensation." Franco filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Thereafte
r, said Motion was denied by DARAB for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Ap
peals rendered decision affirming the DARAB decision with the modification that
private petitioners have no right to disturbance compensation.
Issues:

Whether or not the handwritten note made by one of the members of DARAB under hi
s signature form part of DARAB decision? Whether or not the findings of Non-Tena
ncy as ruled by the Court of Appeals is proper inspite of the fact the same has
not been factually determined in the Court a quo?
Held:


Obviously, the handwritten note of DARAB member Reyes does not form part of the
decision and cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsideration. Thus, it was
proper for the DARAB to dismiss the motion for reconsideration, albeit the reso
lution denying the motion for reconsideration failed to mention the impropriety
of the issue raised in such motion. Again, Franco sought for review not the DARA
B decision but the one-sentence handwritten note of DARAB member Reyes, which is
a mere opinion of a lone member of the DARAB and has no binding effect. The vie
w expressed in the note


is not the opinion of the DARAB and does not form part of the DARAB decision. Ce
rtainly, the note does not form part of the dispositive portion of the DARAB dec
ision which could be subject to an appeal. The Court reiterated that "A judgment
must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of
the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision.
While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of th
e judgment. Indeed, the ruling of the appellate court that private petitioners h
ave no right to disturbance compensation because they have not proven that they
are tenants of Franco's land went beyond the DARAB decision being appealed. The
determination of entitlement to disturbance compensation is still premature at t
his stage since this case originally involved only the issue of nullity of the P
rovisional Lease Rental Orders. Further, it is the DAR that can best determine a
nd identify the legitimate tenants who have a right to disturbance compensation.
TENANCY; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; AGRICULTURAL TENANCY AS D
EFINED UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINES; TENANCY RELATIONS
CANNOT BE BARGAINED AWAY EXCEPT FOR THE STRONG REASONS PROVIDED BY LAW; CHANGE O
F LANDOWNERSHIP DOES NOT TERMINATE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
LUDO & LUYM Development Corporation and/or CPC Development Corporation vs. Vicen
te C. Barreto as substituted by his heirs namely: Maxima L. Barreto, Peregrina B
. Uy, Rogelio L. Barreto, Violeta L. Barreto, Florenda B. Templanza, Eduardo L.
Barreto, Evelyn B. Bersamin, Cecilia B. Aquino and Nelson Nilo L. Barreto G.R. N
o. 147266 (September 30, 2005)
Facts:

The present petition stemmed from a complaint for "Opposition Against the Applic
ation for Renewal of the Conversion Order/Claim for Payment of Disturbance Compe
nsation Plus Damages" filed on 30 April 1991 by Vicente C. Barreto against herei
n petitioners LUDO and CPC before the DARAB Regional Office in Iligan City, Lana
o del Norte, involving a thirty-six-hectare land covered




by TCT No. 18822-25, six hectares of which were devoted for the planting of coco
nuts, while the remaining thirty hectares had been planted with sugarcane. In 19
38, Vicente C. Barreto, as tenant of landowner Antonio Bartolome, worked on and
cultivated two hectares of land devoted to sugarcane plantation. In 1956, Antoni
o Bartolome sold the entire estate to LUDO with the latter absorbing all the far
mworkers of the former. Vicente C. Barreto was designated as a co-overseer with
Bartolome on the six-hectare coco land portion of the estate, pending the develo
pment of the entire estate into a residential-commercial complex. Pursuant to Ci
ty Ordinance No. 1313, the subject landholding fell within the Commercial-Reside
ntial Zone of the city. On 30 March 1978, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR
) issued a conversion permit to petitioner LUDO authorizing the conversion of th
e entire estate into a residential/commercial lot. On 24 November 1988, petition
er CPC, the developer of the subject property, requested for the renewal of the
conversion permit earlier issued to the LUDO. Vicente C. Barreto opposed by fili
ng a letter-complaint on 30 April 1991 before the DARAB Regional Office in Iliga
n City, Lanao del Norte, on the ground that such act was one of the prohibited a
cts enjoined by Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6657. The DARAB rendered a decisi
on, in favor of petitioners LUDO and CPC, finding that there was no tenancy rela
tionship existing between LUDO and Vicente C. Barreto, thus, no disturbance comp
ensation was due the latter for having been dispossessed of the six-hectare land
holding he had been tilling. The DARAB Regional Office gave ample credence to th
e affidavit of Antonio Bartolome, complainant's co-overseer and former owner of
the thirty-six-hectare landholding. On appeal to DARAB Central Office, the latte
r affirmed the PARAD's Decision which CA annulled and set aside through a resolu
tion dated 12 August 1997, hence, the petition for review on certiorari under Ru
le 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:

Whether or not there existed a tenancy relationship between petitioner LUDO and
Vicente C. Barreto? Is the Statute of Limitation under R.A. No. 3844 applicable
to bar payment of disturbance compensation to a tenant? Is deceased Vicente C. B
arreto entitled to disturbance compensation for his dispossession?
Held:

The findings of the Court of Appeals and the Boards a quo are, generally, entitl
ed to respect and non-disturbance. The Court found that there was a compelling r
eason for it to apply the exception of non-conclusiveness of their factual findi
ngs on the ground that the findings of facts of both courts contradict each othe
r. An






overwhelming evidence in favor of the late Vicente C. Barreto was overlooked and
disregarded. In the case at bar, it bears emphasizing that no one has denied th
e existence of the tenancy status of deceased Vicente C. Barreto over the subjec
t thirty-six-hectare landholding with respect to its former owner, Antonio Barto
lome. There being no waiver executed by Barreto, no less than the law clarifies
that the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship is not terminated by
mere changes of ownership, in cases of sale or transfer of legal possession as i
n lease. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 3844 provides that the agricultural leasehol
d relation shall not be extinguished by the sale, of the landholding. In case th
e agricultural lessor sells, the purchaser shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. For this reason, whe
n petitioner LUDO became the owner of the subject landholding, it became subroga
ted to the rights and obligations of its predecessorin-interest, Antonio Bartolo
me, his obligation under the law to Barreto, continues and subsists until termin
ated as provided for by law. A tenant has been defined under Section 5(a) of Rep
. Act No. 1199 as a person who, himself, and with the aid available from within
his immediate household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by anothe
r, with the latter's consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce wit
h the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a p
rice certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehol
d system. Applying the preceding to the case at bar, what became apparent from t
he records is that though the late Vicente C. Barreto was designated as a co-ove
rseer of the subject landholding, he was also tilling the land and had a sharing
arrangement with petitioner LUDO and Antonio Bartolome. What is glittering, the
refore, is that the deceased also took on the added duty of being the overseer o
f the petitioners. Nothing in law and in the facts of the case at bar excludes o
ne from the other. Reclassification is very much different from conversion. The
latter is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land in
to some other use as approved by the DAR. Reclassification, in contrast, is the
act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural
uses such as residential, industrial or commercial, as embodied in the land use
plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. Accordi
ngly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically allow
a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. Parti
es can still continue with their tenurial relationship even after such reclassif
ication. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to u
se the agricultural land for other purposes. In the case at bar, though there ap
pears to be no court proceeding which took cognizance of the reclassification/ap
plication for conversion of the subject landholding from agricultural to residen
tial/commercial, the permit issued by the DAR on 30 March 1978 was never assaile
d and thus, attained finality. In the case

of Bunye v. Aquino, the Court allowed the payment of disturbance compensation be

cause there was an order of conversion issued by the DAR of the landholding from
agricultural to residential. The decree was never questioned and thus became fi
nal. Consequently, the tenants were ejected from the land and were thus awarded
disturbance compensation. Hence, Barreto, who used to be a tenant of petitioner
LUDO at the time of the conversion of the subject landholding, is entitled to di
sturbance compensation for his dispossession. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DAR ADMINISTR
ATIVE ORDER NO. 09, SERIES OF 1993 WHICH PRESCRIBES A MAXIMUM RETENTION LIMIT FO
R OWNERS OF LAND DEVOTED TO LIVESTOCK RAISING; RULE MAKING POWER OF DAR UNDER SE
CTION 49 OF THE CARL
Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce (OIC)
vs. Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. Sutton G.R. No. 162070
(October 19, 2005)
Facts:





This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) o
f the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003
and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O
.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
The case involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has
been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuan
t to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents ma
de a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail
of certain incentives under the law. On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Repu
blic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (C
ARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising li
vestock, poultry and swine. On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the c
ase of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, the Court ruled that lands devoted to live
stock and poultryraising are not included in the definition of agricultural land
and declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they
included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of this, r
espondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as t
heir landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted fro
m the coverage of the CARL. On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that it was de
voted solely to






cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exem
pted from the coverage of the CARL. On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to
petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supp
orting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored such re
quest. On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provid
ed that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of live
stock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage
of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the
following retention limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of 1.7815 h
ectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise
be excluded from the operations of the CARL. On February 4, 1994, respondents w
rote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the
withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholdi
ng is exempted from the CARL. On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for
exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in
the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for
grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitio
ner ordered the rest of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed und
er Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved for reconsideration, contending tha
t their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to ca
ttle-raising. Said motion was denied. Respondents filed a notice of appeal with
the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DA
R A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in
determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the con
stitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which d
eclared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. The
OP affirmed the impugned order. On appeal to CA, the CA ruled in favor of respon
dents and declared A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993 as void.
Issue:

Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes
a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitu
tional?
Held:

The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought
to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian refor
m




and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deli
berations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,
inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultryraising
. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-ra
ising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agricu
lture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry i
s different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural,
activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form o
f industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, dr
ainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhaust
s and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies,
antipollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons a
nd concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and ot
her technological appurtenance. Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestoc
k farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrari
an reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. Moreover, it i
s a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute
by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and a
doption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress se
eks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 19
88 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the
CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms "agricultura
l activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that ar
e devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swineraising. With this significa
nt modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian
laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock
farms from the coverage of agrarian reform. It is doctrinal that rules of admin
istrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. The
y cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and
be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrat
ive order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assai
led A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it
enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 C
onstitution.
TENANCY; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE PRESUMED; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP MUST EXIS
T BETWEEN THE LITIGANTS BEFORE DARAB MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE; INDISPENSABLE REQUISIT
ES OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP

Domingo C. Suarez vs. Leo B. Saul, Roger S. Brillo, Efrain S. Brillo, Eleno S. B
rillo and Ignacio G. Pelaez G.R. No. 166664 (October 20, 2005)
Facts:




The case arose from a complaint for reinstatement with preliminary mandatory inj
unction, recovery of possession and damages filed by respondents against petitio
ner and T'boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) before the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB
). Respondents claimed that they were agricultural tenants in petitioner's land
on a 25-75 sharing agreement; petitioner voluntarily offered the land for sale t
o the government under a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) that they signed the docu
ments for the transfer of the land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Progr
am (CARP) as farmer-beneficiaries; that while the VOS was being processed, they
were summarily ejected from the property by TADI after the latter entered into a
Grower Agreement with Contract to Buy with petitioner thereby depriving them of
their landholdings. Petitioner contended that respondents were installed as ten
ants, not by him, but by Wennie Gonzaga of the DAR in Koronadal, South Cotabato.
He denied the existence of a grower's contract between him and TADI over the su
bject land. The latter claimed that its grower's contract with petitioner covere
d parcels of land different from those being claimed by respondents. The Regiona
l Adjudicator dismissed the complaint for lack of merit finding that respondents
failed to prove their alleged tenancy over petitioner's land, and while they we
re identified as potential farmer-beneficiaries of the land subject of the VOS,
they only have an "inchoate right" to the land since its coverage under the CARP
has yet to be completed. On appeal, the DARAB Central Office rendered a Decisio
n reversing the Regional Adjudicator declaring the respondents as bona-fide tena
nts; it ordered the reinstatement of respondents in their respective original la
ndholdings after harvest, and ordered the MARO and other concerned DAR officers
to determine the disturbance compensation from the time of actual ejectment to a
ctual reinstatement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said DARAB Decision. Henc
e, the instant petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision.
Issues:

Whether or not the respondents are bona fide agricultural tenants under the law?
Whether or not the petitioner illegally ejected respondents from their landhold
ings?

Held:



The petitioner's admission that respondents were tenants in the land, was qualif
ied in paragraph 2 of petitioner's answer that it was Wennie Gonzaga of DAR who
installed them as such. Clearly, it was the DAR who placed respondents in actual
possession of the land upon petitioner's offer to transfer the same to the gove
rnment. Other than this supposed admission, there is no evidence on record to pr
ove the tenancy relations. Respondents did not substantiate their claim with evi
dence to show that they were agricultural tenants in petitioner's land. They did
not allege actual cultivation or specify the crop produced thereby. Neither did
they mention how much of the produce was delivered to petitioner or submit rece
ipts to prove the purported 25-75 sharing of harvests. They did not state, much
less prove, the circumstances of their agreement with petitioner as to the alleg
ed tenancy relationship. Thus, there is no basis to the claim that they are agri
cultural tenants on the property. In VHJ Construction and Development Corporatio
n v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a tenancy relationship cannot be presume
d. There must be evidence to prove the tenancy relations such that all its indis
pensable elements must be established, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by t
he landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are
necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisi
tes will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. In this case, there is n
o showing that there exists a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respon
dents. Likewise, respondents have no tenancy relationship with TADI, against who
m they principally have a cause of action. The controversy is civil in nature si
nce it involves the issue of material possession, independent of any question pe
rtaining to agricultural tenancy. Hence, the case falls outside the jurisdiction
of DARAB, it is cognizable by the regular courts.
AUTHORITY TO APPEAR; IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER; WHO HAS AUTHORITY TO FILE NOTICE O
F APPEAL
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Pamintuan Development Co., represented by Maria
no Pamintuan, Jr. G.R. No. 167886 (October 25, 2005)
Facts:







This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the April 15, 2005 Decisio
n of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85843, which dismissed Land Bank of
the Philippines' (LANDBANK's) petition and sustained the August 2, 2004 Order of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which denied due c
ourse to the notice of appeal and notice of entry of appearance filed by LANDBAN
K's counsels. In DARAB case for Preliminary Determination of Just Compensation,
DARAB rendered a Decision dated April 27, 2004, fixing the just compensation of
respondent Pamintuan Development Company's 274.9037 hectare lot covered by Trans
fer Certificate of Title No. T-4972 and located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotaba
to, at P58,237,301.68. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. On J
une 4, 2004, Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, filed a Notice of
Entry of Appearance in behalf of petitioner. Within the period to appeal, or on
June 15, 2004, said counsels also filed a Notice of Appeal via registered mail.
Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the notice of appeal and notice o
f entry of appearance should be denied due course because Attys. Montarde and Me
sa failed to show that their appearance was authorized by petitioner. Said new c
ounsels, on the other hand, asserted that they were duly authorized, attaching t
o their Comment the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Gilda E. Pico, E
xecutive Vice President of petitioner, authorizing Loreto B. Corotan to represen
t, and designating Attys. Montarde and Mesa as counsels for LANDBANK. On August
2, 2004, DARAB issued an order holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa are without
authority to represent petitioner because the latter failed to effect a valid s
ubstitution of their former counsel of record. It added that the April 27, 2004
decision had become final and executory because the notice of appeal filed by it
s purported new counsels is a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running
of the reglementary period to appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsidera
tion appending two memoranda signed by Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, petitioner's Depa
rtment Manager and Head, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) Legal Serv
ices Department, confirming the authority of Atty. Montarde to file a notice of
appeal. The DARAB, however, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Henc
e, a petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals,
but the latter dismissed the petition. It sustained the DARAB's finding that Att
ys. Montarde and Mesa were not clothed with authority to file the notice of appe
al. Petitioner filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temp
orary restraining order. In a resolution dated June 6, 2005, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the April 27, 2004 decisi
on of the DARAB.
Issue:

Who has the authority to file a Notice of Appeal on behalf of a petitioner?

Held:

We find that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in holding that Attys. Mont
arde and Mesa lacked the authority to file a notice of appeal in behalf of petit
ioner. Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: "SEC. 21. Authority
of attorney to appear.
An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to repres
ent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required
to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may,
on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, requi
re any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove th
e authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any i
ssue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order
as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for a person witho
ut being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as
an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions."



The presumption in favor of the counsel's authority to appear in behalf of a cli
ent is a strong one. A lawyer is not even required to present a written authoriz
ation from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of appea
rance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client's name
. However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party requ
ire a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client. In the case at bar, the fi
ling of a notice of entry of appearance by Attys. Montarde and Mesa, gave rise t
o the presumption that they have the authority to file the notice of appeal in b
ehalf of petitioner. When their authority was challenged, they presented the SPA
executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of LANDBANK authorizing the
m to represent petitioner; and the two memoranda of Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, Depa
rtment Manager and Head, CARP Legal Services Department, requesting Atty. Montar
de to file a notice of appeal. These documents are sufficient proof of their aut
hority to represent petitioner's cause. The doubt entertained by the DARAB as to
when the SPA and memoranda were executed is of no consequence in view of petiti
oner's vigorous assertion that it authorized said lawyers to file a notice of ap
peal. Indeed, even an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by
the client either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of
the lawyer's first appearance and validates the action taken by him. The DARAB's
assertion that Attys. Montarde and Mesa cannot validly represent petitioner bec
ause there was no proper substitution of counsels, lacks merit. Petitioner never
intended to replace its counsel of record, the law firm Piczon, Beramo & Associ
ates. Though not specified in the notice, Attys. Montarde and Mesa entered their
appearance as collaborating counsels.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; ELEMENTS

Alejandro Danan, et al. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals and Estrella Arrastia G.R.
No. 132759 (October 25, 2005) The Court of Appeals and the DARAB vs. Estrella A
rrastia G.R. No. 132866 (October 25, 2005)
Facts:




Sometime in 1976, a certain Rustico Coronel leased the subject property for a pe
riod of twelve (12) years or until the crop year 1987 to 1988. Then, persons cla
iming to be farmers and residents of Barangay Lourdes and Barangay San Rafael si
gned a joint resolution as members of the Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultur
a ("AMA") to enter and lease the subject property from the Arrastia heirs. They
entered the disputed land and planted various crops thereon. This culminated in
a violent confrontation on May 21, 1988 that led to the filing of criminal charg
es against AMA members. On June 2, 1988, the AMA filed a complaint with petition
er DARAB, praying that respondent Arrastia be prevented from destroying standing
crops on the disputed property and from fencing said property and that petition
ers be allowed to continue with their farming thereon. On August 15, 1988, the D
ARAB ordered the DAR Regional Director to conduct an ocular inspection on the di
sputed property. The inspection team submitted an Ocular/Investigation Report st
ating that there were no substantially significant plantings on the disputed pro
perty. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer ("MARO") of Lubao, Pampanga also su
bmitted a report recommending the disqualification of private petitioners from a
vailing of the benefits under the CARP. On October 5, 1988, the DARAB issued an
order denying AMA's motion for authority to cultivate and the order became final
and executory on July 29, 1989. Arrastia instituted an action against private p
etitioners for violation of Section 73(b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 on Oct
ober 9, 1989 and the trial court, sitting as a special agrarian court ("SAC"), i
ssued a temporary restraining order. Subsequently a preliminary injunction, both
enjoining private petitioners from entering and cultivating the disputed proper
ty was issued to the latter. On November 29, 1989, private petitioners filed a c
omplaint for injunction and damages before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudi
cation Board ("PARAD") against Arrastia, alleging that they were actual tillers
of the disputed property who







were forcibly evicted by Arrastia from their tenanted lots through the use of ar
med men. The matter was referred to BARC but the dispute could not be settled am
icably per recommendation of BARC Officials. On the basis of the reports submitt
ed by BARC officials and private petitioners' affidavits, the hearing officer is
sued on December 9, 1990 an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of
petitioners and the PARAD also directed the MARO to act on the petition for the
coverage of the disputed property under the CARP. On January 30, 1991, Arrastia
filed an omnibus motion in DARAB Case No. 0001, questioning the jurisdiction of
the hearing officer to issue an order of injunction. The DARAB denied said motio
n and subsequently issued the writ of injunction on September 22, 1992. Arrastia
filed an answer in DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P' 89, interposing the defense t
hat the disputed land was not devoted to agriculture and that private petitioner
s were not tenants thereof. After due hearing, the PARAD rendered a decision in
DARAB Regional Case No. 161-P' 89 on May 13, 1993, declaring that the subject pr
operty is covered by the CARP and that private petitioners are qualified benefic
iaries of the program. The adjudicator also issued an injunction prohibiting Arr
astia from disturbing private petitioners' occupation of the property. Arrastia
appealed the aforementioned decision to petitioner DARAB. The appeal was dockete
d as DARAB Case No. 1551. On March 28, 1994, the DARAB rendered its decision mod
ifying the appealed judgment. Aggrieved, Arrastia elevated the controversy to th
e Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB.
Issue:

Whether or not private petitioners are qualified beneficiaries under the CARP?
Held:


The Court affirms factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court's conclusion that private petitioners committed particular viola
tions warranting their disqualification from the CARP is based on the MARO repor
t which has not been disputed by all the private petitioners. The MARO who prepa
red the report enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of her fu
nctions. Absent any showing that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of d
iscretion in giving evidentiary weight to said report, said factual findings are
generally deemed conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. Mere
occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert
a tiller or farmworker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian la
ws. The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are
the



landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is con
sent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisite
s must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. In
the case at bar, it has not been sufficiently established that private petitione
rs' occupation and cultivation of the disputed property was with the consent of
the landowners. As borne by the case records, respondent Arrastia owns only 4.46
30 hectares of the subject property, which is below the retention limit under Se
ction 6 of R.A. No. 6657 granting a right of retention of up to a maximum of fiv
e (5) hectares of agricultural land in favor of a landowner whose property may b
e acquired for distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Consequently, a la
ndowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not e
xceed the retention limit of five (5) hectares. His land will not be covered at
all by the operation land transfer program although all requisites for coverage
are present. The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, whic
h is subject to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effe
cts of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and
the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to
perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name den
otes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, t
hus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return
it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process. For as long
as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does not exceed the rete
ntion ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retai
ned must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, which su
pplies the details for the exercise of a landowner's retention rights, likewise
recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuade
d to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers. Therefore, ther
e is no legal and practical basis to order the commencement of the administrativ
e proceedings for the placement of respondent Arrastia's land under the CARP sin
ce her property's land area falls below the retention limit of five (5) hectares
.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
Ester Deloso vs. Sps. Alfonso Marapao and Herminia P. Marapao G.R. No. 144244 (N
ovember 11, 2005)
Facts:



This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision of the Court of Appe
als in CA-G.R. SP No. 48503 which reversed the decision of the DARAB and declare
d that petitioners is not a tenant of respondents. Petitioner filed a complaint
with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the province of Agus
an del Norte against respondents praying that the latter be enjoined from interf
ering with her tenurial rights, and that an order be issued fixing the sharing o
f the net produce of the landholding between the parties and directing responden
ts to account for the November 1994 harvest. Respondents, on the other hand, mai
ntained that Primitivo was not a tenant of the landholding but merely an oversee
r paid for the work he rendered. After Primitivo's death, his son, Alberto, was
installed as overseer and paid as farmworker. On the basis of the report of the
ocular inspection and investigation, the MARO found Alberto Temple to be the ten
ant of the landholding. The PARAD, however, reversed the finding of the MARO and
declared the petitioner as tenant of the landholding. On appeal, the DARAB affi
rmed the findings of the PARAD and ruled that the requisites of agricultural ten
ancy are present.
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is indeed a tenant of the subject landholding?
Held:


In order to establish a tenancy relationship, the following essential requisites
must concur: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultur
al lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural lan
d; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee;
and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricu
ltural lessee. Petitioner's evidence fails to establish the existence of all the
requisites of a tenancy relationship. We, therefore, concur with the Court of A
ppeals that the DARAB relied far too much on the pesadas and vales and overlooke
d compelling evidence indicating the absence of a tenancy relationship between t
he parties. In particular, the DARAB ignored the findings of the legal officer w
ho investigated the case and concluded that Alberto Temple, petitioners son, is
the tenant of the landholding.
LEASEHOLD/GROUNDS FOR EXTINGUISHMENT
Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr., namely, Norma Tan, Jeanette Tan, Julieta Tan, Rommel
Tan, and Enrique Tan, Jr., All represented

by Rommel Tan vs. Reynalda Pollescas G.R. No. 145568 (November 17, 2005)
Facts:



Petitioners are co-owners of a coconut farmland ("Land"). Esteban Pollescas ("Es
teban") was the original tenant of the Land. Upon Esteban's death in 1991, his s
on Enrique Pollescas ("Enrique") succeeded him and was appointed as tenant by th
e landowner Enrique Tan ("Tan"). Respondent Reynalda Pollescas ("Reynalda"), Est
eban's surviving second spouse, demanded that Tan recognized her as Esteban's su
ccessor. Tan did not accede. Thus, Reynalda filed with the Department of Agraria
n Reform Adjudication Board of Ozamis City ("DARAB-Ozamis") a complaint for Annu
lment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of Tenancy Relationship and damages. The
DARAB-Ozamis declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the land in its Decision
dated 28 April 1993. However, Reynalda failed to deliver to the Tan Heirs 2/3 o
f the harvests amounting to P3,656.70. Consequently, the Tan Heirs filed a compl
aint forestafa against Reynalda with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Ozamis
City, Branch 2. The trial court found Reynalda guilty ofEstafa. For Reynalda's
continued failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed with the DARAB, Mi
samis Occidental ("DARAB-Misamis Occidental") an ejectment case. On 18 September
1996, the DARAB-Misamis Occidental ruled in favor of the Tan Heirs. Reynalda ap
pealed to the DARAB, Diliman, Quezon City which reversed the DARAB-Misamis Occid
ental. The Tan heirs appealed the decision of the DARAB to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB ordering the Tan Heirs
to respect Reynalda's possession and cultivation of the Land. Hence, this petiti
on. A petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals was filed whic
h affirmed the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
ordering petitioners to respect respondent's possession and cultivation of the l
and.
Issues:

Whether or not there is a ground for extinguishment of leasehold? Whether or not
the petitioners can validly dispossess respondent of the landholding for non-pa
yment of rental?
Held:

Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there is a leasehold relation
ship, as in the present case, the landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant
from the land unless authorized by the court for causes provided by law.



RA 3844 as amended expressly recognizes and protects an agricultural leasehold t
enant's right to security of tenure. Section 36 of RA 3844 as amended enumerates
the grounds for dispossession of the tenant's landholding. . . . Section 34 of
RA 3844 as amended mandates that "not . . . more than" 25% of the average normal
harvest shall constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case,
the Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, w
hich clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount prescribed by law. Therefore, the T
an Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment o
f rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful
. Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. According
ly, the DAR must first fix the provisional lease rental payable by Reynalda to t
he Tan Heirs pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amende
d. Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda cannot be in d
efault in the payment of lease rental since such amount is not yet determined. T
here can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental because it i
s impossible to pay an undetermined amount. That Reynalda is not yet in default
in the payment of the lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot be lawfully
ejected from the Land for non-payment of rental. OVER THE CANCELLATION OF REGIST
ERED
JURISDICTION EP/CLOAS
Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro, as represented by Maximino dela Cr
uz vs. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, as represented by Benedicto U. Cruz G.R. No. 16289
0 (November 22, 2005) Facts:


The Republic of the Philippines acquired the De Leon Estate in Nueva Ecija for r
esale to deserving tenants and landless farmers, conformably with Commonwealth A
ct No. 539, as amended by Republic Act No. 1400. The property was under the admi
nistration of the Land Tenure Administration and later the Department of Agraria
n Reform (DAR). In 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor of
Julian dela Cruz who was a tenant thereon. By virtue of an Agreement to Sell, t
he DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in his favor as the qualified a
llocatee of the landholding. Julian bound and obliged himself to pay the amortiz
ations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the property and m
ade payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979
and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talarodela Cruz and their 10 children, inc
luding Mario and Maximino dela Cruz. Mario administered the landholding, until t
heir mother executed a private document







declaring that, with the consent of her children, she had sold the land in favor
of Alberto Cruz. Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it o
ver a period of 10 years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He t
hen filed an application to purchase the property with the DAR. The Municipal Ag
rarian Reform Officer (MARO) recommended that the landholding be declared vacant
and disposable to a qualified applicant and the approval of Alberto's applicati
on to purchase the property. On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Refor
m Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving the recommendation of the MARO. He di
rected the cancellation of Julian's CLT and declared that his rights be forfeite
d in favor of the government under the agreement. The PARO endorsed the Certific
ate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the DAR Secretary, copy furnished the Regi
onal Director. The DAR Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution reviewed and
evaluated the records and recommended that the PARO's recommendation be affirmed
. On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA over the property i
n favor of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the Land Regist
ration Authority (LRA). Sometime in early 1996, Maximino, one of the surviving c
hildren of Julian, discovered that the landholding had already been registered i
n the name of Alberto Cruz. On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children, wi
th the assistance of the DAR Bureau of Legal Assistance, filed a petition with t
he Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the o
rder of the PARO, CLOA and TCT issued in favor of Alberto Cruz. The petitioners
declared, inter alia, that they were the surviving heirs of Julian dela Cruz and
had no knowledge of the sale by Leonora and Mario of their right as beneficiari
es of the property; not being privies to the said sale, they were not bound by t
he private deed executed by Leonora; and such sale, as well as the issuance of t
he CLOA and the title over the property in favor of Alberto, was null and void,
inasmuch as they violated agrarian reform laws and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8
, Series of 1980. They insisted that they were deprived of their rights as heirs
of the beneficiary without due process of law. After due proceedings, the PARAD
granted the petition in a Decision declaring the petitioners as the rightful al
locatees of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA and issue another
in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to vacate the property. The PA
RAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the said title
and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the petitioners. Alberto ap
pealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD.
Issues:


Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over matters involving the issuance, c
orrection and cancellation of registered CLOAs. Whether the petitioners were den
ied of their right to substantive and procedural due process.
Held:



The petition is denied for lack of merit. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction
of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the
nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the mater
ial allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective
of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs
. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by t
he Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties whe
re the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject mat
ter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omis
sion of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to
a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties t
o challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addres
sing the issue, especially where the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction is apparent on
the face of the complaint or petition. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or
tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or
respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determine
d by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also
the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. I
f the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed
and resolved by the DARAB. The proceedings before a court or tribunal without ju
risdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to dir
ect and collateral attacks. However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA
that the dispute between the petitioners and the respondents over the validity o
f the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-30
35 and the cancellation thereof is not agrarian in nature. The petitioners thems
elves categorically admitted in their pleadings that there was no landlord-tenan
cy relationship between them and Alberto over the landholding. Nor did they have
any tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations whatsoever when petitioners Leon
ora and her son Mario executed the deed of sale in May 1980 in favor of Alberto,
nor when the petitioners filed their petition with the DARAB. The sole tenant-b
eneficiary over the landholding was Julian dela Cruz. There is no showing that b
efore the execution of the deed of transfer/sale, Alberto was a tenant or farmer
, or that he was landless.




The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that, under Section 2 (f), Rul
e II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases invo
lving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were "registered"
with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they m
ust relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs ha
ve been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correctio
n and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation
of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultur
al tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARA
B. In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the name of
Alberto in the exercise of his administrative powers and in the implementation
of the agrarian reform laws. The approval was based on the Report of the MARO, t
he November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO and the recommendation of the DAR Directo
r of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, over whom the DAR Secretar
y has supervision and control. The DAR Secretary also had the authority to withd
raw the CLOA upon a finding that the same is contrary to law and DAR orders, cir
culars and memoranda. On the second issue, the DAR Secretary took into account,
inter alia, Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990. As the Court ruled in Nu
esa v. Court of Appeals: P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administra
tive implementation of the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D.
No. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regul
ations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, inc
luding: . . . (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land trans
fer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No. 816. The revocation by the Regional
Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture f
alls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial
adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then overturning the decision of th
e DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on the merits without affording th
e petitioner opportunity to present his case.
DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTION OF THE REGULAR COURTS AND THE DARAB

Norberto Rimasug, et al. vs. Melencio Martin, et al. G.R. No. 160118 (November 2
2, 2005)
Facts:





The case at bar involves a petition for review on the implied tenancy relationsh
ip. Petitioners were "either employees or relatives of some employees" who were
members of the San Miguel Cooperative Credit Union (SMCCU) organized by the San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) labor force. SMCCU acquired several parcels of land loc
ated at Pritil, Guiguinto, Bulacan which it subdivided for residential purposes
and sold to petitioners, to which they were issued separate titles. Due to finan
cial constraints, petitioners were unable to construct houses on their respectiv
e lots. They later came to know, however, that respondents had, without their kn
owledge and consent, entered the lots on which they planted various agricultural
crops. Petitioners thereupon put respondents on notice of their ownership, brou
ght the matter before barangay authorities but respondents were "uncooperative .
. ." In the meantime, petitioners who could not "come up with the money to star
t a leg al battle with [respondents]" tolerated the continued occupation of thei
r lots until, by letter dated May 31, 1999, they advised respondents of their in
tention to build their houses thereon and accordingly asked them to vacate withi
n fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter. Respondents refused to heed the
demand, however, prompting petitioners to file on June 28, 1999 a complaint for
unlawful detainer against them before the MTC of Guiguinto. By their "Answer wit
h Special and Affirmative Defenses with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter
claim," respondents claimed that they are the recognized and registered tenants
of agricultural lands owned by the SMC to which they paid corresponding lease re
ntals; petitioners failed to comply with Sections 409(c) and 412 of Republic Act
No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) requiring mandatory conciliation proce
edings before the lupon; and the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case, it falli
ng within the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudica
tion Board (DARAB) in accordance with Sections 4 and 50 of Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988). On the merits, by Decision of Marc
h 12, 2002, the MTC held that respondents failed to prove the existence of a lan
dlord-tenant relationship with petitioners who are the owners of the lots in que
stion. Both parties appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulac
an before which petitioners assailed the MTC's failure to grant attorney's fees
and damages in the form of reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
their lots. Respondents, on the other



hand, again raised the issue of jurisdiction and, in any event, assailed the MTC
decision as not in accordance with the facts and the evidence. Respondents' Mot
ion for Reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the RTC by Order o
f January 27, 2003, they filed an "Urgent Verified Motion for Immediate Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Injunction and Petition for Review" be
fore the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision and dis
missed petitioner's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It held tha
t respondents had satisfactorily proven that they are duly recognized agricultur
al tenants of SMCCU on the subject lots. And it belied petitioners' claim of hav
ing tolerated respondents' occupation of the lots, it charging petitioners "as f
ormer employees or workers of the previous landowner company" with actual knowle
dge of respondents' tenancy.
Issue:

Whether or not there is an implied tenancy relationship over which the DARAB has
jurisdiction.
Held:




Section 33, paragraph 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act.
No. 7691, vests Metropolitan Trial Courts, MTCs, and Municipal Circuit Trial Cou
rts with exclusive original jurisdiction cases for forcible entry and unlawful d
etainer. On the other hand, Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988 vests the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) with primary jurisdiction
over all agrarian reform matters and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters inv
olving the implementation of agrarian reform. Jurisdiction over the subject matt
er of an action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and t
he law at the time the action is commenced, irrespective of whether the plaintif
f is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon a motio
n to dismiss, otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entire
ly on the defendant. A scrutiny of the following material allegations in petitio
ners' complaint showed that it involves possession de facto, the only issue invo
lved in ejectment proceedings. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agra
rian Reforms of the Philippines) likewise provides: SEC. 10. Agricultural Leaseh
old Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.
The agricultural lease
hold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of th
e term or period in a leasehold contract nor by

the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In

case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession
of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to t
he rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor. (Unders
coring supplied)

By their own admission, respondents were "informed" that the lots they are tilli
ng are "allegedly" owned by SMC because the one collecting the payments was work
ing at SMC, although the official receipts issued to them were under the name of
SMCCU. On that score alone, the claim of the existence of a tenancy relationshi
p fails, requirements No. 1
that the parties are the landowner and the tenant is a
gricultural lessee, and No. 3
that there is consent between the parties
not being
ent, for how could respondents have contracted with a landowner whose identity t
hey are not even certain of? Such uncertainty becomes more pronounced when note
is taken that before the trial and appellate courts they maintained that the lot
s are owned by SMC. Before this Court, however, they now adopt the observation o
f the appellate court that the lots were owned by SMCCU. Unless a person establi
shes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure. I
n fine, respondents' occupancy and continued possession of the subject lots, upo
n their "honest belief and impression" that they are tenants of SMC or SMCCU, do
es not make them de jure tenants.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; WHAT CONSTITUTES
Juan Padin, Juana Padin, Purita Padin and Gloria Padin vs. Heirs of Vivencio Obi
as, namely: Heirs of Isidro Obias, Santos Dolores, and Atty. Francisco Obias G.R
. No. 137337 (December 9, 2005)
Facts:

A complaint against the heirs of the late Vivencio Obias, herein respondents, wh
o are the owners of 36 hectares of agricultural land situated in Barangays Minor
o and Kinalasan, San Jose, Camarines Sur; that in 1960, Cecilio Obias, then resp
ondents' representative, designated petitioner Juan Padin as tenant and farm adm
inistrator over the whole property from 1960 until 1991; that after the death of
Vivencio Obias in 1991, Atty. Francisco Obias, one of herein respondents, took
over the management of the property; that in August 1991, petitioners attempted
to register themselves with the DAR as agricultural tenants but respondents inte
rposed their opposition; and that respondents sold 204 cows without giving Juan
Padin his share. Petitioners thus prayed that they be declared agricultural tena
nts; that Juan Padin be retained as administrator of the entire property and as
caretaker of the herd of cattle; and that his share from the proceeds of the sal
e of


the 204 cows be turned over to him. Respondents, in their Answer, admitted that
they allowed petitioners to occupy and cultivate a portion of the subject agricu
ltural land. However, they denied any tenancy relationship with petitioners. On
April 19, 1995, the PARAD rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners' complaint,
holding that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties. Juan Padin
was only an administrator or overseer of the Obias estate. On appeal by petition
ers, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), reversed the
PARAD Decision. Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review. On January 12, 1999, it rendered the assailed Decision affirming with mo
dification the DARAB Decision.
Issue:

Whether or not there was a tenancy relationship between the parties?
Held:



The issue of whether there was tenancy relationship between the parties can no l
onger be raised by respondents before this Court since they did not interpose an
appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, this issue is factu
al and is building upon this Court, the same being supported by substantial evid
ence. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the DARAB is without authority t
o compel respondents to retain petitioner Juan Padin as farm administrator of th
eir property and as caretaker of their cattle. His services ended in 1991. As to
the claim of petitioner Juan Padin that he is entitled to one-half of the amoun
t realized from the sale of the cows, again, this is a factual issue. This Court
has no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals' finding that there is no evidenc
e to support such assertion.
TENANCY; ELEMENTS
Monico San Diego vs. Eufrocinio Evangelista G.R. No. 163680 (January 24, 2006)
Facts:

Petitioner Monico San Diego has been an agricultural tenant in a parcel of land
located in barangay San Vicente, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by TCT Number 98.7
28 (M) in the name of Andres Evangelista. After Andres Evangelista died in 1994,
his son respondent Eufrocinio Evangelista inherited the property which has a to
tal area of three hectares, 21,000 square meters of which are planted with rice
and the remaining 11,200 square meters with bamboo.







On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region III Office, Malolos, Bulacan against re
spondent for maintenance of peaceful possession, enjoyment, and damages with res
pect to the bambooland portion of the property. He complained that respondent an
d some unidentified companions forcibly entered the bambooplanted portion of the
property and without authority of law and by means of force and intimidation cu
t down some of the bamboo trees which he had planted thereon, without giving him
his lawful share, and they threatened to continue cutting down the remaining ba
mboo trees and tried to dispossess him as agricultural tenant thereof. Responden
t countered that petitioner is a tenant only with respect to the riceland portio
n of the property, the bambooland portion not being tenanted. And he denied peti
tioner's claim of having planted the bamboo trees, he claiming that they have be
en existing since 1937. The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator dismissed petitioner's
complaint by decision of October 6, 1997, holding, inter alia, that only the ric
eland portion of the landholding is actually covered by the contract of lease an
d that the 33 cavans amount of rental per year during the wet seasons refers to
the riceland portion of the landholding. On appeal, the DARAB, by decision of Fe
bruary 16, 2000, reversed that of the Provincial Adjudicator holding the agricul
tural leasehold contract executed between Plaintiff-Appellant and the late Andre
s Evangelista covers the lot consisting of three (3) hectares as evidenced by an
Agricultural Leasehold Contract executed by herein parties on 4 September 1984.
Apparently, PlaintiffAppellant is a tenant on the 3-hectare land and not on the
21,000 square meter area. Clearly, the bamboo land is part and parcel of the 3hectare land. His motion for reconsideration having been denied by DARAB resolut
ion of January 12, 2001, respondent elevated the case via petition for review to
the Court of Appeals which reversed the DARAB decision and reinstated that of t
he DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, by decision of December 18, 2003. In reversing
the DARAB decision, the Court of Appeals observed: In the case of Monsanto v. Ze
rna, the Supreme Court laid down the elements of a tenancy relationship, which a
re: "(1) the parties are landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) an
d subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is conse
nt between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relation
ship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivatio
n on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is share
d between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee."

Following the guidelines set forth in Monsanto case, the Agricultural Leasehold
Contract of private respondent with the late Andres Evangelista excluded the bam
boo land area, for the simple reason that requisites 5 and 6 are wanting in the
instant case. Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is a tenant of the entire landholding including th
at portion planted with bamboo.
Held:


Private respondent is not a tenant in the subject bamboo land. The wordings of t
he agricultural leasehold contract itself which pertains only to the produce of
rice belies private respondent's claim in paragraph 4 of his Complaint that ". .
. the subject bamboo trees were planted by herein plaintiff (now private respon
dent) when the latter started working as agricultural tenant on the subject land
holding." Thus, no evidence of personal cultivation of bamboo trees was presente
d by private respondent other than his bare allegations to this effect. It was e
stablished in the Affidavits or "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of several neighbors of pe
titioner, one of whom is a Barangay Chairman, that as early as 1957, Andres Evan
gelista during his lifetime was the one in possession of the bamboo land and act
ively administered the cutting of the bamboo trees thereon, which upon the death
of Andres Evangelista was carried on by petitioner when he inherited the bamboo
land in question. "It is quite intriguing to one's conscience if there is any t
ruth to the claim of plaintiff that he was the one who planted the bamboo trees
existing in the landholding in question for it must be taken judicial notice of
the fact that during the recent years, specially so at the age of the plaintiff,
that it is no longer usual for a person of his age to claim that he was the one
who planted the bamboo trees on the bamboo land portion of the landholding in q
uestion."


Moreover, Exhibit 6-A which is the annual payment of lease made by private respo
ndent, listed merely in a piece of paper, as kept by the late Andres Evangelista
during his lifetime, clearly showed that the said payments corresponds only to
the yield of rice over the portion of riceland and not on the disputed bamboo la
nd. Again, no mention was made about the yield of the bamboo land as to how much
per year was the harvest. Absent the essential elements of consent and sharing
between the parties no tenancy relationship can exist between them. Acts contemp
oraneous and subsequent to the execution of the contract show that the parties i
ntended to establish a tenancy relationship only as regards the riceplanted port
ion of the property.




Petitioner has been paying rentals in palay, not in bamboo. Annex "1" of respond
ent's position paper submitted to the Provincial Adjudicator, which is a handwri
tten list ("Listahan ng Ani [of petitioner]") made by respondent's fatherpredece
ssor-in-interest, shows under the column "Bigay" that petitioner was from 1981 u
p to 1994 paying annual rentals ranging from "28" to "33," which figures are con
sistent with the earlier-quoted stipulation in the contract for petitioner to pa
y rental of 33 cavans of palay per annum. The evidence proffered by respondent o
n the other hand abundantly shows that the bambooland portion of the property ha
s always been untenanted, which evidence has not been controverted by petitioner
. In fine, the contract, as well as the acts of both petitioner and respondent c
ontemporaneous and subsequent to the execution thereof, shows that the parties e
stablished a tenancy relationship only with respect to the riceland portion of t
he property. MTC;
AGRARIAN DISPUTE, OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF REQUISITES OF AGRICULTURAL TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP
Valeriano Cano vs. Spouses Vicente and Susan Jumawan G.R. No. 153860 (February 6
, 2006)
Facts:




Respondents Vicente Jumawan and Susan Jumawan, are owners of agricultural land w
ith an area of about 24,025 square meters at Barangay Malagos, Baguio District,
Davao City and registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
185776 of Davao City Registry of Deeds. On February 24, 1999, petitioner and re
spondents entered into a notarized document entitled "Agreement," whereunder, fo
r "humanitarian consideration," the spouses, designated in said document as "OWN
ERS," allowed petitioner, therein referred to as "BUILDER," to construct a house
of light materials in an area of about twenty (20) square meters at the eastern
portion of their property. Good for a term of two (2) years starting March 1, 1
997 and terminating on March 1, 1999. Following the expiration of the aforementi
oned "Agreement," respondents demanded the petitioner to vacate the area occupie
d by him and to pay a rent of not less than P300.00 a month until he shall have
vacated the same. Petitioner refused. After conciliation proceedings before the
local barangay lupon proved futile, respondents filed against petitioner a compl
aint for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Da
vao City on September 20, 1999. On July 26, 2000, MCTC rendered judgment in favo
r of respondents.



An appeal to RTC, a decision was rendered reversing the appealed judgment for la
ck of jurisdiction saying that MCTC should have dismissed the case and allowed t
he DAR to resolve the agrarian case. CA reversed and set aside that of the RTC a
nd reinstated the judgment of MCTC. With the CA's denial of his motion for recon
sideration in its Resolution of June 6, 2002, petitioner is now with this Court
via the present recourse on the lone issue of his own formulation.
Issue:

Whether or not the instant case involves agrarian dispute which falls outside th
e jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court?
Held:



The basic rule is that the material averments in the complaint determine the jur
isdiction of a court. And jurisprudence dictates that a court does not lose its
jurisdiction over an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of a party raising a
s a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the evid
ence, precisely to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after
hearing, tenancy is shown to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisd
iction. Here, the allegation in respondent's complaint before the MCTC clearly m
ake out a case for unlawful detainer. Petitioner was allowed to construct his ho
use/shanty on a portion of respondents' property without paying rental therefore
but merely for "humanitarian consideration", pursuant to a notarized agreement
which explicitly imposes on the petitioner the obligation to remorse his constru
ction thereon and vacate the premises upon the expiration of said agreement. The
agreement had undoubtedly expired but despite respondent' demand to vacate, pet
itioner refused. To the MCTC, the agreement which petitioner admitted having sig
ned clearly negates the claim of tenancy relationship between the petitioner and
the respondents. For sure, the very pieces of evidence submitted by the parties
before the MCTC, consisting of annexes to their respective positive papers, ind
ubitably belie petitioner's claim of being a tenant of respondents. Case law tea
ches that the essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultura
l land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) th
ere is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these req
uisites must concur for a tenancy relationship to exist. The absence of one does
not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter
thereon, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as de jure te
nant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor covered by the land reform pr
ogram of the government under existing tenancy laws.

TENANCY; ITS ESSENTIAL REQUISITES

Hilaria Ramos vda. de Brigino vs. Dominador Ramos and Filomena Ramos G.R. No. 13
0260 (February 6, 2006)
Facts:



On 10 July 1992, petitioner and her spouse filed a petition for Annulment and/or
Cancellation of Agricultural Leasehold Contract against herein respondents Domi
nador Ramos and Filomena Ramos before the Provincial Adjudicator of Malolos, Bul
acan. Petitioner and her spouse alleged that they are the registered owners of t
he subject landholding with an area of 11,451 square meters located at Malibong
Bata, Pandi, Bulacan. The petition further stated that petitioner is the sister
of respondent Dominador Ramos while respondent Filomena Ramos is the surviving s
pouse of another brother named Pedro Ramos. The petition likewise averred that i
n the early months of 1991, petitioner and her spouse discovered that respondent
Dominador and Pedro Ramos were able to register with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) two documents both entitled, "Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan" dated 29 J
une 1973, without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner and her spouse as
the signature of petitioner in those documents were forged. Hence, petitioner an
d her spouse prayed that said documents be declared void and the subject land as
untenanted. On 31 August 1993, after attempts to amicably solve the dispute fai
led, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator ruled for respondents. Despite the Nationa
l Bureau of Investigation (NBI) finding that the signatures of petitioner in the
"Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan" were forgeries, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjud
icators (PARAD) opined that the forgery does not suffice to render said document
s null and void inasmuch as petitioner and her spouse are estopped from denying
the existence of said documents in view of the fact that petitioner's spouse had
issued rental receipts to respondents, which receipts strongly prove that they
are occupying the subject land in the concept of tenants and that implied tenanc
y was, accordingly, perfectly established. The PARAD further disposed that such
being the case, security of tenure must be accorded respondents in tune with Sec
tion 7 of Republic Act No. 3844. Petitioner and her spouse appealed the PARAD's
Decision with the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 1968 which affirmed in toto the decisi
on of the PARAD. Petitioner and her spouse elevated the matter to the Court of A
ppeals, which on 25 January 1996, affirmed the ruling of the DARAB.
Issue:


Whether or not the respondents are bonafide tenants of the subject landholding?
Held:

Republic Act No. 1199, also known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philipp
ines, defines "agricultural tenancy" as: [T]he physical possession by a person o
f land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for
the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of
his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to sh
are the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either in produce or
in money, or in both.

The essential requisites of tenancy relationship based on the foregoing definiti
on, as cited in cases of recent vintage, are: 1) that the parties are the landow
ner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the rel
ationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties
to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about a
gricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the la
ndowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.


In the present case, there is no dispute as to the presence of the foregoing ele
ments, but the conflict lies in the elements ofconsent and sharing. To prove suc
h sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented. In fin
e, there exists substantial evidence on record to boost the findings of the Boar
ds and the Court of Appeals that petitioner and her husband consented to respond
ents' cultivation of the land in the concept of tenants and that the element of
"sharing" is present, as shown by the receipts for the period of 1991-1992. Inde
ed, tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged t
enant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. Here, all the essenti
al requisites of tenancy relationship are obtaining.
EXEMPTION; EFFECT; FAILURE TO OBSERVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE FOR THE APPLICATI
ON FOR EXEMPTION
Nicanor T. Santos Development Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary, Department of Agra
rian Reform, DAR Adjudication Board & Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (Andrea F
. Dalmacio), Tuba,

Benguet G.R. No. 159654 (February 28, 2006)

Facts:






The case at bar involves a petition for mandamus filed by petitioner against res
pondent officials of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Petitioner is a do
mestic corporation which owns a large tract of land known as the Santos Farm sit
uated in Tabaan Valley, Tuba, Benguet. Santos Farm with an area of 103.8 hectare
s and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19305 in the name of
petitioner. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Tuba, Benguet infor
med petitioner through its counsel that a portion measuring 14 hectares of the S
antos Farm would be placed under the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian refo
rm program (CARP) for acquisition and distribution to prospective beneficiaries.
Petitioner sent letter to BLAD requesting exemption of the Santos Farm from CAR
P coverage. The latter endorsed the matter to DAR Regional Director for investig
ation and report. Petitioner also sent a letter to the DAR Secretary reiterating
its position that the Santos Farm should be excluded from the CARP coverage. Th
ereafter, respondent MARO Andrea F. Dalmacio sent petitioner a Notice of Coverag
e and Field Investigation Report, to confirm that the Santos Farm had been place
d under the CARP. Petitioner sent a letter to MARO Dalmacio expressing its posit
ion that the Santos Farm should be exempt from CARP coverage. Petitioner also wr
ote the DAR Secretary insisting that the Santos Farm is exempted from the covera
ge of the CARP. DAR Regional Director Wilfredo B. Leano advised petitioner to pu
rsue the exemption of the Santos Farm in accordance with the mandates of DAR Adm
inistrative Order (A.O.) No. 09, series of 1994 and DAR A.O. No. 06, series of 2
000. Instead, petitioner filed a Protest with the DAR arguing that the Santos Fa
rm is exempted from the CARP coverage. Petitioner also filed a Complaint before
the DARAB importuning the Board to rule on the protest. The DARAB ruled that it
had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue on petitioner's exemption. Thus, the DA
RAB referred the Complaint to the DAR Regional Director. In a Memorandum, Provin
cial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Deogracias F. Almora dismissed the Complaint
for being time-barred and for failure to observe proper formalities. Hence, the
petitioner instituted a Petition for Mandamus with the Court of Appeals to comp
el the DAR, DARAB, and MARO to act on its petition for exemption of the Santos F
arm from the CARP coverage. The Court of Appeals rendered Decision dismissing th
e petition for lack of merit and for being the improper remedy denying the petit
ioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioner has complied with the administrative procedure for
the application for exemption? Whether or not the petition for mandamus filed b
y petitioner with the Court of Appeals is proper in view of the appellate court'
s conclusion that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies?
Held:




The records of the case, however, do not indicate that petitioner complied with
the administrative procedure for the application for exemption. Under Administra
tive Order No. 13, series of 1990, the application must be initiated before the
MARO by submitting ownership documents and other muniments of title and other ev
idence to support the application. The endorsement letters from the DAR Secretar
y and the BLAD Director only indicate that petitioner's application for exemptio
n was channeled to the wrong offices. Hence, the application was referred to the
DAR Regional Director. The records do not show, however, that after the endorse
ment letters came out, petitioner pursued its application with the proper DAR of
fice. Besides, the endorsement to the appropriate DAR office did not relieve pet
itioner of its duty to initiate the proper formal application for exemption. As
a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the
courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative
redress. In the instant case, it is beyond dispute that petitioner failed to res
ort to proper administrative recourse in resisting the Notice of Coverage issued
by respondent MARO. Unsuccessful in its attempt to oppose the Notice of Coverag
e when it lodged its protest with the incorrect administrative offices, petition
er resorted to a judicial remedy. The petition for mandamus, which it filed, how
ever, was correctly denied by the Court of Appeals. Truly, a petition for mandam
us is premature if there are administrative remedies available to petitioner. It
is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, o
f a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It is essential to the issu
ance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to th
e thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform
the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. The writ will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his d
uty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by
law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command
to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. Suf
fice it to say that a petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy to assail t
he Notice of Coverage. The administrative rules of the DAR also provide for the
appellate procedure to contest decisions and issuances of the MARO. The

mandatory recourse to the administrative appeals process before any judicial rem
edy is invoked likewise falls within the ambit of the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. EJECTMENT; LANDOWNER RETAIN ITS RIGHT TO EJECT UNLAWFU
L POSSESSORS OF HIS LAND INSPITE OF THE ISSUANCE OF NOTICE OF COVERAGE OVER HIS
LAND POTENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARY MAY BE EJECTED BY LANDOWNER OVER HIS
PROPERTY
Sps. Jesus and Evangeline Pasco vs. Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Cor
poration G.R. No. 165501 (March 28, 2006)
Facts:



The case at bar involved an action for unlawful detainer filed by respondent her
ein against petitioner spouses Jesus and Evangeline Pasco. Respondent, Pison-Arc
eo Agricultural and Development Corporation, is the registered owner of a parcel
of land containing more than 100 hectares. Constructed on respondent's parcel o
f land are houses which are occupied by its workers. Petitioners, among other wo
rkers, used to work for respondent until 1987. They having ceased to be employed
by respondent, petitioners were asked to vacate the house they were occupying b
ut they refused, hence, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer again
st them before the MTCC in Talisay City. Petitioners claimed that, inter alia, t
hey built the house occupied by them at their own expense and their stay on the
land was upon the tolerance of respondent. However, the MTCC of Talisay rendered
judgment in favor of respondent upon the findings that respondent provided hous
ing facilities to every worker in its hacienda without a requiring payment of re
ntals, however, with an implied promise that the same be vacated upon their cess
ation from work. . . . After the promulgation of the MTCC decision, the Municipa
l Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Talisay City sent a Notice of Coverage and Fi
eld Investigation (Notice of Coverage) advising respondent that its parcel of la
nd is now covered under Republic Act 6657. The petitioners appealed the MTCC dec
ision in the Unlawful Detainer Case to the RTC, contending that respondent's hac
ienda is covered by the CARL and they are qualified beneficiaries thereunder tha
t the MTCC has no jurisdiction yet to order their ejectment. The RTC of Bacolod
City affirmed the decision of MTCC Talisay, with modification. Petitioners moved
to reconsider the RTC decision, contending that the MTCC had no jurisdiction ov
er the complaint for unlawful detainer in view of the agrarian dispute between t
hem and respondent; and by Order


petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, they elevated the cas
e to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, the MARO of Talisay City issued a Ce
rtification that herein petitioner Jesus Pasco is registered as potential Compre
hensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) beneficiary in the land owned by responde
nt. On appeal, the Court of Appeal finds that the only issue in ejectment cases
is the physical possession of the premises, independent of any claim of ownershi
p by the parties, and this must be so because the issue of ownership cannot be d
efinitely decided in an ejectment case. Considering that the petitioners were in
possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew
that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time.
Issues:



Whether or not one who has been identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) as potential agrarian reform beneficiary may be ejected from the land wher
e he is identified as such, by the landowner, who has already been notified by t
he DAR of the coverage of his land by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
of the government? Whether or not the issuance of Notice of Coverage to responde
nt during the pendency of the ejectment case will automatically considered as an
agrarian dispute? Whether or not the issuance of Notice of Coverage to responde
nt will prevents its right to eject unlawful possessors of his land?
Held:


In the case at bar, we find that the theory of petitioner before the MTCC is dif
ferent from that proffered before the RTC. Thus, before the MTCC, they claimed t
hat the house they are occupying was built at their own expense. Before the RTC,
they raised for the first time that, they being qualified beneficiaries of the
CARP. And, for the first time too, they assailed the MTCC's lack of jurisdiction
over the action due to prematurity, they contending that respondent's right to
eject them would accrue only after they are reimbursed of their expenses in the
repair of the house. As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory
upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be permitt
ed to change theory on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will no
t be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first t
ime at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule.
The aforecited rule is not without exception, however. The issuance during the p
endency of the case of a Notice of Coverage to respondent does not, however, aut
omatically make the




ejectment case an agrarian dispute over which the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction. The issuance of a Notice of Coverag
e is merely a preliminary step for the State's acquisition of the land for agrar
ian reform purposes and it does not automatically vest title or transfer the own
ership of the land to the government. The purpose of a Notice of Coverage is exp
lained by this Court. The Notice of Coverage shall also invite the landowner to
attend the field investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from notice. T
he field investigation is for the purpose of identifying the landholding and det
ermining its suitability for agriculture and its productivity. . . . The date of
the field investigation shall also be sent by the DAR Municipal Office to repre
sentatives of the L[and] B[ank] [of the] P[hilippines], BARC, DENR and prospecti
ve farmer beneficiaries. The field investigation shall be conducted on the date
set with the participation of the landowner and the various representatives. . .
. Should there be a variance between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as to
whether the land be placed under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to agri
culture, the degree or development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be res
olved by a composite team of the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly condu
ct further investigation. Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL a
re not confined to the Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law.
They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A.O. No. 12, Se
ries of 1989 and subsequently amended in DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR
A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the l
andowner that his property shall be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to
exercise his retention right; it also notifies him, pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9,
Series of 1990, that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and represent
atives of the concerned sectors of society may attend to discuss the results of
the field investigation, the land valuation and other pertinent matters. Under D
AR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage also informs the landowner
that a field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted where he and t
he other representatives may be present. As for the registration of petitioners
as potential CARP beneficiaries, the same does not help their cause. As "potenti
al" CARP beneficiaries, they are included in the list of those who may be awarde
d land under the CARP. Nothing in the records of the case shows that the DAR has
made an award in favor of petitioners, hence, no rights over the land they occu
py can be considered to have vested in their favor in accordance with Section 24
of the CARL which reads: Section 24. Award to Beneficiaries.
The rights and respo
nsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an awa
rd of the land to him, which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty
(180) days from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. Ownership
of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award,
which shall contain the restrictions and conditions provided for in this Act, an
d shall be

recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and annotated on the Certificate of

Title. JURISDICTION; LAND CLASSIFICATION TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; REQUISITES
Nolito D. Solmayor, et al. vs. Antonio L. Arroyo G.R. No. 153817 (March 31, 2006
)
Facts:





The case at bar involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of th
e Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President reversing the Order of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which dismissed herein respondent's appeal f
rom the order of the Regional Director of DAR Region XI dismissing the petition
filed by Antonio Arroyo for the cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (C
LTs) issued to herein petitioners. Respondent Arroyo received a letter from the
legal officer of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) informing him th
at his land with an aggregate area of 9.8038 hectares situated at Matina, Davao
City, was the subject of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree
No. 27. Likewise, he was advised that he could apply for the conversion of the
land to residential or other urban purposes in accordance with applicable laws.
Team Leader I of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform notified respondent that based
on the parcellary map sketching conducted by the Agrarian Reform and the Bureau
of Lands, the subject property was covered by the OLT program since the area the
reof, which was tenanted at that time, was more than seven hectares. Based on an
Indorsement issued by the City Zoning and Development Officer it certifies that
the property is "partly zonified as Residential Class 'A' and 'B,' Commercial a
nd Open Space . . . as per existing Zoning Ordinance of Davao City," respondent
applied for the conversion of the land to residential subdivision. Series of con
ferences were conducted between petitioners and respondent by DAR local official
s for relocation and disturbance compensation, however, no final agreement was r
eached. Later, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued CLTs in favor of peti
tioners. Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of said CLTs on the gr
ound that the subject land was, and still is, residential property and thus, bey
ond the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27. Furthermore, respondent denies t
he existence of a tenancy relationship between him and petitioners. Respondent,
through his attorney-in-fact, made a Voluntary Offer to Sell his entire landhold
ing, including the subject property, to the government in accordance with




the provisions of Republic Act 6657. As a consequence thereof, the Regional Dire
ctor of DAR Region XI issued an Order dismissing respondent's petition for cance
llation of CLTs. Respondent appealed said Order to the Office of the Secretary o
f Agrarian Reform praying that it be set aside and that the CLTs be cancelled. M
eanwhile, DAR issued Emancipation Patents to petitioners as the identified farme
r-beneficiaries on the land. Thereafter, in an Order, DAR Secretary Ernesto Gari
lao issued an order dismissing respondent's appeal and upheld the validity of th
e Emancipation Patents awarded to petitioners which states that this Office so h
olds that the landholding in question are agricultural as of October 21, 1972 de
spite the fact that the same have been declared for tax purposes as residential.
The Memorandum dated May 17, 1993 which contains the investigation report of th
e DAR personnel who conducted the ocular inspection and investigation explicitly
shows that when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect the actual use of the la
nd is agricultural. This fact is further buttressed when petitioner, in his lett
er dated August 8, 1988 manifested his desire to voluntarily offer to sell the p
roperties in question to the Department of Agrarian Reform, declaring that the s
ubject landholdings are productive and suitable to agricultural production. Resp
ondent's Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied in an Order promptin
g respondent to file an appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of
the President reversed the order of the DAR Secretary and declared the 9.8 hect
ares outside the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27, which states that exemp
tion from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn c
rops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is dev
oted to rice or corn crops. That it is essential to determine whether or not ten
ancy relationship exists between Mr. Arroyo and the appellees. Aggrieved by the
decision of the Office of the President, petitioners filed a Petition for Review
before the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the Office of the President erred
in finding that the subject landholding has been classified as nonagricultural
prior to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 27 and not primarily devoted
to rice or corn crops, and that the farmer-beneficiaries are not tenants of res
pondent. Thereafter, the appellate court denied petitioners' appeal and affirmed
the decision of the Office of the President. Hence, this petitioner seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of appeal.
Issue:

Whether or not respondent property is an agricultural land devoted primarily to
rice and/or corn? Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship between petitio
ner and respondent?
Held:



In contrast, respondent offers for consideration several documents to bolster it
s position that subject land is residential, namely: 1) copies of the Declaratio
n of Real Property (tax declaration) filed by respondent as early as 1968 indica
ting therein that the subject property is residential; 2) a Certification dated
3 July 1979 by the Bureau of Soils stating that the land is suitable for urban u
se and for housing projects; 3) a copy of the Preliminary Approval and Locationa
l Clearance granted by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission dated 12 Janu
ary 1982 indicating therein that the land is primarily coco land and residential
and suitable for the proposed residential subdivision; 4) a Certification from
the Office of the Zoning Administrator of Davao City dated 10 December 1981 to t
he effect that the property per Zonification Ordinance of Davao City is within a
Residential Zone Class "B"; 5) a Zoning Certification issued by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) dated 4 March 1991 certifying that the land i
s within the Residential/Commercial Zones under zoning ordinance of Davao City a
dopted through a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution and ratified by the HLURB, through
Board Resolution No. 39-4, s. of 1980, dated 31 July 1980; 6) a Certification f
rom the Office of the City Planning and Development Coordinator, Office of the Z
oning Administrator, dated 26 March 1991 to the effect that the subject land was
classified as Major Commercial Zone (C-2) and High Density Residential Zone (R2) in the City Ordinance No. 363, s. of 1982, or better known as Expanded Zoning
Ordinance of Davao City; 7) a Certification from the Office of the City Plannin
g and Development Coordinator of Davao City dated 16 February 1996 that per Offi
cial Zoning Map of the City of Davao adopted under Resolution No. 711, Ordinance
No. 281, Series of 1972, the subject property is within two zones classificatio
n namely: Commercial Zone and Residential Zone Class B; and 8) the Report of the
DAR Provincial Task Force on Illegal Conversion dated 2 June 2000, ruling out a
ny act of illegal conversion as the subject land is classified as commercial and
residential zones. Although this Court will not disregard the evidence presente
d by petitioners that the land is devoted to rice and corn crops in 1993, when t
he ocular inspection by the DAR personnel was conducted, it must be noted that a
round the time of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 up to 1978, when the
subject property was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, the
available evidence issued and certified by the different government agencies, cl
oser in time to the mentioned time frame will show that respondent's property ha
s, indeed, been classified as within the residential and commercial zones of Dav
ao City. It cannot escape the notice of this Court that more than a decade befor
e the issuance of the said ocular investigation report stating that the land is
devoted to agricultural production, government agencies equipped with the techni
cal expertise to determine the proper classification of the subject land have al
ready determined that the land is part of the residential and commercial zones o
f Davao City making it suitable for other urban use. Therefore, it is only reaso
nable to conclude, based on the certification of various executive agencies issu
ed when this controversy



arose, that at the time of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27, respondent
's property was not agricultural. . . . As to the issue of whether or not there
exists a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondents, we sustain th
e findings of both the Court of Appeals and the Office of the President that pet
itioners are not de jure tenants of respondent. The essential requisites of a te
nancy relationship which must all concur in order to create a tenancy relationsh
ip between parties, to wit: The parties are the landowner and the tenant; The su
bject is agricultural land; There is consent; The purpose is agricultural produc
tion; There is personal cultivation; and There is sharing of harvests. The absen
ce of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof
, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of t
enure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under exist
ing tenancy laws. The subject land not being agricultural, the requirements for
the creation of a tenancy relationship is thus lacking. Moreover, the Court has
had the occasion to state that the key factor in ascertaining whether or not the
re is a landowner-tenant relationship in this case is the nature of the disputed
property. Accordingly, having earlier concluded that the subject landholding is
not agricultural, we must conclude that petitioners are not de jure tenants of
respondent and are, therefore, not entitled to the benefits of Presidential Decr
ee No. 27.
JURISDICTION; DARAB'S JURISDICTION ON JOINT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT; A TYPE OF JOIN
T ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE; AGRARIAN DISPUTE; DEFINITION
Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Lapanda
y Agricultural and Development Corporation G.R. No. 159089 (May 3, 2006)
Facts:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to re
verse the June 30, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 65
498.





On March 8, 1993, a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreem
ent for petitioner (Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperati
ve, Inc.) with respondent (Lapanday Agricultural and Development Croporation). O
n April 2, 1996, petitioner, represented by its alleged chairman, Manuel K. Asta
, filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity, Mandamus, Damages,
with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondent, the alleged . . . off
icers of petitioner who entered into the agreement, and the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office of Davao (hereinafter PARO), represented by Saturnino D. Sibbaluca
. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended complaint with leave of court allegin
g that the persons, who executed the contract were not authorized by it. Respond
ent's filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) has primary, exclusive, and original jurisdiction; th
at petitioner failed to comply with the compulsory mediation and conciliation pr
oceedings at the barangay level; and for the unauthorized institution of the com
plaint in behalf of petitioner. Respondent also averred that petitioner was enga
ged in forum shopping because it also filed a petition before the DAR praying fo
r the disapproval of the Joint Production Agreement. The PARO also filed a motio
n to dismiss on May 16, 1996. On August 21, 1996, respondent then filed a case a
t the DARAB for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, Injunction with Restra
ining Order, Damages and Attorney's Fees. On February 25, 1997, the DARAB decide
d the case in favor of respondent declaring the Joint Production Agreement as va
lid and binding and ordering petitioner to account for the proceeds of the produ
ce and to comply with the terms of the contract. The RTC then issued its decisio
n on October 18, 1999.
Issue:



Whether or not . . . the . . . Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the d
ismissal of the case at bench by RTC of Tagum City on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of the suit. Whether or not . .
. the . . . Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that the Joint Production Agr
eement' is valid instead of declaring it as null and void ab initio, its provisi
ons, terms and condition, cause and purposes being violative of the express mand
atory provision of R.A. 6657. Whether or not . . . the . . . Court of Appeals gr
avely erred in holding that the 'Joint Production Agreement' is a leasehold cont
ract and therefore valid. Whether or not . . . the . . . Court of Appeals gravel
y erred in interpreting and applying the prevailing doctrines and jurisprudence
delineating the jurisdiction between the regular court and DARAB on the matter o
f agricultural land and tenancy relationship.

Held:







Section 50 of Republic Act 6657 and Section 17 of Executive Order 229 vests in t
he DAR the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to d
etermine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian ref
orm. Through Executive Order 129-A, the President of the Philippines created the
DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and functions of the DAR pertainin
g to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. The subject matter of the presen
t controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In question a
re the rights and obligations of two juridical persons engaged in the management
, cultivation and use of agricultural land acquired through the Comprehensive Ag
rarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. To prove tenancy or an agricultu
ral leasehold agreement, it is normally necessary to establish the following ele
ments: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2
) the subject matter of the relationship is a piece of agricultural land; 3) the
re is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the rel
ationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultiv
ation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is sh
ared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In the present
case, the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. Petitioner i
s thus correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not one
of tenancy or agricultural leasehold. Nevertheless, we believe that the present
controversy still falls within the sphere of agrarian disputes. An agrarian disp
ute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements
whether leasehold
, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise
over lands devoted to agriculture. Such disput
es include those concerning farm workers' associations or representations of per
sons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms o
r conditions of such tenurial arrangements. Also included is any controversy rel
ating to the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to fa
rm workers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries
whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee. The assailed Joint Production Agreement is a type
of joint economic enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or ar
rangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land ben
eficiaries and investors to implement agribusiness enterprises in agrarian refor
m areas. Jurisdiction over the present controversy lies with the DARAB. As the R
TC had correctly dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it wa
s superfluous for the trial court and the Court of Appeals for that matter to ha
ve ruled further on the issue of the validity of the agreement.

JUST COMPENSATION; CANNOT BE PRESUMED, EXPROPRIATION OF LANDHOLDING COVERED BY R

.A. NO. 6657 TAKE PLACE, NOT ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE ACT ON JUNE 15, 1988 BUT
ON THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION JURISDICTION; RTC AS SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS
DISTINGUISHED FROM AGRARIAN ADJUDICATORS; DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. DARAB, ARB Associations of
, Cavite, Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite
toco, Sr., Maria R. Tantoco, Zosimo Tantoco, Margarita
Tantoco vs The DAR Region IV Director G.R. No. 149621
Facts:

San Francisco, Gen. Trias

Heirs of Francisco R. Tan
R. Tantoco, and Pacita R.
(May 5, 2006)

The case involves an action for cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-1424 and the reinst
atement of TCT No. T-402203 with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction f
iled by petitioners before the DARAB Region IV on November 11, 1994. Subject lan
d was offered by Petitioner for sale under the VOS scheme for 5M/hectare, title
was cancelled and TCT CLOA 1424 was issued by the ROD in favor of ARBA. DARAB Re
gion IV rendered a decision declaring the subject property as covered under the
CARP without prejudice to the exercise of petitioners of their respective right
of retention upon proper application; voiding and annulling TCT CLOA 1424; direc
ting ROD of Cavite to effect the cancellation of TCT No. CLOA 1424 and reinstate
ment of TCT No. T-402203 in the joint names of Petitoners/Co-owners subject to i
ts eventual coverage under CARP; and directing the MARO to re-screen ARBs and ge
nerate individual CLOAs. Both petitioners and respondent ARBA separately appeale
d to the DARAB in Quezon City. Said appeal was consolidated. In resolving the co
ntroversy, DARAB condensed the issue posed by respective parties by addressing t
he question: Can a Collective Certificate of Land Ownership Award validly issued
pursuant to a Voluntary Offer to Sell scheme acquisition of the Comprehensive A
grarian Reform Program (CARP) be cancelled on the petition of the former owner o
n the mere suspicion that some of the names listed therein are not really qualif
ied farmerbeneficiaries? DARAB rendered its Decision modifying the appealed deci
sion of the Regional Adjudicator by approving the validity and efficacy of TCT-C
LOA No. 1424.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsiderat

ion was denied by DARAB for lack of merit. On appeal to Court of Appeals. Petiti
oners appeal dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners moved for the reconsiderat
ion but was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issues: 1. Whether or not the CLOA that had been
issued by DAR to ARBA may be cancelled on the following grounds:


The land in question is exempt from the coverage of CARP by reason of its inclus
ion in the industrial zone of CALABARZON; The DAR failed to conform strictly to
the procedure for the acquisition of private agricultural lands laid down in RA
6657, hence, violating due process and consequently denying petitioners just com
pensation; and ARBA and all its members have not paid the amortizations for the
landholdings awarded to them as required under RA 6657 and DAR Administrative Or
der No. 6, Series of 1993.
2. Whether or not DAR's failure to comply with the requisites prescribed by law
in the acquisition proceeding gives the courts the power to nullify the CLOA iss
ued to ARBA? Held:




The Court accords respect to the findings of the Regional Adjudicator who has th
e primary jurisdiction and competence to establish the agricultural character of
the land in question which is properly within the coverage of CARP. It was not
reclassified nor converted from agricultural to non-agricultural use with the ap
proval of the HLURB prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Refor
m Law (CARL) on June 15, 1988. The DAR officials or its employees failed to comp
ly strictly with the guidelines and operating procedures provided by law in acqu
iring the property subject to CARP. Firstly, there were certain inconsistencies
in the manner of selection by the DAR of the CARP beneficiaries who are members
of ARBA. Secondly, the TCT No. CLOA-1424 was directly issued by the DAR in the n
ame of ARBA without: (a) payment of just compensation; and, (b) initial transfer
of title to the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, in contrav
ention to Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657. In the implementation of the CARP, the
Special Agrarian Courts which are the Regional Trial Courts, are given original
and exclusive jurisdiction over two



categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just com
pensation to landowners; and, (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
R.A. No. 6657. What agrarian adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determ
ine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landow
ners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the question. The failu
re of the DAR to comply with the requisites prescribed by law in the acquisition
proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA that had bee
n issued to ARBA. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative pro
cess, which has yet to run its regular course. DAR must be given a chance to cor
rect its administrative and procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. Th
e resolution of this case by the DAR is to the best advantage of petitioners sin
ce it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administra
tive agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter and vested with pri
mary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform controversies. Fur
ther, the proceedings therein are summary and the department is not bound by tec
hnical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes
and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive act
ion or proceeding.
JURISDICTION; NULLIFICATION OF CLOA; DARAB'S JURISDICTION CANNOT BE DEEMED TO DI
SAPPEAR THE MOMENT A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS ISSUED; BENEFICIARIES; LANDOWNERS A
RE WITHOUT PERSONALITY TO QUESTION THE SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES
Rodolfo Hermoso, et al. vs. C.L. Realty Corporation G.R. No. 140319 (May 05, 200
6)
Facts:


The case involves a petition filed by C.L. Realty filed with the DARAB-Region II
I office a petition, docketed as DARAB Case No. 092-B-93, praying for the cancel
lation of petitioners' CLOAs on the ground of irregular, premature and anomalous
issuance. C.L. Realty alleged, that the CLOA recipients do not meet the basic f
armer-beneficiary qualification requirement and are not under the order of prior
ity defined in Section 22 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. Respondent C.L. Realt
y Corp. is the registered owner of land with an area of 46.1476 has. located at
Brgy. Alas-asin, Mariveles, Bataan covered by TCT No. T60221. On 28 August 1991,
respondent received Notice of Acquisition of the said parcel of land followed b
y a Notice of Valuation which the property in question was valued at 273,559.00
from the DAR Region III. Respondent challenged the valuation.






Respondent requested then DAR Region III Director Antonio Nuesa that the issuanc
e of the CLOAs covering the property in question be held in abeyance. Without re
questing for the lifting of the land coverage, respondent applied for conversion
. Unknown to respondent, CLOAs were already issued to petitioners and correspond
ing certificates of title were thus issued. From then on, petitioners entered in
to possession of said land and planted crops thereon. PARAD rendered decision or
dering the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to petitioners finding that undue ha
ste attended the processing and issuance of the questioned CLOAs, and that they
were not qualified as farmer beneficiaries under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657. On
appeal to DARAB proper, the assailed PARAD decision was reversed and set aside
and upheld the efficacy of the CLOAs predicating its disposition on the premise
that respondent failed to substantiate its allegations respecting the lack of qu
alification of petitioners as farmer beneficiaries, and had not overturned the p
resumption that official duty had been duly performed. Following the denial of i
ts motion for reconsideration, C.L. Realty went to the Court of Appeals (CA) by
way of petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43795. Court of A
ppeals set aside the DARAB proper decision and reinstated the ruling of the PARA
D. Aggrieved, petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues:


Whether or not the DARAB provincial adjudicator has jurisdiction to nullify the
CLOAs issued to petitioners, given that the corresponding TCTs have been issued
over the lands covered? Whether or not the petition filed by C.L. Realty before
the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator should have been dismissed for non-join
der of indispensable parties? Whether or not the CA failed to take into account
facts and circumstances supportive of herein petitioners' cause, and, on the oth
er hand, accorded undue weight to the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator?
Held:

Petition is granted. The DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and
its regional and provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functi
ons and jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to agrarian dispute or controvers
y and the implementation of agrarian reform laws. In Nuesa vs. Court of Appeals,
the Court, citing the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, stated that the
DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to determine and adjudic
ate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involv
ing the implementation of all the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program [CARP]





under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 638
9, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulati
ons." The Court made a similar pronouncement on the jurisdiction of DARAB in Bau
tista vs. Mag-isa vda. de Villa. Under Section 1 (f) of the DARAB Rules of Proce
dure, such jurisdiction of the DARAB includes cases involving "the issuance, cor
rection and cancellation of (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are reg
istered with the Land Registration Authority." Surely, such jurisdiction cannot
be deemed to disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued. For, such ce
rtificates are not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of such tra
nsfer. Needless to state, there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLO
A on which it was grounded is void. The petitioners are in no position to questi
on the jurisdiction of the DAR and its adjudicative arm at this late junction of
the proceedings. They are already estopped at this stage to challenge the compe
tency of the DARAB and its provincial adjudicator to have taken cognizance of th
e case. This disposition becomes all the more pressing considering the petitione
rs' active participation in the proceedings below, and their having been the rec
ipients of a favorable decision dated August 21, 1996 of the DARAB Proper. Decis
ional law frowns upon a jurisdictional challenge cast against such a milieu. Pet
itioners' thesis, under the second ground, that the DAR officials who processed
and approved the applications for issuance of CLOAs and the Register of Deeds ar
e indispensable parties cannot be given cogency. Surely, a final determination o
f the petition for cancellation of CLOAs could be had even without joining in su
ch petition any of the officials adverted to. And as a matter of long and recogn
ized practice, a public respondent need only to be impleaded in certiorari proce
edings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but even then, the adjudicating judg
e, officer or tribunal would only be considered a nominal party. In petitions fo
r review on certiorari as a mode of ordinary appeal under either Rule 43 or 45,
only the private parties to the case are to be impleaded. The foregoing notwiths
tanding, the Court still rules for petitioners due to compelling reasons ostensi
bly overlooked by the appellate court. Respondent's standing to question the qua
lification of the petitioners as CARP beneficiaries. As the DARAB Proper aptly o
bserved: It is the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) or the Provincial Ag
rarian Reform Officer (PARO) together with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committe
e (BARC) who screen and select the possible agrarian beneficiaries. The landowne
r, however, does not have the right to select who the beneficiaries should be. H
ence, other farmers who were not selected and claimed they have a priority over
those who have been identified as such can file a written protest with the MARO
or the PARO who is currently processing the claim folder. Section 22 of the CARP
law provides merely for an order of priority in the distribution of the land to
beneficiaries. In the case at bar, there appears to be no applicants other than
the petitioners.

EXEMPTION DECLARED
FROM CARP AS
COVERAGE OF A LANDHOLDING A SECURITY ZONE
Department of Agrarian Reform rep. by Secretary Hernani A. Braganza vs. Philippi
ne Communications Satellite Corp. G.R. No. 152640 (June 15, 2006)
Facts:




The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is seeking the nullification of the Deci
sion and Resolution, dated November 23, 2001 and March 7, 2002, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435, entitled "Philippine Communicatio
ns Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) v. DAR." The controversy involves a parcel
of land owned by respondent PHILCOMSAT situated within the area which had been
declared a security zone under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended b
y P.D. No. 1848, entitled "Declaring the Area within a Radius of Three Kilometer
s surrounding the Satellite Earth Station in Baras, Rizal, a Security Zone," whi
ch is subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government.
Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense promulgated the Revised
Rules and Regulations to Implement P.D. No. 1845 dated 30 April 1982, as amende
d, Declaring the Philippine Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. In view of this,
the metes and bounds of PHILCOMSAT's satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal, we
re delineated. In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitione
r DAR informing the former that the land in question shall be placed under CARP'
s compulsory acquisition scheme. On January 28, 1994, PHILCOMSAT wrote to DAR se
eking an exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage, insisting that th
e land will be utilized for the expansion of its operations. Respondent's applic
ation for exemption from CARP coverage was evaluated by DAR. During the pendency
of the application, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, in a letter dated Ma
rch 21, 1994, suggested that respondent enter into a usufructuary agreement with
the occupants of the subject property until such time that it will have to use
the property for its planned expansion. The occupants, however, refused to enter
into such an agreement. Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanay, Rizal, in it
s Resolution No. 65-94 that was endorsed to DAR, moved for the coverage of the 7
00-hectare PHILCOMSAT property within the security zone under CARP. The Provinci
al Agrarian Reform Officer of Teresa, Rizal further opined that subjecting the s
urrounding agricultural area within the security zone under CARP will not be det
rimental to the operations of PHILCOMSAT.


An Order was issued by then Secretary Garilao rejecting PHILCOMSAT's application
for exemption from CARP. Having been denied, PHILCOMSAT filed a Petition for Re
view with the Court of Appeals to which the appellate court granted. Consequentl
y, DAR moved for reconsideration but the same was denied hence this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a secu
rity zone under P.D. No. 1845m as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be subjected to
CARP.
Held:



P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was issued way before the effectivit
y of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The same was issued in 1982
pursuant to an exigency to create a security zone in the surrounding areas of PH
ILCOMSAT's satellite earth station in order to ensure its security and uninterru
pted operation considering the vital role of the earth station in the country's
telecommunications and national development. P.D. No. 1848, amending P.D. No. 18
45, subjected the security zone to the authority of the Ministry of National Def
ense, consequently conferring on the Minister of National Defense the power and
authority to determine who can occupy the areas within the security zone, and ho
w the lands shall be utilized. The area, however, should be exempt from CARP cov
erage by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared
the area to be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Nation
al Defense. It is evident from the very wording of the law that the government r
ecognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSAT's operations to national security, ther
eby necessitating the protection of its operations from unnecessary and even ant
icipated disruption. Thus, every statute is understood, by implication, to conta
in all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose,
or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants
, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Ref
orm Law or R.A. No. 6657, as amended, provides that lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt
from the coverage of the Act. The determination as to whether or not the subjec
t property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense usua
lly entails a finding of fact which this Court will not normally delve into cons
idering that, subject to certain exceptions, in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called upon to review only errors of
law. Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot ser
iously be denied that the act of securing a

vital communication facilities is an act of national defense. Hence, the law, by

segregating an area for purposes of a security zone for such facilities, in eff
ect devoted that area to national defense. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MUST BE SO
UGHT BEFORE SEEKING RELIEF FOR CERTIORARI
Inocencio Alimboboyog vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Paz Noble-Noblefranca G.R. N
o. 163655 (June 16, 2006)
Facts:




This case involves a Petition for Certiorari for the decision of the Court of Ap
peals dated June 7, 2004, Inocencio Alimboboyog (Alimboboyog) assailing the Deci
sion of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 73861 dated March 12, 2004 as it
was allegedly rendered without jurisdiction, there having been no prior valid s
ervice of pleadings and court orders upon him. Private respondent Paz Noble-Nobl
efranca (Noblefranca) instituted an action before the Department of Agrarian Ref
orm Adjudication Board (DARAB) Office of the Provincial Adjudicator against Alim
boboyog for collection of rentals and ejectment with damages. The complaint was
later amended to reflect the correct technical description of the property. Nobl
efranca prayed therein that Alimboboyog be directed to pay back rentals represen
ting her share as landowner amounting to 156 cavans of palay or its money equiva
lent covering the period from 1988-1995. Alimboboyog filed an answer claiming th
at he was no longer obliged to remit the landowner's share because he had alread
y acquired the property by operation of law through the issuance of a Certificat
e of Land Transfer (CLT) in the name of his father, Domingo Alimboboyog. The Pro
vincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, ordering respond
ent to vacate the landholding, turn over its peaceful possession to Noblefranca,
and pay the latter back rentals consisting of 156 cavans of palay or its moneta
ry equivalent. Alimboboyog's Notice of Appeal was denied due course in an Order
dated April 7, 1997 for having been filed out of time. Subsequently, a writ of e
xecution was implemented and Noblefranca was placed in possession of the land. F
our (4) years later or on January 10, 2001, the DARAB Central Office reversed th
e decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. The resolution disposed of Noblefranca
's motion for reconsideration, despite the fact that Alimboboyog's Notice of App
eal was filed beyond the reglementary period, it opted to relax the application
of the rules and admit the appeal in order to achieve agrarian justice. This was
questioned on a

petition for review with the Court of Appeals. This decision is now the subject
of the instant case. Issue:

Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari was proper.
Held:



It is not proper. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari
will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate reme
dy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of respondent. In this case, t
he plain and adequate remedy was a motion for reconsideration of the assailed De
cision and the resolution thereof, which was not only expected to be but would a
ctually have provided an adequate and more speedy remedy than the present petiti
on for certiorari. The filing of a motion for reconsideration would have afforde
d the Court of Appeals the opportunity to correct the errors attributed to it an
d allowed Alimboboyog to ventilate his side. His failure to file such motion dep
rived the appellate court of its right and opportunity to review and purge its d
ecision of any oversight. In view of the fact that Alimboboyog failed to take ad
vantage of the procedural remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration without
any concrete, compelling and valid explanation, we cannot allow him to now seek
relief by certiorari. As a final note, we add that although the merits of the ca
se are not in issue in this petition, the same having been filed solely to quest
ion Noblefranca's failure to serve a copy of the petition which she filed with t
he Court of Appeals on Alimboboyog's counsel, we nonetheless reviewed the substa
ntive conclusions reached by the appellate court and found them to be in accord
with the facts of the case, law and pertinent jurisprudence.
AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; JURISDICTION; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP NOT EXTINGUISHED BY C
HANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY A CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES
Sps. Proceso Amurao and Minerva Amurao vs. Sps. Jacinto Villalobos and Herminigi
lda Villalobos G.R. No. 157491 (June 20, 2006)
Facts:





Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas which they bought
from a certain Ruperto Endozo, the landlord of herein respondents. The parties
then entered into a contract "Kasulatan Tungkol sa Lupang Pagtatayuan ng Bahay"
(KASULATAN) before the barangay officials wherein respondents promised to surren
der the possession of the land to the petitioners should the latter need it for
personal use and in turn the petitioner will give 1,000 square meters upon surre
nder thereof. However, the respondents refused to vacate when it was finally dem
anded. The matter was then brought to the Barangay but no compromise was reached
. A complaint for ejectment was then filed with the MTC. In turn, respondents fi
led an answer with motion to hear special and affirmative defenses claiming that
they were already occupying and working on the same as agricultural tenants pri
or to petitioners acquisition. The controversy being an agrarian dispute must be
lodged with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and no
t the court which has jurisdiction over the case. The Municipal Circuit Trial Co
urt (MCTC) of Batangas disposed of the case, ruling that it has jurisdiction ove
r the case because respondents spouses Jacinto Villalobos and Herminigilda cease
d to be agricultural tenants after they executed the "Kasulatan Tungkol sa Lupan
g Pagtatayuan ng Bahay" ("Kasunduan" or "Kasulatan") where they expressly waived
their status as tenants after having been given one thousand (1000) square mete
rs of the land in question. It explained that the Kasulatan is the law between t
he parties. Via a Notice of Appeal, respondents appealed the Decision to the Reg
ional Trial Court (RTC), where it rendered a Decision modifying the ruling of th
e MTC. The RTC ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case and that respondents
are bonafide tenants in petitioners' land. It explained that the MCTC anchored
its decision on the assumption that respondents were already occupying the 1,000
square meters of land embodied in the Kasulatan. It found that it was unclear w
hether the terms and conditions contained in the Kasulatan have been observed an
d complied with by petitioners because there was no documentary evidence showing
that the 1,000 square meters of land have been transferred to the respondents.
It upheld the MCTC's finding that theKasulatan is the law between the parties, a
nd to be binding, the parties should comply with its terms and conditions. Thus,
for the Kasulatan's enforcement, it found it necessary that petitioners execute
a document transferring full and absolute ownership over the 1,000 square meter
s of land to the respondents. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petition
ers but was denied. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals by w
ay of Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Th
e Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues:



Whether or not the court a quo erred in ruling that the judgment of
l Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court are null and void having
d without jurisdiction? Whether or not there is an agrarian dispute
nt case? Whether or not tenancy relationship has been terminated by
N.

the Municipa
been rendere
in the insta
the KASULATA

Held:

In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera, this Court held that: Indeed, Section 21
of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving the dispossession
of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and dispos
ition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant shall be
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations
.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship of lan
dlord and tenant
at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often t
imes arises, precisely from the previous termination of such relationship. If th
e same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subjectma
tter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, o
r if the dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord and ten
ant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations . .
. .



We rule that there is. As defined under Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," an agrarian dispute
refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in ne
gotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditio
ns of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compen
sation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transf
er of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm o
perator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers t
o any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agricul
ture. The instant case undeniably involves a controversy involving tenurial arra
ngements because the Kasulatan will definitely modify, nay, terminate the same.
Even assuming that the tenancy relationship between the parties had ceased due t
o theKasulutan, there still exists an agrarian dispute because the action involv
es an incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. There being an
agrarian dispute, the action is properly within the jurisdiction of the DAR, th
rough the DARAB.

JUST COMPENSATION; COURT

JURISDICTION
OF
SPECIAL
AGRARIAN
Ernestina L. Crisologo-Jose vs. Land Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 167399 (Ju
ne 22, 2006)
Facts:




Petitioner is the owner of 34.6960 hectares of land which used to form part of a
larger expanse situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by Transfer Certif
icate of Title (TCT) No. NT-147218 of the land records of North Nueva Ecija. She
is also the owner of several parcels of land situated in the same municipality
with a total area of 27.09 hectares and covered by twelve (12) separate titles,
i.e., TCT Nos. 155604 -09, 155611, 155615, 245112-15. According to the petitione
r, respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) gave these landholdings
whi
ch she inherited from her uncle, Alejandro T. Lim
a measly valuation of P9,000.00
per hectare. Excepting from the valuation purportedly thus given, petitioner fil
ed on September 25, 1997, a PETITION for determination of just compensation resp
ecting her landholdings aforementioned. In said petition, docketed as AGR. CASE
No. 962G of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, petitioner prayed t
hat "the sum of P100,000.00 at least per hectare, or the total sum of P6,178,600
.00 be fixed as just compensation of the total area of 61.7860 hectares," it bei
ng her allegation that her computation hewed with the guidelines established und
er the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and other related statutes. On Septembe
r 8, 1999, the trial court, after due proceedings, rendered judgment fixing the
fair market value of the 61.7860 hectares of the land in question at P100,000.00
per hectare. But beyond value determination, the trial court ordered the respon
dent to pay petitioner the total sum of P6,178,600.00, subject to the usual rule
s and regulation regarding payment. Following the denial of its motion for recon
sideration, respondent Land Bank went on appeal to the CA whereat its recourse w
as docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69463. Eventually, the CA, in a decision dated Oct
ober 15, 2004, reversed that of the trial court. In time, petitioner moved for r
econsideration but the CA denied her motion in its equally assailed resolution o
f January 24, 2005. Hence, petitioner's present recourse on both procedural and
substantive grounds.
Issue:


Whether or not the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court is cor
rect in rendering judgment fixing the just compensation of the subject landholdi
ngs?
Held:



Just compensation, under the premises, presupposes the expropriation or taking o
f agricultural lands for eventual distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
In the case at bench, respondent has averred and the CA has peremptorily determ
ined that the tracts of land for which petitioner is claiming just compensation
have not actually been acquired by the government. With respect to the parcels o
f land with a total area of 27.09 hectares and covered by TCT Nos. 155604, 15560
5, 155606, 155607, 155608, 155609, 155611 155615, 245112, 245113, 245114 and 245
115, the appellate court found that the claim folders therefor have not been for
warded to the respondent bank for processing and eventual payment of the transfe
r claims. This reality could only mean, so the CA correctly concludes, that the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has not yet expropriated the parcels in ques
tion for agrarian reform purposes. In other words, ownership or at least control
over the 27.09 hectares has not passed from the registered owner to the expropr
iator. Petitioner could have had proven
but had not
the fact of actual or symbolic c
ompulsory taking by presenting evidence to that effect, such as the required Not
ice of Valuationwhich usually follows the Notice of Coverage, the letter of invi
tation to a preliminary conference and the Notice of Acquisitionthat DAR sends,
pursuant to DAR administrative issuances, to the landowner affected. Just like t
he matter of the 27.09 hectares of land immediately referred to above, petitione
r has not discharged her burden of proving the acquisition by the DAR of the oth
er 34.6960 hectares of land once covered by TCT No. NT-147218. But even if perha
ps she wanted to, she could not have possibly done so, that portion being either
a school site, a creek or residential area,ergo unsuitable for agricultural act
ivities and, hence, outside the scope of the agrarian reform program, be it unde
r the CARL law or the more exacting P.D. No. 27. It must be stressed, at this ju
ncture, that respondent had all along i.e., in its basic answer, its CA appeal bri
ef and finally in its Memorandum filed with the Court
stuck to its position that t
he 27.09-hectare area was never taken over by the DAR; and that no claim for com
pensation therefor was ever processed, as is usual in agrarian compulsory acquis
ition scheme, under the summary administrative proceedings prescribed by governi
ng DAR circulars. Yet, the petitioner never attempted to prove the contrary. Sig
nificantly, save for determining the fair market value of the landholdings in qu
estion, no reference is also made in the decision of the trial court regarding t
he actual expropriation of the specific parcels of land subject of this case, al
beit, quite strangely, it ordered payment of the value of the property in questi
on.

EJECTMENT; DISPOSSESSION UNDER RA 3844; FAILURE TO PAY AMORTIZATION NOT A GROUND

FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP
Cynthia V. Omadle and Angelito Alisen vs. Spouses Wilfredo and Rogelia B. Casuno
G.R. No. 143362 (June 27, 2006)
Facts:




Cynthia V. Omadle, petitioner, is the daughter of the late Francisco Villa owner
of the lot 406, Pls-98 Ext., in Kalatugay, Base Camp, Maramag, Bukidnon. Angeli
to Alisen, another petitioner, is Cynthia's farm worker. Spouses Wilfredo and Ro
gelia B. Casuno, respondents, were once tenants of Francisco Villa who were cult
ivating a portion of said lot which was later on awarded to them by the DAR and
an Emancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title was issued. It turned o
ut that respondents mortgaged the property. Cynthia then redeemed the land and c
aused their eviction. Consequently, respondents filed with the Office of the Reg
ional Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Cag
ayan de Oro City, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership (with pra
yer for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) against petition
ers. Petitioner Cynthia Omadle admitted that respondents were her father's tenan
ts. However, the DAR declared the area exempt from the coverage of the land refo
rm program, being within the retention limits. She claimed that respondents paid
their amortization only once. They mortgaged the lot to several persons in viol
ation of the terms of the Certificate of Land Transfer. Moreover, their cause of
action has prescribed because they filed their complaint only after four years
from their eviction. In a Decision dated August 24, 1992, the DARAB Regional Adj
udicator dismissed the complaint. On appeal by respondents, the DARAB Central Of
fice reversed the Decision, holding that petitioners and her siblings waived the
ir right to retain seven (7) hectares, allowed under Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 27, and being grantees of the Emancipation Patent, respondents could no long
er be evicted. Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for r
eview. In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DARAB judgmen
t. Hence this instant petition.
Issues:



Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that respondents are owne
rs of the subject land considering that they failed to pay the Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank) the required amortizations. Whether or not petitioners'
cause of action was barred by prescription pursuant to Section 38 of R.A. 3844.
Whether or not respondents are disqualified for violating the terms and conditio
ns of their land title by not cultivating the area?
Held:



On petitioners' contention that respondents failed to pay the Land Bank the requ
ired amortizations, SC agrees with the Court of Appeals that at the time the pat
ent and title were issued to respondents, petitioner Cynthia Omadle had already
been paid her just compensation. And granting that she has not yet been compensa
ted, her proper recourse is against the Land Bank, not against respondents. As t
o petitioners' claim that respondents' cause of action has prescribed, let it be
stressed that since respondents have been issued Emancipation Patent No. A04246
3 and TCT No. ET-5184 as early as December 18, 1987, they can no longer be consi
dered tenants or lessees, but owners of the subject landholding. Obviously, Sect
ion 38 of R.A. No. 3844 on prescription finds no application to their case. An e
mancipation patent, while it presupposes that the grantee thereof shall have alr
eady complied with all the requirements prescribed under P.D. No. 27, serves as
a basis for the issuance of a TCT. It is the issuance of this emancipation paten
t that conclusively entitles the farmer/grantee of the rights of absolute owners
hip. In Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, SC held: It is the emancipation patent which const
itutes conclusive authority or the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transf
er, or a Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee . . . . Clear
ly, it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitles a farme
r/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolut
e ownership in the landholding
a right which has become fixed and established and
is no longer open to doubt or controversy.
EJECTMENT DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP, ONCE ESTABL
ISHED, ENTITLES THE TENANT TO A SECURITY OF TENURE
Purificacion Perez-Rosario, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Adjudication Board
of Agrarian Reform, Mercedes Resultay,

Basilio Cayabyab, Federico Baniqued, And Miguel Resultay (deceased) Substituted

by his heir, Arturo Resultay G.R. No. 140796 (June 30, 2006)
Facts:




The petition originated from an action for ejectment filed with the DARAB princi
pally on the grounds of non-payment of lease rentals and sub-leasing without the
knowledge and consent of the owners of a parcel of agricultural land, consistin
g of 2.2277 hectares, more or less, devoted to rice and mango production, locate
d at Barangay Obong, Basista, Pangasinan and registered in the name of Nicolasa
Tamondong vda. de Perez, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, under Trans
fer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31822. Respondents appealed to the DARAB. O
n June 10, 1994, the DARAB promulgated its decision, declaring Miguel and Merced
es Resultay to be agricultural tenants on the land they till and to fix the leas
e rental on the land in accordance with pertinent agrarian laws, rules and regul
ations. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA, the CA rendered the
assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the DARAB ruling. Petitioners moved to
reconsider, but the CA denied the motion through its Resolution dated November
8, 1999, a copy of which was received by the petitioners on November 15, 1999. T
wenty-two days later, or on December 7, 1999, petitioners filed the instant Peti
tion for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issues:


Whether respondent Miguel and her wife Mercedes Resultay, is entitled to remain
as agricultural lessee of the land in question with respondent Federico Baniqued
as their hired farm worker? Whether respondent Basilio Cayabyab is entitled to
remain as an agricultural lessee on the one-half hectare riceland portion of the
landholding in question?
Held:

While it is conceded in all quarters that respondent Baniqued is a hired farm wo
rker, from this fact alone, it cannot be inferred that respondent Mercedes Resul
tay is not actually performing her obligations as an agricultural tenant or, sta
ted otherwise, that she did not cultivate the land in person or through other me
mbers of the immediate household. Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, and coupled with the fact that the petitioners are the complainants the
mselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful




cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee rests upon them, since they ar
e the agricultural lessors. This proceeds from the principle that a tenancy rela
tionship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure. She can
only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law. S
ection 36 of the same law enumerates the grounds for dispossession of the tenant
's landholding. In the recent past, the Court has held that the employment of fa
rm laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence
of an agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that an agricultural lessee
does not leave the entireprocess of cultivation in the hands of hired helpers.
Indeed, while the law explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his immedi
ate family to work on the land, this Court nevertheless has declared that the hi
ring of farm laborers by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency bas
is does not negate the existence of the element of "personal cultivation" essent
ial in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship. As correctly noted by t
he DARAB, it appears that the juridical relationship of the parties is still gov
erned by agricultural share tenancy. The relationship should be converted into a
leasehold. Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 3844 provide for the automatic conversi
on of share tenancy to agricultural leasehold. The lease rental should be determ
ined in accordance with Section 12 of R.A. No. 6657 in relation to Section 34 of
R.A. No. 3844, as amended, and existing rules and regulations. The instant peti
tion is DENIED.
RETENTION RIGHT
Heirs of Juan Grio, Sr. represented by Remedios C. Grio vs. Department of Agrarian R
eform G.R. No. 165073 (June 30, 2006)
Facts:


Grios 9.35 hectares land in Brgy. Gua-an, Leganes, Iloilo was placed under the cov
erage of P.D. No. 27 on account of which Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) co
vering a portion thereof were issued in favor of his tenants. Grio later filed in
the early 80's a letter-petition for the cancellation of the above-said CLTs, co
ntending that they were issued to the tenants without giving him an opportunity
to be heard, the area being a little over 6 hectares. In lieu of the land covere
d by the CLTs, Grio offered seven hectares for each of the tenants from his 50-hec
tare land in Brgy. Tad-y, Sara, Iloilo (which is mortgaged to the DBP). Grio, howe
ver, later ordered to the DBP his 50-hectare land via dacion en pago to settle h
is obligation to it. On July 10, 1985, Grio died. He was survived by his



wife and seven children. On June 22, 1988, his wife also passed away. On June 15
RA 6657 or the CARL took effect. DAR-RD Antonio S. Malaya dismissed the said pe
tition by Order of September 25, 1989, citing letter of instructions No. 474. Th
e LBP later advised Grio heirs, herein petitioners, by letter of June 6, 1996, of
the DAR's submission of Grios 9.35 hectare land transfer claim for payment under P
D 27, its approval on June 5, 1996, and the requirement for the parcels of the c
laim to be released. Petitioners later filed with the DAR Regional Office an app
lication for retention dated 14 March 1997 of the 9.35 hectare land. They likewi
se sought the exemption of the 9.35 hectare land for the coverage of either PD 2
7 or the CARL. Emancipation Patents were issued in favor of Grios 5 tenant on June
5 and 25, 1997. DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres subsequently dismisse
d petitioners application for retention, by Order dated April 27, 1998. Petition
ers moved to reconsider the April 27, 1998 Order of the DAR RD but it was denied
by Order of August 18, 1998. Petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary but it w
as denied by Order dated September 3, 2002 of then Secretary Hernani A. Braganza
. Petitioners elevated the case before the Court of Appeals via petition for rev
iew. The appellate court affirmed the September 3, 2002 Order of the DAR Secreta
ry. On challenge via petition for certiorari are the October 17, 2003 Decision a
nd the June 21, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 73368, "
Heirs of Juan Grio, Sr. represented by Remedios C. Grio v. Department of Agrarian Re
form."
Issue:

Whether the petitioners are entitled to right of retention?
Held:


Petitioners fault the appellate court for ignoring the "evidence" they discovere
d when they had the opportunity to examine the records forwarded by the DAR to t
he appellate court
"that Grio was misled into believing that [the] CLTs had been iss
ued, when there were none, or that the [September 25, 1989] Maraya Order denying
Grio's petition for cancellation of [the] CLTs was without legal effect
because the
(1) CLTs were inexistent, (2) he was dead by the time the Order was rendered, a
nd the property had long passed on to his heirs, and (3) the heirs were never no
tified of said order, and there is no showing that it was sent even to Juan Grio,
Sr.'s address of record either." As the appellate court ruled, however, petition
ers are guilty of laches in their attempt to "resurrect the retention issue [sev
en and a half] years after its denial was decreed and came to finality."




As the appellate court ruled too, the DAR cannot be faulted if no substitution o
f parties took place when Grio died, it being the duty of the heirs to attend to t
he estate of the deceased, which duty includes notification to adjudicating trib
unals the fact of death of the litigant. At all events, these issues raised by p
etitioners, which substantially reiterate those raised in their motion for recon
sideration before the appellate court, were as the appellate court observed, nev
er raised in the proceedings below nor in petitioners' petition for review befor
e said court. The petition is DISMISSED.
EMANCIPATION PATENTS; INDEFEASIBILITY OF TITLE
Samuel Estribillo, et al. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and Hacienda Maria,
Inc. G.R. No. 159674 (June 30, 2006)
Facts:


The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation P
atents (EPs) over parcels of land located atBarangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan
del Sur. The parcels of land, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerl
y part of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging ope
rations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with oth
er persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public
lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful
cultivation thereof. HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the P
hilippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issue
d OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area
of 527.8308 hectares. HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that
527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and oth
er occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under
said law. The RARAD rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs The
Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria Act
ion Team. Petitioners' TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RAR
AD Decision. After the DARAB denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the
latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review on Cert
iorari. The Court of Appeals denied the assailed Resolution:


The petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shoppi
ng was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without t
he corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners au
thorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Petitioners filed a "Motion for Recon
sideration with Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of Spec
ial Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Pe
titioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion. Petitioners now file this pr
esent Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that
the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their regi
stration.
Issues:

Whether there was compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil P
rocedure; the certification against forum shopping? Whether Certificates of Titl
e issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in
registration proceedings?
Held:



Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised C
ircular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certif
ication against forum shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and com
plaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, an
d other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avo
id a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to resolve t
he same issues. Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff or pri
ncipal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rul
e 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by
this Court when we held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog and Escorpizo v. University of
Baguio that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plain
tiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo
Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission. The Court of Ap
peals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that j
ustify the relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping a
re not present in the case at bar, without discussing the circumstances adduced
by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the s
ake of argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance
with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it should still be
determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the





suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification a
gainst forum shopping, such as those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.
Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, provides that certificates of title issued
in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issue
d in judicial proceedings: The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the
distribution of governmentacquired lands to the landless would arise if the poss
ession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because h
is certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence
of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuan
t thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act. After complying with the p
rocedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise k
nown as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the
corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who h
ave complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), the TCTs issued to petitioners pu
rsuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The cer
tificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration
of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the p
atent, . . . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter o
f a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person." The EPs them
selves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No
. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torr
ens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Cha
pter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, en
titled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration pro
ceedings.
DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION ON CASES OF CONVERSION
Melencio Berboso and Concepcion Berboso vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. N
os. 141593-94 (July 12, 2006)
Facts:


The case at bar is a petition for review of the Decision involving the confirmat
ion of the order of conversion and the determination of the amount of disturbanc
e compensation filed with the DARAB by Belen and Corazon Carlos. On 29 November
1973, herein private respondents Belen and Corazon Carlos, together with Manuel,
Alberto, Antonio and Rafaelito, all surnamed Carlos, filed with the Bureau of L
and Acquisition, Distribution and Development of the Department of Agrarian Refo
rm (DAR), a joint request for the conversion of their









parcel of land consisting of 48.2789 hectares of unirrigated riceland situated a
t Calvario, Iba, and Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and covered by TCTs No. 48182
and No. 48183 issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. On 22 Jan
uary 1975, DAR Secretary Conrado F. Estrella issued an Order declaring the said
parcels of land suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and other urban
purposes. Pursuant to the 22 January 1975 Order, respondents Carloses effected
the payment of the compensation due their agricultural tenants. However, petitio
ners Melencio and Concepcion Berboso, successors-in-interest of one of their ori
ginal tenants, Macario Berboso, refused to vacate their landholdings. On 1 Septe
mber 1989, private respondents Carloses filed with the DARAB Region III a Petiti
on for Confirmation of the Order of Conversion and for the Determination of the
Amount of Disturbance Compensation. Private respondents Carloses and Emiliano Be
rboso, brother of herein petitioners Berbosos and the named respondent in DARAB
Case No. 101-Bul '89, filed with the DARAB a Joint Motion to Determine the Amoun
t of Disturbance Compensation due to the respondent/tenant agreeing to abide wit
h the decision of the Board. On 16 October 1989, private respondent Corazon Carl
os executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property in favor of their co-respon
dent herein JKM which involves one parcel of land consisting of 20,186 square me
ters covered by TCT No. T-225598 on even date, private respondent Belen Carlos e
xecuted another Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property also in favor of JKM whic
h involves one parcel of land consisting of 20,110 square meters covered by TCT
No. T-58059. In its Decision dated 18 December 1989, the DARAB ordered private r
espondents Carloses to pay Emiliano Berboso the total amount of P112,644.00 equi
valent to five years disturbance compensation. On 15 January 1990, Emiliano Berb
oso filed with the DARAB a Motion to Set Aside the 18 December 1989 Decision of
the DARAB assailing therein the amount of disturbance compensation. He, together
with the other petitioners Berbosos, asserted that he is entitled to either the
thirty percent (30%) physical portion of the lot, or the equivalent value there
of in cash, as disturbance compensation. He further asserted that petitioners Be
rbosos, being tenants of the subject land, should have been included also as par
ties in the Joint Motion filed in DARAB Case No. 101-Bul '89. On 5 March 1990, E
miliano Berboso filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review of the 18
December 1989 Decision of the DARAB docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 20147. Meanwhile,
on motion of private respondents Carloses, the DARAB issued a Writ of Possessio
n dated 13 September 1990 against Emiliano Berboso. On 26 December 1990, petitio
ners Berbosos filed an Action for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Damages, a
nd Injunction against private respondents Carloses before the DARAB, docketed as
DARAB Case No. 217-Bul '90, alleging therein that the enforcement of the said W
rit of Possession would unjustly deprive









them of possession of their land since the land being tilled and tenanted by the
ir brother Emiliano Berboso is separate and distinct from the land they are tena
nting from private respondents Carloses, and that they have their own tenanted a
reas of cultivation which are separate and distinct from that of their brother E
miliano Berboso. On 25 March 1992, petitioners Berbosos filed a Petition before
the DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. 368-Bul '92, seeking to exercise their rig
ht of redemption under Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. They similarly prayed
for the reversion of the subject land to its original agricultural use contendin
g that private respondent JKM had already started utilizing the said land by bul
ldozing it. Finally, they deposited with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicato
rs (RARAD) the amount of P1,000,000.00 as redemption money. DARAB Case No. 368-B
ul '92 was consolidated with DARAB Case No. 217-Bul '90. On 26 March 1992, the C
ourt of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20147, denying Emiliano Be
rboso's Petition for Review. On 9 December 1992, petitioners Berbosos filed befo
re the DAR Secretary a Petition for the Cancellation of the Conversion Order dat
ed 22 January 1975 of previous DAR Secretary Estrella. On 9 February 1993, the P
rovincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) rendered a Decision dismiss
ing the consolidated DARAB Cases No. 217-Bul '90 and No. 368-Bul '92. Petitioner
s Berbosos appealed the aforesaid Decision to the DARAB Head Office at Quezon Ci
ty, and on 5 January 1994, the DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order
granting the Motion for Cancellation of the Conversion Order dated 22 January 19
75. Private respondents Carloses moved for the reconsideration of the aforementi
oned Order of DAR Secretary Garilao but the same was denied. Aggrieved, they fil
ed an Appeal with the Office of the President which was docketed as O.P. Case No
. 5994. On 24 October 1994, petitioners Berbosos filed before the DARAB Head Off
ice, Quezon City, a Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Complaint for Redempti
on in DARAB Case No. 368-Bul '92, since there was no more need for resolution of
the said case in light of the Order of DAR Secretary Garilao dated 5 January 19
94 finding the subject lands to be still agricultural in use and tenanted by pet
itioners Berbosos. On 1 March 1996, the Office of the President rendered a Decis
ion reversing and setting aside the Order of DAR Secretary Garilao dated 5 Janua
ry 1994 and reinstating the Order of the former DAR Secretary Estrella dated 22
January 1975. On 25 June 1996, the DARAB Head Office, Quezon City, rendered a De
cision on DARAB Case No. 1283, dismissing the Appeal of petitioners Berbosos and
affirming the Decision of the DARAB Region III dated 18 December 1989.




On 21 August 1996, petitioners Berbosos filed before the Court of Appeals a Peti
tion for Review of the Decision dated 1 March 1996 of the Office of the Presiden
t in O.P. Case No. 5994. On 29 December 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a De
cision dismissing both Petitions for Review, and affirming the Decisions of the
Office of the President dated 1 March 1996 and the DARAB dated 25 June 1996. Pet
itioners Berbosos invoked Presidential Decree No. 27. They argued that, upon the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on 21 October 1972, they are automat
ically deemed owners of the land in question; that TCTs No. EP-150-M and No. EP149-M which cover the subject lands, were issued in their favor by the DAR; and
that said titles cannot be cancelled by the Court of Appeals in the absence of a
direct attack by private respondents Carloses and JKM.
Issues:


The Court of Appeals erred in invalidating the Transfer Certificates of Titles o
f the Petitioner Berbosos in the absence of direct attack. The Court of Appeals
erred in upholding the validity of the Conversion Order of DAR Secretary Estrell
a dated 22 January 1975. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the private r
espondent Carlosses have complied with the requirements for conversion of their
land under Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 3844. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that t
here was observance of due process in application and issuance of order of conve
rsion. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no violation of the s
ecurity of tenure of petitioner Berbosos as farmer-beneficiaries.
Held:


Petitioners Berbosos' arguments are without merit. As to the issue of whether or
not there was a direct attack on the validity of the TCTs No. EP-149-M and No.
EP-150-M of the petitioners Berbosos by private respondents Carloses and JKM thu
s allowing for the cancellation of said titles, we rule in the affirmative. In t
he case of Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, we had an occasion to discuss the issue of
direct attack on the validity of titles, to wit: A torrens title, as a rule, is
conclusive and indefeasible. Proceeding from this, P.D. No. 1529, Section 48, p
rovides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack an
d cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. When
is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or procee
ding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which
the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or

proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On

the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obta
in a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an inci
dent thereof.




It is well-settled that a judgment which had acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, thus, may no longer be modified in any respect except to cleri
cal errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved
and laid to rest. Since the lawfulness of the determination of the award of dis
turbance compensation was already settled in the 26 March 1992 Decision of the C
ourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20147, we hold that the legality and validity
of the 22 January 1975 Conversion Order is also settled because determination of
disturbance compensation necessarily follows the Conversion Order. Simply put,
there would be no determination of disturbance compensation without a Conversion
Order being first validly issued. Well-settled is the rule that findings of adm
inistrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined only to specific matters, is accorded not only respect but finality, p
articularly when affirmed by the appellate tribunal. Time and again, we ruled th
at what is repugnant to due process is the absolute lack of opportunity to be he
ard. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as appl
ied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of t
he action or ruling complained of. Due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controver
sy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling compl
ained of. Lastly, petitioners Berbosos also posited that their security of tenur
e as farmersbeneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 was violated. Accordi
ng to them, the 18 December 1989 DARAB Decision fixing the amount of disturbance
compensation is binding only with respect to Emiliano Berboso, and since they w
ere never made parties therein, their security of tenure cannot be affected.
TENANCY; ELEMENTS
Sps. Francisco G. Tuazon and Ruth A. Tuazon vs. Vicente G. Tuazon and John L. Tu
azon G.R. No. 168438 (August 28, 2006)
Facts:

Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73617 dated July 28, 2004 and April 26, 2005, respect
ively, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,






Branch 21, in Civil Case No. RTC 2000-0027. The trial court ruled that the case
involves tenancy over which it lacks jurisdiction. The appellate court found tha
t the issue is mere possession and remanded the case for further proceedings. Th
e instant case arose from a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages fil
ed by respondents Vicente G. Tuazon and John L. Tuazon against petitioner spouse
s Francisco G. Tuazon and Ruth A. Tuazon. Respondents alleged in their Complaint
that they are the absolute owners of a 2.3119-hectare of land located at Gotob,
San Agustin, Canaman, Camarines Sur covered by Original Certificate of Title No
. RP-298 (224241). They acquired the land by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale date
d June 14, 1985 from its original owner, the late Rosa G. Tuazon, who was Vicent
e's mother. They further alleged that after the sale, Francisco Tuazon (a brothe
r of Vicente) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, a com
plaint for Reconveyance of Property docketed as Civil Case No. RTC '922568 again
st Vicente on the ground that their mother Rosa ceded to him one hectare of the
subject property. Rosa allegedly gave Francisco the one hectare of land in excha
nge for the expenses which he and his wife incurred in redeeming the subject pro
perty from Atty. Ricardo Gonzales and in paying the disturbance compensation to
Federico Adriano, the former tenant of the subject property. They alleged that F
rancisco's complaint was dismissed on February 28, 1994 and the validity of the
Deed of Sale between Vicente and Rosa was upheld. The decision became final on M
arch 27, 1999. Respondents then averred that despite the finality of the decisio
n and their repeated demands to vacate the subject property, petitioners refused
to turn over its possession. Petitioners pleaded tenancy as a special and affir
mative defense. They alleged that in 1986, before respondents purchased the subj
ect property, Rosa instituted Ruth as legitimate tenant of the land. Ruth was in
stituted tenant after she redeemed the subject property from Atty. Ricardo Gonza
les with her own money and paid the disturbance compensation to the former tenan
ts of the subject parcel. The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing to rec
eive evidence on petitioners' defense of tenancy. During the hearing, Ruth prese
nted two certifications attesting that she is a tenant of the subject land. One
was issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Canaman, Camarines
Sur and the other by the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC). Alex Tuazon al
so testified that he regularly received twenty-five percent (25%) of the produce
of the land as landowner's share after his mother's death. The trial court then
ruled that the case involves an agrarian dispute which is under the jurisdictio
n of the DARAB. Thus, on October 24, 2001, it dismissed the case for lack of jur
isdiction over the subject matter. Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration was d
enied for lack of merit, hence, they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated July 28, 2004, the appellate court reversed the ruling of th
e trial court.


Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the appella
te court in its assailed Resolution dated April 26, 2005. The appellate Court de
nied the petition.
Issues:

Whether or not the lower court (RTC) has jurisdiction over the complaint filed b
y the respondents against the petitioners? Whether or not petitioner is not a du
ly instituted tenant on the subject land and that no tenancy relationship exists
between her and the respondent?
Held:



To determine whether a case involves a tenancy dispute, the following essential
requisites must be present: 1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2.
the subject matter is agricultural land; 3. there is consent between the parties
; 4. the purpose is agricultural production; 5. there is personal cultivation by
the tenant; and, 6. there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. Not a
ll of these requisites obtain in the case at bar. Petitioners' contention that t
heir previous claims of ownership over the subject property are immaterial and d
o not negate the tenancy relationship defies logic. Tenancy is established preci
sely when a landowner institutes a tenant to work on his property under the term
s and conditions of their tenurial arrangement. Petitioners cannot anomalously i
nsist to be both tenants and owners of the subject land. Even the documentary ev
idence on record
the respective certifications issued by the MARO and BARC officer
s do not constitute proof that petitioner Ruth is a tenant of the subject land. It
is settled that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Ag
rarian Reform or his authorized representative in a given locality concerning th
e presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties a
re merely preliminary or provisional, not binding upon the courts, and could be
overturned by a showing of evidence to the contrary. The appellate court correct
ly observed, viz.: . . . . In fact, we even entertain doubts about their compete
nce as evidence of tenancy status in the absence of further evidence that the MA
RO and BARC officers who made the certification investigated Ruth's status and s
aw for themselves or knew for a fact that Ruth personally cultivated the land an
d undertook the activities required from a tenant.

Petitioners also failed to prove that petitioner Ruth shared the produce of the
subject land with Rosa from 1987-1991. The certification of Alex that there is s
haring of harvest leaves much to be desired. Alex himself admitted during his

testimony that he was neither authorized by his mother, Rosa, nor by his co-heir
s, to act as administrator of the subject property. ABANDONMENT; LANDHOLDING? WH
EN IS THERE ABANDONMENT OF A
Jovendo del Castillo vs. Abundio Orciga, et al. G.R. No. 153850 (August 31, 2006
)
Facts:






This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner del Castillo see
king the nullification of the November 26, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66122, ordering him to vacate the subject landholding an
d directing the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to rest
ore possession of the farm lot to respondents. Petitioner Jovendo del Castillo i
s the son and administrator of Menardo del Castillo, who previously owned a 1.33
00-hectare riceland located at Omabo, Polpog, Bula, Camarines Sur. Eugenio Orcig
a was awarded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-070176 over the said landholdin
g on April 3, 1981. On August 1, 1988, Eugenio Orciga died. Prior to the final s
election and determination of the successor of the deceased tenant, on July 1, 1
991, the heirs agreed to rotate among themselves the cultivation of the riceland
covered by said CLT. After cultivating and harvesting the riceland from 1989 to
1991, Ronald Orciga abandoned the said farm on May 3, 1991 and left the town. O
n May 28, 1991, petitioner Del Castillo
a member of the CAFGU (Citizens Armed Forc
es Geographical Unit) forcibly entered the riceland of the late Eugenio Orciga. He
started to cultivate the said land over the objection of the respondents, effec
tively ejecting them from their possession and cultivation of the land. Responde
nts filed a Complaint on June 10, 1991, with the Office of Provincial Adjudicato
r, DARAB, Naga City. for Reinstatement with Mandatory Injunction and Damages. Pe
titiner (Del Castillo), in his Answer, averred that Orciga failed to give lessor
's share and was advised by DAR Para-legal Officer to take over the cultivation
of the land denying ejectment of respondents. He also claimed Orciga mortgaged p
ortions of the farm. PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. A Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by respondents, but the same was denied. Undaunted
, Del Castillo, on July 18, 2001, interposed a petition for review before the CA
, which was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 66122.



On petition for review, the appellate court concluded that petitioner Del Castil
lo had no right to take possession of the farmland being disputed even if the he
irs had failed to deliver the agricultural lessor's share. It held that when the
beneficiary abandons the tillage or refuses to gain rights accruing to the farm
er-beneficiary under the law, it will be reverted to the government and not to t
he farm lot owner. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:

Who should be entitled to possess the disputed landholding under the DAR Land Tr
ansfer Program
the petitioner, as representative of the former titled landowner, o
r the respondents, as successors of the deceased beneficiary?
Held:




The Court holds respondents to be the rightful possessors of the disputed farmla
nd and at the same time, rejects the instant petition. Undeniably, Eugenio Orcig
a, the original beneficiary and predecessor-in-interest of respondents, was awar
ded Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0070176 over the contested land pursuant to
PD No. 27. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, he is the acknowledged owne
r of the contested land. A Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) is a document issu
ed to a tenant-farmer, which proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land p
rimarily devoted to rice and corn production. It is issued in order for the tena
nt-farmer to acquire the land. This certificate prescribes the terms and conditi
ons of ownership over said land and likewise describes the landholding
its area an
d its location. A CLT is the provisional title of ownership over the landholding
while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of the land's value or for as long
as the beneficiary is an "amortizing owner." In the case at bar, the petitioner
has two options; first, to bring the dispute on the non-payment of the land to
the DAR and the Barangay Committee on Land Production that will subsequently res
olve said dispute pursuant to Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Memorandum Circu
lar No. 26, series of 1973 and other issuances; and, second, to negotiate with t
he DAR and LBP for payment of the compensation claim pursuant to Section 2 of EO
No. 228. Eventually, the scheme under EO No. 228 will result to the full paymen
t of the compensation of the value of the land to Menardo del Castillo, petition
er's father and former landowner. From the foregoing options, it is indubitably
clear that the reconveyance of the land to the former owner is not allowed. The
policy is to hold such lands under trust for the succeeding generations of farme
rs. The objective is to prevent repetition of cases where the lands distributed
to the tenant-farmers reverted to the former lot owners or even conveyed to land
speculators. Thus, possession of the land cannot be restored to petitioner del
Castillo although there was failure of the

heirs to pay the landowner's share or compensation. The transfer or conveyance o

f the riceland can only be made to an heir of the beneficiary or to any other be
neficiary who shall in turn cultivate the land. In the case in hand, even if Ron
ald Orciga has abandoned the land, the right to possess and cultivate the land l
egally belongs to the other heirs of Eugenio Orciga. Undoubtedly, petitioner Del
Castillo is not a beneficiary of Eugenio Orciga
the original beneficiary; hence,
petitioner has no legal right to the possession of the farmland. RIGHT OF REDEMP
TION; THE ISSUE ON REDEMPTION HAVING ATTAINED FINALITY, PETITIONER'S EFFORT TO M
ODIFY THE SAME IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA
Alejandro Moraga vs. Sps. Julian and Felicidad Somo, et al. G.R. No. 166781 (Sep
tember 5, 2006)
Facts:





The property in dispute is a parcel of agricultural land consisting of 1.7467 he
ctares which is located in Pandayan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, and covered under Tran
sfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5926 in the name of Victoriano Ipapo who d
ied on 6 June 1976. This property was tenanted by Alejandro Moraga, the deceased
father of petitioner Enrique Moraga. On 7 March 1973, Victoriano Ipapo sold the
landholding to his daughters Felicidad, Carmelita, and Herminigilda, and their
respective spouses, Julian Somo, Reynaldo Fernandez and Gil San Diego (responden
ts) for P10,000.00 per Bilihan Tuluyan of even date, with the knowledge and cons
ent of Alejandro Moraga as admitted in his affidavit. On 22 July 1981, a Certifi
cate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-042737 was issued in favor of Alejandro Moraga
for the same parcel of agricultural land and eventually, TCT No. EP-108 (m) was
issued in his favor. On 11 October 1993, respondents filed with the DARAB a com
plaint for Cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer and the Emancipation
Patent and for Ejectment against Enrique and Mercedes Moraga (Moragas), the sur
viving heirs of the late Alejandro Moraga who died on 25 August 1993. Mercedes M
oraga is the surviving spouse of the deceased Alejandro Moraga. The case was doc
keted as DARAB Case No. 567-Bul '93. Finding that the EP was issued not in accor
dance with Presidential Decree No. 27 and that the Moragas violated their obliga
tions as tenants of the subject landholding, the Provincial Adjudicator, in a de
cision dated 30 June 1994, rendered a judgment in favor of respondents. The Mora
gas filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit. The M
oragas then appealed to the Court of Appeals.









In the meantime, respondents filed an application for retention with the Departm
ent of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which was opposed by petitioner Enrique Moraga. In
an Order dated 22 February 1994, the Regional Director of DAR Region III granted
the application for retention by respondents. Petitioner appealed to the Secret
ary of Agrarian Reform who affirmed the decision of the Regional Director in an
Order dated 14 October 1994. Unfazed, petitioner appealed the ruling of the Secr
etary of Agrarian Reform to the Court of Appeals. Said appealed ruling of the Se
cretary of Agrarian Reform was consolidated by the Court of Appeals with the app
ealed decision of the DARAB in Case No. 567-Bul '93. The consolidated cases were
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP No. 38445. In a Decision dated 28 September 1995, th
e Court of Appeals dismissed the two appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38445, thus affir
ming the rulings of the DARAB and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The decision
became final and executory since no either motion for reconsideration nor appea
l from the same were ever filed by any party. While the CA-G.R. SP No. 38445 was
still pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner and Mercedes Moraga, on 6
April 1995, filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Malolos, Bulacan, a comp
laint for Redemption against respondents which was docketed as DARAB Case No. 92
7-Bul '95. In a Decision dated 23 November 1995, the Provincial Adjudicator, opi
ned that the case for redemption has been rendered moot and academic inasmuch as
respondents, by virtue of the said ruling of the Court of Appeals, had acquired
vested rights over the subject property. On appeal, the DARAB in Case No. 927-B
ul '95 affirmed with modification the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. Th
e DARAB, while sustaining the Provincial Adjudicator's ruling that the Moragas'
right to redeem has prescribed, stated that the heirs of Alejandro Moraga shall
remain as tenants and are entitled to security of tenure. The Moragas filed a mo
tion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision denying their claim for redem
ption. Respondents likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decis
ion insofar as it decreed that Alejandro Moraga's heirs shall "remain tenants en
titled to security of tenure." Both motions were denied by the DARAB. Hence, bot
h parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated 29 January 2003,
the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a judgment in CA-G.
R. SP No. 63895 affirming in toto the decision of the DARAB. Since no appeal was
filed by either party, this decision became final and executory. On the other h
and, the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, in resolving the sole issue in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70051 on whether or not the DARAB is correct in ordering that the
heirs of Alejandro Moraga remain as tenants in the subject landholding, ruled f
or the respondents. It ratiocinated that the DARAB committed palpable error in d
ecreeing that Alejandro Moraga's heir "shall remain as tenants


entitled to security of tenure" considering that the said ruling alters the alre
ady final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38445
, enunciating that the Moragas are not entitled to security of tenure for violat
ing their obligations as tenants. Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reco
nsideration of the above decision. The Court of Appeals did not budge from its s
tand and denied the motion in a Resolution dated 11 January 2005.
Issues:

Whether or not petitioner shall remain as tenant of the landholding entitled to
security of tenure? Whether or not the petitioner has a right of redemption over
the landholding subject of the instant case? Whether or not petitioner is entit
led to disturbance compensation?
Held:



Contrary to what petitioner believed, the said portion of the body of the decisi
on is merely an obiter dictum. In fact, the dispositive portion of the decision
categorically upholds the eviction of petitioner. If indeed, it was pronounced i
n the said decision that petitioner were to remain as tenant, then the dispositi
ve portion of the same would not have upheld petitioner's eviction. It should be
remembered that while the body of a decision, order or resolution might create
some ambiguity regarding which way the court's reasoning propenderates, it is th
e dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets
conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duti
es and obligations. Since CA-G.R. SP No. 38445 resolved the issue of security of
tenure and ordered petitioner's eviction, this Court can no longer entertain pe
titioner's attempt to relitigate the same on the ground of res judicata. In a ze
alous attempt to salvage his case for redemption, petitioner insisted that the l
ate Victoriano Ipapo failed to inform petitioner's deceased father in writing an
d the DAR of the sale of the land in question in violation of Section 12 of Repu
blic Act No. 6389, amending Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 3844. By rais
ing this issue, petitioner is trying to resuscitate the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63895, dated 29 January 2003, which has already attai
ned finality. It must be recalled that said decision declared that petitioner lo
st his right to redeem the property on the grounds of prescription and that peti
tioner's father has waived his right to redeem said property. Said issue on rede
mption having attained finality, petitioner's effort to modify the same is barre
d by res judicata. Anent petitioner's claim of disturbance compensation, suffice
it to state that since this matter is brought up for the first time in this Pet
ition for Review, this Court

cannot take cognizance of the same. The settled rule is that matters or issues n
ot raised below cannot be raised before this Court for the first time. CERTIORAR
I; PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65; 60 DAY PERIOD MUST BE OBSERV
ED
Land Bank of the Philippines, Represented by Margarito B. Teves, President and C
EO, Leticia Lourdes Camara, Department Head-Landowners Compensation Department I
I, and Romeo V. Cadanial, Acting LVD Head, AOC XI vs. The Honorable Bernardo V.
Saludanes, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, T
agum City, Diosdado Cajes, in capacity as Deputy Sheriff, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Tagum City, Soriano Fruits Corporation et al. G.R. No. 146581 (Decembe
r 13, 2006)
Facts:




Petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated November 22, 2
000 and January 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (Seventeenth Division) in CAG.R.
SP No. 59492. The instant case stemmed from twenty one (21) petitions for just
compensation filed on April 6, 1999 by several landowners with the Regional Tria
l Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. The Land Ban
k of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner, and the Department of Agrarian Re
form (DAR) were impleaded as respondents. The petitions involve several tracts o
f land forming part of a banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companie
s, one of herein respondents. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Prog
ram (CARP), the landowners offered to sell these parcels of land to the governme
nt. The Special Agrarian Court consolidated the cases and named a panel of Commi
ssioners to receive and evaluate evidence on the amount of compensation to be pa
id to the landowners. After trial, the Special Agrarian Court admitted and appro
ved the Appraisal Report of the Commissioners. On February 7, 2000, the said cou
rt rendered its joint Decision fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the jus
t compensation for the landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petit
ioners in all these above-captioned docketed agrarian cases. Petitioner LBP file
d a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court. The
LBP filed with the same court a Notice of Appeal. A few


days after. The DAR also filed its Notice of Appeal. Both notices of appeal was
denied by the SAC. The LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
but was denied. The joint Decision, having become final and executory, was ente
red in the Book of Entries of Judgment of the Special Agrarian Court. The LBP fi
led with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. In its Resolution the C
ourt of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed thirty-two (32) day
s beyond the sixty (60) day reglementary period prescribed by Section 4, Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for reconsideration but it was d
enied by the Appellate Court.
Issue:

Whether or not the untimely filing of the petition for certiorari be exempt from
the operation of Section 4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice and equity.
Held:

We deny the petition outright. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Pro
cedure, as amended, provides: SEC. 4. When and where petition filed.
The petition
may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order o
r resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed
or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
day period shall be counted notice of the denial of said motion. The petition sh
all be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the act or omission of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer, or person, in the Regional Tria
l Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supr
eme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same
is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction, if it involves the acts or omissions of a quasijudicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petiti
on shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension o
f time shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 1
5 days.

In Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, we held that the period of 60 days to file a pe
tition for certiorari is reasonable and sufficient. It provides for ample time f
or a party to mull over and prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discreti
on by a lower court, tribunal, board, or officer, It was specifically set to avo
id any

unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a

speedy disposition of their cases. Hence, the 60-day period must be considered n
on-extendible, except where a good and sufficient reason can be shown to warrant
an extension. COMMERCIAL FARM; DEFERMENT ORDER SERVES AS NOTICE OF COVERAGE AFT
ER THE EXPIRATION OF THE DEFERMENT PERIOD CONVERSION; REQUIREMENTS; DAR SHOULD R
EFER TO THE COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLANS AND THE ORDINANCES OF THE SANGGUNIAN IN
ASSESSING LAND USE CONVERSION APPLICATIONS
DAR, as represented by its Secretary, Rene C. Villa vs. Sarangani Agricultural C
o., Inc., Acil Corp, Nicasio Alcantara and Tomas Alcantara G.R. No. 165547 (Janu
ary 24, 2007)
Facts:




Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been reclassified
from agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal zoning or
dinance (MZO), and are included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Munici
pality of Alabel, approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani. A porti
on of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the CARL com
mercial farms deferment scheme. On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultur
al Company, Inc. (SACI) filed an application for land use conversion of various
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,005 hectares covering lot No. 1-C, 2
, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 2, 39, 53, 806 and 807. Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition
to the DAR Secretary opposing the application for land use conversion filed by
SACI. They alleged that its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rig
hts. Later, an "Urgent Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Applicatio
n of Banana Commercial Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI. The PLUTC, recommended
the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares planted with bananas and coconuts. The com
mittee noted that said portion of the property was still viable for agriculture,
irrigated, with Notice of Coverage, and under protest or with opposition from S
ARBAI. SACI contended among others that 1) the banana plantations will be transf
ormed into a socialized housing subdivision which will be made available to the
displaced workers and the other low income earners of Alabel; 2) at the time the
application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of Coverage was ever



issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly irregular b
ecause the same may be issued only after the final resolution of the application
for land use conversion; and 3) the previous Order of Deferment cannot be a leg
al barrier to the filing of an application for land use conversion. DAR Secretar
y denied SACI's application for land use conversion. The Office of the President
dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondent
s' motion for reconsideration was denied, elevated the case with the Court of Ap
peals on petition for review raising substantially the same issues. The Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition, the assailed Decision and Or
der of the Office of the President, as well as the Orders of the DAR Secretary w
ere reversed and set aside insofar as the DAR directs the MARO of Alabel, Sarang
ani to proceed with the distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of
the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage. The Secretary of the Department of Agraria
n Reform was directed to issue a conversion order covering the aforesaid area un
der the terms and conditions as provided in pertinent guidelines of the departme
nt. As to the rest of the area applied for conversion, action on which has been
deferred, the DAR Regional Office (DAR Region No. XI) is hereby DIRECTED to expe
dite the processing and evaluation of petitioners' land use conversion applicati
on in accordance with the provisions of DAR AO No. 7, Series of 1997, and DAR AO
No. 01-99 whenever the provisions of the latter issuance are made applicable to
those applications filed before its effectivity. It also enjoined the DAR Secre
tary and all officers and employees acting on his behalf from proceeding with th
e distribution of petitioners' lands under compulsory acquisition provided in Se
c. 16 of R.A. No. 6657. Actions already taken in pursuance of the June 16, 1998
Notice of Coverage under CARP are also nullified for DAR's failure to observe du
e process therein.
Issues:


Whether or not the notice of coverage was illegal for failure of the DAR to obse
rve due process? Whether or not DAR should use the Comprehensive Land Use Plans
and accompanying ordinance of the local sanggunian as primary reference so as no
t to defeat the very purpose of the Local Government Unit (LGU) concerned in rec
lassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic benefits in pursuance to
its mandate towards the general welfare? Whether or not DAR failed to take into
consideration the basic provisions and principles of law with special attention
to the requirements or preconditions for land classification/conversion and the
basic mandate of the CARP?
Held:







On due process issue, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement b
efore DAR can acquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by
a deferment period under the CARL or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June
15, 1998. The process of acquisition of commercial farms by DAR is specifically
provided under Article III, Section 9 of A.O. 9, that in VOS and CA, the Order o
f Deferment previously issued over the landholding shall serve, upon the expirat
ion of the deferment period of the subject commercial farm, as the Notice of Cov
erage. It is unnecessary for petitioner to issue a notice of coverage to respond
ents in order to place the properties in question under CARP coverage. Hence, th
e contention by respondents that due process was not duly observed by petitioner
must fail. Accordingly, the denial of the application for conversion must be up
held. On the second issue, DAR Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997, or th
e Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non
-agricultural Uses prescribes the guidelines for land use conversion. In connect
ion thereto, Sec 20 of R.A. 7160, [the Local Government Code of 1991], empowers
the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands. Memorandum Circular
No. 54 "Prescribing the Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 Otherw
ise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991 Authorizing Cities and Municipali
ties to Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into NonAgricultural Uses" issued by Presi
dent Fidel V. Ramos on June 8, 1993 specified the scope and limitations on the p
ower of the cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into othe
r uses. With regard to agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-ag
ricultural uses by the local government unit concerned, the CA is correct in dec
laring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land use plans and the ordinan
ces of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications. The convers
ion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly regulated
and may be allowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are
present. In this regard, the Court agrees with the ratiocination of the CA that
DAR's scope of authority in assessing land use conversion applications is limite
d to examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
regulations have been complied with. This holds true in the present case where,
because of the creation of the Province of Sarangani and in view of its thrust
to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is the Municipality of Al
abel, the local government has reclassified certain portions of its land area fr
om agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, to reiterate, in accordance with E.O.
No. 72, Series of 1993, and subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DAR s
hould utilize the comprehensive land use plans in evaluating the land use conver
sion application of respondents whose lands have already been reclassified by th
e local government for non-agricultural uses.




The creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification that was
effected by the Municipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the applica
ble provisions of R.A. No. 6657. Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the
reclassification of lands explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section shal
l be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions
of R.A. No. 6657." The petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as the issue on due pr
ocess is concerned. In connection with this, the denial by the Department of Agr
arian Reform (DAR) of respondents' application for conversion with regard to the
154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares, the deferment period of which has already expir
ed, is AFFIRMED; and the Orders of the DAR, directing the MARO of Alabel, Sarang
ani to proceed with the distribution of the banana and coconut areas subject of
the June 16, 1998 Notice of Coverage, are REINSTATED.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; PERSONAL CULTIVATION AS ESSENTIAL REQUISITE REDEMPTION RIG
HT; ONLY BONAFIDE TENANTS MAY AVAIL OF THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
Gerardo Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, Nigaderio Pangilinan, Tranquilino Cua and
Juliana Francisco Pajota G.R. No. 161959 (February 2, 2007)
Facts:



Juliana F. Pajota is the registered owner of an agricultural land situated at Ga
pan, Nueva Ecija. On August 28, 1993, Pajota appointed Tranquilino Cua as her at
torney-in-fact to negotiate with the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation fo
r the cancellation of a real estate mortgage on the land. On December 5, 1994, P
ajota leased the land to petitioner as evidenced by aKasunduan Buwisan sa Sakaha
n. On December 8, 1995, a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage and a Deed of Absolut
e Sale dated September 28, 1995, in favor of respondent Nigaderio Pangilinan, we
re presented simultaneously before the ROD of Nueva Ecija. Thereafter, a new TCT
was issued in Pangilinan's name. Petitioner alleged that when he visited the la
nd, he was driven away by Pangilinan and Cua and also discovered that the land w
as already fenced with wooden posts and barbed wire. He reported the incident to
the Philippine National Police Station in Gapan, Nueva Ecija and also alleged t
hat upon learning of the sale, he sent two letters to Pangilinan demanding to va
cate the property, informing Pangilinan that he was exercising his right of rede
mption. He also tendered a payment of P50,000 which he deposited with Security B
ank, Gapan Branch. The said money was





consigned with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Caban
atuan City. Petitioner filed before the PARAD a Petition for Redemption and Ejec
tment, who dismissed the case on the ground that Castillo had no cause of action
against Pangilinan since he was not the latter's tenant. On reconsideration and
after the impleaded Pajota and Cua, the PARAD reversed his decision. He ruled t
hat Castillo was a tenant entitled to exercise the right of redemption under Sec
tion 12 of Republic Act No. 3844. The respondents appealed to the DARAB which re
versed the ruling of the PARAD in a new judgment, declaring plaintiff-appellee n
ot a bona fide tenant over the property in suit and ineligible to avail of the r
ight of redemption granted under Sec 12 of R.A. No. 3844; and ordering the maint
enance of respondentsappellants in peaceful possession of the landholding. The D
ARAB ruled that only a bona fide tenant who cultivates the land himself and with
the aid available from his immediate farm household may exercise the right of r
edemption granted by Sec 12 R.A. No. 3844. Based on the records, Castillo was ga
infully employed as a manager of Warner Lambert Philippines during the period wh
en he should have been cultivating the land. Thus, he could not have cultivated
the land himself as his employment required him to report for office work regula
rly. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the DARAB denied the same. Then pe
titioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with th
e Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the decision and resolution of the DARA
B. The appellate court dismissed the petition, reiterating that only bona fide t
enants may avail of the right of redemption.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is a bona fide tenant of Respondent Pajota, and whethe
r he can avail the right of redemption in a lease contract he entered into?
Held:


The element of personal cultivation by the petitioner was not proven. There is a
dearth of evidence on record to show that the petitioner personally cultivated
the lands. Much less was it shown that he was assisted by his sons in his farm w
ork. This is fatal to the petitioner's cause as without the element of personal
cultivation, a person cannot be considered a tenant even if he is so designated
in the written agreement of the parties. The Kasunduan Buwisan sa Sakahan entere
d into by Pajota and the petitioner can not by itself prove that the petitioner
is abona fide tenant. To determine whether a tenancy relationship exists, the co
ncurrence of all the following essential requisites must be established by subst
antial evidence: (1) the parties are the landowner and


the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relations
hip; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural producti
on; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or ag
ricultural lessee. The petition fails to show that the petitioner is a bona fide
tenant. Hence, his petition cannot be granted.
JUST COMPENSATION; PAYMENT OF THE COMPENSATION MUST BE WITHIN THE REASONABLE TIM
E FROM ITS TAKING
APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals a
nd Land Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 164195 (February 6, 2007)
Facts:





Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered
owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao
Province. On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above
parcels of land to the government. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received sep
arately from PARO of Davao province a notice of land acquisition and valuation,
informing AFC that the value of the properties has been placed at P86,900,925.88
or P165,484.47 per hectare while HPI's properties were valued at P164,478,178.1
4. AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366 and No. 113359, and app
lied for the shifting of the mode of acquisition for TCT No. 113359 from Volunta
ry Offer to Sell (VOS) to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme. HPI als
o rejected the valuation of its three parcels of land covered by TCTs No. T-1036
1, No. T-10362 and No. T-10363. Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LB
P's valuation, the DAR requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to their
valuations in the names and for the accounts of AFC and HPI. AFC thereafter with
drew the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew the amount of P45,481,706.
76, both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed the Register of Deeds of D
avao to cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to issue a new
one in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. After the issuance of the c
ertificate of title in the name of the RP the ROD of Davao, upon the request of
the DAR, issued TCTs and Certificates of Land Ownership Award to qualified farme
r-beneficiaries.









On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination of
just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse of
more than three years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed and re
fused to render a decision on the valuation of the land. Hence, two complaints f
or determination and payment of just compensation were filed by AFC and HPI befo
re Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting as a Special
Agrarian Court), which were subsequently consolidated. The SAC rendered a decis
ion dated 25 September 2001 fixing the just compensation for the 1,388.6027 hect
ares of lands and its improvements owned by the plaintiffs. LBP filed a Motion f
or Reconsideration on 5 October 2001 on the ground that the trial court based it
s valuation on the value of residential and industrial lands in the area forgett
ing that the lands involved are agricultural. On December 5, 2001, the trial cou
rt modified its decision ordering the DAR to pay interest. LBP filed a Notice of
Appeal and was given due course in the Order of the RTC dated 15 May 2002. In t
he same Order, the RTC set aside its Order dated 5 December 2001 granting execut
ion pending appeal. On 28 March 2003, LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12 February 2003 orders
of the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted said petition for being meritor
ious. AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Ap
peals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June 2004. Earlier, on 23 January 2003,
DAR filed its own separate petition before the Court of Appeals by way of a Peti
tion for Review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of the DAR for fail
ure to state the material dates under Rule 42, Section 2, of the Rules of Court.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by the DAR in CA-G.R
. SP No. 74879 became final and executory and entry of judgment was issued by th
e appellate court on 7 May 2003. On the other hand, from the decision of the Cou
rt of Appeals in the Petition filed by LBP in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, AFC and HPI
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:

Whether or not there is payment of Just Compensation?
Held:

The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment of the lan
d within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to




suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being ma
de to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary t
o cope with his loss. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivale
nt of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It is not the taker
's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning o
f the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. When t
he trial court arrived at the valuation of a landowner's property taking into ac
count its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value, as
sessor's value and the volume and value of its produce, such valuation is consid
ered in accordance with Republic Act No. 6657. Conspicuously, the trial court di
d not merely rely solely on the appraisal report submitted by the Commissioners.
The trial court conducted hearings for the purpose of receiving the parties' ev
idence. The SAC, correctly determined the amount of just compensation due to AFC
and HPI.
JURISDICTION; RTC DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF DARA
B DECISIONS; DARAB IS A CO-EQUAL BODY WITH THE RTC AND ITS DECISIONS ARE BEYOND
THE RTC's CONTROL
Springfield Development Corporation, Inc. and Heirs of Petra Capistrano Piit vs.
Hon. Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 40, Ca
gayan de Oro City, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), et
al. G.R. No. 142628 (February 6, 2007)
Facts:


Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291 located in Cagayan de Oro Ci
ty which measured 123,408 sq. m. under TCT No. T-62623. Springfield Development
Corporation, Inc. (Springfield) bought Lot No. 2291-C with an area of 68,732 sq.
m., and Lot No. 2291-D with an area of 49,778 sq. m. Springfield developed thes
e properties into a subdivision project called Mega Heights Subdivision. On May
4, 1990, the DAR, through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice
of Coverage (NOC), placing the property under the coverage of R.A. No. 6657. Th
e heirs of Piit, opposed the NOC. On August 27, 1991, Provincial Adjudicator Abe
to A. Salcedo, Jr. rendered a decision declaring the nature of the





property as residential and not suitable for agriculture. The Regional Director
filed a notice of appeal, which the PARAD disallowed for being pro forma and fri
volous. The decision became final and executory and Springfield proceeded to dev
elop the property. The DAR Regional Director filed a petition for relief from ju
dgment of the PARAB Decision before the DARAB. In its Decision dated October 5,
1995, the DARAB granted the petition and gave due course to the NOC. It also dir
ected the MARO to proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and distribution
of the property to the true and lawful beneficiaries. On June 13, 1997, Springfi
eld and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro Cit
y, Br. 40, a petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision dated October 5, 1995
and all its subsequent proceedings, contending that the DARAB decision was rende
red without affording petitioners any notice and hearing. The RTC issued an Orde
r dated June 25, 1997, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. On July 2,
1997, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action fo
r certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Petitioners alleged t
hat the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment
of judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in a different
color; that what they sought before the RTC is an annulment of the DARAB Decisi
on and notcertiorari, as the DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having been re
ndered without due process of law. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of mer
it, ruling that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision b
ecause it is a co-equal body.
Issues:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB?
Whether the petition for annulment of the DARAB judgment could be brought to the
CA?
Held:

With the introduction of B.P. Blg. 129, the rule on annulment of judgments was s
pecifically provided in Section 9(2), which vested in the then Intermediate Appe
llate Court (now the RTC) the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for a
nnulment of judgments of RTCs. Sec. 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 also vested the CA wit
h "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolut
ions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, in
strumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellat
e jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the pro
visions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph and





subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1
948." As provided in paragraph 16 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementi
ng B.P. Blg. 129, the quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appe
alable to the CA are those, which under the law, R.A. No. 5434, or its enabling
acts, are specifically appealable to the CA. The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body
created by Executive Order Nos. 229 and 129-A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adju
dicatory powers and functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure adopted on D
ecember 26, 1988 specifically provides for the manner of judicial review of its
decisions, orders, rulings, or awards. Given that DARAB decisions are appealable
to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with
the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control. The CA was therefore cor
rect in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARA
B Decision dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any jurisdiction to e
ntertain the same. Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 vested in the CA the exclusive
original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments, but only those re
ndered by the RTCs. It does not expressly give the CA the power to annul judgmen
ts of quasi-judicial bodies. Consequently, the silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the j
urisdiction of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quas
i-judicial bodies like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority.
EXEMPTION; DETERMINATION OF FACTUAL MATTERS; THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVING THE JUR
ISDICTION ON THE CONTROVERSY MUST RE-EVALUATE THE FACTUAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE
Paulino Reyes, et al. vs. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc., and Court of Appeals G.R.
No. 148967 (February 9, 2007)
Facts:


Petitioners are the tenants of the disputed portion of Hacienda Looc which has b
een the subject of application for exclusion from CARP coverage pursuant to Admi
nistrative Order No. 10, Series of 1994. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27
, a portion of the hacienda with an aggregate area of 1,282.9767 hectares that w
ere planted with rice and corn were distributed to the farmers, and emancipation
patents (EPs) were accordingly issued.










The hacienda was acquired by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) from
the Magdalena Estate, Inc. through a Deed of Cession in Payment of Debt on May 1
9, 1971. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 issued on February 3, 1987, certain
assets and liabilities of DBP were transferred to the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. Among the properties that were transferred was Hacienda Loo
c. On February 27, 1987, DBP executed a Deed of Transfer of the properties in fa
vor of the Government. On the same date, a Trust Agreement was entered into by t
he Government and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) whereby the latter was con
stituted trustee of Hacienda Looc. On June 28, 1990, APT entered into a Memorand
um of Agreement (MOA) with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Wherein APT s
ignified its intention to sell to DAR portions of the hacienda under the Volunta
ry Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of R.A. No. 6657 on the condition that DAR will re
turn to APT nonCARPable portions of the property. Between 1991 and 1993, DAR gen
erated 25 Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) to the farmers of the ha
cienda. On December 10, 1993, APT conducted a public bidding involving the prope
rty in question. Bellevue Properties, Inc. tendered the highest cash bid. It the
reafter assigned the right to purchase the property to Manila Southcoast Develop
ment Corporation (MSDC), subrogating to the latter all its rights, claims and be
nefits under the DAR-APT MOA. On March 7, 1995, MSDC filed an adverse claim over
Hacienda Looc before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas. In the same ye
ar, MSDC was able to register the disputed ten parcels of land of the hacienda w
ith an aggregate area of 1,219.0133 hectares. On April 10, 1995, MSDC filed a pe
tition before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Regi
on IV, for the cancellation of the notices of acquisition issued by DAR; the can
cellation of the CLOAs; and the conversion of the property into non-agricultural
uses. On May 30, 1995, PARAD Antonio Cabili issued an Order stopping all joint
venture agreements in Hacienda Looc. Between the months of January and June of 1
996, the RARAD issued three Partial Summary Judgments canceling the fifteen (15)
CLOAs issued to the farmers, including those covering the ten parcels of land.
The cancellation was grounded on the waiver allegedly executed by the farmer-ben
eficiaries who declared that the lands they were tilling were not suitable for a
griculture. On October 4, 1996, private respondent, by virtue of a Joint Venture
Agreement with MSDC for the purpose of developing the area covered by the ten c
ancelled CLOAs, filed a Petition for Exclusion of the subject lots from CARP cov
erage on the ground that they had an average slope of more than eighteen percent
(18%), and the area "has no semblance of agricultural development whatsoever."






Meanwhile, petitioners, along with the other farmer-beneficiaries affected by th
e order, filed a complaint with the Office of the DAR Secretary objecting to the
cancellation of their respective CLOAs. On December 26, 1996, the DAR Regional
Director for Region IV issued an Order granting the Petition for Exclusion filed
by Fil-Estate pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 10, Series of 1994. A
s a result, the subject ten parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,219.0133
hectares were exempted from CARP coverage. On January 29, 1997, petitioners, ag
grieved by the Order of Exclusion, filed their appeal with the Office of the DAR
Secretary, on the grounds that 1) there was no due process as they were not inf
ormed of the exemption case or the proceedings thereof; 2) the cancellation of t
he CLOAs was based on the waivers allegedly executed by the farmer-beneficiaries
; and 3) the property was agriculturally developed and, therefore, covered by CA
RP. On March 25, 1998, the DAR Secretary issued an Order, ordering the coverage
of the agriculturally developed areas, re-documentation of the same under CARP a
cquisition and awarded to individual beneficiaries found to be qualified under t
he CARL. Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. P
etitioner then filed an appeal with the Office of the President but the same was
denied. The OP affirmed the Order of the Secretary. Petitioners filed a petitio
n for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals (CA)
assailing the decision of the Executive Secretary. The CA, in its resolution, da
ted September 4, 2000, denied the petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the disputed ten parcels of land are exempt from CARP coverage?
Held:


One of the reasons why petitioners are objecting to the cancellation of their CL
OAs and the exclusion of the ten parcels of land from CARP coverage is because t
hese lots are agricultural and developed. While it is true that the DAR official
s have generally found the lots to have an average slope of 18%, the contention
that the same have been cultivated and are actually agriculturally developed so
as to make them subject to CARP is a factual matter that must be looked into. Up
on a review of the records, the Court agreed with petitioners that there are fac
tual matters that should be re-examined to properly resolve the case. The Court
is not a trier of facts. The CA, having the appellate jurisdiction to rule on th
e controversy, must re-evaluate the factual aspects of the case in order to prev
ent a miscarriage of justice.



While, generally, petitioners' failure to comply with the procedural requirement
s prescribed under the Rules of Court would warrant the dismissal of the petitio
n, fundamental considerations of substantial justice persuade the Court to have
the present case decided on the merits rather than dismissed on a technicality.
It is settled that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very strict
and technical sense. These are used only to help secure rather than override su
bstantial justice. The stringent application of the rules must yield to the dema
nds of substantial justice. The petition is GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for it to render a decision on the merits withDISPATCH.
EXEMPTION; EXEMPTION OF LIVESTOCK FROM CARP; CONDITIONS THEREOF; RULES OF ADMINI
STRATIVE BODIES MUST BE IN HARMONY WITH THE CONSTITUTION
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Vicente K. Uy G.R. No. 169277 (February 9, 200
7)
Facts:




This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules o
f Court of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 7
0541 and the Resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsider
ation thereof. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the Office of the P
resident (OP) which had affirmed the Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) exempting only a portion (219.50 hectares) of respondent Vicente K. Uy's 3
49.9996-ha landholding from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Pr
ogram (CARP). Some 44 farmers who occupied portions of the property owned by the
respondent filed petitions in the DAR, seeking to be declared as owners- benefi
ciaries. The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage under the CARP over the property. R
espondent, in behalf of the co-owners, filed an Application for Exclusion, throu
gh Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Durante L. Ubeda citing the Luz Far
ms ruling as the property had been exclusively used for livestock-raising for se
veral years prior to June 15, 1988. MARO Belen Babalcon made a Final Report, dec
laring that 346.000 ha, more or less, is devoted to coconut and livestock farmin
g; The MARO declared that while a total of 429 livestock heads are being raised
in the property, "the total area for exclusion is undetermined because there are
portions occupied by tenants which should not be excluded from CARP coverage."
Meanwhile, PARO Ubeda submitted a separate Report where he declared the followin
g: that the total number of Certificate[s] of Ownership is 434 which is








more than the actual headcount of 401; that the number of cattle 7 years old and
above totaled 134 heads with 13 males and 121 females as of date of certificati
on; and that 300 cattles were of ages 6 years old and below with 76 males and 23
4 females. The applicants, through Uy, wrote a letter to DAR Region IV Director
Percival C. Dalugdug, requesting for a reinvestigation of the Report of PARO Ube
da. This request was reiterated in a letter where the applicants requested, for
the first time, the exclusion of another parcel of land
22.2639 ha and covered by
TCT No. T11948 which is contiguous to the 349.9996-ha lot covered by their earlier
application. The Regional Director issued an Order affirming the findings and r
ecommendation of PARO Ubeda. Respondent and his co-owners appealed. Arguing that
the properties have been devoted to livestock-raising even prior to 1977. Thus,
the landholdings should be excluded from CARP coverage. They further argued tha
t for purposes of determining the area for exclusion under A.O. No. 9, the entir
e number of livestock should be credited in applying the ratio of one head to on
e hectare and that the landholdings totaled only 370 ha and there are 429 heads
of livestock, they have more than complied with A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993. The
DAR issued an Order suspending the processing and issuance of Certificates of La
nd Ownership Awards to the farmers-beneficiaries of the landholding covered by T
CT No. 160988 pending the resolution of the appeal. On October 7, 1996, the DAR
issued an Order partially granting the application for exclusion. The applicants
appealed the Order to the OP via an Appeal with Prayer for Status Quo/Stay of E
xecution. The President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Coron
a (now a member of the Court), rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lac
k of merit. Respondent and his co-owners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, whi
ch was denied for being devoid of substantial merit. The OP, issued a Memorandum
for DAR Secretary Morales referring the case for the Secretary's final disposit
ion, on the matter of exemption from CARP coverage of the subject landholding. R
espondent for himself and in behalf of other owners then filed a "Petition for R
eview with Application/Prayer for Status Quo and/or Stay of Execution" before th
e CA, alleging that the OP committed errors. Judgment was rendered affirming the
decision of the OP and, consequently, the October 7, 1996 DAR Order. Respondent
and his co-owners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, praying t
hat the entire 349.9996 has. be exempted from CARP coverage. On May 24, 2004, th
e CA rendered an Amended Decision reversing and setting aside its previous decis
ion.
Issues:



Whether or not the 349.9996-hectare landholding of Vicente K. Uy used in raising
livestock, poultry and swine are exempted from the coverage following the Luz F
arms Doctrine? Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration filed by res
pondent tolled the reglementary period to appeal? Whether or not the application
of DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 on the respondent's landholdi
ng of more or less 472 ha. is valid in light of the ruling of this Court in Depa
rtment of Agrarian Reform v. Sutton, where DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Serie
s of 1993 was declared unconstitutional?
Held:




It must be shown that the entire landholding, and not just portions of it, shoul
d be devoted to livestock raising. The words "regardless of age" in the order sh
ould be interpreted to mean only those heads of cattle existing as of June 15, 1
988. Accordingly, the ratio of land to livestock should be based on those livest
ock found existing in the landholding at the time R.A. No. 6657 took effect on J
une 15, 1988. This is consistent with the intent of the law to prevent fraudulen
t declaration of areas actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock as
well as to protect the rights of agrarian beneficiaries therein. It is clear the
n that only one motion for reconsideration is allowed to be filed from a decisio
n, resolution or order of the OP. However, the filing of a second motion for rec
onsideration is not absolutely prohibited. A second motion for reconsideration i
s allowed in exceptionally meritorious cases. It is doctrinal that rules of admi
nistrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. Th
ey cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to an
d be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administra
tive order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assa
iled A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it
enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987
Constitution. The instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Amended Decision of
the CA in CA-GR SP No. 70541 exempting the parcel of land under TCT No. T160988
with an area of 349.9996 hectares from coverage of the CARP is AFFIRMED. Howeve
r, the Amended Decision exempting the 22.2639-hectare landholding covered by TCT
No. 11948 from the coverage of the CARP is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. DETERMINATIO
N AND PAYMENT OF
JUST COMPENSATION; COMPENSABLE AREAS

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Juan H. Imperial G.R. No. 157753 (February 12,
2007)
Facts:






Respondent Juan H. Imperial owned five parcels of land with a total area of 156.
1000 hectares, located in Barangay Pawa, Manito, Albay. Pursuant to the Land Ref
orm Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228, the De
partment of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed these lands under its Operation Land Tr
ansfer (OLT). On October 21, 1972, the lands were distributed to deserving farme
r beneficiaries. On July 20, 1994, Imperial filed a complaint for determination
and payment of just compensation in the Regional Trial Court. During the course
of the trial, the court created a commission to examine, investigate and ascerta
in facts relevant to the dispute including the lands' valuation. On June 21, 199
6, the commission submitted a report containing the following findings: (1) the
lands were not first-class riceland; (2) the irrigation came from a creek which
depended on rains; (3) the harvest was once a year; (4) about fifteen hectares w
ere devoted to non-fruit bearing coconut trees; (5) approximately five hectares
were upland rice while the rest of the area was uncultivated; and (6) the lands
were rolling hills. Using the formula under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 for com
puting the land value, the commission fixed the just compensation at P2,012.50/h
ectare, for a total of P314,151.25. Imperial vigorously objected to the valuatio
n. Thus, the trial court referred the report back to the commission for further
reception of evidence. The commission submitted another report, with the followi
ng observations: (1) of the total land area of 156.1000 hectares, only 151.7168
hectares were compensable since 4.3832 hectares were either used by Imperial or
devoted to right of way, barrio site, or feeder road; (2) the irrigated area was
only 1,000 square meters; and (3) the lands were generally devoted to upland ri
ce. After due proceedings, the trial court issued on August 4, 2000, a judgment,
fixing the compensable area of 151.7128 has. at P2,185,241.50. It also declared
as noncompensable 4.3832 hectares which were either used by Imperial or devoted
to right of way, barrio site, or feeder road. The trial court fixed the just co
mpensation at P14,375/hectare for unirrigated area, and P57,500/hectare for irri
gated area, for a total of P2,185,241.50. The party appealed to the CA where on
November 23, 2001, the CA set aside the trial court's decision, and remanded it
to the court of origin for re-evaluation of the correct compensation.
Issues:


Whether a 6% annual interest should be included in computing the just compensati
on? Whether the areas used as feeder road, right of way, and barrio site should
be considered as compensable?
Held:




DAR A.O. No. 13 applies to all landowners: (1) whose lands are actually tenanted
as of October 21, 1972, or thereafter, and covered by the OLT; (2) who opted fo
r government-financing through the petitioner as the mode of compensation; and (
3) who have not yet been paid the value of their land. It provides a formula for
determining the land value and the additional interests it would have earned. T
he grant of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded annually shall be reckon
ed as Tenanted as of 21 October 1972 and covered under OLT which is From 21 Octo
ber 1972 up to the time of actual payment but not later than December 2006; andT
enanted after 21 October 1972 and covered under OLT: From the date when the land
was actually tenanted (by virtue of Regional Order of Placement issued prior to
August 18, 1987) up to the time of actual payment but not later than December 2
006 (Emphasis supplied.) The taking of private lands under the agrarian reform p
rogram partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. Just compensation
in expropriation proceedings represents the full and fair equivalent of the prop
erty taken from its owner by the expropriator. The respondent should be compensa
ted for what he actually lost and that should include not only the areas distrib
uted directly to the tenant beneficiaries but also those areas used as feeder ro
ad, right of way, and barrio site, which were undoubtedly diverted to the use of
the public. The only area that ought to be excluded is the portion or portions
retained by the respondent as owner-cultivator for his own use.
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT; PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF FINAL PARAD DECISION IS NOT ALL
OWED UNDER THE RULES OF COURT
Valentin P. Fraginal, et al. vs. The Heirs of Toribia Belmonte Paraal, represented
by Pedro Paraal, et al. G.R. No. 150207 (February 23, 2007)
Facts:

The heirs of Toribia Belmonte Paraal, filed with the Office of the Provincial Agra
rian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatio
n Board (DARAB), Camarines Sur, a Complaint for Termination of



Tenancy Relationship, Ejectment, and Collection of Arrear Rentals and Damages, a
gainst Fraginal, et al. Fraginal, et al. filed an Answer questioning the jurisdi
ction of the PARAD on the ground that they are not tenants of the Heirs of Torib
ia Paraal, for the land they are tilling is a 1.1408-hectare public agricultural l
and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natur
al Resources. The PARAD issued a Decision on October 8, 1998 ordering the ejectm
ent of Fraginal. On April 5, 2001, two years from issuance of the PARAD Decision
, Fraginal, et al. filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with P
rayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order. They insi
sted that the PARAD Decision is void as it was issued without jurisdiction. CA d
ismissed the Petition in its April 24, 2001 Resolution. Likewise, CA also denied
the Motion for Reconsideration of Fraginal, et al. in the assailed Resolution d
ated September 3, 2001.
Issue:

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Rule 47 of t
he Rules of Court pertains only to judgment or final orders and resolutions in c
ivil actions of the Regional Trial Court?
Held:




The Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Fraginal, et al. before the CA f
ailed to meet the conditions. First, it sought the annulment of the PARAD Decisi
on when Section 1 of Rule 47 clearly limits the subject matter of petitions for
annulment to final judgments and orders rendered by Regional Trial Courts in civ
il actions. Final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrat
ive bodies such, in this case, the PARAD, are not susceptible to petitions for a
nnulment under Rule 47. Second, Section 1, Rule 47 does not allow a direct recou
rse to a petition for annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are av
ailable, such as a petition for new trial, and a petition for relief from judgme
nt or an appeal. The 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedures, which was applicable at
the time the PARAD Decision was issued, provided for the mode of appeal: Under
Rule XIII Section 1 (b), it does not allow for a petition for annulment of a fin
al PARAD Decision. While the DARAB Rules provide for an appeal to the DARAB from
a decision of the PARAD, Fraginal, et al. did not avail of this remedy. Moreove
r, there is nothing in Rule XIII that allows a petition for annulment of a final
PARAD Decision. As held in Macalalag,there must be a law granting such right, i
n the absence of which, Fraginals' petition for annulment of judgment was correc
tly denied due course by the CA.

JURISDICTION; BARC CERTIFICATION IS NOT NECESSARY TO BE PRESENTED TO ADJUDICATOR

IF THE PARTIES ARE RESIDING IN NON-ADJOINING BARANGAYS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS ARE NOT BOUND BY TECHNICAL RULES FOLLOWED IN
COURTS OF LAW
Espinosa vs. Quiboloy G.R. No. 147525 (February 26, 2007)
Facts:

A complaint for ejectment was filed against petitioner by private respondent Mar
ia V. Quiboloy, as co-owner and administratrix of three (3) parcels of land cove
red by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3676. She alleged that petitioner had r
eneged on his obligations as tenant to pay the rent and till the subject landhol
ding. Petitioner filed his answer assailing Quiboloy's personality to bring suit
. Petitioner also offered unsubstantiated denials of Quiboloy's charges. As his
defense, he denied allegations of non-payment of rents and non-tillage of the la
nd for lack of knowledge and information to form a belief as to the veracity the
reof. The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently convinced that Quiboloy's alle
gations were true and correct. Accordingly, he decided the case against petition
er. Instead of immediately appealing from the adjudicator's decision, petitioner
allowed the reglementary period to lapse. Thereafter, he filed a petition for c
ertiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition,
reiterating the wellsettled rule that certiorari lies only in cases of errors o
f jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. It stressed that certiorari cannot be
a substitute for a lost appeal.
Issue:

Whether or not the Provincial Adjudicator of Pampanga (PARAD) is correct in proc
eeding with the case without first complying with the jurisdictional requirement
s on BARC certification under the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure?
Held:

The PARAD did not err in entertaining the dispute notwithstanding the absence of
the BARC Certification. The 1989 DARAB Rules exempted parties residing in non-a
djoining barangays from presenting the BARC Certification. Since it is undispute
d that Quiboloy resided in San Nicolas 1st, Lubao, Pampanga while petitioner sta
yed in San Agustin, Lubao, Pampanga, the former was not required to



present the BARC certification before the adjudicator taking cognizance of the a
grarian dispute. Under the law, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicia
l functions are not bound by technical rules. The adjudicator is given enough la
titude, subject to the essential requirements of administrative due process, to
be able to expeditiously ascertain the facts of the agrarian dispute. The assail
ed acts of the adjudicator did not amount to a grave abuse of discretion justify
ing a writ of certiorari. Considering the technical flexibility afforded to agra
rian adjudicators, the order may easily be construed as a denial of the motion t
o dismiss. What would have been the prudent recourse under the rules was to subm
it an answer immediately, participate in the hearing and appeal an adverse decis
ion. The petitioner failed to do any of these. It is now too late for him to dis
pute the adjudicator's decision. The petition is DENIED.
APPEAL; THE MODE OF APPEAL FROM DECISIONS OR ORDERS OF DAR AS QUASI-JUDICIAL BOD
Y IS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE CA
Robert Padua vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, Atty. Delfin B. Samson, Department o
f Agrarian Reform, and Mr. Teofilo Inocencio G.R. No. 153456 (March 2, 2007)
Facts:


Private respondents Pepito dela Cruz, et al. were tenants of Lot Nos. 68 and 90
of the Dolores Ongsiako Estate in Anao, Tarlac. In 1966, upon the request of Ana
o Mayor Catalino Cruz (Mayor Cruz), Dela Cruz, et al. agreed to donate said prop
erties to the municipality on the condition that these be used as school sites.
The project did not materialize and, in 1977, Dela Cruz, et al.asked that the pr
operties be returned to them. However, they found out that Mayor Cruz had distri
buted Lot No. 68 to Flor Labagnoy (Labagnoy) and Lot No. 90 to Edwin Cruz (Cruz)
who were each issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT). Upon Petition for Ca
ncellation of CLT filed by Dela Cruz, et al., Department of Agrarian Reform Secr
etary Condrado Estrella issued an Order dated April 19, 1982 (Estrella Order), c
ancelling the CLT issued to Labagnoy and Cruz. The latter filed a Petition for R
elief from Judgment for lack of due process but the same was denied by Secretary
Estrella in his Order dated September 19, 1984. Labagnoy and Cruz appealed to t
he Office of the President (OP) which dismissed the same in an Order dated May 9
, 1990. Said OP Order became final and the same was partially executed with the
restoration of Lot No. 68 in the possession of Dela Cruz, et al.







During the pendency of the appeal before the OP, Cruz executed an Affidavit of W
aiver over his interest in Lot No. 90 on the basis of which DAR Regional Office
III issued an Order dated December 7, 1987 cancelling the CLT of Cruz and declar
ing Lot No. 90 open for disposition. On November 7, 1989, then DAR Secretary Mir
iam Defensor Santiago issued an Order awarding Lot No. 90 to herein petitioner R
oberto Padua (Padua) who had been occupying said property and paying the amortiz
ation thereon to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Aggrieved, Dela Cruz, e
t al., acting thru Anao Mayor Clemente Apuan, filed with the DAR Secretary a Let
ter-Petition for Cancellation (Letter-Petition) of the December 7, 1987 DAR Regi
onal Office III Order and the November 7, 1989 DAR Order, the same was granted i
n an Order by Secretary Ernesto Garilao dated July 2, 1995. Accordingly, DAR Reg
ional Director Nestor Acosta issued a Memorandum dated May 9, 2000, directing he
rein public respondent Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Teofilo Inocencio (PAR
O Inocencio) to implement the Garilao Order. In turn, PARO Inocencio instructed
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Lino Mabborang (MARO Mabborang) to issue the n
ecessary documents to award Lot No. 90 to Dela Cruz, et al. In justifying his re
course to a Petition for Annulment, Padua claims that the DAR under Sec. 50 of C
omprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) cannot take cognizance of the petition f
or cancellation because the matter involved is a civil law issue relating to the
validity of a contract of sale executed by LBP and petitioner, not an agrarian
reform matter; that cancellation can only be ordered by a court of justice, not
by an administrative agency exercising only quasi-judicial powers. Padua also cl
aimed lack of due process in that he was allegedly never impleaded as a party to
the Petition for Cancellation of CLT nor furnished a copy of the Letter-Petitio
n but that he became aware of the Garilao Order only when it was about to be imp
lemented. Padua filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Final and Executor
y Order of the DAR Secretary on December 18, 2001. The CA issued Decision dismis
sing the Petition for Annulment. Padua filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
the CA denied in its May 7, 2002 Resolution.
Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not holding that the
Department of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction?
Held:

Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that a DAR Decision or Order be reviewable
by the CA in accordance with the Rules of Court. In turn, the Rules of





Court, consistent with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and R.A. N
o. 7902, prescribes under Rule 43 that the mode of appeal from decisions or orde
rs of DAR as a quasi-judicial agency is by petition for review to the CA. Padua'
s recourse to a Petition for Annulment of the Garilao Order, rather than a petit
ion for review, was therefore fatally infirm. The July 2, 1995 Order, then DAR S
ecretary Garilao Order was therefore issued by Sec. Garilao in the exercise of h
is power under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 2 (b) of Administrative O
rder No. 06-00. As Padua himself admitted that he is still paying amortization o
n Lot No. 90 to LBP, his status in relation to said property remains that of a m
ere potential farmerbeneficiary whose eligibilities DAR may either confirm or re
ject. In fact, under Section 2 (d) of Administrative Order No. 06-00, DAR has au
thority to issue, recall, or cancel a CLT, CBC, EP, or CLOA issued to potential
farmerbeneficiaries but not yet registered with the Register of Deeds. As to the
claim of Padua that he was not accorded due process in the cancellation of the
Santiago Order which awarded Lot No. 90 in his favor, this is belied by his own
Annex "A" in support of his Urgent Reiteration of Application for Restraining Or
der or for Observance of Judicial Courtesy as Mandated by Eternal Gardens versus
Court of Appeals. Thus, any defect in due process was cured by the fact that Pa
dua had filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an Appeal to the OP from the Gari
lao Order. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December
18, 2001 and Resolution dated May 7, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; ALL REQUISITES MUST CONCUR IN ORDER TO CREATE A TENANCY RE
LATIONSHIP
Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, et al. vs. Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, et al. G.R. No.
170346 (March 12, 2007)
Facts:


On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas Jugalbo
t based on the latter's claim that he was the tenant of the subject property loc
ated at Brgy. Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, registered in the name of Virginia A
. Roa under TCT No. T-11543. The property was originally registered in the name
of Marcelino Cabili from whom Virginia A. Roa purchased the same sometime in 196
6. On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents,
filed before the DARAB Provincial Office of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for




cancellation of title (TCT No. E-103), Recovery of Possession and Damages agains
t Nicolas Jugalbot. On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered dismissing priv
ate respondents' complaint and upholding the validity of the Emancipation Patent
. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. On appea
l, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision on th
e sole ground that private respondents' right to contest the validity of Nicolas
Jugalbot's title was barred by prescription. On November 10, 2003, the DARAB de
nied private respondents' motion for reconsideration, hence they filed a petitio
n for review before the Court of Appeals which was granted. The appellate court
reversed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on the followin
g grounds: (1) the absence of a tenancy relationship; (2) lack of notice to Virg
inia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property which was less than one hectar
e and deemed swampy, rainfed and kangkong-producing: and (4) the classification
of the subject property as residential, which is outside the coverage of P.D. No
. 27.
Issues:

Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists? Whether or not the petitioners are
de jure tenants of private respondents?
Held:




The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under P.D. No. 27
due to the absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relatio
nship between them. There is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establ
ish that the petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or th
at there was sharing of harvests except for their self-serving statements. The f
act of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. The
taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process.
The CA was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process b
ecause the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to th
e proper party. Likewise, the property under dispute is residential property and
not agricultural property. Zoning Certification No. 98-094 issued on September
3, 1998 clearly shows that the subject property is located within the Residentia
l 2 District in accordance with paragraph (b), Section 9, Article IV of Zoning O
rdinance No. 880, Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning and Development Off
ice of Cagayan de Oro City.

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST; CERTIFICATION ALONE THAT CLOAs WERE ALREADY GENERATED
IN THE NAMES OF FARMERS DOES NOT VEST ANY RIGHT AS AWARDEES THUS, CANNOT BE CONS
IDERED REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya, represented by Elvira M. Baladad vs. Wilfredo
G. Mosquera, et al. G.R. No. 152430 (March 22, 2007)
Facts:




Petitioner Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya (Samahan) is an association of farm
er-beneficiaries duly recognized by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pet
itioner alleged that its members had been cultivating the disputed land for many
years prior to the effectivity of R.A. 6657, (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
). Respondents are the registered owners of three parcels of land covered by Tra
nsfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-267409, T-267410, and T-267411, which have an
aggregate area of 53.1164 hectares located in Macabud, Rodriguez (formerly Monta
lban), Rizal. The disputed land was previously owned by Philippine Suburban Deve
lopment Corporation which planned to develop it as a residential subdivision, an
d was sold to Vinebel Realties, Inc. in 1979 through an extrajudicial foreclosur
e sale. Petitioner alleged that in 1994, the landholding was sold to respondents
without any DAR clearance, in violation of Section 6-D of CARL. On July 7, 1994
, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Rodriguez, Rizal issued a Noti
ce of Coverage to the disputed land. On February 21, 1995, respondents applied f
or exemption from the coverage of CARL based on Sec. 10, R.A. 6657. On March 31
and August 7, 1995, the Regional Director of DAR-Region IV denied respondents' a
pplication and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively. Respondents appealed th
e two Orders of the Regional Director to the DAR Secretary, which on April 19 an
d July 9, 1996, Sec. Ernesto D. Garilao denied. In his April 19, 1996 order, Gar
ilao stated that: as for the apparently conflicting certifications issued by the
CENRO of Antipolo, Rizal, on different dates, it is the view of this Office tha
t there is actually no conflict between the two certifications. The certificatio
n issued by Deputy Land Inspector Ruben A. Cabreira on October 21, 1994 refers o
nly to one of the three lots subject of the instant petition while the other cer
tification issued pertains to all the lots subject of the instant petition, whic
h were described to be "partly rolling and agricultural in nature and planted to
fruit-bearing trees. Even assuming arguendo that they are in conflict, it is su
bmitted that between the two certifications, the second one should prevail since
it is not only the latest, [but] it is also more complete.







On appeal, Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres set aside the DAR Secretary's Ord
ers and exempted the property from the CARL coverage through his June 25, 1997 R
esolution. Petitioner and the DAR subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideratio
n. In the meantime, the Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of So
il and Water Management, sent two missions to conduct fieldwork and validate the
actual development in the disputed land. In a report transmitted by DA to Pres.
Fidel V. Ramos, it was recommended that the disputed land be exempted from conv
ersion since the general area of the land, including areas with 18% slope, was p
hysically occupied and actively used for intensive and diversified farming. On A
ugust 14, 1998, the OP denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. On Septem
ber 23, 1998, petitioner, through Elvira M. Baladad, and the DAR jointly filed a
second Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the OP in its December 22
, 2000 Resolution. Petitioner appealed the Resolutions of the OP to the CA throu
gh Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA rules that the petitione
r was not a real party in interest and had no legal standing to sue. On the exem
ption of the land from CARL, the CA found that the OP's Resolution was supported
by substantial evidence; hence, the CA did not substitute the OP's findings of
fact.
Issues:

Whether or not petitioners are real parties-in-interest in this case? Whether or
not the subject landholding may be exempted from the coverage of the Comprehens
ive Agrarian Reform Program?
Held:


Petitioner is not a real party-in-interest in this case. According to Sec. 2 of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands t
o be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to t
he avails of the suit. We stand by the ruling in Fortich v. Corona that farmer-b
eneficiaries, who are not approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-int
erest. In Fortich, the farmers who intervened in the case were mere recommendees
. The peculiar circumstances of this case should be noted. This petition origina
ted from an application for exemption from CARP which was filed by the responden
ts before the Regional Director of the DAR. Petitioner entered the picture when
the DAR's Orders were reversed by the OP. Petitioner's lack of capacity to inter
vene in the case may not have been an issue before the OP since in administrativ
e cases, technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. In fact, Sec. 50
of R.A. 6657 expressly allows farmer leaders to "represent themselves, their fe
llow farmers, or



their organization in any proceedings before the DAR." This right of representat
ion generally continues in appeals in congruence with the provisions of Rule 3 o
f the Revised Rules of Court. In the case at bar, members of petitioner Samahan
are mere qualified beneficiaries of CARP. The certification that CLOAs were alre
ady generated in their names, but were not issued because of the present dispute
, does not vest any right to the farmers since the fact remains that they have n
ot yet been approved as awardees, actually awarded lands, or granted CLOAs. Resp
ondents cannot be considered estopped from questioning petitioner's legal standi
ng since petitioner appeared before the OP after the latter decided in responden
ts' favor. When the petitioner appealed the case to the CA, respondents duly que
stioned the petitioner's capacity to sue. Thus, having resolved that the respond
ents have no legal standing to sue and are not the real parties-in-interest, we
find no more necessity to take up the other issues.
EXEMPTION; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ARE GENERALLY ACCORDED RE
SPECT AND EVEN FINALITY BY THE SUPREME COURT
Department of Agrarian Reform, rep. by OIC-Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman vs. O
roville Development Corp., rep. by Antonio H. Tiu and Waldo G. Rebolos G.R. No.
170823 (March 27, 2007)
Facts:



On July 7, 1997, petitioner, Oroville applied with DAR Regional Office No. X for
exclusion of the subject property from CARP coverage pursuant to DAR Administra
tive Order No. 06, s. of 1994. Petitioner alleged that the property was reclassi
fied into residential use prior to June 15, 1998, the date of effectivity of RA
6557, per Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance No. 880, s. of 1979 of Cagayan de Oro C
ity, as approved by the HLURB on September 24, 1980. On May 25, 1998, DAR Secret
ary Garilao issued an Order denying petitioner's application, declaring it as ag
ricultural and coverable under CARP. Petitioners' MR was denied thru an Order is
sued by DAR Secretary Braganza on June 20, 2002, affirming Sec. Garilao's order.
Petitioner elevated the DAR Orders to the Office of the President (OP). OP rend
ered a Decision on June 27, 2003, affirming the two earlier decisions of the DAR
Secretaries. Petitioner's MR was denied by the OP in its Resolution dated Decem
ber 9, 2003.







On petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals
was faced with the issue of whether the subject property is classified as agric
ultural as found by the DAR Secretary and affirmed by the OP, or residential as
alleged by respondent Oroville. CA initially declared in its Decision dated Marc
h 16, 2005 that the subject property is agricultural on the basis of a later cer
tification to this effect dated February 10, 1997 issued by the City Development
Coordinator of the City Planning and Development Office which superseded the Ce
rtification dated November 22, 1993 issued by the same authority. Upon Oroville'
s motion for reconsideration, however, the CA set aside its earlier Decision and
ruled that the subject property has been reclassified as residential and theref
ore beyond the coverage of CARP. This time, the appellate court gave credence to
three (3) Zoning Certifications dated July 23, 2004 issued by the Assistant Cit
y Development Coordinator of the City Planning and Development Office to the eff
ect that the subject property is within the city's potential growth areas for ur
ban expansion. According to the Court of Appeals, these certifications were not
considered by the court in the resolution of Oroville's petition because they we
re not yet in existence when the petition was filed on February 24, 2004. In its
Petition for Review dated January 9, 2006, the DAR seeks the reversal of the ap
pellate court's Amended Decision, arguing that the latter precipitately relied o
n the Zoning Certifications issued by the City Planning and Development Office a
nd erroneously assumed that a local government unit such as Cagayan de Oro City
has unconditional authority to classify and reclassify lands within its territor
ial jurisdiction. The DAR points out that the Assistant City Development Coordin
ator herself clarified, in a letter dated December 2, 2005, that the zoning clas
sification of the subject property remains to be agricultural considering that t
he 1979 Zoning Code of Cagayan de Oro City is still in force. Further, the Zonin
g Certifications do not qualify as newly discovered evidence because the suppose
d basis for these certifications, City Ordinance No. 7959, was already in effect
in 2001, years before the Court of Appeals rendered its original Decision in 20
05. The DAR maintains that the Certification dated February 10, 1997 to the effe
ct that the subject property is agricultural should be upheld because it was bas
ed not only on a zoning ordinance but, more importantly, was approved prior to t
he effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) in 1988. Oroville
centers its comment on the argument that the subject property had been classifi
ed as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL and the Local Government
Code (LGC). Moreover, it avers that the subject property has been consistently d
eclared as residential land as shown in previous tax declarations. The DAR asser
ts that tax declarations are not conclusive of the nature of the property for zo
ning purposes. In the Orders dated May 25, 1998 and June 20, 2002, the DAR decla
red the property to be agricultural on the basis primarily of the Certification
dated February 10, 1997 prepared by the City Planning and Development Office sta
ting

that it is within AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT per provision of Section 22-A of the 199
4 Certified Ordinance of the City of Cagayan de Oro." Issue:

Whether or not Certifications issued by the City Planning and Development Office
are conclusive in determining whether a landholding is exempt from CARP coverag
e?
Held:



In order to be exempt from CARP coverage, the subject property must have been cl
assified as industrial/residential before June 15, 1988. In this case, the DAR's
examination of the zoning ordinances and certifications pertaining to the subje
ct property, as well as its field investigation, disclosed that the same remains
to be agricultural. The Zoning Certifications to the effect that the land is wi
thin the city's potential growth area for urban expansion are inconsequential as
they do not reflect the present classification of the land but merely its inten
ded land use. Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by subs
tantial evidence, a situation that obtains in this case. The factual findings of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who, by reason of his official position, has a
cquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full resp
ect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or revers
ed. More so, because the DAR's findings have gone up the ladder of administrativ
e process and have been affirmed by the Office of the President. Petition is GRA
NTED. OF SUGARLANDS;
COVERAGE; COVERAGE AND ACQUISITION VALIDITY OF SECTION 16, R.A. NO. 6657
Confederation of Sugar Producers Association, Inc., (CONFED), et al. vs. Departm
ent of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Land Registrat
ion Authority (LRA) G.R. No. 169514 (March 30, 2007)
Facts:

A Prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restr
aining order filed by the Confederation of Sugar Producers Association, Inc.,


et al. It seeks, inter alia, to enjoin the Department of Agrarian Reform, the La
nd Bank of the Philippines, and the Land Registration Authority from "subjecting
the sugarcane farms of Petitioner Planters to eminent domain or compulsory acqu
isition without filing the necessary expropriation proceedings pursuant to the p
rovisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and/or without the application or con
formity of a majority of the regular farmworkers on said farms." Petitioners CON
FED, NFSP, UNIFED and PANAYFED claim that their members own or administer privat
e agricultural lands devoted to sugarcane. They and their predecessors-in-intere
st have been planting sugarcane on their lands allegedly since time immemorial.
While their petition is denominated as one for prohibition and mandamus, the pet
itioners likewise seek to nullify paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Section 16 of R
epublic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. In other words, their arguments, which will be discussed shortly, are ancho
red on the proposition that these provisions are unconstitutional.
Issue:

Whether or not DAR acted in excess of jurisdiction by exercising the Power of Em
inent Domain to Deprive Thousands of Landowners, including the MemberPlanters of
Petitioner-Federations of their Private Agricultural Lands, without Filing the
Necessary Expropriation Proceedings pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court in
Gross Violation of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution?
Held:



In Association of Small Landowners, the Court categorically passed upon and uphe
ld the validity of Section 16 of RA 6657, including paragraphs (d), (e) and (f),
which sets forth the manner of acquisition of private agricultural lands and as
certainment of just compensation. The foregoing disquisition is binding and appl
icable to the present case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et n
on quieta movere which means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle thing
s which are established." Under the doctrine, when the Supreme Court has once la
id down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will ad
here to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substa
ntially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. T
he doctrine of stare decisis is based upon the legal principle or rule involved
and not upon the judgment which results therefrom. Contrary to the petitioners'
submission that the compulsory acquisition procedure adopted by the DAR is witho
ut legal basis, it is actually based on Section 16 of RA 6657. Under the said la
w, there are two modes of acquisition of private





agricultural lands: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for compulsory acqui
sition is that prescribed under Section 16 of RA 6657. The procedure prescribed
in Section 16 of RA 6657 is a summary administrative proceeding. As outlined in
Roxas, the said procedure, taken together with the pertinent administrative issu
ances of the DAR, ensures compliance with the due process requirements of the la
w. More importantly, this summary administrative proceeding does not preclude ju
dicial determination of just compensation. In fact, paragraph (e) of Section 16
of RA 6657 is categorical on this point as it provides that "[a]ny party who dis
agrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdictio
n for final determination of just compensation." The petitioners' main objection
to paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of Section 16 of RA 6657 is that they are allege
dly in complete disregard of the expropriation proceedings prescribed under Rule
67 of the Rules of Court. The petitioners' argument does not persuade. As decla
red by the Court in Association of Small Landowners, we are not dealing here wit
h the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain, but a revolutionary k
ind of expropriation: Indeed, it is not within the power of the Court to pass up
on or look into the wisdom of the inclusion by Congress of the sugar lands in th
e coverage of RA 6657. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary
cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the
legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the o
thers, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or f
ield of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire int
o or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken
or decisions made by the other departments. Petition is dismissed.
SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL; WHAT IS REQUIRED IN SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Fernando Alsua, namely: Clotilde S. Al
sua, Roberto S. Alsua, Ma. Elena S. Alsua and Ramon Alsua G.R. No. 167361 (April
2, 2007)
Facts:


Respondents are the heirs of the late Fernando Alsua, who was the registered own
er of various parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of approximate
ly 50 hectares situated in Catomag, Guinobatan, Albay. The Department of Agraria
n Reform initiated proceedings to acquire respondents' properties via the Compul
sory Acquisition Scheme under the Comprehensive




Agrarian Reform Law. Petitioner LBP valued the properties at P2,361,799.91, whic
h respondents rejected. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Boa
rd (DARAB) commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the compens
ation for respondents' lands which eventually came out with a decision fixing th
e value of the properties at P4,806,109.05, to which respondents opposed. On 11
April 2002, petitioner LBP filed a petition for the determination of just compen
sation before the RTC, Branch 3, Legazpi City which issued an Order dismissing t
he petition for failure to prosecute within reasonable length of time. Petitione
r's counsel sought reconsideration of the order of dismissal, however, the trial
court denied the same because it was filed one day late and lacked merit. Petit
ioner elevated to the Court of Appeals the issue of the timeliness of the filing
of its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insisted that the copy of the ord
er of dismissal should be deemed received upon delivery to petitioner's counsel
and not upon receipt by petitioner's guard on duty. On 17 September 2004, the Co
urt of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, dismissing the petition for re
view. The Court of Appeals cited Rule 13, Section 8 and Section 10 of the Rules
of Court in disregarding petitioner's proposition that the fifteen-day period fo
r filing the motion for reconsideration should be reckoned from its counsel's ac
tual receipt of the order of dismissal. It explained that the purpose of this ru
le on service by registered mail is "to place the date of receipt of pleadings,
judgments and processes beyond the power of the party being served to determine
at his pleasure."
Issue:

What is required in service by registered mail?
Held:



All that the rules of procedure require in regard to service by registered mail
is to have the postmaster deliver the same to the addressee himself or to a pers
on of sufficient discretion to receive the same. Thus, in prior cases, a housema
id, or a bookkeeper of the company, or a clerk who was not even authorized to re
ceive the papers on behalf of its employer, was considered within the scope of "
a person of sufficient discretion to receive the registered mail." The paramount
consideration is that the registered mail is delivered to the recipient's addre
ss and received by a person who would be able to appreciate the importance of th
e papers delivered to him, even if that person is not a subordinate or employee
of the recipient or authorized by a special power of attorney. In the instant ca
se, the receipt by the security guard of the order of dismissal should be deemed
receipt by petitioner's counsel as well.


The instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; ESSENTIAL REQUISITES; TENANCY IS NOT A PURELY FACTUAL RELA
TIONSHIP IT IS ALSO A LEGAL RELATIONSHIP
Loreto Reyes vs. Spouses Honorio and Josefina B. Joson, Dominador Masangkay, and
Renato Robles G.R. No. 143111 (June 7, 2007)
Facts:






Sometime in 1963, Hilarion Caragay hired Loreto Reyes, petitioner, as caretaker/
watcher of a fishpond situated in Doa Francisca, Balanga, Bataan. Caragay was then
leasing the fishpond from its owner, Apolonio Aguirre. In 1973, Caragay's lease
contract expired. Tomas Aguirre, son of Apolonio Aguirre (deceased), leased the
fishpond to Honorio Joson for the period from 1973 to 1982. Upon the expiration
of the lease in 1982, Tomas Aguirre appointed Joson administrator of the fishpo
nd. As administrator of the fishpond, Joson, in June 1984, leased it to Felizard
o Malibiran for five years. The lease contract bears the signature of petitioner
as bantay palaisdaan. Malibiran then retained petitioner as fishpond caretaker/
watcher during the five-year lease period. Upon the expiration of Malibiran's le
ase, possession of the fishpond reverted to Joson who allowed petitioner to cont
inue working as caretaker/watcher. Sometime in November 1989, Caragay, the forme
r lessee, re-entered the fishpond and proceeded to harvest bangus and prawns the
refrom with the assistance of petitioner. Caragay refused to vacate the premises
, prompting Joson to file with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balanga, Bataa
n a complaint for forcible entry. Eventually, the parties reached a compromise a
greement which was approved by MTC in a decision dated March 4, 1990. However, C
aragay and his workers, including petitioner, failed to comply with the compromi
se agreement, hence, the MTC issued a writ of execution. Thereupon, petitioner f
iled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Balanga, Bataan a petition f
or injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against spouse
s Honorio and Josefina Joson, et al. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition for injunction for lack of jurisdiction. On October 1, 1990, petitioner
filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD), San Ferna
ndo, Pampanga a complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for
a TRO.




The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a Decision, declaring the plaintiff, Loreto
Reyes, the lawful tenant over the subject landholding, making the temporary rest
raining order permanent, and ordering the respondent to respect the peaceful pos
session and actual occupation of the plaintiff Loreto Reyes. On appeal, the DARA
B, affirmed the judgment of the PARAD. With the denial of their motion for recon
sideration by the DARAB, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for review, alleging in that the DARAB erred in finding that petitioner is an ag
ricultural tenant. On March 13, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
granting respondents' petition and setting aside the DARAB's challenged Decisio
n.
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural tenant?
Held:




The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is int
ent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged
tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the pa
rties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, their written agreements,
provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more imp
ortant. The essential requisites to establish a tenancy relationship are: 1) tha
t the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that t
he subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; 3) that there is con
sent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relatio
nship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal culti
vation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. All the
above elements must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship. The absenc
e of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, a cultivator or a plante
r thereon, a de jure tenant. It is only when an individual has established his s
tatus as a de jure tenant that he is entitled to security of tenure and would th
us come under the coverage of existing tenancy laws. Moreover, mere occupation o
r cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or
farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. Occupan
cy and continued possession do not make one a de jure tenant. Tenancy status onl
y arises if an occupant has been given possession of an agricultural landholding
for the primary purpose of agricultural production which, in this case, is sign
ificantly absent. Based on the records, petitioner was a mere fishpond watcher/c
aretaker.


As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, there is no evidence to prove petiti
oner's claim he is a tenant on the subject fishpond. His bare assertions are ins
ufficient. To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is
substantial, defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accep
t as adequate to support a conclusion.
LAND VALUATION; VALUATION OF LAND COVERED UNDER P.D. 27
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Sps. Vicente M. Estanislao and Luz B. Hermosa G
.R. No. 166777 (July 10, 2007)
Facts:







Petitioner challenges, via petition for review, the Court of Appeals' Decision a
ffirming the valuation and determination of just compensation by the Regional Tr
ial Court of Balanga City, Branch I, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Spouses Vicente M. Estanislao and Luz B. Hermosa (respondents) are the registere
d owners of eight parcels of land situated in Hermosa, Bataan with a total land
area of 10.8203 hectares covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles. Sometime in
1996, 1997 and 1999, 10.5321 hectares (subject lots) of respondents' lands were
awarded to tenant-beneficiaries pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program
(OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Applying Executive Order (E.O.)
228, petitioner, together with the Department of Agrarian Reform, valued the sub
ject lots at P97,895 or P1.075 per square meter. The formula used by petitioner
and the DAR to compute the amount payable to respondents: is LV (land value) = A
GP (average gross production) x 2.5 x GSP (government support price) Upon the re
quest of the DAR, petitioner deposited the amount of P237,089.02, in cash and in
bond, in favor of respondents. Respondents subsequently filed a complaint befor
e the SAC, against the DAR, the petitioner, and the OLT tenantbeneficiaries. The
SAC, which named a panel of Commissioners to receive and evaluate evidence on t
he amount of compensation to be paid to respondents, rendered a Decision on Octo
ber 8, 2003, fixing the just compensation at P20 per square meter. Only petition
er filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the SAC, which motion w
as denied, hence, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
SAC decision, hence, this petition.
Issue:


What is the land valuation formula that can be utilized in fixing the just compe
nsation of landholding that is covered under P.D. 27?
Held:




This Court held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad that seizure of lan
dholdings or properties covered by P.D. No. 27 did not take place on October 21,
1972, but upon the payment of just compensation. Taking into account the passag
e in 1988 of R.A. No. 6657 pending the settlement of just compensation, this Cou
rt concluded that it is R.A. No. 6657 which is the applicable law, with P.D. No.
27 and E.O. 228 having only suppletory effect. Land Bank's contention that the
property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the t
ime of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the v
alue of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993,
is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of A
ppeals, we ruled that theseizure of the landholding did not take place on the da
te of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensa
tion. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process
is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has
yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) be
fore the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined
and the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable
law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our r
uling in Paris v. Alfeche. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just c
ompensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the
DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of ti
me. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and
not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation
should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
JURISDICTION; DARAB HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REVERSE THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF D
AR ON QUALIFICATION OF FB's
Sonny B. Manuel vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and
Pedro Tejada G.R. No. 149095 (July 24, 2007)
Facts:





The estate of Juan C. Cojuangco at Bakal 1, Talavera, Nueva Ecija (Cojuangco est
ate) was placed under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree (P
.D.) No. 27. A portion thereof was awarded to Pedro Tejada (Tejada) as shown by
Emancipation Patent (EP), issued in his name. Petitioner filed with the Provinci
al Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), Nueva Ecija, a Petition praying t
hat the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Talavera, Nueva Ecija and th
e Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be directed to cancel EP issued in the name o
f Tejada and to generate and register a new emancipation patent in his name. PAR
AB rendered a Decision, on November 11, 1996 ordering the MARO of Talavera, Nuev
a Ecija and/or the PARO of DAR North, Nueva Ecija to cancel the EP issued to res
pondent Pedro Tejada and generate a new EP in the name of petitioner Sonny Manue
l and ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel EP 22205 issued in
the name of respondent Pedro Tejada and register the new EP thus generated by t
he DAR in the name of Sonny Manuel. On appeal by Tejada, the DARAB issued a Deci
sion affirming the cancellation of EP No. 22205 but, at the same time, denying p
etitioner's application for EP. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the
CA which affirmed in toto the DARAB Decision, adding that petitioner's employmen
t as a Municipal Engineer and his having established residence in a municipality
different from where the subject property is located constitute abandonment. Pe
titioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in CA Resolution.
Issues:

Whether or not the DARAB has incidental jurisdiction to resolve an application f
or emancipation of patent in the exercise of its original jurisdiction? Whether
or not DARAB may inquire into and reverse the finding of DAR on the status of th
e applicants as an agrarian reform beneficiary?
Held:



Section 50 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, reiterating Section 17, Chapter IV o
f Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229, vested in DAR both quasi-judicial authority to
adjudicate agrarian reform issues and administrative prerogative to determine m
atters involving implementation of agrarian laws. Inherent in the power of DAR t
o undertake land distribution for agrarian reform purposes is its authority to i
dentify qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries. Corollary to it is also the aut
hority of DAR to select a substitute to a previously designated beneficiary who
may have surrendered or abandoned his claim, and to reallocate the land awarded
to the latter in favor of the former. Since the identification and selection of
CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementat
ion of the CARP, it behooves the courts to




exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unles
s there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. It
should also be equally binding on the DARAB for the simple reason that the latte
r has no appellate jurisdiction over the former: the DARAB cannot review much le
ss reverse the administrative findings of DAR. Instead, the DARAB would do well
to defer to DAR expertise when it comes to the identification and selection of b
eneficiaries. In proceedings for issuance of registered emancipation patents to
an applicant who has been appointed substitute beneficiary by DAR, the authority
of the DARAB is limited to the examination of the applicant's full-fledged memb
ership in a recognized farmers' cooperative, as evidenced by a certification to
that effect issued by the SN and a final reallocation order issued by DAR. In sa
id proceedings, the DARAB cannot review, much less overturn, the administrative
assessment made by DAR on the qualifications of said applicant to be an agrarian
reform beneficiary. However, if the proceeding instituted is for cancellation o
f a registered emancipation patent, then the DARAB has the authority to inquire
into the qualifications of the holder of the emancipation patent to determine wh
ether the latter committed misrepresentation as to his basic qualifications, whi
ch is one of the grounds for cancellation of his emancipation patent. It is clea
r that the DARAB and the CA went overboard when they reversed the administrative
finding of DAR on the qualifications of petitioner. As the proceeding filed bef
ore the DARAB involved merely an application for issuance of emancipation patent
, it should have limited its adjudication to these questions: a) whether petitio
ner has been appointed a substitute beneficiary by virtue of a final reallocatio
n order issued by DAR; b) whether he is a full-fledged member of the SN; and c)
whether he has paid in full the amount of just compensation.
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; SECURITY OF TENURE OF AGRICULTURAL LESSEE
Dolores Granada vs. Bormaheco, Inc., Represented by its Branch Manager, Hernane
Lozanes G.R. No. 154481 (July 27, 2007)
Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for Status Quo with Prayer for the Issuance of a Pre
liminary Injunction, before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) i
n Bacolod City, wherein she sought to prevent respondent Border Machinery and He
avy Equipment Co., Inc. (BORMAHECO) from ejecting her from a parcel of land, wit
h an area of 2.5 hectares and with 300 coconut trees growing on subject property
.






Petitioner alleges that as early as 1950, her father, Alfredo Granada, was the a
gricultural lessee of the subject property, which was then owned by Augusto Vill
arosa. When Augusto Villarosa sold the subject property to respondent in 1965, s
he claims that Alfredo Granada continued to occupy the subject property as an ag
ricultural lessee until his death in 1981. Thereafter, petitioner succeeded to h
er father's rights as an agricultural lessee. Since then, she had cultivated the
subject property and paid all rent due thereon. On 1984, petitioner and respond
ent executed a Contract of Lease which provided that the lease covered the cocon
ut trees growing on the subject property. Meanwhile, in a Decision, the PARAD de
creed that no agricultural leasehold relationship existed between respondent and
petitioner. It also found that there was no showing that the purpose of the lea
se was for agricultural production since rent was paid in terms of money and not
crops, and that the contract of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate t
hat the petitioner shall cultivate the subject property. It further ruled that t
he subject property was not agricultural, but industrial or residential in natur
e. On appeal, the DARAB, in its Decision, reversed the PARAD Decision. It pronou
nced that the subject land was agricultural in nature as evidenced by the Certif
ication issued by the Local Assessment Operations Officer, stating that the same
was officially classified as "cocoland." It further declared that the written 1
984 contract of lease, is not reflective of the true intent of the parties. Even
though the contract stipulated that only the coconut trees were covered, the DA
RAB resolved that petitioner was in actual possession of the land and cultivated
the same. Respondent then filed Petition for Certiorari at Court of Appeals whe
re the CA rendered decision dated 12 April 2002 reversing the DARAB and upholdin
g PARAD decision. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was subse
quently denied by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural leasehold tenant entitled to se
curity of tenure?
Held:

The petition is meritorious. The essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy
relationship as follows: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or ag
ricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural la
nd; (3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) The purpos
e of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is pe
rsonal cultivation on the part of the tenant



or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee. The definition of cultivation is not limited
merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promoti
on of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the
products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique
agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not
need harrowing or plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient dep
th and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof cover
ed by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years.
The major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fr
uit bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking
care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby i
ncreasing the produce. It is clear from the foregoing that the requirements of a
gricultural leasehold tenancy are met in this case.
JUST COMPENSATION; BASIS FOR COMPUTATION OF THE FIXING OF JUST COMPENSATION
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Luz Lim and Purita Lim Cabochan G.R. No. 171941
(August 2, 2007)
Facts:




Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the Department of Agr
arian Reform compulsorily acquired 32.8363 hectares of agricultural land situate
d in Patag, Irosin, Sorsogon (the property) owned by respondents Luz Lim and Pur
ita Lim Cabochan. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) computed the val
ue of the property at P725,804.21. Respondents rejected petitioner's valuation.
Thus, pursuant to Section 16 (d) of RA 6657, a summary administrative proceeding
was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to dete
rmine the valuation of the property. The PARAD initially valued it at P1,174,659
.60 but later reduced the amount to P725,804.21 upon motion of petitioner. Dissa
tisfied with the PARAD's decision, respondents filed on January 26, 1998 a petit
ion for determination of just compensation with the RTC of Sorsogon where they p
rayed for a compensation of at least P150,000 per hectare, or an aggregate amoun
t of P4,925,445. The case proceeded to trial, with the RTC appointing each party
's nominee as commissioner. On September 14, 2001, Branch 52 of the Sorsogon RTC
renders decision adopting the valuation submitted by respondents' commissioner
(P1,548,000).

Both parties moved for reconsideration. On December 21, 2001 Order, the RTC reco
nsidered its earlier decision and increased the valuation to P2,232,868.40. Issu
e:

Whether the RTC erred in dispensing with the formula prescribed by DAR Administr
ative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11
, series of 1994?
Held:


In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, this Court underscored the man
datory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 1194. The amount of P2,232,868 adopted by the RTC in its December 21, 2001 Order w
as not based on any of the mandatory formulas prescribed in DAR AO 6-92, as amen
ded by DAR AO 11-94, the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the valuation a
dopted by the RTC. The Court is thus compelled to remand the case for determinat
ion of the valuation of the property by the RTC which is mandated to consider th
e factors provided under above quoted Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as tran
slated into the formula prescribed in DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94. D
ARAB's JURISDICTION ON THE
EMANCIPATION PATENT; CANCELLATION OF EP
Heirs of Florencio Adolfo vs. Victoria P. Cabral, et al. G.R. No. 164934 (August
14, 2007)
Facts:




The controversy involves two parcels of land consisting of 29,759 square meters
and 957 square meters, respectively, situated in Barangay Iba (now Pantok), Meyc
auayan, Bulacan. Petitioners are the heirs of the late Florencio Adolfo, Sr. The
y alleged that the parcels were included in the Operation Land Transfer program
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Thus, their father applied with the Min
istry of Agrarian Reform (now Department of Agrarian Reform) for the purchase of
these parcels. On April 25, 1988, he was issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) Nos.
A-117858 and A-117859-H, which became the basis for the issuance of Transfer Ce
rtificates of Titles (TCTs) Nos. EP-003(M) and EP-004(M) on October 24, 1989. Re
spondent Victoria P. Cabral alleged that she is the lawful and registered owner
of the lands covered by petitioners' emancipation patents and certificates of ti
tles as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds of





Meycauayan, Bulacan, issued on January 6, 1960. She also averred that petitioner
s' emancipation patents should be cancelled since (1) these covered nonagricultu
ral lands outside the coverage of P.D. No. 27; (2) these were issued without due
notice and hearing; and (3) no Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) were previo
usly issued. On August 26, 2003, respondent Cabral filed with the DARAB, Region
III, Branch II, Malolos City, Bulacan, a petition for the cancellation of petiti
oners' emancipation patents and torrens titles and the revival of the respondent
's previous title. Petitioner move to dismiss the petition due to (1) lack of ju
risdiction (2) lack of legal personality to sue (3) prescription. On November 20
, 2003, the PARAD denied the motion and upheld the DARAB's jurisdiction to deter
mine and adjudicate cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of
emancipation patents. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals. On May 18, 2004, the appellate court dismissed the petition due to p
etitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies since the orders of the P
ARAD should have been elevated for review to the DARAB. Meanwhile, the PARAD ren
dered a Decision on June 18, 2004, canceling petitioners' emancipation patents a
nd ordering the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to revive respondent C
abral's OCT No. 0-1670 [now OCT No. 0-220(M)]. That decision is on appeal with t
he DARAB.
Issue:

Does the DARAB have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for the cancellation o
f emancipation patents and certificates of titles?
Held:


Specific and general provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657 and its implementing rules
and procedure address the issue of jurisdiction. Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657
confers on the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) quasi-judicial powers to adj
udicate agrarian reform matters. In the process of reorganizing the DAR, Executi
ve Order No. 129-A created the DARAB to assume the powers and functions with res
pect to the adjudication of agrarian reform matters. Section 1, Rule II of the D
ARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure enumerates the cases falling within its primary and
exclusive original jurisdiction. Subparagraph 1.6 provides that the DARAB has j
urisdiction over cases involving the correction, partition, cancellation, second
ary and subsequent issuances of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Auth
ority (the Registry of Deeds). Incidentally, under


DAR Memorandum Order No. 02, one of the grounds for the cancellation of register
ed EPs is that the land is exempt or excluded from P.D. No. 27. In respondent Ca
bral's petition before the DARAB, she sought the cancellation of petitioners' em
ancipation patents and torrens titles. She impugned the legality of the emancipa
tion patents since (1) these covered non-agricultural lands outside the coverage
of P.D. No. 27, (2) these were issued without due notice and hearing, and (3) n
o CLTs were previously issued. Based on these material averments, it is crystalclear that the action was one for cancellation of emancipation patents on the gr
ound of exemption or exclusion from the coverage of P.D. No. 27. Indisputably, j
urisdiction is properly vested with the DARAB.
LAND VALUATION; FINALITY OF DARAB DECISION ON LAND VALUATION
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2
007)
Facts:




After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform, on November 1
6, 1993, of respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San
Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrari
an Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered P1
,955,485.60 as just compensation, for which respondent rejected. Thus, the Depar
tment of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, through its Provincial Agrarian Ref
orm Adjudicator conducted summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary
determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CAR
L. On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment ordering th
e LBP to pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered wit
h the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUND
RED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50). A petition for the fixing of
just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel before the Special Agrarian C
ourt (SAC) of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon. Meanwhile, responde
nt, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Of
fice of the PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was ev
entually granted on November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for reconsi
deration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004.


LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resoluti
on. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instit
uted a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September 28, 2004 dism
issed the petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of
execution despite the pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensatio
n with the SAC?
Held:



In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same ti
me petitioned for their annulment via certiorariunder Rule 65. In both proceedin
gs, the parties are identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In the tw
o actions, petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD resolutions should n
ot be executed in view of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just compen
sation with the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two fora could come u
p with conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be avoided by
the rule against forum-shopping. We find petitioner not entitled to the grant o
f a writ of certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD di
d not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4,
2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. In Philip
pine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian Reform Adju
dication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the
effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after
the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's
petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days afte
r its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the reglementary pe
riod, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could very well issue
the writ of execution.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CANNOT BE PRESUMED
Marino Escariz y de los Santos vs. Genaro D. Revilleza G.R. No. 155544 (August 2
4, 2007)
Facts:






This controversy involves a fruit orchard situated in San Isidro, Calauan, Lagun
a with an area of 6,967 square meters. Respondent Genaro D. Revilleza, bought th
e orchard from Jose Velasco and had the property registered in his name under Tr
ansfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-98856 and T-98857. On December 17, 1993, Mari
no Escariz, petitioner, filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Ad
judicator, Region IV a complaint for "Recognition of Security of Tenure with Dam
ages and Prayer for Accounting and Depositing of Tenant's Share Pending Litigati
on" against respondent, docketed as DARAB Case No. LA-0336-93. In his answer, re
spondent denied any tenancy relationship with petitioner, claiming that the latt
er is actually a tenant of the owner of a neighboring riceland. He would occasio
nally hire petitioner to work on his orchard on a piecework basis. Petitioner il
legally entered the property by erecting a shack where he lives. Respondent then
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. In a Decision dated October 11, 1994
, the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator rendered its Decision i
n favor of petitioner. On appeal by respondent, the DARAB, in its Decision, affi
rmed the assailed judgment with modification permanentlyprohibiting the responde
nt landowner from disturbing the complainant's peaceful possession and cultivati
on of the subject premises as a legitimate tenant/lessee thereon. Respondent fil
ed a motion for reconsideration but the DARAB denied the same. On appeal the Cou
rt of Appeals rendered its Decision on October 21, 1999 finding that none of the
elements of a tenancy relationship exists.
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is a bona fide tenant?
Held:

Petitioner is not a bona fide tenant. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed.
There must be evidence to prove that a tenancy relationship exists. The followi
ng are the elements of tenancy relationship: o o o o o Parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee Subject matter is an agricultural land Co
nsent of the parties Purpose is agricultural production Personal cultivation

o

Harvest is shared
In Caballes v. DAR, all elements must concur for a tenancy relationship to exist
. Absent such status as a de jure tenant, a person is not entitled to security o
f tenure There is no evidence on record of the following elements: o o Consent o
f the parties Sharing of harvest


Tenancy is a legal relationship. The principal factor in determining its existen
ce is the intent of the parties. Other than the self-serving statement of petiti
oner that he is a tenant, there is no concrete evidence to show that the parties
agreed to establish such a relationship. To prove sharing of harvests, a receip
t or any other similar evidence must be presented, self-serving statements are i
nadequate. Petition denied.
JURISDICTION; DARAB HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ANNULMENT OF REGISTERED CLOA's
Mariano Dao-Ayan vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) G.
R. No. 172109 (August 29, 2007)
Facts:


Assailed via petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of A
ppeals affirming the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) which affirmed the decision of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudi
cator of the DARAB, Region X, Malaybalay City dismissing the complaint of herein
petitioners-father and son Mariano Dao-ayan (Mariano) and Marjun Dao-ayan (Marj
un) against respondents Araneta Landless Agrarian Reform Farmers Association (AL
ARFA), the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Bukidnon, and the Register of D
eeds of Bukidnon, for Annulment and Cancellation of Certificate of Title of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00371923 and TCT No. AT-9035. After Lot No. 209 (the
lot), which is located at Kahaponan, Valencia City, Bukidnon belonging to the A
gricultural Research Farm Incorporated, was placed under the Comprehensive Agrar
ian Reform Program (CARP), Marjun filed an application before the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office No. 10 as a farmer-beneficiary thereof. It
appears, however, that Marjun's name as applicant was later delisted.







It turned out that ALARFA had filed a Petition for Disqualification of Mariano a
s Farmer-Beneficiary under the CARP on the ground that he already possessed subs
tantial real properties to thus bar him from being a farmer-beneficiary, and tha
t acting on the petition for disqualification, DAR Regional Director Rogelio Tam
in disqualified Mariano as farmer-beneficiary, he having been found to be, among
other things, already a beneficiary under Operation Land Transfer of P.D. No. 2
7 of at least three parcels of land totaling 2.2938 hectares. The DAR Regional D
irector subsequently issued to ALARFA on October 20, 1997 the CLOA, on account o
f which the TCT was issued in ALARFA's name, represented by Claudio A. Fuentes.
Petitioners filed a motion to stay execution of the award of the CLOA to ALARFA,
claiming that they were not given notice of the Petition for Disqualification a
nd of the Decision of the DAR Regional Director thereon. In the meantime, the Pr
ovincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), by installation order, directed the MAR
O of Valencia, Bukidnon to install ALARFA on the lot and to order the occupantsnon beneficiary including petitioner to vacate the same. Petitioner thus filed t
he complaint subject of the present petition, for annulment and cancellation of
ALARFA's CLOA against ALARFA, the PARO, the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon. The D
ARAB, Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication dismissed petitioners complaint. The
DARAB affirmed the dismissed as did the Court of Appeals. The DARAB affirmed th
e dismissal as did the Court of Appeals.
Issues:

Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the annulment of registered CLOAs
Whether or not the decision of the DAR RD disqualifying petitioners and the awa
rding of the CLOA to respondent ALARFA has already become final and executory su
ch that it may no longer be questioned in further proceedings
Ruling on the 1st Issue:

DARAB has jurisdiction Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules enumerates the
cases over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction: o (f) those inv
olving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are regi
stered with the Land Registration Authority o Matters involving strictly the adm
inistrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, shall be the exclusive prerogative
of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR


Section 2 of DAR A.O. No. 06-00 (ALI Rules) enumerates the cases over which the
DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction: (d) issuance, recall or cancellation o
f EPs or CLOAs not yet registered with the ROD Prior to registration with the RO
D, cases involving the issuance, recall or cancellation of CLOAs or EPs are with
in the jurisdiction of the DAR Since the complaint was for cancellation of a CLO
A which had already been registered, the DARAB correctly assumed jurisdiction ov
er it
Ruling on the 2nd Issue:

The Regional Director's resolution has already become final and executory Sectio
n 15, Chapter 3 Book VII of Administrative Code of 1987 provides: "Section 15. F
inality of Order.
The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fift
een (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affecte
d unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if prop
er, has been perfected."


There is no proof that petitioners were given notice of the proceedings before t
he DAR RD. Thus, the counting of the 15-day prescriptive period commenced upon t
he registration of the CLOA on October 28, 1997 which is considered constructive
notice as against the whole world, or on December 12, 1997, the date petitioner
s filed a motion to stay execution of the DAR RD's resolution granting the CLOA
to ALARFA No appeal having been taken by petitioners within the 15-day prescript
ive period counted from any of said two dates, the assailed DAR Regional Directo
r's resolution had become final and executory long before petitioners filed on J
une 22, 1998 the complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of the CLOA. TO RETENT
ION ON
RETENTION; LANDOWNER'S RIGHT LANDHOLDING COVERED UNDER P.D. 27
Josephine A. Taguinod and Vic A. Aguila vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 15
4654 (September 14, 2007)
Facts:

Salud Alvarez Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots with Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-12368 and T-65348, with an aggregate area of
10.4496 hectares, being 7.8262 hectares and 2.6234 hectares, respectively, both









under the Registry of Deeds of Isabela, Cagayan. TCT No. T-12368 emanated from O
riginal Certificate of Title (OCT) No. I-3423 which was issued on January 11, 19
36 based on a homestead patent issued on December 18, 1935. On the other hand, T
CT No. T-65348 was derived from TCT No. T-36200-A which cancelled OCT No. I-2965
. OCT No. I-2965 was issued on May 27, 1935 on the basis of a homestead patent i
ssued on June 27, 1935. Subsequently, the 7.8262-hectare lot covered by TCT No.
T-12368 was transferred to and registered in the name of petitioner Vic A. Aguil
a (who was then 14 years old) under TCT No. T-90872 dated January 19, 1976; whil
e the other 2.6234-hectare lot under TCT No. T-65348 was transferred to petition
er Josephine A. Taguinod. Both disputed lots were placed under the coverage of t
he OLT pursuant to PD 27. Petitioner Vic A. Aguila, Salud Aguila, on behalf of t
hen minor petitioner Aguila, filed a notarized application for retention on Janu
ary 26, 1976. On October 24, 1984, when he was already of age, petitioner Aguila
filed a letterprotest for exclusion or exemption from the OLT of his landholdin
g covered by TCT No. T-90872. Similarly, after acquiring the subject lot covered
by TCT No. T-65384, petitioner Taguinod filed her June 24, 1988 letter-protest
with the Team Leader of the DAR, Santiago, Isabela, seeking exclusion or exempti
on from the OLT of her landholding. On June 23, 1989, the DAR Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) of San Fermin, Cauayan, Isabela sent a letter to the Prov
incial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), recommending approval of the applications
of Salud A. Aguila/Vic A. Aguila and Josephine A. Taguinod for retention of rig
hts over the two subject lots. On August 3, 1990, taking into consideration the
MARO's recommendation, the PARO issued a Resolution granting the application for
retention of petitioners and plac[ing] under OLT coverage the excess of seven (
7) hectares. Respondents-farmer-beneficiaries filed an Opposition to and Counter
-Protest over Resolution dated August 3, 1990 of the PARO and a Motion for Recon
sideration to Set Aside Resolution dated August 3, 1990 at DAR Regional Director
. On August 21, 1991, the Regional Director of the DAR, Region 02, issued an Ord
er, affirming the August 3, 1990 PARO Resolution. Private respondents filed thei
r motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1991, where they contended, inter ali
a, that landowner Salud Aguila was not entitled to a seven (7)-hectare retention
over the subject lots, as she was the owner of several other landholdings, spec
ifically 11 parcels of land, at the time the subject lots were placed under the
coverage of the OLT program pursuant to PD 27. Petitioner Taguinod filed her Sep
tember 16, 1991 appeal from the August 21, 1991 Order of the Regional Director w
ith the DAR Secretary. On September 28, 1992, the DAR Secretary issued an Order
affirming the August 21, 1991 Order of the Regional Director and denying petitio
ner Taguinod's appeal. On January 6, 1993, the DAR Secretary issued an Order gra
nting private respondents' Motion for Reconsideration finding that Salud Aguila
was



disqualified to retain seven (7), as she owned several landholdings other than t
he subject lots. Petitioners appealed before the OP. OP rendered a Decision reve
rsing the January 6, 1993 Order of the DAR Secretary and reinstating the latter'
s September 28, 1992 Order with a modification that subject landholdings are not
covered by the OLT program of the government pursuant to P.D. No. 27. Private r
espondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Decision, but same was deni
ed Respondents filed before the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 43. CA susta
ined private respondents' position affirming the Order of the Secretary of Agrar
ian Reform. Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration where on August
7, 2007 resolution said motion was rejected by the CA.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retention?
Held:




Settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that the rights of a holder of a homest
ead patent are superior over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agraria
n Reform Law. LOI No. 474 mandates the DAR Secretary to "undertake to place unde
r the Land Transfer Program of the Government pursuant to Presidential Decree No
. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven (7) hectares or less belo
nging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hect
ares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselv
es and their families." Considering her other eleven (11) landholdings and the a
pplication of LOI No. 474, we agree with the DAR Secretary and CA's holding that
Salud Aguila is not entitled to retention over the subject lots. Moreover, cons
idering the seemingly simulated transfers made by Salud Aguila over the subject
properties, we agree with the DAR Secretary and CA that these were done to circu
mvent the intent and application of PD 27 and the OLT of the Government. Premise
d on said grounds, the issue on petitioners' right to retention over the subject
lots is answered in the negative as they are not the owners, and consequently a
re not small landowners who are accorded the right of retention.
JUST COMPENSATION; ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF RTC; VALUATION OF PROP
ERTY IN EMINENT DOMAIN IS ESSENTIALLY A JUDICIAL FUNCTION

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Federico C. Suntay, Represented by his Assignee
, Josefina Lubrica G.R. No. 157903 (October 11, 2007)
Facts:







Federico Suntay (married to Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay), herein respondent, repre
sented by his assignee, Josefina Lubrica, is the registered owner of a parcel of
land with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro, covered by TCT No. T-31 of the Registry of Deeds of Mambura
o. Sometime in 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), pursuant to the go
vernment's land reform program under PD No. 27, expropriated 948.1911 hectares o
f respondent's property. The portion expropriated consisted mostly of lowland an
d non-irrigated riceland. The Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), herein p
etitioner, and the DAR fixed the value of the expropriated land at P4,251,141.68
or P4,497.50 per hectare. Respondent rejected petitioner's valuation as being u
nconscionably low and tantamount to taking his property without due process. He
then filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD),
Region IV, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), a petition
for the determination of just compensation against petitioner and the DAR. On Ja
nuary 24, 2001, the RARAD rendered a decision fixing the just compensation for t
he expropriated land at P157,541,941.30 and directing petitioner to pay responde
nt the said amount. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was den
ied by the RARAD in an Order dated March 14, 2001. On April 20, 2001, petitioner
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mind
oro, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, a Petition for Judicial Determination
of Just Compensation against respondent and the RARAD. On May 22, 2001, the RARA
D, upon respondent's motion, issued an Order in DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00 de
claring that the Decision of January 24, 2001 had become final and executory. Pe
titioner moved for reconsideration. However, the RARAD denied the same in an Ord
er dated July 10, 2001. On July 18, 2001, the RARAD issued a writ of execution d
irecting the sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement the Decision. Before the RT
C, Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan issued an Order dated August 6, 2001, di
smissing the Land Bank's petition for being late. Petitioner promptly filed a mo
tion for reconsideration. However, in an Order dated August 31, 2001, the RTC de
nied the motion.



On September 10, 2001, petitioner filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. The cou
rt issued an Order dismissing the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner's motion for reco
nsideration was likewise denied by the RTC. Petitioner filed with the CA a petit
ion for certiorari. On July 19, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision (1) granting
the petition for certiorari. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The
CA finding merit in respondent's motion for reconsideration, rendered an Amended
Decision dated February 5, 2003 dismissing the petition for certiorari. Petitio
ner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
Issue:

Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the LBP's petition for the determination of
just compensation?
Held:

The RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank's petition. The petition is not an app
eal from the RARAD's final Decision but an original action for the determination
of the just compensation over which the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdic
tion.




Section 50 (Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR) must be construed in harmony with
Section 57 by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation
and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitu
de of power conferred upon the DAR. Valuation of property in eminent domain is e
ssentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies
. It is clear from Section 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to de
termine such cases is in the RTC. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to th
e adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appella
te jurisdiction would be contrary to Section 57 and therefore would be void. Wha
t adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner
the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the
ultimate power to decide this question. The petition is granted.
COVERAGE; COVERABILITY OF P.D. 27 LANDS THROUGH WAIVER, INTENTIONAL AND VOLUNTAR
Y SURRENDER OF RIGHT OF THE LANDOWNER TRANSFERABILITY; TRANSFERABILITY OF P.D. 2
7 AWARDED LANDS

Estate of the late Encarnacion vda. de Panlilio, represented by George Lizares v

s. Gonzalo Dizon, et al. G.R. No. 148777 (October 18, 2007)
Facts:

Encarnacion vda. de Panlilio is the owner of a vast tract of land with an aggreg
ate area of 115.41 hectares located in Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga. Sometime in 19
73, Pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27, a Certificate of Land Tra
nsfer (CLTs) covering said landholding, including the portion planted with sugar
cane, were issued to the tenants of said land. On January 12,1977, landowner Pan
lilio executed an Affidavit interposing no objection in placing portion dedicate
d to palay crop under P.D. 27 and that it is her desire that her entire property
which is referred as Hacienda Masamat be placed under said law. On February 28,
1994, a complaint for the annulment of coverage of said landholding under P.D. 2
7 was filed by Petitioner Jesus Lizares, Panlilio's Administrator of Hacienda Ma
samat. The same was dismissed by the PARAD and on Appeal, the DARAB affirmed sai
d dismissal. The Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the DARAB in its ame
nded decision dated November 29, 2000. Likewise, an issue on the validity of the
transfer by the tenant-farmers to third person of the awarded land was raised i
n the Court of Appeals.
Issue:

Whether or not the ownership of the lot may now be transferred to persons other
than the heirs of the beneficiary or the Government
Ruling:



The prohibition in PD 27, states that "[t]itle to land acquired pursuant to this
Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable e
xcept by hereditary succession or to the Government" PD 27 is clear that after f
ull payment and title to the land is acquired, the land shall not be transferred
except to the heirs of the beneficiary or the Government The prohibition stems
from the policy of the Government to develop generations of farmers to attain it
s avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production Sec. 6 o
f EO 228 provides, thus:
"Ownership of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after full
payment of amortizations"

The CA construed said provision to mean that the farmer-beneficiary can sell the
land even to a non-qualified person This is incorrect. Implied repeals are not
favored Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228 principally deals with payment of amortization an
d not on who qualify as legal transferees of lands acquired under PD 27



The lands acquired under said law can only be transferred to the heirs of the be
neficiary or to the Government for eventual transfer to qualified beneficiaries
by the DAR Thus, transfers of lands acquired under PD 27 to non-qualified person
s are illegal and null and void A contrary ruling would make the farmer an "easy
prey to those who would like to tempt [him/her] with cash in exchange for incho
ate title over the same," and PD 27 could be easily circumvented and the title s
hall eventually be acquired by nontillers of the soil The prohibition even exten
ds to the surrender of the land to the former landowner. The sales or transfers
are void ab initio, being contrary to law and public policy under Art. 5 of the
Civil Code In this regard, DAR is duty-bound to take appropriate measures to ann
ul the illegal transfers and recover the land unlawfully conveyed to non-qualifi
ed persons for disposition to qualified beneficiaries.
JURISDICTION; AGRARIAN DISPUTE
Active Realty and Development Corporation vs. Bienvenido Fernandez G.R. No. 1571
86 (October 19, 2007)
Facts:

Petitioner filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent with the M
unicipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, alleging that it had beco
me the owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT
) No. T-85541 by virtue of the Deed of Sale executed between petitioner and Phil
ippine National Bank (PNB), the previous owner of the land; that respondent had
been occupying the subject land by reason of PNB's tolerance; that petitioner se
nt a letter of demand to respondent asking the latter to vacate the subject prop
erty; and that despite the demand, respondent failed and refused to vacate the s
ubject land, as a consequence of which, petitioner had been unlawfully deprived
of the possession of the lot and the rental value of P500.00 per month.








Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that the MTCC lacked jurisdicti
on over the case as it involved the implementation of Agrarian Reform and should
fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrari
an Reform (DAR). MTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. Respondent i
nsisted that there was a pending case involving same parties at DARAB. An Injunc
tion Order dated January 3, 1996 was issued by the DARAB against the petitioner
ordering the latter to cease, desist and refrain from harassing, molesting, dist
urbing, threatening, ousting, and removing or ejecting from their respective lan
dholdings the petitioners in DARAB Case No. R-0605-142-96. The DARAB case was re
solved by the Provincial Agrarian Report Adjudication Board (PARAB) which direct
ed the DAR-PARO to make a factual finding on the "CARPability" or "non-CARPabili
ty" of the subject land. Aggrieved by the said order, petitioner elevated the ma
tter to the DARAB. The DARAB rendered a Decision which held that the subject mat
ter is not within its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the MTC rendered a Decision, orde
ring the defendants (including herein private respondent), their heirs and succe
ssors-in-interest, to vacate the premises covered by TCT No. T-85541 situated in
Eroreco Subdivision, Bacolod City, to pay plaintiff (herein petitioner) actual
damages in the amount of P500.00 monthly computed from November 27, 1997 until t
he lot is actually vacated, to pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's
fees and the amount of cost. Respondent appealed the MTC Decision to the RTC. Th
e DARAB rendered a Decision which held that the subject matter is not within its
jurisdiction. The RTC rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the MTC j
udgment. The motion for reconsideration of said decision was also denied by the
RTC. Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of th
e Rules of Court. The CA issued a Resolution requiring Teresita F. Mendoza to ca
use her appearance as party-respondent in behalf of the deceased respondent. The
CA issued a Resolution stating that pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 13 of the Rules o
f Court, the service to Teresita F. Mendoza, although actually unserved, shall b
e considered completed. The CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC judgment. P
etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same.
Issue:

Whether or not this case presents an agrarian dispute. If it does, jurisdiction
over it should be with the DARAB, otherwise, it should be with the regular court
s.
Held:

Respondent sought the dismissal of the pending unlawful detainer case in the MTC
by involving the defense of litis pendentia.






For litis pendentia to lie as a ground for a motion to dismiss, the following re
quisites must be present: (1) that the parties to the action are the same; (2) t
hat there is substantial identity in the causes of action and reliefs sought; (3
) that the result of the first action is determinative of the second in any even
t and regardless of which party is successful. Contrary to the claim of responde
nt, the parties in the unlawful detainer case in the MTC and the DARAB case are
different, as he is not included as a petitioner in the DARAB case. Not being a
party to the DARAB case, respondent has no personality to assert that the DAR ha
s primary jurisdiction over the land subject matter of the MTC case considering
that he is not identified as one of the farmers-beneficiaries-petitioners in the
DARAB case. Further, the CA should not have relied on the Investigation Reports
of MARO Officer Villa dated March 4, 1997 and March 26, 1997, as the same were
not executed pursuant or in relation to any pending case. Moreover, browsing thr
ough the Investigation Reports, it is clear that its tenor is only recommendator
y or directory in nature. Thus, the execution of the Investigation Reports does
not automatically divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over the unlaw
ful detainer case. WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED.
EXEMPTION/EXCLUSION; EXEMPTION OF FISHPOND FROM COVERAGE OF CARL AND THE PASSAGE
OF RA 7881 CANNOT DEFEAT VESTED RIGHT ALREADY GRANTED AND ACQUIRED BY THE TENAN
T
Jaime Sanchez, Jr. vs. Zenaida F. Marin, et al. G.R. No. 171346 (October 19, 200
7)
Facts:


Petitioner Jaime Sanchez, Jr. is an agricultural tenant of a 10-hectare fishpond
situated at Barangay Talao-Talao, Lucena City, which was previously owned by Da
vid Felix, the ascendant of herein respondents. Respondent Zenaida F. Marin is t
he civil law lessee of the subject fishpond and the mother of respondents. In 19
77, the petitioner was instituted as a tenant of the subject fishpond by its pre
vious registered owner David Felix. A few years thereafter, David Felix sold and
transferred ownership of the subject fishpond to respondents Jesus Nicasio, Jos
e David, Maria Bernadette, Paul Peter and Philip Luis, all surnamed Marin, to wh
om a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43289, covering the subject fishp
ond, was issued. The aforesaid respondents, as the new owners of the fishpond, e
ntered into a civil law lease










agreement dated 24 June 1985 with their mother and co-respondent Zenaida F. Mari
n, which was renewable yearly. On 21 July 1986, the petitioner filed a Complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch 53, in which he as
ked the court to declare him as a tenant of the subject fishpond. On 20 July 198
7, the RTC of Lucena City rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner, declar
ing the [herein petitioner] as the agricultural tenant, not a hired contractual
worker on the [subject fishpond], and therefore, entitled to the security of ten
ure. The Decision was appealed by respondent Zenaida F. Marin to the appellate c
ourt, which on 11 September 1989, the appellate court affirmed in toto the Decis
ion of the RTC of Lucena City. Having been declared as an agricultural tenant on
the subject fishpond, the petitioner, on 15 March 1991, filed before the Provin
cial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Region IV a Petition for the fixing of
the leasehold rentals for his use of the subject fishpond at P30,000.00 per annu
m. On 17 April 1991, respondent Zenaida F. Marin filed a Complaint before the PA
RAD Region IV, primarily to eject the petitioner from the fishpond because of th
e latter's failure to pay the rent and to make an accounting, in violation of Se
ctions 17 and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199. The PARAD on 2 March 1993, rendered a
Decision. Ordering that the petitioner be maintained in the peaceful possession
of subject farm-holding. Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the afore
mentioned Decision but the same was denied in a Joint Order, dated 15 May 1995,
rendered by the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Aggrieved responde
nts appealed the PARAD Decision dated 2 March 1993 to the DARAB, reiterating the
ir position that the fishpond was excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensiv
e Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. On 25 September 2000, the DA
RAB rendered a Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the Provincial Adjudic
ator dated 2 March 1993. Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Review where on 23 May 2005, the appellate court rendered its assailed Decis
ion granting in part the Petition of the respondents by annulling and setting as
ide the DARAB Decision dated 25 September 2000 on the ground of lack of jurisdic
tion. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision, but it
was denied in a Resolution dated 25 January 2006.
Issue:

Whether the subject fishpond is exempted/excluded from the coverage of the Compr
ehensive Agrarian Reform Program?

Held:





Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 b
y expressly exempting/excluding private lands actually, directly and exclusively
used for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL. Section 3(c)
of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, now defines agricultural land as land devo
ted to agricultural activity and not otherwise classified as mineral, forest, re
sidential, commercial or industrial land. As to what constitutes an agricultural
activity is defined by Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, as th
e cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including
the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices pe
rformed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons
whether natural or juridical. By virtue of the foregoing amendments, the operati
on of fishponds is no longer considered an agricultural activity, and a parcel o
f land devoted to fishpond operation is no longer an agricultural land. Even as
it is recognize that the fishpond is not covered by the CARL, pursuant to Sectio
n 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 7881. The Court, n
onetheless, does not agree in the conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals
that since the subject fishpond is no longer an agricultural land, it follows th
en that there can be no tenurial arrangement affecting the parties in this case.
And in view of the fact that there is no agrarian dispute cognizable by the DAR
AB, then the DARAB had no jurisdiction to resolve petitioner's case. It bears em
phasis that the status of the petitioner as a tenant in the subject fishpond and
his right to security of tenure were already previously settled in the Decision
dated 20 July 1987 of the RTC of Lucena City in Agrarian Case No. 86-8, which w
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 11 September 1989. Hav
ing been declared as a tenant with the right to security of tenure as provided i
n Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844 in relation to Section 7 of Republic Act N
o. 1199, the law enforced at the time of the filing of the Complaint before the
RTC of Lucena City, the petitioner has acquired a vested right over the subject
fishpond, which right or interest has become fixed and established and is no lon
ger open to doubt or controversy. Therefore, even if fishponds, like the subject
matter of this case, were later excluded/exempted from the coverage of the CARL
as expressly provided in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Rep
ublic Act No. 7881, and despite the fact that no CLOA has been issued to the pet
itioner, the same cannot defeat the aforesaid vested right already granted and a
cquired by the petitioner long before the passage of Republic Act No. 7881. Indu
bitably, despite the amendments to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, the peti
tioner's right to tenancy and security of tenure over the subject fishpond must
still be honored. The Court likewise affirms that the DARAB correctly assumed ju
risdiction over the case, contrary to the declaration made by the appellate cour
t in its Decision.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS

Antonio Masaquel, et al. vs. Jaime Orial G.R. No. 148044 (October 19, 2007)
Facts:





Petitioners Antonio Masaquel (Antonio), Juliana Masaquel-Marero (Juliana), Apolo
nia Masaquel-Tolentino (Apolonia) and Maria Masaquel-Oliveros (Maria) were co-ow
ners of a parcel of land with an area of 66,703 sq. m. located in Barrio Biga, A
ntipolo, Rizal and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. ON724. On
21 June 1987, the co-owners executed a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Paghahati
ng Lupa" whereby the subject lot was divided into four parts. On 27 September 1
993, Respondent Jaime Orial filed an amended complaint with the DARAB against pe
titioners alleging that he was a tenant of a parcel of agricultural land owned b
y and registered in the name of Antonio. Petitioners denied the existence of a t
enancy relationship between them and respondent claiming that respondent was a m
ere usurper and trespasser, petitioners specifically denied the allegation that
they harassed him and threatened him with physical harm. In a Decision dated 18
December 1994, the provincial adjudicator ruled that respondent was not a tenant
of the subject land. On appeal, the DARAB reversed the findings of the provinci
al adjudicator and declared respondent a tenant of the subject land. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but the DARAB denied it in a Resolution date
d 22 November 1999. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where
the appellate court affirmed the DARAB decision on 9 May 2001.
Issue:

Whether or not there is tenancy relationship between the parties?
Held:

No tenancy relationship existed between the parties. In order for a tenancy agre
ement to arise, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, viz
.: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is con
sent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationshi
p is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation o
n the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared b
etween the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. All these



requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the absence of on
e or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant. The evi
dence presented by respondent failed to meet the test of substantiality, in line
with the standard of proof required in administrative cases. Tenancy relationsh
ip can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is
either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land, and not
thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of
the tenancy. In view of the absence of a tenancy relationship, the case falls o
utside the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Thus, it is cognizable by the regular cour
ts. Consequently, the complaint filed by respondent was rightfully dismissed by
the provincial adjudicator.
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; EJECTMENT; ASSERTION OF OWNERSHIP OF A HOMELO
T NOT SUFFICIENT TO DIVEST MTC OF JURISDICTION
Juliana Sudaria vs. Maximilliano Quiambao G.R. No. 164305 (November 20, 2007)
Facts:


On 11 October 2001, respondent Maximilliano Quiambao filed a Complaint for unlaw
ful detainer against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mi
guel, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 2557. Respondent stated that he was the
owner of a parcel of land with an area of 354 sq.m. situated in Barrio Sta. Rit
a, Bata, San Miguel, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-113925. He also averred th
at in 1965, by virtue of a Kasunduan, his predecessor-in-interest, Alfonsa C. vd
a. de Viola, leased the said piece of land to petitioner's late husband, Atanaci
o Sudaria, for a monthly rental of P2.00 which was later increased to P873.00 pe
r annum in 1985. According to respondent, in the same year, petitioner, who took
over the lease after her husband's death, stopped paying the rentals on the pro
perty. In April 2001, respondent made a demand for petitioner to pay the overdue
rentals and vacate the premises. In her Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petition
er averred that the subject property was previously owned by Alfonsa C. vda. de
Viola and later inherited by Leticia and Asuncion Viola as evidenced by an agric
ultural leasehold contract. She claimed that she had not been remiss in paying t
he lease rentals, as the payment for the years between 1980 and 1999 were eviden
ced by receipts except that the receipts for 1998 and 1999 were withheld by resp
ondent. Petitioner also maintained that she refused to pay the lease rentals to
respondent because he was not the registered lessor, and that as bona fide tenan
t-successor of her deceased




husband, she was entitled to security of tenure, as well as to the homelot which
formed part of the leasehold under agrarian laws. She further contended that th
e MTC could not have taken cognizance of the case as there had been no prior rec
ourse to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council as provided for in Section 53 of R
epublic Act No. 6657. Finally, petitioner asserted that the MTC had no jurisdict
ion over the case as it involved an agrarian dispute. In a Decision dated 10 May
2002, the MTC held that there existed a tenancy relationship between the partie
s and that since the subject lot was petitioner's homelot, the instant controver
sy is an agrarian dispute over which the courts have no jurisdiction. On appeal,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 9 reversed the decis
ion of the MTC. Consequently, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appea
ls in a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure w
here the CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA aff
irmed the RTC decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Cou
rt of Appeals decision but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal by certiorari
.
Issue:

Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or posses
sion de facto?
Held:



Rightful possession belongs to respondent. Petitioner failed to show that the De
partment of Agrarian Reform had awarded the property in her favor as her homelot
. Instead, the clear preponderance of evidence is on the side of respondent. He
presented the Torrens title covering the lot in his name. It must be stressed, h
owever, that the Court has engaged in this initial determination of ownership ov
er the lot in dispute only for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.
The petition is DENIED.
JUST COMPENSATION; DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION BY THE RTC
APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals a
nd Land Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 164195 (December 19, 2007)

Facts:


The LBP filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration on the Decision of the SC da
ted 6 February 2007 partially granting the LBP's petition and affirming the deci
sion of the CA giving due course to LBP's appeal. The grounds for the LBPs motio
n for reconsideration are that special agrarian courts are not at liberty to dis
regard the formula devised to implement Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657; the
LBP complied with the constitutional requirement on prompt and full payment of
just compensation; the LBP ensured that the interests already earned on the bond
portion of the revalued amounts were aligned with 91-day treasury bill (T-Bill)
rates and on the cash portion the normal banking interest rates; that petitione
rs are not entitled to an award of Attorney's fees and commissioners' fees; and
that LBP's counsel did not unnecessarily delay the proceedings.
Issue:

Whether or not SACs are bound by the formula devised to implement Section 17 of
R. A. No. 6657 on Determination of Just Compensation?
Held:




In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the SC declared that as the governmen
t agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the
DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DA
R AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6
657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be t
aken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was
devised to implement the said provision. The ruling in the Celada case is in con
flict with the Apo Fruits which the SC ruled that the more acceptable practice h
as always been to interpret and reconcile apparently conflicting jurisprudence t
o give effect to both by harmonizing the two (Celada Ruling vis--vis Apo Fruits Ru
ling). The trial court, actually took into consideration all the factors in the
determination of just compensation as articulated in Section 17 of Republic Act
No. 6657. The trial court had substantially applied the formula by looking into
all the factors included therein, i.e. net income, comparable sales and market v
alue per tax declaration, to arrive at the proper land value. The basic formula
set forth in DAR AO No. 5, Series of 1998 does not and cannot strictly bind the
courts. As established in earlier jurisprudence, the valuation of property in em
inent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the regional
trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative agencies.



The SAC, therefore, must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial discr
etion in the evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be ar
bitrarily restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR, an administrative agency.
The modification of the Decision dated 6 February 2007 pertaining to the award
of interest on just compensation, commissioner's fees and attorney's fees, is in
order. In all other respects, the Decision dated 6 February 2007 is MAINTAINED.
COVERAGE; CONDITIONAL DONATION OF PROPERTIES UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF AN ARCH
BISHOP WILL NOT SERVE TO REMOVE THE PROPERTY FROM COVERAGE OF CARL
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform and DAR Re
gional Director (Region V) G.R. No. 139285 (December 21, 2007)
Facts:




Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres is the registered owner of several properti
es in Camarines Sur, with a total area of 268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0
236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the remaining 19.5432 hectare
s are planted with coconut trees. Archbishop filed with the Municipal Agrarian R
eform District Office petitions for exemption from the coverage of Operation Lan
d Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. 27. Two of these petitions were d
enied. Archbishop appealed and sought exemption from OLT coverage of all lands p
lanted with rice and corn which were registered in the name of the Roman Catholi
c Archdiocese of Caceres. This appeal was denied by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D
. Garilao and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. The matte
r was then raised to the CA via Petition for Review on Certiorari. The petition
was dismissed by the CA. Archbishop filed a motion for reconsideration, but was
also denied.
Issue:

Whether or not as administrator of the Roman Catholic properties, these subject
properties should have been exempt from the OLT?
Held:

The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to under what
title the land is held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise. Th
ere








is no distinction made whether the landowner holds "naked title" only or can exe
rcise all the rights of ownership. To do so would be to frustrate the revolution
ary intent of the law, which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the
benefit of landless farmers and farmworkers. The provisions of PD 27 and RA 6657
are plain and require no further interpretation
there is only one right of retent
ion per landowner, and no multiple rights of retention can be held by a single p
arty. Archbishop makes much of the conditional donation, that he does not have t
he power to sell, exchange, lease, transfer, encumber or mortgage the transferre
d properties. He claims that these conditions do not make him the landowner as c
ontemplated by the law. This matter has already been answered in Hospicio de San
Jose de Barili, Cebu City (Hospicio) v. Department of Agrarian Reform. In that
case, wherein Act No. 3239 prohibited the sale under any consideration of lands
donated to the Hospicio, a charitable organization, the Court found that the lan
ds of the Hospicio were not exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform. Archbis
hop's claim that he does not have jus disponendi over the subject properties is
unavailing. The very nature of the compulsory sale under PD 27 and RA 6657 defea
ts such a claim. Other less scrupulous parties may even attempt creating trusts
to prevent their lands from coming under agrarian reform, and say that the trust
ee has no power to dispose of the properties. The disposition under PD 27 and RA
6657 is of a different character than what is contemplated by jus disponendi, w
herein under these laws, voluntariness is not an issue, and the disposition is n
ecessary for the laws to be effective. Under PD 27 and RA 6657, Archbishop canno
t claim that the alleged conditions of the donations would have primacy over the
application of the law. This forced sale is not even a violation of the conditi
ons of the donation, since it is by application of law and beyond Archbishop's c
ontrol. The application of the law cannot and should not be defeated by the cond
itions laid down by the donors of the land. If such were allowed, it would be a
simple matter for other landowners to place their lands without limit under the
protection of religious organizations or create trusts by the mere act of donati
on, rendering agrarian reform but a pipe dream. Archbishop's contention that he
is merely an administrator of the donated properties will not serve to remove th
ese lands from the coverage of agrarian reform. The lands in Archbishop's name a
re agricultural lands that fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall und
er the exemptions. Archbishop would claim exemption from the coverage of agraria
n reform by stating that he is a mere administrator, but his position does not a
ppear under the list of exemptions under RA 6657. His claimed status as administ
rator does not create another class of lands exempt from the coverage of PD 27 o
r RA 6657, and The Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. does no
t create another definition for the term "landowner." Petition Denied.