TWELVE

What Is uSexual Orientation"?

William S. Wilkerson

In this essay, William S. Wilkerson raises some difficulties with the mainstream concept of "sexual orientation," which classifies people as heterosexual,
homosexual, and bisexual and which assumes that people's sexual desires are
fairly stable. Wilkerson argues that this concept of "sexual orientation" faces
difficulty in accommodating sexual variations: for example, people whose sexual
object choices are not based on sex/gender and people whose sexuality changes
over time. The mainstream concept also faces difficulty in accounting for the
different ways of understanding sexuality that cultures other than contemporary
Western cultures have adopted. Wilkerson concludes by arguing that an "interpretive" model of sexuality allows us to have our cake and to eat it: on such a
model we are able to explain how in some cultures people's sexual orientations
are stable while also leaving conceptual room for new sexual possibilities.
William S. Wilkerson is professor of philosophy at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. His research
focuses on gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer (GLBTQ) philosophy and the contemporary Continental tradition. He is the author of Ambiguity and Sexuality: A Theory of Sexual Identity (Palgrave Macmillan,
2007) and a coeditor of the forthcoming anthology Beauvoir and Western Thought from Plato to Butler (SUNY
Press). "What Is Sexual Orientation?" is printed here for the first time. 2012, William S. Wilkerson, who
kindly gave permission for his new essay to be included in this volume.

Most people find it difficult to grasp that whatever they like to do

sexually will be thoroughly repulsive to someone else, and that whatever repels them sexually will be the most treasured delight of someone, somewhere.
-Gayle Rubin, "Thinking Sex"

"Sexual orientation" is usually understood to refer to one's persistently

recurring sexual desires for members of the sex that attracts one. In this
195

196

William S. Wilkerson

respect, it differs from "sexual identity," which refers to self-consciously

living as a person with a particular sexual orientation. Although many
people identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual and live with that selfunderstanding, either privately or publicly, most identify as heterosexual. However, people need have neither a homosexual identity nor homosexual sex to have a homosexual orientation. Their orientation can be
experienced as persisting feelings of attraction, sexual fantasies, or other
private episodes. 1 When we speculate that people might be lesbian or
gay before they come out, we usually speculate about their sexual orientation, not their identity.
Most think that sexual orientation is separate from the vicissitudes of
historical and cultural change and independent of choice, and that everyone has a sexual orientation despite cultural and historical differences.
Like traits such as intelligence, athleticism, or calm temperament, sexual
orientation is regarded as part of a person's makeup. "Sexual orientation" thus names a psychological feature of people that precedes and
guides the choices people make in life; the idea of orientation seems to
imply a persistent and nonchosen direction in people's attitudes and desires.2 Accordingly, sexual orientation explains why some people are attracted to people of the same sex while others are attracted to those of the
opposite sex (and some to both).
Although not everyone regards sexual orientation this way, most do.
Certainly mainstream gay and lesbian political movements reflect this
view of sexual orientation when they claim that homosexuals and bisexuals are "born this way." In her excellent analysis of homophobia, Cheshire Calhoun notes that our culture assumes "that everyone necessarily
has a determinable sexual orientation as part of their basic psychological
makeup ... there are no persons who lack a sexual orientation."3 This
view of sexual orientation also squares with the research into its biological basis, which considers it a persisting feature of a person's psychological makeup. Finally, this view is reflected in philosophical definitions of
"sexual orientation": Edward Stein disregards both self-identification
and behavior and thinks of sexual orientation as a "disposition" to engage in specific sexual acts with people of one or the other gender, thereby prioritizing people's desires and psychological features over their behavior. John Corvino also favors this view. 4
I question three features of this concept of sexual orientation: its basis
in sex, its stability, and its cross-cultural universality. First, sex: sexuality
can involve many sorts of attractions, so that it appears that some people
can be attracted to traits or features that have little or no connection to
sex. Can sexual orientation help us understand these forms of sexuality?
Second, stability: even if most people experience a consistent and stable
attraction to one or another sex across their lives, some experience their
sexuality as fluid and changing. Can the concept of sexual orientation
handle both types, or are those with fluid sexualities not captured by it?

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

197

Finally, cross-cultural universality: sexual orientation purportedly exists

across cultures and times, but, as I show below, sexual orientation might
not be a universal feature of human existence but particular to our culture; it might result from how our particular culture has organized the
experiences it calls sexual and might even result from the way individuals interpret their sexual feelings in light of their social situations. 5

SEXUAL ORIENTATION, SEX, AND GENDER

In feminist thought, "gender" typically refers to both the socially visible
presentation of oneself as either male or female and to the social role of
male or female, while "sex" refers to the person's actual biological sex. 6
With this distinction in mind, we can ask a question not usually raised by
your average person: does sexual orientation attach to sex, gender, or
both? For even though, for example, gay men are usually attracted to
people who are both sexually male and who present themselves as male,
perhaps not all gay men are like that. A gay man could feel an attraction
to a drag queen because he desires effeminate qualities in a man; putting
it bluntly, he likes penises, but he likes them attached to very feminine
gender presentation. We could say that, when it comes to sex, he's attracted to men, but when it comes to gender, he's attracted to femininity.
Similarly a lesbian who is attracted to butch, masculine women could be
attracted to female sex but also to male gender.
In these examples, we could argue that sex is the main attractor since
both people are attracted to a particular biological sex, even though they
desire this biological sex wrapped in the opposite gender. Certainly in the
history of butch/femme relationships, attraction remained deeply intertwined with gender presentation, such that a femme was often attracted
to both female sex and male gender presentation since she desired specifically butch women. So the orientation may really have been for masculine women (if the lesbian were femme) and feminine women (if the
lesbian were butch). 7 In other words, the attraction could be for a particular sex(gender combination. Thus, if "sexual orientation" refers simply to
attraction based on sex, it fails to capture such possibilities.
We can respond to these possibilities by broadening our concept of
sexual orientation to encompass both sex and gender such that, for each
person, we specify their orientation along an axis of sex and an axis of
gender. Even if the mainstream concept of sexual orientation mostly ignores this distinction, this adjustment allows us to capture more finegrained distinctions among people's sexual orientations. So there will be
obvious cases: someone is gay if he is attracted to both male sex and male
gender presentation, and someone is lesbian if she is attracted to both
female sex and female gender presentation. Then there are less obvious
cases that require us to decide: the femme attracted to butch women can

William S. Wilkerson

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

also be a lesbian, with the qualification that she has some very specific
desires about the gender presentation of her partners.
Going further, some people are intersex-they have physiological features of both genders-either naturally or as a result of elective surgery.
(And, in this happy Internet age, we know that there is a minor pornography industry catering to those who sexually desire intersex people.) Do
people who desire a body with a penis and female breasts desire males or
females, gender or sex, or neither or both? If we say that they desire
males, the common concept of sexual orientation would fail to explain
the fact that they desire males with prominent female physical features.
Similarly, if we say that they desire females, the common concept of
sexual orientation would fail to explain the fact that they desire females
with prominent male physical features.
We might solve this difficulty as follows: just as we broadened the
concept of sexual orientation to include combinations of sex and gender,
we can broaden it even further and say that those who desire intersex
people have a unique sexual orientation built around ambiguously sexed
bodies. However, in broadening it this far, we implicitly reject sexual
orientation based solely on purportedly normal ideas of gender and sex.
That is, the common understanding is that sexual orientation names attraction to people of a specific sex, but we have now seen that this concept is simply too narrow to capture the range of possible sex/gender
combinations to which people can be attracted.
Moreover, as we keep adding different sexual possibilities, there
seems to be no end to how many things we should include as objects of
sexual orientations. We have already gone past the common belief that
there are only two sexes to which one can be attracted to see that one can
be attracted to various combinations of sexes and genders. But we can go
even further: there are fetishists, zoophiles, narcissists-people with all
kinds of sexual attractions that might not involve gender as the primary
basis of attraction. Consider a foot fetishist who might be attracted to both
men's and women's feet (as opposed to being attracted to men's feet
because they are men's feet). Gender would then be less relevant than the
object of the fetish. So are foot fetishists attracted to the sex first and the
feet second, or are they attracted to feet and simply prefer men's to women's feet because, say, of their rougher skin or their larger size? In ~ome
cases, people might have an attraction to a sex that is at least coeval with
their attraction to their object of the fetish, while in others people might
be attracted simply to the object of their fetish rather than either sex. In
both cases, we face difficulties in individuating the object of sexual attraction and difficulties with the connection between the object of sexual
attraction and the sex of the person to whom one is attracted. What is the
sexual orientation of the man who desires men's feet? Is he a homosexual
or a homosexual-foot-fetishist? If the former, why neglect the fact that he
likes feet? After all, men's feet are part of what he is sexually oriented

toward. If the latter, then how narrowly or broadly are we to construe

people's sexual orientations? Suppose he likes hairy feet. Is his sexual
orientation a homosexual-hairy-foot-fetishist? And what is the sexual orientation of the man who desires feet regardless of sex and gender? He
seems to have a persisting attraction to something that bears virtually no
connection to sex or gender. So is he, simply, a "foot-sexual" (or even a
"pede-sexual")? There might be orientations for feet, gentle temperaments, navels, or brown curly hair-sexual orientations could involve
attraction to any kind of personal or bodily feature, or to things disconnected from human bodies altogether. Zoophiles desire sexual relations
with animals; some fetishists actually have stable attractions to particular
inanimate objects (shoes and underpants are popular examples, but we
can imagine others).
Can sexual orientation handle all these possible cases? It could, but
only if we broaden it to include not only sex, gender, and their combinations but also virtually any kind of stable sexual proclivity. Being attracted to a specific sex or gender would no longer be necessary for
having a sexual orientation because somebody attracted only to, say, animals would not require human sex or gender for attraction. Attraction
based on sex would still be sufficient for possessing a sexual orientation,
but so would any stable sexual proclivity. Sexual orientation. would just
name whichever persisting psychosexual attraction a person feels. At this
point, however, the concept of sexual orientation based on stable attraction loses its value since asserting the existence of all these sexual orientations amounts to saying that whatever attracts an individual over a period of time is his or her orientation. The concept gets so diluted that it
loses the ability to explain particular features of human sexuality. This
raises a dilemma: either we can retain the concept of orientation for all
sexual proclivities, using it so broadly that it has no more explanatory
power than the trivial claim that each individual has his or her own
sexual proclivities (and this is putting aside asexual people), or we can
restrict the concept to the narrow confines of attraction based on sex, in
which case people with stable desires not directed towards sex will actually lack sexual orientations. The second horn of the dilemma is highly
counterintuitive if, as Calhoun noted, our society assumes that everybody
has a sexual orientation, while the first horn of the dilemma virtually
eliminates the concept of sexual orientation by completely diluting it. 8
Things are further complicated by the lives and experiences of bisexuals. How can they have an orientation if their sexuality lacks a consistent
and persisting desire for one sex or gender? Consider the life of the
French philosopher and novelist Simone de Beauvoir.9 As a young student, she fell deeply in love with a young woman who died tragically,
leaving Beauvoir to suffer a lifelong heartbreak, though she soon began
her famous affair with the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Even during this
affair, she had occasional trysts with other women and men. Although

198

199

200

William S. Wilkerson

the relationship with Sartre changed to friendship, she later had an intense sexual relationship with the American novelist Nelson Algren. The
affair was doomed by circumstance, but only a few years later, she met a
younger woman with whom she spent the rest of her life in companionship and love. Beauvoir flatly refused to define her sexuality, and her
thinking about sexuality manifests genuine suspicion of the belief that we
have deep, persistent desires for a specific sex.
Although Beauvoir's life may be an unusual example, it is possible
that even people who identify as heterosexual or homosexual can have
desires for, and engage in sex with, somebody outside their normal pattern. How should we understand sexual orientation if sex selection seems
inconsistent in some cases? A common answer refers to the famous Kinsey scale: that sexual preference occurs along a continuum. 10 Although
Alfred Kinsey's surveys of sexual activity of midcentury Americans are
now dated, his scale has proved remarkably durable. Finding that few
people had totally consistent sexual tendencies with respect to sex or
gender (in other words, that few people had strictly heterosexual or
homosexual activity), he proposed a continuum of sexuality from zero to
six, with zero being exclusive heterosexuality and six being exclusive
homosexuality. He claimed that one in ten men fell between a three and a
five for a period of three years during their adult lives. In other words,
they were predominantly having homosexual activity.ll This one-in-ten
figure has survived despite the fact that recent studies put the actual
percentage of lifelong homosexual men and women much lower (around
4 percent for men and slightly lower for women).12 The Kinsey scale
allows us to make some conceptual room for sexual orientations based on
sex that lack total consistency. Gay men and lesbians are fives and sixes,
heterosexual men and women are zeros and ones, and bisexuals (e.g.,
Beauvoir) might be threes. An individual's sexual orientation is reflected
in a persistent pattern of behavior: mostly boys, mostly girls, equally
boys and girls, boys more than girls, and so on.
However, since bisexuals like Beauvoir feel attraction to people of
both sexes, it is possible that their attraction is based on features other
than gender. People who are attracted to both sexes might not be attracted
to sex or gender per se but rather to other features of the person that bear
no connection to gender. For example, Jane Litwoman, in an early essay
on bisexuality, supports this possibility:
The sexologist Kinsey has created a 0--6 scale in which people are rated
as to their homolheterosexuality. I think of myself as off the scale ....
Gender is just not what I care about or even notice in a sexual partner.
This is not to say I don't have categories of sexual attraction, that I
judge each person as an individual-I have categories, but gender isn't
one of them. 13

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

201

Litwoman does not experience attraction based on sex at all but on other
features of a person. Like Beauvoir, who saw both romantic and sexual
relationships as expressions of a free desire to join with another in the
project of becoming more whole people, Litwoman's sexuality functions
much like the possible sexualities we discussed earlier. It is not built
around. sex. This does not deny that sex and gender are factors (surely,
she notIces them when she chooses sexual partners, and other bisexuals
sometimes declare a preference for one sex), but it denies that sex or
gender is always the determining factor in attraction. This is why Litwoman claims that she is entirely off a scale, such as Kinsey's, polarized
by sex, since her dual attraction to people of both sex does not take sex
itself as an aspect of attraction.
There are other reasons why Kinsey's scale does not help the mainstream concept of sexual orientation. First, the scale, as I discuss in the
next section, is about sexual behavior, not the inner, psychic desires to
which "sexual orientation" usually refers. Second, it is about the sex
(male or female) of one's sexual partners. As such, the scale can at most
capture "surface patterns" of behavior: it cannot capture the very particular sexual tastes we are discussing. Regardless of what attracts one person deeply and specifically, the scale only reveals patterns of selecting
sexual partners from one of the two available sexes (or both in the case of
bisexuals).
To summarize, the difficulty is that so many people's sexual lives do
not fit the pattern of the popular concept of sexual orientation - a stable
attraction based on sex or gender. In some of these cases, sexual orientation involves attraction to objects that are not related to sex or gender at
all (zoophiles, for example), while in other cases, like fetishes, a person
may be either attracted to sex first and the fetish object second, or the
other way around. Finally, at least some bisexuals claim to be attracted
not by sex but by people's other features.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND STABILITY

So far, we have focused on the question of whether the concept of sexual
orientation based on sex or gender succeeds in explaining the great diversity of human sexual experience. The cases we raised show that this
concept fails to capture the full range of human sexuality. Part of this
failure arises from the fact that sexuality could be simply too various and
individual, but it also arises from the assumption that sexual orientation
names a stable feature of people's psychosexual make up: that it captures
something about their psychology and sexuality that remains constant
throughout most of their lives. Defining" sexual orientation" in terms of
psychological disposition rather than behavior assumes this kind of
stability. Because people's behaviors can be less consistent than their pat-

202

William S. Wilkerson

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

terns of attraction (as Kinsey quickly discovered), behavior has been set
aside as a defining feature of sexual orientation in both the philosophical
literature 14 and the contemporary biological literature, as we will see
below. Even the term "orientation" implies a lasting or enduring inclination.
Does sexual attraction indeed have the stability granted it by the concept of sexual orientation, or is it rather fluid and changing for individuals? This is a difficult question to answer, but one thing is clear: if we
abandon stability, we have abandoned the concept of sexual orientation
altogether since we would no longer be discussing persisting, recurring
desires, which lie at the heart of the concept. We would then be left
simply discussing behaviors or sexual interests over short periods of
time, no longer seeing them as arising from any enduring feature of a
person.
The answer to the question of sexual stability seems mixed. Most people in our society seem to experience their sexuality as fairly stable: gay
men, lesbians, and heterosexuals usually claim to have feelings from an
early age that persist through most of their lives. However, some people
experience their sexuality as fluid. Beauvoir appears to have had such a
fluid sexuality, and bisexuals often describe their sexuality in such terms.
A well-known sociological study of bisexuals in the San Francisco Bay
Area reports that a third to half of men and women experience major
shifts in their sexual preferences, measured in terms of both psychological and behavioral factors.1s It reports their attitude this way: "1 experienced swings in my primary sexual interests between a Kinsey 6 to a 2
approximately every five years for the past fifteen years; I experienced
changes in my sexual preferences fromday to day, even moment to moment." 16 Quite aside from these rather striking examples, we may have
noticed in our own lives that what attracts us sexually changes over time,
even if the sex or gender remains stable as the primary object of attraction. At one point, we may prefer younger people, at another older,
sometimes well-kempt, sometimes slovenly, sometimes heavy or thin; we
might perhaps even cultivate a liking for sadism or masochism. This is
especially true if sexual orientations are narrowly construed (e.g., X is a
homosexual foot-fetishist, not simply a homosexual). For if so, then sexuality would indeed be, in many cases, fluid over time (e.g., X is still a
homosexual but no longer a foot-fetishist). Human sexual desire can be
quite multifarious, and what's hot at one time might be cold at another.
As proof of this, consider that Kinsey surveyed thousands of people
and his results showed such inconsistency that he refused to countenance
the idea of sexual orientation as a persistent desire. 17 He stated clearly
that he was not measuring sexual orientation but rather measuring and
cataloging behaviors. Those men who fell between three and five had sex
mainly with other men over a three-year period but might have spent the
rest of their lives having sex with women. Indeed, many have inaccurate-

ly used the Kinsey scale because Kinsey never meant to group people by
stable psychological orientations. No doubt, we aren't bound by his ideas
about his scale, but he created it because he realized that since many
people's sexual behavior changes over time, it might not be fruitful to
talk about sexual orientations.
Of course, Kinsey's work is dated, and there is recent biological research that appears to show that homosexuality, as a persistent desire for
people of a particular gender, has a genetic or other biological basis. This
research has received a lot of mainstream media attention and is popular
among gays and lesbians because it purportedly proves that we are "born
this way." If true, this research would support the claim that sexuality is
not very fluid since it would present a scientifically justified case for a
firm, biological foundation for sexual orientation. A full investigation of
this literature goes beyond the scope of this essay, but it cannot rescue
sexual orientation as a persistent, stable desire because it assumes its existence in just this form. All the famous researchers in the field (Dean
Hamer, Simon LeVay, William Byne, Brian Mustanski, and J. Michael
Bailey) 18 explicitly claim to study the opposite of what Kinsey studied.
They do not investigate behaviors over short periods but persisting sexual orientations. They support this methodological decision by admitting
that people's actual sexual behaviors are too fluid and unreliable and that
a psychosexual sexual orientation remains stable across a person's lifetime, so it presents a better object of study.
This approach faces the difficulty that while behaviors are readily
accessible, the inner psychology, fantasies, and orientations of subjects
must be inferred indirectly. To solve this problem, most investigators
screen their subjects to check whether they have genuine, enduring samesex attractions (i.e., homosexual orientations). They must find some way
to exclude those whose sexuality and sexual behavior are more like those
of bisexuals and those with fluid sexualities. This aspect of their approach
produces almost comically opposed results. For instance, Dean Hamer's
famous early study excluded anybody who showed the slightest tendency
towards bisexuality, while J. Michael Bailey's studies are infamous for
including bisexuals on the assumption that true bisexuality does not really
exist and that bisexuals are really homosexual. 19
This part of their methodology shows that sexual orientation, as a
persisting desire based on gender, does not emerge as a result of their data,
but is the filter for the collection of the data. By grouping together a range
of people who satisfy narrow criteria or by ignoring all the differences in
people's reports of their sexual lives, scientists can certainly find evidence
of a stable homosexual orientation, but only because they have either
excluded or reinterpreted the experiences of those who do not fit the
criterion of having a stable homosexual orientation. This does not show
that the scientific studies produce false results, but it does show that they
cannot be used to argue against the fluidity of human sexuality since they

203

205

William S. Wilkerson

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

begin by disregarding or reinterpreting it. More important, by excluding

people with fluid sexualities, these studies make plausible, in a backhanded way, the belief that they exist. Indeed, other empirical work has
suggested that women, in contrast to men, tend to experience their sexuality as fluid and changing and that the tendency to think of sexual orientation on the model of male desire, which tends to be more stable, has led
to the erasure of this difference (not surprisingly, most of the scientific
studies have focused on male sexuality). 20
So it is fair to conclude that empirical and anecdotal evidence shows
that at least some people have fluid, changing sexualities. Does the concept of sexual orientation help us understand their sexuality? Again, no.
Somebody whose sexuality changes over time and circumstance cannot
have a persistent psychological disposition towards a particular sexual
object or practice. Even if his or her sexual desires exhibit periods of
relative stability, the periods have to be fairly long to have the kind of
consistency necessary to the concept of sexual orientation.
We have seen, in the first section, that the common concept of sexual
orientation fails to explain the sexualities of some people. With the addition of the possibility of sexual fluidity, the failure is more dramatic. For
even if we agree that not all people feel attraction based on sex, gender,
or combinations of the two, we might still think that something that is
inner and persisting explains people's sexual proclivities, even though it
might trivialize the concept of sexual orientation. But if some people's
sexuality is not even stable, then we cannot speak of an orientation at all,
not truthfully anyway. We are left simply with narratives about the particularities of a person's sexual life.

suIt of gender difference: if I am a man attracted to men, it is because I am

really a woman (or a third sex altogether), and my identity often has
more to do with being a woman or a third sex than with my sexual
behavior. Other cultures disregard sexual preference and desire in favor
of sex role, whereby it is normal for some men to prefer sexually penetrating others (including other men) and abnormal for some men to
strongly prefer being penetrated. In other cultures, homosexuality has a
ritualized, professional, or spiritual role to play disconnected from its
associations with sexuality, romance, and even the whole category of the
erotic. 23
The implications of these facts for the concept of sexual orientation
depend on which version of social constructionism we endorse. I discuss
three different versions: weak, strong, and interpretive social constructionism. Weak social constructionism claims that sexual identities and
roles arise from social ways of responding to and organizing sexual desires and orientations so that different cultures organize sexual roles and
identities in their particular ways. Though the social organization of
these desires produces different sexual identities, sexual orientations are
left untouched. This version of constructionism is thus compatible with at
least some essentialist views because essentialists also recognize cultural
variation in sexual roles and identities as a well-established fact (hence
the adjective "weak"). Even if sexual roles and identities come in many
shapes and forms, this would not deny the existence of underlying, fairly
stable heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual desires. The differences in
the sexual lives found, for example, in Murray's work only show that
different sexual roles and identities"channel" desires in different ways. 24
Weak social constructionism is thus compatible with the ordinary concept of sexual orientation.
More controversially, strong social constructionism argues that sexual
desire itself also varies. This means that not all cultures and all ages have
people with our taken-for-granted three-way division of sexual orientation. For example, people in another culture might have, instead of
heterosexual or homosexual desire, a desire to penetrate or to be penetrated. Thus, desires are formed differently-are socially constructed-in
different cultures and times, and there are many competing theories
about how this process of desire construction happens. 25 The resulting
view holds that sexual desires and identities remain fairly fixed in cultures but can vary across cultures, and that individuals with similar desires in a particular culture would experience their sexualities in basically
the same way. This version of social constructionism implies that sexual
orientations like ours need not exist in other cultures. Thus, sexual orientation need not have a universal status. Sexual orientation would result
from the way a particular culture organizes its sexual practices and desires and would not exist apart from a particular combination of social
factors. This strong social constructionism would then undercut the final

204

SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CULTURAL UNIVERSALITY,

AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
In academic discussions of sexuality, one important debate concerns
whether sexual orientation is cross-cultural and universal or whether it
varies with changing social and historical circumstances. Social constructionism is the view that sexuality varies with cultural variation. Essentialism is the view that sexuality is the same across cultures-specifically that
people are basically divided into homosexuals, heterosexuals, and bisexuals.21 Essentialism is thus in line with the common concept of sexual
orientation.
According to social constructionism, the sexual identities we take for
granted in contemporary America and Europe rarely appear in other
times and places. The sociologist Stephen O. Murray documents a remarkable diversity of different sexual styles from around the world, with
homosexual activity in men and women as part of many different sexual
identity formations. 22 Some cultures treat sexual object choice as the re-

207

William S. Wilkerson

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

feature we normally take to be part of the common concept of sexual

orientation: its cultural universality.
Finally, interpretive social constructionism argues that, even if sexual
desires remain the same across different cultures, individuals must engage in some self-interpretation of these feelings in light of social practices and that this self-interpretation changes the feelings themselves.
Hence, the interpretive social constructionist disagrees with the strong
social constructionist that individuals in particular cultures must experience similar sexual desires similarly, although given strong social pressures to interpret their desires in a particular way, they likely would. In
making this argument, the interpretive constructionist relies on a philosophical tradition that assumes that a person's experiences do not come,
as William James put it, "ticketed and labeled" -with their meanings and
structures already given. 26 Only through a process of interacting with
others and checking one's experiences against the linguistic and conceptual resources available in society do experiences come to have comprehensible meanings that one can use to understand and act on. I call this
process "interpretive" because in it people begin with inchoate experiences, ones that suggest a plenitude of possible meanings, which must
then be narrowed and understood in light of social categories. In doing
this, the experiences themselves come to change as they come to be
understood as an experience of "such and such."
This view about experience is plausible because many of our unconceptualized experiences are quite "thick" with possible meanings. To use
an example relevant to sexual orientation, imagine a teenage boy who has
strong feelings of attraction for another boy but who is unsure what these
feelings mean. He might also simultaneously have feelings for some
women. I use the word "feelings" here because the interpretive view will
deny that we always begin with desires that are explicitly or obviously
homosexual or heterosexual. Many coming-out stories include a long period of confusion such as this. What will this young man make of these
feelings? First, he may not be certain what attracts him in each case. Does
he like the other boy's masculinity, or his quick wit, or his intelligence?
Are his feelings genuinely sexual or are they just a "warm fuzziness" he
feels when he's around this particular boy? Similar questions arise about
his feelings for girls. He experiences each of these feelings in the context
of the other, such that he might compare these feelings to each other.
Assuming that he lives in our society, he may well be aware that he could
be gay, bisexual, or straight, but which possibility he chooses may not be
obvious to him. Note that if he decides that his attraction to the boy is a
sexual attraction to masculine features of the boy (his muscular bodYJ his
masculine comportment, his penis) and that this means that he is gay, he
has interpreted his feelings and changed them in two respects. First, he
has significantly thinned out his previously thick experiences by conceptualizing them and narrowing the range of their possible meanings. Sec-

ond, by conceptualizing them and putting them into language, he has

effectively changed them into the feelings that a gay person has; he has
set aside his feelings for girls as secondary, perhaps just a result of social
pressure to be heterosexual. Rather than the unconceptualized, thick, and
ambiguous experiences, his interpretation has partially constructed them
as feelings of a particular kind.
Interpretive social constructionism thus claims that sexual desire is
partly inchoate and protean, such that we do not simply have straightforward sexual desires but something less clearly defined: feelings that can
be interpreted in a variety of possible ways to fit different sexualities.
Such a view would not only undercut the cross-cultural universality of
sexual orientation, like strong social constructionism does, it would seem
to radically undercut sexual orientation altogether. However, I would
like to argue (and have argued)27 that this is not the case. We can accept
even this strong, interpretive social constructionism without embracing
the apparent skepticism about sexual orientation it seems to imply.

206

SEXUALITY AS INTERPRETATION
To see how we can still retain sexual orientation based on sex or gender
even with this interpretive view, consider religious identity. Christianity
is a complex social phenomenon with a rich history, a specific set of
values and mores, and a core group of beliefs, all of which are passed on
and enforced by specific social groups, such as specific communities of
believers and particular authority figures (pastors, priests, religious writers, and leaders). Being an individual Christian means adapting oneself
to this social complex. Depending on the depth of a person's commitment
to the social complex, the adaptation can have a deep and transforming
effect on one's personality. Habits of action, thought, and perception can
change as one sees the world as a Christian. This transformation accounts
in part for the profundity of the conversion experience: people say they
are different after conversion, and in some cases they genuinely are at a
subpersonal or subconscious level. This means that both conscious, explicit understandings of one's self change and subconsciously one sees
the world differently, adopts different habits, and feels differently about
things. Christianity, as individually lived, is a self-transformation
brought on by adaptation to specific cultural and historical traditions
shared by communities of fellow believers. Keeping with the analogy,
some people might try more than one religion or spiritual practice as they
search for one that resonates with and makes sense of their vaguely felt
spiritual needs.
Becoming Christian gives us another type of case in which we have
rich, inchoate feelings that require interpretation to be understood. In the
case of sexuality, feelings are capable of transformation and adaptation to

208

William S. Wilkerson

social norms and roles. We would then declare ourselves gay or lesbian
not because we have naturally given sexual orientations but because sexuality in our time is culturally organized around sexual orientations, be
they homosexual or heterosexual, and we interpret our sexual feelings
and experiences in light of these concepts, bringing our sexual selves in
line to match. In much the same way, a person might have thick, inchoate
spiritual needs that they cannot necessarily articulate but that resonate
well with the particular beliefs, practices, and narratives of a particular
religion. They adapt themselves to this religion and in the process come
to understand their previously inchoate spiritual needs in light of its
socially defined practices.
Both the religious and the sexual cases share the following structure:
people have nonconceptualized feelings, some of which they can articulate, while others are inchoate and unclear. They spend time trying to
understand them and rely on social ideals, roles, and identities to make
sense of them. 28 In some cases, one might see that one obviously desires
people of the same, or opposite, sex, but in many cases one might be less
certain. In the latter cases, sexual orientation is not just a given and persistent desire for other men, women, or both; people have lots of desires
that can be confusing to interpret, and they take on the project of a particular sexual orientation because it is the closest match. Identity and sexual
orientation form together in the coming-out process. This view of sexual
orientation thus brings it and sexual identity much closer together. People can develop an orientation based on their projected identity as much
as they develop their identity based on feelings that they come to describe as an orientation.
Interpretive social constructionism thus both preserves and changes
the common concept of sexual orientation: sexual orientation is neither a
naturally occurring, persistent desire nor merely a concept that disregards the complexity of our desires (despite its practical use in some
cases). Instead, it is a convergence of individual feelings, social constructs, and the interpretive choices individuals make about how to live
their sexuality. Sexual orientation is more akin to an existential project
than a psychological fact: it designates features of our existence that we
take up and live in a particular social setting. People do have feelings, and
some might have content that guides them toward some interpretations
and away from others, but this content does not fully determine their
sexual being.
This leads to an obvious objection: if there are feelings that fit with our
current concept of sexual orientation, then the essentialist is right, and at
least some people have sexual orientations as given, persisting desires for
people of a particular sex or gender. Interpretive social constructionism
regards sexual orientation as arising at the juncture of an individual's
feelings and the social roles and cultural possibilities of their historical
and geographical location. It thus admits that people have feelings that

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

209

they match to their social surroundings. But surely, the objection continues, if some people have desires that lead them to adopt one rather than
another sexual understanding and identity, then these desires have a
meaning that could exist independently of social circumstances, and
interpretation merely amounts to recognizing the truth of one's desires
and experiences.
This objection claims that feelings are given and then subject to interpretation. But if feelings are subject to interpretation, then it must also be
true that their meaning is not fully given; otherwise they would not be
open to interpretation. Since there is something in the feeling that is
subject to interpretation, there is something unclear and ambiguous in it,
which the act of interpretation resolves through conceptualization. If its
meaning is fully given, how could it change with context or even be
construed in different ways? The objection asks us to accept the impossible: the interpretation of something that at the least requires no interpretation and that at the most cannot be interpreted.
At issue here is the larger philosophical question of the degree to
which our experiences constrain the interpretations we make of them and
the knowledge we gain from them. Three views are possible: our experiences totally constrain (determine, even) the interpretations we make of
them. I find this view implausible for two reasons. First, it makes little
sense to speak of determined interpretations since the interpretation of
something implies the possibility that it could have been interpreted in
another way, and second because our interpretations of feelings can and
do change. Equally implausible is the second view that we can interpret
a~y experience in any way. In between, there is the third view that exper~ences can suggest and constrain, without determining, our interpretations of them. This view is the most plausible. It fits well with familiar
examples like interpreting literary works. A dense and thick work like
Moby Dick supports many interpretations, but it does not support any
interpretation at all. It is not, for example, a manual on how to assemble a
tent. In the same way, the interpretive view of sexual orientation argues
that a person's sexual feelings may guide his or her interpretation without determining it.
This account, then, allows that people's feelings may remain constant
and that they may live out one particular sexual identity, which they
regard as built from a particular sexual orientation. Yet it also allows for
people whose sexuality focuses on other objects and sensations to find
some other interpretive schemes that make sense of their own particular
sexual proclivities. People can learn to understand their own sexuality as,
perhaps, a fetish, or a desire for masochistic sensation, and they can find
roles and communities that support and help them understand their specific sexuality. People might change their interpretation of their feelings
or discover that their feelings may change, thus allowing that a person's

William S. Wilkerson

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

sexuality can be fluid, even though such people could still tell a narrative
about their changing sexual lives.
The interpretive view thus leaves us with interesting answers to the
three questions we raised about the concept of sexual orientation: its
basis in sex or gender, its stability, and its cross-cultural universality. In
our current time and place, most people will interpret their sexuality in
accordance with the prevailing concepts and roles in a society. In short,
most people will settle on a sexual orientation based on sex and regard
this as the natural feature of their psychosexual makeup because this is
the prevailing concept, even if the interpretive view disputes that this
sexual orientation is simply given as part of their psychosexual makeup.
The interpretive view also implies that in cultures that organize their
sexualities differently, people would organize and live their sexualities
accordingly. So the interpretive view does not endorse the cross-cultural
universality of the ordinary concept of sexual orientation and therefore
does not require that sexuality be organized around sex or gender as our
common concept of sexual orientation entails. Moreover, because an element of individual interpretation is always involved in the process of
being sexual, there remains the possibility that in any particular culture
some people might find other, more creative ways to interpret their feelings, thus realizing new sexual possibilities. Some individuals could even
come to understand their sexuality as a fluid and changing process that
defies any singular categorization. The interpretive view thus comports
with the experience of those who have fluid and changing sexualities,
although it does not claim, any more than the regular concept of sexual
orientation does, that these people have sexual orientations since that
concept remains tied to our prevailing understanding of it as a stable
desire.

NOTES

210

CONCLUSION
The concept of sexual orientation as an inner drive that is stable, that
persists through times and cultures, and that is based on sex or gender
faces some difficulties: How narrowly or broadly should we understand
the concept so as to account for people's possibly diverse or fluid sexualities? Does it apply universally, given the possible truth of social constructionism, especially in its strong and interpretive versions? While
there may be many ways to retain the concept in light of these questions
and problems, none of them may seem ultimately satisfactory, and we
may still have to wait for a better answer to the question: What is sexual
orientation? 29

211

.1. E~ Stein, in The Mismeasure of Desire: The Science, Theory and Ethics of Sexual
OnentatlOn (Oxford, u.K.: Oxford University Press, 1999), 23-70, discusses sexual orientation in terms of all these factors, as does much of the biological literature (see
notes 18 and 19 below).
2. I do ~ot endorse 0is view about choice. I merely mean to point out that the
common VIew takes thIS stance on the status of choice in sexual orientation. See
William Wilkerson, "Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation" Journal of
Social Philosophy 40:1 (2009): 97-116.
'
3. ~heshire Calhoun, Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and
Gay DIsplacement (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford UniverSity Press, 2000), 93.
4. John Corvino, "Orientation, Sexual," in Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical
Encyclopedia, vol. 2, edited by Alan Soble (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006),
728-34, at 729-30.
5. I am not questioning the practical uses of the concept; we must often use the
category of homose~uality (or heterosexuality) regardless of whether it captures deep
facts about the particulars of people's sexual attractions, in, say, political action that
seeks to change ~e di.sc~imin.ation a.gan:st. ga;:- people or to stop the spread of HIV.
6. I ~m overslmphfymg smce thIS dlstmction has been criticized in different ways.
For a mce summary of the history of this debate, see Linda Martin Alcoff Visible
Identities: Race, Gender and the Self (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Pres; 2006)
153-55.
'
,
7. The history of .these ki.nds of relationships ~an be found in Elizabeth Lapovsky
Kennedy and Madelme DaVIS, Boots of Leather, Sltppers of Gold: The History of a Lesbian
Com~unity (New York: Penguin, 1993). See also George Chauncey, "From Sexual InverSlOn to Homosexuality: The Changing Medical Construction of Sexual Boundaries," in Passion and Power: Sexuality in History, edited by Kathy Peiss, Christina Simmons, ru:~ Robert Padgug (Philadelphia, Penn.: Temple University Press), 87-117. The
compleXIties of butch-femme (and butch-butch) sexual relationships are detailed in
Gayle Rubin, "Of Catamites and Kings: Reflections on Butch, Gender, and Boundaries" in Gayle Rubin, Deviations: A Gayle Rubin Reader (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 2011), 241-53, especially 246-47.
8. Others hav~ .objected that "se~ual orientation" based on gender oversimplifies
and theref<:>re falSIfies human sexuahty. For example, Chris Cuomo writes, "the range
of what dnves u~ through the curves, scents, and swells of human intimacy cannot be
captured b~ avaIlable w~man/~an/hom~/hetero categories ... sexuality is a realm of
end~ess vanety and particulanty. Must It be something that provides an identity?"
Chns Cuomo, The Philosopher Queen: Feminist Essays on War, Love, and Knowledge (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 107.
9. This information can be found in a variety of sources, some in Deirdre Bair's
Simone de Beauvoir: A Biography (New York: Summit Books, 1990), and some in Beauvoir' ~ own Diary of a ~hilosophy Student, tr~slated by Barbara Klaw, edited by Margare~ SI.mons and SylVIe Le Bon de BeauvOlr (Urbana-Champaign, Ill.: University of
IllinOls Press, 2006). Beauvoir fictionalized the story of her love affair with the
Amer.ican novelist Nelson Algren in her novel The Mandarins, translated by Leonard
M. Fnedman (New York: W.W. Norton, 1956). But the best discussion of her relationship to her sexuality is certainly Margaret Simons's "Lesbian Connections: Simone de
Beauvoir and Feminism," in Adventures in Lesbian Philosophy, edited by Claudia Card
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1985),217--40.
10. Stein use~ this scale in defining sexual orientation, Mismeasure of Desire, 47--49.
11. Alfred Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, and Clyde Martin, Sexual Behavior in the
Human Male (Philadelphia, Penn.: W.B. Saunders Company, 1948), 612ff.
12. R. E. Fay, C. F. Turner, A. D. Klassen, and J. H. Gagnon, "Prevalence of SameGender Contact among Men," Science 243 (January 20, 1989): 343-48; S. M. Rogers and

William S. Wilkerson

What Is "Sexual Orientation"?

C. F. Turner, "Male-Male Sexual Contact in the USA: Findings from Five Sample
Surveys, 1970-1990," Journal of Sex Research 28:4 (1991): 491-519.
13. Jane Litwoman, quoted in Loraine Hutchins and Lana Kaahumanu, "Overview," in Bi Any Other Name, edited by Loraine Hutchins and Lana Kaahumanu (Los
Angeles: Alyson Publications, 1991),4-5. Carol A. Queen writes, "I hate hearing 'You
just can't make up your mind.' I make up a decision each time I have sex.,r choose to
honor the purr in my cunt that says 'Gimme.' I choose the thrill of attraction and the
promise of pleasure, the clit, the cock, the fire in the eyes" ("The Queer in Me," in Bi
Any Other Name, 20). .
.
.
"..
"
14. Both Stein (Mlsmeasure of DeSIre, 41-44) and CorVinO ( Onentation, Sexual,
728-29) reject behavioral definitions of "sexual orientation" because these definitions
do not generally square with how we think of sexual orientation and because they face
their own difficulties. Specifically, if we define "sexual orientation" behaviorally, sexual orientation lacks all stability and changes with the current behavior of any particular individual.
15. Martin S. Weinberg, Colin J. Williams, and Douglas Pryor, Dual Attractions:
Understanding Bisexuality (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 162-65.
16. Weinberg, Williams, and Pryor, Dual Attractions, 145.
17. Such interpretations and theories of homosexuality are, he writes, "most unfortunate, for they provide an interpretation in anticipation of any sufficient demonstration of the fact; and consequently they prejudice investigations of the nature and
origin of homosexual activity" (Kinsey, Sexual Behavior, 612). This point proves remarkably prescient in light of later biological studies of homosexuality.
18. J. Michael Bailey et al., "Do Individual Differences in Sociosexuality Repres~nt
Genetic or Environmentally Contingent Strategies? Evidence from the AustralaSIan
Twin Registry," Journal of Personality and Soci.al Psychology 78:3 (2000): 524:-36; J: M~~
chael Bailey and Richard Pillard, "A Genetic Study ~f Male ~exual. Onenta~on,
Archives of General Psychiatry 48:12 (1991): 1089-9.6; J. MIchael B.aIleY'.Ri0ard PIllard:,
and Yvonne Agyei, "Heritable Factors InfluencIn~ ~exual OnentatI?,n In Wom~r:'
Archives of General Psychiatry 50:3 (1993): 217-23; WIllIan: By.ne et al., .~e Int~rstItIal
Nuclei of the Human Anterior Hypothalamus: An Investigation of VanatIon WIth Sex,
Sexual Orientation, and HIV Status," Hormones and Behavior 40:2 (2001): 86-92; Dean
Hamer et al., "A Linkage between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male
Sexual Orientation," Science 261 (July 16, 1993): 321-27; Dean Hamer and Peter Copeland, The Science of Desire (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Simon LeVay, "~
Difference in Hypothalamic Structure between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men,
Science 253 (July 30,1991): 1034-37; Brian Mustanski, Meredith Chivers, and J. M~chael
Bailey, "A Critical Review of Recent Biological Research on Human Sexual Onentation," Annual Review of Sex Research 12 (2002): 89-140.
.
19. G. Reiger, M. Chivers, and J. M. Bailey, "Sexual Arousal Patterns of BIsexual
Men," Psychological Science 16:8 (2005): 579-84.
.
20. Lisa M. Diamond, Sexual Fluidity: Understanding Women's Love and DeSIre (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008).
21. The literature on this topic is vast. Some of the highlights include John Boswell,
Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990); John Boswell, "Revolutions, Universals, and Sexual Categories," in Hidden fr?n:
History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past, edited by Martin Dube.rman, Martha VICInus, and George Chauncey (New York: NAL Books), 37-53; MIchel ~oucault, The
History of Sexuality, vol. 1, translated by Robert Hurley (~ew York: Vintage Books,
1976); David Halperin, One Hundred Years of HomosexualIty (New York: Routledge,
1990); David Halperin, How to Do the History of Homosexuality (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2002); and William Wilkerson, Ambig~ity and Sexuality (~ew York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). All these aut~ors argue eIther for sorr:e .vers.IOn of constructionism or present general introductIons to the debate. EssentIalIsm IS defended
by Raja Halwani, "Prolegomena to Any F~tur.e Metaphys!~~ of Sex1;lal Ide~~ty: Reca~t
ing the Essentialism and Social ConstructionIsm Debate, In IdentIty PO/ztICS Reconsld-

ered, edited by Linda Martin A1coff, Michael Hames-Garda, Satya P. Mohanty, and
Paula M. L. Moya (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and by Richard Mohr, Gay
Ideas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992).
22. Stephen O. Murray, Homosexualities (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000).
23. The claim that society has roles for people it would generally not acknowledge
or wish to praise, as odd as it sounds, is quite common among sociologists who study
deviance and deviance theory. The idea is that society can contain and monitor deviance by "channeling" it into specific roles that are nonetheless stigmatized. A classic
text is Erving Goffman's Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963).
24. John Boswell insists on this possibility for understanding social and sexual history (Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality, 41-59), and Halwani's "Prolegomena" argues that essentialism is consistent with the variation in sexual roles across
societies.
25. Theories for understanding this process include Gayle Rubin's argument that
the creation of the sex/gender system involves deep social structures that both organize and create gender and sex roles. She combines both the social anthropology of
Claude Levi-Strauss with Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis to understand this
process at both the social and individual level. See Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women," in Deviations: A Gayle Rubin Reader, 33-65. Michel Foucault views the entire concept of human sexuality as a construct emerging out of contingent power relationships
necessary to the creation of modem, ordered society. See Abnormal: Lectures at the
College de France 1974-1975, edited by Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni,
translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2003), and History of Sexuality, vol.
1. George Chauncey sees the origin of modem gay and lesbian identity as bound up
with social and economic transformations brought about by twentieth-century industrialization; see his Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male
World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
26. William James, Pragmatism (Sioux Falls, S.D.: NuVision Publications, 2007), 71.
The discussion of whether or not experience has intrinsic content, how much this
content constrains our understanding and conceptualization of it, and the related
problem of the "given" has been large in the last century. For other important discussions, see Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception,
and Reality (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing, 1991), 127-96; John McDowell,
Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), especially 3-24;
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979), 182-92, and, in the Continental tradition, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Donald Landes (New York: Routledge, 2012),
especially the Introduction.
27. See Wilkerson, Ambiguity and Sexuality and "Is It a Choice?"
28. For a discussion of this kind of interpretive process, see Charles Taylor, "What
Is Human Agency?" in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
29. I would like to thank the editors-Raja Halwani, Nicholas Power, Alan Soblealong with Nicholas Jones, Chris Cuomo, Talia Mae Bettcher, and especially Andrew
Cling for many helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper.

212

"~I

213

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. When discussing the sex/gender component of the mainstream

concept of sexual attraction, Wilkerson uses both attraction "to"
and attraction "based on" sex or gender. Is there a difference in the
meaning of these expressions? How would the difference, if any,

214

William S. Wilkerson

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

affect the way we understand the mainstream concept of sexual

orientation? How would it affect Wilkerson's argument?
Is there a way to philosophically analyze the concept of sexual
orientation so that it is neither too broad (i.e., it succeeds in not
including sexualities that pre analytically do not seem to warrant
being called an orientation) nor too narrow (i.e., it succeeds in
including all the sexualities that do warrant being classified as an
orientation)?
What would Vemallis have to say to Wilkerson about bisexuals
who are not attracted to others based on sex or gender (see her
essay "Bisexual Marriage" in this volume)?
Explain the conceptual differences between strong social constructionism and interpretive social constructionism. How could one
make a case that the latter is only a variation of the former, not a
third version of social constructionism?
Explain the objection that Wilkerson raises against interpretive social constructionism and his reply to it. Is the reply convincing?
Particularly, might interpretation get rid of epistemic ambiguity, as
opposed to ambiguity in the very nature of experiences? How
would this affect Wilkerson's argument?
Interpretive social constructionism claims that sexual desire is
"partly inchoate and protean," but on what basis can it also claim
that the feelings that we interpret (in light of our own and our
culture's sexual constructs) and that form the basis of our sexual
orientation are themselves sexual? What features would make such
a "thin" (raw, uninterpreted, not yet conceptualized) experience a
sexual one as opposed to a nonsexual one?

THIRTEEN
Bisexual Marriage
Kay ley Vernallis

Kay~~y yemallis distinguishes between two types of bisexuals: (1) genderspecific bIsexuals, who are attracted to people based on their gender and for that
reason are attracted to both males/men and females/women, and (2) gendernonspecific bisexuals, who are attracted to people based on their personality and
character regardless of their gender. Vernallis argues that neither opposite-sex
marriage rights nor same-sex marriage rights guarantee the equal treatment of
gender-specific bisexuals, who desire to maintain concurrent relationships with
both sexes or genders. If two central ideals of marriage are to allow the full
expression of the sexuality of the spouses and, at the same time, to encourage and
m,aintain sexual fidelity, then perhaps only foursome marriages -of two female
bIsexuals and two male bisexuals, all married to each other-would allow such
bisexuals to uphold both of these ideals of marriage. Vernallis concludes with
some remarks about how various sorts of plural marriages might benefit society.
Kayley Vernallis is professor and chair of the philosophy department at California State University, Los
Her publications include "Tedium, Aesthetic Form, and Moral InSight in Silverlake Ufe," Film and
PhIlosophy (2008); the e~~~ "Bisexuality" in Sex from Plato to Paglia: A Philosophical Encyclopedia, edited by
Alan Soble (2006), and Bisexual Monogamy: Twice the Temptation but Half the Fun?" Journal of Social
PhiiosOPh~ (1 ~99). "Bi~exual Marriage" is printed here for the first time. 2012, Kayley Vernallis, who kindly
gave permission for thiS new essay to be included in this volume.
An~eles.

,i,

Changing traditional attitudes toward homosexuality is in itself a

mind-expanding experience for most people. But we shall not really
succeed in discarding the strailjacket of our cultural beliefs about sexual choice if we fail to come to terms with the well-documented, normal
human capacity to love members of both sexes. 1
- Margaret Mead

215