Case Digest of Ramirez Vs Vda de Ramirez

CASE DIGEST: LANDTITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT SECTION 5,
ARTICLE III OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION)

RAMIREZ VS VDA DE RAMIREZ, G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
This opinion notwithstanding, we uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a

usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
FACTS OF THE CASE: The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the
testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11,
1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court
of First Instance of Manila, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. The widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for
substitutions. On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as
follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall
go to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged
with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that
the provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect
to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the
testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because
the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as
provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in
the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of
the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in
the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates
the testator's express win to give this property to them. Nonetheless, the lower court
approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967.
In view of the foregoing, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez was ordered distributed as
follows:
ISSUE: Whether or not the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is
void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
aliens.
RULING: The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows: SEC. 5. Save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens
to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of
land.
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
CASE DIGEST 2: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT)

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION VS LUI SHE, G.R. No. L-17587, September 12,
1967
FACTS OF THE CASE: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were
the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila with an area of 2,582.30 square meters.
In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen
Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses, while
Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a longtime lessee of a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental of P2,620. Justina Santos
became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir.
Justina Santos executed a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering
the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street.
The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time
from the agreement and the monthly rental was P3,120. The contract was amended so as to
cover the entire property. On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong
the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a
monthly installment of P1,000. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine
citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal .
However the application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that
he was not a resident of Rizal. She then filed a petition to adopt him and his children
on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error
was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned. On November 18, 1958 she executed
two other contracts, one extending the term of the lease to 99 years, and another fixing the
term of the option of 50 years. In the two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 she
bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a later
date she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were
made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now
directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.
A complaint was filed in CFI alleging that the contracts were obtained by
Wong "through fraud, misrepresentation, inequitable conduct, undue influence and abuse of
confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the helplessness of the plaintif and
were made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting aliens from acquiring lands
in the Philippines and also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws." In his answer, Wong
insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties.
The Court ruled that with the exception of the first which is the lease contract, all other
documents were declared null and void. After the case was submitted for decision,
both parties died. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this
case, while Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contracts in question and the land subject-matter of the
contracts be returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine
Banking Corporation. YES
RULING: Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered
collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution
directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is
an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is
granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,
Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of
land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual
transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to
enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right
to dispose of it ( jus disponendi) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is
just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the
disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are
consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within
the space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was
reduced to a hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien
landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
REPUBLIC VS QUASHA, G.R. No. L-30299 August 17, 1972
FACTS OF THE CASE: Respondent, William H. Quasha, an American citizen, had

acquired by purchase on 26 November 1954 a parcel of land with the permanent
improvements thereon, in Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, with an area of 2,616 sq. m.
more or less, and covered by a T. C. T. He filed a petition in the CFI of Rizal averring the
acquisition of said real estate. The Republic claimed that upon expiration of the Parity
Amendment on 3 July 1974, rights acquired by citizens of the United States of America shall
cease and be of no further force and efect. Such claims necessarily afect the rights and
interest of the plaintif, for which reason plaintiff Quasha sought a declaration of his
rights under the Parity Amendment, said plaintif contending that the ownership of
properties during the efectivity of the Parity Amendment continues notwithstanding the
termination and efectivity of the Amendment.
The Solicitor General contended that the land acquired by plaintiff constituted
private agricultural land and that the acquisition violated section 5, Article XIII, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to
non-Filipinos, except by hereditary succession; and assuming that Quasha's acquisition
was valid, any and all rights by him so acquired "will expire ipso facto and ipso jure at the
end of the day on 3 July 1974, if he continued to hold the property until then, and will be
subject to escheat or reversion proceedings" by the Republic.
The CFI of Rizal held that acquisition by the plaintiff the private agricultural
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title in his name was valid, and that plaintiff has a
right to continue in ownership of the said property even beyond July 3, 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not by virtue of the so-called Parity Amendment to the Philippine
Constitution respondent Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the private residential
land in Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal, which is concededly classified private agricultural land.
NO
Hence, the contracts in question are annulled and set aside and the land subjectmatter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented
by the Philippine Banking Corporation. Moreover, Wong Heng (as substituted by the
defendant-appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum
of P56,564.35, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint.
RULING: "Parity Amendment" provides that: Notwithstanding the provision of section one,
Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during
the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the Philippines
with the President of the United States on the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six,
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three,
but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and seventyfour, the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to
citizens of the United states and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to, and under
the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
CASE DIGEST 3: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)
Examination of the "Parity Amendment", as ratified, reveals that it only establishes an

express exception to two (2) provisions of our Constitution, to wit: (a) Section 1,
Article XIII, re disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of agricultural, timber
and mineral lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines; and
The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines" is an
expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. We hold that under the
Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential
lands.
(b) Section 8, Article XIV, regarding operation of public utilities. As originally drafted by
the framers of the Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit agricultural
lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to
operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by
them: but the "Parity Amendment" expressly extended the privilege to citizens of the
United States of America and/or to business enterprises owned or controlled by them. Thus,
whether from the Philippine or the American side, the intention was to secure parity
for United States citizens, only in two matters: (1) exploitation, development and
utilization of public lands, and other natural resources of the Philippines; and (2) the
operation of public utilities.
It is easy to see that all exceptional rights conferred upon United States citizens
and business entities owned or controlled by them, under the Amendment, are
subject to one and the same resolutory term or period: they are to last "during the
efectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into on 4 July 1946", "but in no case to
extend beyond the, third of July, 1974". None of the privileges conferred by the "Parity
Amendment" are excepted from this resolutory period.
Hence, the Court ruled that the provisions of the "Parity Amendment" prescribing that
the disposition and exploitation, etc. of agricultural lands of the public domain are in no
case to extend beyond the third of July 1974. This limitation already existed when Quasha
in 1954 purchased the Forbes Park property, and the acquisition was subject to it. Further,
the decision of the CFI of Rizal was reversed and declared that, under the "Parity
Amendment" to our Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations
and business enterprises owned or controlled by them cannot acquire and own, save
in cases of hereditary succession, private agricultural lands in the Philippines and that all
other rights acquired by them under said amendment will expire on 3 July 1974.

HULST VS PR BUILDERS, G.R. No. 156364
September 3, 2007
FACTS OF THE CASE: Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida
Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR
Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in respondent's
townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. When respondent failed to
comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995, the spouses Hulst
filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board a complaint for rescission of
contract. HLURB Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of spouses Hulst and reimburse
complainant the sum of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid by the
complainants to P.R. Builders, plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from the time complaint was filed and other damages.
Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased
property to petitioner. From then on, petitioner alone pursued the case. A writ of execution
was issued and levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas. Two days before the scheduled
public auction, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB
on the ground that the Sherif made an overlevy, but the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15
parcels of land. Holly Properties Realty Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15
parcels of land for the total amount of P5,450,653.33. Four months later, HLURB issued an
Order setting aside the sherif's levy on respondent's real properties because of the
disparity of the valuation. While mere inadequacy of the price is not a sufficient ground to
annul the sale, the court is justified to intervene where the inadequacy of the price shocks
the conscience.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner and his wife, who are Dutch nationals are allowed to own
real property in the Philippines. NO
RULING: The Court ruled that before resolving the question whether the CA erred in
affirming the Order of the HLURB setting aside the levy made by the sherif, it befits this
Court to address a matter of public and national importance which completely escaped
the attention of the HLURB Arbiter and the CA: petitioner and his wife are foreign
nationals who are disqualified under the Constitution from owning real property in their
names.
Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 7. Save in

cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain." The 1987 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens or
corporations at least 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos . Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands;
hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, a naturalized Filipino citizen can own the
disputed lot. YES
Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the
Constitution from acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to
Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. Under Article
1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code, all contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law or public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are
inexistent and void from the beginning. Article 1410 of the same Code provides that the
action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. A
void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil efect. It does not create, modify
or extinguish a juridical relation.
Further, under Article 1414, one who repudiates the agreement and demands his
money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore
entitled to recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission,
which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private
land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the
amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. No damages
may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement
produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. Further, petitioner is not entitled to
actual as well as interests thereon,moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
RULING: Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the
sale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee was an
alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the property, of respondent
Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who is constitutionally qualified to own land.
The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned
by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally
qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in
allowing petitioner to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.
Futher, in the case of Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia vs. Cuenco, it ruled that if the ban
on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by
this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.
Laches also militates against petitioner's cause. She sold the disputed lot in 1938.
She instituted the action to annul the sale only on July 15, 1968. What the Court said in the
cited Sarsosa case applies with equal force to the petitioner, it is likewise inescapable that
petitioner had slept on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction of
inexcusable neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated
property. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
Respondent, therefore, must be declared to be the rightful owner of the property.
DE CASTRO VS QUEEN TAN, G.R. No. L-31956 April 30, 1984
FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Filomena Gerona de Castro sold a 1,258 sq. m.
residential lot in Bulan, Sorsogon to Tan Tai, a Chinese. In 1956, Tan Tai died leaving herein
respondents his widow, To O. Hiap, and children Joaquin Teng Queen Tan, Tan Teng Bio,
Dolores Tan and Rosario Tan Hua Ing. Before the death of Tan Tai or on August 11,
1956, one of his sons, Joaquin, became a naturalized Filipino. Six years after Tan Tai's
death, his heirs executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate with sale , whereby
the disputed lot in its entirety was alloted to Joaquin.
Petitioner commenced suit against the heirs of Tan Tai for annulment of the sale for
alleged violation of the 1935 Constitution prohibiting the sale of land to aliens.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of (a) lack of cause of
action, the plaintif being in pari delicto with the vendee, and the land being already owned
by a Philippine citizen; (b) laches; and (c) acquisitive prescription.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint, sustaining the first two grounds invoked by
the movants.

LEE VS REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001
FACTS OF THE CASE: Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon,
Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all
surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an
approximate area of 1,631 square meters, and covered by Original Certificate of situated at
the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City. However, in 1948, the former
owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong
for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale
because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private
agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land.
The same former owners filed with the CFI, Capiz an action for recovery of the
same parcel of land. Citing the case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She, they
submitted that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC, Roxas City a petition for
reconstitution of title of the lot. They alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee
Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the
lot. Petitioner Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in Lot through an extra-judicial
settlement and donation executed in her favor by her deceased husband Lee Bing Hoo.
Petitioner Pacita Yu Lee acquired her share in the same lot by succession from her
deceased husband Lee Bun Ting, as evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial settlement.
RTC ordered the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the
name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approved plan and technical description, which were
burned during the war. The Solicitor General filed with CA a petition for annulment of
judgment in Reconstitution Case, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in
the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire
title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to
own the subject land. CA declared that the reconstitution is void.
valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no
longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The
objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of
title must be based on an owners duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid
sources of the title to be reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan
and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the
order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. Thus, although petitioners are in
possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of
ownership of the land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Liong predecessors-in-interest has the qualification to own land
in the Philippines. YES
RULING: The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936,
during the efectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could
not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee
Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate
the transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However, the proper party to assail the
illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the transaction. In sales of real
estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of
the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the
constitutional violation and being thus in pari delictothe courts will not aford protection to
either party. The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was
done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment
of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert
itself, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription never lies against the
State.
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of
the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or
escheat (power of a state to acquire title to property for which there is no owner ) of the land
to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth. In this case, subsequent
circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of
Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited
by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino
citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or
private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In
this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw
in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered

MATTHEWS VS TAYLOR, G.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009
FACTS OF THE CASE: Respondent Benjamin A. Taylor, a British subject, married Joselyn
C. Taylor, a 17-year old Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon
and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral
Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were
obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin,
authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into
contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. Joselyn as lessor and
petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the
Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. Benjamin
instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against
Joselyn and the petitioner since the agreement was executed without the formers consent,
hence it was void. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns
husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
RTC declared the agreement null and void and considered the Boracay property as
community property of Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was
necessary to validate any contract involving the property. CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino
wife without the consent of her British husband valid. YES
RULING: The court ruled that the trial and appellate courts both focused on the property
relations of petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions.
They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional principles, which, in fact, are
the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Section 7. Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional
provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of
this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public
domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the
capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or
private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. We find
and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn
and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private
and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the
funds for such acquisition.
By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was
created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration
can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the
spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain
such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If
the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot
be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
KRIVENKO VS REGISTER OF DEEDS, G.R. No. L-630
November 15, 1947
FACTS OF THE CASE: Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by
the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the
register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila by
means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the
register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land. NO
RULING: Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented ," and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional
purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be
defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in
favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII,
and it reads as follows: Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots
or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of
any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." The
exclusion of aliens from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of
owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep
pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos."
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are
construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the efect of
our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites
where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we
will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied,
however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands
for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they
may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private
or public agricultural lands, including residential lands. The Court affirmed the
decision of CFI of Manila sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds to register the
disputed lot.
CASE DIGEST 9: LANDTITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

BARSOBIA VS. CUENCO, G.R. NO. L-33048 APRIL 16, 1982
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The lot in controversy is a one-half portion (on the northern side) of two adjoining
parcels of coconut land located at Barrio Mancapagao, Sagay, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental
(now Camiguin province). The entire land was owned previously by a certain Leocadia
Balisado, who had sold it to the spouses Patricio Barsobia (now deceased) and Epifania
Sarsosa, one of the petitioners herein. They are Filipino citizens. Epifania Sarsosa then
a widow, sold the land in controversy to a Chinese, Ong King Po, who took actual possession
and enjoyed the fruits thereof. Thereafter, Ong King Po sold the litigated property to
Victoriano T. Cuenco (respondent herein), who immediately took actual possession and
harvested the fruits therefrom.
Petitioner Epifania usurped the controverted property and sold one-half portion of
the land to Pacita W. Vallar, the other petitioner herein. Epifania claimed that it was not her
intention to sell the land to Ong king Po and that she signed the document of sale merely to
evidence her indebtedness to the latter and she has been in possession ever since except
for the portion sold to Pacita. Respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession and
ownership of the litigated land against petitioners Epifania and Pacita Vallar. Petitioners
insisted that they were the owners and possessors of the litigated land; that its sale to Ong
King Po, a Chinese, was inexistent and/or void ab initio; and that the deed of sale between
them was only an evidence of Epifania's indebtedness to Ong King Po.
The trial court declared the Deeds of Sale as inexistent and void from the very
beginning and declared Pacita Vallar as as the lawful owner and possessor of the portion of
land. Court of Appeals reversed the aforementioned decision and decreed instead that
respondent was the owner of the litigated property.
ISSUE: Whether of not the petitioners are the rightful owners of the property. NO
RULING: Respondent Victoriano T. Cuenco must be declared to be the rightful owner of
the property. There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936
by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [7],
Civil Code) because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935
Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos.
Said provision reads: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations,
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a
naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a
naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There
would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the
land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person. Applying by analogy the ruling of
this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons: ... if the ban on aliens from
acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed by this Court in the
Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos,
that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition
of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
While, strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no
rights of ownership to transmit, it is likewise inescapable that petitioner Epifania had slept
on her rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable
neglect, she should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property.
However, petitioner Pacita Vallar, should not be held also liable for actual damages to
respondent. In the absence of contrary proof, she, too, must be considered as a vendee
in good faith of petitioner Epifania.

REPUBLIC VS IAC, GONZALES, G.R. No. 74170 July 18, 1989
FACTS OF THE CASE: The case principally concerns Chua Kim @ Uy Teng Be, who
became a naturalized Filipino citizen on January 7,1977 and was the adopted son of
Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. The case involved three (3) parcels of land, which were
respectively adjudicated in a land registration cases to two persons, as follows: 1) Lots 1
and 2, to the Spouses Benigno Maosca and Julia Daguison; and 2) Lot 549 to Gaspar
Marquez, married to Marcela Masaganda. However, no decree of confirmation and
registration was entered at the time.
Lots 1 and 2 and Lot 549 were sold by the respevctive owners to Gregorio Reyes Uy Un.
Subsequently, Gregorio Reyes Uy Un died, and his adopted son, Chua Kim @ Uy Teng,
took possession of the property. These three (3) parcels of land together with several
others, later became subject of a compromise agreement in a litigation in the CFI of Quezon
Province. Later, Chua Kim then filed a petition for issuance of decree of confirmation and
registration of subject parcels of land.
The CFI of Quezon finds that herein petitioner Chua Kim alias Uy Teng Be has duly
established his registerable title over the properties in question in this land registration
case. The Republic challenged the correctness of the Order and appealed it to the Court of
Appeals. The Republic's theory is that the conveyances to Chua Kim were made while he
was still an alien, i.e., prior to his taking oath as a naturalized Philippine citizen on January
7, 1977, at a time when he was disqualified to acquire ownership of land in the Philippines
(ART XIII, SEC. 5, 1935 Constitution; ART. XIV, Sec. 14, 1973 Constitution); hence, his
asserted titles are null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not a conveyance of a residential land to an alien prior to his acquisition
of Filipino citizenship by naturalization valid. YES
RULING: Plainly, the conveyances were made before the 1935 Constitution went
into effect, i.e., at a time when there was no prohibition against acquisition of private
agricultural lands by aliens. Gregorio Reyes Uy Un therefore acquired good title to the
lands thus purchased by him, and his ownership was not at all afected either (1) by the
principle subsequently enunciated in the 1935 Constitution that aliens were incapacitated to
acquire lands in the country, since that constitutional principle has no retrospective
application, or (2) by his and his successor's omission to procure the registration of the
property prior to the coming into efect of the Constitution.
It is a fact, furthermore, that since the death of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, Chua Kim @ Uy
Teng Be had been in continuous possession of the lands in concept of owner, as the putative
heir of his adoptive father, said Gregorio Reyes; this, without protest whatever from any
person.
Be this as it may, the acquisition by Chua Kim of Philippine citizenship should
foreclose any further debate regarding the title to the property in controversy, in line with
this Court's rulings relative to persons similarly situated. In Sarsosa Vda. de Barsobia v.
Cuenco, for instance, the ruling was as follows: The litigated property is now in the
hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified vendee.
Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject
property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania
to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.
Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap &
Sons ... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.
VASQUEZ VS LI SENG GIAP, G.R. No. L-3676, January 31, 1955
FACTS OF THE CASE: On January 22, 1940, plaintiff Socoro Vasquez sold and transferred
to defendant Li Seng Giap, then Chinese citizen, for the sum of P14,500, a parcel of land
together with a house of strong materials existing thereon in Tondo, City of Manila.
Defendant Li Seng Giap sold and transferred unto defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc.,
whose shareholdings then were owned by Chinese citizens, for the same sum of P14,500,
the above-mentioned parcel, together with the improvements thereon, and duly registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59684 of the Office of the Register of Deeds on August
23, 1940.
Defendant Li Seng Giap was duly naturalized as a Filipino citizen on May 10,
1941. Moreover, defendant Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., is now a Filipino corporation, 96.67
per cent of its stock being owned by Filipinos, and duly authorized by its articles of
incorporation to own, acquire or dispose of real properties.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint to rescind the sale of a parcel of land

together with the improvements erected thereon, which was sold by the plaintif to
the defendant Li Seng Giap on 22 January 1940, on the ground that the vendee was an
alien and under the Constitution incapable to own and hold title to lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of real property to an alien, who was later
naturalized as a Filipino citizen maybe annulled. NO
RULING: Majority of the Court has ruled that in Sales of real estate to aliens incapable of
holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and
the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation and being thus in
pari delicto the courts will not aford protection to either party.
However, if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban
lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization.
The title to the parcel of land of the vendee, a naturalized Filipino citizen, being
valid that of the domestic corporation to which the parcel of land has been transferred,
must also be valid, 96.67 per cent of its capital stock being owned by Filipinos.

ONG CHING PO VS CA, G.R. Nos. 113472-73 December 20, 1994
FACTS OF THE CASE: On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of to private
respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong Yee. The latter, the brother of petitioner
Ong Ching Po, died in January 1983; while petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October
1986. The said sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English.
Subsequently, the document was registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila, which
issued a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of private respondent.
According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and
building to petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled in Iloilo. When her
husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she was going to sell it.
Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said premises. Hence, private respondent
filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching Po. The MTC dismissed her
case, which was affirmed by the RTC, and then the CA.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong
Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a
photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese with the letter head "Sincere Trading Co."
On December 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Ong
Joi Jong to private respondent in 1947. On December 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po,
Jimmy Ong and David Ong filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private
respondent in the Regional Trial Court. While, private respondent filed an action for
quieting of title against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the
Regional Trial Court.
The cases were consolidated, and the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
private respondent, which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners, who are aliens be declared as lawful owners of the
subject parcel of land. NO
RULING: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides: Save in cases of
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public
domain.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain". The 1935
Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition, exploitation, development
and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other natural resources of the
Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which
was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been
disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from
acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified
from acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution
of Exhibit "B" has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law. On
the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in favor
of private respondent (Exhibit "A") is a notarized document.
Moreover, petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due
execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit "B". The due execution of the document may be
established by the person or persons who executed it; by the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged; or by any person who was present and saw it executed or
who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the
parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof. If it is true that
she was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely as a witness? Her oral
testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate.
As to the contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration,
rental receipts, deed of sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were in
their possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband entrusted said
lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo. As observed by the Court of
Appeals: We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of
dominion, as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant to
his appointment or employment. It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the
name of private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name
of her husband.

FRENZEL VS CATITO, G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German
descent. He arrived in the Philippines in 1974, and thereafter married Teresita Santos, a
Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board without
obtaining a divorce. Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a
vacation and went to a night spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a
Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in
Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national.
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at
Kings Cross, return to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her own.
Ederlina was delighted at the idea and proposed to put up a beauty parlor, which Alfred
agreed. Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his wife in
Australia. Ederlina purchased properties in the Philippines, but was financed by Albert,
which included a building used as a beauty parlor business and a house and lot. Since Alfred
knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed
that only Ederlinas name would appear in the deed of sale as the buyer of the property, as
well as in the title covering the same. After all, he was planning to marry Ederlina and he
believed that after their marriage, the two of them would jointly own the property.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina, so he
decided to sell his various properties in Australia and Papua New Guinea. While Alfred was in
Papua New Guinea, he received a Letter from Klaus Muller who was then residing in Berlin,
Germany informing him that he and Ederlina had been married on October 16, 1978 and
had a blissful married life until Alfred intruded therein. When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she
admitted that she and Klaus were, indeed, married, but she assured Alfred that she would
divorce Klaus. In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase another house and lot and a
parcel of land in Davao City also in the name of Ederlina. They also decided beach resort on
a four-hectare land in Camudmud, Babak, Davao.
Ederlinas petition for divorce was denied because Klaus opposed the same.
Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating and Alfred decided to live separately
from Ederlina and cut of all contacts with her. Alfred filed a Complaint against Ederlina, with
the RTC, for recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon City and Manila. He
also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the RTC of Davao City, for specific performance,
declaration of ownership of real and personal properties. RTC of Quezon City rendered a
decision in favor of Alfred, while the RTC of Davao City rendered a decision in favor of
Ederlina.
premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal
contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Under Article 1412 of the
New Civil Code, the petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow
him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. Equity as a rule will
follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. Where the wrong of one party equals that of the
other, the defendant is in the stronger position ... it signifies that in such a situation, neither
a court of equity nor a court of law will administer a remedy. The rule is expressed in the
maxims: EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO
DEFENDENTIS.
It is evident that the plaintiff was fully aware that as a non-citizen of the
Philippines, he was disqualified from validly purchasing any land within the country. Futile,
too, is petitioners reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code that No person should
unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. An action for recovery of what has been
paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision
does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from
filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he
paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs.
Johnson: The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff
and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for
his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles
of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between
him and the plaintif.
ISSUE: Whether or not an alien is entitled to reimbursements of the properties purchased in

the Philippines in name of another through the use of his own funds. NO
FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent

Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany and resided therein at a house owned
by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in
1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which
he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the
cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The
Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of
Title of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila. Due to incompatibilities and
respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually
separated. Respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial
Court.
The trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. With regard to the
Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. It provides
that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in
RULING: Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows: Save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public
domain. Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred
or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands
of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him
as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence,
are null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is
null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal efect at
all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law
and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by
knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may
not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and

MULLER VS MULLER, G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property. x x x CA
modified the decision of the RTC, and directed respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller to
reimburse the petitioner the amount for the acquisition of the land and the amount for the
construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Hence, the Court reversed the decision of the CA. It ruled that petitioner
Buenaventura Muller not liable for reimbursement for the amount of the acquisition of the
land as well as the house constructed in Antipolo City.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property. NO
RULING: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Save in cases of
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.
The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the
name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained. Thus, in the instant case,
respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of
funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in efect
permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is
likewise proscribed by law.
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain." In Cheesman vs IAC, the court ruled that petitioner Thomas Cheesman
was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his
intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly
violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had
and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband
in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion
of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would
then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase
the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and
overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the
acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds,
against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And
whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for
the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is
not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.

REYES VS GRAGEDA, G.R. No. L-31606 March 28, 1983
FACTS OF THE CASE: On April 12, 1939, Maximino Rico, for and in his own behalf
and that of the minors Maria Rico, Filomeno Rico, Prisco Rico, and Lourdes' Rico,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 339 and a portion of Lot 327 in favor of the
petitioner Donato Reyes Yap who was then a Chinese national. Respondent Jose A. Rico is
the eldest son of Maximino Rico, one of the vendors herein. Subsequently, the petitioner
as vendee caused the registration of the instrument of sale and the cancellation of Original
Certificates of Title and the consequent issuance in his favor of Transfer Certificate of Title
covering the two lots subject matter of the Contract of Sale.
After the lapse of nearly fifteen years from and after the execution of the
deed of absolute sale, Donato Reyes Yap was admitted as a Filipino citizen through
naturalization. On December 1, 1967, the petitioner ceded the major portion of Lot No.
327 consisting of 1,078 square meters in favor of his engineer son, Felix Yap, who was also
a Filipino citizen because of the Filipino citizenship of his mother and the naturalization of
his father Donato Reyes Yap. Subsequently, Lourdes Rico, aunt and co-heir of
respondent Jose A. Rico, sold the remaining portion of Lot 327 to the petitioner who had
his rights thereon duly registered under Act 496. Petitioner, Donato Reyes Yap, has been
in possession of the lots in question since 1939, openly, publicly, continuously, and
adversely in the concept of owner until the present time. The petitioner has one surviving
son by his first marriage to a Filipino wife. He has five children by his second marriage also
to a Filipina and has a total of 23 grandchildren all of whom are Filipino citizens.
Respondent court declared as absolutely null and void the sale of a residential lot
in Guinobatan, Albay to a Chinese national and ordered its reconveyance to the vendors
thirty years after the sale inspite of the fact that the vendee had been a naturalized
Filipino citizen for fifteen years at the time. The respondent court considered Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution that "no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines" to be an absolute and
unqualified prohibition and, therefore, ruled that a conveyance contrary to it would not be
validated nor its void nature altered by the subsequent naturalization of the vendee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the vendee, who was subsequently naturalized as a Filipino citizen,
is authorized to own subject parcel of land. YES
RULING: The Court cited the rulings in Vasquez v. Leng Seng Giap et al. and Sarosa Vda.
de Bersabia v. Cuenco: There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in
1936 by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning (Art. 1409 [7],
Civil Code) because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the 1935
Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. Said
provision reads: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall
be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations, qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Had this been a suit between Epifania and Ong King Po she could have been
declared entitled to the litigated land on the basis, as claimed, of the ruling in Philippine
Banking Corporation vs. Lui She, reading: ... For another thing, and this is not only cogent
but also important. Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides as an exception to the rule
on pari delicto that when the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and
the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintif, he may, if public
policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has sold or delivered. ... But the factual setup has changed. The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is
no longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was
constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There would be no more public policy
to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands
of a qualified person.
Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap and Leng Seng
Giap & Sons: ... if the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also
urban lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's
lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted
but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization.
Hence, the ruling of respondent court was reversed. The conveyance of the property
to the vendee who was a Chinese citizen at the time of conveyance is validated by the
subsequent naturalization of the vendee.

GODINEZ VS LUEN, G.R. No. L-36731 January 27, 1983
FACTS OF THE CASE: The plaintiffs filed this case to recover a parcel of land sold by their
father, now deceased, to Fong Pak Luen, an alien, on the ground that the sale was null and
void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code . The
plaintiffs filed a complaint in the CFI of Sulu alleging that they are the heirs of Jose Godinez
who was married to Martina Alvarez Godinez sometime in 1910. During the marriage of their
parents they acquired a parcel of land lot No. 94 of Jolo townsite with an area of 3,665 square
meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title in the name of Jose Godinez. Their mother
died sometime in 1938 leaving the plaintifs as their sole surviving heirs. On November 27,
1941, without the knowledge of the plaintifs, the said Jose Godinez, sold the aforesaid
parcel of land to the defendant Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese citizen. A TCT was then issued by
the Register of Deeds to the said defendant, which is null and void ab initio since the
transaction constituted a non-existent contract.
Thereafter, defendant Fong Pak Luen executed a power of attorney in favor of his
co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, also an alien , who conveyed and sold the above
described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata , who is aware of and with full
knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the
law are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property in this jurisdiction.
Since one-half of the said property is conjugal property inherited by the plaintifs from
their mother, Jose Godinez could not have legally conveyed the entire property.
Notwithstanding repeated demands on said defendant to surrender to plaintifs the said
property she refused, hence, plaintiffs filed a complaint that they be adjudged as the
owners of the parcel of land in question and the TCT issued in the name of defendant Fong
Pak Luen as well as the TCT issued in the name of defendant Navata be declared null and
void ab initio. Defendant Navata filed her answer alleging that the complaint does not
state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered
in the name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same. The
cause of action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document
of sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant
Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a title was issued to said defendant. The lower court
dismissed the complaint on the ground that their cause of action has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of a person who sold a parcel of land to an alien in violation
of a constitutional prohibition may recover the property if it had, in the meantime, been
conveyed to a Filipino citizen qualified to own and possess it. NO
RULING: There can be no dispute that the sale in 1941 by Jose Godinez of his residential lot
acquired from the Bureau of Lands as part of the Jolo townsite to Fong Pak Luen, a Chinese
citizen residing in Hongkong, was violative of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution which provided: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
We see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of
sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se or
merely pro-exhibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned,
prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument
based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino
citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. The lower
court erred in treating the case as one involving simply the application of the statute of
limitations. From the fact that prescription may not be used to defend a contract which the
Constitution prohibits, it does not necessarily follow that the appellants may be allowed to
recover the property sold to an alien. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the
disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Trinidad S. Navata, a Filipino
citizen qualified to acquire real property.
In Herrera v. Luy Kim Guan the court declared that where land is sold to a Chinese citizen,
who later sold it to a Filipino, the sale to the latter cannot be impugned. In Sarsosa vda. de
Barsobia v. Cuenco we had occasion to pass upon a factual situation substantially similar to
the one in the instant case. We ruled: But the factual set-up has changed. The litigated
property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no longer owned by a disqualified
vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the
subject property. There would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner
Epifania to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.
Applying by analogy the ruling of this Court in Vasquez vs. Giap & Sons: ... if the
ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as construed
by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by making lawful
the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization . While,
strictly speaking, Ong King Po, private respondent's vendor, had no rights of
ownership to transmit, it is likewise in escapable that petitioner Epifania had slept on her
rights for 26 years from 1936 to 1962. By her long inaction or inexcusable neglect, she
should be held barred from asserting her claim to the litigated property. Laches has been
defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier ; it is
negligence or ommission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Respondent Navata, the titled owner of the property is declared the rightful owner.

LEE VS REPUBLIC, G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001
FACTS OF THE CASE: Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr.,
Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and
Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with
an approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original
Certificate of Title, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the CFI, Capiz an action against the
heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffs assailed the
validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring
ownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial
land. Rebufed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintifs appealed to the Supreme
Court, which ruled that another principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty vendor
from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that of pari
delicto. In 1968, the same former owners filed with CFI, Capiz an action for recovery of
the same parcel of land. Citing the case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She, they
submitted that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC, Roxas City a
petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre since it was burned
during the war. Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the deceased Lee Bing
Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner of the lot. Petitioner
Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in Lot No. 398 through an extra-judicial settlement and
donation executed in her favor by her deceased husband Lee Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita
Yu Lee acquired her share in the same lot by succession from her deceased husband Lee
Bun Ting, as evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial settlement.
In 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment in Reconstitution Case No. 1928, alleging that the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City
had no jurisdiction over the case andthat the petitioners were not the proper parties in the
reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to
the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the
subject land. CA declared that the judgment of reconstitution was void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Liongs predecessors-in-interest can validly own the subject
parcels of land. YES
RULING: The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936,
during the efectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could
not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee
Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.
In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue of the
provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have
committed the constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not
aford protection to either party. The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor
General. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action
for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than
sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription never
lies against the State. Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original
sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action
for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set
forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings

because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has
since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs,
petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not
dispute. The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or
private domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In
this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw
in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered
valid. Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no
longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of
the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate
of title must be based on an owners duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid
sources of the title to be reconstituted. In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan
and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority. This renders the
order of reconstitution void for lack of factual support. A judgment with absolutely
nothing to support it is void. As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the reissuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and condition . It
does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Any
change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. Thus,
although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to
thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.

Case Digest of Ramirez Vs Vda de Ramirez

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Case Digest of Ramirez Vs Vda de Ramirez

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CASE DIGEST: LANDTITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT SECTION 5,

ARTICLE III OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION)

This opinion notwithstanding, we uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

CASE DIGEST 2: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT)

REPUBLIC VS QUASHA, G.R. No. L-30299 August 17, 1972

FACTS OF THE CASE: Respondent, William H. Quasha, an American citizen, had

CASE DIGEST 3: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

Examination of the "Parity Amendment", as ratified, reveals that it only establishes an

The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private

CASE DIGEST 4: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 7. Save in

CASE DIGEST 5: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

DE CASTRO VS QUEEN TAN, G.R. No. L-31956 April 30, 1984

CASE DIGEST 6: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

CASE DIGEST 7: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

CASE DIGEST 8: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

KRIVENKO VS REGISTER OF DEEDS, G.R. No. L-630

November 15, 1947

CASE DIGEST 9: LANDTITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

CASE DIGEST 10: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

VASQUEZ VS LI SENG GIAP, G.R. No. L-3676, January 31, 1955

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint to rescind the sale of a parcel of land

CASE DIGEST 12: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

CASE DIGEST 13: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

ISSUE: Whether or not an alien is entitled to reimbursements of the properties purchased in

FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent

CASE DIGEST 14: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

CASE DIGEST 15: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

CASE DIGEST 16: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

CASE DIGEST 17: LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (CITIZENSHIP)

In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings

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