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RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

3000F Danville Boulevard #268


Alamo, California 94507
Plaintiff in Pro Per

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA

RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY


v.

Plaintiff,

ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS, an


individual, VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS, an
individual and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
inclusive.
Defendants.
__________________________________
ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS, an
individual,
VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS, an individual

CASE NO. C13-02412


PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF MOTION TO
QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA AND
MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE
ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
THEREOF

Original Action Filed: November 15, 2013

Filed Concurrently With Declaration of


Ravi Reddy

Cross-Complainants
v.
RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, an
entity, and RAVI REDDY, an individual
and DOES 1 through 100
Cross-Defendants
______________________
TO DEFENDANTS ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS AND VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS AND
THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on _________________ or on the date allocated by the
e ntitled Court, located at Superior Court Martinez, 725 Court Street, Room 103,
Martinez, CA 94553, PLAINTIFF RSR DEVELOPMENT will move this Court pursuant

to California Code of Civil of Civil Procedure under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify
the subpoena duces tecum , and will and hereby do, move for a protective order against
the production of business records. Notice of this motion shall be given to the witness and
deposition officer at least five days prior to production. The motion will be based on this
notice of motion, on the declaration of Ravi Reddy and the memorandum of points and
authorities served and filed herewith, on the papers and records on file herein, and on such
oral and documentary evidence as may be presented on the hearing of the motion.
A. INTRODUCTION
1. On January 24 2014, Defendants served Plaintiffs and Coldwell Banker the deposition

subpoena for production of business records. Plaintiff seeks an order to quash the
deposition notice and a protective order pursuant to California Code of Civil of Civil
Procedure Section 1985.3 (g): Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a
subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces
tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1
to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum. No witness or deposition officer shall be
required to produce personal records after receipt of notice that the motion has been
brought by a consumer, except upon order of the court. CCP 1985.3(g).
2. A motion to quash is the procedurally appropriate method of testing the validity of a subpoena
duces tecum, for an order made for discovery of documents without showing of good cause,
or challenging a request for documents which is not particularized [see People ex rel. Dept. of
Public Works v. Younger (1970) 5 Cal. App. 3d 575, 579, 86 Cal. Rptr. 237 (prior to adoption
of Code Civ. Proc. 1987.1); Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal. App. 2d
61, 67-68, 77 Cal. Rptr. 836 ; Flora Crane Serv., Inc. v. Superior Court (1965) 234 Cal. App.
2d 767, 787, 45 Cal. Rptr. 79] .
3. Plaintiff shall move the Court for a protective order prohibiting the production of

consumer records. Plaintiff shall also move the Court for a protective order prohibiting
the taking of any third party witness deposition. This Motion is made on the grounds to
protect Plaintiffs privacy interest in his bank records and the privacy rights of third parties
financial records.
4. Defendants cannot demonstrate the requisite compelling state interest to permit the

invasion of those privacy rights the court should quash the subpoenas.

B. FACTS
5. The Parties to this action are as follow: Plaintiff, RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY is a

business entity within the state of California. RAVI REDDY, is President and Owner dba
as RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. Defendant, ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS is an
individual attorney practicing at Van Blois & Associates in Oakland California.
Defendant, VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS is an individual, married to ROBERT LEWIS VAN
BLOIS. Mr. and Mrs. VAN BLOIS own the property that is the subject of this dispute as
joint tenants.
6. The parties entered into a purchase agreement on June 13th 2013 for the sale of

property generally referred to as the Happy Valley property.


7. This case involves a dispute over the purchase agreement between the parties for the

purchase said property to Plaintiff.


8. On October 4th 2013 Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant Robert Van Blois law

office demanding that he sign a Cancellation of Contract by October 09th 2013 or that he
(Van Blois) would commence litigation.
9. Plaintiffs lawyer wrote the Defendants on October 8th 2013 and informed Defendants that

the funds were in escrow and Plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform.
10.

Specifically, on October 8th 2013 attorney Anderson informed Defendant Van Blois

that escrow number FSJP-6061300928 has been opened at Chicago Title Company and
that the full amount of the property's purchase price is being transferred into escrow at this
time.
11.

Defendants refused to perform and continuess to refuse to perform.

12.

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on November 15th 2013 on the causes of specific

performance, breach of contract, and interference with prospective economic relations.


13.

Defendants answered the Complaint and Cross Complained for quiet title to the

property on January 13th 2014.


14.

Defendants unilaterally served Plaintiff with an ex parte Notice to Compel Deposition and

for the Production of Documents on December 23rd 2013. Defendants failed to meet and confer
with Plaintiff regarding the ex parte issuance of the Notice of Deposition.

15.

On January 24th 2014 Defendants unilaterally served Plaintiff and third party Coldwell

Bankers with a Deposition Subpoena for the Production of Business Records. Defendants failed
to meet and confer with Plaintiff regarding the issuance of the Deposition Subpoena for the
Production of Business Records.
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16.

Plaintiff has the necessary funds to purchase the property as of the date of this motion.

Plaintiff remains ready, willing, and able to perform. Any request therefore by Defendants

for financial records is rendered moot and protected under Article I, Section 1 of the
California Constitution.
C. AN ORDER TO QUASH OR MODIFY A SUBPOENA IS A PROPER MEANS BY
WHICH PLAINTIFFS RIGHT OF PRIVACY MAY BE PROTECTED
17.

Parties can preclude, limit or control and condition discovery if it is unduly

burdensome, expensive or intrusive, by obtaining a protective order. Concerning


depositions and document requests directed to parties, a court is allowed to "make any
order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or
organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue
burden and expense." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 2025.420(b), 2031.060(b).
18.

When a subpoena requires a witness to attend a deposition or produce documents,

that witness or any party, or any consumer whose records are subject to the subpoena, may
move to quash the subpoena in its entirety or to modify its terms. Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
1987.1, 1985.3.
19.

Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution recognizes an individuals right

to privacy. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130. The right
contained in the California Constitution is limited to natural persons and does not extend
to corporations. Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp.(1983) 147 Ca.App.3d 770, 791.
20.

Respecting the right to privacy in the California Constitution is also a valid ground

upon which to quash the deposition notice and the request for the production of business
documents.. This right covers matters such as personal finances (Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 652 (1975).
21.

Business records is further broadly interpreted to include documents such as

journals, account books, reports, correspondence and the like as well as electronically
stored information about the business entity. Urban Pac. Equities Corp. v. Sup. Court.
(1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 688, 692-93; cal. Code civ. Proc. 2020.410(a).
22.

Plaintiffs financial files are within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy,

set forth under Article I, Section 1 of Californias Constitution, and this protection applies

to such records. Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844; Tylo v. Superior Court
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379
23.

The standard applicable to general discovery, i.e. that items need only be

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is inapplicable to


the discovery of items protected by a right to privacy in which the threshold requirement
is that such items must be directly relevant. .
24.

For matters coming within the right to privacy, a court must grant a protective

order unless disclosure is found to further a "compelling" state purpose and that the
purpose could not be achieved through less intrusive means. Britt v. Superior Court, 20
Cal.3d 844 (1978).
25.

When discovery is used to seek information from a non-party in a California

lawsuit, California courts utilize deposition subpoenas to bring the non-party within the
purview of the court. The subpoena is used to compel the non-partys attendance,
testimony, or production of documents. Cal. Code civ. Proc. 2020.010(a)(1),
2025.280(b); Terry v. SLICO(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 352, 357
26.

The right to subpoena third party witnesses is not absolute. The right to privacy

may pertain to one of the parties to the action or a third person non-party. Robert I. Weil et
al., Cal. Prac. Guide Civ. Pro. Before Trial 8:296 (2013). Information involving a nonparty may be within the recognized zone of privacy protected from discovery in an action
between other parties. Coito v. Sup. Ct. (State of Calif.) (2012) 54 Cal.4th 480, 502.
27.

The court may make whatever orders are appropriate to protect any party, witness

or consumer from un-reasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable


violations of the right of privacy of the person. Cal. Code civ. Proc. 1985.3(g),
1985.6(f)(4).
28.

In ruling on a motion for protective order, even in the case of an initial deposition,

the trial court must consider the "particular facts" of the case. ( Greyhound
Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 382-383.) The court exercises wide
discretion, and may grant a motion if it concludes that a protective order is necessary to
limit attempted discovery which, while it may come within the rules established by other
code sections, offends the sense of justice and reason. Weisman v. Bower (1987) 193
Cal.App.3d 1231, 1238.

29.

Thus, the moving party merely has to make a showing "good cause" for a court to

exercise its discretion in granting a protective order. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. g 2025.210;
S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Super. Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 832, 843, 103 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715 (1972),
30.

The court may, as set forth in pertinent part, of California Code of Civil Procedure

1987.1 make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing
compliance with it upon such terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including
protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate
to protect the parties, the witness, the consumer, or the employee from unreasonable or
oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the
consumer.
31.

Likewise, the court may make whatever orders are appropriate to protect any party,

witness or consumer from un-reasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable


violations of the right of privacy of the person. Cal. Code civ. Proc. 1985.3(g),
1985.6(f)(4). The court exercises wide discretion, and may grant a motion if it concludes
that a protective order is necessary to limit attempted discovery which, while it may come
within the rules established by other code sections, offends the sense of justice and
reason. Weisman v. Bower (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1231, 1238.
32.

The breadth and scope of Defendants subpoenas are overly broad failing to

include any date boundaries and are an invasion of his privacy. The court may make any
other order as may be appropriate to protect the parties from unreasonable or
oppressive demands Lee v. Swansboro Country Property Owners Assn., (2007) 151 Cal.
App. 4th 575 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 924.
33.

The disclosure of private information may be ordered only if a compelling public

interest would be served. Courts recognize the historically important state interest of
facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings, and carefully
balance this interest against an individuals right to privacy to determine if disclosure is
appropriate. El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d
342, 345-46 citing Moskowitz v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 313, 316. See also
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355.
34.

The party seeking discovery is required to show a compelling need for the

information. A compelling need is demonstrated where the information is directly


relevant and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit. Britt v. Superior Court (1978)
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20 Cal.3d 844, 859. Defendant fails to meet this threshold test because Plaintiff is in a
position to perform.
35.

While the filing of the lawsuit by petitioner may be something like issuing a

fishing license for discovery, as with a fishing license, the rules of discovery do not allow
unrestricted access to all species of information. Discovery of constitutionally protected
information is on a par with discovery of privileged information and is more narrowly
proscribed than traditional discovery." (Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp.
852-853.)
36.

The party at whose instance the subpoena was issued must show good cause for

the production of the items and their materiality to the issues in the action [see Code Civ.
Proc. 1985(b)]. The declarant in support of issuance of the subpoena cannot rely merely
on the legal conclusion, stated in general terms, that the desired documentary evidence is
relevant and material [ People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Younger
(1970) 5 Cal. App. 3d 575, 580, 86 Cal. Rptr. 237] .
37.

In conducting the balancing test and determining whether good

cause has been established, the court looks at the following nonmandatory, non-exhaustive factors: the requester's need for the
information from this particular source, its relevance to the litigation at
hand, the burden of producing the sought-after material; and the harm
which disclosure would cause to the party seeking to protect the
information. Burka v. United States. Dep't of HHS, 87 F.3d 508, 517 (D;C.
Cir. 1996); Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th
Cir. 2002) ("For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the
burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective
order is granted .").
38.

Defendants subpoena is unduly burdensome because it seeks

information regarding topics that are unrelated or beyond the scope of the
litigation as a violation of Plaintiffs privacy rights. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Prods. (9th Cir. 2003) 353 F.3d 792, 813-14 The court may make whatever orders are
appropriate to protect any party, witness or consumer from un-reasonable or oppressive
demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person. Cal.
Code civ. Proc. 1985.3(g), 1985.6(f)(4).
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39.

When discovery is sought from non-parties, the standard for obtaining a protective

order is reduced because there appear to be quite strong considerations indicating that
discovery would be more limited to protect third parties from harassment, inconvenience,
r disclosure of confidential documents. Dart Indus Co. v Westwood Inc 649 F 2d. 64 649
(9th Cir 1980); non-parties are afforded "special protection against the time and expense
of complying with subpoenas"); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 455, 458 (D. Nev. 1986)
"The rule is thus well established that nonparties to litigation enjoy greater protection
from discovery than normal parties. Exxon Shipping Co.v United States Dept. of Interior
4F 3d. 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994).
D. CONCLUSION
A motion to quash or limit Defendants request for Coldwell Bankers deposition and
document request is warranted in this case, the subpoena being a stark violation of
Plaintiffs right to privacy to bank and consumer records. For the foregoing reasons,
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court issue an order quashing the deposition subpoena
and moves the Court for a protective order prohibiting the production of documents
p ursuant to the deposition notice.
Respectfully Submitted,
___________________
RAVI REDDY dba RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
Plaintiff Pro Per

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