ARE RIGHTS UNIVERSAL?

Theories of International Human Rights: Universalism,

Relativism, and the Dangers of Cultural Imperialism
I.

Introduction: The Debate Over Universality of Human Rights Versus

Cultural Relativism

Determining the source of international human rights law can be just as controversial as
defining its content, with various stakeholders asserting different philosophical, moral, and
empirical perspectives to support or refute the abundant legal theories on the matter. One of the
most intellectually rich tensions in this debate is that between the universal theory of human
rights and the theory of cultural relativism, and a great deal of scholarship has been dedicated to
solving the conflict between the two.
If we concede that our current international legal regime has at least a modicum of
authority as it performs the Sisyphean task of ensuring global peace, why should it matter from
whence came the human rights it works to protect? Of the 195 sovereign nations in the world,1
the United Nations has 193 Member States; the Holy See and Palestine have observer status. 2
Member States of the United Nations have all signed the UN Charter, which states that one of the
purposes of the UN is to achieve international cooperation...in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights, among others.3 Surely this broad consensus of the global community
to submit to the jurisdiction of the United Nations (in at least some capacity) is sufficient to
justify the international legal regime as it has developed over the last sixty-six years. If this is so,
why is the debate over the source of human rights still important?

U.S. Department of State, Independent States in the World < http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm> accessed 13
August 2011.
2
United Nations, Growth in United Nations Membership, 1945-present <
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml> accessed 13 August 2011.
3
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, [24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI], Preamble,
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html> accessed 13 August 2011.

First, to human rights advocates, a solid moral foundation is essential, both as a grounds
upon which to demand change from those in power and as a conviction from which to draw
strength in times of difficulty as they face unfathomable atrocities in the field and collide with
immoveable bureaucracies in the policy chambers. Second, for some members of some
(primarily non-Western) cultures, the fear of cultural degradation arising from recognition of
universal human rights norms is sincere, even if the logic of their arguments is flawed or their
assumptions misplaced. Others still (mostly anthropologists) would argue that human rights
cannot be derived philosophically, and can be proven only through empirical evidence.4 While
this position is practical and logically sound, from a legal theory perspective it falls short of
answering the essential philosophical questions that are at the heart of the law. Thus, despite the
fact of an established legal system governing human rights, a determination as to whether human
rights are universal or relative to culture is of paramount importance to those it affects most, and
so the debate rages on.
This essay will explore the two dominant arguments in the debate over the source of
human rights: 1) Universalism, the theory that human rights are universal and inure to the person
by virtue of his or her personhood, and 2) Cultural Relativism, the theory that human rights, to
the extent that they exist at all, are relative to ones culture, and can only be understood or
enforced by members of that culture.

II.

Framing the Debate

In order to properly frame an analysis of the comparative values of the universal and
cultural relativist positions on the sources of human rights, it is essential to first understand the
4

See Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (Sage Publications
1990).

concept of human rights themselves. Michael Perry states that there are two fundamental
concepts underlying human rights.5 The first concept is that every human being is sacred,
meaning that the good of every human being is worth pursuing in its own right. This premise is
reflected in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, which reaffirms faith in the
dignity and worth of the human person.6 The second concept is that because of this, certain
things ought to be done and certain things ought not to be done to every human being, simply by
virtue of his being human, also referred to herein as his personhood. Most of the debate over
cultural relativism and universalism centres on this second concept, which is a simplified
statement of the doctrine that has come to be known as universalism.
While this premise may seem perfectly acceptable at face value, it in fact has raised many
thorny questions about conceptions of human nature in the West (primarily individualistic) and
elsewhere (often socialistic or community-based). Still, no matter the source of identity of a
given culture, if human rights are based simply on the fact that one is a human being, it would
seem impossible for them to be relative in any meaningful way, since it is beyond dispute in the
21st century that all persons of all cultures as we currently know them are in fact human beings.
In fact, a relativist may point out that the previous statement is not an absolute truth but merely a
reflection of a Western worldview, and instead insist that personhood itself is relative, as
evidenced by the origin myths of certain cultures (such as the Hopi and Arapahoe) which define
outsiders as non-human.7
III.

World War II and the Historical Origins of the United Nations

Michael J Perry, Are Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters (1997) 19 Hum.Rts.Q. 461,
462.
6

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, [24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI], Preamble,
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html> accessed 3 June 2011.
7
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (first published 2003, 2nd edn, Cornell University
Press 2003) 91.

The United Nations was born out of the sincere efforts of the international community to
prevent the atrocities of World War II from recurring. To that end, the Charter of the United
Nations was drafted at Dumbarton Oaks and signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 by
representatives of the original 50 Member States.8 The first line of the Preamble to the Charter
unambiguously linked the recent wars with the impetus for creating the United Nations: to save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold
sorrow to mankind.9
Those espousing the time-honoured validity of universalism may point to this moment as
the birth of international personhood as the source of human rights: The idea of personhood
unbounded by territorial lines or citizenship ties originated as a reaction against the sovereign
abuse of unfettered power.10 However, true universality of human rights cannot be presumed
from this moment without deliberately overlooking the nations other than the 50 original
Member States. Most African and Asian countries did not participate in the formulation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights because, as victims of colonization, they were not
members of the United Nations.11 Because universalists often rely on the UN Charter as
evidence of the validity of their position, those who oppose them often do so in the name of these
post-colonial nations and indigenous cultures that were excluded from the initial consensus. This
position eventually gave rise to arguments about cultural relativism, which advocate for a nonWestern perspective by which to judge non-Western nations; for many, this forecloses the
concept of human rights as we currently know it in international law.

United Nations, Origins of the United Nations < http://www.un.org/Overview/origin.html> accessed 3 June 2011.
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, [24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI], Preamble,
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3930.html> accessed 3 June 2011.
10
Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Human Rights, Globalization, and Culture: Centering Personhood in
International Narrative in Moral Imperialism: A Critical Anthology (New York University Press 2002) 353.
9

11

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural
Initiatives (1990) 3 Harv.Hum.Rts.J 13.

IV.

International Human Rights Today

a. The International Bill of Rights and the UN Human Rights Bodies

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights indicates by its very title the understanding
of the drafters that human rights are indeed universal. Article 1 states that [a]ll human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights, and Article 2 sets forth the principle of nondiscrimination, that [e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind.12 The Universal Declaration, although not a
binding treaty itself, serves to elucidate the fundamental freedoms granted to signatories of the
Charter of the United Nations, and thus does have legal effect for all UN Member States. In
addition, many international legal scholars assert that the Universal Declaration has the status of
customary international law, meaning states are bound by the norms it enumerates irrespective of
their manifestation of intent to be or not be bound.
The body of international human rights law may start with the Universal Declaration, but
it extends far beyond the international Bill of Human Rights (which also include the ICCPR and
ICESCR.) Other core human rights treaties, Human Rights Council resolutions, ILO
conventions, customary international law, and regional treaties are just a few examples of the
wide-ranging sources of authority for international human rights norms today. Perhaps because
of this great body of law, it remains important to assess to what extent certain norms may be
considered universal.13
12

UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, [10 December 1948, 217 A
(III)], <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html> accessed 2 June 2011.
13
Judicial opinions interpreting international laws provide another layer of analysis. For example, the European
Court of Human Rights rejected an interpretation of the European Convention which would have codified a form of
cultural relativism. Article 63(3) states that the provisions of this Convention shall be applied in [colonial
territories] with due regard, however, to local requirements. In its opinion concerning the legality of corporal
punishment on the Isle of Man, the court determined that the term requirement indicated a certain necessity to
maintain law and order which could never be found to support the beating of a person with birch twigs. The Tyrer
case stands for the proposition that international human rights possess a transboundary meaning that cannot be
modified or ignored on relativist grounds. See Tyrer v United Kingdom (App no 5856/72) (1978) Series A no 026;
Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [4
November 1950, ETS 5], <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b04.html> accessed 2 June 2011; Fernando

V.

Universalism Defined
a. Philosophical Origins of Universal Human Rights
i. Natural Law and Rationalism

As developed by Thomas Aquinas, the theory of natural law asserts that individuals have
certain inalienable rights of the highest order granted to all individuals by God or Providence,
and that man-made laws are only viable to the extent that they do not clash with the natural
laws of the universe.14 This theory provided one of the early justifications for the universality of
human rights by contending that individual rights are part of the natural law as ordained by a
higher power. However, in a modern global society where conflict over the existence and nature
of God is intense, anachronistic reliance on natural law theory to support the universality of
human rights would be misplaced.
Related, yet distinct from natural law, is the theory of rationalism as a basis for the
universality of human rights. This theory holds that the belief in the universal human capacity for
reason and rational thinking gives rise to the individuals possession of human rights. However,
many non-universalists argue that rationalism itself is a product of Western culture and therefore
cannot be attributed universally to all human beings without ignoring the true diversity of human
worldview and philosophy.15 As circumstantial evidence of this position, one need look no
further than the quintessentially Western Declaration of Independence of the United States, the
text of which indicates reliance on natural law and/or rationalism as the source of its unalienable
rights: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and

Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism (1985) 25 Va.J.Intl L. 869, 878.
14
Elizabeth Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual (1997) 53
J.Anthropo.Res. 319, 320.
15

Zechenter 321.

the pursuit of Happiness.16 No matter the philosophical underpinnings of the Declaration of

Independence, it is incongruous with true universalism, as at the time of its drafting the rights
enshrined therein only inured to white men.
ii. Positivism
Unlike natural law and rationalism, positivist legal theory is based on the premise that
laws are made by human beings. In terms of international human rights law, positivists would
argue that there is sufficient evidence of global agreement arising from the drafting, ratification,
and implementation of human rights treaties such that the universality of the principles
underlying these treaties cannot reasonably be questioned. Positivists also observe that the
source of human rights lies not in individual cultures but rather in international law which gave
rise to the idea of universal rights (emphasis in original).17
One major flaw of the positivist approach to validating the universality of human rights is
that it fails to account for indigenous peoples, many of whom denied that the nation-state whose
borders contain them geographically had the moral authority to represent them at the
international level. This position was enforced by several provisions of the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, which recognized
the rights of indigenous peoples as including the right to free, prior and informed consent before
adopting and implementing legislative and administrative measures that may affect them.18
b. Challenges to the Universal Sacredness of the Individual

16

Declaration of Independence [ 2] (1776).

Zechenter 321.
18
UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples : resolution / adopted by
the General Assembly, [2 October 2007 A/RES/61/295], Art. 19
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/471355a82.html> accessed 3 June 2011.
17

Because universalism is rooted in the concept of the sacred individual as described by

Perry above, some challenges focus on attacking this premise alone. For example, Pollis and
Schwab emphasized that the first-priority goals of newly independent non-Western states were
economic development, modernization, and nation-building, and that these goals necessitated the
curtailment of individual rights.19 This curtailment is justified on the basis of traditional cultures
lack of individualism in favour of group-based identity.20 After decolonization and the incipience
of the nation-state as the new social group, whatever rights an individual possesses are given to
him by the state, and this state retains the right and the ability to curtail individual freedoms for
the greater good of the group.21 This argument has been characterized as the socialist concept of
rights.22 Underlying this socialist concept is the notion that authoritarianism enhances economic
development, which has been challenged on the grounds that there is little evidence to suggest
that suppression of civil and political rights imparts any benefit in terms of economic growth and
development.23
It is worth nothing that even within the Western world, fundamental differences exist in
the conception of the individual, with the England and the United States representing an
individualist tradition and continental Europe representing a dignitarian tradition which places
greater importance on family, communities, and citizens duties.24 This is reflected not only by
the different domestic legal philosophies of, for example, the United States (life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness) and France (liberty, equality, fraternity), but also by the two countries
vastly different approaches to international law. While both the United States and France were
19

20

Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (eds), Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives (Praeger 1979).
Wiktor Osiatynski, Human Rights and Their Limits (Cambridge University Press 2009) 149.

21

Pollis and Schwab 9.

Osiatynski 148.
23
Osiatynski 155; Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values (Carnegie Council 1997) 11
<http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/publications/morgenthau/254.html/_res/id=sa_File1/254_sen.pdf>
accessed 2 June 2011.
24
Osiatynski 172.
22

original Member States of the United Nations, their respective levels of acceptance of its human
rights norms are quite distinct. France has ratified all of the core human rights treaties save the
Migrants Treaty,25 whereas the United States is party only to ICCPR,26 ICERD,27 and CAT,28 and
is notably one of only two nations in the world not to have ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child,29 the other being Somalia. Thus, even within the Western world, the notion of
universalism is not undisputed.

VI.

Cultural Relativism Defined

a. Historical Origins

On June 24, 1947, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association
addressed the United Nations Committee on Human Rights by issuing a statement warning that
universalism was a dangerous ground on which to assert human rights, advocating instead for a
relativist position that acknowledged the disparities between different cultures.30
Standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive so that any
attempt to formulate postulates that grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one culture
must to that extent detract from the applicability of any Declaration of Human Rights to
mankind as a whole.31
Although this viewpoint may have found some expression in earlier scholarship, the birth
of the cultural relativist approach to human rights is attributed to this statement. While the
25

UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families [18 December 1990 A/RES/45/158]
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3980.html> accessed 3 June 2011.
26
UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [16 December 1966, UNTS 999]
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html> accessed 3 June 2011.
27
UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination [21
December 1965 UNTS 660] <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3940.html> accessed 3 April 2011.
28
UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment [10 December 1984 UNTS1465] <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html> accessed 3
June 2011.
29
UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child [20 November 1989 UNTS 1577]
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38f0.html> accessed 3 June 2011.
30
Osiatynski 147.
31

American Anthropological Association Executive Board, Statement on Human Rights (1947) 49

Am.Anthropologist 539.

American Anthropological Association later went on to recant its position, calling the statement
an embarrassment, the substance of their position remains a valid (albeit somewhat
controversial) ground for arguing against a universal theory of human rights.32 This original
notion of anthropological relativism, as distinct from other types of relativism described below,
is summarized in a statement by Joseph de Maistre: I have seen in my time Frenchmen, Italians,
and Russians.but as for Man, I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists it is
without my knowledge.33

b. Modern Relativist Viewpoints

The doctrine of cultural relativism has been expressed and defined in many different
ways. For some, it holds that some moral rules and social institutions cannot be legitimately
criticized by outsiders. 34 For others, the heart of the relativist position is that nothing is good
and nothing is bad for every human being, and what is good or bad for a particular human being
is always relative to something about him or her or about his or her context or situation.35 Still
others assert that there is no absolute truth, be it ethical, moral, or cultural, and there is no
meaningful way to judge different cultures because all judgments are ethnocentric.36 Finally,
cultural relativism is said to be the position according to which local cultural traditions properly
determine the existence and scope of civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given
society.37

32

Osiatynski 148.
Quoted in Perry 500.
34
Donnelly (2003) 89.
33

35

Perry 468.
Zechenter 323.
37
Teson 870.
36

10

Jack Donnelly, as an early scholar on the topic, proposed thinking about the different
definitions of relativism in terms of a continuum, and this method continues to prove useful for
organizing analysis of the relativism/universalism debate.38 In particular, the continuum model
highlights the direct contradictions between universality and relativity, and offers a middle
ground where the two may overlap.
i. Radical Cultural Relativism (Epistemological Relativism)
The epistemological relativist perspective sees all knowledge and morality as being
exclusively culture-bound, leading to the conclusion that rationality (as discussed above) is
merely a product of Western ethnocentrism and therefore cannot provide the basis for the
universality of human rights.39 More broadly, true objectivity is meaningless, rendering
universality impossible. Going even further, [t]he strongest form of radical cultural relativism
would hold that the concept human being is of no moral significance; the mere fact that one is a
human being is irrelevant to ones moral status.40 Under this view, culture is the sole source of
moral value. A universalist may respond by noting that if the fact of personhood is irrelevant to
moral status, similarly the accident of birth into a particular social group or culture is not an
ethically relevant circumstance and thus has no bearing on that individuals intrinsic human
worth.41
ii. Strong Cultural Relativism (Normative Relativism)
Normative relativism holds that culture is the principal source of moral validity; by
acknowledging the diversity of global cultures, no true transcultural standards may exist. A
38

Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights (1984) 6 Hum.Rts.Q. 400; Donnelly (2003).

39

Zechenter 325.
Donnelly (1984) 404.
41
Zechenter 320.
40

11

strong cultural relativist may equivocate, accepting certain rights as having more or less
universal application but maintaining the contention that moral validity derives primarily from
culture.
The assertion that no transcultural standards exist, or that cultures are inherently
incomparable, may be challenged by the anthropologists observation that
[a]lthough numerous social scientists have conducted fieldwork in seemingly alien
cultures, and numerous individuals have travelled and lived in alien cultures, no one has
ever encountered a culture that was so vastly different as to be wholly incomprehensible
or uninterpretable to outsiders.42
iii. Weak Cultural Relativism (Descriptive Relativism)
Descriptive relativism may mean only a commonsense observation that cultures vary,43
or it may mean the same thing as strong universalism. From this perspective, culture is a
persuasive, but secondary, source of moral validity. Universality is initially presumed, but the
relativity of human nature, communities, and rules checks potential excesses of universalism.44
A weak cultural relativist appreciates the distinctions among cultures but sees no reason why one
cultures principles may not be applicable to another, i.e. that transcultural standards may exist.
For example, the categorical imperative may explain why it is wrong for one Nigerian to tell a
lie to another even though the categorical imperative was first formulated and theorized in East
Prussia.45
iv. Radical Universalism
Radical universalism holds that culture is totally irrelevant as a source of moral validity,
and requires a rigid hierarchical ordering of the multiple moral communities, giving priority to

42

Zechenter 327.
Zechenter 323.
44
Donnelly (2003) 90.
45
Jeremy Waldron, How to Argue for a Universal Claim (1999) 30 Colum.Hum.Rts.L.Rev. 305
43

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the demands of the cosmopolitan moral community over other (lower) communities.46 Under
this view, the United Nations might be characterized as the governing body of the cosmopolitan
community tasked with enforcing universal moral standards. However, the concept of national
sovereignty has deep roots in international law and is carefully considered by all UN bodies
before taking action to create or enforce international laws, especially when to do so would be to
contravene a nations stated sovereign interests. Thus, even an expansive view of the binding
nature of international law would stop short of supporting a radical universalist position as stated
herein.
c. Challenges to Cultural Relativism
i. Anachronisms
In articulating an argument based on cultural relativism in any of the above forms, its
proponents often cite to ancient cultures such as the pre-colonial African village, the Native
American tribe, and the traditional Islamic community as the sacred source from which their
current identities and practices derive.47 While in many cases it is true that the concept of
possessing human rights by virtue of personhood alone was foreign to these communities, the
traditional culture advanced to justify cultural relativism far too often no longer exists.48
To the extent that modernization or Westernization has reached into, and transformed,
traditional communities, traditional approaches to guaranteeing human dignity seem
objectively inappropriate; traditional limits on political power are unlikely to function
effectively in modern conditions.49
ii. Logical Fallacy
Cultural relativism is often criticized as being self-contradictory. The assertion that there
are no universal principles is incompatible with the assertion that all rights and values are
46

Donnelly (2003) 90.

Donnelly (1984) 410.
48
Donnelly (1984) 411; (2003) 101.
49
Donnelly (1984) 406.
47

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culturally relative, because this latter assertion is a universal principle in itself. This criticism has
been tempered by many, including Donnelly with his continuum, which acknowledges that
relativism can be expressed in such a way as to resolve this logical flaw. For example, one might
say that 1) there are no universal principles, except for one, and 2) the sole universal principle is
that moral rights are relative to culture.
iii. Evolution
One of the principle objections to cultural relativism is that it depends on a static
conception of culture that belies the results of modern research in evolutionary psychology,
neuroscience, socio-biology, and psychiatry. Many reject relativism in favour of an evolutionary
analysis by observing that societies do indeed change their customs by developing more humane
habits in conjunction with the growth of their economic, technological, and scientific
capabilities.50 Related to the ever-changing nature of culture is the fact of transcultural
influences, especially in a globalizing world. Further, many argue that the concept of culture
itself is not monistic, and that intercultural dialogue is not only possible, but in many cases is
more accessible than intracultural dialogue.51
d. Other Issues
i. Self-Determination and Non-Intervention
Despite the many critiques of cultural relativism, some of the principles upon which it
relies are widely accepted and in fact are recognized as international legal norms in themselves.
The right to self-determination is enshrined in both the ICCPR and the ICESCR,52 and the
principle of non-intervention is delineated in Article 2(7) of the Charter and given support by
50

Zechenter 326.
Perry 494.
52
UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,[16 December
1966, UNTS 993] <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html> accessed 3 June 2011.
51

14

careful actions of the UN Security Council. While the right to self-determination extends to all
peoples,53 the principle of non-intervention refers to the domestic jurisdiction of any state,54
foreclosing its direct application to any culture that may assert its sovereignty without being
recognized as such by the international community. Some theorists have gone so far as to
condition sovereignty on a good human rights record, meaning that international enforcement of
human rights would not violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
sovereign states because such states were only sovereign insofar as they respected human
rights.55 This view is not favoured; instead it is agreed there is an obligation in international law
not only to promote the right to self-determination, but also to respect the cultural identities of
peoples, their local traditions, and customs.56
ii. Asian Values
Asian resistance to universalism is perhaps best summarized by Singapores Foreign
Minister Won Kang Sens statement at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in
1993: universal recognition of the ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used
to deny or mask the reality of diversity. 57 So-called Asian values emphasize order over
equality, discipline over liberty, cooperation over independence, and duties over rights.58 The
civil and political rights that are at the core of Western human rights norms are fundamentally
alien in many of the long-established traditions of Asian cultures, which tend to emphasize social
and cultural rights instead. Rather than arising from an individuals sacred human nature, rights
53

Ibid.
UN Charter Article 2(7).
55
Binder G, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law (1999) 5 Buff.Hum.Rts.L.Rev.
211, 212.
54

56

Teson 873.
Quoted in Osiatynski 150.
58
Osiatynski 150-151.
57

15

are contingent upon performance of duties or are worded as an express grant by the state, similar
to the socialist conception of rights outlined above.59
The Asian values argument lost much of its credibility following the Asian Economic
Crisis of the late 1990s, when it became clear that hewing to a particularly Asian set of policies
did not in fact have a beneficial impact on economic growth and development in the region.60
Interestingly, little has been heard of Asian values since the 1998 financial crisis in the
region, an understandable political retreat given that a principal rationale for repression
for maintaining social order and the denial of individual liberties was the East Asian
countries success in bringing about development and prosperity.61

VII.

Is It Imperialistic to Espouse Universalism as the Foundation for Human

Rights?
a. Operation Iraqi Freedom

One clear reason that the universalism/cultural relativism debate continues to be relevant
today is the United States assertion of human rights and humanitarian principles as justifications
for the ongoing war in Iraq.62 By espousing ideals of emancipation from terror to rationalize the
conflict (tellingly known as Operation Iraqi Freedom), the United States invites allegations of
imperialism. Although humanitarian concerns initially formed only a tertiary rationale for the
war, as the assertions that Saddam Hussein was linked to international terrorist groups and in
possession of weapons of mass destruction failed to prove credible, the only remaining
justification for continued intervention was on humanitarian grounds.63 Whether these grounds
did in fact exist is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the fact that they were proffered as a
central rationale for non-consensual intervention in Iraq has left many in the Middle East and
59

Osiatynski 151.
Osiatynski 155.
61
Admantia Pollis, A New Universalism in Admantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (eds), Human Rights: New
Perspectives, New Realities (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2000) 27-28.
62
Osiatynski 153.
63
Ken Roth, War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention (2004) Human Rights Watch World Report <
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/3.htm> accessed 2 June 2011.
60

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elsewhere sceptical of the validity of human rights and humanitarian principles beyond their
utility for the advancement of American global interests.64
[B]ecause the idea of human rights has been in use as an instrument of foreign policy, it
has been rejected by those who believe that the policy of the West, particularly as
represented by the United States, is aimed against them or against their interests.65
Even before human rights justifications became part of the rhetoric surrounding the war
in Iraq, moral imperialism was of concern to many leaders in developing countries who resisted
the imposition of international human rights law on their peoples. The sceptical view of this
phenomenon is that cultural relativism and accusations of moral imperialism were relied upon by
despots and dictators to shield their brutal tactics from international scrutiny; Suharto, Mobutu,
and Nguema come to mind.66 A more charitable view would accept that the legacy of colonialism
was ongoing and potent, giving rise to sincere concerns on the part of citizens and leaders of
developing countries that their way of life would be irreparably damaged. Unfortunately, these
two viewpoints have conflated such that
well-meaning Westerners with a well-developed sense of the legacy of Western
colonialism indirectly support [arguments put forth by vicious elites to deflect attention
from their repressive policies] when they shy away from criticizing arguments advanced
by non-Westerners even when they are empirically inaccurate or morally absurd.67
b. Is There Any Way to Justify Cultural Relativism in Todays Society?
The flaws, whether logical or moral, of cultural relativism have been enumerated by
many scholars. One of the more poignant statements of this kind speaks to the divisiveness
propagated by the cultural relativists insistence on difference and categorization. [O]versimple
generalizations about Western civilization, Asian values, African cultures, and so onare
not only intellectually shallow, they also add to the divisiveness of the world in which we live.68

64

Osiatynski 153.
Osiatynski 173.
66
Donnelly (2003) 102.
67
Donnelly (2003) 100.
68
Sen 31.
65

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Cultural relativism is often put forward to try and give voice to marginalized peoples and
to combat the threat of Western moral imperialism, but it may have the opposite effect:
Discrediting of indigenous aspirations for social change as nothing more than Western
contamination or as an aberrant foreign import, merely because these aspirations run
counter to some entrenched cultural practices of the majority in power, seems to show
singularly bad judgment.69
Put another way, is it really a form of cultural respect to abstain from criticizing the practices of
others, thereby regarding them as beyond or beneath criticism?70
VIII. Conclusion
Much of the scholarship cited above dates from the 1990s, when the level of acceptance
of international human rights law (indeed, the human rights system itself) was substantially
different than it is today. While many of the philosophical and ethical arguments that underscore
the universalist-relativist debate are still relevant, the fact of the existence of a body of human
rights law is no longer in question. Human rights advocates need not rely on the skeleton of the
United Nations Charter or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to support their assertions
that human rights are recognized as a matter of international law. As the human rights
enforcement and promulgation mechanisms have become more widely accepted, the question of
whether these rights are universal accordingly becomes less practical. This is because most
nations (including non-Western ones) have willingly ratified one or more human rights treaties,
thereby evidencing their acquiescence to the norms enshrined in those treaties.
Nonetheless, many of the concerns raised by the cultural relativist position are not
disposed of simply by asserting the universal acceptance of a human right, whether or not it
arises from the inherent dignity of the person. For example, it may be argued that the right to life
69

70

Zechenter 334.
Steven Lukes, Moral Diversity and Relativism (1995) 29 Journal of Philosophy of Education 173.

18

is universally accepted as a fundamental human right, enshrined in all the core human rights
treaties and acknowledged by every nation in the world in some way. Despite its universal
acceptance, the right to life clearly takes on different meanings within different nations and
cultures: in Iran, the right to life is not extended to apostates;71 in the United States, a strong antiabortion movement supports the right to life for unborn foetuses. Fernando Teson articulates this
notion as a version of cultural relativism which accounts for the existence of a body of
international human rights norms while simultaneously insisting that its meaning will vary
substantially from one culture to the next.72
Because of the great diversity of global culture, the question of whether human rights are
universal is a rich one that remains ripe for debate. After examination of the continuum from
radical relativism to radical universalism, a moderate position that accepts universal norms but
allows for some degree of culture-dependent interpretation presents a compelling alternative. In
order to ensure that basic human rights, including the right to self-determination, are protected
worldwide, global society must strike a balance between respecting cultural norms and ensuring
that fundamental freedoms are available to all citizens of the globe.

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