Existentialism Here and Now

Author(s): Alfie Kohn

Source: The Georgia Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 381-397
Published by: Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia by and on Behalf of the
University of Georgia and the Georgia Review

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Alfie

Kohn

Existentialism

Here

and

Now

years ago, existentialismwas a hot piece of intellectual property.The reading public was buying up such new books
TWENTY-FIVE
as William Barrett's Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy
and Viktor Frankl's From Death Camp to Existentialism (later republished under the title Man's Search for Meaning ) . American psychologists were being introduced to the movement by a brilliant anthology
entitled Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology,
edited by Rollo May and others.The 1958 InternationalCongress of Psychotherapychose existentialpsychology as its theme. And the twentiethcentury existentialiststhemselveswere all still alive: Heidegger, Sartre,
and Camus, Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel and Paul Tillich.
Today all six men are dead and, from firstappearances, so is the
movement for which they are known. One recent essay in a religious
journal referredto existentialismin the past tense, and virtuallynothing
has been published on the subject in any leading popular magazine during the whole of the last decade. When W. W. Norton reissued some of
May's introductoryessays from Existence last fall, a Boston Globe review of the collection began: "Remember existentialism?"Is such a book,
in fact, no more than an exercise in nostalgia? Should existentialismbe
dispatched to a museum along with bobby sox and the U-2 affair?As I
will attemptto show here,such views are mistaken: existentialistthought
has not so much blown away as decomposed in order to fertilizevarious
fieldsof thought.
What ExistentialismIs and Is Not
Camus spoke of a dialectical tension between human beings, who- desperate for a sense of coherence to theirlives- cry out to the heavens for
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answers, and the stubborn silence that greets such pleas. This may serve
as a somewhat strained metaphor for the quest to understand existentialismitself.A desire for neatly packaged definitions. . . and the maddening ambiguityof the subject in question: here,too, are ingredientsfor
the absurd- or at least for a generous measure of misunderstanding.
To startwith the former,Maurice Friedman began his introduction
to The Worlds of Existentialismby sounding a note of annoyance:
"Give me a one-sentencedefinitionof existentialism."This
statementis oftenmore a ritual defenseagainstthe insecurity
aroused by not being au courant than a genuine desire for
is someknowledge. . . . The very notion that existentialism
thingthat can be definedin a catch phrase,or that one can
it fromwithin,has
merelyknow about it withoutunderstanding
made it, forsome people, into an intellectualfad and robbed it
of its properseriousness.1
In its own fulsome way, Time magaine may have been on to something in the 29 December 1958 issue, which proclaimed: "There is no
sign that [existential psychology] will become a frothy success like
Freudian analysis or hula hoops . . . [because] any understandingof it
requires the most rigorous intellectual exercise." A book on the subject
likely to sell today would have to be entitled, "The One-Minute Existentialist."I was reminded of this recently,when a middle-aged student
of mine conceded that she wanted to learn about philosophy so
long as
she did not have to read too much.
The other half of the equation is existentialism'speculiar resistance
to being defined.This is not merely a functionof its complexity or even
of the diversityof ideas offeredunder its uiqbrella, though the latter is
noteworthy.For instance,a Danish theologian,strugglingagainst Hegel
and against the dilution of his Christian faith,is tossed under the same
rubric with a twentieth-centuryatheistwho edited
newspapers, directed
and
criticized
this
plays,
very theologian.
Existentialismis difficultto define primarilybecause its essence, so
to speak, is to oppose the kind of analytic reduction that definitionentails. It is not a system of philosophy to be learned or subscribed to (I
am always at a loss to answer the question "Are you an existentialist?");
it is not properly an "ism" at all, at least in the sense that Catholicism or
Communism is. Perhaps the best one can do is define the term ostensively: "Read Sartre and Kierkegaard and you'll understand." (This is
1The WorldsofExistentialism
(New York:RandomHouse,1964),p. 3.

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KOHN

383

admittedlyunsatisfying,though,since we need a set of criteriato justify

puttingSartre and Kierkegaard on the list and keeping othersoff.) What
analytic philosopherscall ostensive definition,a method, here becomes a
clue to content; it recalls the watchword of phenomenology: "Zm den
Sachen selbst!"- "To the thingsthemselves!" But how are we to recognize existentialism'spresence?
The fact of existingbecomes, for the existentialist,not simply declarative but exclamatory ("Imagine! I am!") and then interrogatory
(". . . and what am I to make of that?"). As H. J. Blackham put it, "Man
becomes a question to himself,"2-and the question begets more questions,all of which concern the issues inherentto being human. The issues
of interest,for example, do not concern my being a male or an Ohioan,
a laborer or a Protestantor a neurotic; the focus instead is on those problems common to every human being by virtue of that status: What does
it mean to choose? What will serve as meaning for me? What am I to
make of my fellows? And, in Ionesco's haunting words, "Why was I
born if it wasn't forever?"
The existentialistsmay offerdifferentanswers, but they have the
questions in common- as well as the passion with which they ask them.
The existentialstyle,moreover,is to address such questions to the whole
person rather than to our rational faculties alone. In fact, an opposition
to what is seen as a disproportionateemphasison reason is one of the defining characteristicsof existentialism-not merely because rationalism,
like one of the blind men, feels a tail and calls out that he now knows
what an elephant is, but because reason ultimatelysees the individual as
an exemplar of somethinglarger and prior. To the existentialist,the living subject comes first-a position that engenders opposition to Platonic
essentialism,Cartesian dualism,Hegelian idealism,modern scientism,and
a great deal more. Rational thoughtis in all respects ancillary to concrete
existence: Primm vvere, deinde philosophari.
To complete this painfullyabbreviated overview, it may be helpful
to say somethingabout what existentialismis not. This endeavor is particularly appropriate given that much of the American response to the
movement- both its initial infatuation and subsequent loss of interesthas been based on a distortedview. Even in its halcyon days- or especially
duringthat period- the word "existentialism"was misused by many who
were counted as supremelyliterateand enviably well-informed.The di2Reality,
ManandExistence
(New York:Bantam,
ij), p. 3.

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mensions of this misunderstandinghelp to account for the equanimity

with which supportive scholars now observe the apparent passing of
existentialismfrompopular discourse. And like the difficultyof arriving
at a definition,the responsibilityfor widespread misconceptions, if it
makes sense to assign responsibility,must be shared by those interested
only in convenientlabels and by theimpenetrability(or richness,depending on one's inclination) of existentialismitself.
I was introduced to the topic by an English teacher in high school
and then by a political theoristin college, both of whom treated existentialism as synonymous with the thought of Camus. I currently own
two dictionaries,one of which defines the term as "a body of ethical
thought" and the other as "a literary-philosophiccult of nihilism and
pessimism." These grotesquely mistaken characterizations suggest the
range of error one finds,but I should like to focus here on six specific
misconceptions: existentialismviewed as atheistic,pessimistic,abstract,
here-and-now oriented,irrational,and individualistic.
The firsttwo adjectives of these- "atheistic" and "pessimistic"-are
regularlyand vigorously attached to existentialism.Each, by telling only
part of the story,is egregiouslymisleading;both are quite clearly the result of associating the entire movement with Sartre, a confusion he encouraged by essentiallyappropriatingthe term. (It is this appropriation
that led Heidegger, Jaspers,Marcel, and Camus to back off from the
appellation "existentialist";actually they were only distancingthemselves
fromSartre's thought.) With respect to the question of God, of the ten
philosophers most frequently discussed in the context of existentialism,
only three (Sartre, Camus, and Nietzsche) were unquestionably atheists.
Five (Kierkegaard, Marcel, Berdyaev, Tillich, and Buber) were passionately religious, and the remaining two (Heidegger and Jaspers) prove
rather difficultto classify. Just as significantfor anyone seeking to understand the movement is the fact that the overwhelming majority of
sympatheticsecondary sources on existentialismhave been written by
theologians or, at the very least,theists.Most of the philosophical articles
about existentialismstill appear in religious journals like Encounter,
Thought, and Cross Currents. Christians,particularly Catholics, have
resonated to the existentialcanon far more than atheists. It should be
noted, though, that the problems of human existence cannot be neatly
resolved for a theistic existentialist;this is what distinguisheshim from
many other theists.For Kierkegaard or Marcel or Buber (to choose one
representativefrom each of the major Western faiths), there is no un-

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385

troubledsalvationforthe faithful.Truly, even a lifewith God- or searching for God- is a life strugglingto conquer absurdity.
The "pessimistic" epithetis even less appropriate. Those who use it
usually have Sartrein mind,so its validityis at best very limited.But even
Sartre pronounced his philosophy optimistic on balance (although the
claim is surely debatable) . He, along with Nietzsche and Camus, explicitly repudiated nihilismand sought to constructalternativesto it. Even if
Rollo May is rightthat "the terms'optimism'and 'pessimism'referto the
state of one's digestion,and have nothing whatever to do with truth,"3
it is instructiveto realize why existentialismis perceived as pessimisticby
so many Americans.
To talk about subjects like death- never mind what one has to sayis generally viewed in this country as morbid and unseemly. Existentialismis a philosophy of balance: to exist is literallymarvelous and not
to be taken for granted,but that existence is shot throughwith finitude;
our freedomto defineourselves is exhilaratingbut also a terribleburden;
that God is dead- an historical statement,not a theological one- allows
us to "belong to a higher historythan any history hitherto,"4but also
suggests utter abandonment, a loneliness of dreadful proportions. On
the other hand, when Sartre writes that "life begins on the far side of
despair," he is not only pointingto the self-deceptioninvolved in denying
the dark underside of existence but also emphasizing that life can begin.
Such balance does not play well to the "Have-a-nice-day" audience
on this side of the Atlantic. In my experience, adolescents as well as
adults are puzzled by the suggestion that awareness or authenticityor
any other ideal may be intrinsicallyvaluable rather than dependent for
its worth on the extentto which it enhances our happiness.For them,for
many of us, the only sensible justificationfor a value is its potential to
give us pleasure. If a fuller,more truthfulappreciation of absurdityisn't
any fun, why bother with it? (Psychotherapy, similarly,having lost all
connection with Freud's ideal of self-knowledge,is now seen as nothing
other than a means to feeling better.) Existentialismis perceived as pessimistic,then, not because of the context in which it raises the issues of
mortality and meaninglessness,but for having the bad taste to raise
them at all. As Barrett correctly notes, existentialismdid not create the
3 "TheProblem
ofEvil: An OpenLetterto CarlRogers,"
PsyJournal
ofHumanistic
, 22 (Summer
chology
1982),20.
4Friedrich
ThomasCommon(New York:Frederick
Wisdom,
Nietzsche,
Joyful
, trans.
Ungar,i960),p. 168.

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wrenching problems it addresses,"but simply sought to give them philosophic expression,ratherthan evading them by pretendingthey were not
there."5
The assumption that existentialismis a philosophy of abstraction
could not be furtherfrom the truth. Abstraction is precisely what this
movement finds intolerable. From Kierkegaard's furious and lifelong
assault on Hegel's sub specie aeterni view of human historyto Sartre's
famous declaration that existence precedes essence, existentialismhas
argued for the primacy of the real, experiencinghuman being. That "existential" is loosely used to mean "abstract" can only suggest a failure
to distinguishbetween intangibility (a characteristicof any idea) and
abstraction.
The description of existentialismas concerned exclusively with
"here-and-now" reality offers a truncated and thus misinformedperception of the movement.The human being as he or she experiences the
world is central,but thisis not at all an experience locked in the present
moment. Kierkegaard brilliantlydescribed such temporal isolation in his
discussion of the "aestheticmode," but he did not mean to endorse this
any more than Camus' idea of authenticitywas reflectedby his stranger.
Human life is a tension between history and possibility, which is to
say, between past and future. Thus, the present can be understood as
the intersection of previous choices (now congealed into a self) and
the process of projecting ourselvesforwardat each moment- anticipating,
dreading,planning. Like Eliot, existentialistsunderstandthat "If all time
is eternally present/ All time is unredeemable." Existentially oriented
psychologists have even used the idea of temporal imbalance as a conceptual tool for understandingpersonalitydisturbance.7Misunderstanding of existentialism'sview of the present probably issues from the dramatic depictions in its literatureof being caught in the present and also
fromthe disproportionateemphasison here-and-now experience in some
quarters of humanisticpsychology.
Existentialism'srebellion against reason's proud reign since the Enlightenmenthas led some to see the movement as championing the ir5Irrational
Man:A StudyinExistential
(New York:Anchor,1962),p. 26.
Philosophy
Princeton
Univ.Press,1959),esp.
6S0renKierkegaard,
Either/
Or,Vol. 1 (Princeton:
"The Rotation
Method"and"Diaryof theSeducer."
The latteris paralleled
by Camus'
ofDonJuanism
discussion
inTheMythofSisyphus
(NewYork:Vintage,
1955),
pp.51-57.
7See,e.g.,EugeneMinkowski,
in a Caseof Schizophrenic
"Findings
Depression"
(pp.
of Existential
127-38),and RolloMay,"Contributions
Psychotherapy"
(pp. 65-71),in
Existence
, ed.RolloMayetal., (New York:Basic,1958).

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rational. (That William Barrett's superb introduction to existentialism

carries the unfortunatetitle Irrational Man has undoubtedly multiplied
the confusion.) Luther branded reason "a whore," infinitelyinferiorto
faith;the Romantics (and the neo-Romanticismof the American humanpotential movement) dismissedmattersof the mind as sterile and unrewarding in contradistinctionto those of the heart. But existentialismhas
challenged the insufficiencyof reason and the hubris of positivism and
scientismin theirrefusalto grant the legitimacy of other domains of human life. It is the exclusive emphasison rationality,the imperial arrogance
of its partisans,to which the existentialistshave objected. Their critique
restson threefoundations: the value of wholeness (and the need to affirm
the whole person ratherthan just a disembodied mind), the urgency of
action (as opposed to mere reflection), and the personal relationshipto
what is known (which Kierkegaard called "subjective knowledge" and
counterposed to the rationalistideal of disinterestedobjectivity). Once
again, the point is balance rather than a swing to irrationality-or, more
precisely,an attemptto illuminatethe existinghuman who embodies both
reason and unreason.
Finally there is the matter of individualism. This view of existentialismis at once the most common and the most plausible. Kierkegaard's
denigrationof "the crowd," Nietzsche's of "the herd," and Heidegger's
"
"
of das Man (the "they") surely are suggestive,and John Macquarrie
must be taken seriously when he writes that "all the leading existentialists. . . are [primarily] concerned with the individual whose quest for
authentic selfhood focuses on the meaning of personal being" despite
paying "lip-serviceto the truththat man existsas a person only in a community of persons."8 Still, the truthproves much less susceptible to the
easy label of individualism.Buber, Marcel, and the mature Camus were
centrallyconcerned with the interhumanand were tirelessin their criticism of rampant individualism.Buber in particular noted that the individual/collective dichotomy was a false one: "The wholeness of man . . .
[involves] the sphere of 'between.' . . . This is where the genuine third
alternativemust begin."9 To this extent,to stressthe limitsof das Man
is not necessarilyto fall into uncriticalworship of the individual. (Highschool English teachers are apt to link existentialismwith the American
transcendentalisttheme of self-reliance,an equation that is myopic and
difficultto defend.)
8Existentialism
(Middlesex,
1973),p. 17.
England:Penguin,
9"WhatIs Man? mBetween
MananaMan (New York:Macmillan,
1965;,pp. 199-205.

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The assumptionthat Sartreis purely individualisticis similarlyhasty.

Two hundred and fiftypages on "Being-with-Others" in Being and
Nothingness should convince us that he is not unaware of the issue,10
while his caution againstviewing No Exit as a statementof his view of human relationshipneeds to be considered as well. Add to this the grounding of his ethics- "When we say that a man is responsible for himself,
we do not only mean that he is responsible for his own individuality,
but that he is responsible for all men"11-and the moral impulse underlying his later Marxism. Generalizations about existentialism'sindividualistic coloration are, in short,only partly justified,and the focus on "the
individual self" may be read as emphasizing the "self" more than the
"individual."
The Current Status of Existentialism
Existentialism'svirtual disappearance from contemporary discourse has
not been restricted to popular culture. The Journal of Existentialism
(formerlythe Journal of Existential Psychology) ceased publication in
1967, and the International Forum for Existential Psychiatry folded
threeyears later. Only the Review of ExistentialPsychiatryand Psychology limps along, publishing irregularly,its parent association gone.
This and other evidence notwithstanding,however, existentialism
has not gone the way of the phlogiston theory. It continues to offera
minorityreport in philosophy proper, to color the Zeitgeist more generally, and to contribute most impressivelyto psychology and psychotherapy.This assessmentwas confirmedby a seriesof recent interviewsI
conducted with philosophers,including William Barrett (retired from
New York University), Hazel Barnes (University of Colorado), and
Maurice Friedman (San Diego State University); psychologistssuch as
Rollo May (now in private practice), Suzanne Kobasa (City University
of New York), and Steen Hailing (Seattle University); and literary
criticslike William Spanos (SUNY-Binghamton), Frederick Karl (New
10To theextent
thathistreatment
of theproblem
in thisbookwas notexactlyBuhislaterreflections
describe
a significant
berian,
change:"In BeingandNothingness,
my
ofothers
lefttheindividual
tooindependent,"
he latertoldan interviewer
theory
("The
LastWordsofJean-Paul
Dissent[Fall1980],405).Thisentire
interview
is filled
Sartre,"
withreflections
on fraternity,
andcollaborative
obligation,
activity.
11 Existentialism
m Existentialism
andHumanEmotions(New York:Philosophical
1957),p. 16.
Library,

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York University), and Leo Hamalian (City Universityof New York).12

Existentialismmay be viewed as analogous to psychoanalysis- its
heyday past, its number of practitionersfalling,its representationin psychology departmentsapproaching zero, and even its criticsfailingto become exercised anymore. Yet the impact of psychoanalysis both in and
out of the academy is beyond dispute; its concepts and dialect are so
much a part of us that even recognizing the extent of its contribution
proves difficult.Something similar,though clearly on a smaller scale, has
happened with existentialism.Neither movement is au courant in the
1980's, but that signals a diminutionof its faddishnessrather than of its
significance. No one sympathetic to existentialistideas is dismayed at
their having passed from the realm of hem-lengthsand Top-40 music.
To note that popularization involves dilution and misrepresentationis
not to consign the movement to the ivory tower in a fitof elitism.It is
merely to insistthat just because other topics have replaced it in cocktail
party conversation (a predictable occurrence given our appetite for
novelty; as Sartreput it, we require the smell of freshpaint) we need not
begin the last rites for existentialism.
A thoroughsurvey of existentialism'sinfluenceacross the disciplines
would require a much more intimate familiaritywith the currents of
each discipline than most of us possess. I know, for example, that
existentialism-and, more saliently,phenomenology- has shaped a recognizable school in sociology and political science, and that existentialist
thoughthas been brought to bear on a surprisinglywide variety of other
topics and fields.13But since my understanding of many of these disciplines is unfortunatelylimited,the discussionthat follows will be confined to brief looks at existentialismin literatureand philosophy, with
a more extended analysis of its role in contemporary psychology.
In literature,one would be hard put to argue that existentialthemes
12All quotations
which-withthe
comefromtheseinterviews,
attributed
nototherwise
conducted
Rollo
with
in
conversation
an
of
by
1983
May-were
person
August
exception
in December1983.
telephone
13RobertBogartoffers
of Existential
in A Critique
a goodbibliography
Sociology,
in otherdisSocialResearch
, 44 (Autumn1977),502-28.For theroleof existentialism
SocialWork(NewYork:FreePress,1978); John
seeDonaldF. Krill,Existential
ciplines,
Existential
(New York:Hastings
House,1977);Van Cleve
CalhounMerrill,
Journalism
in Education(New York: Harperand Row, 1966);Arturo.
Existentialism
Morris,
Hall, 1962);andCelia
N.J.:Prentice
Fallico,ArtandExistentialism
(EnglewoodCliffs,
ChicanoPerspectives
and the HumanCondition,"
Existentialism,
Medina,"Chicanos,
andtheEnvironment,
SeriesinHumanBehavior
1974).
(Marfel

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have receded over the last quarter-century.However, determiningwhich

writersmeritthe existentialistlabel is, more than in any other arena, virtually impossible. There are some on whom most critics will agree:
Kafka, Dostoevski, Tolstoy, and Rilke, along with the drama of Brecht,
Pirandello, and the Theatre of the Absurd. After that, anythingis fair
game- to the point that the tag is almost meaningless.14Given the unmistakablepresence of existentialistthemesin Aeschylus and the Book of
Job, one can scarcely suggest we are addressing a phenomenon exclusively of the modern age. On the other hand, with the likes of Walker
Percy and Joan Didion stillpublishing,it would be difficultto argue that
literaturehas left such themes behind.
Literary criticismis quite another matter.Twenty years ago Frederick Karl and Leo Hamalian edited a widely used anthology entitled
The Existential Imagination, and another, The Existential Mind, ten
years ago. Today, Hamalian pronounces existentialism"dated," noting
that he hasn't seen the word used in a long time in connection with criticism. Similarly,Karl comments: "As an active movement or something
that would influencepresent-dayliterarycriticism,it's almost died out."
Criticismhas turnedtoward deconstructionand other stylesemphasizing
a reading of the text in a vacuum- or so it seems to the existentialist.
"There is no 'real life' anymore," says Karl. "What remains is the
internaldynamicsof the textitself."Yet paradoxically, according to William Spanos (himself the editor of an existentialismanthology), deconstructionismpresupposes existentialistthoughtin a way that partisansof
the formerare loath to acknowledge. Calling himselfboth a deconstructionistand a Heideggerian, Spanos sees no discontinuitybetween poststructuralistcriticismand Sartreanand Heideggerian philosophy.
If the problems of "lived life" contrastwith the isolated textin criticism, they contrasteven more sharply with the philosophy of language.
Breathtakinglytrivial issues form the mainstay of analytic philosophy,
whose practitionersjustifythis orientationby citing the rigor made possible thanksto a microscopic dissectionof formalpropositions.Shaped by
the positivismof the Vienna Circle, this approach to philosophy is
per14Existentialism
haveincluded
fromShakespeare,
anthologies
Proust,
excerpts
Dickens,
In hisExistentialism
and ModernLiterature
Crane,and Hemingway.
(Secaucus,N.J.:
outIbsen,MillerandFaulkner.
Citadel,
1962),DavisDunbarMcElroysingles
JohnMacMelquarrienominates
Joyce;RolloMaywouldincludeO'NeillandFitzgerald.
Surely
villeand Woolfcannotbe excluded.
All of whichsuggests
thepossibility
of a short
literature
courseon nonexistential
writers.

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haps best captured in J. L. Austin's dictum that truthis important,but

importance is not.
Yet this school, from all accounts, does not hold the discipline in
thralltoday the way it did not so long ago. Whether thisshiftis due more
to the inherentlimitationsof the approach or to the insistentcriticism
from Continental philosophy (notably existentialismand phenomenology) is difficultto ascertain.In any case, the Society forPhenomenology
and ExistentialistPhilosophy, currently based at SUNY-Stony Brook,
claims a national membership of almost 1,000 scholars, 85 per cent of
whom are philosophers.
More significantly,two of this country's most respected studentsof
existentialismargue that the movement has influenced the discipline as
a whole. "The contributions existentialismhas made have become, in
certain respects,part of modern philosophy," contends William Barrett.
"They've infiltratedgradually, and analytic philosophers have become
more aware of these problems." He points especially to the range of
topics being explored by ethical theoristsand to the increased interestin
Heidegger among philosophers of religion. Hazel Barnes, Sartre's major
English translator,notes that a paper on existentialismis almost always
given at any philosophy conference now, while courses on the subject
are still being taught all over the country. "In other words, it's become
part of the basic philosophical framework.It would be inconceivable for
someone who spoke even three minutes on philosophy today not to include [existentialismand phenomenology] as a very profound part of it."
Barnes findsthat students'interestis undiminishedas well: "It used to be
that people regarded Sartre,Camus, and so forthas the latest thing: obviously they don't now. But you know the old Quaker expression, 'it
speaks to my condition'? Well, the studentsstill feel that; and I findthat
both when I speak around the country and in my own classroom."
It is in psychology, however, where existentialism'scontributionis
still most pronounced. The departmentsat certain universities-notably
Duquesne, Seattle, and the University of Dallas- are dominated by the
existentialand phenomenological perspective, offeringsuch courses as
"Phenomenology of the Face" and "Seminar on Desperate Styles." (Interestingly,all three of theseschools are Catholic.) Yet the real power of
existentialismin psychology derives not from the minority that conspicuously identifiesitselfwith it but fromthe extentto which its themes
have been assimilated into other schools. During a lengthy and wideranging conversationlast summer,Rollo May stressedthis point:

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The impact [of existentialism]is not that thereare therapists

who call themselvesexistentialtherapists,because existentialism is not a technique over againstothertechniques.It is not
a systemthat you go to school to learn. It's rathera concern
of what it meansto be a human
with the basic presuppositions
You
be
a
can
Freudian
or a good Jungianand still
being.
good
be existential-and if you are good, you will be existential.
Even
some behaviortherapistsare very good existentialists.
. . . Existentialismmeans keeping in mind the person who has the instinctsor drivesor behavior.
Irvin Yalom, whose publication of Existential Psychotherapy gave a
boost to the movement several years ago, similarlyemphasized that "the
experienced clinician [of any school] oftenoperates implicitlywithin an
existentialframework."15
Historically, the influence of existentialismon psychology comes
fromtwo sources: Sartre and his "existentialpsychoanalysis" (as set out
in Being and Nothingness) fromwhich R. D. Laing took his cue, and the
Swiss psychoanalysts Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss who attempted a synthesisof Freud and Heidegger. The latter version washed
up on American shores with May's Existence anthology. Its primary
featureis a repudiation of the so-called "subject/object" dualism (which
Binswanger once called "the cancer of all psychology") in favor of the
notion of "being-in-the-world." This rather clumsy locution refers to
the fact that we constitutewhat is outside us and are constitutedby it,
and that this realityis prior to the existence of the individual. It is inaccurate, in other words, to speak of an "I" over here and an "environment" over there and then say they interact.There is a sense in which
the whole that includes them is more real than either by itself.
Other features of an existentialapproach to psychology include a
rejection of the dehumanizing elements of the natural science model
(particularly its emphasis on causality, reductionisticexplanatory theories, and quantification); an affirmationof the individual as changing
through his or her choices, and the need to take responsibilityfor those
choices; a focus on the real encounter between two human beings that
describes psychotherapy; and a rejection of theoretical approaches (including Freud's) that portraythe human as a collection of components.
On traditional disputes in psychology regarding the significance of be15Existential
(New York:Basic,1980),p. 12.
Psychotherapy

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havior versus motivation,or the priorityof thought versus feeling,the

existentialistresponse is to suggest that- as in such philosophical disputes
as the mind/body problem- the whole debate is misconceived. What
mattersis the self's experience; anythingelse is a distractionat best and
a violence against the human at worst. That is, I am not an object for
others to cathect, a collection of neurotransmitters
and chromosomes,a
of
an
or
information
repertoire behaviors,
processing unit; I am an exan
a
choosera
whole
and
unique person in the world.
periencer, actor,
This approach hardly qualifiesas the prevailing direction of American psychology or psychiatry,but its impact is felt. There are presentations at the national conventions,articlesin mainstreamjournals (like the
American Journalof Psychiatry), and textbooksthatreflectan existential
perspective. "Fifteen years ago," says Seattle University'sSteen Hailing,
"if you looked at a traditionalpsychology journal and someone said that
people responded to events as they perceive them and not events as they
really are, that would have been a radical thingto say. It isn't anymore."
Suzanne Kobasa, who has been conducting a longitudinal evaluation of
the relationshipbetween perceived stress and disease, sees her work as
"taking some existential concepts that were vague and trying to turn
them into empirical constructs.Behind the questions of stressresistance,
I see a basic existentialconception of life- such issues as the inevitability
of change and struggle [and the idea] that what one is is what one
makes." The entire field of psychosomatic medicine, in fact, follows
existentialismin rejecting the mind/body split that has plagued Western
thoughtsince Descartes.
The so-called neo-Freudians have introduced a variety of existentialistconcerns into theirstudies of character. In place of Freud's creaky
mechanisticmodel, firmlybased in the natural sciences and decidedly individualistic,the revisionistshave emphasized our capacity to grow and
choose and make meaning, as well as our relationswith others. It is relevant to ask not only how one approaches psychology, but just what one
is studying.Whereas Freud investigatedsuch reificationsas the "id" and
the "ego," the neo-Freudians have been more concerned with the whole
existingperson.
But even many of those psychoanalystswho recoil fromtaking such
libertieswith the master have begun to embrace a new movement that
quietly introducesexistentialistthemes.The late Heinz Kohut developed
a "self psychology" duringthe 1970's that is particularlyconcerned with

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narcissisticdisorders.While the scope of this essay precludes providing

a summary of Kohut's thought- or an explication of narcissism-several
featuresof thistheory warrant brief attention.
To begin with, the very way Kohut and others describe narcissism
recapitulates such existentialistissues as alienation and emptiness.Moreover, Kohut created this self psychology as a direct result of the inadequacy of traditionalpsychoanalytictreatment;it was a change grounded
in his concrete experience, not in a desire for a more elegant theoretical
construct.When he talks about "data," his conception divergesfromthat
of the natural sciences. In the words of one Kohutian, "By taking an
empathie, introspectivestand one may sample the full range of experience from within the self of the patient as well as one's own array of
inner responses."16One addresses the total subjective experience of the
self, that is, and sees this as more fundamental than biologically based
drives; the person replaces Freud's "mental apparatus." Also, this person
is principallyunderstood as a meaning-maker:"Through self psychology
. . . we have learned to approach relations not merely as what goes on
between people, but in terms of the significanceand meanings that become attached to the 'goings on.' "17The self is even described in holistic
terms,as "a psychological whole that is superordinated to the psychological parts."18 In short, while Kohut comes no closer to identifying
himself with the existentialistmovement than an occasional quotation
from Kafka, his work- extraordinarilyinfluential
today in psychoancirclesits
bears
alytic
footprints.
Another area, humanisticor "Third Force" psychology, is so
widely
believed to embody an existentialistperspective that most textbookssimply referto "humanistic-existential
approaches." Indeed, CharlotteBuhler
has argued that "Existential considerations form the underlying
philosophical basis of humanisticpsychology"19; Fritz Perls regarded himself
16MeyerGunther,
SelfPsychology,
andtheConceptof Health,"in Ad"Aggression,
vancesin SelfPsychology
, ed. ArnoldGoldberg(New York:International
Universities
Press,1980),p. 177.
17ArnoldGoldberg,
Introduction
to Advancesin SelfPsychology,
p. 9. Kohutsummarizes
his"newviewpoint"
as onethat"allowedmeto perceive
or thesignifimeanings,
canceofmeanings,
I hadformerly
notconsciously
of
("The Two Analyses
perceived"
Mr Z," International
60 [1979],3).
Journal
of
Psychoanalysis,
18HemzKohut, Remarks
AbouttheFormation
of theSelf,"in The Searchforthe
2 vols. (New York:International
Self,ed. Paul H. Ornstein,
Universities
Press,1978),
II. 7319"BasicTheoretical
of
American
26
Concepts Humanistic
Psychology,"
Psychologist,
(1971),380.

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as an existentialist,
as does Carl Rogers. It is probably accurate to say that
the themesof existentialismwill not be absent fromAmerican psychology
so long as the humanistic alternative endures. Yet there are substantial
differencesbetween the movement originatingin Germany and France
and the one that developed in California. The three most substantialdistinctionsare these:
( i ) Existentialism,particularlybut not exclusively in its atheistic
variety,focuses on the human being as a creator; he or she inventsvalues,
purposes,and, ultimately,a self.Humanistic psychology places its emphasis on discovery.The selfis there already, waiting to be "actualized"; "all
you gotta do is sit and be nice," as May characterizesthe position. Values
presentno real dilemma: "The best way for a person to discover what he
ought to do is to findout who and what he is. . . . Many problems simply
disappear; many others are easily solved by knowing what is in conformitywith one's nature. . . ."20 Somehow it is not surprisingthat the
Journalof Humanistic Psychology is increasinglyfilled with words like
"spiritual,""meditation," and "transpersonal,"or that the photograph on
its cover does not featurea person but an ethereal blue sky.
(2) Implicit in the sufficiencyof discovery is humanistic psychology's profound optimism.Denying the balance offeredby existentialism, Maslow, Rogers, et al. prefer to leave questions of death and
despair to the Europeans, servingup instead a sanitized vision of the human condition. Maslow has no time for what he flippantlyrefersto as
"high I.Q. whimperingon a cosmic scale."21
and rebellion, and
(3) Existentialismis rooted in both affirmation
Camus brilliantlydescribed how the two interpenetrate.But humanistic
psychology virtually excludes revolt. In a very fine essay, Richard E.
Johnsonhas argued thatexistentialchoice must exist"in defianceof every
obstacle- not, as the new humanismpreaches, 'in harmony,in alignment
with everythingelse.' . . . There is no way to reconcile this strain and
tension of the individual self and the creative will . . . with a calm surrender to passive faithin the wisdom of the organismand the probity of
the situation."22Humanistic psychology, in sum, was largely shaped by
an existentialistsensibility,but it would be erroneous to see the two
schools as coextensive.
20Abraham
ReachesofHumanNature(Middlesex,
Maslow,TheFarther
England:Pen1976),pp. 106-7.
guin,
21Towarda Psychology
1968),p. 16.
ofBemg,2nded. (New York:D. Van Nostrana,
22"TheFutureofHumanistic
The
March/
Humanist,
1975,
p. 6.
April
Psychology,"

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39 6

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In developmentalpsychology, finally,we also have evidence of some

incorporationof the spiritof existentialism.An exciting book by Robert
Kegan, The Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development
(Harvard University Press, 1982), offersa new theory to account for
how we look at the world differentlyas we grow. For Freud, one's adult
life is a recapitulation of early experiences, and affect (feeling) is far
more significantthan thought.For the Swiss psychologistJean Piaget, by
contrast,it is cognitive ability that matters.Kegan not only synthesizes
these two perspectives,he transcendsthem. He proposes to explore the
underlyingissue that defineshuman life: the project of making meaning
or making some sense of ourselves and the world around us. From the
epistemologica! concern with how we come to know (Piaget's interest),
he moves to the ontological issue of what and who we are. Our growth,
he suggests,can be understood as a process of reconstruingour relationship to the world, specifically by distinguishingourselves from what is
outside us. This, in turn,permitsus to interactwith the world more fully.
As Buber put it, "One cannot stand in relation to somethingthat is not
perceived as contrasted and existingfor itself."23
Although Kegan makes few explicitreferencesto existentialistideas
or thinkers,his theory is an extraordinaryrealization of existentialism.
His model unself-consciously touches on the dreadful exhilaration of
change and choice ("Every transitioninvolves to some extentthe killing
offof the old self"), the idea of projecting ourselves into the future,and
the repudiationof the subject/object dichotomy. Most important,Kegan
offersan account of growth fromthe inside,a phenomenological portrait
of change that goes far beyond Piaget's "objective" descriptionof which
mental operations can be performed at which age. Unlike most developmental or personality theorists,Kegan's subject is really the human
subject.
In a sense, the tacit use of existentialistthemesby people like Kegan
and Kohut is more significantthan the self-styledexistentialpsychology
to be found elsewhere. Such thinkers-and, doubtless,othersas well- continue to findthese ideas seminal and useful,yet feel no need to call attention to their roots. This suggests that existentialismis present here and
now in a form both more profound and more enduring than the days
when Life ran a nineteen-pagephoto essay on what was effectivelybilled
as a new philosophical craze. Existentialismtoday has a quiet relevance
23TheKnowledge
ofMan (New York:HarperTorchbooks,
1966),p. 62.

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to the issues of everyday life as well as a special immediacy in times of

crisis. "Wherever there's any ground for urgency in modern life, you
have the existentialissues," Barrett says, and, indeed, my students read
Sartre juxtaposed with JonathanSchell's The Fate of the Earth.
Beyond psychology, our consciousness has been subtly changed by
the presence of existentialism.This is clear whenever we speak of "absurdity" and mean more than simple silliness,whenever we talk of "a
leap of faith" or "bad faith,"whenever we referto making someone into
an object or having a "dialogue." As Maurice Friedman observes, "It's
not always being named existentialism,but the thing that representsthat
spirit is very palpably there. It's had a very permanent impact that's
growing, and people are growing throughit."

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