Wolf 1

The Volatile Divorce of a Marriage of Convenience

Foreign strategy during wartime is often dictated by alliances and diplomacy conducted
throughout the nations involved. However, the effect of such policies and agreements made
throughout the war continue to influence their respective nations long after the war is over. One
of the most exemplary instances of this is the relationship forged between the three major Allied
powers of World War IIBritain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The agreements made
between Allied leaders at meetings near the end of World War IIsuch as the Yalta and Potsdam
Conferencesplayed a major role in influencing United States foreign policy. Due to its scale
and highly destructive nature, World War II affected each nation differently and ultimately
influenced how each leader of the Big Three approached the conferences.
Following the success of the invasion of Normandy and the liberation of France from
Nazi control, the military might of the United States established the nation as a contributing force
in the European war effort. Also essential to the European war effort was the use of U.S. goods
by the British and Soviet militaries which were supplied through the lend-lease program. From
this position of both a superior military power and a benefactor to other Allied nations, the
United States had leverage over Britain and the Soviet Union, and felt entitled to assert its clout
in European politics. Roosevelt was desirous of a Europe that had adopted a model of postwar
order in which great powers would maintain regional harmony and stability through wise
leadership and by actively cultivating good relations among their neighbors.1 He intended to
solidify this global alliance through the formation of the United Nations, an organization that
attempted to preserve Allied alliances made during the war. Although he was in a strong position
politically, Roosevelt was prepared to concede to the demands of Stalin in exchange for Soviet
1 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. (New
York: Oxford University, 2008), 555.

Wolf 2

involvement in the Pacific Theatre. Concessions by Rooseveltboth to Churchill and Stalin

would serve to promote his view of the cooperation among the Allied nations.
Sharing Roosevelt's vision of cooperation, Churchill was also an advocate for regional
harmony and stability through wise leadership between the nations of Europe. British policy
had been concerned for centuries, and for at least a century quite consciously, with the
maintenance of an equilibrium or balance of power in Europe, 2 a policy that would later cause
tension between the Big Three concerning the institution of democratic governments in Poland
and other Central European nations. Churchill did not subscribe to the policy of cooperation
through appeasement as ardently as Roosevelt, and when he did so, it was for a different reason.
His principle concern was confined to the status of England on the world stage and as a colonial
empire, the way it had existed before being exhausted by the war. This stress placed on the
restoration of pre-war Europe can be attributed to Churchill's desire to preserve the might of the
British Empire. Of the Big Three, England was the most devastated from the events of the war.
Early involvement in the war and a close proximity to Germany had taken its toll on Englands
resources and infrastructure. With England in such a weakened state and the impending Soviet
emergence as a superpower, Churchills primary concern became maintaining England as
Europes strongest nation. There is evidence that Churchills goal was to juggle the power of
Russia and America whilehe stole the prize of Europe, 3 but this became more difficult once
the spread of Soviet influence to satellite states started to threaten Englands eminence within
Europe. Anxious to have a series of buffer nations between England and the Soviet Union,
Churchill began vying for the establishment of independent democratic nations free from Soviet
2 Keith Sainsbury. British Policy and German Unity at the End of the Second World War,
The English Historical Review 94, no. 373 (1979): 787, http://www.jstor.org/stable/565553.

3 Charles L. Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam (New York: Franklin Square, 1975), 28.

Wolf 3

influence as a sort of containment. Bankrupt and unable to challenge the Soviet Union alone,
Churchill attempted to wed the United States to the case of propping up Great Britain, without
letting Britain be absorbed into a new American empire.4 Churchill was able to accomplish
solidarity with the United States through his concept of the Iron Curtain and the mutual menace
of communism. Together, the nations challenged Stalins influence in Central Europe and sought
to contain the spread of communism.
Although they had incurred disastrous losses at Stalingrad, the Soviet Union pressed
further into Europe until eventually the defeat of Germany was rendered inevitable. The success
of the Soviet army at Stalingrad resulted in a major weakening of Hitlers forcesboth reducing
the military might of Germany and causing troops to be withdrawn from the western front
which marked a turning point in the war. Having greatly contributed to German surrender in this
way, Stalin felt that he was in a strong position to demand compensation; this demand was the
source for the exorbitant reparations requested at the Yalta Conference. German resentment by
the Soviet Union also influenced Stalins demand for influence in Poland and other Central
European countries. Stalin asserted that this influence was necessary because the Germans had
twice invaded Russia via Poland...It is therefore in Russias vital interest that Poland should be
both strong and friendly.5 While Stalin was concerned with invaders entering Russia, he was
also concerned with people leaving Russia. Russian soldiers had seen foreign lands, foreign
wealth, foreign freedomStalin feared that the Russian people would be infected by contact

4 Mee, Potsdam, 25.

5 Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of U.S.S.R and the
President of the U.S.A and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War
of 1941-1945 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957), quoted in Mee, Potsdam,
49.

Wolf 4

with the WestHe had great need of the iron curtain.6 Stalins unwavering presence in Central
Europe served to keep Russia safe by keeping the ideas of the West out.
As the first conference discussing post-war policy in Europe, expectations for the Yalta
Conference were high. Three of its defining aspects would prove to be instrumental in shaping
future U.S. foreign policy the division of German land into four zones, the payment of
reparations among the Big Three and France, and Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe. With
the surrender of Germany imminent, it was decided thatupon unconditional surrender
Germany would be divided into zones, rendering each power equal in exerting influence over its
post-war reorganization. Although the division of Germany would play a more pivotal role in the
later Potsdam Conference, these zones created a stage for one of the most politically tense
atmospheres of the Cold War. The extent to which reparations must be made remained unclear,
but Stalins desire to severely punish Germany clashed with the desire to eventually reunite the
separate zones of Germany into a democratic, self-governing nation. Roosevelt believed that
political settlements should be based on the concept of self-determination of peoplescolonies
should be readied for independence7 while Churchill subscribed to the traditional basis of
[British] national security, which required maintaining...Germany as a major power.8 Selfgovernment presented more of a problem in Eastern Europe, namely Poland. Churchill and
Roosevelt both pushed for free elections in Poland, but Stalin saw Soviet involvement as
necessary to the safety of Russia. Polands previous, more democratic government had been
forced into exile following Soviet occupation during World War II, and both Churchill and
6 Mee, Potsdam, 46.
7 Herring, Colony to Superpower, 549.
8 Ibid., 548

Wolf 5

Roosevelt wished to see it reinstated. An agreement was reached that the governments would be
combined, and Stalin promised that free elections would be permitted. Churchill and Roosevelt
looked to evaluate how the situation was handled to determine how Soviet power and dominance
would treat formerly democratic nations in post-war Europe; thus, Poland had become the issue
over which cooperation would flourish or fail.9
Roosevelt is often criticized for concessions made at Yalta, but the concessions he made
were in the interest of the United States and his post-war vision of Europe, not a result of naivety
or ignorance; the United States government recognized the reality of Soviet presence in Eastern
Europe. We have a pretty clear idea of Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe...We know that the
three Baltic States have been re-incorporated into the Soviet Union and that nothing which we
can do can alter this. It is not a question of whether we like it."10 Roosevelt deemed Soviet
activity in Eastern Europe permissible in order to construct a more cooperative relationship with
Stalin, both during and after the war. He thought accommodation of legitimate Soviet objectives
might enable him to safeguard at less cost more vital American (and British) interests elsewhere
around the globe.11 Soviet entry into the Pacific Theatre was deemed necessary to secure
victory, a victory which could be achieved with less loss of American lives. In a post-war
context, granting certain concessions to Stalin would enable the U.S. government to work out a
regime which will obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union for the rest of Europe and the rest
9 Herring, Colony to Superpower, 48.
10 The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of
State, 8 January 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The
Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State,
1955), 94.

11Melvyn P. Leffler, "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold
War." International Security 11, no.1 (Summer 1986), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538877.

Wolf 6

of the world.12 The attempt to gain Soviet support was successful: Stalin agreed to join the
United NationsRoosevelts post-war peace keeping organizationand the promise of Soviet
invasion negotiated at Yalta would contribute to the surrender of Japan. However, the
importance of post-war peace stressed by Roosevelt would not extend beyond his administration.
The death of Roosevelt shortly after the Yalta Conference marked a drastic shift in U.S.
foreign policy. Trumanelected as way to compromise between the staunch right and left wing
policies of other candidateswas not deemed important to Roosevelts administration, and
Roosevelt deliberately kept Truman ignorant of his foreign policy goals. Roosevelts failure to
share the intricacies of his foreign policy goals with Truman enabled the Truman administration
to completely subvert it; U.S. foreign policy changed from one willing to cooperate and make
concessions with the Soviet Union to one dedicated to stopping the expansion of Russian
influence in Europe. The previous stance of the U.S. government under Roosevelt on Soviet
influence in Eastern Europe had been one of ambivalence, but the Truman administration
intended to use Eastern Europe as a theatre to stage a showdown between the two powers in
order to force cooperation. The opinion of the Truman administration was that Stalin had
interpreted the American desire for cooperation as complaisance, and Soviet policy in Eastern
Europe reflected Stalins belief that he could act without fear of American involvement. The
Truman administration adopted the view that such actions would not be tolerated and the U.S.
government intended to make them realize that they cannot continue their present attitude
except at great cost to themselves.13 This coincided with Churchills goal of maintaining the
12Deputy Director to Secretary of State, in Foreign Relations, 95.
13 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955),
quoted in Gar Alperovitz, Atomic DiplomacyHiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic
Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Penguin, 1985), 71.

Wolf 7

pre-war balance of power in Europe, and the alliance of the two against Soviet influence would
become a source of anxiety for Stalin. The foreign policy of the Truman administration would
have an alienating effect on the Soviet Union, and would greatly contribute to tensions between
the two, eventually laying the foundation of Cold War politics. The harsh and uncompromising
stance on foreign policy taken by Trumanresponding to Soviet policy with what he called the
one-two, right to the jaw14is responsible for the drastic differences between the Yalta and
Potsdam Conferences.
A continuation of the negotiations undertaken at the Yalta Conference, the intentions of
the Potsdam Conference were to address the issue of European construction and to solidify what
had been agreed upon, but had not been concluded decisively, at Yalta. Following the
unconditional surrender of Germany and victory in Europe, the Big Three entered negotiations to
decide how reconstruction should take place and to delineate concretely its terms. Germany
after undergoing demilitarization, denazification, and decentralization of government institutions
would be split into Allied zones of influence from which reparations would be withdrawn. The
divisionsplit into what was defined as the Western Zones and the Soviet zonewith its
ultimate goal of reuniting Germany under a democratic government would contribute to tensions
between Western democracy and Soviet communism; the dichotomy of these political ideologies
would become the most definitive aspects of the Cold War.
Trumans tough foreign policy, and his desire to hinder the spread of communism and
Soviet dominance are both evident in his actions toward negotiating the end of the war in Japan.
As stated in the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies were committed to extracting Japans
unconditional surrender. While Roosevelt made several concessions at Yalta to provide an
14George C. Herring, Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold
War (New York, 1973), 198-99, quoted in Herring, Colony to Superpower, 589.

Wolf 8

incentive for the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan, Truman feared the spread of Soviet
influence in the Far East, and was determined to end the war in Japan on American terms before
the terms of Soviet invasion could be agreed upon. Having delayed meeting with Stalin, Truman
faced another threat to Japans surrender to the United Statesnegotiations were being discussed
between the Soviet government and the Emperor of Japan. The opportunity to force a Japanese
surrender without Soviet influence presented itself upon the successful testing of the atomic
bomb. Although Stalin was able to deploy an invasion force before Japans surrender, Trumans
goal of limiting Soviet influence within global politics would come to define the subsequent
decades of U.S. foreign policy.
FDRs idealistic goal of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union was supplanted
by Trumans policy of containment. The policy of containment was the product of George
Kennan, an American diplomat in Moscow, and his assessment of Soviet postwar ambitions
known as the Long Telegram. Writing that communism would work toward destruction of all
forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral,15 Kennans telegram stressed the
threat the Soviet Union and its communism presented to the qualities that were intrinsic to
American life. The threat of communism, the obligation of the United States to combat it, and the
establishment of global influence through the assertion of American ideals mirrored the defining
document of American nationalismHenry Luces article in Life magazine, The American
Century. Luce wrote that America should strive to become the powerhouse from which the
ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of mankind
from the level of the beasts to what the Psalmist called a little lower than the angels.16 The
spread of American ideals was the best candidate to fight communism because, as Luce argued,
15 George Kennan to George Marshall, 22 February 1946, in Elsey Papers (Independence,
MO: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum).

Wolf 9

the issues which the American people champion revolve around their determination to make the
society of men safe for the freedom, growth and increasing satisfaction of all individual men.17
Through his portrayal of Soviet leadership, Kennans telegram removed any last vestiges of
FDRs foreign policy dedicated to maintaining amiable relations with the Soviet Union, and was
influential in turning the tide of American opinion from one of potential negotiation to outright
opposition. The perception of the threat to freedom as presented by communism was
appropriated by Truman to garner support for actions of his foreign policy.
To conduct the policy of containment and to increase the global influence of the United
States, the Truman administration sought to undertake actions conducive to these goals. Truman
secured popular support by citing the defense of freedom, suggesting the United States was
turning from the tradition of isolationism to assume a global responsibility of supporting
freedom-loving peoples around the world. This American commitment to defending freedom
known as the Truman Doctrinewould become the guiding spirit of American foreign
policy.18 The global responsibility of the United States set forth by the Truman Doctrine entailed
providing military and economic support to factions fighting communist regimes, as well as
providing aid to begin the economic recovery of Europe through the Marshall Plan. Although it
was not specifically anticommunist, the Marshall Plans intention of creating conditions
beneficial to the establishment of free governments was inexorably linked with fighting the

16 Henry R. Luce, The American Century, Information Clearing House. 1941, accessed
November 24, 2014, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article6139.htm.

17 Ibid.
18 Eric Foner, Give Me Liberty! An American History, 3rd edition. (New York: W.W. Norton,
2011), 954.

Wolf 10

conditions which had produced the idea, widespread since the Great Depression, that capitalism
was in decline and communism the wave of the future.19
With foreign policy dominated by anticommunist sentiment and a heavy emphasis on
ensuring the establishment of free, democratic governments throughout Europe, the United
Statesalong with Britain and Franceunited their occupied zones of Germany and Berlin with
the intention of establishing a democratic West German government. The blockade of Berlin by
Stalin, and the Allied response it invoked, resulted in the emergence of two very different nations
an East and West Germany with Berlin remaining divided. The division of one city into such
diametric political opposites threw the tensions into sharp contrast, becoming a symbol of
increasing Cold War hostility. This apprehension would only worsen, although not in Europe.
The struggle for dominance between the democracy of the United States and the
communism of the Soviet Union achieved new fervor in Asia. With both nations possessing
nuclear capabilities, each was reluctant to give the other reason for nuclear retaliation. Unwilling
to engage forces directly, the Soviet Union and the United States began a trend of proxy wars
most notably, the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Separated into Soviet and American zones
following the end of World War II, communist North Korea invaded South Korea in an attempt
to reunite the country, and Truman extended his Doctrine and policy of containment to repel the
invasion force. Although a formal peace treaty has yet to be instituted concerning the conflict, it
was a success for Trumans containment; communist North Korea had been pushed back within
its original boundaries, and has not moved since. The tensions of the Cold War would dominate
decades of foreign policy, producing a similar situation in Vietnam that would have a more
devastating outcome for the United States.

19 Ibid., 954

Wolf 11

United solely in their desire to fight the rapidly expanding threat Hitler presented to the
entirety of Europe, the alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States was simply a
marriage of convenience formed to meet immediate, often urgent needs.20 Once these needs
had been met following the surrender of the Axis Powers in Europe, the conferences held by the
Big Three to address the postwar organization of Europe and, eventually, of the world led to the
realization that each nation expected different outcomes. The failure to reconcile a majority of
these opposing outcomeswhile others were cloaked in the vague language of diplomacy that
left them open to interpretationbecame the source of a series of grievances between the Soviet
Union and the United States, eventually producing an ideological crusade between the forces of
communism and democracy that would define the Cold War and decades of foreign policy.

20 Herring, Colony to Superpower, 546.

Wolf 12

Works Cited
Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of U.S.S.R and the President
of the U.S.A and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of
1941-1945. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957. Quoted in Charles L.
Mee, Jr., Potsdam (New York: Franklin Square, 1975), 49.
The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, 8
January 1945, In Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The
Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 94. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of
State, 1955.
Foner, Eric, Give Me Liberty! An American History, 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton, 2011.
Herring, George C., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War,
198-99. New York, 1973. Quoted in George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower:
U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. (New York: Oxford University, 2008), 589.
Herring, George C., From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. New York:
Oxford University, 2008.
Kennan, George. George Kennan to George Marshall, 22 February 1946, In Elsey Papers.
Independence, MO: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum.
Leffler, Melvyn P., "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold
War." International Security 11, no.1 (Summer 1986), 88-123.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538877.
Mee, Jr., Charles L., Meeting at Potsdam. New York: Franklin Square, 1975.

Wolf 13

Sainsbury, Keith. British Policy and German Unity at the End of the Second World War. The
English Historical Review 94, no. 373 (1979): 786-804.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/565553.
Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, vol. 1, Year of Decisions. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955.
Quoted in Gar Alperovitz, Atomic DiplomacyHiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the
Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Penguin,
1985), 71.