ARMYANDPOLITICS

By:ShujaNawaz
Pakistanisaprisonerofitsgeographyandhistory.ItsstrategiclocationatthecuspoftheMiddle
East,thePersianGulf,andSouthAsiaandatthedoorofCentralAsiaandChinagivesitsignificance
ontheregionalandglobalscene.Itsproximitytoalargeanddominatingneighbour,India,shapes
Pakistansforeignanddefencepoliciesontheonehandandinformsitsdomesticdebatesonthe
other.ThepresenceofnuclearweaponsandmissiledeliverysystemsinbothIndianandPakistani
hands makes this an even more volatile region than in the past. At the same time, Pakistans
historicalwarswithIndiaconstantlyrevivememoriesofthepastandhavethrustthePakistani
militaryintothecentreofdecisionmakingonissuesrelatedtoitsforeignpolicy,especiallypolicy
towardIndia(Kashmir,specifically)andAfghanistan,aswellasnuclearmatters.
PakistanspoliticalreinshavebeeneffectivelyinthehandsoftheArmyformorethanthirty
eight years since its independence. The country is wracked by internal divisions between
provincesandbetweentheforcesofmodernismandmilitantandradicalIslam.Thesecontinuing
warshavecreatedpoliticaluncertaintyandtumult,leadingtotheassassinationofformerPrime
Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. The 2008 elections gave some hope, allowing the
leading political parties, Bhuttos Pakistan People's Party and former Prime Minister Nawaz
SharifsPakistanMuslimLeague (Ngroup) toreturntopower.AndtheIslamistalliancein the
NorthWestFrontierProvincewastrouncedbythePashtunsecular,thoughquitefeudal,Awami
NationalParty.
AttheheartofthepoliticalmaelstromisthePakistanArmy,probablythebestorganisedgroup
andaveritablepoliticalforceuntoitself,whoseeveryactionandhintcreatesreverberationsin
Pakistanspolity,UnderitspresentArmyChief,GeneralAshfaqParvezKayani,whohasswornto
taketheArmybackintothebarracks,therearemanydoubterswhoseethepoliticiansfacinga
hugechallengeinrunningthecountryeffectivelyafternineyearsofautocraticrulebyPresident,
Pervez Musharraf. They point to the gradual destruction or diminution of institutions: the
judiciary,theconstitution,thebureaucracy,andthelegislature,andtothetransmogrificationof
aparliamentarysystemofgovernmentintoapresidentialsystembyMusharraf.
Againstthisbackground,cynicspointtopastpromisesbyotherArmychiefswhopromisedtokeep
theArmyoutofpoliticsbutultimatelyassumedpowertofillwhattheyconsideredtobeapolitical
vacuum.TheWeightofhistoryleanstowardsacontinuingroleoftheArmyinPakistanspolity,
whether overt or behind the scenes. What ever path it takes, the Army too faces daunting
challenges, as it begins the fight against home grown insurgencies. For it too has changed
dramaticallyovertheyears.
Pakistan came into being in 1947 as the most populous Muslim nation on the planet but the
debateoveritsnationalidentityhasnotbeenconducteddemocraticallynorconcluded.Ithasalso
yettocraftastablepoliticalsystemthatestablishesthesupremacyoftheciviloverthemilitary,
asenvisionedbyitsfounderMohammadAliJinnah,theQuaidiAzam.Itspoliticalpartiestoohave
yet to root their thinking and actions in wellcrafted mandates and manifestos or to allow
democraticselectionoftheirownleaders:mostarerunonfamilialordynasticlines.Withouta
powerful base of support in the country as a whole, they have not been able to provide the
counterweighttothehighlytrainedanddisciplinedPakistanArmythatisalltooreadytostepin
whenthepoliticiansfalter.

Although the Muslim way of life was a motive behind the call for Pakistan, its early political
leadershipdidnotgiveanIslamicblueprintforitspoliticaldevelopmentorgoals.Thereasonfor
this was that the movement for Pakistan was not an Islamic movement as much as it was a
movementbyIndianMuslimstoseekgreatersocialandeconomicOpportunityforthemselves.
EarlyNodtoIslam
ThePakistanArmy,thelargelyMuslimrumpoftheBritishIndianArmy,wasalsosaddledatbirth
withthisparadoxicalidentity:thesymbolsofIslambutthesubstanceofacolonialforce,quite
distantfromthebodypoliticofthefledglingstate.Itadopted,forinstance,thenumbers786for
the identification of its General Headquarters in Rawalpindi. In Islamic numerology, 786
representstheArabicBismillahirRehmanirRahim:theinvocationthatMuslimsintoneatthe
startofanyactionorventureofnote.Thisnumericalcodewasemblazonedonallgatepostsand
vehicles,asareminderthatthiswastheArmyofaMuslimcountry.Foritsbadge,itchosetwo
crossed swords holding up an Islamic rising crescent and fivepointed star against a green
background.
ButtheIslamicidentitywasinnameonlyatthatstage.TheseniorechelonsofthePakistanArmy
atitsbirthwerestillBritishofficerswhohadoptedtostayonandtheyweresucceededbytheir
nativeclones:menwhosawtheArmyasauniqueinstitution,separateandapartfromtherestof
civilsocietyandauthority.ThiswasthedominantculturalethosoftheArmyatthetime.With
time,thisschismbetweenthecantonmentandthecitypervadedtheArmysthoughtprocesses
andseemedtoguide,aswellasbedevil,themilitarysrelationshipwiththeciviliansector.The
Armyinitiallyretaineditslargelymoderateandsecularnature.
Pakistans history is one of conflict between the underdeveloped political system and a well
organised army that grew in strength as a counterweight to a hostile India next door and in
relationtothepoliticalsystem.InthewordsofformerArmyChief,GeneralJahangirKaramat:
Wheneverthereisabreakdowninstability,ashashappenedfrequentlyinPakistan,themilitary
translatesitspotentialintothewilltodominate,andwehavemilitaryinterventionfollowedby
military rule. But, he adds, as far as the track record of the military as rulers in the past is
concerned,Iamafraiditisnotmuchbetterthanthecivil~ians.1Themostrecentdirectruleof
GeneralPervezMusharrafsupportsthisassessment.Whileitusheredinaperiodoffalsestability
andostensiblyopenedpublicdiscourse,itstuntedpoliticalgrowthandbadlydamagedtheability
ofcivilsocietytoparticipatefreelyinthepoliticalprocess.Inmanyways,Musharrafwasaliberal
autocratwholosthisliberalbearings.
OvertimetheArmygainedtherespectofPakistanspopulationforitsspiriteddefenceofthe
countrysbordersagainstapowerfulIndia,andcontinuedtoattractlargenumbersofyouthtoits
ranks,butitsdominanceofthepolityofPakistaneventuallyproducedpublicquestioningofits
role.Throughcoupsandlargelyunfetteredaccesstostateresources,theArmywonthebattle
betweenauthority,representedbythestatesvariousinstrumentsofgovernment,andcoercive
power,reflectedintheArmysmilitaryprowess,leavingtheinstrumentsofstateweakenedand
unabletofunctionevenwhenthemilitaryreturnedtoitsbarracks.
PowerBrokers
TheparadoxofpowerthathobbledPakistansslowpoliticaldevelopmentwasthatastheArmy
grewinstrengthandsize,itstuntedthegrowthofthepoliticalsystemwhoseleaderseithermade
noattempttorebalancetherelationshipbetweenthestateandthecentreofpower,theArmy,

orworse,invitedtheArmytosettlepoliticaldifferencesamongstthemselves.Successivepolitical
leaders suborned and eviscerated the vaunted bureaucracy and managed to weaken the
educational system, thus depriving the country of alternative governance mechanisms and an
informed electorate. The Army meanwhile learned over time to establish patronclient
relationshipswiththebureaucracyandwithIslamistparties,whomitusedinitseffortstofight
internalpopulistleadersinbothEastandWestPakistanandfueltheKashmiriinsurgencyagainst
Indianrule.Theresult:apersistentPraetorianstatewithmilitaryorquasimilitaryruleforover
halfitslifeafterindependencefromtheBritish.
Pakistansexistencehasbeenmarkedbyattemptstobuildanationbutwithoutfirstbuildingthe
institutionalfoundationsthatareneededtoallowastablefederalentitytoevolveinademocratic
andpluralisticsetting.Ethnicandregionalstrife,sectarianviolence,andthepersistentintrusion
offoreignpowersintotheregioninthepursuitoftheirglobalagendas,allhavecreatedthesetting
forunevenpoliticalandeconomicdevelopment.
The1999coupthatbroughtGeneralPervezMusharraftopowerresortedtolegallegerdemainto
avoidbeingclassifiedasamartiallawregimebuteffectivelyoperatedunderatemporarylegal
dispensationthatallowedittooperatebeyondtheambitoftheconstitutionofthecountry.The
secondcoup,inNovember2007,byMusharrafeffectivelyallowedhimtoreplacethejudiciary
wholesale,muzzlethemedia,andwinreelectiontothePresidencybutintheprocesshehad
toshedhisuniform,openingthedoortoareturntocivilianruleofsorts.
TodaysInsurgency
Today, Pakistan is at another crossroads, as a partner of the West in the global war against
militancyandterror.AnditsArmyisoperatinginachangedandhighlychargeddomesticpolitical
environment.Itstwoleadingmainstreamparties(thePakistanMuslimLeagueofSharifandthe
PPPofBenazirBhutto)werelargelyexcludedfromthepoliticalprocessunderMusharraf.Onlyin
late 2007' were their leaders allowed back from exile and reenter Pakistani politics. The
assassination of Bhutto deprived the country of a political counterweight to Musharraf. After
decadesofconflictswithIndia,todayforthefirsttime,PakistansArmyiswagingalargelyfutile
waragainstanunseenenemy:Islamistterroristswithinitsownborder.
The eastern front against India is relatively calmer and there is promise of some progress in
normalisingties,thoughthatmaybeillusionary,giventhemoodswingsofgovernmentsonboth
sides.ButthewesternfrontborderingAfghanistanisawashwithinsurgentactivitySpillingover
fromAfghanistanandalsohomegrown,involvingradicalIslamiststheTaliban,whoareintenton
fighting the United States in Afghanistan and putting their stamp on the tribal areas of the
FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA)ofPakistan.
Forthefirsttimeindecades,thePakistanArmyistodayoperatinginforceinsideitsownborders.
TheenemythistimeisagrowingIslamistmilitantmovementknownasTalibanization,afterthe
radicalrightwingandfundamentalistformerregimeofAfghanistan.Foreignelementsaligned
withalQaeda,theamorphousnetworkofwelltrainedterroristsbegunbyOsamabinLadenand
operatingintheFATA,whichformthatambiguousregionbetweenPakistansNorthWestFrontier
Province (now renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KP) and Afghanistans eastern border, the
DurandLine.
AlthoughtheArmyhasnowtakencontroloftheNuclearCommandandControlSystemthrough
the Strategic Plans Division of the Army Headquarters, and oversight by the National Security

CouncilandappearstohavemettheapprovalofstrictWesternreferees,thefearpersistsabroad
thatradicalelementsinthecountryorwithinthemilitarymayonedaydecidetousePakistans
arsenal of nuclear weapons regionally or resort to proliferation, especially to other Muslim
nations.ThefuseforaconstantlybrewingconflictwithneighbouringIndiaistheMuslimmajority
stateofKashmir,representingtheunfinishedpartofthe1947partitionofBritishIndiathathas
beenthecauseofatleastthreewarsbetweenthetwocountries.Whetherthatfusewillbelitor
besnuffedoutliesinthehandsoftheArmy.
TheCorporateArmy
Increasingly,thePakistanArmyisseenbymanyasacorporateentitythatfunctionsasthemost
effectivepoliticalpartyinthecountry,protectingitsinterests,sometimesevenattheexpenseof
nationalinterests.ArecentstudyofMilbus,ormilitarybusinessinterests,byAyeshaSiddiqain
herbookMilitaryInc.focusesonPakistantocharacterisetheroleofthemilitaryaspredatory.
While this study does not ascribe acquisition of assets through legalised means solely to the
military (recognising the prevalence of these actions among the civil sector too), it assigns
personal aggrandisement as the motive force behind the actions of senior serving and retired
militaryofficers.Inacountrywhereacultureofentitlementhastakenholdsincethelate19705,
thiscriticismisvalidagainstallactorsonthepoliticalstage,whousestateresourcesforpersonal
gain.Overtime,theArmyhasbenefitedfromthiscultureandtheredoesnotappeartobeany
movetorollbackthesystemofprivilegesthathigherranksbringwiththem.
NatureoftheArmy
Pakistanisproudlypointtothefactthattheirsisavolunteerarmywithalonghistoricaltradition.
Inmanyways,itisoftentalkedaboutinthesametermsastheArmyofitspoliticalallyandbrother
country,Tur'key.AsauthorStephenKinzerstatesinhisstudyofcontemporaryTurkey:
Turksfeeldeepgratitudeandagenuineconnectiontotheirarmy.Theybelieveitexistsandworks
for them. But Turks want to escape from its political power, which has become intrusive and
suffocating.Theyhavelearnedthelessonsofdemocracyandnowwanttolivebythem.
While many may debate whether Pakistan has truly learned the les~ Sons of democracy, the
sentimentsinPakistantodayaresimilartothoseinTurkey,whosearmyisoftencitedasamodel
forPakistansArmy.
Yet there are those who see a closer resemblance to the Army of Indonesia under Presidents
SukarnoandSuhartowherethedwifungsiordualfunctionsoftheArmybecameentrenched.
Armyofficerssawthemselvesassavioursofthecountryandalsodevelopedaroleinrulingthe
countryviaarevolvingdoorpolicyunderwhichmilitaryofficersweregivencivilianjobsandthen
movedouttomakeroomfornewofficers.
AyeshaSiddiqaattemptstoquantifytheextentofthemilitarysbusinessinterestsinPakistanand
comesupwithafigureof$10billion,Whilehercalculationsareopentodisputeandindeedhave
been challenged by the military, the gist of her arguments raises relevant questions: to what
extentisthemilitarysaccesstostateresourcescrowdingouttheprivatesectorandpreventing
expenditure.onothermoreproductivesectors,suchashealthandeducation?Moreimportant,
isthismodelsustainable?
GeneralKayaniearlyinhistenurerealisedtheneedfortheArmytoreverttoitsprofessionalroots
andbegantodistancehimselffromtheformerChief,Musharraf.ButdisengagingtheArmyfrom

theeconomyandfromcommercialenterpriseswilltaketime.Afterhewon'asecondfullterm,
Kayanimayhavethetimetobeabletotacklesomeoftheissuesthatpreviouschiefscouldnot,
aboutremovingfatfromthesystemandfightingcorruptionwithintheburgeoningranksofthe
civilmilitarybureaucracythattheArmyhasspawned.
TheWideFootprint
BoththesizeandnatureofthePakistanArmyhaveahugeimpactonthecountryseconomyand
society.Risingfromarelativelysmallforceatindependence,Pakistantodayhasanarmyofover
800,000,includingover550,000regulararmyandtherestasparamilitaryforcesorreserves.Itis
largerthantheregulararmyoftheUnitedStates.Itincreaseditsforcesizeevenafterlosinghalf
thecountryin1971withtheindependenceofBangladesh(formerlyEastPakistan).Intheprocess,
PakistanssecuritythreatfromIndiagrew,forcingittomeetIndiasrapidgrowthofmilitarymight
ontheonehandandtheappearanceoftheSovietArmedForcesinAfghanistantoitswestinthe
1980s.
In 2005, according to World Bank data, defence spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product in Pakistan was around 3.4 per cent compared with Indias 2.3 per cent, among the
highestburdensofmilitaryspendingintheworld.AsPakistandevelopsanditseconomygrows,
theopportunitycostofitsdefencespendingwillrisedramatically.Thisisahugechallengefor
theregime,asitpondersitspoliticalfutureontheonehandandthenatureoftheArmythat
Pakistanneedstoensureitssecurityontheother.
How can one increase development expenditure or have a thorough discussion of the overall
budget?Themilitaryshareofthebudgethasrangedfrom3040percentbutitisstillkeptasa
oneline item that is not subjected to any detailed examination or debate in the national
assembly.Expendituresoneducationaccountfornomorethan1.6percentofGDPandonhealth
for0.5percent(comparedwithdefencespendingat3.4percent,mentionedabove).
The issue facing Pakistan and its military today is one that con fronts many other developing
countries.Apartfromcrowdingoutothermoreusefulinvestments,therelativelylargesizeofthe
defencesectoranditsgradualexpansionintoothereconomicactivities,ashasbeenthecasein
Pakistan, Turkey, and Indonesia, for example, creates a host of ills associated with such
enterprises:featherbeddingoroveremployment,heavyandoftenhiddensubsidies,privileged
access to scarce resources, and the creation of a powerful and new vested interest group in
economicactivities:theservingmilitaryandexservicemen.Thereisnohardfinancialscrutiny
orsupervisionoftheseenterprisesor,moreimportantly,overalldefencespending.Thisdistorts
theallocationofscarcedomesticresourcesandretardseconomicdevelopment.Accompanying
thiseconomicdominationofthepoliticallandscape,theArmyhasalsostrengtheneditspolitical
statuswithintherubricofthestatessystemofassigningsenioritytodifferentrepresentativesof
government.
Armyvs.CivilHierarchy
EventwotimeformerPrimeMinisterNawazSharifshookhisheadwhenaskedbymeifheknew
abouttheapplicationoftheWarrantofPrecedenceduringhistermsinoffice.Yetthislistthat
PakistaninheritedfromtheBritishandthatestablishedtherelativerankingofcivilandmilitary
officialsforprotocolpurposeshasbeenamajorpathtotheriseofthemilitaryinPakistanisociety
andpolity.Beyondsimpleprotocol,thislistsymbolisestherelativerolesofofficialsfromthecivil
andthemilitaryinthenationspolityandprovidedamapoftheirrelationships.TheWarrantof

Precedence issued by the Ministry of Interior from Karachi in February 1950 ranked the top
officialsofthethenDominionofPakistan,WiththeGovernorGeneralatthehead,followedby
thePrimeMinister.Notably,theCommanderinChiefofthePakistanArmycameinatnumber
fifteen,below,amongothers,thejudgesoftheFederalCourt,thechiefjusticesofthehighcourts
oftheprovinces,anddeputyministersoftheDominion.TheChiefofStaffofthePakistanArmy
cameinatnumbertwentywhileLieutenantGeneralscameinatnumbertwentyone,followedby
General OfficersCommanding divisionsatnumber twentytwo,bothbelowfederalsecretaries
andtheGovernoroftheStateBankofPakistan.
Pakistanchangedthiswarrant.defactowhenGeneralAyubKhan,theCinCoftheArmy,was
madeDefenceMinisterandafterwardswhenhetookoverasChiefMartialLawAdministratorand
thenPresident.TodaytheChairman,JCSC,andChiefsofArmy,Air,andNavalStaffarerankedat
numbersix,whileLieutenantGeneralsremainatparwithfederalsecretariesatnumbersixteen.
Noneofthecivilianprimeministersinrecentdecadeshasmadeanyattempttochangethisorder.
Indeed, all of them have elevated military officers to levels beyond those envisaged by the
foundersofPakistanandthencomplainedpubliclyaboutthemilitaryassertingitselfinthepolity
ofPakistan.
ProtectingitsOwn
AfrequentcomplaintabouttheArmyintodaysPakistanstemsfromitsoverwhelmingpowerand
ubiquityinallspheresofcivilendeavour,anditsabilitytooperateoutsidetheboundsofnormal
legalsystems.Asaresult,whenitsmemberschoosetoignorethelawortakeitintotheirown
hands, the first instinct of the higher command is to keep the matter out of the publics eye.
Concomitant with this tendency has been the growing power and involvement of the Inter
ServicesIntelligenceagencyandtheMilitaryIntelligenceindomesticpoliticalandcivilissues,as
policy advisors and implementers rather than providing policyneutral intelligence for military
purposesorconductingcounterintelligenceagainsttheexternalenemiesofPakistan.
TheISI,ahighlyeffectivecounterintelligenceentity,cameintoitsownduringtheAfghanJihad
butinrecentyearshasoftenbeencalledarogueagencyorastatewithinastate.Infact,it
oftenoperatesatthebehestofthegovernment,civilandmilitary,aligningwithwhatevercentre
of power is deemed more powerful or supportive of its functions. Because its role has been
confused by its masters, who want it to seer not only an intelligence function but also as the
crafterandimplementerofpolicy,ittakestheheatforsomeofitsactionsontheirbehalf.The
civilian Intelligence Bureau, which used to be tasked with internal security matters, is now an
appendage of the military agencies. Under the Musharraf regime, it was headed by a retired
Brigadier,apersonalfriendoftheChiefofArmyStaffandPresident.Underthepreviouscivilian
regimeofPrimeMinisterSharif,theIBwasusedforpoliticalpurposesandeventhenwasheaded
byaformermilitaryocher.EventheArmysownMilitaryIntelligenceDirectoratewasbroughtin
tothepoliticalspherebyMusharrafandanumberofhispredecessors.Tomaketheseagencies
effectiveandtoremovefromthemtheopprobriumassociatedwiththeirextralegalactions,they
needtobesubjectedtopublicscrutinyandcontrolsnotonlywithintheArmysstructurebutalso
byparliament.
TodayandTomorrow
OvertheyearsthePakistanArmyhasbeenregarded,withsomemerit,asahighlydisciplinedand.
trainedforce,relyingonvolunteerrecruitment.ThePakistanipopulationtraditionallyhasshown
great respect, even adulation, for its soldiers and officers. Many youth sign up voluntarily for

serviceintheArmyasofficersorsoldiersfollowingfamilyortribaltraditionsandrecentlyasa
meansofupwardsocialandeconomicmobility.Itssoldiersandjuniorofficershavetimeandagain
showntheirabilitiesonthebattlefield.ButtheleadershipoftheArmyhasletdowntheforces
and the country repeatedly. Gradually, instead of respect, feelings of fear and loathing have
pervadedthepoliticaldiscourseontheArmyanditsroleinthecountryspolity.
ThePakistanArmyoftoday,thoughlargeandubiquitous,isillequippedforlowintensityconflict
and has suffered heavily at the hands of welltrained guerrillas that melt into the population.
Increasingly, its association with the American superpower that is driving the war against the
TalibaninAfghanistanpitstheArmyagainstitsowntribes.EventheUnitedStatesisnowputting
pressureonPakistantodomoretoplugthegapsintheporousandrugged1,350mileborder
withAfghanistan,somethingthattherelativelysmallUSandcoalitionforceshavefailedtodo
fromtheirsideofthedivide.TheterrornetworkhasstruckbacknotjustinFATAbutalsoagainst
theArmyinsidePakistanproper,withanewweapon:suicidebombers.TheArmyfacesalongwar
onthisfront.
UndergoingChange
Theconditionsthatledtotheweaknessesofthemilitarysystemarenotjustsocietalbutalsoarise
fromtherecruitmentpatternsofthePakistanArmythatdefinethenatureofitsofficerclassand
otherranks(soldiers).Traditionally,theArmywasapredominantlyPunjabiforce.InBritishIndia,
three districts: Campbellpur (now Attock), Rawalpindi, and Jhelum dominated the recruitment
flowsthathelpedIndiasendsome2.5millionsoldierstofightinWorldWarIIonbehalfofthe
BritishEmpire.TheNorthWestFrontierProvince(NWFP)graduallybegansupplyingtroopsand
officers,assettledareasPushtuntribesmenjoinedthemilitary.
Over time, with the provision of waivers for both physical and educational qualifications,
recruitmenthasbeenincreasedfromtheformerlylesswellrepresentedareas.Basedonseparate
GHQdataforsoldiersandofficers,Punjabshowsanoveralldeclineinrecruitmentofsoldiersfrom
63.86 per cent in 1991 to 43.33 in 2005, with Central Punjab outpacing Northern Punjab, the
traditionalrecruitmentground,by7,500to5,000recruitsin2005.SouthernPunjabhad1,800
recruits.TheNWFPandFATAincreasedfrom20.91percentto22.43percent,Sindhrosefrom
8.85percentto23.02percent,withruralSindhaccountingforthemajorityoftherecruits(5,095
to2,500in2005),Balochistanrosefrom0.49percentto1.52percentin2005with200Urbanto
300ruralrecruitsin2005,andAzadKashmirandtheNorthernAreasrising.from5.86percentto
9.70percent.Theinductionof4,000BaluchsoldiersintotheArmyonOctober28,2010withthe
goalofincreasingthisnumberto10,000isagoodsignofnationalintegration.
Comparing the officers commissioned into service during the period 197089 to those
commissionedbetween19902006revealsachangesintherelativeshareofdifferentpartsof
thecountry.ThePunjabrosemarginallyfrom66.46percentto66.93percent,butwithinthe
Punjab there are notable changes in the home districts of the officers shifting to the more
populousandemergingurbancentresofCentralandevenSouthernPunjab.Thisisinlinewith
rapid urbanisation trends nationwide. These bigger cities and towns are also the traditional
strongholdsofIslamistpartiesandgrowingconservatismassociatedwiththepetitbourgeoisie.
TheZiaperiod(reflectedinthestatisticsfor198089)showsasharpbulgeinallcases,asthe
Armybecameavisiblymorelucrativeandattractiveprofessionforurbanyouthandameansfor
upwardsocialmobility.

TheimportanceofthebulgeintheZiaperiodisalsounderscoredbythefactthattheofficerswho
joinedinthatdecadearenowpoisedtoriseintotheGeneralOfficercategory.Whenthecurrent
groupofseniorLieutenantGeneralsretires,mostofwhomwerecommissionedinthelate19608
andearly19705,theZiaBharti(recruits)willtakeovertherunningofthePakistanArmy.Apart
frombeinginductedintotheArmyduringthemiddleofZiasIslamistethosandofficialfostering
ofreligiousideologyanddogma,thisgroupsufferedatthehandsoftheUSandWesternEuropean
embargoofaidtoPakistanandwaslargelydeprivedoftrainingopportunitiesintheWest.Not
only was it deprived of advanced overseas training during its formative years, but this officer
cohortwasalsodeniedexposuretotheworldoutsidetilllateintheircareers,bywhichtimetheir
worldviewhadformedandinmanycasesbecomeentrenched.
ThecurrentcohortofseniorArmyleadersinPakistan,includingtheArmyChief,GeneralKayani,
representthelastgroupofofficerswhowereabletotakeadvantageofoverseastrainingintheir
early years and were exposed to wider external influences. The effects of such training and
exposurearereflectedinsomeofitsthinkingonnationalissues.
PenetrationofCivilSociety
Another visible manifestation of military domination of the civil sector during the Musharraf
periodwasthereemploymentofretiredorevenservingofficersincivilinstitutionsandinthe
hostofmilitaryownedenterprisesthatprovidesalongertermofemploymentforarmyofficers.
Eventoday,militaryofficersheadeducationandtraininginstitutionsinthecivilsector.Allthe
major civil service training establishments, for example, are now under retired army officers.
UnderMusharraf,theyalsoheadeduniversitiesandstateownedcorporations.Some1200army
officers were inducted into key civil slots during the Musharraf period. While military rule or
militarydominatedrulehassomethingtodowiththis,theroleofthecivilianrulerscannotbe
downplayed,fortheyhaveallowedthemilitaryfreeingressintotheirdomainovertheyearsand
indeedhaveelevatedthemilitarypresencetothedetrimentofthecivilsector.Theearliestmoves
byGeneralKayanitowithdrawsome300servingarmyofficersfromcivilianpositionswasagood
signofchangesinthinkingonthisfront.Butmanystillremainintheciviladministration,especially
dominatingtheMinistryofDefence.
DefendingtheHomeland
Pakistanslackofnationalcohesionontheonehandanditslocationinatoughneighbourhood
dictatesthatitshouldmaintainastrongdefenceestablishment.However,asassessmentsbythe
Armyitselfhaveshown,therearedifferentwaysofachievingsecuritywithoutmakingtheArmy
so large and burdensome that it dwarfs and stifles economic development. There are sound
militaryreasonsforreevaluatingthenature,size,andorganisationoftheArmytoo.
Today,Pakistanhasalargeconventionalarmy,taskedwithdefendingeveryinchofitsborders:a
hostileoneon theeastagainstIndiaand inthewestagainstAfghanistan,withapotentialfor
unrestontheIranianfrontier,iftheinternalinsurgencysituationinthatneighboursBalochistan
provincebecomesa crossborderissue.Internally,theArmyneedstoreorientits training and
forcestructurenotonlytocopewithexternalthreatsbutalsotocombatinternalinsurgencies,
startingwiththecurrentsituationinFATA.Itneedsspecialisedunitsandtraininginlowintensity
FourthGenerationwarfareandtoindoctrinateofficersandsoldiersbothintheprinciplesofsuch
warfare,whereideasnotweaponsalonematter.
LookingAhead

ItisimportantfortheArmytohelpcreateastablenationalpolitybysubjectingitselfinpractice
tocivilianoversightandcontrol.Itneedstoensurethatitdoesnotbecometheinstrumentof
civilian dictatorship by subjecting itself to wider parliamentary controls and oversights of its
operations.Thisshouldextendtoratificationofseniorappointmentsoftheservicechiefs,the
proposedregionalcommanders,andtheChairmanoftheJCSC.Itmustalsobepreparedtoexpose
moreofitsexpendituredetailstoscrutinybygovernmentandparliament.
Onitsside,civiliangovernmentneedstoensurethatitfollowstheconstitutionfullyanddoesnot
involvethemilitaryinpoliticaldisputes.Aspastexperienceshows,whenpoliticiansruntothe
ArmyChiefforhelp,itupsetsthebalanceoftheciviliansystemofgovernmentandeventually
bringstheArmyintopower.
While the military has an advantage over the civil in employing force, it has a comparative
disadvantageinbuildingpoliticalloyaltyfromacivilianbase.Thereasonistheirlackofabilityto
fosterandsustainopendebateanddiscussiononkeyissues.Thecultureisstilllargelytopdown.
Fewmilitaryregimeshavesucceededinconstructingmasspolitical;whentheytried,theyhad
difficulty in adjusting to open participation by the masses. The military system of orders and
obediencedoesnoteasilyadjusttothenoiseofdemocracyanddissent.ThePakistaniexperience
certainlysupportstheseviews,althoughsuccessivemilitaryleaders,includingMusharraf,have
feltthattheycanbuckthistrend.
Inthefaceofhostility,Pakistansdefenceliesinasmaller,highlymobile,andpowerfulmilitary,
relying on a nuclear and conventional weapons system, and the capability of delivering a
damagingriposte.Butanevenbetterdefenceliesincreatingapowerful,pluralisticpolityresiding
inastrongeconomy,builtonasocietythatvalueseducationandthewelfareofitspopulation.
TheImmediateChallenges
In the near term, the Army Chief, General Kayani, and his commanders will face a number of
challenges,notleastofwhichistheconstanttussleforpoweratthecentrebetweenthecoalition
governmentheadedbyPresidentAsifAliZardariandthemainoppositionofMr.Sharif.Hismain
focus will remain the counterinsurgency campaign and its followup in the frontier badlands
borderingAfghanistanandinSwat.Byallaccountshehaspressedhiscolleaguestomovequickly
topreparethelogisticalgroundforantiterroroperationsinthoseareas.Butitwillbeimportant
forhimtoallowtheciviliangovernmenttomakethepoliticaldecisionsontheuseoftheArmyin
thatmodeandtodefinethecollaborationwiththeAfghanandUnitedStatesgovernments.This
willbeahardtransitionforanarmythathasbeenusedtoindependentlyworkingwithitsforeign
partnersunderMusharraf.EquallyimportantwillbetheneedforKayanitorecognisewhatthe
US under the thinking General David Petraeus has come to learn the hard way in Iraq that
counterinsurgency operations are 90 per cent political and economic and only 10 per cent
military.
Ultimately,counterinsurgencycampaignsarewonbystrongpolicingandtheisolationofmilitants
fromthepopulationbygoodgovernanceandprotectionfromwithincommunitiesbystrongand
dedicatedpoliceforces.Themilitarycanonlyaddressthesymptomsnotthecausesofinsurgency.
Norisitequippedforcounterterrorism.Theciviliangovernmentfailedinitsfirstfewyearstoset
up an adequate National Counter Terrorism Authority. It will need to make up for lost time.
Moreover,astrongcivilmilitarypartnershipwillbeneededforpostmilitaryoperationsinFATA
andSwatandMalakand.Noneisevidentasyet.

WithouttheArmyssupport,giventhecurrentpowerbalanceinPakistan,theciviliangovernment
willnotbeabletomovequicklyonresolvingissueswithadominantandpotentiallyhegemonic
Indiatotheeast.Kayanirecognisestheneedforpeaceandopenbordersbutheisalsoawarethat
hecannotmovetoofaraheadofthegeneralpublicsentiment.Indiatoowillneedtoshowan
openmindednessthathasbeenabsentinitspublicdiscourseonKashmiroropenborders.For
many in Pakistan, there is deepseated fear of India swamping Pakistan economically and
culturally.However,Kayaniappearstobeamanofinnerconfidence,hencethequietthatmarks
his demeanour. Unlike Musharrafs onestep forward, twosteps back approach on key issues
relatingtoIndia,hecouldwellleapfroghistorybytakingthoseboldstepsforwardthatmatter
mostandsticktothem.Thiswouldhelptheciviliangovernmentgainconfidenceindealingwith
Indiaandopeningbordersinduecourse.
Withaciviliangovernmentinchargeagain,theroleofthe181willneedtobetempered.The
ArmyHighCommandwillwanttofavourgreateroversightofthe181bythecivilauthorityand
evenparliament,withtheinvolvementofthemilitary.IfKayanisstudiedsilenceintheepisode
involvingthebrowbeatinginArmyHouseinMarch2007andsubsequentarbitraryremovalofthe
formerChiefJusticebyMusharrafisanyindication,hecouldendupfavouringareducedpolitical
roleoftheISI,allowingittoconcentrateonimportantCounterintelligenceOperations.Hismain
focusthoughwillbereturningtheArmytoitsprofessionalrootsandkeepingitoutofpolitics.
Asstatedearlier,thecompositionofthePakistanArmytodaybetterrepresentsthesocietyin
whichitoperatesthantheArmyatindependence.Itisalsomoreprofessionalandbettertrained
thaneverbefore.Asitexpandsitsmembershipintootherlessrepresentedareasandprovinces,
itcanbecomeatruenationalarmyandregainitspositionoftrustanddevotion.Ifitdoesnot,and
ifthecivilianpoliticiansalsofailtopayheedtothechangesaroundthem,thentherisingtideof
conservatismmaybetransformedintoaradicalIslamistwavethatwillsweepbothcivilsociety
andthePakistanArmy,withresultsthatareentirelypredictableandnotwhatPakistannorits
neighboursandfriends desire.Thelongerthecountryremainsunder militarydomination,the
greaterthechanceofstatefailure.
The latest recruitment statistics indicate that Pakistans Army today is no longer the same
homogeneousforceofthepastwithitslimitedrecruitmentbase.Itnowreflectsabroaderrange
ofthecountrysrapidlyurbanisingpopulation.Theemergenceofnewmediaandpublicdiscourse
hasalsochallengedthemilitarysabilitytocontrollifeinthecountrywithanironhand.
WhiletheArmyremainsaconservativeinstitutionatheart,itisnotyetabreedinggroundfor
largenumbersofradicalIslamiststhatmanyfear.IslamthoughremainsavisibleforceinPakistani
societyandintheArmytoday.KeepingtheIslamistsatbayremainsadauntingtaskbutitneed
notbeusedonlyasascaryscenariotogainWesternsupport.AprogressivePakistanneedsto
provideopportunitiesforitscitizenstoleadtheirliveswithoutfearoftheradicalforcesofIslam
thatarevyingforpowertoday.
Moreimportant,giventhedominantroleoftheArmyinPakistanspolity,ifPakistanistomature,
thrive,andsurviveasasuccessfulstateandanation,theArmyneedstotakeabackseatandallow
thepoliticiansandcivilsocietytomaketheirmistakesandallowtheothercriticallyimportant
elementsofsociety:media,businesses,professionals,lawyers,etc.,tofunctionunfettered.These
are the challenges that both the Army and civil society in Pakistan must surmount through a
returt1todemocraticnormssothattheycanfulfilltheirpromisestothecountryandwinthelong
waragainstinsurgentsandterrorists.