G.R. No.

163766

June 22, 2006

1927" and that the property is the subject of CENRO Case

No. 520(97) entitled Perpetua San Jose v. Almario Cruz. On
the other hand, the LRA, in its September 21, 1999

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

Report,9 recommended the exclusion of Lot No. 3138-B on

vs.

the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for

CANDY MAKER, INC., as represented by its President,

public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable.

ONG YEE SEE,* Respondent

On September 30, 1999, the Laguna Lake Development

DECISION

Authority (LLDA) approved Resolution No. 113, Series of

1993, providing that untitled shoreland areas may be leased

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

subject to conditions enumerated therein.

At bar is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeking to set aside the May 21, 2004 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73287, which
affirmed in toto the October 12, 2001 Decision 2 of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Taytay, Rizal in Land
Registration Case No. 99-0031 declaring respondent the
owner of the parcels of land designated as Lots 3138-A and
3138-B in Plan CSD. 04-018302, Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.

Lot No. 3138 Cad. 688 of the Cainta-Taytay Cadastre, a

parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation
of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the Laguna de
Bay, and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan
Floodway, and on the southeast by a legal easement.
April

1,

1998,

Geodetic

Engineer

Potenciano

H.

Fernandez, prepared and signed a Subdivision Plan of the

property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was subdivided
into two lots: Lot No. 3138-A with an area of 10,971 square
meters, and Lot No. 3138-B with an area of 239 square
meters.3 The technical description of Lot No. 3138 was also
prepared by Fernandez, and was approved by the Regional
Technical Director of the Bureau of Lands on April 14,
1998.4

3138, alleging therein that:

1. x x x the applicant is the President of CANDYMAKER[,]
INC. and registered owner of a parcel of land located at
Panghulo Brgy. San Juan, Taytay, Rizal with an area of TEN
square meters and as fully described and bounded under
Lot 3138-A plan CSD-04-018302[,] copy of which and the
corresponding technical descriptions are hereto attached to
form parts hereof;
xxxx
8. That for Lot 3138-A the applicant hereby prays for the
benefit granted under the Land Registration Act and/or
under the benefits provided for by P.D. No. 1529, as
applicant and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, public, continuous, and peaceful occupation and
possession of the said land since time immemorial in [the]
concept of true owners and [adverse] to the whole world; x x
x11
On March 27, 2000, the MTC issued an Order 12 admitting

On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all

surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Candy Maker, Inc.5 The buyer declared Lot No. 3138 for
taxation purposes in 1999 under Tax Declaration Nos. 00418929, 004-18930 and 004-18931.6

with

the

MTC

of

Taytay,

the Amended Application and resetting the initial hearing to

June 23, 2000. However, upon the requests of the LRA for
the timely publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
Official Gazette,13 the court moved the hearing date to
September 22, 2000,14 then on January 26, 2001 15 and
until finally, to June 15, 2001.16

On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an

application

15, 1999 for the confirmation of its alleged title on Lot No.

THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (10,971)

Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase

On

The applicant filed its Amended Application 10 on December

Rizal,

for

the

registration of its alleged title over Lot No. 3138-A and Lot
No. 3138-B under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
Acting thereon, the MTC issued an Order 7 on June 18, 1999
directing the applicant to cause the publication of the notice
of initial hearing and for the Deputy Sheriff to post the
same. The Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) and the Directors of the Land Management Bureau
(LMB) and Forest Management Bureau (FMB) were also
instructed to submit their respective reports on the status
of the parcels of land before the initial hearing scheduled on
October 29, 1999.
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO) of Antipolo City filed on August 18, 1999 his
Report8 declaring that "[t]he land falls within the Alienable
and Disposable Zone, under Land Classification Project No.
5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11,

On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA

filed its Opposition17 to the Amended Application in which it
alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration
may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered
part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its
jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as
amended. According to the LLDA, the projection of Lot No.
3138-A, Cad-688-D Csd-04-018302 in its topographic map
based

on the

Memorandum18 of Engineer

Christopher

Pedrezuela of the Engineering and Construction Division of

the

LLDA

indicated

that

it

is

"located

below

the

reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to

datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water" and under
Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the property is a public
land which forms part of the bed of the Laguna Lake. This
Memorandum was appended to the application.
At the hearing conducted on August 31, 2001, the applicant
marked in evidence the complementary copies of the Official

Gazette and the Peoples Tonight as Exhibits "E-1" and "F-

elevation of the lake water. A representative of the applicant

1," respectively.19

witnessed the survey. The team found that the lot is below
the prescribed elevation of 12.50 m. and thus part of the

Except as to the LLDA and the Office of the Solicitor General

bed of the lake; as such, it could not be titled to the

(OSG), which was represented by the duly deputized

applicant. The team also reported that the property is

provincial prosecutor,20 the court, upon motion of the

adjacent to the highway from the Manggahan Floodway to

applicant, issued an Order of general default.

Angono, Rizal. The LLDA moved that the application be

21

withdrawn, appending thereto a copy of the Survey Report.47

The

applicant

presented

as

witnesses

its

Treasurer,
The LLDA did not offer any testimonial and documentary

Fernando Co Siy, and Antonio Cruz, one of the vendees.

evidence and agreed to submit the case for decision based

Cruz

testified

property,

22

that

his

grandparents

owned

the

on its Opposition.

and after their demise, his parents, the spouses

Apolonio Cruz and Aquilina Atanacio Cruz, inherited the

On October 12, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision granting

lot;23 he and his father had cultivated the property since

the application for registration over the lots. The dispositive

1937, planting palay during the rainy season and vegetables

portion of the decision reads:

during the dry season; his father paid the realty taxes on
the property,24 and he (Cruz) continued paying the taxes

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the court hereby

after his fathers death.25 Cruz insisted that he was the

rendered judgment confirming title of the applicants over

rightful claimant and owner of the property.

the real property denominated as Lot 3138-A Csd-04018302 of Cad-688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre; Lot 3138-B

Sometime in the 1980s, Apolonio Cruz executed an

Csd-04-018302 of Cad 688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.48

extrajudicial deed of partition in which the property was

adjudicated to Antonio Cruz and his sisters, Felisa and

On appeal to the CA, the petitioner contended that the MTC

Eladia, to the exclusion of their five (5) other siblings who

did

were given other properties as their shares.

not

acquire

jurisdiction

over

the

application for

He did not

registration since the actual copies of the Official Gazette

know why his ancestors failed to have the property titled

(O.G.) where the notice of hearing was published were not

under the Torrens system of registration.27 He left the

adduced in evidence; the applicant likewise failed to

Philippines and stayed in Saudi Arabia from 1973 to

establish exclusive ownership over the subject property in

1983.

26

Aside from this, he hired the services of an

the manner prescribed by law. The petitioner argued further

"upahan" to cultivate the property. 29 The property is about 3

that the requirements of Section 23, par. 1 of P.D. No.

kilometers from the Laguna de Bay, and is usually flooded

1529,

when it rains.30

that failure to observe such requirements has a fatal effect

28

49

as amended, are mandatory and jurisdictional, and

on the whole proceedings. Citing Republic of the Philippines

Fernando Co Siy testified that the applicant acquired Lot

v. Court of Appeals50 and Register of Deeds of Malabon v.

No. 3138 from siblings Antonio, Eladia and Felisa, 31 who

RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170, 51 the Republic averred that a

had possessed it since 1945;32 that after paying the real

mere certificate of publication is inadequate proof of the

estate taxes due thereon,33 it caused the survey of the

jurisdictional fact of publication because the actual copies

lot;34 that possession thereof has been peaceful 35 and none

of the O.G. must be presented at the initial hearing of the

of the former owners claims any right against it; neither the

case. Moreover, witnesses were not presented to prove

applicant

specific

36

nor

its

predecessors-in-interest

received

acts

to

show

that

the

applicant

and

his

information from any government agency that the lot is a

predecessors-in-interest have been in exclusive, open,

public land;37 the subject lot is 3 kms. away from Laguna de

continuous, and adverse possession of the subject lots in

Bay,

the

the concept of the owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in

property is habitable40 and was utilized as a riceland at the

accordance with Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529. 52 It noted

time it was sold by the former owners;

that the testimonies of the applicants witnesses are more of

38

above its elevation and that of the nearby road;

41

39

and that he was

aware that a legal easement is affecting the lot and is willing

conclusions

to annotate it in the land title.

ownership. Other than the general statement that they

42

of

law

rather

than

factual

evidence

of

planted rice and vegetables on the subject lots, their

On cross-examination by the LLDA counsel, Siy admitted
that his knowledge as to the distance of the lot with respect
to the Laguna de Bay came from "somebody residing in
Taytay" and also from an adjacent owner of the lot; 43 that
the lot is submerged in water since there is no land fill
yet;

44

and that no improvements had been introduced to the

property.

possession could properly be characterized as mere casual

cultivation since they failed to account for its exclusive
utilization since 1945 or earlier. After stressing that tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, it
concluded that the subject lots rightfully belong to the State
under the Regalian doctrine.53

45

The applicant averred in its Appellees Brief54 that it had

The LLDA moved for a joint ocular inspection of the parcels
of land in order to determine its exact elevation. 46 On
September 14, 2001, a Survey Team of the Engineering and
Construction Division of the LLDA, composed of Ramon D.
Magalonga, Virgilio M. Polanco, and Renato Q. Medenilla,
conducted an actual ground survey of the property. The
team used a total station and digital survey instrument to
measure the elevation of the ground in reference to the

marked in evidence the actual copy of the O.G. where the

notice of initial hearing was published; in fact, the MTC
Decision stated that the copy of the O.G. containing the
notice was referred to as Exhibit "E-1." Moreover, Sec. 14,
par. 1 of P.D. 1529 is inapplicable since it speaks of
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. Instead, par. 4 of the same
section55 should govern because the subject parcels of land

are lands of private ownership, having being acquired

Petitioner maintains that respondent failed to present

through purchase from its predecessors-in-interest, who, in

incontrovertible evidence to warrant the registration of the

turn, inherited the same from their parents. It pointed out

property in its name as owner. The testimonies of the two

that there were no adverse claims of interest or right by

witnesses only proved that the possession of the land may

other private persons and even government agencies like the

be characterized as mere casual cultivation; they failed to

Province of Rizal. Lastly, while tax declarations and tax

prove that its predecessors occupied the land openly,

receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are

continuously, exclusively, notoriously and adversely in the

nonetheless prima facie evidence of possession.

concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

On May 21, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Engineers

which dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the

Survey Report and the Laguna de Bay Shoreland Survey

Decision of the MTC,56 holding that the copy of the O.G.,

have no probative value because they were neither offered

where the notice was published, was marked as Exhibit "E-

nor admitted in evidence by the MTC. It points out that

1" during the initial hearing. On the issue of ownership over

petitioner failed to invoke these reports in the appellate

the subject lots, the CA upheld the applicants claim that

court.

the parcels of land were alienable and not part of the public
domain, and that it had adduced preponderant evidence to

It was only when the petition was filed with this Court that

prove that its predecessors had been tilling the land since

the respondent learned of its existence. Petitioners reliance

1937, during which palay and vegetables were planted. In

on the reports/survey is merely an afterthought. The case of

fact, before the lots were purchased, the applicant verified

Bernardo v. Tiamson is irrelevant because the factual issues

their ownership with the assessors office, and thereafter

are different from those of this case.

caused the property to be surveyed; after the lots were

acquired in 1999 and a survey was caused by the applicant,
no adverse claims were filed by third persons. Further, the
CA ruled that tax declarations or tax receipts are good
indicia of possession in the concept of the owner, which
constitute at least positive and strong indication that the
taxpayer concerned has made a claim either to the title or to
the possession of the property.

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation 62 with

this Court, appending thereto the report 63 conducted by the
survey team of the LLDA Engineering and Construction
Division on April 12, 2005. It stated that the 10,971 sq m
property subject of the case is below the 12.5 elevation, and
that the profile distance of the property from the actual lake
waters is about 900 m. to 1 km.

The Republic, now petitioner, filed the instant Petition for

Review on the following issues:

The issues in this case are the following: (1) whether the
MTC had jurisdiction over the amended application; (2)
whether the property subject of the amended application is

A.

alienable and disposable property of the State, and, if so, (3)

whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of

WHETHER

THE

LAND

IN

QUESTION

MAYBE

THE

evidence to prove its ownership over the property under

SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION.

Section 14 of P.D. 1529.

B.

The petition is meritorious.

WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION

On the first issue, we find and so rule that the MTC

OVER

acquired jurisdiction over respondents application for

THE RES CONSIDERING

ITS

INALIENABLE

CHARACTER.

registration since a copy of the O.G. containing the notice of

hearing was marked and adduced in evidence as Exhibit "E1." The representative of the OSG was present during the

C.

hearing and interposed his objection thereto.

WHETHER

THE

AFFIRMING

COURT

THE

TRIAL

OF

APPEALS

COURTS

ERRED

FINDING

IN

THAT

On the second and third issues, we find and so rule that the

LEGAL

property subject of this application was alienable and

REQUIREMENTS ON POSSESSION AS MANDATED BY

disposable public agricultural land until July 18, 1966.

SECTION 14 OF P.D. NO. 1529.57

However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses

RESPONDENT

COMPLIED

WITH

THE

registerable title over the property.

Petitioner asserts that the Engineers Survey Report

58

and

the Laguna de Bay Shoreland Survey 59 both show that Lot

Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by

No. 3138-A is located below the reglementary lake elevation,

R.A. No. 1942, reads:

hence, forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It insists that the
property belongs to the public domain as classified under

Section

Article 502 of the Civil Code.60 Citing the ruling of this

Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or

48.

The

following

described

citizens

of

the

Court in Bernardo v. Tiamson, 61 petitioner avers that the

claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but

subject lot is incapable of private appropriation since it is a

whose titles have not been perfected or completed, nay apply

public land owned by the State under the Regalian doctrine.

to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land

On this premise, petitioner avers that the MTC did not

is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance

acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter, and as a

of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration

consequence, its decision is null and void.

Act, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors

No public land can be acquired by private persons without

in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

any grant from the government, whether express or implied.

notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands

It is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the

of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition

State.68 The rationale for the period "since time immemorial

of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding

or since June 12, 1945" lies in the presumption that the

the filing of the application for confirmation of title except

land applied for pertains to the State, and that the

when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be

occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon only by

conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions

virtue of their imperfect title as continuous, open and

essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a

notorious possession.

certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

A possessor of real property may acquire ownership thereof
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by

through acquisitive prescription. In Alba Vda. de Raz v.

substituting the phrase "for at least thirty years" with "since

Court of Appeals,69 the Court declared that:

June 12, 1945;" thus:

x x x [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),

(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property

Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in

are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of

the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable

ten years, this provision of law must be read in conjunction

and disposable lands of the public domain which have been

with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that x x

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession,

x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires

and occupation by the applicant himself or through his

possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed

predecessor-in-interest,

by law. Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not

under

bona

fide

claim

of

acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of

ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the

was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title

Property Registration Decree, provides:

and good faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in

the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court]
an application for registration of title to land, whether

the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title
when the adverse claimant came into possession of the

personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

property through one of the recognized modes of acquisition

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-

owner or could not transmit any right.70

in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier
(emphasis supplied).
Applicants

for

confirmation

of

imperfect

title

must,

the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public

domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

64

appearing to be clearly within private ownership are

presumed to belong to the State. The presumption is that
lands of whatever classification belong to the State. Unless
65

public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable

or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains
part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public
domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible
appropriation

registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively

establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or

and

acquisitive

prescription.

Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how

long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title.66 The statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural lands does not operate against the State unless
the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same
after a claim of ownership for the required number of years
to constitute a grant from the State.67

Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. 71 Until

then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply. A certification of the Community Environment and
Natural

Resources

Officer

in

the

Department

of

Environment and Natural Resources stating that the land

subject of an application is found to be within the alienable
and disposable site per a land classification project map is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise

private

To prove that the land subject of an application for

administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of

therefore, prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of

of

of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the

subject of the application.72

The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate the claim over the land. 73Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise
over his own property.74 A mere casual cultivation of
portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
sufficient basis for a claim of ownership; such possession is
not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the State.75
In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property
is alienable agricultural land. Romeo Cadano of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Antipolo Rizal, certified that the property "falls within the
Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land Classification
Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on

March 11, 1927."76 However, under R.A. No. 4850 which was

As gleaned from the Survey Report of Magalonga, Polanco

approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and below the

and Medenilla of the LLDA based on the ocular inspection

maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are

dated September 14, 2001 as well as the Memorandum of

public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Such

Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela, the property is located

lands denominated as lakeshore areas are linear strips of

below the reglementary level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the

open space designed to separate incompatible element or

bed of the Laguna de Bay, and, as such, is public land.

uses, or to control pollution/nuisance, and for identifying

Although the Report and Memorandum were not offered as

and defining development areas or zone. Such areas of the

evidence in the MTC, the respondent admitted in its

lake with an approximate total area of 14,000 hectares form

Manifestation in this Court that the property is situated

a strip of the lakebed along its shores alternately submerged

below

or exposed by the annual rising and lowering of the lake

Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla, the same survey team

water. They have environmental ecological significance and

who conducted an ocular inspection of the property on April

actual potential economic benefits.

12, 2005, which thus confirmed the September 14, 2001

the

12.50

elevation

based

on

the

survey

of

survey report. This is a judicial admission in the course of

Under Section 1 of the law, the national policy of the State is

judicial proceedings which is binding on it.77

to promote and accelerate the development and balanced

growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding

Under

R.A.

No.

4850

provinces, cities and towns within the context of the

registerable

national and regional plans and policies for social and

effectivity

economic development and to carry out the development of

respondent failed to adduce proof that its predecessors-in-

the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate

interest had acquired registerable title over the property

provisions for environmental management and control,

before July 18, 1966:

rights
of

the

and

the

issuances

acquired

by

law

recognized.

are

occupants

of

LLDA,

before

the

However,

the

preservation of the quality of human life and ecological

systems,

and

the

prevention

of

undue

ecological

disturbances, deterioration and pollution.

First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired

ownership of the property, and even failed to
mention the

names of his grandparents. He

The rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs

likewise

failed

to

present

his

fathers

death

and the lakeshore town of Laguna de Bay, combined with

certificate to support his claim that the latter died

current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-

in 1980. There is likewise no evidence when his

industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like,

mother died.

created deep concern on the part of the Government and

the general public over the environmental impact of such

Second. Cruz also failed to adduce in evidence the

development, on the water quality and ecology of the lake

extrajudicial partition allegedly executed by his

and its related river systems. The inflow of polluted water

parents in 1980 where the property was supposedly

from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural

deeded to him and his sisters, Felisa and Eladia, to

wastes from developed areas around the lake and the

the exclusion of their five siblings.

increasing urbanization have induced the deterioration of

the lake, and that water quality studies have shown that the
lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check
the same. The floods in the Metropolitan Manila area and
the lakeshore towns are also influenced by the hydraulic
system of the Laguna de Bay, and any scheme of controlling
the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river
systems.

Third. Cruz claimed that he and his parents

cultivated the property and planted palay and
vegetables, and that they had been paying the
realty taxes over the property before his parents
died. However, no tax declarations under the names
of the spouses Apolonio Cruz and/or Eladia Cruz
and his siblings were presented, or realty tax
receipts evidencing payment of such taxes. Indeed,

This prompted then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue

while

on October 17, 1978 P.D. 813 amending Rep. Act No. 4850.

themselves do not convincingly prove title to the

Under Section 6 of the law, the LLDA is empowered to issue

land,78 these are good indicia of possession in the

such rules and regulations as may be necessary to

concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind

effectively carry out the policies and programs therein

would pay taxes for a property that is not in his

provided including the policies and projects of the LLDA,

actual or, at least, constructive possession. 79 While

subject

tax

to

the

approval

of

the

National

Economic

Development Authority.

tax

receipts

receipts

incontrovertible

and

and

tax

payment

declarations

evidence

of

receipts

are

not

ownership,

they

constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a

In 1996, the
Resolution

No.

Board
113,

of Directors
series

of

of LLDA

1996

relating

approved
to

claim of title over the property, particularly when

the

accompanied by proof of actual possession of

Environmental Uses Fee Systems and Approval of the Work

property.80 The voluntary declaration of a piece of

and Financial Plan for its operationalization in the Laguna

property for taxation purposes not only manifests

de Bay Basin. Section 5 of the Resolution provides that the

ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the

LLDA as a matter of policy is to maintain all shoreland areas

property, but also announces an adverse claim

lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone in

against the State and all other interested parties

consonance with the LLDA policies, plans programs for the

with an intention to contribute needed revenues to

improvement of the water quality and pollution and

the government. Such an act strengthens ones

conservation of the water resources of the Laguna de Bay.

bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.81

Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001,

Antonio Cruz declared that he was "74 years

presumptive grant from the state.In light of the foregoing,

the petition of the Republic of the Philippines is granted

old."82 He must have been born in 1927, and was

thus merely 10 years old in 1937. It is incredible
that, at that age, he was already cultivating the
property with his father. Moreover, no evidence was
presented to prove how many cavans of palay were

[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE

planted on the property, as well as the extent of

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

such cultivation, in order to support the claim of

CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

possession with a bona fide claim of ownership.

Fifth. Cruz testified that he hired a worker
"upahan" to help him cultivate the property. He,
however, failed to state the name of the worker or to

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

even present him as witness for the respondent.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 73278 is SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court of
Taytay, Rizal is DIRECTED to dismiss the application for
registration of respondent Candymaker, Inc. in Land
Registration Case No. 99-0031. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the
Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate
court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26,
1999, and the 7thMunicipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)[3] of
Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which
granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of
Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER,

INC.
(GR.NO. 163766, June. 22, 2006)
Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all
surnamed Cruz, executed aDeed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located belowthe
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters
away the Laguna de Bay.Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant,
filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for
registration of its alleged title over the lot.
The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within
the alienable anddisposable zone. On the otherhand, the
Land Registration Authority recommended theexclusion of
lot no. 3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and
intended forpublic use, hence, inalienable and indisposable.
On July 2001, the Republic of the
Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition
which alleged that the lot subject of theapplication for
registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is
considered part
of the Laguna Lake Bed, a public land within, its
jurisdiction.
Issue
:Whether the property subject of the amended application is
alienable anddisposable property of the State, and if so,
whether respondent adduced the requisite
quantum of evidence to prove its ownership over the
property?
Held:
The property subject of this application was alienable and
disposable publicagricultural land. However, respondent
failed to prove that it possesses registrable titleover the
property. The statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural lands doesnot operate against the statute
unless the occupant proves possession and occupationof
the same after a claim of ownership for the required number
of years to constitute agrant from the State.A mere casual
cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does
notconstitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership, such
possession is not exclusive andnotorious as to give rise to

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal

age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC
of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a
parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D,
Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area
of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial
confirmation

of

respondents

imperfect

title

over

the

aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing
on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of
Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal
opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the
court issued an order of general default against the whole
world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the
government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel
of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax
Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.[4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his
rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made
by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.
[5]

Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of

absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon

started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel
Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such
as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to
existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.
At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of

judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest

Section

14

of

the

Property

Registration

Decree,

have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner

governing original registration proceedings, bears close

without any objection from any private person or even the

examination. It expressly provides:

government until she filed her application for registration.

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the

in the proper Court of First Instance an application for

public prosecutor manifested that the government did not

registration of title to land, whether personally or through

intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles,

their duly authorized representatives:

as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to

appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,

(1) those who by themselves or through their

1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the

predecessors-in-interest have been in

subject parcel be brought under the operation of the

open,

Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.)

notorious possession and occupation of

No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed

alienable and disposable lands of the

in the name of Naguit.[6]

public domain under a bona fide claim

continuous,

exclusive

and

of ownership since June 12, 1945, or

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the

earlier.

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for

reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over

was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15,

private lands by prescription under the

1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director

provisions of existing laws.

Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources, Region VI.[7] However, the court denied
the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February
18, 1998.[8]

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the

order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On
February

....

26,

1999,

the

RTC

rendered

its

decision,

dismissing the appeal.[9]

application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that

the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous,

exclusive

and

notorious

possession

and

occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the

fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a
decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and
affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable

and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not
borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure

12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent

question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4,

phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally

2000.[10]

speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words

or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals

contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding

not those distantly or remotely located. [13] Ad proximum

antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

that there is no need for the governments prior release of

the subject lot from the public domain before it can be

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would

considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of

result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative

P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of

amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view,

Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required

that all lands of the public domain which were not declared

period.[11]

alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be

susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of

Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is

unchallenged

possession

by

the

occupant.

Such

necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually

Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable

inoperative and even precludes the government from giving

and disposable before the applicants possession under

it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural

a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of

the situation would even be aggravated considering that

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.

Intermediate Appellate Court[12] in arguing that the property

before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.

which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must

first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section

alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have

14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be

maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,

registered as already alienable and disposable at the time

1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration

the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at

Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or

the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it

disposable, the OSG argues.

proper to release the property for alienation or disposition,

the presumption is that the government is still reserving the

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own

ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse

any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have

possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has

not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of

already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is

First Instance of the province where the land is located for

in this case, then there is already an intention on the part

confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate

of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the

of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

property.
xxx xxx xxx
This reading aligns conformably with our holding
in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors

that to prove that the land subject of an application for

in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the

notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands

existence of a positive act of the government such as a

of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition

presidential

an

of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding

administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of

the filing of the application for confirmation of title except

Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. [15] In

when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be

that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR

conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions

as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court

essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a

concluded

certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

proclamation

that

compounded

the

by

the

or

an

alienable

executive

status

established

fact

of

order;

the

that

land,
therein

respondents had occupied the land even before 1927,

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in

sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said

1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the

property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that

right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public

the subject property was released and certified as within

domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this

alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[16]

period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that

the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of

thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public

Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted that while the claimant

Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,

had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that

which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This

the lands in question were classified as alienable and

new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the

disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not

Property Registration Decree.

succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application

in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared

Indeed, there are no material differences between

alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the

Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and

application was made years after the property had been

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the

certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling

Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public

does not apply.

domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the

term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It

A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as

must be noted though that the Constitution declares that

those which form part of a reservation for provincial park

alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to

purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into

agricultural

ownership.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the

[20]

It is elementary in the law governing natural

resources that forest land cannot be owned by private

lands.[24] Clearly,

the

subject

lands

under

Property Registration Decree are of the same type.

persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,[21] forest land

is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree

lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such

and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application

lands are reclassified and considered disposable and

for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,

alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the property in question was

possession over which commenced only after June 12,

undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence,

1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property

the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the

Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the

Court of Appeals.[23]

application of those who have acquired ownership of private

lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

It must be noted that the present case was decided by

the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the

Prescription

is

one

of

the

modes

of

acquiring

Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original

ownership under the Civil Code.[25] There is a consistent

registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The

jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable

right to file the application for registration derives from

public land may be converted into private property by

a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945

reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at

or earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous,

least thirty (30) years.[26] With such conversion, such

exclusive

property may now fall within the contemplation of private

and

notorious

possession

of

alienable

and

disposable lands of the public domain.

lands

under

Section

14(2),

and

thus

susceptible

to

registration by those who have acquired ownership through

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, which reads:

prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public

land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and

such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,

then the possessor may have the right to register the land
by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it
having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years
old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There
is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by
the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept
of owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to
be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim
of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was
declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to
apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by
her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.
The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the
Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower
courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established
through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at
the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed

revenues

strengthens
ownership.

to

the

ones bona

Government.

fide claim

of

Such

an

acquisition

act
of

[28]

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel

of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or
for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of
doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be
properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
That she has been in possession of the land in the concept
of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any
opposition from any private person and the government
itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and
deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT

G. R. No.144057January 17, 2005
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
C o r a z o n N a g u i t fi l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r r e g i s t r a t i
o n o f t i t l e w h i c h s e e k s j u d i c i a l confirmation
of
her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It
was allegedthat Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest
have occupied the land openly and in theconcept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the
governmentuntil she filed her application for registration. The
MCTC rendered a decision confirmingthe title in the name of
Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing
his formal opposition to the petition.The Solicitor General, representing
the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motionfor reconsideration on
the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous
andexclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit
could not have maintained a
bonafide
claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as alienable and
disposableonly on October 15, 1980. The alienable and
disposable character of the land shouldhave already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the
Property RegistrationDecree that the subject land be first classified
as alienable and disposable beforethe applicants possession under a
bona fide
claim of ownership could even start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requi res t hat t he prope
r t y s o u g h t t o b e r e g i s t e r e d a s already alienable
and disposable at t he time t he application for
registration of title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that
the subject propertyis alienable and disposable; (2)
t hat t he applicants and t heir predecessor-ininteresthave been in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession and occupation, and; (3) thatthe possession is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.There must be a
positive act of the government through a statute or proclamationstating
the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property,thus, declaring the land as
alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none,it
is presumed that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property andthe possession of the land no
matter how long would not ripen into ownership
throughacquisitive prescription.To follow the Solicitor Generals
argument in the construction of Section 14 (1)would render
the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that
alllands of public domain which were not declared
as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945
would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter
the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In
effect,
it
precludes
the
government
frome n f o r c i n g t h e s a i d p r o v i s i o n a s i t d e
cides to reclassify lands as alienable a
n d disposable.The land in question was found to be cocal in
nature, it having been planted withcoconut trees now over
fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms
itscer tifi cation
in
1980
as
alienable,
hence
agr icultural. There is no impediment to t he application
of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right
toapply for registration owing to the continuous possession
by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF
LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO,

AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA TANCINCO

containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND

IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.

FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453)

SQUARE METERS. ...

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Lot

3-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan

Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

respondent

Court

of

Appeals

(now

line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on

the S., along line 3-4, by Meycauayan

Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII,

River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1

which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are

of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by

accretion to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title

property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-

No. 89709 and ordered their registration in the names of the

111877), and on the NW., along line 6-1,

private respondents.

by property of Joaquina Santiago. ...

containing an area of ONE THOUSAND

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes,

NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985)

Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.

SQUARE METERS. ...

Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio
Meycauayan,

Meycauayan,

Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along

Intermediate

Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First

Ubihan,

of

along line 1-2, by property of Mariano

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of

the

Municipality

Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE.,

Bulacan

bordering

on

the

Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C.

Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a
written opposition to the application for registration.

On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an

application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their
fishpond property and particularly described as follows: t.
hqw

On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial

withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to
Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation
of the Commissioner appointed by the Court.

Lot

1-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1

A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan

Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of
Ubihan,

Municipality

of

Meycauayan,

Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE.,

along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by
Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines
4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the NE.,
along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina
Santiago; on the E., NE., and NW., along
lines 10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano
Tancinco

(Lot

2,

Psu-111877).

...

containing an area of THIRTY THREE

THOUSAND

NINE

HUNDRED

THIRTY

SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...

Lot

2-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of

Municipality

and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision
granting the application on the finding that the lands in
question

are

accretions

to

the

private

respondents'

fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2
of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are accretions
to the land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 89709 of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of
said property. The Court, therefore, orders
the registration of lots 1 & 2 situated in
the barrio of Ubihan, municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and
more particularly described in plan Psu131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying

A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan

Ubihan,

On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the

of

Meycauayan,

Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E.,

along line 1-2, by property of Rafael
Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by
Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line
3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and on
the N., along line 4-1, by property of
Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). ...

technical descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in

favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married to
Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662
Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.;
Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex
Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila,
Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial,
married to Juan Imperial, residing at
Pasay Road, Dasmarias Village, Makati,
Rizal; and Mario C. Tancinco, married to
Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress

St., Dasmarias Village, Makati, Rizal, all

The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence

of legal age, all Filipino citizens.

establishes the fact of accretion without human intervention

because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion

On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the

was complete.

respondent Court of Appeals.

We agree with the petitioner.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a
decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. The

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: t.hqw

dispositive portion of the decision reads: t.hqw

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay

of rivers belong the accretion which they

sinasangayunan

gradually receive from the effects of the

at

pinagtitibay

sa

current of the waters.

kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad.

The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three

Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court admits of

requisites before an accretion covered by this particular

certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS

provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the

Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court

deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made

retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of

through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that

said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded

the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the

entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2)

banks of rivers.

when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,

and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion,

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect

(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of

of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes

facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went

from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by

beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to

human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of

the admissions of both appellant and appellee.

nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever

to prove that the addition to the said property was made

There are facts and circumstances in the record which

gradually through the effects of the current of the

render untenable the findings of the trial court and the

Meycauayan

Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to

observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to

the private respondents' fishponds.

believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being

and

Bocaue

rivers.

We

agree

with

the

because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of

The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to

under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what

be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of

actually happened is that the private respondents simply

their father noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve

transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the

hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that

Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to

at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If

speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of

so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and

the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters

imperceptible increase to their land in the years before

of the river.

1939. However, the witness testified that in that year,

sheobserved an increase in the area of the original fishpond

On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the

testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acua to the effect that: t.
hqw

which is now the land in question. If she was telling the

truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence
that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and manmade and not the exclusive result of the current of the

xxx xxx xxx

Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits

... when witness first saw the land, namely,

of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike

Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry almost at

the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr.
Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of
the lots, for about two (2) arms length the
land was still dry up to the edge of the
river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil
was established on the boundaries of Lots
1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was
transferred to the new Pilapil and this was
done sometime in 1951; that the new lots
were then converted into fishpond, and
water in this fishpond was two (2) meters
deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the
fishpond ... .

came into being not because of the sole effect of the current
towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought
to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and
gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it.
It is under two meters of water. The private respondents'
own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two
meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond
and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the
river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the
right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to
compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers
because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on
rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful
provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and

various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or

danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not
acquire the additions to his land caused by special works
expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion.
When the private respondents transferred their dikes
towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation
purposes and not to protect their property from the
destructive force of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that
the testimony of the private respondents' lone witness to the
effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such
alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be
noted that the lots in question were not included in the
survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10,
1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality
of Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960.
The alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes
only

in 1972

or 33

years after it had

supposedly

permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is

that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They
existed only after the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951.
What private respondents claim as accretion is really an
encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by
reclamation.

On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial

withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to
Lot 3
of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the
Commissioner appointed by the Court. On March 7, 1975,
Lot
3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial
proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan
Psu131892. On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a
decision granting the application on the finding that the
lands in
question are accretions to the private respondents'
fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals. On August, 19, 1982, the
respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads: DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay
sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan nang
walang
bayad.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots

1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots
were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are
therefore classified as property of the public domain under
Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration

written opposition to the application for registration.

under

the

Land

Registration

Act.

The

adjudication of the lands in question as private property in

the names of the private respondents is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back
the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and
return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the

decision of the respondent Court of Appeals.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes,
Marina (should be "Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C.
Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio
bordering

on

actually happened is that the private respondents simply

transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to
speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of
the
gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of
the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the
testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acua to the effect that:
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they
were already dry almost at the level of the
Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the
boundaries of the lots, for about two (2) arms

REPUBLIC vs. CA G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

Ubihan,
Meycauayan,
Bulacan
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of

under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what

the

On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an

application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their
fishpond
property. On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of
Lands filed a

length the land was still dry up to the edge of the river; that
sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was
established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil from
the old Pilapil was transferred to the new Pilapil
and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were
then converted into fishpond, and water in
this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the
Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence
establishes the fact of accretion without human intervention
because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion
was complete.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land is registrable as an

accretion.
RULE:
We agree with the petitioner. Article 457 of the New Civil
Code requires the concurrence of three requisites before an
accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have
taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion

seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72925 entitled, Angelita F.
Buenaventura and Preciosa F. Buenaventura vs. Republic of the
Philippines, dated 23 August 2004 and 25 January 2005,
respectively, which granted the appeal filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) and declared the parcel of land subject
matter of this Petition as public land, thus, reversing the Order 3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City dated 29
October 2001, which recognized and confirmed the rights of herein
petitioners Angelita F. Buenaventura (Angelita) and Preciosa F.
Buenaventura (Preciosa), over the subject property, and issued a
decree of registration of the same in their favor.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. The

requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of
the current
of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of
the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention.
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the
instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that
the
addition to the said property was made gradually through
the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers.
There is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the
current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged
alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole
effect
of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of
the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The
land
sought to be registered is not even dry land cast
imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the
fishpond
adjoining it. It is under two meters of water.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the
right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to
compensate
him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the
location of his land.
The instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their
fishponds to their original location and return the disputed
property to the river to which it belongs.
G.R. No. 166865

Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa are the applicants for registration

of title over the subject property. They are the heirs of spouses
Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura)
from whom they acquired the subject property.
The facts reveal that the subject property was acquired by the
spouses Buenaventura from the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon, namely:
Aurelio de Leon and his sister Rodencia Sta. Agueda even before
World War II. However, it was only on 30 January 1948 that the
corresponding Deed of Sale4 was executed in favor of the spouses
Buenaventura. After the execution of the said Deed of Sale, the
spouses Buenaventura transferred the tax declaration in their
name. Consequently, Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 5492 covering the
subject property in the names of Aurelio and Rodencia was
cancelled and T.D. No. 61035 was issued in the name of spouses
Buenaventura.
In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way of Deed of
Sale,6 the subject property, together with the adjacent property,
which they previously acquired from Mariano Pascual, to their
children, among whom are herein petitioners. As a result thereof, a
new tax declaration (T.D. No. A-004-05698)7 was issued in the
name of the spouses Buenaventuras children.
Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5
June 2000 before the RTC of Paraaque City of the subject
property, more particularly described as Cadastral Lot No. 5001-B,
Csd-007604-000176-D, Paraaque Cadastre, located in San
Dionisio, Paraaque City, with an area of 3,520.92 square meters,
more or less. Petitioners alleged that "they and their predecessorsin-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru inheritance,
transfer, and possession as owners of the same since time
immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law." 8
As the trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and
substance, it thereby set the case for hearing, and directed the
service and publication of the notice thereof pursuant to Section
239 of the Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree No.
1529).
On 27 September 2001, when the case was called for hearing, no
interested party appeared before the trial court other than the
petitioners. Consequently, petitioners proceeded to present several
documents in order to establish compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements. The same were marked and offered in evidence
before the court a quo.

March 2, 2007

ANGELITA F. BUENAVENTURA and PRECIOSA F.

BUENAVENTURA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The case before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure

No formal opposition had been filed and no oppositor appeared in

any of the previously set hearings of the case; hence, petitioners
counsel moved for the declaration of general default except for the
Republic. The same was granted by the court a quo. The case was
then referred to a commissioner, who directly received petitioners
evidence in chief.
Petitioners presented five witnesses, namely: Aniceta C. Capiral,
Engr. Teofilo R. La Guardia, Atty. Reginald L. Hernandez, Ricardo
H. Lopez, and herein petitioner Angelita, in order to establish the
fact that petitioners and their predecessors have acquired vested
right over the subject property by their open, continuous, and
exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for

over 50 years completely unmolested by any adverse claim,

meaning, their possession of the subject property was in the
manner and for the period required by law; likewise, to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the subject property.
Other than the respective testimonies of the above-named
witnesses, they also presented and identified several
documents10 offered in evidence, which tend to establish further
the following: (1) petitioners fee simple title over the subject
property; (2) the nature of the possession and occupation of the
property; (3) its classification as part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government; and (4) the improvements
introduced thereon and the taxes paid on the subject property.
Said documents were duly admitted by the trial court.
On 29 October 2001, based on the pieces of evidence presented
by petitioners, the court a quo issued an Order granting the
application for registration of title of the subject property, the
decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the application of registration of title to the
subject parcel of land, known as Lot 5001-B Cad 299, Paraaque
Cadastre, and more particularly described in approved Survey
Plan Csd 007604-000176 is hereby confirmed and ordered
registered in the names of [petitioners] Preciosa, Angelita, [and in
the names of their other siblings] Crisostomo, and Alfredo, all
surnamed Buenaventura, free from all liens and encumbrances.
ONCE THIS DECISION has become final, let another one issue
directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree.
Let copies of this [D]ecision be furnished to the adjoining owners,
Land Registration Authority, Land Management Bureau, Office of
the Solicitor General, Sec. of Public Works and Highways,
Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director, Forest Management
Bureau, Chairman Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,
DENR [Department of Environment and Natural Resources], South
CENRO, Land Management Sector, City Mayor of Paraaque and
Registry of Deeds, Paraaque City.11
Feeling aggrieved with the aforementioned Order of the trial court,
the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. According to the
Republic, petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive
and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by
themselves; hence, the trial court erred in granting petitioners
application for registration of the subject property. The Republic
prayed for the reversal of the Order of the trial court and for the
dismissal of the application for registration filed by petitioners.
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in
favor of the Republic, thus, overturning the Order of the court a
quo. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 274, Paraaque City dated October
29, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the parcel of land
subject matter of the application is declared public land. 12
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Decision on 20 September 2004. In a Resolution dated 25 January
2005 rendered by the appellate court, said Motion for
Reconsideration was forthwith denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the resolution of this
Court:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying
the Decision of the trial court confirming petitioners title
over the subject property for not being allegedly
supported by substantial evidence as required by law.

II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in

declaring the subject property as pubic land and ignoring
petitioners evidence of over 50 year possession in the
concept of an owner and completely unmolested by any
adverse claim.
In the Memorandum13 of the petitioners, they allege that the
appellate court committed grave error when it nullified the trial
courts Order dated 29 October 2001, which confirmed their title to
the subject property. Petitioners claim that contrary to the findings
of the Court of Appeals that the above-mentioned Order was not
supported by evidence, the records of the case clearly speak of
the existence, not absence, of sufficient evidence to sustain the
findings of the court a quo that petitioners have established
possession of the subject property in the manner and for the
period required by law, that is by open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession in the concept of an owner since 12 June
1945 or earlier, to warrant the registration of their title to the
subject property.
Petitioners likewise argue that the appellate court gravely erred
when it declared as public land the subject property despite the
fact that they were able to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that their possession of the subject property was indeed in the
manner and within the period required by law. Having been in
possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, they
have already acquired vested right or title over the subject property
by operation of law based on the period provided for under the
prevailing land registration and property laws; hence, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the facts and the law.
The Petition is meritorious.
In resolving the issues involved in the present case, there is a
need for this Court to re-examine the facts of the case for the
proper determination of the issues raised herein.
As a rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review,
the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the
Court.14However, the rule is not without exceptions. There are
several recognized exceptions15 in which factual issues may be
resolved by this Court and two of these exceptions find application
in this present case, to wit: (1) when the findings of the appellate
court are contrary to those of the trial court; and (2) when the
findings of fact of the appellate court are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence
on record.
The issues presented by petitioners will be discussed concurrently,
since they are interrelated.
In the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, it ruled that
petitioners failed to show possession and occupation of the subject
property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945
or earlier as provided for in Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. It further said that the testimonial evidence
presented by petitioners was not sufficient to prove petitioners
possession in the manner and within the period required by the
aforesaid law because petitioners witnesses merely testified on
their familiarity with the subject property.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may
apply for registration of land. The said provision of law refers to an
original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. 16 It
specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
From the aforesaid provisions of the Property Registration Decree,
we can deduce that there are three requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under the first category, to wit: (1)
that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945 or earlier.17 The second classification relates to the
acquisition of private lands by prescription.
In the case at bar, the Republic argues, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, that petitioners own evidence tends to show that
the subject property is not alienable and disposable because it was
a salt bed and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, except for agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. Likewise, under the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.18 However, such presumption is not conclusive. It can be
rebutted by the applicants presentation of incontrovertible
evidence showing that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable and disposable.19
After a thorough examination of the records of this case, this Court
found out that petitioners offered in evidence a certification 20 from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National
Capital Region dated 29 October 2001, to prove that the subject
property was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The said certification contains the following statements:
This is to certify that the parcel of land as shown and described on
the reverse side of this plan- Lot 5001-B, Cad-299, Paraaque
Cadastre situated at San Dionisio, Paraaque City, Metro Manila
containing an area of 3,520.92 square meters as prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Mariano V. Flotildes for Amado Buenaventura,
et al., was verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable
Land per L.C. Map 2623, Project No. 25 of Paraaque per Forestry
Administrative
Order
No.
4-1141
dated
January
3,
1968.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
To our minds, the said certification is sufficient to establish the true
nature or character of the subject property. The certification enjoys
a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence.22 As it is, the said certification remains uncontested and
even the Republic itself did not present any evidence to refute the
contents of the said certification. Therefore, the alienable and
disposable character of the questioned parcel of land has been
clearly established by the evidence of the petitioners, by 3 January
1968, at the latest.
Now, going to the requisites of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, Republic alleges that no
sufficient evidence was adduced by petitioners to show that they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in exclusive
possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier in
the concept of an owner, to which the Court of Appeals agreed.
The Court of Appeals in its decision said that:

Although they were able to show possession by their parents, their

predecessors-in-interest, since 1948, they failed to prove the fact
of possession since [12 June 1945] before the filing of the
application.23
Emphasis should be given to the fact that the Court of Appeals, in
its Decision, did not question petitioners possession of the subject
property since 1948. Verily, it even stated in the said Decision that
petitioners possession may be reckoned from 1948, the year of
the execution of the Deed of Sale. The only reason posited by the
appellate court in denying the Order of the trial court which granted
the application for registration of title of the petitioners was the fact
that petitioners evidence was not sufficient to prove that their
possession of the subject property was since 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that the
evidence presented by petitioners was not enough to prove that
their possession of the subject property started since 12 June
1945 or earlier because the evidence established that the
questioned parcel of land was acquired by petitioners parents only
on 30 January 1948, the date of the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale by its previous owners. They can neither tack their
possession to that of the previous owners because they failed to
present any evidence of possession by those prior owners.
Moreover, petitioners possession of the subject property could
only ripen into ownership on 3 January 1968, when the same
became alienable and disposable. "Any period of possession prior
to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession; such possession can
never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified
as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title shall not apply thereto."24
Be that as it may, this will not be an insurmountable bar to the
petitioners to have the title to the subject property registered in
their names.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court closely
examined the land registration laws governing land registration
proceedings in the Philippines. In the aforesaid case, the Court
made the following pronouncements:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to
register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
amended by R.A. [Republic Act] No. 1942, which provided that the
bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is
concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to
"agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution
declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands." Clearly the subject lands under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration
of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws."26 (Emphasis supplied.)

It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that
even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain
commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of
the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.
Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring
ownership.27 Article 1106 of the Civil Code provides:
By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
laid down by law.
Also in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, it is provided that:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or
any of its subdivision not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.

In the same breath, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners have

been in actual possession of the subject property since 1968, at
the latest. According to the testimony of their witnesses, parts of
the subject property are planted with bananas and some
vegetables, and a bamboo grove. The other parts of the subject
property were used as a fishpond, as well as devoted to salt
making until 1990.32 However, when the property was no longer
suitable for agricultural purposes, for fishpond, and for salt making
because of its conversion to non-agricultural purposes consistent
with the zonal development of the area, the petitioners backfilled
the subject property with gravel and sand, for which they paid their
farm helpers just compensation. Thereafter, they enclosed the
property with perimeter fence, installed guards and a caretaker to
prevent potential squatters from penetrating the area. 33When tax
declarations and receipts are coupled with actual possession, they
constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim
of ownership through prescription.34
Conspicuously, the petitioners witnesses are one in pointing out
that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are the sole
claimants of the subject property.

Likewise, Article 1137 of the Civil Code states that:

Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and
disposable land may be converted into private property by reason
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30
years.28 Such property now falls within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), over which title by prescription
can be acquired. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and
disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as
open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have
the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their
possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.29
The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the
present case, while petitioners possession over the subject
property can be reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date when
according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and
disposable, they can still have the subject property registered in
their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
The records, indeed, reveal that petitioners were in possession of
the subject property for more than 30 years, 32 years to be exact,
reckoned from the year 1968, when the subject property was
finally declared alienable and disposable by the DENR to the time
they filed an application for registration of title over the subject
property on 5 June 2000. Petitioners possession of the subject
property since 1968 has been characterized as open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept
of an owner.
Petitioners presented as evidence their tax declarations covering
the years from 1948 until the third quarter of 2001. They also
offered in evidence a certification30 from the Office of the Treasurer
of the City of Paraaque to prove that realty taxes over the subject
property had been duly paid by petitioners. As a rule, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and
all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens
ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.31

It bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by

petitioners are incontrovertible. No one, not even the Republic,
presented any evidence to contradict the claims of the petitioners
that they are in possession of the subject property and their
possession of the same is open, continuous and exclusive in the
concept of an owner for over 30 years. Verily, even the appellate
court mentioned in its Decision that petitioners were able to show
possession of the subject property as early as 1948, the only basis
for its Decision reversing the Order of the trial court being the
insufficiency of the evidence presented by petitioners to establish
their possession of the subject property prior to 12 June 1945.
IN ALL, petitioners were able to prove sufficiently that they have
been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years,
which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious, in the concept of an owner. By this, the subject
alienable and disposable public land had been effectively
converted into private property over which petitioners have
acquired ownership through prescription to which they are entitled
to have title through registration proceedings. Petitioners right to
have their title to the subject property registered cannot be
defeated simply because the possession of petitioners
commenced on a date later than 12 June 1945, for the law and
supplementing jurisprudence amply, justly and rightfully provides
the necessary remedy to what would otherwise result in an unjust
and unwarranted situation. It would be the height of injustice if
petitioners registration of title over the said property will de denied
solely on that ground.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 August 2004 and 25 January 2005, respectively, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court
dated 29 October 2001 which granted petitioners application for
registration of the subject property and directing the issuance of a
decree of registration in petitioners favor once the judgment has
become final and executory is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
P.D.
1529
SEC.
14
(1)
AND
(2)
Buenaventura
vs.
Republic
(517
SCRA
271)
Limcoma Multipurpose Cooperative vs. Republic (527 SCRA 233)
Applicant may acquire title by prescription under Sec. 14(2) of P.D.
1529 even if he cannot prove possession since June 12, 1945
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration
of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs
and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing
laws."

It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that
even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain
commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of
the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.

3.

Photocopy of the Geodetic Engineers

Certificate.[6]

4.

Owners Copy of Tax Declaration Nos. GR019-0893-R (covering Lot 7513), GR-0190894-R (covering Lot 7515), GR-019-0895R (covering Lot 7516), GR-019-0896-R
(covering Lot7517),
GR-019-0897-R
(covering Lot 7518), all dated January 7,
1993 and in the name of Crisologo C.
Domingo.[7]

5.

Land
Management
Inspectors
2nd Indorsement
dated October
22,
1990 recommending approval of AS-Plan.[8]

Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring

ownership. Article 1106 of the Civil Code provides:
By prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions
laid
down
by
law.
Also in Article 1113 of the Civil Code, it is provided that:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or
any of its subdivision not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object
of
prescription.
Likewise,

Article

1137

of

the

Civil

Code

states

that:

Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe

through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and
disposable land may be converted into private property by reason
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.
Such property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands"
under Section 14 (2), over which title by prescription can be
acquired. Hence, because of Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable
land, and whose possession has been characterized as open,
continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right
to register their title to such land despite the fact that their
possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945. 29
CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO,
Petitioner,

The Land Registration Authority (LRA), which filed before the

RTC its Report[9] dated September 27, 1993, stated that after plotting Plan
AS-04-002475 in the Municipal Index Sheet thru its tie lines, a
discrepancy was noted. The RTC thus referred the matter to the Lands
Management Sector, Region IV for verification and correction.
Acting on the directive of the RTC, the Director of Lands filed
a Report that per records of the Lands Management Bureau in Manila,
the land involved in said case was not covered by any land patent or by
public land application pending issuance of patent. [10]
The
LRA
later
filed
Report[11] dated December 22, 1993 stating that:

G.R. No. 170015

Present:
QUISUMBING,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR.,

- versus -

SEVERINO AND RAYMUNDO LANDICHO,

JULIAN ABELLO, MARTA DE SAGUN AND
EDITHA G. SARMIENTO,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
August 29, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Crisologo C. Domingo (Domingo) filed on April 20, 1993 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City an application for
registration,[1] docketed as LRC No. TG-451, of five parcels of land
delineated as Lot Nos. 7513, 7515, 7516, 7517 and 7518, Cad. 355 under
Approved Survey Plan AS-04-002475[2] (the lots).
The lots, which are located at Barangay Tolentino, Tagaytay,
have a total land area of 38,975 square meters.
In his application, Domingo claimed that he bought the lots
from Genoveva Manlapit (Genoveva) in 1948 and has since been in
continuous, open, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession thereof in
the concept of an owner.
Domingo further claimed that prior to his purchase of the
lots, Genoveva had been in possession thereof in the concept of an owner
for more than 30 years.[3]
To Domingos application the following documents were
attached:
1.

Tracing Cloth of Approved Plan AS-04002475 (surveyed from September 24,

1963 to February 13, 1964 and approved
on December 12, 1990).[4]

2.

Photocopy of the Technical Description

of Lot Nos. 7513, 7515, 7516, 7517, and
7518.[5]

Supplementary

xxxx
2. The Regional Technical Director, Region Office
IV, thru the Chief, Surveys Division, Robert
C. Pangyarihan in his letter dated November
22, 1993, a copy is attached hereto as Annex
A, informed that per records on file in that
Office, the correct adjoining survey along
line 8-9 of Lot 7516 and along lines 3-4-5 of
Lot 7515 should be Lot 9237 Cad-355,
covered by As-04-000091 and that the parcel
of land covered by As-04-002475 are not
portions of or identical to any previously
approved isolated survey; and
3. When the above-furnished correction was applied
on plan As-04-002475 no more discrepancy
exists.
xxxx

On
November
26,
1993,
herein
respondents Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de
Sagun, and Editha G. Sarmiento filed an Answer/Opposition [12]to
Domingos application, claiming that they have been in open, continuous,
adverse and actual possession and cultivation of the lots in the concept of
an owner and have been paying real estate taxes thereon; [13] and that
Survey Plan AS-04-002475 was lifted from the cadastral survey of the
government which was surveyed for them and other individual owners. [14]
During the pendency of his application or on March 9, 1996,
Domingo died. His counsel, Atty. Irineo Anarna, did not, however, inform
the RTC of his death.
By Decision[15] of December 22, 1997, the RTC approved
Domingos application for registration, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing premises and considerations, this Court
hereby renders judgment approving the instant
application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Law,
the lands described in Plan AS-04-002475 as Lots
7513, 7515, 7516, 7517 and 7518, Cad-355,
Tagaytay Cadastre, containing an area of 10,519
square meters, 3, 956 square meters, 18, 921 square
meters, 3, 985 square meters and 1, 594 square
meters, respectively, as supported by their technical
descriptions now forming parts of the records of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced, in the
name of CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO, Filipino, of
legal age, married to Corazon A. Domingo, and with
residence at No. 34 Dao St., Project 3, Quezon City,
Metro Manila.

Once this decision becomes final and

executory, the corresponding decree of registration
shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that
contrary to Domingos claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
lots, Domingo has always been a resident of No. 34 Dao St., Project 3,
Quezon City; that despite Domingos claim that he has a caretaker
overseeing the lots, he could not even give the name of the caretaker; and
that Domingo admittedly declared the lots in his name only in 1993.
By Decision[17] of June 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed Domingos application for
registration of land title.
The appellate court ruled that while Domingo sought judicial
confirmation of his imperfect title under the Public Land Act and Section
14 (1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION DECREE, he failed to prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession and occupation of the lots
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[18]
And the appellate court noted that Domingo failed to present
the alleged deed of sale executed by Genoveva[19] and could only prove
through his Tax Declaration No. 0298 (new) that his possession in the
concept of an owner started only in 1948 (Exhibit L, Records, p. 117).
Domingos Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court, the present petition was lodged, faulting the appellate
court:
I
.
.
.
x x x x WHEN
IT LIMITED
CONSIDERATION
OF
THE
MATTERS
ESTABLISHED IN THE APPLICATION TO
SECTION 48 (B) OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT
AND SECTION 14 (1) OF PD 1529.
II
. . . x x x WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS
NOT ENTITLED FOR REGISTRATION OF
TITLE OVER
THE
SUBJECT
LAND,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE
EVIDENCE
ON
RECORD
CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED HIS ENTITLEMENT [TO]
REGISTRATION OF TITLE OVER THE LAND
UNDER SECTION 14 (1) AND (4) OF PD 1529. [20]
(Underscoring supplied)
Domingos present counsel argues that assuming that Domingo
failed to establish his possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier in
accordance with Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, he is still entitled to
registration of title under Article 1113 [21] in relation to Article 1137[22] of
the Civil Code.[23]
In their Comment[24] to the present petition, respondents pray
for its denial for being substantially defective, Domingos death not
having been alleged, albeit the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping was signed by Domingos alleged Surviving Spouse and
Heirs.[25]
To respondents Comment, Domingos counsel filed a
Reply[26] stating that there is no clearer manifestation of the death of
Domingo than the statement under oath of his surviving spouse and heirs
in substitution of deceased CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO contained in the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping which forms part
of the present petition.[27] Nonetheless, the counsel presented a certified
true copy of Domingos death certificate [28] showing that he died on March
9, 1996 (during the pendencyof his application before the RTC as earlier
stated).
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.[29] (Underscoring supplied)
To thus be entitled to registration of a land, the applicant must
prove that (a) the land applied for forms part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.[30]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and unless it has been
shown that they have been reclassified by the State as alienable or
disposable to a private person, they remain part of the inalienable public
domain.[31]
To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government,
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator or a legislative act or statute.[32]
While petitioner presented a document denominated as
2nd Indorsement[33] issued
by
Land
Management
Inspector Amadeo Mediran that the lots are within the alienable and
disposable zone under Project No. 3 LSC-3113 issued on April 5, 1978 as
certified by the Director of the Forest Development, the genuineness of
the document cannot be ascertained, it being a mere photocopy. Besides,
the truth of its contents cannot be ascertained, Mediran having failed to
take the witness stand to identify and testify thereon.
In fine, Domingo failed to adduce incontrovertible
evidence[34] showing that the lots have been declared alienable. They are
thus presumed to belong to the public domain, beyond the commerce of
man, and are not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription.
But even assuming arguendo that the lots are alienable,
Domingo failed to comply with the requirement on the period of
possession. While he alleged in his petition that he bought the lots
from Genoveva in 1948, he failed, as the appellate court correctly noted,
to adduce the deed of sale executed for the purpose, or to explain the
reason behind the failure and to present sufficient evidence to prove the
fact of sale.
Again, even assuming arguendo that the lots were indeed sold
to him by Genoveva, Domingo failed to adduce proof that Genoveva,
from whom he seeks to tack his possession, acquired registrable title over
them on June 12, 1945 or earlier. Under the same assumption, Domingos
claim that he has been in actual, continuous, adverse and open possession
of the lots in the concept of an owner since 1948 is a conclusion of law
which must be substantiated with proof of specific acts of ownership and
factual evidence of possession.[35]
An examination of the tax receipts [36] presented by Domingo
shows that they are of recent vintage, the earliest being dated January 8,
1993.
Tax Declaration Nos. 0298, GR-019-0884, and GR-019-0885,
which appear to have been issued in 1947 [sic], 1964, and 1968,
respectively, contain the declaration Filed under Presidential Decree No.
464 below the title Declaration of Real Property. P.D. No. 464, THE
REAL PROPERTY TAX CODE, took effect, however, only on June
1,1974. Specifically with respect to the first tax declaration, it even shows
that Domingo subscribed and swore to it on August 1, 1947 at which time
he had not bought the lot yet, in 1948 by his claim.
[37]

A note on Domingos death during the pendency of his

application at the RTC. Indeed, the records do not show that his death
on March 9, 1996 was brought to the RTCsattention, which is not in
accordance with Sections 16 and 17, Rule 3 of the 1994 Rules of
Court, viz:
SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity,
or incompetency of party. Whenever a party to a
pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or
incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity
or incompetency, and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or
other
legal
representative. (Italics
in
the
original; underscoring supplied)

SEC. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the

claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the
court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court,
and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The
court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may
be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may
be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad
litem for the minor heirs. (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
When a party dies in an action that survives and no order is
issued by the court for the appearance of the legal representative or of the
heirs of the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a matter of
fact no substitution has ever been effected, the proceedings held by the
court without such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment
rendered after such trial are null and void because the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or of the heirs
upon whom the trial and judgment would be binding. [38]
Unlike, however, jurisdiction over the subject matter which is
conferred by law, jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case
may, however, be waived either expressly or impliedly.[39] In the case at
bar, the surviving heirs voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of this Court, albeit belatedly, by participating in the present
petition.
Under the now amended Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, failure of a counsel to comply with the provision thereof is a
ground for disciplinary action, viz:
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever
a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days
after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with
this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed
to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel
for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall
fail to appear within the specified period, the court
may order the opposing party, within a specified
time, to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the
latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may
be
recovered
as
costs. (Italics
in
the
original; underscoring supplied)
The
failure
of
Domingos
former
counsel,
Atty. Irineo A. Anarna of
No.
4 Madlansacay St., Poblacion Lilang 4118 Cavite, to comply with the
immediately quoted provisions of the Rules, is compounded by his
misrepresentation, before the CA, that Domingo was well and alive when
he stated in his Motion to Withdraw Appearance as Counsel [40] dated July
8, 2004 that the motion for withdrawal [was] conformed to by Mrs.
Rosemarie Manlapit Zamora, representative of the applicant as shown by
her signature . . . and that Mrs. Rosemarie Zamora also undertakes to
personally seek the conformity of the Applicant (Underscoring supplied);
and by his retaining of the name of Domingo in the title of his pleadings
before the appellate court.

Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a

lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01
likewise provides that a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be
mislead by any artifice. And Rule 10.03 provides that a lawyer shall
observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
This Court thus takes this occasion to warn Atty. Anarna that a repetition
of a similar violation of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional
Responsibility will be dealt with strictly.
WHEREFORE, the
discussion, DENIED.

petition

is,

in

light

of

the

foregoing

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished Atty. Irineo A. Anarna of No.

4 Madlansacay St., Poblacion Lilang, 4118 Cavite.
SO ORDERED.
DOMINGO vs LANDICHO Case Digest
CRISOLOGO C. DOMINGO v. SEVERINO and RAYMUNDO LANDICHO, et
al.531 SCRA 606, 29 August 2007, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)
T o
p r o v e
t h a t
a
l a n d
i s a l i e n a b l e ,
a n
a p p l i c a n t
m u s t
c o n c l u s i v e l y
e s t a b l i s h t h e
e x i s t e n c e
o f
a p o s i t i v e
a c t
o f t h e
g o v e r n m e n t ,
s u c h
a s
a
p r e s i d e n t i a l
p r o c l a m a t i o n
o r
a n
e x e c u t i v e
o r d e r ,
o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
a c t i o n ,
i n v e s t i g a t i o n
r e p o r t s
o f
t h e
B u r e a u
o f
L a n d s
i n v e s t i g a t o r
o r a l e g i s l a t i v e a c t o r s t a t u t e .
FACTS:
Crisologo Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City,
anapplication
for registration of certain parcels of land (the lots), which he supposedly
purchased
from oneGenoveva Manlapit in 1948, and has since been in continuous, open,
public, adverse anduninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an
owner.Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de Sagun and
Editha G. Sarmiento
subsequently filed an Answer/Opposition to Domingos application, claiming,
among other things,
that they have been the ones in open, continuous, adverse and actual possession
and cultivation of the lots in the concept of owners and have even been paying real
estate taxes thereon.
The RTC approved Domingos application for registration. On appeal by Landicho,
et al., th
e Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and dismissed Domingos
application for
registration of land title. Petitioner Domingo filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Court of Appeals which was subsequently denied by said court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Domingo is entitled to the registration of the lots in question
pursuant toSection 14, sub pars. (1) and (4) of P.D. 1529
HELD:
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that to be entitled of a land, the applicant must
provethat: (a) the land applied for forms part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of thepublic domain and (b) he has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession andoccupation of the same under a bona fide
claim of ownership either since time immemorial or sinceJune 12, 1945. All lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong tothe State, and unless it has been shown that they have
been reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private person, they
remain part of the inalienable public domain. To prove that aland is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of government,
such as presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative
action,investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or
statute.

Domingo
vs.
Landicho
(531
SCRA
606)
Republic vs. Barandiaran (538 SCRA 705)
Applicant must prove positive act of government
that
land
is
alienable
and
disposable
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State,
and unless it has been shown that they have been
reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a
private person, they remain part of the inalienable public
domain.

To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must

conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of
the government, such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order, or administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a
legislative act or statute.