PMSC Web Version

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER No.
Private Military & Security Companies:

Future Challenges in Security
Governance
Anne-Marie Buzatu & Benjamin S. Buckland
DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER No. 3
Private Military & Security Companies:

Future Challenges in Security
Governance
Anne-Marie Buzatu & Benjamin S. Buckland
Table of Contents
Introduction
1.
Private Threats to International Security
1.1
1.2
Piracy
Organised Crime
9
10
2.
Increased State Outsourcing of Security Activities
12
2.1
2.2
2.3
SSR
Prisons
Intelligence
12
12
13
3.
Increase in Private Security Clients
15
3.1
3.2
3.3
International Organisations
Multinational Corporations
Humanitarian Organisations
15
16
17
4.
Challenges
18
4.1
4.2
4.3
Lack of Coordination Among Different Security Providers

Lack of Effective Oversight and Accountability
Assymetry in Security Provision
18
18
18
5.
Opportunities
20
5.1
5.2
Cost Savings and Efficiency

Innovations in the Provision of Security
20
20
6.
Responses: A Multi-Stakeholder Way Forward
21
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
Voluntary Principles on Business and Human Rights

Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
The Montreux Document
The International Code of Conduct
21
21
22
23
Conclusions
24
Annex I: The Montreux Document
25
Annex II: The international Code of Conduct
63
About the Series
95
DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER
Introduction
Private military and security forces, in various forms, have been
around for as long as there has been war and insecurity.1 In the first and
second centuries BC, Carthaginians used Numidian mercenaries, in the
fifth century the Romans used Germanic mercenaries on their northern
borders, the Byzantines hired the Spanish in the fourteenth century,2 the
English used Prussian Hessians in the American War of Independence,3
and the Swiss Guard have been providing protective services to the Vatican
since 1506. These forces were used by strong regional and local powers
to safeguard or expand territory or other spheres of influence under their
control.
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, however, which ushered in the
era of sovereign nation states, helped to streamline and consolidate
this piecemeal security provision. In assuming control over its territory,
the state undertook to protect its lands and people with public forces.
State responsibility for the provision of security to protect state interests
became the preferred standard for the use of security forces. In this topdown approach, the only legitimate use of force was that sanctioned
and regulated by the stateand such force was meant to be sufficient to
protect the various individual and private security needs, so long as they
were in line with state interests. The state-centric security model became
so widely-accepted as the norm that it formed the basis for collective
security in the UN charterso long as each state did its job in securing
its own territory and taking care that individual or private threats did
not spill out beyond its borders to undermine international security, then
war among states could be avoidedeven abolished. Unfortunately, this
state-centric model of security did not fulfil these lofty aspirations.4
The end of Cold War bipolarity has seen both the massive
downsizing of state armed forces as well as an increase in the number
1
3
4
The authors would like to thank Chris Sanderson, Siw Drte Hempfing and Andr du Plessis for their valuable contributions
to the text. All photographs are the property of the authors or have been used under a creative commons license from Fras1977,
h de c, and monojussi.
Edward Kwakwa, The Current Status of Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict, Hastings International and Comparative
Law Review 14, (1990): 75.
James Kwok, Armed Entrepreneurs: Private Military Companies in Iraq Harvard International Review, (Spring 2006): 34.
Reference to the Montreux Document (2008) and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
(2010).
and type of security threats, as states, aspiring states and other interests
grapple with a new world (dis)order. In some measure, within this shake
up of the international security sectorwith both new and existing actors
scrambling to secure their spheres of influencecan be found echoes of
pre-Westphalian times. Finding new opportunities in a changing security
landscape, private actors are increasingly taking advantage of porous
borders and availability of powerful and relatively cheap weapons to
support a wide variety interests. Among these private actors are private
military and security companies (PMSCs)5 joining the security sector
in increasing amounts, bringing potent market forces to bear on the
international security sector. Some recent responses have taken innovative
approaches to these threats, creating multi-stakeholder alliances among
states, industry and civil society.
This paper will take a look at future trends in the international private
security sector, beginning with an overview of some of the emerging
private threats impacting the security sector today. This will be followed
by a brief analysis of some of the challenges and opportunities posed by
these actors to the security sector today and beyond. Finally, the paper
will finish with some recommendations for responses to these challenges.
The Montreux Document (2008) defined private military and security companies (PMSCs) as: private business entities
that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services
include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places;
maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security
personnel.
1. Private Threats to
International Security
In the wake of the end of the Cold War, a number of private actors
have come to threaten the state-centric model of security. Crossing
borders often and with ease, these security threats confound traditional
approaches to state security requiring innovative responses from the
security sector. Indeed, some of these threats have even gained a measure
of legitimacy through their ability to identify and supply local needs and
demandsfor example, by offering services to host populations or by
building patronage networks.
1.1 Piracy
One example of this trend is maritime piracy, a phenomenon that
is on the rise, both in terms of the number of incidents and the level of
associated violence. The International Maritime Bureau reports that in
2009 153 vessels were boarded and forty-nine vessels were hijacked. In
addition, eighty-four attempted attacks were made and 120 vessels fired
upon, up from forty-six in 2008. In the course of these incidents, a total of
1,052 crew were taken hostage, sixty-eight were injured and eight were
killed.6 While traditional centres of piracy, such as the Straits of Malacca,
have seen a rise in incidents, much of the new wave in piracy has occurred
in the Indian Ocean, off the Somali coast, and in the Gulf of Guinea, off
the coast of Nigeria. Equipped with increasingly sophisticated weapons
and faster boats, modern-day pirates have been able to operate far out
to sea. The enormous ransoms they are able to demand in exchange for
the safe return of captured ships and sailors have fuelled their number;
particularly as traditional sources of income (such as fishing) come under
pressure.
In response to this increase in maritime piracy, states have had to
adopt innovative and collaborative approaches to effectively counter
them. Nevertheless, these have been insufficient. Even with around
6
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report 2009 (2010), 8.
fifteen states conducting anti-piracy naval patrols in the Indian Ocean,

under various commands, and a slew of resolutions passed by the United
Nations Security Council authorising nations to patrol the waters off the
Somali coast and to pursue pirates, both on the high seas and in Somali
territorial waters, the thirty or so warships involved are not nearly enough
to secure the area. Even when equipped with helicopters and speedboats,
the size of the area means they are often too late on the scene to be of
much use. Furthermore, it is unclear whether expensive naval vessels,
designed for war fighting, are really the best tools with which to combat
pirates in small skiffs and speedboats.
The size of the threat and the inadequacy of states responses have
combined to make private military and security companies an attractive
option for shipping firms and they are increasingly involved in planning,
ransom delivery, negotiations, guarding and seaborne patrol duties. There
are, however, no universally recognised guidelines for how these actors
should behave. Several maritime organisations have published their own
guides to best practice in deterring piracy, including, for example, the
International Maritime Bureaus Advice to Masters and the International
Maritime Organizations Guidance to Ship Owners and Ship Operators,
Shipmasters and Crews on Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships. However, the complicated intersection
between international law, maritime law and contract law that covers
such situations makes it likely that contractors will act in a wide variety of
different ways, not all of them ideal. While violent examples immediately
spring to mind, perhaps the greatest threat to security posed by private
security firms is that they have facilitated the payment of ransoms by shipowners. As United States (US) Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, remarked
in April last year, the fight against piracy would be going better if shipowners stopped paying to regain their vessels.
1.2 Organised crime

A second example is that of organised crime groups. These are
involved in the trafficking of drugs, people and weapons, in profit-related
activities, such as money laundering, as well as in providing services to
the communities in which they are embedded, through, for example,
10
patronage networks or the provision of alternative justice. Such groups use

violence to accumulate capital and secure economic power and, in many
parts of the world, their activities reveal alternative networks of power,
authority and self-governance that erode and undermine state legitimacy.
Many of these operate internationally, fleeing from one state to another
and complicating traditional state-centric approaches to oversight and
accountability.
Many other examples of private threats exist and are increasing,
including citizen militias, vigilante groups, criminal mafias and armed
insurgents, underlining the key point that in places where state power has
eroded, or where trust in its ability to administer justice has evaporated,
private alternatives quickly fill in these gaps. Indeed, the number of nonstate actors taking matters of security for their particular activities into
their own hands is on the rise. In other examples, the state itself has made
a conscious decision to outsource some aspects of its power to private
security companies or to private prisons, for example. This creates a
security environment in which private threats are on the rise, alongside
an increasing diversity in the different kinds of clients seeking private
protection.
11
2. Increased State Outsourcing

of Security Activities
Along with the increase in private threats to international security
are increases in the clients hiring private security service providers. While
it is well-known that some states are hiring these companies to support
them in military operations, states are hiring private companies to support
a number of other traditionally state-security activities.
2.1 Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Much has been written about the use of contractors in military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. High-profile incidents such as the
prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in 2004, or the shootings at Nisour
Square in September 2007 (both in Iraq) served to bring attention to these
actors, as well as to the related difficulties of holding such private actors
accountable. What has been less in the public eye is the use of such private
contractors to perform SSR-related services, such as training public police
and state armed forces. For example, in 2004, the US Department of State
contracted with DynCorp International to establish a state army from
the ground up in Liberia.7 At the 2009 International Peace Operations
Association (IPOA) Annual Summit, US Department of Defense (DoD)
personnel from Africom announced a policy of including PMSCs in their
SSR activities in Africa. While such use of PMSCs is on the rise, there is
some doubt whether these training programmes are part of an overarching
holistic approach to SSR, where other actors in the security sector such as
the judicial branch or civil society are also enhanced and strengthened in
order to help ensure that the reforms are sustainable.
2.2 Prisons
The increased privatisation of prisons also has important
implications for the security sector and its effective functioning/reform.
In fact, privatisation with regards to prisons is occurring on two levels
resulting in double privatisation occurring in the sector: 1) privatisation
of ownership and management of prisons, and 2) the contracting
7
12
See, for example, Sean McFate, I Built an African Army, Foreign Policy (January 2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2010/01/07/i_built_an_african_army (accessed October 2010).
out of prison inmate labour, with the latter amounting to a 1.4 billion
USD industry. Privatisation of prisons is primarily an Anglo-Saxon
phenomenon with most private prisons located in Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. To support the operation of these
prisons, a global multi-stakeholder network of government agencies,
corporations, and professional associations has emerged taking on roles
in law-making, norm formation and standard-setting. Professional
associationsthe American Correctional Association (ACA) in the US,
for exampleplay a huge role. Indeed, the ACA manual plays a greater
role than government authority in establishing prison standards and in
transforming vague directives and standards (against, for example, cruel
and unusual punishment) into specific operational terms.
2.3 Intelligence
Given the nature of the service, private involvement in intelligence
gathering may sometimes be essential. Agencies need the cooperation
of telecommunications and IT firms to establish wiretaps and monitor
communications. The procurement and continuing operation of high-tech
equipment, such as spy satellites, may only be possible through public
private cooperation. While very little information is available on the
precise nature of intelligence privatisation, it seems clear that it is a growing
industry in many parts of the world, particularly since September 11.8
Simon Chesterman, one of the few authors to publish on this issue,
writes that the US spent 70 percent (roughly 42 billion USD) of its 2005
intelligence budget on private contractors. Furthermore, he reports that
private contractors outnumber their public colleagues at the Pentagons
Counterintelligence Field Activity unit, at the Defence Intelligence
Agency, in the CIAs National Clandestine Service and at the National
Counterterrorism Center. These contractors are involved in all aspects
of intelligence gathering, including covert operations. To give just one
example, the British firm Aegis was awarded a 300 million USD contract
in 2004 which required the hiring of a team of analysts with NATO
equivalent SECRET clearance.9
Simon Chesterman, We Cant Spy If We Cant Buy!: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing
Inherently Governmental Functions, The European Journal of International Law 19, no.5 (2008): 10556.
Ibid., 1058.
13
This aspect of public private cooperation raises many familiar

questions regarding oversight and accountability. Contractor involvement
in intelligence activities often shields such activity from scrutiny by
oversight bodies, as well as leading to conflicts of interest when commercial
and operational priorities collide.10
10
14
Chesterman, We Cant Spy If We Cant Buy!, 105474; Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Still Using Private Spy Ring, Despite
Doubts, The New York Times, May 15, 2010.
3. Increase in Private Security

Clients
3.1 International Organisations11
Since the late mid-to-late 1990s, the UN has used PMSCs for a variety
of tasks including specialist services (such as de-mining, intelligence),
support services (helicopter services, logistics, maintenance), and the
more conventional PMSC security services (armed and unarmed security,
security consulting and training). While there is little detailed information
or data available on UN PMSC contracting policies or patterns, it is clear
that there is a lot of this contracting going on.12
Some recent examples of UN PMSC contracts:
Specialist services
For de-mining services ArmorGroup is frequently used. For
example, it has had contracts in Sudan (awarded in 2006) and Nepal. In
Nepal (UNMIN) it did de-mining, demolition, as well as consulting and
monitoring of this process.
Mission Support
Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) provided fuel, vehicles, and
rations for the new UN mission in Ivory Coast. The same company also
provided air traffic control, airport operation and management in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2004, as well as security for
the same mission (MONUC).
Security
In Afghanistan, the UN contracted an Afghan subsidiary of the
London-based company ISG Security Ltd. to provide 169 Gurkhas,
according to figures compiled by the UN Mission in Afghanistan. They are
charged with supplementing security provided by the Afghan National
11
12
The information in this section is based on a forthcoming DCAF Policy Paper on the use of private security providers by the
UN, by Ase Ostensen, to be published in 2011.
One possible indicator, the miscellaneous budget category politics, peacekeeping and mine action services ranked third on
a list of goods and services most often procured by UNOPS, totaling more than one hundred million USD in 2008, and over 78
million in 2009. However, given the lack of itemized entries, there is no way of telling what percentage of these expenditures
were made on services and how much were spent on goods. (UNOPS 2010, 2009 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations
Procurement).
15
Police.13 This example is interesting as it involves the performance of

official police tasks rather than private activities.
In 2008 UNHCR contracted security maintenance services from
Defense Systems Africa, Office security services from G4S, and guard
services from G4S Gurkha services limited. The UNDP contracted Saladin
security for security services the same year.
With the increased use of these actors by the UN also come questions
of accountability. As an organisation made up of states, but without states
oversight institutions nor their enforcement ability, the UN is not equipped
to hold private actors accountable when they violate international law or
human rights.
3.2 Multinational Corporations

Many multinational corporations use private security services to
protect their factories and other business installations, particularly those
located in areas where state security is weak, or where there may be
regular outbreaks of violence. An example of this is the extractive industry
which has many installations located in areas requiring extra security. The
needs of many extractive installations are extensive and many extractive
companies have whole divisions devoted to the selection and training
of private security providers, often hiring them as employees to provide
in-house security. The importance of private security to the extractive
industry business was recognised in the Voluntary Principles on Security
and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles). The fruit of a multi-stakeholder
initiative in which states and civil society worked with industry, the
Voluntary Principles seek to provide guidance to extractive companies
on maintaining the security of their operations in a manner that respects
human rights and fundamental freedoms.14
13
14
16
Colum Lynch, UN Embraces Private Military Contractors, Foreign Policy (January 2010), http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/2010/01/17/un_embraces_private_military_contractors (accessed October 2010).
Vision Statement of the Voluntary Principles, available online at: http://voluntaryprinciples.org/files/VPs_10_Year_
Anniversary_Press_Release_March2010_London.pdf
3.3 Humanitarian Organisations

Perhaps one of the least well-known clients of PMSCs are
humanitarian organisations. Increasingly, the target of attacks while
working in the field,15 humanitarian organisations often require
additional security in order to perform their missions. While most private
security companies hired by humanitarian organisations are unarmed,
in some exceptional cases armed security is provided. It is clear that
this is a growing trend, with more and more organisations in the field
hiring mostly local private security guards.16 For the most part, these
organisations have been hiring private security providers on an ad hoc
basis with little in the way of standard protocols or policies. However, as
some have had negative experiences with private security providers, it
has become increasingly clear that policy guidelines need to be developed
that provide humanitarian organisations with guidance as to when and
how they should hire such companies, particularly with regards to vetting
and training.
15
16
For some examples of attacks against humanitarian organisations, see Andr du Plessis, The Global Code of Conduct for
Private Security Companies: Why it Matters to Humanitarian Organisations, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, http://www.
odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3122 (accessed October 2010).
Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria Di Domenico, The use of Private Security Providers and Services in Humanitarian
Operations, HPG Report, (October 2008).
17
4. Challenges
There is no doubt that a huge wave of privatisation is sweeping
across nearly all aspects of the international security sector bringing a
number of important challenges
4.1 Lack of Coordination Among Different

Security Providers
With private or individual interests purchasing security services
to protect their particular interests, the model is moving away from a
state-monopolistic, state coordinated security provision to one in which
many different unrelated actors provide security on an ad hoc basis.
This decentralisation of security can create situations in which security
coverage is patchy, resulting in both gaps and overlaps. In the area of SSR,
the lack of a holistic approach among the different actors of the larger
security sector (such as, police, armed forces, border guards, judiciary
and prisons, parliaments and civil society) can undermine the long-term
sustainability of reform efforts, such as the training by PMSCs of police
forces.
4.2 Lack of Effective Oversight and

Accountability
Related to the decline of traditional state-centric security systems
is the breakdown of effective oversight and accountability mechanisms.
Where the state has less control of private security forces, it also has less
ability to hold such actors accountable when violations occur. As most
hard law depends upon a states ability to enforce it within its territory,
the ease with which private actors cross borders and can escape territorial
reach undermines the enforcement of both national and international law.
4.3 Assymetry in Security Provision

The private contractual nature of these services means that PMSC
contracted security obligations run to their clients, but not to the public
at large. This can create an asymmetric situation in which some are
provided with more security than others and, furthermore, the security
measures employed to protect paying clients may negatively impact on
18
those not-paying. This shift in obligation from providing security for the
common good to that of the paying client has huge implications for
how security is provided generally. It stands to reason that in this new
paradigm, decisions on how security should be provided would begin
with the clients needs, followed by those of the wider community. At
the same time, it may not always be the clients best interest that guides
decision-making. For example, it has been suggested by one journalist that
the scope and duration of training programmes were extended beyond
what was appropriate in order to secure the greatest possible return on
investments.17
17
David Isenberg, Private Military Contractors as Buzz Lightyear: To Afghanistan and Beyond, The Huffington Post, March 11,
2010.
19
5. Opportunities
While private security services certainly pose significant challenges,
they may also provide some significant benefits and opportunities.
5.1 Cost Savings and Efficiency

While the jury is still out on whether PMSCs are more cost-efficient
than state armed forces in the long-run,18 there are some studies that indicate
that private services are more cost-efficient generally. For example, one
study touted a 38 percent decrease in costs for private prisons in the UK
when compared to state-run-prisons.19 During this economic downturn,
strategies for achieving cost-savings figure prominently in defence budget
discussions and will likely be a continuing trend in the debate about
PMSCs.
5.2 Innovations in the Provision of Security

Competition is another market force which can shape the way
private security is provided. Not only does it have the potential to keep
costs down, but it also can encourage innovation and development of
new technologies that support improved methods for providing security.
Contrary to popular perceptions, not all PMSCs believe it is an advantage
to be armed while providing securityciting the increased risks inherent
to carrying weapons while providing security and the costs associated
with those risks. To minimise such risks, new technologies are being
developed that support efficient security provision without the use of
arms. For example, innovations in secure containers for carrying large
amounts of cash that make it effectively impossible for would-be thieves
to steal even if they manage to get possession of the containers,20 relieving
security of the need for firearms.
18
19
20
20
For further discussion, please see Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Eric Fredland, Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role
of Military Companies Defence and Peace Economics 15 (2004): 205219.
Gary Sturgess, Market Testing, Ethos Journal (Autumn 2010), http://www.ethosjournal.com/home/item/183-markettesting (accessed October 2010).
For a discussion of their use in the EU, see: EURICPA, White Paper on Professional Cross-Border Transportation of Euro-Cash by Road
Between Member States, (Brussels: EURICPA, 2009). http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15735_
en.pdf
6. Responses: A MultiStakeholder Way Forward

While PMSCs present important challenges to the traditional security
systems, some recent multi-stakeholder standard-setting and regulatory
initiatives hold some real promise for effective responses.
6.1 Voluntary Principles on Business and

Human Rights
As previously mentioned, the Voluntary Principles on Business and
Human Rights is a multi-stakeholder initiative which aims to set humanrights compliant standards for the extractive industry. Now in its 10th
year, the initiative relies on its three stake-holder pillars (composed
of states, the extractive industry, and human rights organisations).
Criticised for its lack of effective oversight, the initiative is in the process
of reorganising its structure to include a more robust and effective
secretariat. Notwithstanding its weaknesses, it has clearly had a positive
impact on human rights as part of its in-country programmes, which
focus on operations within a particular state.21
6.2 Special Representative of the UN Secretary

General on Business and Human Rights
In July 2005, Kofi Annan appointed Professor John G. Ruggie to
be Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Business &
Human Rights. In 2008, this mandate was extended by the UN Human
Rights Council in order to provide views and concrete and practical
recommendations on ways to strengthen the protection of human rights
from abuses by or involving transnational corporations and other business
enterprises, including through international cooperation22 To this end,
Professor Ruggie developed the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework
which rests on three pillars: 1)the state duty to protect against human rights
abuses by non-state actors, including businesses, through appropriate
21
22
For more information, please visit the Voluntary Principles website at http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/
HRC Resolution 8/7. Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, available on-line at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/
resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf
21
regulation, policies, and adjudication; 2) the corporate responsibility to

respect human rights, which means to act with due diligence to avoid
infringing the rights of others and to address adverse impacts that occur;
and 3) increased access for victims to effective remedies, both judicial and
non-judicial. Professor Ruggie is working on an operational plan for the
Protect, Respect and Remedy framework, which is due for completion by
2011.23
6.3 The Montreux Document

Seeking to address gaps in international humanitarian law as it
applies to PMSCs, in September 2008 the Swiss government in cooperation
with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concluded an
intergovernmental dialogue on how to ensure and promote respect for
international humanitarian and human rights law24 by states and PMSCs
operating in areas of armed conflict. The initiatives stated objectives
were 1) to clarify the existing obligations of states and other actors under
international law; and 2) to develop good practices, regulatory options
and other measures at the national and possibly international level.25
The Montreux Document has been almost universally welcomed.
Some have praised it for its generally inclusive and even-handed approach26
and others have commented on the quality of its content.27 While the
target audience of the Montreux Document was primarily states, it also
adopted a multi-stakeholder approach to develop the document, bringing
together representatives from governments, human rights organisations
and the PMSC industry to build consensus on how to best achieve the
objectives stated above. Two years later, thirty-five states have endorsed
the Document.28
23
24
25
26
27
28
22
For more information, please visit Professor Ruggies web portal, available on-line at: http://www.business-humanrights.
org/SpecialRepPortal/Home
Overview of the Swiss Initiative, available on-line at: http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc
Outline of the Swiss Initiative (November 2007), 2, http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc
See, for example, Doug Brooks, The Swiss Show Some Initiative, Journal of International Peace Operations 3, no. 6 (May-June
2008), 4.
For example Amnesty International, even while criticizing some aspects of it, noted that it is a text a text with many useful
elements that provides a number of detailed and useful recommendations for States. See, for example, Amnesty International
Public Statement on the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to the
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGIOR300102008
For an up-to-date list of endorsing states, please visit: http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/
pse/parsta.html
6.4 The International Code of Conduct for

Private Security Service Providers
In response to industry demands to develop international standards
for private security service providers, the Swiss government launched
another initiative to develop an International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Service Providers (ICoC) which would articulate clear standards
for private security providers based on international human rights law, as
well as develop an independent oversight and compliance mechanism to
provide effective sanctions when the ICoC is breached, as well as remedies
to victims. Once again developed through a multi-stakeholder approach,
including private security companies, states and civil society, the ICoC
was finalised and signed by participating companies in November
2010. The ICoC uses contractual mechanisms to impose human-rightscompliant standards directly on the companies themselves, regardless of where
they are operating. Currently, the ICoC is in an institution-building phase
led by a multi-stakeholder Steering Committee to develop the operational
framework for the oversight institution. It is expected that this framework
will be completed by the end of 2011, and the institution should be
functioning by the end of 2012.29
29
For more information about the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, please visit: http://
www.dcaf.ch/privatisation-security/_index.cfm
23
Conclusions
In a time of increasing security threatsboth public and private-which affect states and a multitude of private actors, as well as decreasing
state capacity to meet those threats, the trend to use private military and
security companies will likely continue to increase and shape international
security. In defiance of the traditional paradigm of state-centric security,
these private security actors pose real challenges to effective regulation of
their services, particularly accountability for violations of human rights
and remedies to victims. However, these actors can also challenge security
provision in a positive manner, through innovations and the possibility
of cost-effectiveness that may be welcome in difficult economic times.
The recent trends towards privatisation of security and the impact of
international business on the enjoyment of human rights have also served
as the impetus to forge surprising alliances among states, industry and
civil society groups. These multi-stakeholder efforts may be able to find
real solutions to some of these challenges, building innovative and flexible
frameworks that can respond to the confluence of global, economic and
human security that characterises todays 21st century world.
24
Annex I:
MONTREUX DOCUMENT
ON PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND
GOOD PRACTICES FOR STATES RELATED TO OPERATIONS OF
PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES DURING ARMED
CONFLICT
PART ONE
PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO
PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES
INTRODUCTION
The following statements aim to recall certain existing

international legal obligations of States regarding private military
and security companies. The statements are drawn from various
international humanitarian and human rights agreements and
customary international law. This document, and the statements
herein, do not create legal obligations. Each State is responsible
for complying with the obligations it has undertaken pursuant
to international agreements to which it is a party, subject to any
reservations, understandings and declarations made, and to
customary international law.
A. CONTRACTING STATES
1.
Contracting States retain their obligations under international

law, even if they contract PMSCs to perform certain activities.
If they are occupying powers, they have an obligation to take
all measures in their power to restore, and ensure, as far as
25
possible, public order and safety, i.e. exercise vigilance in

preventing violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights law.
2.
Contracting States have an obligation not to contract PMSCs

to carry out activities that international humanitarian
law explicitly assigns to a State agent or authority, such
as exercising the power of the responsible officer over
prisoner of war camps or places of internment of civilians in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions.
3.
Contracting States have an obligation, within their power, to

ensure respect for international humanitarian law by PMSCs
they contract, in particular to:
a)
b)
c)
4.
26
ensure that PMSCs that they contract and their

personnel are aware of their obligations and trained
accordingly;
not encourage or assist in, and take appropriate
measures to prevent, any violations of international
humanitarian law by personnel of PMSCs;
take measures to suppress violations of international
humanitarian law committed by the personnel of
PMSCs through appropriate means, such as military
regulations, administrative orders and other regulatory
measures as well as administrative, disciplinary or
judicial sanctions, as appropriate.
Contracting States are responsible to implement their

obligations under international human rights law, including
by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to these obligations. To this end
they have the obligation, in specific circumstances, to take
appropriate measures to prevent, investigate and provide
effective remedies for relevant misconduct of PMSCs and

their personnel.
5.
Contracting States have an obligation to enact any legislation

necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons
committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, Additional
Protocol I, and have an obligation to search for persons alleged
to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such
grave breaches and bring such persons, regardless of their
nationality, before their own courts. They may also, if they
prefer, and in accordance with the provisions of their own
legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another State
concerned, provided such State has made out a prima facie
case, or to an international criminal tribunal.
6.
Contracting States also have an obligation to investigate and,

as required by international law, or otherwise as appropriate,
prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of
having committed other crimes under international law,
such as torture or hostage taking, in accordance with their
obligations under international law. Such prosecutions are to
be carried out in accordance with international law providing
for fair trial, mindful that sanctions be commensurate with
the gravity of the crime.
7.
Although entering into contractual relations does not in itself

engage the responsibility of Contracting States, the latter
are responsible for violations of international humanitarian
law, human rights law, or other rules of international
law committed by PMSCs or their personnel where such
violations are attributable to the Contracting State, consistent
with customary international law, in particular if they are:
27
a)
b)
c)
d)
8.
incorporated by the State into its regular armed forces

in accordance with its domestic legislation;
members of organised armed forces, groups or units
under a command responsible to the State;
empowered to exercise elements of governmental
authority if they are acting in that capacity (i.e. are
formally authorised by law or regulation to carry out
functions normally conducted by organs of the State);
or
in fact acting on the instructions of the State (i.e. the
State has specifically instructed the private actors
conduct) or under its direction or control (i.e. actual
exercise of effective control by the State over a private
actors conduct).
Contracting States have an obligation to provide reparations

for violations of international humanitarian law and human
rights law caused by wrongful conduct of the personnel of
PMSCs when such conduct is attributable to the Contracting
States in accordance with the customary international law of
State responsibility.
B. TERRITORIAL STATES
9.
Territorial States have an obligation, within their power, to

operating on their territory, in particular to:
a)
b)
28
disseminate, as widely as possible, the text of the

Geneva Conventions and other relevant norms of
international humanitarian law among PMSCs and
their personnel;
c)

humanitarian law committed by the personnel of
PMSCs through appropriate means such as military
regulations, administrative orders and other regulatory
measures as well as administrative, disciplinary or
judicial sanctions, as appropriate.
10.
Territorial States are responsible to implement their

obligations under international human rights law, including
by adopting such legislative and other measures as may be
their personnel.
11.
Territorial States have an obligation to enact any legislation

12.
Territorial States also have an obligation to investigate and,

as required by international law, or otherwise as appropriate,
29

13.
In situations of occupation, the obligations of Territorial

States are limited to areas in which they are able to exercise
effective control.
C. HOME STATES
14.
Home States have an obligation, within their power, to

of their nationality, in particular to:
a)
b)
c)
15.
30
disseminate, as widely as possible, the text of the

Geneva Conventions and other relevant norms of
international humanitarian law among PMSCs and
their personnel;
humanitarian law committed by the personnel
of PMSCs through appropriate means such as
administrative or other regulatory measures as well
as administrative, disciplinary or judicial sanctions, as
appropriate.
Home States are responsible to implement their obligations

under international human rights law, including by
adopting such legislative and other measures as may be

their personnel.
16.
Home States have an obligation to enact any legislation

17.
Home States also have an obligation to investigate and, as

required by international law, or otherwise as appropriate,
D. ALL OTHER STATES
18.
All other States have an obligation, within their power, to

ensure respect for international humanitarian law. They
have an obligation to refrain from encouraging or assisting
in violations of international humanitarian law by any party
to an armed conflict.
31
19.
All other States are responsible to implement their obligations

under international human rights law, including by adopting
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to these obligations.
20.
All other States have an obligation to enact any legislation

21.
All other States also have an obligation to investigate and, as

required by international law, or otherwise as appropriate,
E. PMSCS AND THEIR PERSONNEL
22.
32
PMSCs are obliged to comply with international humanitarian

law or human rights law imposed upon them by applicable
national law, as well as other applicable national law such
as criminal law, tax law, immigration law, labour law, and
specific regulations on private military or security services.
23.
The personnel of PMSCs are obliged to respect the relevant

national law, in particular the national criminal law, of the
State in which they operate, and, as far as applicable, the law
of the States of their nationality.
24.
The status of the personnel of PMSCs is determined by

international humanitarian law, on a case by case basis, in
particular according to the nature and circumstances of the
functions in which they are involved.
25.
If they are civilians under international humanitarian law,

the personnel of PMSCs may not be the object of attack,
unless and for such time as they directly participate in
hostilities.
26.
The personnel of PMSCs:

a)
b)
c)
d)
are obliged, regardless of their status, to comply with

applicable international humanitarian law;
are protected as civilians under international
humanitarian law, unless they are incorporated into
the regular armed forces of a State or are members
of organised armed forces, groups or units under
a command responsible to the State; or otherwise
lose their protection as determined by international
humanitarian law;
are entitled to prisoner of war status in international
armed conflict if they are persons accompanying the
armed forces meeting the requirements of article 4A(4)
of the Third Geneva Convention;
to the extent they exercise governmental authority,
have to comply with the States obligations under
international human rights law;
33
e)
are subject to prosecution if they commit conduct

recognised as crimes under applicable national or
international law.
F. SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
27.
Superiors of PMSC personnel, such as:

a)
b)
governmental officials, whether they are military

commanders or civilian superiors, or
directors or managers of PMSCs,
may be liable for crimes under international law committed

by PMSC personnel under their effective authority and
control, as a result of their failure to properly exercise control
over them, in accordance with the rules of international law.
Superior responsibility is not engaged solely by virtue of a
contract.
PART TWO
GOOD PRACTICES RELATING TO PRIVATE MILITARY AND
SECURITY COMPANIES
INTRODUCTION
This Part contains a description of good practices that aims

to provide guidance and assistance to States in ensuring respect
for international humanitarian law and human rights law and
otherwise promoting responsible conduct in their relationships
with PMSCs operating in areas of armed conflict. They may also
provide useful guidance for States in their relationships with
PMSCs operating outside of areas of armed conflict.
The good practices do not have legally binding effect and
are not meant to be exhaustive. It is understood that a State may
34
not have the capacity to implement all the good practices, and that
no State has the legal obligation to implement any particular good
practice, whether that State is a Contracting State, a Territorial
State, or a Home State. States are invited to consider these good
practices in defining their relationships with PMSCs, recognising
that a particular good practice may not be appropriate in all
circumstances and emphasising that this Part is not meant to imply
that States should necessarily follow all these practices as a whole.
The good practices are intended, inter alia, to assist States to
implement their obligations under international humanitarian law
and human rights law. However, in considering regulation, States
may also need to take into account obligations they have under
other branches of international law, including as members of
international organisations such as the United Nations, and under
international law relating to trade and government procurement.
They may also need to take into account bilateral agreements
between Contracting States and Territorial States. Moreover,
States are encouraged to fully implement relevant provisions of
international instruments to which they are Parties, including
anti-corruption, anti-organised crime and firearms conventions.
Furthermore, any of these good practices will need to be adapted
in practice to the specific situation and the States legal system and
capacity.
A. GOOD PRACTICES FOR CONTRACTING STATES
States contemplating to contract PMSCs should evaluate

whether their legislation, as well as procurement and contracting
practices, are adequate for contracting PMSCs. This is particularly
relevant where Contracting States use the services of a PMSC
in a State where law enforcement or regulatory capacities are
compromised.
35
In many instances, the good practices for Contracting States

may also indicate good practices for other clients of PMSCs, such
as international organisations, NGOs and companies.
In this sense, good practices for Contracting States include
the following:
I. Determination of services
1.
To determine which services may or may not be contracted

out to PMSCs; in determining which services may not be
contracted out, Contracting States take into account factors
such as whether a particular service could cause PMSC
personnel to become involved in direct participation in
hostilities.
II. Procedure for the selection and
contracting of PMSCs
2.
To assess the capacity of the PMSC to carry out its activities

in conformity with relevant national law, international
humanitarian law and international human rights law,
taking into account the inherent risk associated with the
services to be performed, for instance by:
a)
b)
c)
36
acquiring information relating to the principal services

the PMSC has provided in the past;
obtaining references from clients for whom the PMSC
has previously provided similar services to those the
Contracting State is seeking to acquire;
acquiring information relating to the PMSCs
ownership structure and conducting background
checks on the PMSC and its superior personnel, taking
into account relations with subcontractors, subsidiary
corporations and ventures.
3.
To provide adequate resources and draw on relevant

expertise for selecting and contracting PMSCs.
4.
To ensure transparency and supervision in the selection and

contracting of PMSCs. Relevant mechanisms may include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
public disclosure of PMSC contracting regulations,

practices and processes;
public disclosure of general information about specific
contracts, if necessary redacted to address national
security, privacy and commercial confidentiality
requirements;
publication of an overview of incident reports or
complaints, and sanctions taken where misconduct has
been proven; if necessary redacted to address national
requirements;
oversight by parliamentary bodies, including through
annual reports or notification of particular contracts to
such bodies.
III. Criteria for the selection of PMSCs
5.
To adopt criteria that include quality indicators relevant

to ensuring respect for relevant national law, international
humanitarian law and human rights law, as set out in good
practices 6 to 13. Contracting States should consider ensuring
that lowest price not be the only criterion for the selection of
PMSCs.
6.
To take into account, within available means, the past

conduct of the PMSC and its personnel, which includes
ensuring that the PMSC has:
37
a)
b)
c)
no reliably attested record of involvement in serious

crime (including organised crime, violent crime, sexual
offences, violations of international humanitarian law,
bribery and corruption) and, insofar as the PMSC or
its personnel had engaged in past unlawful conduct,
has appropriately remedied such conduct, including
by effectively cooperating with official authorities,
taking disciplinary measures against those involved,
and, where appropriate and consistent with findings
of wrongdoing, providing individuals injured by their
conduct with appropriate reparation;
conducted comprehensive inquiries within applicable
law regarding the extent to which any of its personnel,
particularly those who are required to carry weapons
as part of their duties, have a reliably attested record
of not having been involved in serious crime or have
not been dishonourably discharged from armed or
security forces;
not previously been rejected from a contract due to
misconduct of the PMSC or its personnel.
7.
To take into account the financial and economic capacity of

the PMSC, including for liabilities that it may incur.
8.
To take into account whether it and its personnel possess

or are in the process of obtaining requisite registrations,
licenses or authorisations.
9.
To take into account whether it maintains accurate and up

to date personnel and property records, in particular, with
regard to weapons and ammunition, available for inspection
on demand by the Contracting State and other appropriate
authorities.
38
10.
To take into account that the PMSCs personnel are

sufficiently trained, both prior to any deployment and on an
ongoing basis, to respect relevant national law, international
humanitarian law and human rights law; and to establish
goals to facilitate uniformity and standardisation of training
requirements. Training could include general and task- and
context-specific topics, preparing personnel for performance
under the specific contract and in the specific environment,
such as:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
rules on the use of force and firearms;

international humanitarian law and human rights law;
religious, gender, and cultural issues, and respect for
the local population;
handling complaints by the civilian population, in
particular by transmitting them to the appropriate
authority;
measures against bribery, corruption, and other
crimes.
Contracting States consider continuously reassessing the

level of training by, for example, requiring regular reporting
on the part of PMSCs.
11.
To take into account whether the PMSC:

a)
b)
c)
12.
acquires its equipment, in particular its weapons,

lawfully;
uses equipment, in particular weapons, that is not
prohibited by international law;
has complied with contractual provisions concerning
return and/or disposition of weapons and ammunition.
To take into account the PMSCs internal organisation and

regulations, such as:
39
a)
b)
13.
To consider the respect of the PMSC for the welfare of its

personnel, as protected by labour law and other relevant
national law. Relevant factors may include:
a)
b)
c)
40
the existence and implementation of policies relating

to international humanitarian law and human rights
law, especially on the use of force and firearms, as
well as policies against bribery, corruption, and other
crimes;
the existence of monitoring and supervisory as well as
internal accountability mechanisms, such as:
i.
internal
investigation
and
disciplinary
arrangements in case of allegations of wrongdoing by its personnel;
ii.
mechanisms enabling persons affected by the
conduct of the personnel of the PMSC to lodge a
complaint, including both third party complaint
mechanisms and whistle-blower protection
arrangements; and
iii. regular
performance
reporting,
specific
incident reporting, and reporting on demand
to the Contracting State and under certain
circumstances other appropriate authorities;
iv. requiring PMSC personnel and its subcontracted
personnel to report any misconduct to the
PMSCs management or a competent authority.
providing personnel a copy of any contract to which

they are party in a language they understand;
providing personnel with adequate pay and
remuneration arrangements commensurate to their
responsibilities and working conditions;
adopting operational safety and health policies;
d)
e)
ensuring personnel unrestricted access to their own

travel documents; and
preventing unlawful discrimination in employment.
IV. Terms of contract with PMSCs
14.
To include contractual clauses and performance requirements

that ensure respect for relevant national law, international
humanitarian law and human rights law by the contracted
PMSC. Such clauses, reflecting and implementing the
quality indicators referred to above as selection criteria, may
include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
past conduct (good practice 6);

financial and economic capacity (good practice 7);
possession of required registration, licenses or
authorisations (good practice 8);
personnel and property records (good practice 9);
training (good practice 10);
lawful acquisition and use of equipment, in particular
weapons (good practice 11);
internal organisation and regulation and accountability
(good practice 12);
welfare of personnel (good practice 13);
Contractual clauses may also provide for the Contracting

States ability to terminate the contract for failure to comply
with contractual provisions. They may also specify the
weapons required for contract performance, that PMSCs
obtain appropriate visas or other authorizations from
the Territorial State, and that appropriate reparation be
provided to those harmed by the misconduct of PMSCs and
their personnel.
41
15.
To require by contract that the conduct of any subcontracted

PMSC is in conformity with relevant national law,
international humanitarian law and international human
rights law, including by:
a)
b)
c)
16.
establishing the criteria and qualifications for the

selection and ongoing employment of subcontracted
PMSCs and personnel;
requiring the PMSC to demonstrate that subcontractors
comply with equivalent requirements as the PMSC
initially contracted by the Contracting State;
ensuring that the PMSC is liable, as appropriate
and within applicable law, for the conduct of its
subcontractors.
To require, if consistent with force protection requirements

and safety of the assigned mission, that the personnel of the
PMSC be personally identifiable whenever they are carrying
out activities in discharge of their responsibilities under a
contract. Identification should:
a)
b)
be visible from a distance where mission and context

allow, or consist of a non-transferable identification
card that is shown upon demand;
allow for a clear distinction between a PMSCs
personnel and the public authorities in the State where
the PMSC operates.
The same should apply to all means of transport used by

PMSCs.
17.
42
To consider pricing and duration of a specific contract as

a way to promote relevant international humanitarian law
and human rights law. Relevant mechanisms may include:
a)
b)
c)
18.
securities or bonds for contractual performance;

financial rewards or penalties and incentives;
opportunities to compete for additional contracts.
To require, in consultation with the Territorial State, respect

of relevant regulations and rules of conduct by PMSCs and
their personnel, including rules on the use of force and
firearms, such as:
a)
b)
using force and firearms only when necessary in selfdefence or defence of third persons;
immediate reporting to and cooperation with
competent authorities, including the appropriate
contracting official, in the case of use of force and
firearms.
V. Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability
19.
To provide for criminal jurisdiction in their national

legislation over crimes under international law and their
national law committed by PMSCs and their personnel and,
in addition, to consider establishing:
a)
b)
20.
corporate criminal responsibility for crimes committed

by the PMSC, consistent with the Contracting States
national legal system;
criminal jurisdiction over serious crimes committed
by PMSC personnel abroad.
To provide for non-criminal accountability mechanisms for

improper or unlawful conduct of PMSCs and their personnel,
including:
a)
contractual sanctions commensurate to the conduct,

including :
43
i.
b)
c)
21.
To provide for, in addition to the measures in good practices

19 and 20, appropriate administrative and other monitoring
mechanisms to ensure the proper execution of the contract
and the accountability of contracted PMSCs and their
personnel for their improper and unlawful conduct; in
particular to:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
44
immediate or graduated termination of the

contract;
ii.
financial penalties;
iii. removal from consideration for future contracts,
possibly for a set time period;
iv. removal of individual wrongdoers from the
performance of the contract;
referral of the matter to competent investigative
authorities;
providing for civil liability, as appropriate.
ensure that those mechanisms are adequately resourced

and have independent audit and investigation
capacity;
provide Contracting State government personnel onsite with the capacity and authority to oversee proper
execution of the contract by the PMSC and the PMSCs
subcontractors;
train relevant government personnel, such as military
personnel, for foreseeable interactions with PMSC
personnel;
collect information concerning PMSCs and personnel
contracted and deployed, and on violations and
investigations concerning their alleged improper and
unlawful conduct;
establish control arrangements, allowing it to veto or
remove particular PMSC personnel during contractual
performance;
f)
22.
When negotiating agreements with Territorial States which

contain rules affecting the legal status of and jurisdiction
over PMSCs and their personnel:
a)
b)
23.
engage PMSCs, Territorial States, Home States, trade

associations, civil society and other relevant actors
to foster information sharing and develop such
mechanisms.
to consider the impact of the agreements on the

compliance with national laws and regulations;
to address the issue of jurisdiction and immunities
to ascertain proper coverage and appropriate civil,
criminal, and administrative remedies for misconduct,
in order to ensure accountability of PMSCs and their
personnel.
To cooperate with investigating or regulatory authorities of

Territorial and Home States, as appropriate, in matters of
common concern regarding PMSCs.
B. GOOD PRACTICES FOR TERRITORIAL STATES
The following good practices aim to provide guidance

to Territorial States for governing the supply of military and
security services by PMSCs and their personnel on their territory.
Territorial States should evaluate whether their domestic legal
framework is adequate to ensure that the conduct of PMSCs
and their personnel is in conformity with relevant national law,
international humanitarian law and human rights law or whether
it needs to establish further arrangements to regulate the activities
of PMSCs.
Acknowledging the particular challenges faced by Territorial
States in armed conflict, Territorial States may accept information
45
provided by the Contracting State concerning the ability of a

PMSC to carry out its activities in conformity with international
humanitarian law, human rights law and relevant good practices.
In this sense, good practices for Territorial States include the
following:
24.
To determine which services may or may not be carried out on

their territory by PMSCs or their personnel; in determining
which services may not be carried out, Territorial States take
into account factors such as whether a particular service
could cause PMSC personnel to become involved in direct
participation in hostilities.
II. Authorisation to provide military and security services
25.
To require PMSCs to obtain an authorisation to

provide military and security services in their territory
(authorisation), including by requiring:
a)
b)
PMSCs to obtain an operating license valid for a limited

and renewable period (corporate operating license),
or for specific services (specific operating license),
taking into account the fulfilment of the quality criteria
set out in good practices 31 to 38; and/or;
individuals to register or obtain a license in order to
carry out military or security services for PMSCs.
III. Procedure with regard to authorisations
26.
46
To designate a central authority competent for granting

authorisations.
27.
To allocate adequate resources and trained personnel to

handle authorisations properly and timely.
28.
To assess, in determining whether to grant an authorisation,

the capacity of the PMSC to carry out its activities in conformity
with relevant national law, international humanitarian law
and international human rights law, taking into account the
inherent risk associated with the services to be performed,
for instance by:
a)
b)
c)
29.

has previously provided similar services or clients in
the Territorial State;
ownership structure and conduct background checks
on the PMSC and its personnel, taking into account
relations with subcontractors, subsidiary corporations
and ventures, or obtain information from the
Contracting State on these matters.
To ensure transparency with regard to authorisations.

Relevant mechanisms may include:
a)
b)
c)
public disclosure of authorisation regulations and

procedures;
public disclosure of general information on granted
authorisations, including on the identity of authorised
PMSCs and their number of personnel, if necessary
redacted to address national security, privacy and
commercial confidentiality requirements;
publication of an overview of incident reports or
complaints, and sanctions taken where misconduct has
been proven; if necessary redacted to address national
47
d)
e)

requirements;
such bodies;
publishing and adhering to fair and non-discriminatory
fee schedules for authorisations.
IV. Criteria for granting an authorisation
30.
To ensure that PMSCs fulfil certain quality criteria relevant

for the respect of relevant national law, international
humanitarian law and human rights law by the PMSC and
its personnel, including those set out below.
31.
To require that the conduct of PMSCs and of any PMSC

subcontracted is in conformity with relevant national law,
international humanitarian law and international human
rights law, which includes ensuring that:
a)
b)
c)
d)
32.
48
the PMSC notifies any subcontracting of military and

security services to the authorisation authority;
the PMSC can demonstrate that its subcontractors
comply with equivalent requirements as the PMSC
which initially obtained an authorisation by the
Territorial State;
the subcontractor is in possession of an authorisation;
the PMSC initially granted authorisation is liable, as
appropriate and within applicable law, for the conduct
of its subcontractors.
To take into account, within available means, the past

conduct of the PMSC and its personnel, which includes
ensuring that the PMSC has:
a)
b)
c)

has appropriately dealt with such conduct, including
and where appropriate and consistent with findings
law regarding the extent to which any of its personnel,
security forces;
not previously had an operating license revoked for
33.

34.
To take into account whether the PMSC maintains accurate

and up to date personnel and property records, in particular,
with regard to weapons and ammunition, available for
inspection on demand by the Territorial State and other
authorities.
35.

49

such as:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
rules on the use of force and weapons;

complaints handling;
measures against bribery, corruption, and other
crimes.
Territorial States consider continuously reassessing the level

of training by, for example, requiring regular reporting on
the part of PMSCs.
36.
Not to grant an authorisation to a PMSC whose weapons

are acquired unlawfully or whose use is prohibited by
international law.
37.

a)
b)
50

law, especially on the use of force and firearms, as well
as policies against bribery and corruption;
the existence of monitoring and supervisory measures
as well as internal accountability mechanisms, such as:
i.
internal
investigation
and
disciplinary
ii.
iii.
iv.
complaint, including both third party complaints

arrangements;
regular reporting on the performance of the
assignment and/or specific incident reporting;
requiring PMSC personnel and its subcontracted
personnel to report any misconduct to the
PMSCs management or a competent authority.
38.

personnel.
39.
To take into account, in considering whether to grant a

license or to register an individual, good practices 32 (past
conduct) and 35 (training).
V. Terms of authorisation
40.
To include clauses to ensure that the conduct of the PMSC

and its personnel is continuously in conformity with
relevant national law, international humanitarian law and
international human rights law. The authorisation includes,
where appropriate, clauses requiring the PMSC and its
personnel to implement the quality criteria referred to above
as criteria for granting general and/or specific operating
licenses and relating to:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

lawful acquisitions (good practice 36);
(good practice 37);
welfare of personnel (good practice 38);
51
41.
To require the PMSC to post a bond that would be forfeited in

case of misconduct or non-compliance with the authorisation,
provided that the PMSC has a fair opportunity to rebut
allegations and address problems.
42.
To determine, when granting a specific operating license,

a maximum number of PMSC personnel and equipment
understood to be necessary to provide the services.
VI.
Rules on the provision of services by PMSCs and

their personnel
43.
To have in place appropriate rules on the use of force and

firearms by PMSCs and their personnel, such as:
a)
b)
44.
To have in place appropriate rules on the possession of

weapons by PMSCs and their personnel, such as:
a)
b)
c)
d)
52
using force and firearms only when necessary in selfdefence or defence of third persons;
immediately reporting to and cooperation with
competent authorities in the case of use of force and
firearms.
limiting the types and quantity of weapons and

ammunition that a PMSC may import, possess or
acquire;
requiring the registration of weapons, including their
serial number and calibre, and ammunition, with a
competent authority;
requiring PMSC personnel to obtain an authorisation
to carry weapons that is shown upon demand;
limiting the number of employees allowed to carry
weapons in a specific context or area;
e)
f)
g)
45.
requiring the storage of weapons and ammunition in

a secure and safe facility when personnel are off duty;
requiring that PMSC personnel carry authorised
weapons only while on duty;
controlling the further possession and use of weapons
and ammunition after an assignment is completed,
including return to point of origin or other proper
disposition of weapons and ammunition.
To require, if consistent with force protection requirements

and safety of the assigned mission, that the personnel of the
PMSC be personally identifiable whenever they are carrying
out activities in discharge of their responsibilities under a
contract. Identification should:
a)
b)
be visible from a distance where mission and context

allow, or consist of a non-transferable identification
card that is shown upon demand;
allow for a clear distinction between a PMSCs
personnel and the public authorities in the State where
the PMSC operates.
The same should apply to all means of transportation used

by PMSCs.
VII. Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability
46.
To monitor compliance with the terms of the authorisation,

in particular:
a)
b)
establish or designate an adequately resourced

monitoring authority;
ensure that the civilian population is informed about
the rules of conduct by which PMSC have to abide and
available complaint mechanisms;
53
c)
d)
requesting local authorities to report on misconduct

by PMSCs or their personnel;
investigate reports of wrongdoing.
47.
To provide a fair opportunity for PMSCs to respond to

allegations that they have operated without or in violation
of an authorisation.
48.
To impose administrative measures, if it is determined

that a PMSC has operated without or in violation of an
authorisation; such measures may include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
revocation or suspension of the authorisation or

putting the PMSC on notice of either of these steps
in case remedial measures are not taken within a set
period of time;
removing specific PMSC personnel under the penalty
of revoking or suspending the authorisation;
prohibition to re-apply for an authorisation in the
future or for a set period of time;
forfeiture of bonds or securities;
financial penalties.
49.

national law committed by PMSCs and their personnel
and, in addition, to consider establishing corporate criminal
responsibility for crimes committed by the PMSC, consistent
with the Territorial States national legal system.
50.
To provide for non-criminal accountability mechanisms for

improper and unlawful conduct of PMSC and its personnel,
including:
54
a)
b)
51.
When negotiating agreements with Contracting States which

contain rules affecting the legal status of and jurisdiction
over PMSCs and their personnel:
a)
b)
52.
providing for civil liability;

otherwise requiring PMSCs, or their clients, to provide
reparation to those harmed by the misconduct of
PMSCs and their personnel.
to consider the impact of the agreements on the

compliance with national laws and regulations;
to address the issue of jurisdiction and immunities
to ascertain proper coverage and appropriate civil,
criminal, and administrative remedies for misconduct,
in order to ensure accountability of PMSCs and their
personnel.
To cooperate with investigating and regulatory authorities

of Contracting and Home States in matters of common
concern regarding PMSCs.
C. GOOD PRACTICES FOR HOME STATES
The following good practices aim to provide guidance to

Home States for governing the supply of military and security
services by PMSCs and their personnel abroad (export). It
is recognised that other good practices for regulation - such as
regulation of standards through trade associations and through
international cooperation - will also provide guidance for
regulating PMSCs, but have not been elaborated here.
In this understanding, Home States should evaluate
whether their domestic legal framework, be it central or federal,
is adequately conducive to respect for relevant international
humanitarian law and human rights law by PMSCs and their
55
personnel, or whether, given the size and nature of their national

private military and security industry, additional measures should
be adopted to encourage such respect and to regulate the activities
of PMSCs. When considering the scope and nature of any licensing
or regulatory regime, Home States should take particular notice of
regulatory regimes by relevant Contracting and Territorial States,
in order to minimise the potential for duplicative or overlapping
regimes and to focus efforts on areas of specific concern for Home
States.
In this sense, good practices for Home States include the
following:
53.
To determine which services of PMSCs may or may not

be exported; in determining which services may not be
exported, Home States take into account factors such as
whether a particular service could cause PMSC personnel to
become involved in direct participation in hostilities.
II. Establishment of an authorisation system
54.
To consider establishing an authorisation system for the

provision of military and security services abroad through
appropriate means, such as requiring an operating license
valid for a limited and renewable period (corporate
operating license), for specific services (specific operating
license), or through other forms of authorisation (export
authorisation). If such a system of authorisation is
established, the good practices 57 to 67 set out the procedure,
quality criteria and terms that may be included in such a
system.
55.
To have in place appropriate rules on the accountability,

export, and return of weapons and ammunition by PMSCs.
56
56.
To harmonise their authorisation system and decisions

with those of other States and taking into account regional
approaches relating to authorisation systems.
III. Procedure with regard to authorisations
57.
To assess the capacity of the PMSC to carry out its activities in

respect of relevant national law, international humanitarian
law and international human rights law, taking into account
the inherent risk associated with the services to be performed,
for instance by:
a)
b)
c)

has previously provided similar services or clients in
the Territorial State;
ownership structure and conduct background checks
on the PMSC and its personnel, taking into account
relations with subcontractors, subsidiary corporations
and ventures.
58.
To allocate adequate resources and trained personnel to

handle properly and timely authorisations.
59.
To ensure transparency with regard to the authorisation

procedure. Relevant mechanisms may include:
a)
b)
public disclosure of authorisation regulations and

procedures;
public disclosure of general information on specific
authorisations, if necessary redacted to address national
requirements;
57
c)
d)

such bodies;
publishing and adhering to fair and non-discriminatory
fee schedules.
IV. Criteria for granting an authorisation
60.
To take into account the past conduct of the PMSC and its
personnel, which include ensuring that the PMSC has:
a)
b)
c)
61.
58

has appropriately dealt with such conduct, including
and where appropriate and consistent with findings
law regarding the extent to which its personnel,
security forces;
not previously had an authorisation revoked for

62.
To take into account whether the PMSC maintains accurate

and up to date personnel and property records, in particular,
with regard to weapons and ammunition, available for
inspection on demand by competent authorities.
63.

such as:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
rules on the use of force and firearms;

complaints handling;
measures against bribery, corruption and other crimes.
Home States consider continuously reassessing the level of

training by, for example, requiring regular reporting on the
part of PMSCs.
64.
To take into account whether the PMSCs equipment, in

particular its weapons, is acquired lawfully and its use is
not prohibited by international law.
65.

59
a)

law;
the existence of monitoring and supervisory as well as
internal accountability mechanisms, such as:
i.
internal
investigation
and
disciplinary
ii.
complaint, including both third party complaints
arrangements.
b)
66.

personnel as protected by labour law and other relevant
national law.
V. Terms of authorisation granted to PMSCs
67.
To include clauses to ensure that the conduct of the PMSC

and its personnel respect relevant national law, international
humanitarian law and international human rights law. Such
clauses, reflecting and implementing the quality criteria
referred to above as criteria for granting authorisations, may
include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
60

lawful acquisitions (good practice 64);
(good practice 65);
welfare of personnel (good practice 66).
VI. Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability
68.
To monitor compliance with the terms of the authorisation, in

particular by establishing close links between its authorities
granting authorisations and its representatives abroad and/
or with the authorities of the Contracting or Territorial State.
69.
To impose sanctions for PMSCs operating without or in

violation of an authorisation, such as:
a)
b)
c)
revocation or suspension of the authorisation or

putting the PMSC on notice of either of these steps
in case remedial measures are not taken within a set
period of time;
prohibition to re-apply for an authorisation in the
future or for a set period of time;
civil and criminal fines and penalties.
70.
To support Territorial States in their efforts to establish

effective monitoring over PMSCs.
71.

national law committed by PMSCs and their personnel and,
in addition, consider establishing:
a)
b)
72.
corporate criminal responsibility for crimes committed

by the PMSC, consistent with the Home States national
legal system;
criminal jurisdiction over serious crimes committed
by PMSC personnel abroad.
To provide for non-criminal accountability mechanisms

for improper and unlawful conduct of PMSCs and their
personnel, including:
61
a)
b)
73.
62
providing for civil liability;

otherwise requiring PMSCs to provide reparation to
those harmed by the misconduct of PMSCs and their
personnel.
To cooperate with investigating or regulatory authorities of

Contracting and Territorial States, as appropriate, in matters
of common concern regarding PMSCs.
Annex II:
INTERNATIONAL
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE
PROVIDERS
A. PREAMBLE
1.
Private Security Companies and other Private Security

Service Providers (collectively PSCs) play an important
role in protecting state and non-state clients engaged in relief,
recovery, and reconstruction efforts, commercial business
operations, diplomacy and military activity. In providing
these services, the activities of PSCs can have potentially
positive and negative consequences for their clients, the
local population in the area of operation, the general security
environment, the enjoyment of human rights and the rule of
law.
2.
The Montreux Document On Pertinent International

Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related
to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies
63
During Armed Conflict recognizes that well-established

rules of international law apply to States in their relations
with private security service providers and provides for good
practices relating to PSCs. The Respect, Protect, Remedy
framework developed by the Special Representative of the
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General on Business and
Human Rights, and welcomed by the UN Human Rights
Council, entails acting with due diligence to avoid infringing
the rights of others.
3.
Building on these foundations, the Signatory Companies

to this International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers (the Code) endorse the principles of
the Montreux Document and the aforementioned Respect,
Protect, Remedy framework as they apply to PSCs. In so
doing, the Signatory Companies commit to the responsible
provision of Security Services so as to support the rule of
law, respect the human rights of all persons, and protect the
interests of their clients.
4.
The Signatory Companies affirm that they have a

responsibility to respect the human rights of, and fulfil
humanitarian responsibilities towards, all those affected
by their business activities, including Personnel, Clients,
suppliers, shareholders, and the population of the area in
which services are provided. The Signatory Companies also
recognize the importance of respecting the various cultures
encountered in their work, as well as the individuals they
come into contact with as a result of those activities.
5.
The purpose of this Code is to set forth a commonly-agreed

set of principles for PSCs and to establish a foundation to
translate those principles into related standards as well as
governance and oversight mechanisms.
64
6.
Signatory Companies commit to the following, as set forth

in this Code:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
7.
to operate in accordance with this Code;

to operate in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations, and in accordance with relevant corporate
standards of business conduct;
to operate in a manner that recognizes and supports
the rule of law; respects human rights, and protects
the interests of their clients;
to take steps to establish and maintain an effective
internal governance framework in order to deter,
monitor, report, and effectively address adverse
impacts on human rights;
to provide a means for responding to and resolving
allegations of activity that violates any applicable
national or international law or this Code; and
to cooperate in good faith with national and international
authorities exercising proper jurisdiction, in particular
with regard to national and international investigations
of violations of national and international criminal
law, of violations of international humanitarian law,
or of human rights abuses.
Those establishing this Code recognize that this Code

acts as a founding instrument for a broader initiative to
create better governance, compliance and accountability.
Recognizing that further effort is necessary to implement
effectively the principles of this Code, Signatory Companies
accordingly commit to work with states, other Signatory
Companies, Clients and other relevant stakeholders after
initial endorsement of this Code to, within 18 months:
65
a)
b)
Establish objective and measurable standards

for providing Security Services based upon this
Code, with the objective of realizing common and
internationally-recognized operational and business
practice standards; and
Establish external independent mechanisms for
effective governance and oversight, which will include
Certification of Signatory Companies compliance
with the Codes principles and the standards derived
from the Code, beginning with adequate policies and
procedures, Auditing and Monitoring of their work
in the field, including Reporting, and execution of a
mechanism to address alleged violations of the Codes
principles or the standards derived from the Code;
and thereafter to consider the development of additional

principles and standards for related services, such as training
of external forces, the provision of maritime security services
and the participation in operations related to detainees and
other protected persons.
8.
66
Signature of this Code is the first step in a process towards

full compliance. Signatory Companies need to: (1) establish
and/or demonstrate internal processes to meet the
requirements of the Codes principles and the standards
derived from the Code; and (2) once the governance and
oversight mechanism is established, become certified by and
submit to ongoing independent Auditing and verification
by that mechanism. Signatory Companies undertake to be
transparent regarding their progress towards implementing
the Codes principles and the standards derived from the
Code. Companies will not claim they are certified under this
Code until Certification has been granted by the governance
and oversight mechanism as outlined below.
B. DEFINITIONS
These definitions are only intended to apply exclusively in

the context of this Code.
Auditing a process through which independent auditors,
accredited by the governance and oversight mechanism, conduct
on-site audits, including in the field, on a periodic basis, gathering
data to be reported to the governance and oversight mechanism
which will in turn verify whether a Company is meeting
requirements and if not, what remediation may be required.
Certification a process through which the governance and
oversight mechanism will certify that a Companys systems and
policies meet the Codes principles and the standards derived
from the Code and that a Company is undergoing Monitoring,
Auditing, and verification, including in the field, by the governance
and oversight mechanism. Certification is one element of a larger
effort needed to ensure the credibility of any Implementation and
oversight initiative.
Client an entity that hires, has formerly hired, or intends
to hire a PSC to perform Security Services on its behalf, including,
as appropriate, where such a PSC subcontracts with another
Company.
Company any kind of business entity or form, such as
a sole proprietorship, partnership, company (whether public or
private), or corporation, and Companies shall be interpreted
accordingly.
Competent Authority any state or intergovernmental
organization which has jurisdiction over the activities and/
or persons in question and Competent Authorities shall be
interpreted accordingly.
67
Complex Environments any areas experiencing or

recovering from unrest or instability, whether due to natural
disasters or armed conflicts, where the rule of law has been
substantially undermined, and in which the capacity of the state
authority to handle the situation is diminished, limited, or nonexistent.
Implementation the introduction of policy, governance
and oversight mechanisms and training of Personnel and/or
subcontractors by Signatory Companies, necessary to demonstrate
compliance with the Codes principles and the standards derived
from this Code.
Monitoring a process for gathering data on whether
Company Personnel, or subcontractors, are operating in compliance
with the Codes principles and standards derived from this Code.
Personnel persons working for a PSC, whether as
employees or under a contract, including its staff, managers and
directors. For the avoidance of doubt, persons are considered to be
personnel if they are connected to a PSC through an employment
contract (fixed term, permanent or open-ended) or a contract of
assignment (whether renewable or not), or if they are independent
contractors, or temporary workers and/or interns (whether paid
or unpaid), regardless of the specific designation used by the
Company concerned.
Private Security Companies and Private Security Service
Providers (collectively PSCs) any Company (as defined
in this Code) whose business activities include the provision of
Security Services either on its own behalf or on behalf of another,
irrespective of how such Company describes itself.
Reporting a process covered by necessary confidentiality
and nondisclosure arrangements through which companies
68
will submit to a governance and oversight mechanism a written

assessment of their performance pursuant to a transparent set of
criteria established by the mechanism.
Security Services guarding and protection of persons and
objects, such as convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or
other places (whether armed or unarmed), or any other activity
for which the Personnel of Companies are required to carry or
operate a weapon in the performance of their duties.
Signatory Companies are PSCs that have signed and
agreed to operate in compliance with the Codes principles and
the standards derived from the Code and Signatory Company
shall be interpreted accordingly.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
9.
In recognition of the additional steps to be taken to

support the Implementation of this Code in particular the
development of standards based on the Code (standards)
and an independent governance and oversight mechanism
(the mechanism) as outlined in the Preamble Signatory
Companies intend to, along with other interested
stakeholders, convene regularly to review progress toward
those steps.
10.
Upon signature of the Code, Signatory Companies and

other stakeholders will undertake to work with national
standards bodies as appropriate to develop standards, with
the intent that any national standards would eventually be
harmonized in an international set of standards based on
the Code.
11.
Upon signature of the Code, Signatory Companies and

other stakeholders will appoint a multi-stakeholder steering
69
committee of 6-9 members who will function as a temporary

board. This steering committee will be responsible for
developing and documenting the initial arrangements for
the independent governance and oversight mechanism,
including by-laws or a charter which will outline mandate
and governing policies for the mechanism. The Steering
Committee will endeavour to complete a work plan for
constituting the mechanism before the end of March 2011,
and further to develop the bylaws/charter by the end of July
2011 and an operational plan before the end of November 2011.
12.
After the independent governance and oversight mechanism

has been constituted (by the adoption of bylaws/charter),
the governance and oversight mechanism shall accept
responsibility for maintenance and administration of the
Code, and shall determine whether and how it is appropriate
for the mechanism and standards to be reflected in the text
of the Code itself.
D. GENERAL PROVISIONS
13.
This Code articulates principles applicable to the actions of

Signatory Companies while performing Security Services in
Complex Environments.
14.
This Code complements and does not replace the control

exercised by Competent Authorities, and does not limit or
alter applicable international law or relevant national law.
The Code itself creates no legal obligations and no legal
liabilities on the Signatory Companies, beyond those which
already exist under national or international law. Nothing in
this Code shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in
any way existing or developing rules of international law.
70
15.
This Code may be modified in accordance with procedures to

be established by the governance and oversight mechanism.
E. GENERAL COMMITMENTS
16.
Signatory Companies agree to operate in accordance with

the principles contained in this Code. Signatory Companies
will require that their Personnel, and all subcontractors or
other parties carrying out Security Services under Signatory
Company contracts, operate in accordance with the principles
contained in this Code.
17.
Signatory Companies will implement appropriate policies

and oversight with the intent that the actions of their
Personnel comply at all times with the principles contained
herein.
18.
Signatory Companies will make compliance with this Code

an integral part of contractual agreements with Personnel
and subcontractors or other parties carrying out Security
Services under their contracts.
19.
Signatory Companies will adhere to this Code, even when

the Code is not included in a contractual agreement with a
Client.
20.
Signatory Companies will not knowingly enter into

contracts where performance would directly and materially
conflict with the principles of this Code, applicable national
or international law, or applicable local, regional and
international human rights law, and are not excused by any
contractual obligation from complying with this Code. To
the maximum extent possible, Signatory Companies will
interpret and perform contracts in a manner that is consistent
with this Code.
71
21.
Signatory Companies will comply, and will require their

Personnel to comply, with applicable law which may include
international humanitarian law, and human rights law as
imposed upon them by applicable national law, as well as all
other applicable international and national law. Signatory
Companies will exercise due diligence to ensure compliance
with the law and with the principles contained in this Code,
and will respect the human rights of persons they come into
contact with, including, the rights to freedom of expression,
association, and peaceful assembly and against arbitrary
or unlawful interference with privacy or deprivation of
property.
22.
Signatory Companies agree not to contract with, support

or service any government, person, or entity in a manner
that would be contrary to United Nations Security Council
sanctions. Signatory Companies will not, and will require
that their Personnel do not, participate in, encourage, or
seek to benefit from any national or international crimes
including but not limited to war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, torture, enforced disappearance,
forced or compulsory labour, hostage-taking, sexual or
gender-based violence, human trafficking, the trafficking of
weapons or drugs, child labour or extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions.
23.
Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their

Personnel do not, invoke contractual obligations, superior
orders or exceptional circumstances such as an armed
conflict or an imminent armed conflict, a threat to national
or international security, internal political instability, or any
other public emergency, as a justification for engaging in
any of the conduct identified in paragraph 22 of this Code.
72
24.
Signatory Companies will report, and will require their

Personnel to report, known or reasonable suspicion of the
commission of any of the acts identified in paragraph 22 of
this Code to the Client and one or more of the following:
the Competent Authorities in the country where the act took
place, the country of nationality of the victim, or the country
of nationality of the perpetrator.
25.
Signatory Companies will take reasonable steps to ensure

that the goods and services they provide are not used to
violate human rights law or international humanitarian
law, and such goods and services are not derived from such
violations.
26.

Personnel do not, consistent with applicable national and
international law, promise, offer, or give to any public
official, directly or indirectly, anything of value for the
public official himself or herself or another person or entity,
in order that the public official act or refrain from acting in
the exercise of his or her official duties if such inducement is
illegal. Signatory Companies will not, and will require their
Personnel do not, solicit or accept, directly or indirectly,
anything of value in exchange for not complying with
national and international law and/or standards, or with
the principles contained within this Code.
27.
Signatory Companies are responsible for establishing a

corporate culture that promotes awareness of and adherence
by all Personnel to the principles of this Code. Signatory
Companies will require their Personnel to comply with this
Code, which will include providing sufficient training to
ensure Personnel are capable of doing so.
73
F. SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE

CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL
General Conduct
28.
Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel

to, treat all persons humanely and with respect for their
dignity and privacy and will report any breach of this Code.
Rules for the Use of Force
29.
Signatory Companies will adopt Rules for the Use of

Force consistent with applicable law and the minimum
requirements contained in the section on Use of Force in this
Code and agree those rules with the Client.
Use of Force
30.
Signatory Companies will require their Personnel to take all

reasonable steps to avoid the use of force. If force is used, it
shall be in a manner consistent with applicable law. In no
case shall the use of force exceed what is strictly necessary,
and should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to
the situation.
31.
Signatory Companies will require that their Personnel not use

firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of
others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury,
or to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime
involving grave threat to life.
32.
To the extent that Personnel are formally authorized to

assist in the exercise of a states law enforcement authority,
Signatory Companies will require that their use of force or
weapons will comply with all national and international
74
obligations applicable to regular law enforcement officials of

that state and, as a minimum, with the standards expressed
in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990).
Detention
33.
Signatory Companies will only, and will require their

Personnel will only, guard, transport, or question detainees
if: (a) the Company has been specifically contracted to
do so by a state; and (b) its Personnel are trained in the
applicable national and international law.
Signatory
Companies will, and will require that their Personnel, treat
all detained persons humanely and consistent with their
status and protections under applicable human rights law
or international humanitarian law, including in particular
prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Apprehending Persons
34.

to, not take or hold any persons except when apprehending
persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent
threat of violence, or following an attack or crime committed
by such persons against Company Personnel, or against
clients or property under their protection, pending the
handover of such detained persons to the Competent
Authority at the earliest opportunity. Any such apprehension
must be consistent with applicable national or international
law and be reported to the Client without delay. Signatory
Companies will, and will require that their Personnel to,
treat all apprehended persons humanely and consistent
with their status and protections under applicable human
rights law or international humanitarian law, including in
75
particular prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or

degrading treatment or punishment.
Prohibition of Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment
35.

Personnel not, engage in torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment. For the avoidance
of doubt, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, as referred to here, includes
conduct by a private entity which would constitute torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
if committed by a public official.
36.
Contractual obligations, superior orders or exceptional

circumstances such as an armed conflict or an imminent
armed conflict, a threat to national or international security,
internal political instability, or any other public emergency,
can never be a justification for engaging in torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
37.
Signatory Companies will, and will require that their

Personnel, report any acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, known to them, or
of which they have reasonable suspicion. Such reports will
be made to the Client and one or more of the following: the
competent authorities in the country where the acts took
place, the country of nationality of the victim, or the country
of nationality of the perpetrator.
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse or Gender-Based Violence
38.
76
Signatory Companies will not benefit from, nor allow their

Personnel to engage in or benefit from, sexual exploitation
(including, for these purposes, prostitution) and abuse or

gender-based violence or crimes, either within the Company
or externally, including rape, sexual harassment, or any other
form of sexual abuse or violence. Signatory Companies will,
and will require their Personnel to, remain vigilant for all
instances of sexual or gender-based violence and, where
discovered, report such instances to competent authorities.
Human Trafficking
39.
Signatory Companies will not, and will require their

Personnel not to, engage in trafficking in persons. Signatory
Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, remain
vigilant for all instances of trafficking in persons and, where
discovered, report such instances to Competent Authorities.
For the purposes of this Code, human trafficking is the
recruitment, harbouring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining of a person for (1) a commercial sex act induced
by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced
to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or (2)
labour or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion
for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, debt
bondage, or slavery.
Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour
40.
Signatory Companies will not use slavery, forced or

compulsory labour, or be complicit in any other entitys use
of such labour.
Prohibition on the Worst Forms of Child Labour
41.
Signatory Companies will respect the rights of children

(anyone under the age of 18) to be protected from the worst
forms of child labour, including:
77
a)
b)
c)
d)
all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such

as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and
serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including
forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use
in provision of armed services;
the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution,
for the production of pornography or for pornographic
performances;
the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit
activities, in particular for the production and
trafficking of drugs;
work which, by its nature or the circumstances in
which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health,
safety or morals of children.

to, report any instances of the activities referenced above that
they know of, or have reasonable suspicion of, to Competent
Authorities.
Discrimination
42.

Personnel do not, discriminate on grounds of race, colour,
sex, religion, social origin, social status, indigenous status,
disability, or sexual orientation when hiring Personnel and
will select Personnel on the basis of the inherent requirements
of the contract.
Identification and Registering
43.
78
Signatory Companies, to the extent consistent with

reasonable security requirements and the safety of civilians,
their Personnel and Clients, will:
a)
b)
c)
require all Personnel to be individually identifiable

whenever they are carrying out activities in discharge
of their contractual responsibilities;
ensure that their vehicles are registered and licensed
with the relevant national authorities whenever
they are carrying out activities in discharge of their
contractual responsibilities; and
will ensure that all hazardous materials are registered
and licensed with the relevant national authorities.
G. SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS REGARDING MANAGEMENT

AND GOVERNANCE
Incorporation of the Code into Company Policies

44.
Signatory Companies will incorporate this Code into

Company policies and internal control and compliance
systems and integrate it into all relevant elements of their
operations.
Selection and Vetting of Personnel
45.
Signatory Companies will exercise due diligence in the

selection of Personnel, including verifiable vetting and
ongoing performance review of their Personnel. Signatory
Companies will only hire individuals with the requisite
qualifications as defined by the applicable contract,
applicable national law and industry standards, and the
principles contained in this Code.
46.
Signatory Companies will not hire individuals under the

age of 18 years to carry out Security Services.
47.
Signatory Companies will assess and ensure the continued

ability of Personnel to perform their duties in accordance
79
with the principles of this Code and will regularly evaluate

Personnel to ensure that they meet appropriate physical and
mental fitness standards to perform their contracted duties.
48.
Signatory Companies will establish and maintain internal

policies and procedures to determine the suitability of
applicants, or Personnel, to carry weapons as part of their
duties. At a minimum, this will include checks that they
have not:
a)
b)
c)
d)
been convicted of a crime that would indicate that the

individual lacks the character and fitness to perform
security services pursuant to the principles of this
Code;
been dishonourably discharged;
had other employment or engagement contracts
terminated for documented violations of one or more
of the principles contained in this Code; or
had a history of other conduct that, according to an
objectively reasonable standard, brings into question
their fitness to carry a weapon.
For the purposes of this paragraph, disqualifying crimes

may include, but are not limited to, battery, murder,
arson, fraud, rape, sexual abuse, organized crime, bribery,
corruption, perjury, torture, kidnapping, drug trafficking
or trafficking in persons. This provision shall not override
any law restricting whether a crime may be considered
in evaluating an applicant. Nothing in this section would
prohibit a Company from utilizing more stringent criteria.
49.
80
Signatory Companies will require all applicants to

authorize access to prior employment records and available
Government records as a condition for employment or
engagement. This includes records relating to posts held
with the military, police or public or Private Security

Providers. Moreover, Signatory Companies will, consistent
with applicable national law, require all Personnel to agree
to participate in internal investigations and disciplinary
procedures as well as in any public investigations conducted
by competent authorities, except where prohibited by law.
Selection and Vetting of Subcontractors
50.
Signatory Companies will exercise due diligence in the

selection, vetting and ongoing performance review of all
subcontractors performing Security Services.
51.
In accordance with principle 13 of this Code, Signatory

Companies will require that their Personnel and all
subcontractors and other parties carrying out Security
Services under the contract, operate in accordance with the
principles contained in this Code and the standards derived
from the Code. If a Company contracts with an individual
or any other group or entity to perform Security Services,
and that individual or group is not able to fulfil the selection,
vetting and training principles contained in this Code and the
standards derived from the Code, the contracting Company
will take reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that all
selection, vetting and training of subcontractors Personnel
is conducted in accordance with the principles contained in
this Code and the standards derived from the Code.
Company Policies and Personnel Contracts
52.
Signatory Companies will ensure that their policies on the

nature and scope of services they provide, on hiring of
Personnel and other relevant Personnel reference materials
such as Personnel contracts include appropriate incorporation
of this Code and relevant and applicable labour laws.
81
Contract terms and conditions will be clearly communicated

and available in a written form to all Personnel in a format
and language that is accessible to them.
53.
Signatory Companies will keep employment and service

records and reports on all past and present personnel for a
period of 7 (seven) years. Signatory Companies will require
all Personnel to authorize the access to, and retention of,
employment records and available Government records,
except where prohibited by law. Such records will be
made available to any compliance mechanism established
pursuant to this Code or Competent Authority on request,
except where prohibited by law.
54.
Signatory Companies will only hold passports, other travel

documents, or other identification documents of their
Personnel for the shortest period of time reasonable for
administrative processing or other legitimate purposes. This
paragraph does not prevent a Company from co-operating
with law enforcement authorities in the event that a member
of their Personnel is under investigation.
Training of Personnel
55.
82
Signatory Companies will ensure that all Personnel

performing Security Services receive initial and recurrent
professional training and are also fully aware of this Code
and all applicable international and relevant national laws,
including those pertaining to international human rights,
international humanitarian law, international criminal law
and other relevant criminal law. Signatory Companies will
maintain records adequate to demonstrate attendance and
results from all professional training sessions, including
from practical exercises.
Management of Weapons
56.
Signatory Companies will acquire and maintain

authorizations for the possession and use of any weapons
and ammunition required by applicable law.
57.
Signatory Companies will neither, and will require that their

Personnel do not, possess nor use weapons or ammunition
which are illegal under any applicable law. Signatory
Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel not,
engage in any illegal weapons transfers and will conduct any
weapons transactions in accordance with applicable laws
and UN Security Council requirements, including sanctions.
Weapons and ammunition will not be altered in any way
that contravenes applicable national or international law.
58.
Signatory Company policies or procedures for management

of weapons and ammunitions should include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
secure storage;
controls over their issue;
records regarding to whom and when weapons are
issued;
identification and accounting of all ammunition; and
verifiable and proper disposal.
Weapons Training
59.
Signatory Companies will require that:

a)
Personnel who are to carry weapons will be granted

authorization to do so only on completion or verification
of appropriate training with regard to the type and
model of weapon they will carry. Personnel will not
83
b)
c)
operate with a weapon until they have successfully

completed weapon-specific training.
Personnel carrying weapons must receive regular,
verifiable and recurrent training specific to the
weapons they carry and rules for the use of force.
Personnel carrying weapons must receive appropriate
training in regard to rules on the use of force. This
training may be based on a variety of relevant standards,
but should be based at a minimum on the principles
contained in this Code and the UN Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials (1990), and national laws or regulations in
effect in the area duties will be performed.
Management of Materiel of War

60.
Signatory Companies will, and will require that their

Personnel to, acquire and maintain all authorizations for the
possession and use of any materiel of war, e.g. hazardous
materials and munitions, as required by applicable law.
61.
Signatory Companies will neither, and will require that

their Personnel will neither, possess nor use any materiel
of war, e.g. hazardous materials and munitions, which are
illegal under any applicable law. Signatory Companies will
not, and will require that their Personnel not engage in any
illegal material transfers and will conduct any materiel of
war transactions in accordance with applicable laws and
UN Security Council requirements, including sanctions.
62.
Signatory Company policies or procedures for management

of materiel of war, e.g. hazardous materials and munitions,
should include:
84
a)
b)
c)
d)
secure storage;
controls over their issue;
records regarding to whom and when materials are
issued; and
proper disposal procedures.
Incident Reporting
63.
Signatory Companies will prepare an incident report

documenting any incident involving its Personnel that
involves the use of any weapon, which includes the firing
of weapons under any circumstance (except authorized
training), any escalation of force, damage to equipment or
injury to persons, attacks, criminal acts, traffic accidents,
incidents involving other security forces, or such reporting
as otherwise required by the Client, and will conduct an
internal inquiry in order to determine the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
time and location of the incident;

identity and nationality of any persons involved
including their addresses and other contact details;
injuries/damage sustained;
circumstances leading up to the incident; and
any measures taken by the Signatory Company in
response to it.
Upon completion of the inquiry, the Signatory Company

will produce in writing an incident report including the
above information, copies of which will be provided to the
Client and, to the extent required by law, to the Competent
Authorities.
85
Safe and Healthy Working Environment

64.
Signatory Companies will strive to provide a safe and

healthy working environment, recognizing the possible
inherent dangers and limitations presented by the local
environment. Signatory Companies will ensure that
reasonable precautions are taken to protect relevant staff in
high-risk or life-threatening operations. These will include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
assessing risks of injury to Personnel as well as the

risks to the local population generated by the activities
of Signatory Companies and/or Personnel;
providing hostile environment training;
providing adequate protective equipment, appropriate
weapons and ammunition, and medical support; and
adopting policies which support a safe and healthy
working environment within the Company, such
as policies which address psychological health,
deter work-place violence, misconduct, alcohol and
drug abuse, sexual harassment and other improper
behaviour.
Harassment
65.
Signatory Companies will not tolerate harassment and abuse

of co-workers by their Personnel.
Grievance Procedures
66.
86
Signatory Companies will establish grievance procedures to

address claims alleging failure by the Company to respect
the principles contained in this Code brought by Personnel
or by third parties.
67.
Signatory Companies will:

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
establish procedures for their Personnel and for third

parties to report allegations of improper and/or illegal
conduct to designated Personnel, including such acts or
omissions that would violate the principles contained
in this Code. Procedures must be fair, accessible and
offer effective remedies, including recommendations
for the prevention of recurrence. They shall also
facilitate reporting by persons with reason to believe
that improper or illegal conduct, or a violation of
this Code, has occurred or is about to occur, of such
conduct, to designated individuals within a Company
and, where appropriate, to competent authorities;
publish details of their grievance mechanism on a
publically accessible website;
investigate allegations promptly, impartially and with
due consideration to confidentiality;
keep records about any such allegations, findings or
disciplinary measures. Except where prohibited or
protected by applicable law, such records should be
made available to a Competent Authority on request;
cooperate with official investigations, and not
participate in or tolerate from their Personnel, the
impeding of witnesses, testimony or investigations;
take appropriate disciplinary action, which could
include termination of employment in case of a finding
of such violations or unlawful behaviour; and
ensure that their Personnel who report wrongdoings
in good faith are provided protection against any
retaliation for making such reports, such as shielding
them from unwarranted or otherwise inappropriate
disciplinary measures, and that matters raised are
examined and acted upon without undue delay.
87
68.
No provision in this Code should be interpreted as replacing

any contractual requirements or specific Company policies
or procedures for reporting wrongdoing.
Meeting Liabilities
69.
Signatory Companies will ensure that they have sufficient

financial capacity in place at all times to meet reasonably
anticipated commercial liabilities for damages to any
person in respect of personal injury, death or damage
to property. Sufficient financial capacity may be met by
customer commitments, adequate insurance coverage,
(such as by employers liability and public liability coverage
appropriately sized for the scale and scope of operations of
the Signatory Company) or self insurance/retention. Where
it is not possible to obtain suitable insurance cover, the
Signatory Company will make alternative arrangements to
ensure that it is able to meet such liabilities.
H. REVIEW
70.
88
The Swiss Government will maintain a public list of Signatory

Companies and convene an initial review conference with a
view to reviewing the Code after governance and oversight
mechanisms (as referenced in the Preamble and Section C
Implementation to this Code) are developed.
Companies that signed in Geneva on

9 November 2010
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Aegis Defense Services LLC

Aegis Defence Services Ltd
Aegis Group
Argonautic Personal Protection & Defence Systems, Ltd
Blue Hackle Group LLC
Britam Defence Ltd
Control Risks Group
DynCorp International
Edinburgh International
EOD Technology, Inc.
Evolutionary Security Management
G4S plc
Garda World Security Corporation
Global Strategies Group (Europe) B.V.
GROUPE EHC LLC
GROUPE GEOS
Groupe OROPEX
GW Consulting
Hart Security Ltd
International Ship Security Group Holdings, Limited
LandMark Security Limited
LSA
Manuel Security
Maritime Asset Security and Training Ltd.
NYA International
OGM International Ltd
Oil Gas Maritime Int Suisse SAGL
Olive Group FZ-LLC
Osprey Security Services (Sierra Leone) Ltd
Overseas Security & Strategic Information, Inc.
Pax Mondial Limited
Protection Vessels International Ltd
89
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
Quemic
Reed International Inc.
RISKSGROUP
Safenet North America LLC
Salama Fikira International Ltd
Saracen International Limited
Saracen Uganda Limited
SOC LLC
Triple Canopy, Inc.
Triskel Services Ltd
Tumas Security Consulting & Research
Unity Resources Group
Xe Services LLC
Companies that signed by letter on or before
9 November 2010
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
90
Askar Security Services Ltd

Four Horsemen International
GCE Consultants
Gold Fields Protection Services
Higginson Associates Ltd
KK Security
Maritime & Underwater Security Consultants
Marrow Alert Security Intelligence
Minimal Risk Consultancy Ltd
Page Group Limited
Radnor Training & Security Ltd
Saladin Security Ltd
Tundra Strategies
Industry Statement
9 November 2010
In June of 2009 at a conference in Nyon, Switzerland, industry
representatives committed to pursuing an international code
of conduct built on the success of the Montreux Document
and in partnership with key governments, nongovernmental
organizations and humanitarian organizations as well as other
key stakeholders.
The result of this collaboration is the International Code of
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) which was
completed in October 2010 in Geneva, Switzerland after numerous
meetings and consultations with partners and stakeholders and
with special efforts to ensure that the ICoC is compliant with
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. Industry
supports an ambitious timetable for the next steps to implement a
compliance and governance mechanism.
The industry expresses its gratitude to the Swiss government for
its crucial role in hosting and facilitating the process and whose
ongoing support has played a vital role in ensuring this process
has been inclusive and comprehensive. We are also grateful to the
U.S. and UK governments who have energetically supported the
process and ensured its success.
We commend all companies providing international security
services who have signed the code today.
At the outset of this process, we recognize that the ICoC presents
an opportunity to address broader stakeholder concerns and to
serve all our clients, government and otherwise, in a transparent,
professional and ethical manner.
Issued by:
91
Pan-African Security Association (PASA)

International Stability Operations Association (ISOA)
British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC)
Aerospace Defence Security (A|D|S)
Private Security Association of Iraq (PSCAI)
Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI)
International Association of Maritime Security Professionals
(IAMSP)
92
References
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Public Statement on the Montreux Document on
Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to the Operations of
Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, http://www.amnestyusa.org/
document.php?id=ENGIOR300102008
Avant, Deborah D. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Brooks, Doug. The Swiss Show Some Initiative, Journal of International Peace Operations 3, no.
6 (May-June 2008).
Chesterman, Simon. We Cant Spy If We Cant Buy!: The Privatization of Intelligence
and the Limits of Outsourcing Inherently Governmental Functions. The European Journal of
International Law 19, no.5 (2008).
EURICPA. White Paper on Professional Cross-Border Transportation of Euro-Cash by Road Between
Member States. (Brussels: EURICPA, 2009).
Fredland, Eric. Outsourcing Military Force: A Transactions Cost Perspective on the Role of
Military Companies Defence and Peace Economics 15 (2004).
HRC Resolution 8/7. Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf
ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report
2009 (2010)
Isenberg, David. Private Military Contractors as Buzz Lightyear: To Afghanistan and
Beyond, The Huffington Post, March 11, 2010.
Kwakwa, Edward. The Current Status of Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict. Hastings
International and Comparative Law. Review 14, (1990).
Kwok, James. Armed Entrepreneurs: Private Military Companies in Iraq. Harvard
International Review, (Spring 2006).
Lynch, Colum. UN Embraces Private Military Contractors. Foreign Policy (January 2010),
http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/17/un_embraces_private_military_
contractors
McFate, Sean. I Built an African Army, Foreign Policy (January 2010), http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/07/i_built_an_african_army
Mazzetti, Mark, U.S. Still Using Private Spy Ring, Despite Doubts, The New York Times, May
15, 2010.
93
Ostensen, Ase. The Use of Private Security Providers by the UN. (DCAF Policy Paper,
forthcoming).
Outline of the Swiss Initiative (November 2007), http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc
Plessis, Andr du. The Global Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies: Why it
Matters to Humanitarian Organisations. Humanitarian Exchange Magazine. http://www.
odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3122
Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harmer and Victoria Di Domenico. The use of Private Security
Providers and Services in Humanitarian Operations. HPG Report, (October 2008).
Sturgess, Gary. Market Testing. Ethos Journal (Autumn 2010), http://www.ethosjournal.
com/home/item/183-market-testing
UNOPS, 2009 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement. (Geneva: UNOPS, 2010).
94
About the series

A great deal of material has been produced on the rise of private military and
security companies (PMSCs). Recent work has also sought to integrate these actors
into a wider SSR and SSG agenda. However, there is, as yet, very little that takes the
logical next step and explores the role of a wider range of private and other nonstate actors in responding to a broad range of security governance challenges. We
will be obliged in the years to come to broaden our analytical horizons way beyond
current SSR and SSG approaches. There is a growing urgency to move beyond the
first revolution in this area that led to the whole of government approach towards
a second revolution, one that leads to a fully integrated security sector approach that
reaches beyond established state structures to include select private companies and
thus permit, what we might call, a whole of issues approach.
This project brings together relevant state and non-state actors for a series
of thematic roundtables throughout 2010. Each roundtable is designed to inform a
subsequent working paper. These working papers provide a short introduction to
the issue, before going on to examine theoretical and practical questions related to
transparency oversight, accountability and democratic governance more generally.
The papers, of course, do not seek to solve the issues they address but rather to provide
a platform for further work and enquiry. As such, they ask many more questions
than they answer. In addition to these working papers, the project has published an
occasional paper Trends and Challenges in International Security: An Inventory that
seeks to describe the current security landscape and provide a background to the
projects work as a whole.
95
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the worlds leading
institutions in the areas of security sector reform and security sector governance. DCAF provides in-country
advisory support and practical assistance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic
norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and conducts policy-related
research to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector.
Visit us at: www.dcaf.ch
DCAF Geneva
P.O. Box 1360
1211 Geneva 1
Switzerland
DCAF Brussels
Place du Congrs 1
1000 Brussels
Belgium
DCAF Ljubljana
Dunajska cesta 104
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenia
DCAF Ramallah
Al-Maaref Street 34
Ramallah / Al-Bireh
West Bank, Palestine
DCAF Beirut
P.O. Box 113 - 6041
Beirut
Lebanon
Tel: +41 (22) 741 77 00

Fax: +41 (22) 741 77 05
Tel: +32 (2) 229 39 66

Fax: +32 (2) 229 00 35
Tel: +386 (1) 5609 300

Fax: +386 (1) 5609 303
Tel: +972 (2) 295 6297

Fax: +972 (2) 295 6295
Tel: +961 (1) 738 401

Fax: +961 (1) 738 402

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DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER No.

Private Military & Security Companies:

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER No. 3

Private Military & Security Companies:

Private Threats to International Security

Increased State Outsourcing of Security Activities

Increase in Private Security Clients

Lack of Coordination Among Different Security Providers

Cost Savings and Efficiency

Responses: A Multi-Stakeholder Way Forward

Voluntary Principles on Business and Human Rights

Annex I: The Montreux Document

Annex II: The international Code of Conduct

About the Series

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

fifteen states conducting anti-piracy naval patrols in the Indian Ocean,

1.2 Organised crime

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

patronage networks or the provision of alternative justice. Such groups use

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

2. Increased State Outsourcing

2.1 Security Sector Reform (SSR)

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

This aspect of public private cooperation raises many familiar

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

3. Increase in Private Security

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

Police.13 This example is interesting as it involves the performance of

3.2 Multinational Corporations

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

3.3 Humanitarian Organisations

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

4.1 Lack of Coordination Among Different

4.2 Lack of Effective Oversight and

4.3 Assymetry in Security Provision

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

5.1 Cost Savings and Efficiency

5.2 Innovations in the Provision of Security

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

6. Responses: A MultiStakeholder Way Forward

6.1 Voluntary Principles on Business and

6.2 Special Representative of the UN Secretary

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

regulation, policies, and adjudication; 2) the corporate responsibility to

6.3 The Montreux Document

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

6.4 The International Code of Conduct for

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

The following statements aim to recall certain existing

Contracting States retain their obligations under international

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

possible, public order and safety, i.e. exercise vigilance in

Contracting States have an obligation not to contract PMSCs

Contracting States have an obligation, within their power, to

ensure that PMSCs that they contract and their

Contracting States are responsible to implement their

DCAF HORIZON 2015 WORKING PAPER

effective remedies for relevant misconduct of PMSCs and