Pals - Political-Law-2015 - Revfinal (As of 09.09.2015)

Jurisprudence Political
Law
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
POLICE POWER
In the exercise of police power, the State can regulate the rates imposed by a public
utility such as SURNECO. Hence, the ERC simply performed its mandate to protect
the public interest imbued in those rates. SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO) v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, G.R.
No. 183626, October 04, 2010
A mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the
exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence, discretionary in nature.
ABRAHAM RIMANDO v. NAGUILAN EMISSION TESTING CENTER, INC., et al.,
G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012
Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the
exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of
property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In
such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation
is not required. On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain,
property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose which
necessitates the payment of just compensation therefor. MANILA MEMORIAL
PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC. v. SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT and THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, G.R. No. 175356, December
3, 2013
STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the
Ombudsmans exercise of discretion, however, the Courts intervention only occurs
when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of discretion is shown. ERDITO
QUARTO v. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEONMARCELO,et al., G.R.
No. 169042, October 5, 2011
The state may not be sued without its consent. Likewise, public officials may not be
sued for acts done in the performance of their official functions or within the scope
of their authority. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al. v. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH,
INC., G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013
The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit
if it consents to be sued, either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent
when a law so provides, while there is implied consent when the State enters into a
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contract or it itself commences litigation. This Court explained that in order to
determine implied waiver when the State or its agency entered into a contract,
there is a need to distinguish whether the contract was entered into in its
governmental or proprietary capacity. HEIRS OF DIOSDADO MENDOZA ET AL. v.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, G.R. No. 203834, July 9,
2014
The DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit. HEIRS OF DIOSDADO
MENDOZA ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, G.R.
No. 203834, July 9, 2014
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are
exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district
and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are
exclusive in character. TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA
TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution,
the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and to allowthe Executive Department, through the
Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence
to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of
exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established
that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he
has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law. Hence, in matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,
mandamus mayonly be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct
the manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised, or to compel the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment or
discretion. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary
of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State
Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF
THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No.
197291, April 3, 2013
Where the Executive Department implements a relocation of government center,
the same is valid unless the implementation is contrary to law, morals, public law
and public policy and the Court cannot intervene in the legitimate exercise of power
of the executive. The rationale is hinged on the principle of separation of powers
which ordains that each of the three great government branches has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ABUSAMA
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M. ALID, Officer-in-Charge, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE - REGIONAL
FIELD UNIT XII (DA-RFU XII) v. ABDULWAHAB A. BAYAO, OSMEA I.
MONTAER, RAKMA B. BUISAN, HELEN M. ALVAREZ, NEILA P. LIMBA,
ELIZABETH B. PUSTA, ANNA MAE A. SIDENO, UDTOG B. TABONG, JOHN S.
KAMENZA, DELIA R. SUBALDO, DAYANGW. MACMOD, FLORENCE S. TAYUAN,
in their own behalf and in behalf of the other officials and employees of
DA-RFU XII, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013
CHECKS AND BALANCES
Any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal
autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. RE:
COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC,July 31, 2012
VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. They cannot be
made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. SOUTHERN
HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL,
et.al., G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Republic Act No.(R.A.) 9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005 and its IRR
are constitutional.BUREAU OF (CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA)
v. HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 is valid and constitutional.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, et al.v. REY SALAC, et al., G.R. No. 152642,
November 13, 2012
A statute having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out
the general subject. HENRY R. GIRON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188179, January
22, 2013
The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of
sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such
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institutions, thus, the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education
teachers is not unreasonable. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. ANALIZA F.
PEPANIO AND MARITI D. BUENO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013
The tests to determine if an ordinance is valid and constitutional are divided into the
formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the
LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
As to substantive due process, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of
validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy. Considering that traffic congestions
were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic
centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the
public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption
was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose. With regard to
procedural process the clamping of the petitioners vehicles was within the
exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. As already said, the immobilization
of illegally parked vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the
transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such
circumstance, notice and hearing would be superfluous. VALENTINO L. LEGASPI
v. CITY OF CEBU, et al./BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., et al. v. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 159110/G.R. No. 159692. December 10, 2013
There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and enjoyment of
property is caused by the implementation of R.A. 9646. If petitioners as property
owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only
licensed real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such
is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. No right is
absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of
the State. The legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks
of real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical
standards as real property transactions are susceptible to manipulation and
corruption. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY
BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE, G.R. No. 197676; February 4, 2014
The petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing
first that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional
question that he raised is unavoidable. If there is some other ground upon which the
court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the question of
constitutionality should be avoided.Thus, to justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is
doubtful, speculative or argumentative. KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP,
INC., v. JESSIE ROBREDO, G.R. No. 200903, July 22, 2014
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
The clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system
is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list
system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement
in R.A. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party
consists
of
citizens
who
advocate
the
same
ideology
orplatform,orthesamegovernanceprinciplesand
policies,
regardless
of
their
economic status as citizens. While the major political parties are those that field
candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties, however,
cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined
political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors.
Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily
those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the
national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack welldefined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in
the House of Representatives.
The Supreme Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially
legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in
patent violation of the Constitution and the law." The experimentations in sociopolitical engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party- list
system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. 7941, must now come to an end. The High Court is sworn to uphold the 1987
Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socioeconomic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has
ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution.
Thus, in this case the Supreme Court remanded the present petitions to the
COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by the Supreme Court. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC.,
represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
POWERS OF CONGRESS
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The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has jurisdiction to pass upon
the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of
office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of
Representatives. WALDEN F. BELLO AND LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 191998, December 07, 2010
The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with
it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. RENALD F.
VILANDO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 192147, August 23, 2011
The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress,
must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, et al.v. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 180308, June 19, 2012
A person cannot file an action with the Supreme Court questioning the findings of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) except when it committed a
grave abuse of discretion. The abuse must, as contemplated by the law, be so gross
that it amounts to evasion of duty. MARIA LOURDES B. LOCSIN v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MONIQUE YAZMIN MARIA Q.
LAGDAMEO, G.R. No. 204123, March 19, 2013
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal was in no way estopped from
subsequently declaring that the integrity of the ballot boxes was not preserved
opposed to its initial findings, after it had the opportunity to exhaustively observe
and examine in the course of the entire revision proceedings the conditions of all
the ballot boxes and their contents, including the ballots themselves, the Minutes of
Voting, Statements of Votes and Election Returns. LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO v.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER E.
PANOTES, G.R. No. 204637, April 16, 2013
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the
Members of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the following requisites:
(1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Absent any
of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the said contests. REGINA
ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B.
TAN, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the
statutory public office or position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, noncareer service position. Flowing from the legislative power to create public offices is
the power to abolish and modify them to meet the demands of society; Congress
can change the qualifications for and shorten the term of existing statutory offices.
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When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officers security of
tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or the shortening of his term.
Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its
tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the
incumbent. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE,
represented by GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR. v. BEATRIZ O. GONZALES,
G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013
The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. REGINA ONGSIAKO
REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R.
No. 207264, October 22, 2013
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about
by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation. The aim of legislative apportionment is to equalize
population and voting power among districts. The basis for districting shall be the
number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered
voters therein. The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in
Camarines Sur, the current Third District, which brought Naval to office in 2010 and
2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of the old Second District, which
elected him in 2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. 9716 indicate the
intent of the lawmakers to create a single new Second District from the merger of
the towns from the old First District with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third
District, Section 3(c) of R.A. 9716 used the word rename. Although the qualifier
without a change in its composition was not found in Section 3(c), unlike in
Sections 3(d) and (e), still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new
district in that of the Second, while merely renaming the rest.ANGEL G. NAVAL v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA, G.R. No. 207851, July
8, 2014
LIMITATIONS ON LEGISLATIVE POWER
The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all
the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
176951, August 24, 2010
R.A. 9646 does not violate the one title-one subject rule under Article VI, Section
26 (1) of the Constitution. In Farinas v. Executive Secretary, the Court held it is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient to accomplish that object. Aside from provisions
establishing a regulatory system for the professionalization of the real estate
service sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate developers with
respect to their own properties. The inclusion of real estate developers is germane
to the laws primary goal of developing "a corps of technically competent,
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responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose
standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the
growth of the real estate industry."REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE, G.R. No.
197676; February 4, 2014
PDAF
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case. Legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various
operational aspects of budgeting,including the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activitiesand the regulation and release of funds , in violation
of the separation of powers principle [The Court cites its Decision on Guingona, Jr. v.
Carague (Guingona, Jr., 1991)]. From the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional [The Court cites its Decision on AbakadaGuro
Party List v. Purisima (Abakada, 2008)]. That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is
lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from
which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to; and (b) a
specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two
acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013
PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,
said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their
own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only
after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual
items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the
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creation of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting
the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of
the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and
(b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of
spending (i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation
of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes
that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,
who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of postenactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that: [A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall
not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.Allowing
legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due
to the qualifying phrase as may be defined by law.In this respect, said provision
does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of making equal the unequal (Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis
gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List
Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President who do not
represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
Considering that Local Development Councils are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who
are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as
a body.
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Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads,
the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
As for the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of P.D. 1869, as amended by P.D.
1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used to [first,] finance
the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to
spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority
to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
priority. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure
development projectsand hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructureis
too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
Thus, the phrase to finance the priority infrastructure development projectsmust
be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to Section 8 of P.D. 910 it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v.
PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No.
209251, November 19, 2013
DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy
through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and
implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main actor
during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully
execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or
to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to
do during the Budget Execution Stage.
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the
countrys economic situation.He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He
could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The
pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be
funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the
money had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the
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GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25 (5) must be made
upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for
their respective offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act
free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the
completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose
for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising
from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and
leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from
the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and
thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or planned targets,
programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from
"pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services
appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of
slow moving projects and discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings."
The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the
treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings. The fact alone that
the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of
the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of
items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations have been considered
"released" if there has already been an allotment or authorization to incur
obligations and disbursement authority.
Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its
power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal
submitted by the Executive. Its power of the purse is touted as the very foundation
of its institutional strength, and underpins "all other legislative decisions and
regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches
of government." Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate
money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and to spend the money.
Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by
specifying the PAPs for which public money should be spent.
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say
on matters of appropriations.For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing
principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies
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received from whatever source by any part of the government are public funds;"
and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any public
money without legislative authorization."To conform with the governing principles,
the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a
PAP by resorting to either public or private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer
appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so
doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of both
appropriations will thereby be violated.MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v.
BENIGNO SEMION C. AQUINO III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
CYBERCRIME LAW
Section4 (c) (3) Penalizing posts of unsolicited commercial communications or
SPAM. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. Commercial
speech though not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression; it is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob one of these rights without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Section 12 Authorizing the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time. If
such would be granted to law enforcement agencies it would curtail civil liberties or
provide opportunities for official abuse. Section 12 is too broad and do not provide
ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading the right to
privacy.
Informational Privacy which is the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
has two aspects, specifically: (1) The right not to have private information disclosed;
and (2) The right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.
Section 12 applies to all information and communications technology users and
transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope properly
addressed, sealing it closed and sending it through the postal service.
Another reason to strike down said provision is by reason that it allows collection
and recording traffic data with due cause. Section 12 does not bother to relate the
collection of data to the probable commission of a particular crime. It is akin to the
use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits. Likewise it is bit
descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be used. The authority given
is too sweeping and lacks restraint which may only be used for Fishing Expeditions
and unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or worse to extortion
from certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section19 Authorizing the DOJ to restrict or block access to suspected computer
data. Computer data produced by its author constitutes personal property
regardless of where it is stored. The provision grants the Government the power to
seize and place the computer data under its control and disposition without a
warrant. The DOJ order cannot substitute
judicial search warrants.
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Content of the computer data also constitutes speech which is entitled to
protection. If an executive officer could be granted such power to acquire data
without warrants and declare that its content violates the law that would make him
the judge, jury and executioner all rolled in one.
Section 19 also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the
validity of restrictions on speech: (1) dangerous tendency doctrine; (2) balancing of
interest test; and (3) clear and present danger rule.
It merely requires that the data be blocked if on its face it violate any provision of
the cybercrime law.
Section 4(c)(4)penalizes libel in connection with Section 5 which penalizes aiding or
abetting to said felony. Section 4 (c)(4) is valid and constitutional with respect to the
original author of the post but void and unconstitutional with respect to other who
simply receive the post and react to it.
With regard to the author of the post, Section4 (c) (4) merely affirms that online
defamation constitutessimilar meansfor committing libel as defined under the RPC.
The internet encourages a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. Facebook and
Twitter were given as examples and stated that the acts of liking, commenting,
sharing or re-tweets, are not outrightly considered to be aiding or
abetting.Compared to the physical world such would be mere expressions or
reactions made regarding a specific post.
The terms aiding or abetting constitute a broad sweep that generates a chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and
other messages.
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicament
awaits internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues and
democracy will be threatened together with all liberties.
Charging offenders of violation of R.A.10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel
andlikewise with R.A.9775 on Child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The
acts defined in the Cybercrime Law involve essentially the same elements and are
in fact one and the same with the RPC and R.A.9775. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr.,
ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R. No. 203335. February 18,
2014
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes
liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a partyrespondent in an amparo petition. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA
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C.ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXASv. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,etal., G.R. No.
189155, September 07, 2010
The doctrine of state immunity should not be extended to the petitioner as the
same is an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or
sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance
of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State
in its sovereign capacity. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID
and ELISEA RAMOS, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011
The president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. IN THE MATTER
OF THE PETITION FORTHE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR
OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZV. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO,etal., G.R. No. 191805, 193160, November 15, 2011
POWERS
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of
Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 is well within the purview of the doctrine of
qualified political agency. JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MANUEL E.
GAITE et al., G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such
places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President, without need
of congressional authority to exercise the same. DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, et
al.v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, et al., G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011
The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under
his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganizehis own office pursuant
to Executive Order No (E.O.) 292. PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v.OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS-INVESTIGATIVE AND
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, et al., G.R. NO. 196425, JULY 24, 2012
Directives and orders issued by the President in the valid exercise of his power of
control over the executive department must be obeyed and implemented in good
faith by all executive officials. Acts performed in contravention of such directives
merit invalidation. DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT AND THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUDIT OFFICE, G.R.
No. 189774, September 18, 2012
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should
be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The
faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the
President, not a separate grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law and,
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corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is
obliged to obey and execute them. This is precisely why the law provides that
"administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."NATIONAL ARTIST FOR
LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, et al. v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, etal.,
G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued
that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning
power of the President. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. ALFREDO LIM, G.R. No.
206666, January 21, 2015
The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the
Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive
and administrative functions are exercised through executive departments headed
by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President
unless disapproved by the latter. There can be no question that the act of the
secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this case,
approval of the Amendments to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement
(ASTOA) by the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President.
The same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in which the
President specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve
contracts entered into by the Toll Regulatory Board. ANA THERESIA RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, G.R. No. 181293,
February 23, 2015
POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The power to appoint rests essentially on free choice. The appointing authority has
the right to decide who best fits the job from among those who meet the minimum
requirements for it. As an outsider, quite remote from the day-to-day problems of a
government agency, no court of law can presume to have the wisdom needed to
make a better judgment respecting staff appointments. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND NATIONAL MARITIME POLYTECHNIC (NMP)
v. RUBEN Y. MACEDA, G.R. No. 185112, January 18, 2010
Prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within
two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court. ARTURO DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PRES.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
The prohibition against the President or Acting President to make appointments
within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
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Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G. R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
POWER OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
The Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power including the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally- created Office of the Ombudsman.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
et al., G.R. Nos. 196231, 196232 September 04, 2012
POWERS RELATIVE TO APPROPRIATION MEASURES
The power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch includes such powers
and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive
and broad interpretationofthe Presidents power to reorganize executive offices has
been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA et al. v. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, G.R. No. 166620, April
20, 2010
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
JUDICIAL POWER
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial
power
under
ArticleVIII
oftheConstitution,
because
theexecution
oftheDecisionisbutanintegralpart ofthe adjudicative function of the Court.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED
RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is not simply an agency to which Members of
the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department, i.e., the Supreme Court. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, June 7, 2011
The fact that the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) conducts
public consultations or hearings does not mean that it is performing quasi-judicial
functions. SALVACION VILLANUEVA, et al. v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, et al., G.R. No. 178347, February 25, 2013
The Constitutional mandate of the courts in our triangular system of government is
clear, so that as a necessary requisite of the exercise of judicial power there must
be, with a few exceptions, an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
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rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, not
merely a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. As Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution provides, "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts
decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems,
ormereacademic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual
cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite
allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed
to the other branches of government. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION v. THUNDERBIRD PILIPINAS HOTELS AND RESORTS, INC., et
al., G.R. No. 197942-43/G.R. No. 199528. March 26, 2014
The interpretation and application of laws have been assigned to the Judiciary under
our system of constitutional government. Indeed, defining and interpreting the laws
are truly a judicial function. Hence, the Court of Appeals(CA) could not be denied
the authority to interpret the provisions of the articles of incorporation and bylaws
of Forest Hills, because such provisions, albeit in the nature of private laws, have an
impact on the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties. FOREST HILLS
GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., v. GARDPRO, INC., G.R. No. 164686,
October 22, 2014
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence
supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds
for the belief that the claim is correct. When the evidence submitted by a deportee
is
conclusive
of
his
citizenship,
the
right
to
immediate
review
shouldberecognizedandthecourtsshouldpromptlyenjointhedeportation proceedings.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, et al. v. MICHAEL
ALFIO PENNISI, G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010
The discretion to determine whether a case should be filed or not lies with the
Ombudsman.Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is shown, judicial review is uncalled for as a policy of non-interference by
the courts in the exercise of the Ombudsmans constitutionally mandated powers.
ANGELITA DEGUZMAN v.EMILIOA.GONZALEZ III, et al., G.R.No.158104,
March 26, 2010
Unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere in the
findings of probable cause determined by the Ombudsman. ROBERTO B. KALALO
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v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ AND MARCELO L.
AGUSTIN, G.R. No. 158189, April 23, 2010
The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) was constituted in implementation of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies - not unlawfully
defies - the constitutional directive. As intended by the framers of the Constitution,
is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department,
i.e., the Supreme Court. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010
When the issues presented do not require the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of a body but are purely legal questions which are within the
competence and jurisdiction of the Court, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should
not be applied. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF
THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE,
G.R. No. 187714, March 08, 2011
The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road
extension is obviously not within the province of this Court. Such determination
belongs to the Executive branch. BARANGAY CAPTAIN BEDA TORRECAMPO v.
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, et al., G.R. No.
188296, May 30, 2011
Certiorari does not lie against the SangguniangPanglungsod, which was not a part of
the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and
enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policymaking body declaring its sentiment or opinion. SPOUSES ANTONIO AND FE
YUSAY v. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
MANDALUYONG CITY, G.R. No. 156684, April 06, 2011
This Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. However, the Court held that an
exception to this rule applies where the commission of grave abuse of discretion is
apparent on its face. MARIA LAARNI L. CAYETANO v. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND DANTE O. TINGA, G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011
While as a rule, it is beyond the province of the Court to analyze and weigh the
parties evidence all over again in reviewing administrative decisions, an exception
thereto lies as when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of
justice would thereby result. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ANTONIO T.
REYES G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011
The power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C.
CORONA v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES SITTING AS AN IMPEACHMENT
COURT, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012
Courts cannot certainly give primacy to matters of procedure over substance in a
party-list groups Constitution and By-Laws, especially after the general
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membership has spoken. SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ROMEO R. ROBJSO, PEDRO
T. DABU, JR., LOPE E. FEBLE, NOEL T. TIAMPONG and JOSE FLORO
CRISOLOGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JONATHAN DE LA CRUZ, ED
VINCENT ALBANO and BENEDICT KATO, G.R. No. 203646, April 16, 2013
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where
the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsmans decision
shall be final, executory, and unappealable. But of course, the said principle is
subject to the rule that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final
and unappealable by law are still "subject to judicial review if they fail the test of
arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or
when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of
such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to
reverse the factual findings."FREDERICK JAMES C. ORAlS v. DR. AMELIA C.
ALMIRANTE, G.R. No. 181195, June 10, 2013
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution. Petitioners who are real
estate developers are entities directly affected by the prohibition on performing acts
constituting practice of real estate service without first complying with the
registration and licensing requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. 9646. The
possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law is
likewise real. Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property owners,
petitioners challenged on constitutional grounds the laws implementation which
respondents defended as a valid legislation pursuant to police power. REMMAN
ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE
SERVICE, G.R. No. 197676; February 4, 2014
Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in
deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower
courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or
resolution. SPOUSES RICARDO and EVELYN MARCELO v. JUDGE RAMSEY
DOMINGO G. PICHAY, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 78,
PARANAQUE CITY, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838, March 12, 2014
What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of constitutionality is
the fact that this issue is not the lismota of this case. Lismota literally means the
cause of the suit or action; it is rooted in the principle of separation of powers and
is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislative acts of our coequal branches of the government. KALIPUNAN NG
DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP, INC., v. JESSIE ROBREDO, G.R. No. 200903, July 22,
2014
The petition did not comply with the requisites of judicial review as there was no
actual case or controversy. Petitioner's allegations show that he wants the Supreme
Court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund.
This court must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution. This court
is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law. The court has
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explained that the filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is not
subject to judicial restraint. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to
interpret laws. It cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a
bill that Congress may or may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or
issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition, therefore, does not
present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this court's determination. IN
THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF)
AND REDUCTION OF AUTONOMY, UDK-15143; January 21, 2015
The following are the determinants of an issue having transcendental importance:
(a) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (b) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (c) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised. None of the determinants is present in this case. The events feared by
petitioner are merely speculative. IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME
COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AGAINST THE ABOLITION OF THE
JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF AUTONOMY,
UDK-15143,January 21, 2015
OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE
The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations
issued by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a
statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature. HACIENDA LUISITA,
INCORPORATED et.al v. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, G.R.
No. 171101, November 22, 2011
As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the
illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result
in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply. The Court has
upheld the efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact
doctrine. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SEMION C. AQUINO III,
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
MOOT & ACADEMIC
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO v. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA AND
COMELEC, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010
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E.O. 883 and Career Executive Service Board Resolution No. 870 having ceased to
have any force and effect, the Court can no longer pass upon the issue of their
constitutionality. ATTY. ELIAS OMAR A. SANA v.CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE
BOARD, G.R. No. 192926, November 15, 2011
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
JOEL P. QUIO, et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RITCHIE R.
WAGAS, G.R. No. 197466, November 13, 2012
Retirement from the service during the pendency of an administrative case does not
render the case moot and academic.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANv.MARCELINO
A.DECHAVEZ, G.R.No. 176702, November 13, 2013
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. The Court, as
a rule, will decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case and proceed to dismiss it
when the issues posed have been mooted by supervening events. Mootness
intervenes when a ruling from the Court no longer has any practical value and, from
this perspective, effectively ceases to be a justiciable controversy.
While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic"
principle, these exceptions relate only to situations where: (1) there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and
paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. BANKERS ASSOCIATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES and PERRY L. PE v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 206794, November 26, 2013
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy. Thus, in Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco we have ruled that "where the issue
has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and
adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however
intellectually
challenging."HADJI
HASHIM
ABDUL
v.
HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
NO. 184496, December 2, 2013
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question
in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the
Court. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN AND ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES v. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
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As stated in Francisco v. HRET, a political question will not be considered justiciable
if there are no constitutionally-imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally-imposed limits justifies
subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.In
this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech.
Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not
fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.THE DIOCESE OF
BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
APPOINTMENT TO THE JUDICIARY
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been
signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document)
is the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the
members of the CA in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended
by R.A.8246. RE: SENIORITY AMONG THE FOUR (4) MOST RECENT
APPOINTMENTS TO THEPOSITION OFASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURTOF
APPEALS,A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010
The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of
it, goes against that mandate. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL, et al., G.R. NO. 202242,July 17, 2012
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed
adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in
the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function to legislate. In
the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the
four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of
government. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature,
not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as
a major branch of government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot
represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is,
thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or
the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN.
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No.
202242, April 16, 2013
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral
fitness is challenged. It follows then that the unanimity rule only comes into
operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no
application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicants moral
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uprightness. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
The JBC, as a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of
the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to
determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative offense but to
ascertain the fitness of an applicant vis--vis the requirements for the position.
Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon
by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at
the most, discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the
objections against him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the
issues, but instead chose to tread on his view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably
become his accuser, prosecutor and judge. FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA v. CHIEF
JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
THE COMMISSION OF AUDIT
POWERS
The Commission on Audit (COA) has been granted by the Constitution the authority
to establish a special audit group when a transaction warrants the formulation of
the same and the authority to determine the scope of its audit and examination as
well as the methods and techniques to be used therefor. THE SPECIAL AUDIT
TEAM, COMMISSION ON AUDIT v. COURT OF APPEALS and GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 174788, April 11, 2013
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public funds, with enough
latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. The COA is
generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and
the Court generally sustains its decisions in recognition of its expertise in the laws it
is entrusted to enforce.
On the issue whether the TESDA officials should refund the excess EME granted to
them, the Court applied the ruling in the case Casal v. COA where the Court held
that the approving officials are liable for the refund of the incentive award due to
their patent disregard of the law of and the directives of COA. Accordingly, the
Director-General's blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the
2004- 2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting
to bad faith. He is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for
himself. TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT CHAIRPERSON MA.GRACIA PULIDO TAN,
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COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. AND COMMISSIONER HEIDI L.
MENDOZA, G.R. No. 204869. March 11, 2014
JURISDICTION
It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the
Commission of Audit, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court,
if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific
matters under their jurisdiction. RUBEN REYNA AND LLOYD SORIA v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011
Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a
government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject
to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the
provisions of the BSP Charter. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
COMMSSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential
Decree No. 1445, it is the Commission on Audit which has primary jurisdiction over
money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities.
The scope of the COAs authority to take cognizance of claims is however
circumscribed to mean only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily
determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of
accounting officers. THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP, G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013
Under Section 2(1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COA was vested with the
power, authority, and duty toexamine, audit, and settletheaccountsof nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the government. Complementing this power is Section 29(1) of the Audit
Code, which grants the COA visitorial authority over non-governmental entities
required to pay levy or government share.
The Manila Export and Cultural Office (MECO) is not a government-owned and
controlled corporation or a government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private
entity especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial
relations with the people in Taiwan. However, despite its non-governmental
character, the MECO handles government funds in the form of the verification
fees it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the consular fees it collects under
Section 2(6) of E.O. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the
MECO pertaining to its collection of such verification fees and consular fees
should be audited by the Commission of Audit. Section 14 (1), Book V of the
Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit accounts of nongovernmental
entities required to pay ... or have government share but only with respect to
funds ... coming from or through the government. This provision of law perfectly
fits the MECO. DENNIS A.B. FUNA v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
OFFICE AND COA, G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014
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The COA disallowed the payment of healthcare allowance of TESDA employees. COA
is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty
and responsibility to examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly
those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Only in instances
when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction shall the Court interfere.TECHNICAL
EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) v. THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 196418, February 10, 2015
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JURISDICTION
Civil Service Commission (CSC) has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it,
regardless of who initiated the complaint. CSC likewise exercises concurrent original
jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative cases. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. Nos. 176162, 178845,
October 09, 2012
Where the law allows its Board of Directors to create its own staffing pattern, it may
hire a person even if the position being filled does not exist in the compensation
and classification system of the Civil Service Commission. The rules that the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) formulates should implement and be in harmony with the
law it seeks to enforce. This is so since the CSC cannot enforce civil service rules
and regulations contrary to, and cannot override, the laws enacted by Congress.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182249, March 5,
2013
When a public school teacher is subject of an administrative action, concurrent
jurisdiction exists in the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Department of
Education (DepEd) and the Board of Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC). Hence, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR. v.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013
ADDITIONAL, DOUBLE, OR INDIRECT COMPENSATION
There has been no change of any long-standing rule, thus, no redefinition of the
term capital.The terms capital stock subscribed or paid,capital stock,and
capitalwere defined solely to determine the basis for computing the supervision
and regulation fees under Section 40(e) and (f) of the Public Service Act. HEIRS OF
WILSON P. GAMBOA v. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, G.R. No.
176579, October 09, 2012
BILL OF RIGHTS
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DUE PROCESS(RIGHT TOLIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY)
Due process, simply requires: (1) the right to notice of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a persons legal right; (2) the right to a reasonable
opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant
evidence in his favor; (3) the right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent
jurisdiction; and (4) the right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by
substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records
or disclosed to the parties. MAYOR ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and187962,
April 7, 2010
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution
of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity
to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected. SPO1 LEONITO ACUZAR v. APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON.
EDUARDO A. APRESA, PEOPLES LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB), G.R.
No. 177878, April 7, 2010
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. A.Z. ARNAIZ REALTY,
INC. v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010
A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at
anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked. WINSTON F. GARCIA v.
MARIO MOLINA AND ALBERT VELASCO, G.R. No. 157383, August 10, 2010
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. RIMANDO
GANNAPAO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 180141, May 31,
2011
As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity
to be heard. MONICO K. IMPERIAL, JR. v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, G.R. No. 191224, October 4, 2011
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The forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an
unlawful act that violates or threatens the right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding private
army groups (PAGs) with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA v.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Thus, when the
party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and
air his side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these chances, then his
cry for due process must fail. THE HEIRS OF JOLLY R. BUGARIN v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174431, August 6, 2012
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trial-type proceeding. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges
and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. DR.
FERNANDO A. MELENDRES M.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE LUNG
CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES [LCP] v. PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT
COMMISSION, et al., G.R.No. 163859, August 15, 2012
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict
judicial sense. What matters for due process purpose are notice of what is to be
explained, not the form in which the notice is given, and simply the opportunity to
be heard.SPS. EUGENE C. GO AND ANGELITA GO, AND MINOR EMERSON
CHESTER KIM B. GO v. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, et al., G.R. No.
169391, October 10, 2012
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of
opportunity to be heard. JOHN C. ARROYO, et al.v. ROSAL HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC, G.R. No. 175155, October 22, 2012
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. PACIFICO C. VELASCO v.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
No. 169253, February 20, 2013
A government officer subject of an administrative action cannot claim that his right
to due process was violated when he was made known of the charges against him
and when he was able to file a counter- affidavit to refute the allegations against
him. In an administrative case, due process is the opportunity to explain ones side,
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. ARLIC ALMOJUELA, G.R. No. 194368, April 2,
2013
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The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment
in this administrative case. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. The law simply requires
that the civil servant is informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him
in a clear and concise manner to give the person a chance to answer the allegations
intelligently. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
v. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 191877, June 18, 2013
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of
the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due
process. ENGINEER MANOLITO P. MENDOZA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R.
No. 195395, September 10, 2013
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of
the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity
for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. RAY PETER O. VIVO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME
CORPORATION (PAGCOR), G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex
parte order. The victim is required under R.A. 9262 (or the Anti-ViolenceAgainst
Women and their Children Act of 2004) not only to verify the allegations in the
petition, but also to attach her witnessesaffidavits to the petition. The grant of a
Temporary Protection Order ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of
the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be
enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same
way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace
that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women
and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.Further,
the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard"
does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
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pleadings. RALPH P. TUA v. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, G.R. No. 170701,
January 22, 2014
In due process, the parameter required is the presence of an opportunity to be
heard, as well as the time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or
controvert the grounds upon which it is based. This was not properly afforded to
Saint Louis University. Plenary contempt power must be exercised judiciously and
sparingly with highest self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retribution or
vindication. It should not be availed of unless necessary in the interest of justice.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., ET AL. v. BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 162299; March 25, 2014
The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of
opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process
exists when a party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for
reconsideration. In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents
filed with the Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution.
Therefore, any initial defect in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the
respondents availed of. On the respondents allegation that they were denied due
process during the NBI investigation, we stress that the functions of this agency are
merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial
powers and is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even
determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are
merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own
initiative or as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also
renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes in
order to prosecute the persons responsible. Since the NBIs findings were merely
recommendatory, we find that no denial of the respondents due process right could
have taken place; the NBIs findings were still subject to the prosecutors and the
Secretary of Justices actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable
cause. We find it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession of
Metrobank were submitted by the respondents for the consideration of the city
prosecutor and eventually of the Secretary of Justice during the preliminary
investigation proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity to examine
these signatures. RAY SHU v. JAIME DEE, ET AL., G.R. No. 182573, April 23,
2014
On the procedural grounds, the Court did not subscribe to the contention that
petitioners right to due process was violated after the RTC had already conducted a
full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the CA.
Based on record, the petitioner had ample opportunity to refute the allegations
contained in the Violation Report. The essence of due process is that a party is
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his case; what the law
abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. When
the party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard
and to air his side, but it was by his own fault or choice that he squandered these
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chances, then his cry for due process must fail.NEIL E. SUYAN v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 189644, July 2, 2014
It is arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any
discernable valid purpose. Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The
award of the three-month equivalence of respondents salary must be modified
accordingly. SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C.
CABILES, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There
may be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be made.
COMELECs infringement upon petitioners property rights as in the present case
also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.Respondents
have not demonstrated thatthe present state interest they seek to promote justifies
the intrusion into petitioners property rights. Election laws and regulations must be
reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individuals right to exercise
property rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated.THE DIOCESE
OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD
CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
K & G Mining Corporation was not deprived of due process.So long as a party is
given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.The question is not whether
petitioner succeeded in defending its rights and interests, but simply, whether it
had the opportunity to present its side of the controversy. Records show that the
case took its regular course in lower tribunals.KGMC had the opportunity to be
heard, was so heard and actively participated, in the proceedings before the Panel
of Arbitrators and the Mines Adjudication Board. K& G MINING CORPORATION v.
ACOJE MINING CORPORATION, INC., G.R. No. 188364, February 11, 2015
A cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has
constitutionally protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence,
disciplinary proceeding conducted within the bounds of procedural due process is a
must. For that reason, the Philippine Military Academy is not immune from the
strictures of due process.
The statement that a cadet can be compelled to surrender some civil rights and
liberties in order for the Code and System to be implemented simply pertains to
what cadets have to sacrifice in order to prove that they are men or women of
integrity and honor, such as the right to entertain vices and the right to freely
choose what they want to say or do. In the context of disciplinary investigation, it
does not contemplate a surrender of the right to due process but, at most, refers to
the cadets rights to privacy and to remain silent.
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The minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process for students in disciplinary cases are: (1) The students must be
informed in writing of the nature and the cause of any accusation against them; (2)
They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) They shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4)
They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) The
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice.Proceedings may be summary. Cross-examination is not an essential part of
the investigation. Only substantial evidence is required, or such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The PMA
Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate a cadets honor violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a
judicial proceeding. There is aversion to undue judicialization of an administrative
hearing in the military academy.FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF
THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
EQUAL PROTECTION
The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on a reasonable classification. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v.
PINATUBO COMMERCIAL, G.R. No.176006, March 26, 2010
Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. ANG LADLAD
LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Non-application of the condonation doctrine to appointive officials does not violate
the right to equal protection of the law. ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and
GLENDA ARAA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 180917,
April 23, 2010
E.O. 1, creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, is declared
unconstitutional insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. LOUIS "BAROK"C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. No. 193036, December 07, 2010
The consolidation of cases to a DOJ Special Panel under DO No. 182 does not violate
equal protection of law and the right to speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by
the Constitution. SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO
v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, G.R. No. 188056, January 08, 2013
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the
integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. Section 47 of
R.A. 8791 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed
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properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the
one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. There is likewise no retroactive
application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts fromits
operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall
retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Further, the equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and
individual or class privilege. Equal protection permits of reasonable classification.
The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based
on the nature of the properties foreclosed whether these are used as residence,
for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained, orused for
industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed
necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of property and
enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. GOLDENWAY
MERCHANDISING CORPORATION v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, G.R. NO. 195540,
MARCH 13, 2013
We note that the Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact
be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not prohibit discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. All that is required of a valid classification is that it
be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must
apply equally to each member of the class. AMELIA AQUINO, RODOLFO
TAGGUEG, JR., ADELAIDA HERNANDEZ and LEOPOLDO BISCOCHO, JR. v.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 181973, April 17, 2013
R.A.9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws, for the
following reasons: (1) R.A.9262 rests on substantial distinctions. The unequal power
relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the
law; (2) The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The distinction
between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children; (3) the classification is
not limited to existing conditions only, and apply equally to all members. The
applicationof R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security
of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. R.A.9262 applies
equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. JESUS C.
GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court- Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for
herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
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Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. In approving R.A. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the
necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service
practitioners, including and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners
working for real estate developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated
transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses, and
condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly
regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot
buyers.REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD
OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE, G.R. No. 197676; February 4, 2014
This right does not require universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality,
it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the same class. The
Reproductive Health Law (RH Law) does not discriminate the poor. Rather, the RH
Law provides priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women and children by providing free medical care.JAMES M. IMBONG, et al. v.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al., G.R. No. 204819,April 8, 2014
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances
and falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. It is a guarantee against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates
the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector,
especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as
placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose
protection no less than the Constitution commands. SAMEER OVERSEAS
PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., v. JOY C. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139, August 5,
2014
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
A search warrant may readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a
warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other
motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
where the warrant must be sought. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BELEN
MACARIOS, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in theplain viewof an officer, who has
a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. ELENITA C. FAJARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011
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A settled exception of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not
require a warrant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NGYIK BUN, KWOK WAI
CHENG et al., G.R. No. 180452, January 10, 2011
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO v.
CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, et al., G.R. No. 181881,
October 18, 2011
In a buy-bust operation, the police officers conducting the operation are not only
authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to search him for
anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGG C. BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No.
184807, November 23, 2011
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal
security and privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is the
exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
REYNALDO BELOCURA, G.R. No. 173474, August 29, 2012
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that
his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. HPS
SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPORATION AND HYMAN YAP v.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLOT), et al., G.R. Nos.
170217, 170694 December 10, 2012
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
theirpersons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. DON DJOWEL SALES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
191023, February 6, 2013
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. The elements must be complied strictly since if the arrest was illegal, the
search and seizure that resulted therefrom was likewise illegal. GEORGE
ANTIQUERA Y CODES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 180661,
December 11, 2013
A general warrant is defined as "[a] search or arrest warrant that is not particular as
to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized." It is one that allows the
"seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer
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executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. Such discretion is
abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable
to abuses.Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their
properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
161106, January 13, 2014
The accused was caught inflagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover
police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest
made without warrant is deemed lawful. The warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs
from the appellant is likewise valid since it is incidental to a lawful arrest. A search
incidental to a lawful arrest includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule,
an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules
of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante
delicto; (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit; and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
Any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of
the information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped
from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity was cured upon their
voluntary submission to the trial courts jurisdiction.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. DONALD VASQUEZ, G.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest
is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach. It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police
power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by
a person they have lawfully arrested and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the
arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of
the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. MEDARIO CALANTIAO, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014
The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspects
person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because [o]bjects in
the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.The doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x xx. [It] serves to
supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MEDARIO CALANTIAO, G.R. No.
203984, June 18, 2014
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Considering that the appellants warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and
seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag
containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence,
having come from an invalid search and seizure. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
OLIVER RENATO EDANO, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph
(a) of the aforequoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. REYMAN ENDAYA, G.R. No. 205741, July 23, 2014
Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR COGAED, G.R. No.
200334, July 30, 2014
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not sufficient
that the police officer introduce himself or herself, or be known as a police officer.
The police officer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on
his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must
communicate this clearly and in a language known to the person who is about to
waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance given to the
police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental
nature of a persons constitutional right to privacy requires no less.THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR COGAED, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
An individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right
to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase prying into the privacy of
anothers residence,therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an
individual considers as private, including a business office. In this day and age,
video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection
and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not
cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of
the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Simply put, a
person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in his property, whether he uses it
as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance
cameras directly facing his property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without his consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. SPOUSES BILL
AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY,
G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
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The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy
tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the users invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is Public, it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook,
absent any proof that petitioners children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to
the right to informational privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the
digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones
of privacy in view of the following: (1) Facebook allows the world to be more open
and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable
way; (2) A good number of Facebook users befriend other users who are total
strangers; (3) The sheer number of Friends one user has, usually by the hundreds;
and (4) A users Facebook friend can share the formers post, or tag others who
are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her
own Facebook friends. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or
profile details privacy to Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed
by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit
of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question. RHONDA AVE
S. VIVARES v. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, G.R. No. 202666, September 29,
2014
The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
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consumption he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence
on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between ones
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas
data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas
data petition dismissible, as in this case. DR. JOY MARGATE LEE v. P/SUPT. NERI
A. ILAGAN, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a
shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. However, mere criticism should be
distinguished from insult. MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMELEC, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 209185, February 25, 2014
The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary
as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to
reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits leveling the playing field does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their
ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so
in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
The Constitution itself provides as part of the means to ensure free, orderly, honest,
fair and credible elections, a task addressed to the COMELEC to provide for a right
to reply.66 Given that express constitutional mandate, it could be seen that the
Fundamental Law itself has weighed in on the balance to be struck between the
freedom of the press and the right to reply. Accordingly, one is not merely to see the
equation as purely between the press and the right to reply. Instead, the
constitutionally-mandated desiderata of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections would necessarily have to be factored in trying to see where the balance
lies between press and the demands of a right-to-reply.GMA NETWORK, INC. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches
into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of
a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative
speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a
candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law; (b) reasonable; (c)
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression; and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored
onthe basis of its content. For this purpose, it will notmatter whether the speech is
made with or on private property.
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This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed,
the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social
advocacy.Second, the present law Section 3.3 of R.A. 9006 and Section 6(c) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 if applied to this case, will not pass the test of
reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to
the distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain
distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the general
public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the
abridgement of speech with political consequences.THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD,
REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE
BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The exercise of the right to travel guaranteed by the Constitution is not absolute.
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to
travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health as may be provided by law. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JUDGE IGNACIO B.
MACARINE, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The
people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further
"subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v.
ABELARDO R. DOMONDON, et al., G.R. No. 165036, July 5, 2010
The right to information allows the public to hold public officials accountable to the
people and aids them in engaging in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation. By itself, it does not extend
to causing the award of the sale of government assets in failed public biddings.
Thus, assuming that a bidder, in a public bidding for the sale of government assets,
may access the records for the purpose of validating the indicative price under the
right to information, it does not follow that the said bidder is entitled to the award.
PRIVATIZATION and MANAGEMENT OFFICE v. STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT
and/or PHILIPPINE ESTATE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 200402, June 13, 2013
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
The rationale for upholding the validity of union shop clauses in a CBA, even if they
impinge
upon
the
individual
employees
right
or
freedomofassociation,isnottoprotecttheunionfortheunions
sake.
Laws
and
jurisprudence promote unionism and afford certain protections to the certified
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bargaining agent in a unionized company because a strong and effective union
presumably benefits all employees in the bargaining unit since such a union would
be in a better position to demand improved benefits and conditions of work from the
employer. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNIONDAVAO CHAPTER-FEDERATION OF UNIONS IN BPI UNIBANK, G.R. No.
164301,August 10, 2010
RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The Reproductive Health Law (RH Law) does not violate the right to religious
freedom when it comes to mandatorily using taxpayers money to fund
contraceptives and when it comes to requiring would-be spouses, as a condition for
the issuance of marriage license, attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding, and infant nutrition. The State may pursue its objectives without
being dictated by the policies of a particular religion; otherwise, it would violate the
separation of State and Church.
But the RH Law violates the right to religious freedom when it comes to compelling
medical health practitioners, health care providers, and hospitals to refer patients to
other institutions even though it is against their religious beliefs. It has been held
that religious freedom yields to compelling state interest. However, using the
compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free
exercise of the conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to life or
health of an individual in the perceived scenarios.JAMES M. IMBONG, et al. v.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al., G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
The subject tarpaulins, on its face, do not convey any religious doctrine of the
Catholic church." That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with
the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the
expression within the ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin
clearly refers to candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay"
according to their respective votes on the RH Law.The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the
posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such
basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubtas to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.
BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015
EMINENT DOMAIN
Notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the
landowner of the States intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just
compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that his
landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law. HEIRS OF
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DR. JOSE DELESTE, NAMELY: JOSEFA DELESTE, et al. v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011
The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his
property is now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses
against the allegations in the complaint for eminent domain. CITY OF MANILA v.
MELBA TAN TE, G.R. No. 169263, September 21, 2011
In expropriation cases, the trial court has the discretion to act basedthe
commissioners report. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. SPS. TAN
SONG BOK AND JOSEFINA S. TAN, et al., G.R. No.191448,
November 16, 2011
Takingalso occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner
and approved by Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)for Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage through the stock distribution scheme,
as in the instant case. Thus, Hacienda LuisitaInc. (HLI)s submitting its stock
distribution programfor approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the
PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of taking as it
was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP
coverage of these lands. HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED v. PRESIDENTIAL
AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, et al., G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012
There is nothing infirm in an agreement which impliedly waives the right of City of
Manila to present evidence that it was acquiring the subject lots by expropriation for
a proper public purpose since it may be assumed that the parties knew what they
were doing and since such agreement would facilitate early disposal of the case.
CITY OF MANILA v. ALEGAR CORPORATION, et al., G.R. No. 187604, June
25, 2012
The consequence of a finding of unjust and improper titling of the entire property by
the Republic is that the title over the excluded portion shall be returned or
transferred back to the owners of the lot, with damages. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al. v. PAZ O. MONTALVAN, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, JESUS
J. MONTALVAN, G.R. No. 190336, June 27, 2012
Sequestration is not meant to deprive the owner or possessor of his title or any right
to his property and vest the same in the sequestering agency, the Government or
any other person, as these can be done only for the causes and by the processes
laid down by law. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI
(THROUGH ITS EXECUTOR, MANUEL G. MONTECILLO), SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTHDIVISION) et al., G.R. No. 183446, November 13, 2012
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages.
Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
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PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI),
G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Taking
of private property without just compensation is a violation of a persons property
right. In situations where the government does not take the trouble of initiating an
expropriation proceeding, the private owner has the option to compel payment of
the property taken, when justified. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH) v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, G.R. No.
171496, March 3, 2014
JUST COMPENSATION
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they
rejected the DAR's valuation is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, et al., G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010
Although the formula found in Section 17 of the CARL may be justly adopted in
certain cases, it is by no means the only formula that the court may adopt in
determining just compensation. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FORTUNE
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY PHILIPPINE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010
The just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property
amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Thus, the applicable
interest rate at 12% per annum, computed from the time the property was taken
until the full amount of just compensation was paid. APO FRUITS CORPORATION
AND HIJO PLANTATION, INC., v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
164195, October 12, 2010
It is settled that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The
Department of Agrarian Reforms's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by
any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GLENN Y. ESCANDOR, et.al., G.R. No.
171685, October 11, 2010
It is a settled rule that the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking
is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be
given to the landowner. MOISESTINIO, JR. AND FRANCIS TINIO v. NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, G.R. No. 160923, January 24, 2011
Just compensation determined in accordance with R.A.6657, and not P.D. 27 or E.O.
228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the
equivalent being real, substantial, full, and ample. LAND BANK OF THE
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PHILIPPINES v. MAGIN FERRER, ATTY. RAFAEL VILLAROSA, G.R. No. 172230,
February 2, 2011
The Land Bank of the Philippines is not merely a nominal party in the determination
of just compensation but an indispensable participant in such proceedings. As such,
LBP possessed the legal personality to institute a petition for determination of just
compensation. DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181566, March 09, 2011
The proper determination of the same is a matter of transcendental importance.
The determination of just compensation goes beyond the private interests involved;
it involves a matter of public interest the proper application of a basic
constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a landowner to receive just
compensation when the government exercises the power of eminent domain in its
agrarian reform program. APO FRUITS CORPORATION AND HIJO PLANTATION,
INC. v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G. R. No. 164195, April 05, 2011
The fair market value of the lot should be determined at the time when the parties
signed the compromise agreement and the same was approved because this is
tantamount to EPZA impliedly agreeing to paying the market value in 1993.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v. ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ, et
al., G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011
The Court has already categorically declared in that if the issue of just
compensation is not settled prior to the passage of the CARL, it should be computed
in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under P.D. 27.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JESUS S. YUJUICO, et al., G.R.
No. 18471, March 21, 2012
In the payment of just compensation, the payment of interest shall be made until
full payment of the amount adjudged as just compensation for the land. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PERFECTO OBIAS, et al, G.R. No. 184406,
March 14, 2012
Just compensation for private agricultural lands acquired by the government under
the auspices of P.D. 27 in relation to E.O. 228 should be computed in accordance
with the method set forth under R.A. 6657. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, REPRESENTED BY OIC-SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE, NOW BY
SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN v. HEIRS OF ANGEL T. DOMINGO,
G.R. No. 188670, March 7, 2012
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function
vested in the RTC acting as a special agrarian court, the judge cannot abuse his
discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified by
law and implementing rules. Special agrarian courts are not at liberty to disregard
the formula laid down by the Department of Agrarian Reform. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF SALVADOR ENCINAS and JACOBA DELGADO, G.R.
No. 167735, April 18, 2012
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The Department of Agrarian Reform, as the administrative agency tasked with the
implementation of the agrarian reform program and pursuant to its rule-making
power under R.A. 6657, translated the factors in Section 17 into a basic formula in
DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, and those found in succeeding DAR administrative
regulations. The application of these formulas ismandatoryand imposes upon the
RTC-SACs the duty to apply, and not to disregard, them in determining just
compensation. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JUAN LOPEZ, et
al, G.R. No. 171038, June 20, 2012
Evidently in a case where the conflict is exactly on just compensation, the agrarian
reform process has yet to be completed. Thus, the land shall be considered taken
only upon payment of just compensation because it would complete the agrarian
reform process. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. MANOLOGODUCO,
G.R. Nos. 174007, 181327, June 27, 2012
In appraising just compensation the courts must consider, in addition, all the facts
regarding the condition of the landholding and its surroundings, as well as the
improvements and the capabilities of the landholding. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. VERONICA ATEGANABLE, G.R. No. 176692, June 27, 2012
When the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation due
the landowner has yet to be settled, such just compensation should be determined
and the process concluded under R.A. 6657. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
EMILIANO R. SANTIAGO, JR., G.R. No. 182209,October 03, 2012
Acquisition of the property under OLT or P.D.27 does not necessarily mean that the
determination of just compensation thereof must be under the same decree. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPS. ROKAYA AND SULAIMAN BONA, G.R. No.
180804, November 12, 2012
It is well-settled that, in expropriation of properties, the amount of just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking. HENRY L. SY v.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, G.R. No. 202690, June 5, 2013
When a private property is taken for public use and there is a dispute as to the
amount of just compensation, it is the value of the property at the time of taking
that is controlling. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but
also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT
ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS v. SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA
TECSON, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013
When the government takes property pursuant to P.D. 27, but does not pay the
landowner his just compensation until after R.A. 6657 has taken effect in 1998, it
becomes more equitable to determine just compensation using R.A. 6657 and not
E.O. 228. Hence, the valuation of the GSP of palay should be based on its value at
the time it was ordered paid by the SAC. It is more equitable to determine just
compensation due the petitioners using values pursuant to the standard laid down
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in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, considering that the tenant-beneficiaries have already
benefited from the land, while the landowners wait in vain to be paid. THE HEIRS
OF SPOUSES DOMINGO TRIA AND CONSORCIA CAMANO TRIA v. LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. No.
170245, July 1, 2013
Where there is a dispute as to the amount of just compensation, the method to be
used in the determination of the value of the land must result to a fair and
reasonable amount and must not drastically reduce the said value. Just
compensation refers to full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the owner
and to be "just," the compensation must be real, substantial, full and ample. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL O. GALLEGO, JR., JOSEPH L.
GALLEGO and CHRISTOPHER L. GALLEGO, G.R. No. 173226, July 29, 2013
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be a sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by
the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and
competition.
The amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking,
which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
Further, the Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived
at arbitrarily; several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to,
acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the condemned
property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors can be considered
and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 193936. December 11, 2013
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. To
guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. 6657
enumerates the factors required to be taken into account to correctly determine just
compensation. The law (under Section 49 of R.A. 6657) likewise empowers the DAR
to issue rules for its implementation. The DAR thus issued DAR AO 5-98
incorporating the laws listed factors in determining just compensation into a basic
formula that contains the details that take these factors into account. LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, G.R. No.
172551. January 15, 2014
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the
owners loss. It must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation
of different factors.
Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates the standards for assessing the value of
expropriated land taken for national government infrastructure projects: (a) the
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classification and use for which the property is suited; (b) the developmental costs
for improving the land; (c) the value declared by the owners; (d) the current selling
price of similar lands in the vicinity; (e) the reasonable disturbance compensation
for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the
value of the improvements thereon; (f) the size, shape or location, tax declaration
and zonal valuation of the land; (g) the price of the land as manifested in the ocular
findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and (h) such facts and
events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire
similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the
government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible. In this case,
the trial court failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation,
tax declarations, and current selling price supported by documentary evidence.
Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair market value of real estate and
cannot be the sole basis of just compensation in expropriation cases. Various
factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for
expropriation. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market
value the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its
actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape,
location, and the tax declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker's gain but
the owner's loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner
but also to the taker.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. ASIA PACIFIC
INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 192100. March 12, 2014
The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation
should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. An
emancipation patent constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee. It is from the issuance of an
emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of ownership in
the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTORINO T. PERALTA, G.R. No.
182704, April 23, 2014
The clear intent of the Constitutional guarantee of just compensation, whether
understood within the terms of Article III, Section 9 or of Article XIII, Section 4, is to
secure to any owner the "full and fair equivalent" of the property taken. Regardless
of whether the taking was pursued in the "traditional" exercise of eminent domain
or in its "revolutionary" exercise in the context of the States agrarian reform
program, just compensation has but onemeaning and the State is obligated to pay
the "fair and full price of the property" even if the property is taken for social justice
purposes. Jurisprudence settles that the determination of just compensation is
fundamentally a function of the courts. Section 57 of R.A. 6657 explicitly vests in
the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation
for lands taken pursuant to the States agrarian reform program.LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. BENECIO EUSEBIO, JR., G.R. No. 160143, July 2, 2014
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of
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taking. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program are: (a) the acquisition cost of the land;(b) the current
value of like properties;(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the
income therefrom;(d) the owner's sworn valuation;(e) the tax declarations;(f) the
assessment made by government assessors;(g) the social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the
property;and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing
institution
on
the
said
land,
if
any,
must
be
equally
considered.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SPOUSES DIOSDADO
STA. ROMANA AND RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290,
July 9, 2014
The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which
is vested in the regional trial court acting as a SAC, and not in administrative
agencies. The SAC, therefore, must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial
discretion in the evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be
arbitrarily restricted by a formula dictated by the DAR, an administrative
agency.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA.
ROMANA AND RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290, July 9,
2014
The Regional Trial Court may impose interest on the just compensation award as
may be warranted by the circumstances of the case. In previous cases, the Court
has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in
the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be
an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at
the rate of 12% interest per annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30,
2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just
compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6%
interest p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799,
series of 2013. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SPOUSES DIOSDADO
STA. ROMANA AND RESURRECCION O. RAMOS, ET AL., G.R. No. 183290,
July 9, 2014
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
The constitutional right to aspeedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. CAPT. WILFREDOROQUERO v. THE CHANCELLOR OF UP MANILA, et
al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010
The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations.
CLARITA J. CARBONEL v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 187689,
September 07, 2010
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An information elicited in violation of the rights of the accused or without a valid
waiver thereof is inadmissible, and the evidence garnered as the result of that
interrogation is also inadmissible. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FEDERICO
LUCERO, G.R. No. 188705, March 02, 2011
When custodial investigation is conducted in violation of Section 12 of ArticleIII, only
evidence on confessions and admission of the accused as against himself is
prohibited. HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 176229,
October 19, 2011
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession
of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable
only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning
initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. A written
statement given by an employee during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the
course of his employment, is not a statement given by a person under custodial
investigation, hence, not falling under the proscription provided in Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. CARLOS L. TANENGGEE v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
Where the Office of the Ombudsman fails to investigate a case in an expedient
manner through its own fault, the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases is deemed violated. Such constitutional right is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.
RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA v. SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191411; EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P.
MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G. AMUGOD v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION)
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 191871, July
15, 2013
Speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies
to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FIRST DIVISION and
THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON
ARCEO and ERNEST ESCALER, G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No. 189063. December
11, 2013
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The
concept of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to
resolve the appeal of petitioner does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was
denied his right to the speedy disposition of his case. After all, a mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, as the facts and circumstances
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peculiar to the case must also be considered. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN
JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014
The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the
freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be examined came
from the body of the accused. The Court said: This was a mechanical act the
accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts
but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. JAIME D.
DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 200748,July 23, 2014
The right to a speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or
statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law. Ones
right to the speedy disposition of his case must therefore be asserted. Due to the
failure of petitioner to assert this right, he is considered to have waived it.
EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014
This Court has emphasized that speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a
flexible concept. In determining whether the accuseds right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay (b) reason
therefor (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it and (d) prejudice caused by
such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not
suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings
which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given
to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the Court recognizes
the accuseds right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration
of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly
prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy
trial.WILLIAM CO v. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, G.R. No.
183994, June 30, 2014
As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the term is statutorily defined in
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 9851, to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or
any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c)
that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. JULIAN YUSAY
CARAM v. ATTY. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014
The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of
theMiranda rights, which require that: (a) any person under custodial investigation
has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him
in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned
and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford
an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.
The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to
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include the statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made in
writing and in the presence of counsel. The invocation of these rights applies
during custodial investigation, which begins when the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. MARK JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22,
2014
R.A. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to include the practice
of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
inviting officer for any violation of law. This means that even those who
voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda
rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario.
Chavez is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who
accompanied him to the police station. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARK
JASON CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014
His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of
his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not
when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHARLIE FIELDAD, G.R. No. 196005, October 1,
2014
[T]he fact that [the accused] was not assisted by counsel during the investigation
and inquest proceedings does not in any way affect his culpability.It has already
been held that the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible
only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation.Here, [the accuseds] conviction was based not on his alleged
uncounseled confession or admission but on the testimony of the prosecution
witness. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABOLA BIO, G.R. No. 195850,
February 16, 2015
There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer,
while desirable, is not indispensable. A party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the administrative body
is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is
not an absolute requirement. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF
THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY V. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
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The rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the
Constitution are applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. A
person undergoing a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation
and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law enforcement officer
contemplated by the rule. MARIERA DE CASTRO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where
the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial
was a sham. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE TAN, G.R. No. 167526,
July 26, 2010
As a rule, judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the
accused under double jeopardy. In order to come under the exceptional cases where
a judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered by the court, it is not enough that the
party invoke the exceptions he must be able to bring his pleas for reconsideration
under such exceptions. ANTONIO LEJANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
Nos. 176389 and 176864, January 18, 2011
Only the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), and not the private offended party,
has the authority to question the order granting the demurrer to evidence in a
criminal case. And an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not
appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. BENJAMIN B.
BANGAYAN, JR v. SALLY GO BANGAYAN, GR No. 172777, October 19, 2011
Mistrial is the only exception to the well-settled principle that acquittal is
immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. This
Court was categorical in stating that a re-examination of the evidence without a
finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of an accused, which is what is
protected by the rule against double jeopardy. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
THE HONORABLE CA, et al., G.R. No. 198589,July 25, 2012
There is simply no double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges
another with a different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts.
Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution
for the same offense. ISABELO A. BRAZA v. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 1950, February 20, 2013
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in theOSG.Section 35 (1), Chapter 12,
Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. It must be noted that the private complainant or
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the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The rule is that a judgment
acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation,
and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused
in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the
State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal of the accused to this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court but such may be assailed by the People in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the
accused in double jeopardy. DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA, G.R.
No. 166995, January 13, 2014
CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political
community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full
civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes
the duty of allegiance to the political community. 14 The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievance.DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014
NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION
It is not the registration of the act of election of Philippine citizenship, although a
valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625,which will confer Philippine
citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that
citizenship has been claimed. BALGAMELO CABILING MA, et al. v.
COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., et al., G.R. No. 183133, July 26,
2010
Bare general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an
applicant for naturalization. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO
ONG, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012
Where a foreigner seeking to be granted of Philippine citizenship does not follow the
rule on the period to file his petition, the action must be dismissed. The opportunity
given to a foreigner to become a citizenis a mere privilege and the absence of one
requirement is fatal to the petition of the foreigner. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN
LEE KENG, G.R. No. 197450, March 20, 2013
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A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial
naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino
citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the
second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to
acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements
required under CA 473. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA
SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or
administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for
citizenship and receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law, the competent court
may order the issuance of the proper naturalization certificate and the registration
thereof in the proper civil registry. On the other hand, R.A. 9139 provides that aliens
born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by
administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special
Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition and issue
a certificate of naturalization. In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF
Petitioners failure to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to his
application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Differently stated, the inclusion of present
and former places of residence in the petition is a jurisdictional requirement, without
which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured
by evidence on the omitted matter at the trial.DENNIS L. GO v. REPUBLIC OF
LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine
Bar. However, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. IN
RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE
PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO MUNESES, A.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012
Foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before
an officer authorized to administer oath. TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012
The act of using a foreign passport does not divest one of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as a foreign
citizen, he voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant he represented himself
as a foreign citizen by using his foreign passport.
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Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship
in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring
candidate filed his certificate of candidacy he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights
and privileges of Filipino and foreign citizenship, he was qualified to vote, but by the
express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was
not qualified to run for a local elective position. By being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning.
Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted.
This leaves the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
MODES AND KINDS OF APPOINTMENT
A permanent appointment implies the holding of acivil service eligibility on the part
of the appointee, unless the position involved requires no such eligibility. Where the
appointee does not possess a civil service eligibility, the appointment is considered
temporary. The subsequent acquisition of the required eligibility will not make the
temporary appointment regular or permanent; a new appointment is needed.
JUSTINA MANIEBO v. CA, G.R. No. 158708, August 10, 2010
When the position is not among those enumerated in Section 7, Chapter 2, Book V,
Title 1 (Subtitle A) of E.O. 292, otherwise known as The Revised Administrative Code
of 1987, the appointment in order to be valid does not require presidential
appointment. MODESTO AGYAO, JR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No.
182591, January 18, 2011
R.A. 6975 is intended only to prevent the new appointee from serving beyond the
term of office of the original appointee. It does not prohibit the new appointee from
serving less than the unexpired portion of the term as in the case of a temporary
appointment. HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL v. HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE NEW APPOINTEE VICE HEREIN PETITIONER, et al.,
G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011
Section1(2), Article IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution and similar provisions do not
peremptorily prohibit the promotional appointment of a commissioner to chairman,
provided the new appointees tenure in both capacities does not exceed sevenyears
in all. DENNIS A. B. FUNA, v. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
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The language of Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution makes no reference to the
nature of the appointment or designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary. DENNIS FUNA v.
ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al., G.R. No. 191644,
February 19, 2013
A person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 may still be
appointed in a government position provided that it is a coterminous or primarily
confidential position. The tenure of a confidential employee is coterminous with that
of the appointing authority, or is at the latters pleasure. The position of a General
Manager (GM) in a water district is considered as a confidential position due to the
intimate relationship between the GM and the Board of Directors (BOD) of the water
district and the power of the BOD to terminate the services of the GM on the ground
of loss of confidence. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. PILILLA WATER DISTRICT,
G.R. No. 190147, March 5, 2013
DISABILITIES AND INHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
A reading of the conflict of interest rule reveals that the prohibition against NEA
personnel from participating in any question pertaining to a public service entity
where he is directly or indirectly interested has the purpose of preventing such
personnel from exercising the power of his office for personal pecuniary gain, which
may cause grave damage and prejudice to public interest. NATIONAL
ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND
PEDRO RAMOS, G.R. No. 149497, January 25, 2010
DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
There is a tremendous difference between the degree of responsibility, care, and
trustworthiness expected of a clerk or ordinary employee in the bureaucracy and
that required of bank managers, cashiers, finance officers, and other officials
directly handling large sums of money and properties. SALVADOR O. ECHANO, JR.
v. LIBERTY TOLEDO, G.R. No. 173930, September 15, 2010
Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and
integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal
and private dealings with other people, to preserve the courts good name and
standing. LOURDES CELAVITE-VIDAL v. NORAIDA A. AGUAM, A.M. No.SCC-1013-P,June 26, 2012
Acts may constitute Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service as long as
they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. Where a professor in a
state university directly sells books to her students, the acts shall constitute
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service taking into account that the
said act is prohibited by the institution, her moral ascendancy over her students,
the book/compilation was overpriced, and that the students refusal to buy the
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book/compilation could result in their failure in the subject. DR. ZENAIDA P. PIA v.
HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., OVERALL DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN,
FORMERLY ACTING OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, DR.
OFELIA M. CARAGUE, FORMERLY PUP PRESIDENT, DR. ROMAN R. UANNUG,
FORMERLY DEAN, COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND POLITICS
(CEFP), NOW ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, CEFP POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES (PUP), STA. MESA, MANILA, G.R. No. 172334, June 5,
2013
Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very
nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must faithfully adhere to, hold
sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public
trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
ATTY. VIRGILLO P. ALCONERA v. ALFREDO T. PALLANAN, A.M. No. P-123069, January 20, 2014
Section 8 of R.A. 6713, requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of their SALN. In this relation, the same provision
mandates
full
disclosure
of
the
concerned
public
official's(a)realproperty,itsimprovements,acquisitioncosts, assessedvalueandcurrent
fair market value, (b) personal property and acquisition cost, (c) all other assets
such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like,(d)
liabilities, and(e) all business interests and financial connections. ANGELITO R.
MARQUEZ, ET AL. v. JUDGE VENANCIO OVEJERA AND SHERIFF IV LOURDES
COLLADO, A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014
While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and
employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their functions with utmost
responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty,the court must
protect them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather
than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.
MICHAELINA RAMOS BALASBAS v. PATRICIA B. MONAYAO, G.R. No. 190524,
February 17, 2014
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the
land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their
rights and interests. GSIS AND WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRES. & GEN. MANAGER OF GSIS v. DINNAH VILLAVIZA, et al., G.R. No.
180291, July 27, 2010
Though respondent is a casual employee as contemplated under Rule III, Section
2(f) of the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, she is
entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed for more serious causes
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or for causes other than that provided under Civil Service Commission Form No.
001, to wit: (1) when their services are no longer needed; (2) funds are no longer
available; (3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their
performance are below par. PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND REYNALDO P. MARTIN v. MARIE JEAN C. LAPID,
G.R. No. 191940, April 12, 2011
Rice subsidy is one of the benefits that will be granted to employees of GOCCs or
GFIs only if they are "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989. MANOLITO AGRA, et al. v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011
The only exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect
compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra compensation for
services rendered in another position which is an extension or is connected with his
basic work. HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, et al. v. JULITA ESPARTERO, et al., G.R.
No. 154952, July 16, 2012
R.A. 6758 withdrew the authority of the NHA to grant additional incentive benefits to
its project personnel. Only those additional compensation benefits being received
by incumbents before the effectivity of R.A. 6758, which were not integrated into
the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be authorized. GENEROSO
ABELLANOSA, et al. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good
faith in the discharge of official duties, such that, in the absence of any proof that a
public officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with
personal liability for damages that may result from the performance of an official
duty. Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the
burden to convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officers
performance of his duties. Case law also exhorts that although a public officer is the
final approving authority and the employees who processed the transaction were
directly underhissupervision, personalliability doesnotautomatically attach to him
but only upon those directly responsible for the unlawful expenditures. ROSALINDA
DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ, in her capacity as then administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
represented by CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND COMMISSIONER
JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013
LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
In administrative cases, misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part
of a person concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of the
parties or to the right determination of the cause; dishonesty, on the other hand,
dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false statement in any
material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in
securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion.
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It is a well-settled rule that a public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees areduty-bound to serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.
GERARDO Q. FERRERAS v. RUDY P. ECLIPSE, A.M. No. P-05-2085, January
20, 2010
To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established
rule must be manifest. TERESITA NARVASA v. BENJAMIN A. SANCHEZ, JR.,G.R.
No. 169449, March 26, 2010
Acts which affect the performance of duties as an officer of the court and taints the
judiciarys integrity should be punished accordingly. ROLAND ERNEST MARIE
JOSE SPELMANS v. JUDGE GAYDIFREDO T. OCAMPO, A.M. No.MTJ-07-1663,
March 26, 2010
Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation
from the established norm, whether it be work- related or not, amounts to
misconduct. PRISCILLA HERNANDO v. JULIANA BENGSON, A.M. No.P- 092686, March 10, 2010
Compensation and benefits of public officers are not intended purely for the
personal benefit of officers neither is payment of salaries and benefits to a public
officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the
anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid
enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than that
such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. RAMON R.
YAP v. COMMISION ONAUDIT, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. ALAN A. OLANDESCA, G.R. No. 171434,
April 23, 2010
The failure to remit the funds in due time amounts to dishonesty and grave
misconduct which are both punishable with dismissal from service.OFFICE OF THE
COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MARCELA V. SANTOS, A.M. No. P-06-2287,
October 12, 2010
In order that the public officer may be held guilty of giving unwarranted advantage
to another to the prejudice of the government, it must be shown that the accused
public officials did not rely on the competence and good faith of his subordinates.
ANTONIO Y. DE JESUS, SR., ANATOLIO A. ANG and MARTINA S. APIGO v.
SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
Nos. 182539-40, February 21, 2011
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Misrepresentation of qualifications, i.e., educational attainment and eligibility for
government service amounts to plain and simple dishonesty as it refers to the act of
intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing one's
appointment. ANTONIO EXEQUIEL A. MOMONGAN v PRIMITIVO A. SUMAYO,
A.M. No. P-10-2767, April 12, 2011
The public officials personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government
funds was made in violation of law. TOMAS R. OSMEA, IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF CEBU CITY v. THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R.No. 188818 May 31, 2011
The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all
those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of
public accountability and diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary. ESPINA &
MADARANG
CO.
&
MAKAR
AGRICULTURAL
COMMERCIAL
&
DEVELOPMENTCORP.(MAKAR)v.HON.CADERP.INDARALHAJ,A.M.No.RTJ-072069, December 14, 2011
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so
far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable. VICTORY M. FERNANDEZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et
al., G.R. No. 193983, March 14, 2012
An administrative offense constitutes misconduct when it has direct relation to,
and is connected with, the performance of the official duties of the one charged.
Thus, misconduct refers to a transgression of an established and definite rule of
action, more specifically, some unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer charged. PRISCILLA L. HERNANDO v. JULIANA Y. BENGSON, LEGAL
RESEARCHER, RTC, BRANCH 104, QUEZON CITY, A.M. No. P-09-2686
(Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 06- 2441-P), March 21, 2012
An officer or employee in the government shall be considered habitually absent only
if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2/5 days monthly leave
credit under the Civil Service Rules for at least three months in a semester or at
least three consecutive months during the year. OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR v. MANUEL Z. ARAYA, JR., UTILITY WORKER, MTCC,
BRANCH 2, OZAMIS CITY, A.M. No.P-12-3053, (formerly A.M. No. 06-3-88MTCC)
Dismissal from the service, as a prescribed penalty imposed by Section 52(A)(1),
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as a first
offense, underscores the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust
and only those who can live up to such exacting standard deserve the honor of
continuing in public service. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
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CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. FLORENTINOVELOSO,
G.R. No. 196201,June 19, 2012
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services
are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012
Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft warranting the
penalty of dismissal and cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. MA.IRISSA G. MUSNI, A.M. No. P11-3024, July 17, 2012
When an individual is found guilty of dishonesty, the corresponding penalty is
dismissal from employment or service. BAGONG KAPISANAN SA PUNTA
TENEMENT, INC v. AZER E. DOLOT, et al., G.R. NO.179054, September 05,
2012
In case of dishonesty, the individual intentionally makes a false statement of any
material fact, practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to
secure his examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. Given the fact that
respondent government officer was able to successfully overcome the onus of
demonstrating that he does not possess any unexplained wealth and that the
omissions (he did not disclose any business interest and/or financial connection, but
showed a steady increase of his net worth) in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALNs) did not betray any sense of bad faith or the intent to mislead
or deceive on his part considering that his SALNs actually disclose the extent of his
and his wifes assets and business interests, respondent is merely culpable of
Simple Negligence instead of the more serious charge of Dishonesty. OFFICE OF
THEOMBUDSMAN v. ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V, BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) G.R. No. 181598, March 6, 2013
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper
attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or
indifference. On the other hand, gross neglect of duty is characterized by want of
even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, and in
cases involving public officials, by flagrant and palpable breach of duty. It is the
omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take
on their own property. Where a bank officer wilfully disregards the bank procedures,
the act constitutes gross, not a simple, neglect of duty. This is so since the banking
business is one impressed with public trust and a higher degree of diligence is
imposed on banks compared to an ordinary business enterprise in the handling of
deposited funds; the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of
their officials and employees is far greater than those imposed on ordinary officers
and employees in other enterprises. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
ARTEMIO S. SAN JUAN, JR., G.R. No. 186279, April 2, 2013
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When an elected official refuses to recognize a legitimate operation of a
government agency and wilfully intervenes to lead the said operation to failure,
grave misconduct is committed. It is characterized by a clear intent to violate the
law, or a flagrant disregard of established rules, which must all be supported by
substantial
evidence.
FRANKLlNALEJANDROv.OFFICEOFTHEOMBUDSMAN
FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria
Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013
Where an officer or employee in the civil service incurs unauthorized absences
exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit for at least three months in a
semester or at least three consecutive months during the year, his act constitutes
habitual absenteeism. If it is the second offense of the employee, the proper penalty
is dismissal from service. Nonetheless, in several administrative cases, the Court
refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts. The
Court hasconsidered the employees length of service, acknowledgment of his or
her infractions and feelings of remorse, advanced age, family circumstances and
other humanitarian and equitable considerations in determining the appropriate
penalty. The Court also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice,
whatever missteps may be committed by the employee ought not to be visited with
a consequence so severe. JUDGE MA. MONINA S. MISAJON, Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), San Jose, Antique v. JERENCE P. HIPONIA, Clerk II, ELIZABETH
B. ESCANILLAS, Stenographer I, WILLIAM M. YGLESIAS, Process Server,
and CONRADO A. RAFOLS, JR., Utility Aide, all of the same court, A.M. No.
P-08- 2439, June 25, 2013
Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of
a public officer. A government employee who is found guilty of grave misconduct
may be dismissed from the service even upon the first offense. ROLANDO
GANZON v. FERNANDO ARLOS, G.R. No. 174321, October 22, 2013
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact is not absolute. It is well
settled that findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies are
conclusive only when supported by substantial evidence.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as
corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which
must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.
Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to
procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the
rights of others. PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas v. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS, CATALINA
ALINGASA and PORFERIO I. MENDOZA, G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45,
November 20, 2013
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There is no defense in receiving money from party-litigants. The act itself makes
court employees guilty of grave misconduct. Grave misconduct is a serious
transgression of some established and definite rule of action that tends to threaten
the very existence of the system of administration of justice an official or employee
serves. It may manifest itself in corruption, or in other similar acts, done with the
clear intent to violate the law or in flagrant disregard of established rules.
Dishonesty has been defined as "the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
VILLAHERMOSA SR. v. SARCIA, A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office
in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from
an employee than a position in the judiciary. An administrative case for dishonesty
against a court employee is cognizable by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) pursuant to Section 6 Article VIII of the Constitution. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION v. NENITA C. LONGOS, CLERK II, MUNICPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT,
DEL
CARMEN-NUMANCIA-SANISIDROSANBENITO,SURIGAODELNORTE,A.M.No.P-12-3070,March 11, 2014
In Blaquerav. Alcala, the Court no longer required the officials and employees of
different government departments and agencies to refund the productivity incentive
bonus they received because there was no indicia of bad faith and the disbursement
was made in the honest belief that the recipients deserved the amounts. But this
was qualified in Casal v. COA, where SC held the approving officials liable for the
refund of the incentive award due to their patent disregard of the issuances of the
President and the directives of COA. There, the officials failure to observe the
issuances amounted to gross negligence, which is inconsistent with the presumption
of good faith. TESDA v. COA, G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014
The act of fraudulently securing ones appointment constitutes dishonesty.
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material
fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his
examination, appointment or registration. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v.
LONGOS,A.M. No. P-12-3070, March 11, 2014
Clerks of Courts perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the courts
funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. By failing to remit on time, she
violated the trust reposed to her as a disbursement officer. Delay in the remittance
is a serious breach of duty, which carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
service. However, jurisprudence on administrative cases refrains from imposing
actual penalties if mitigating circumstances are present. Conditions such as length
of service, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations may
alter the courts decision.OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.
PEREZ, A.M. No. P-12-3074, March 17, 2014
Loafing is defined under the Civil Service rules as frequent unauthorized absences
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from duty during office hours. The word frequent connotes that the employees
absent themselves from duty more than once. Respondents two absences from his
post, being without authority, can already be characterized as frequent. It
constitutes inefficiency and dereliction of duty, which adversely affect the prompt
delivery of justice.OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. JOHNI GLENN D.
RUNES, A.M. No. P-12-3055, March 26, 2014
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer
is entitled to give and have obeyed. It imports a willful or intentional disregard of
the lawful and reasonable instructions of the employer. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION&
DEPARTMENT
OF
SCIENCE
AND
TECHNOLOGY
v.
ARANDIA, G.R. No. 199549, April 7, 2014
Misconduct has a legal and uniform definition. It is defined as an intentional
wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior,
especially by a government official. Amisconduct is grave where the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule
are present. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer.Misconduct becomes grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which
must be established by substantial evidence.Section 52 (A) (3), Rule IV of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the
penalty for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service. RUBY P. LAGOC v.
MARIA ELENA MALAGA, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ET AL., G.R. No.
184890, July 9, 2014
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray;
unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and
lack of fairness and straightforwardness. It is a malevolent act that makes people
unfit to serve the judiciary.
Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must
imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officers
official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect,
or failureto discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross
misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the
former. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LAGADO v. CLERK II BRYAN LEONIDO, A.M.
No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014
Under Administrative Circular No. 14-2002, an officer or employee in the civil
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service shall be considered habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences
exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the leave law for at
least three (3) months in a semester or at least three (3) consecutive months during
the year. RE: REPORT OF JUDGE RODOLFO D. VAPOR ON THE HABITUAL
ABSENTEEISM OF FILIGRIN E. VELEZ, JR., PROCESS SERVER, A.M. No. P-143232, August 12, 2014
Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact,
or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his
examination, registration, appointment or registration. Dishonesty was understood
to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of
integrity. Respondents act of recommending approval despite lack of certification
from end-users does not constitute dishonesty. It is actually a form of gross neglect
of duty and grave misconduct.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless persons never fail to
take on their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross
negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
Misconduct is an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior, especially by a government official. As differentiated from
simple misconduct, in grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORENDO B. ARIAS, G.R. No. 188909,
September 17, 2014
Sheriffs, being ranking officers of the court and agents of the law, must discharge
their duties with great care and diligence. In serving and implementing writs, as well
as processes and orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting
adversely the proper dispensation of justice. Simple Neglect of Duty is defined as
the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge
a duty due to carelessness or indifference.On the other hand, Grave Abuse of
Authority has been defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who
under color of his office, wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority. SPS.SABIJON v. DE JUAN, A.M. No. P-14-3281, January 28, 2015
The Administrative Code of 1987 provides that a public employees failure to pay
just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Just debts are defined as (a) claims
adjudicated by a court of law; or (b) claims, the existenceand justness of which, are
admitted by the debtor. Willful failure to pay just debts is a light offense with the
corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first offense. Failure to pay debts can
indeed be considered, broadly speaking, as misconduct. However, when the
gravamen of the offense is unwillingness to pay a just obligation, the employee
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should be held guilty for willful failure to pay just debt. MARY-ANN S. TORDILLA v.
AMILANO, A.M. P-14-3241, February 4, 2015
Allowing another person to take the examination in ones behalf is an act of
dishonesty.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. JOVILYN DAWANG,A.M. No. P-153289, February 17, 2015
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
An employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment
after serving the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending
administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEMANDWINSTON F. GARCIA v.ALBERT M. VELASCOAND MARIO I.
MOLINA,G.R.No. 170463, February 2, 2011
The issuance by the proper disciplining authority of an order of preventive
suspension for 90 days of a civil officer or employee pending investigation of her
administrative case is authorized provided that a formal charge is served to her and
her charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that she is guilty of the
charge as to warrant her removal from the service. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. ROSARIO S.
MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, G.R. No. 176343, September 18, 2012
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT AND BACK SALARIES

An illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only
to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal
termination up to his reinstatement. ISABEL GALANG v. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 175276, May 31, 2011
Section 63 of the EPIRA as well as Section 5, Rule 33 of the IRR clearly state that the
displaced or separated personnel as a result of the privatization, if qualified, shall be
given preference in the hiring of the manpower requirements of the privatized
companies. Clearly, the law only speaks of preference and by no stretch of the
imagination can the same amount to a legal right to the position. Undoubtedly, not
all the terminated employees will be re-hired by the selection committee. ENRIQUE
U. BETOY v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011
A government officer or employees removal from office as a result of a bona fide
reorganization is a valid cause for that employees removal. CARLOS COTIANGCO,
et al. v. THE PROVINCE OF BILIRAN ANDTHE CA G.R. No. 157139, October
19, 2011
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A government employee enjoys constitution protection that No officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.VICTOR R. REYES, substituted by his heirs, CLARIBEL G.
REYES, CLARISSA G. REYES, and CZARINA G. REYES v. CA, CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, G.R. No.167002, December 12, 2011
For a valid dismissal from the government service, the requirements of due process
must be complied with. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP. v.
COURT OF APPEALS and MIA MANAHAN,G.R. No. 185668, December 13,
2011
Failure to adduce substantial evidence that the act was part of the fraudulent
scheme amounting to grave misconduct, dishonesty and reasonable violation of
office rules and regulations presupposes that the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal from the service is not warranted. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, REPRESENTED BY ROBERT G. VERGARA v. HEIDI R. CHUA, G.R. No.
202914, September 26, 2012
When there is reorganization conducted pursuant to an authority granted to the
BODof a government-owned and controlled corporation, an officer reassigned to a
new position cannot claim that she was illegally removed from the previous one on
the claim that the BOD has no authority to conduct reorganization. The BOD of a
government-owned and controlled corporation may be granted by law the authority
to effect reorganization therein. Thus, a reorganization undertaken pursuant to a
specific statutory authority by the Board of Directors of a government-owned and
government-controlled corporation is valid. ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANGDEMIGILLO v. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP) et al., G.R. No. 168613, G.R. No. 185571,
&G.R. No. 185571, March 5, 2013
When a government officer is subject to an administrative action, there must be a
formal charge against him/her and an investigation to give him/her ample
opportunity to be heard. A formal charge issued prior to the imposition of
administrative sanctions must conform to the requirements set forth in Section 16,
Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. If the
purported formal charge does not contain the requirements set forth in Section
16, it cannot be said that the employee concerned has been formally charged,
rendering the dismissal from service invalid. A memorandum directing the person to
explain within a given period of time does not constitute as a formal charge. Such
wanton disregard of the proper procedure in administrative investigations under the
civil service rules cannot be countenanced. For a valid dismissal from the
government service, the requirements of due process must be complied with.
TERESITA L. SALVA v. FLAVIANA M. VALLE, G.R. No. 193773, April 2, 2013
Civil servants enjoy security of tenure, and [n]o officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and
after due process. Under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code,
it is the Civil Service Commission that has the power to [h]ear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.LIGHT
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RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA, G.R. No. 192074, June
10, 2014
OTHER MATTERS
Section 13(3) of R.A. 7077 evidently has to do with the composition of the Retired
Reserve Unit. The provision in question does not prescribe the retirement age for
reservists who are called into active service in the regular armed forces. COL.
JESUS G. CABARRUS, JR., PAF (RES.) v. HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, et al., G.R. No. 180966, June 13, 2012
Resignation implies an intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office
and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority. To constitute a complete
and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to
relinquish a part of the term (b) an act of relinquishment and (c) an acceptance by
the proper authority. In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a
public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is
nothing and the officer remains in office. Resignation to be effective must be
accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to an
acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor. A public officer cannot
abandon his office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject
to the penal provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or
conclusive act of a resignations acceptance is the notice of acceptance. The
incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his
resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor.LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT
AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014
During the pendency of the presentadministrative matter, respondent Sahi suffered
a stroke andresigned from office in January 2011. Her claim for separationbenefits
and accrued leave credits though cannot be processed andreleased for lack of
requirements. Nonetheless, respondent Sahisresignation does not render this case
moot. Resignation is not away out to evade administrative liability when a court
employeeis facing administrative sanction.PRESIDING JUDGE JUAN GABRIEL
HIZON ALANO v. PADMA LATIP SAHI, ET AL., A.M. No. P-11-3020, June 25,
2014
P.D. 626, as amended, defines compensable sickness as any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness
caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting
the same is increased by the working conditions. Based on this definition, we ruled
that for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable,
the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease
listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation with the
conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the
disease was increased by the working conditions.
The new employee compensation program now directs that all covered employers
throughout the country be required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums
or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust
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fund. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or
recklessly included, the integrity of the trust fund would be endangered. In this
sense, compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the
need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of
workers and their families look up to for compensation whenever covered accidents,
salary and deaths occur. GSIS v. JOSE CAPACITE, G.R. No. 199780, September
24, 2014
NPC employees who were separated from the service because of the reorganization
of the electric power industry and who received their separation pay under the
EPIRA Law are still entitled to receive loyalty awards under the CSC Memorandum
Circular.
We declared that the receipt of retirement benefits does not bar the retiree from
receiving separation pay. Separation pay is a statutory right designed to provide the
employee with the wherewithal during the period that he/she is looking for another
employment. On the other hand, retirement benefits are intended to help the
employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying
about his financial support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty and service to
the employer. A separation pay is given during one's employable years, while
retirement benefits are given during one's unemployable years. Hence, they are not
mutually exclusive.
Thus, it is clear that a separation pay at the time of the reorganization of the NPC
and retirement benefits at the appropriate future time are two separate and distinct
entitlements.
Thus, not unless the loyalty award was considered in the computation of the
separation pay, the same should not be withdrawn from the employees enumerated
in the ND. NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, G.R. No. 204800, October 14, 2014
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable
authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is
discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived
from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a
mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as the public or third persons who are
interested therein are concerned.This clarification is necessary in order to protect
the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority
emanates from the State. Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of
the President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
any decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and
effective. REMIGIO D. ESPIRITU v. LUTGARDA TORRES DEL ROSARIO,G.R. No.
204964, October 15, 2014
THE CIVIL SERVICE
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For an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to
security oftenure, she/he must pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES
eligibility, comply with the other requirements prescribed by the CES Board, and be
appointed to a CES rank by the President. PEZA BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND
LILIA DE LIMA v. GLORIA MERCADO, G.R. No. 172144, March 9, 2010
Our Constitution, in using the expressions all workersand no officer or
employee,puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular
employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy
security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense
that during their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for
cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(CSC) v. GREGORIO MAGNAYE, JR., G.R. No. 183337, April 23, 2010
Reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the
test of good faithlies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is
foreconomyortomakethebureaucracymore efficient. Removal from office as a result
of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith. VIRGINIA BAUTISTA v.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010
The CES covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Assistant
Department Manager II does not require appointment by the President of the
Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT
OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, G.R. No.
185766, November 23, 2010
Good faith is actually a question of intention and can be ascertained not from a
persons own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of
his conduct and outward acts. CESAR S. DUMDUMA v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182606, December 4, 2011
Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service is clear
that length of service may be considered either as mitigating or aggravating
depending on the circumstances of the case. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v.
AURORA M. CLAVE, G.R. Nos. 194665, 194645, March 6, 2012
The mandatory order in the program of devolution under R.A.7160 connotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The only
instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is
when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result to
duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the
national government. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DR. AGNES QUIDA P. YU,
G.R. No. 189041, July 31, 2012
Where another person takes the civil service examination on behalf of another, the
said act constitutes dishonesty which is punishable by dismissal from service. The
said public officer or government employees length of service in the judiciary is
inconsequential. The CSCs discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of her civil
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service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her
Personal Data Sheet when she had been already found guilty of an administrative
charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking
clemency tell that she has not and does not live up to the high standards demanded
of a court employee. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA,
Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City, A.M. No. P-08-2531,
April 11, 2013
When a government employee undisputedly lacked CES eligibility, he did not hold
hismanagerial position, within the coverage of the CES, in a permanent capacity or
acquire security of tenure in that position. Otherwise stated, his appointment was
temporary and "co-terminus with the appointing authority. One who holds a
temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be
terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show
that the termination is for cause. EMMANUEL A. DE CASTRO v. EMERSON S.
CARLOS, G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013
The Civil Service Law and rules do not give a concrete description of what specific
acts constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the Court
defined such an offense in Ito v. De Vera as acts or omissions that violate the norm
of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in
the Judiciary, thereby prejudicing the best interest of the administration of justice. In
Government Service Insurance System v. Mayordomo, the Court further declared
that the administrative offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service need not be related to or connected with the public officers official
functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of
his public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public
officer or employee. HEIRS OF CELESTINO TEVES v. AUGUSTO J. FELICIDARIO,
A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013
Section 26, Chapter 5, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 lists the
personnel actions that may be taken in the government service, namely: (1)
appointment through certification;(2) promotion; (3) transfer; (4) reinstatement; (5)
reemployment; (6) detail; and (7) reassignment. Reassignment should not be
confused with a transfer.
Reassignment has been defined as movement of an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not
involve a reduction in rank, status or salary. Under Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 (Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Actions) it includes reassignment in the enumeration of personnel
movements that do not require the issuance of a new appointment (but shall
nevertheless require an office order from a duly authorized officer). It is presumed
to be regular and made in the interest of public service unless proven otherwise or if
it constitutes constructive dismissal.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC has the power and
function to prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and otherpertinentlaws.The
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reassignmentofagovernmentemployeewhichisundoubtedly a personneland Civil
Servicematter to be properly addressed in accordance with the rules and guidelines
prescribed by the CSC.MARICHU G. EJERA v. BEAU HENRY L. MERTO AND
ERWIN VERGARA, G.R. No. 163109, January 27, 2014
The CSC has the power and the authority to amend the Civil Service Rules whenever
it deems the amendment necessary. The insinuation of petitioner that this change
was made for the sole purpose of hurting his appeal is a mere product of his
imagination. The CSC is under no obligation to review all the cases before it and, on
the basis thereof, decide whether or not to amend its internal rules. We note,
though, that the authority of the CSC to amend the rules does not give it the
authority to apply the new provision retroactively. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v.
DAN JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014
Article IX(B), Section 3 of the Constitutionmandates that the Civil Service
Commission shall be the centralpersonnel agency of the Government. In line with
theconstitutionally enshrined policy that a public office is a publictrust, the
Commission was tasked with the duty to set standardsand to enforce the laws and
rules governing the selection,utilization, training, and discipline of civil
servants.LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY v. AURORA A. SALVANA, G.R. No.
192074, June 10, 2014
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only
when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the
employees income or other sources of income and the public officer/employee fails
to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he become
susceptible to dishonesty. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. NIETO A. RACHO,
G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011
While Section 10 of R.A. 6713 provides that when the head of office finds the SALN
of a subordinate incomplete or not in the proper form such head of office must call
the subordinates attention to such omission and give him the chance to rectify the
same, and such procedure is an internal office matter. Whether or not the head of
office has taken such step with respect to a particular subordinate cannot bar the
Office of the Ombudsman from investigating the latter. LIBERATO M. CARABEO v.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 190580-81, February 21, 2011
Failure to disclose a spouses business interests and financial connections in the
SALN constitutes simple negligence. PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION
(PAGC) and THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT v. SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, G.R.
No. 176058, March 23, 2011
Cessation from office of a public official by resignation or retirement neither
warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he
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was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and
academic. The jurisdiction that was this Courts at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the public official had
ceased in office during the pendency of his case. A public officials resignation does
not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be
answerable. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. DESIDERIO W.
MACUSI, A.M. No. P-13-3105, September 11, 2013
Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing
authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4)
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. By way of exception,
the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a
confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion
of the appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or
recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the
appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in
fact tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural
persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its
personnel. Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that
we must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. To
rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, and not to the individual
members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the
Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never have
relatives to speak of.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MARICELLE M. CORTES,
G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014
Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very
nature of their duties and responsibilities, public officers and employees must
faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that
a public office is a public trust and must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.JESSE PHILIP
B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No.
203696, June 2, 2014
The Court said that the rules do not provide a definition of, or enumeration of the
acts constituting, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It refers to
acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or
tend to diminish the peoples faith in the Judiciary. If an employees questioned
conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he is liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. EFREN T. UY, ET AL. v.
JUDGE ALAN L. FLORES, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2332, June 25, 2014
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice because they are
tasked to execute final judgments of the courts, which would otherwise become
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empty victories for the prevailing party, if left unenforced. As agents of the law,
sheriffs are mandated to uphold the majesty of the law, as embodied in the
decision, without unnecessary delay to prevent injury or damage to the winning
party. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up" the sheriffs implementation of
the writ. Once the writ is placed in their hands, sheriffs are duty-bound to proceed
and see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
We have consistently held that the conduct required of court personnel, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. All court personnel should be
reminded that they have no business getting personally involved in matters directly
emanating from court proceedings, unless expressly so provided by law. The reason
is that, the image of the courts of justice is reflected in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of even its minor employees. It is the imperative duty of everyone
involved in the dispensation ofjustice, to maintain the courts integrity and standing
as true temples of justice and to avoid any impression or impropriety, misdeed or
negligence. HOLASCA v. PAGUNSAN, A.M. No, P-14-3198, July 23, 2014.
The Republic cannot simply rely on the presumption that the PCGG has acted
pursuant to law and based on prima facie evidence, for the same will undermine the
basic constitutional principle that public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people. Indeed, sequestration is an extraordinary and harsh
remedy. As such, it should be confined to its lawful parameters and exercised with
due regard to the requirements of fairness, due process, and justice. While the
Court acknowledges the Government's admirable efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth
allegedly taken by the corporations, it cannot, however, choose to turn a blind eye
to the demands of the law, justice, and fairness. PALM AVENUE HOLDING v.
PCGG, G.R. no. 173082, August 6, 2014
Time and again, this Court has pronounced that any act which falls short of the
exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those expected to
preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Public office is a
public trust. Public officers must at all imes be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. RE:
REPORT OF JUDGE RODOLFO, ON THE HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM OF FILIGRIN
VELEZ, A.M. No. P-14-3232, August 12, 2014
It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and
any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of
the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best
possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor
condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and
diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As
such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its
efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its
image in the eyes of the public. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE LAGADO v. CLERK II
BRYAN LEONIDO, A.M. No. P-14-3222, August 12, 2014
Complete reliance on signatures is a ministerial function but respondent, as
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Assistant Director of BOE under DPWH, does not exercise purely ministerial duties.
His duties entail review and evaluation of documents presented before him for
recommending approval. He cannot simply recommend approval of documents
without determining compliance with existing law, rules and regulations of the
Department.
According to the Court, all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on
their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies orenter negotiations. However, the Court went on to state that "there
should be other grounds than mere signature or approval appearing on the voucher
to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction" or dismissal in this case.
There exists a ground other than the signatures appearing on the emergency
purchase/repair documents that should have prodded respondent to conduct a more
than cursory examination of the documents. The absence of a certification and
signature of the end-user which would justify the emergency repair and/or purchase
is glaring. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FLORENDO B. ARIAS, G.R. No.
188909, September 17, 2014
All official travels abroad of heads of financial institutions, such as the DBP officials
herein, are subject to prior approval of the President, regardless of the duration of
the subject travel.
When government officials are found to have clearly committed an outright violation
and disregard of the law, We will not hesitate in ordering the refund of incentive
awards and allowances for while the acts of public officials in the performance of
their duties are presumed to be done in good faith, the presumption may be
contradicted and overcome by evidence showing bad faith or gross
negligence. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COA, G.R. No.
202733, September 30, 2014
Well-entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that the power to abolish a public
office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the
power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is created either by
the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office
was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature
that brought it into existence.
The Court cannot agree to petitioners supposition that there should be automatic
absorption of all ATO employees to the CAAP. Indeed, there is no such thing as a
vested interest in a public office, let alone an absolute right to hold it. Except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. Public
office is not property but a public trust or agency. While their right to due process
may be relied upon by public officials to protect their security of tenure which, in a
limited sense, is analogous to property, such fundamental right to security of tenure
cannot be invoked against a valid abolition of office effected by the legislature itself.
A careful perusal of Section 86 of R.A. 9497 reveals that the transfer of ATO
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personnel, unless they opted to retire from the service, to the CAAP implies the
application of the hold-over principle. There being no express, much less implied
prohibition of the application of the hold-over principle in R.A. 9497 per se,
such proviso in the latters IRR does not amount to grave abuse of discretion. CIVIL
AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION (CAAP-EU)
v. CAAP, G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014
OMBUDSMAN
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the Sangguniang Bayan over
administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying positions below
salary grade 27. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ROLSON RODRIQUEZ, G.R.
No. 172700, July 23, 2010
The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school
teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of
the DepEd. Corollary, the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose
administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PEDRO DELIJERO, JR, G.R. No. 172635,
October 20, 2010
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. Consequently, a
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed
as a matter of course. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.JOEL S. SAMANIEGO,
G.R. No. 175573, October 05, 2010
The Ombudsman, in dismissing a complaint carries the duty of explaining the basis
for his action; he must determine that the complainant had failed to establish
probable cause. PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON
BEHEST LOANS THRU THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
OMBUDSMAN, etal., G.R. No. 148269, November 22, 2010
When a public official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the
Office of the Ombudsman and the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a
month, an appeal may be made to the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a
matter of course. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CA and DINAH C. BARRIGA,
G.R. No. 172224, January 26, 2011
The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may
not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. Section
7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003.ROQUE C. FACURA and
EDUARDO F. TUASON v. CA, et al. G.R. No. 166495, February 16, 2011
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In administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable
doubt or preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN v. MANUEL P. VALENCIA, G.R. No. 183890, April 13, 2011
The decision of the Ombudsman of in finding probable cause is reviewable by
Court when there is allegation of grave abuse of discretion. PRESIDENTIAL
HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, REPRESENTED
MAGDANGAL B. ELMA v. HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO
OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011
the
AD
BY
AS
The power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not
exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government in relation to the offense charged. THERON LACSON v. THE HON.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., G.R. Nos. 165399,165475, 165404 and
165489, May 30, 2011
The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the
exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the
Ombudsmans power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the
Constitution only grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by
this Court. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. NELLIE R. APOLONIO, G.R. No.
165132, March 07, 2012
The Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a
complaint. That should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of
merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their
discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be
conducted. JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MA. MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, et al., G.R. No. 189161, March 21, 2012
The power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is
not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. ERNESTO A. FAJARDO v.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012
In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt
is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt
which requires moral certainty to justify affirmative findings. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. RODRIGO MAPOY, et al., G.R. No. 197299, February 13,
2013
The decision of the Office of the Ombudsman is immediately executory, and an
appeal therefrom does not stop the decision from being executory. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. SAMSON G. DE LEON, G.R. No. 154083, February 27, 2013
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is
tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials,
save only for impeachable officers. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to
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investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to
public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.
Consequently, any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a
salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.
The Ombudsman also has the power to impose administrative sanctions. Section 15
of R.A.6770 reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. This provision covers the
entire range of administrative activities attendant to administrative adjudication,
including, among others, the authority to receive complaints, conduct
investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon
witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive
suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the
appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted
by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the corresponding penalty. These powers
unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to directly impose
administrative sanctions; its power is not merely recommendatory.
The maintenance of peace and order in the community is a general function
undertaken by the punong barangay. It is a task expressly conferred to the punong
barangay under Section 389(b) (3) of R.A.7160. The peace and order function of the
punong barangay must also be related to his function of assisting local executive
officials (i.e., the city mayor), under Section 389(b), Chapter III of the Local
Government Code. Local executive officials have the power to employ and deploy
police for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes and the
arrest of criminal offenders. However, police authority is superior to the punong
barangays authority in a situation where the maintenance of peace and order has
metamorphosed into crime prevention and the arrest of criminal offenders.
FRANKLlN
ALEJANDRO
v.
OFFICEOFTHEOMBUDSMANFACTFINDINGANDINTELLIGENCEBUREAU,represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena
A. Roxas, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013
The Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the protector of the people
against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as
a complaints and action bureau. Its independence was expressly and
constitutionally guaranteed. Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770 vesting disciplinary authority
in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman and is thus unconstitutional.
By constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary
subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the
exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in
the Executive Department. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true,
not only for her Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act
directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET AL./ WENDELL
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BARERAS-SULIT v. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET AL., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014
The administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsmandoes not end with a
recommendation to punish. Further, clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when
AO 14-A was issued, the OMB- imposed penalties in administrative disciplinary
cases were already immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal timely filed.
FLOR GUPILAN-AGUILAR and HONORE R. HERNANDEZ v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN REPRESENTED BY HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, ET AL., G.R. No.
197307, February 26, 2014
The long standing policy of the Court is noninterference in the powers given by no
less than the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. Except in clear cases of
grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the
Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers on complaints filed
against erring public officials and employees. Its findings of fact are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Generally, in reviewing administrative
decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that
of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the
function of this Court to analyze and weigh the parties evidence all over again
except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice
would thereby result. JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014
The Ombudsmanis constitutionally authorized to promulgate its own rules of
procedure. This is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. 6770, otherwise known
as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which empower the Ombudsmanto "promulgate
its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers,
functions, and duties" and to accordingly amend or modify its rules as the interest
of justice may require. As such, the CA cannot stay the execution of decisions
rendered by the said office when the rules the latter so promulgates categorically
and specifically warrant their enforcement, else the OMBs rule-making authority be
unduly encroached and the constitutional and statutory provisions providing the
same be disregarded.THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ALEX M.
VALENCERINA, G.R. No. 178343, July 14, 2014
The Court reiterates its policy of noninterference with the rulings of the Office of the
Ombudsman, except in a clear case of grave abuse of discretion... The Constitution
and R.A. 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the
exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers, to pass upon criminal
complaints involving public officials and employees. Specifically, the determination
of whether probable cause exists is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances,
should be filed or not is basically its call. As a general rule, the Court does not
interfere with the Office of the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and
prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Office of the Ombudsman which, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
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people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service. While the
Ombudsmans findings as to whether probable cause exists are generally not
reviewable by this Court, where there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion,
the Ombudsmans act cannot escape judicial scrutiny under the Courts own
constitutional power and duty to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. ROMEO R. ARAULLO v. OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 194157, July 30, 2014
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute illegal and unjust
acts of those who are in the public service emanates from no less than the 1987
Constitution. Section 12 of Article XI states: Section 12. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
-controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of
the action taken and the result thereof. As mandated by the 1987 Constitution, The
Ombudsman Act was enacted in line with the states policy of maintaining honesty
and integrity in the public service and take effective measures against graft and
corruption. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties: ... Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of Government, the investigation of such cases. EDITA S. BUENO v. OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 191712, September 17, 2014.
Although the tenor of the text in Section13(3), Article XI of the Constitution merely
indicates a recommendatory function, this does not divest Congress of its plenary
legislative power to vest the Ombudsman power beyond those stated in the
Constitutional provision. Pursuant to R.A. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act, the
Ombudsman is legally authorized to directly impose administrative penalties
against errant public servants. The current Ombudsman is intended to play a more
active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other
offenses committed by public officers and employees. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN v. PRUDENCIO QUIMBO, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015
IMPEACHMENT
The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the
language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. MA.
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MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et al., G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
Sequestration is simply a provisional remedy. It is an extraordinary measure

intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or dissipation of sequestered
properties, and thereby to conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial
determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth illgotten. YKR CORPORATION AND HEIRS OF LUISA YULO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 162079, March 18, 2010
The PCGG has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending
on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of illgotten wealth cases. It can even agree, to conditions expressed by the witness as
sufficient to induce cooperation, which cannot be later withdrawn without mutual
consent. JESUS DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. No. 180564, June 22, 2010
PCGG may not delegate to its representatives and subordinates its authority to
sequester and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) AND IMELDA R.
MARCOS, G.R. No. 155832, December 07, 2010
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie
case. The order and the list of the sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith
be registered with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification of this
Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or proceeding shall be filed within six
months from its ratification. For those issued after such ratification, the judicial
action or proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the issuance
thereof. PALM AVENUE HOLDING v. PCGG, G.R. no. 173082, August 6, 2014
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In administrative cases, the requisite proof is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. JOEPHIL C. BIEN v. PEDRO B. BO, G.R. No. 179333. August 3,
2010
The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts
involving the expenditure of public funds unless an appropriation law authorizing
the expenditure required in the contract and certification by the proper accounting
official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are
available are attached to the contract. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v
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KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., G.R. No. 182967, April
06, 2011
Notice and hearing are the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which
is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings. The right is guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does not need
legislative enactment. The statutory affirmation of the requirement serves merely to
enhance the fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is essential to
due process and its non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative
proceedings.
Equally significant is the principle that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. Hence, whatever irregularity had
attended the issuance of the temporary permits in this case does not render correct
what appears to be erroneous procedure. GMA NETWORK, Inc. v. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112, February 26, 2014
The implementing rules and regulations embodied in this circular, whose validity is
undisputed by the parties, partake of the nature of a statute and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such, they have the
force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality
until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.
GMA NETWORK, INC. v. CENTRAL CATV, INC., G.R. No. 176694, July 18,
2014.
Well-established is the rule that administrative issuances such as the NEDA JV
Guidelines, duly promulgated pursuant to the rule-making power granted by statute
have the force and effect of law. Being an issuance in compliance with an
executive edict, the NEDA JV Guidelines, therefore, has the same binding effect as if
it were issued by the President himself. As such, no agency or instrumentality
covered by the JV Guidelines can validly stray from the mandatory procedures set
forth therein, even if the other party acquiesced therewith or not.SM LAND,
INC., v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No.
203655, August 13, 2014
We are very much aware of the time-honored rule that the government cannot be
estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents. Suffice it to state, however, that
this precept is not absolute. As jurisprudence teaches, this rule on estoppel cannot
be used to perpetrate an injustice. SM LAND, INC., v. BASES CONVERSION AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014
There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a lawyer,
while desirable, is not indispensable. A party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the
respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the administrative body
is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is
not an absolute requirement.
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With respect to military academy disciplinary proceedings, the right to
representationby counsel is generally not recorded by US courts as a fundamental
requirement of due process. This is in view of the policy of treading lightly on the
military domain, with regard for their own power and authority to conduct their own
affairs within the broad confines of the law. FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P.
CUDIA v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY, G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The National Power Corporation is not exempt from the payment of filing/ docket
fees. It can no longer invoke R.A. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by P.D. 938, as
its basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees. IN RE: EXEMPTION OF
THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION FROM PAYMENT OF FILING/ DOCKET
FEES, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010
The structure of the Philippine National Red Cross is sui generis being neither
strictly private nor public in nature. DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD J.
GORDON, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, G. R. No.175352, January 18,
2011
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if
there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so
promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must involve
no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details
in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to
conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine
of non-delegability of legislative power. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU OF FOODAND DRUGS (NOW FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION) v. DRUGMAKER'SLABORATORIES, INC. AND
TERRAMEDIC, INC., G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014
GMA must be reminded that the National Telecommunications Commission, insofar
as the regulation of the telecommunications industry is concerned, has exclusive
jurisdiction to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations, standards and
specifications in all cases related to the issued Certificate of Public Convenience and
administer and enforce the same." As such, and considering further its expertise on
the matter, its interpretation of the rules and regulations it itself promulgates are
traditionally accorded by the Court with great weight and respect. The NTC, being
the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its
special and technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to
implement its objectives, is in the best position to interpret its own rules,
regulations and guidelines. The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great
respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules unless
there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. GMA NETWORK,
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INC. v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 196112,
February 26, 2014
The FDA has been deputized by R.A. 3720 to accept applications for registration of
pharmaceuticals and grant or reject such applications. The said law expressly
authorized the Secretary of Health, upon the recommendation of the FDA Director,
to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical
products.
It is A.O.67, an administrative regulation issued by the Secretary of Health in
accordance with his rule-making power under R.A. 3720, which required that certain
pharmaceutical products undergo BA/BE testing prior to the issuance of CPR,
contrary to respondents assertion that it was Circular Nos. 1 and 8 that required
such tests.
Circular Nos. 1 and 8 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because
they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b)
interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA
operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which
the enforcement of R.A.3720 depends. The only purpose of these circulars is for the
FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67,
including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, pursuant to R.A.3720.
Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they
would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern as
they are not administrative regulations in the first place, no prior hearing,
consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.BUREAU AND FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION v. DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC., G.R.
No. 190837, March 5, 2014
There is no quarrel about the Secretary of Justices power of review over the actions
of his subordinates, specifically public prosecutors. This power of review is
encompassed in the Secretary of Justices authority of supervision and control over
the bureaus, offices, and agencies under him, subject only to specified guidelines.
Chapter 7, Section 38, paragraph 1 of E.O. 292, defines the administrative
relationship that is supervision and control: Unless otherwise expressly stated in
the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows: ...
Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance
of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution
of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the
relationship of particular agencies, the word control shall encompass supervision
and control as defined in this paragraph. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE v. TEOFULO
NANO ALAON, G.R. No. 189596, April 23, 2014
For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy
relation between the parties. [I]n order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over
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a dispute, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee (2) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land (3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part
of the tenant or agricultural lessee and(6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.CHARLES BUMAGAT, ET AL. v.
REGALADO ARRIBAY, G.R. No. 194818, June 9, 2014
The power of taxation is inherently legislative and may be imposed or revoked only
by the legislature. Moreover, this plenary power of taxation cannot be delegated by
Congress to any other branch of government or private persons, unless its
delegation is authorized by the Constitution itself. Hence, the discretion to ascertain
the following (a) basis, amount, or rate of tax; (b) person or property that is
subject to tax; (c) exemptions and exclusions from tax; and (d) manner of collecting
the tax may not be delegated away by Congress.
However, it is well-settled that the power to fill in the details and manner as to the
enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized
administrative agencies like the Secretary of Finance in this case.
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing
complexity of modern life and many technical fields of governmental functions as in
matters pertaining to tax exemptions. This is coupled by the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The
growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
Thus, rules and regulations implementing the law are designed to fill in the details
or to make explicit what is general, which otherwise cannot all be incorporated in
the provision of the law. Such rules and regulations, when promulgated in pursuance
of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by
law, "deserve to be given weight and respect by the courts in view of the rulemaking authority given to those who formulate them and their specific expertise in
their respective fields." To be valid, a revenue regulation must be within the scope
of statutory authority or standard granted by the legislature. Specifically, the
regulation must (1) be germane to the object and purpose of the law; (2) not
contradict, but conform to, the standards the law prescribes; and (3) be issued for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect the general provisions of our tax laws.LA
SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY v. CA, G.R. No. 125346, November
11, 2014
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
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The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the
MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in P.D. 1986. ELISEO SORIANO
v. MA. CONSOLIZA LAGUARDIA, et al., G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010
Administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should
be for the sole purpose of carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The law
itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress. LUIS LOKIN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al., G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22,
2010
By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has
authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas
owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. PHILIPPINE
ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) v. JOSEPH CARANTES, ROSE
CARANTES, AND ALL OTHER HEIRS OF MAXIMINOCARANTES, G.R. No.
18127, June 23, 2010
The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO
TOMAS, GLENDA A. VARGAS, et al. v. DANES B. SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 165569,
July 29, 2010
By explicit provision of law, the Toll Regulatory Board was given the power to grant
administrative franchise for toll facility projects. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.
AND JOSE MA. O. HIZON v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD, et al., G.R. No.
166910, October 19, 2010
When the question involves the validity of a resolution issued by petitioner, it is the
National Electric Authority, pursuant to its power of supervision, which has the
authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue
orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric
cooperatives. SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., et al. v. ANANIAS D.
SELUDO, JR., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012
As a separate juridical personality from the government, UP cannot evade
execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy. This
notwithstanding, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment
award must first be filed with the COA. LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND WATCHMAN
AGENCY, INC. v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185918, April
18, 2012
It is abundantly clear that Sections 3 (a) and (e) of P.D. 1112 in relation to Section 4
of P.D. 1894 have invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person
or entity with authority to construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to
issue the corresponding toll operating permit or TOC. By explicit provision of law,
the TRB was given the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility
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projects.RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TRB, G.R. No. 181293, February
23, 2015
JUDICIAL RECOURSE AND REVIEW
Administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to
support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have
been performed (or have not been performed). HON. PRIMO C. MIRO v.
REYNALDO M. DOSONO, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010
Even
in
administrative
cases,
a
degree
ofmoralcertaintyisnecessarytosupportafindingof
liability.
OFFICE
OF
THE
OMBUDSMAN v. RODOLFO ZALDARRIAGA, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010
With regard to pollution-related matters, an administrative recourse to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) must first be made before filing the complaint with the
regular courts. SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V. v. EFREN JALOS, et al.,
G.R. No. 179918, September 08, 2010
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292
provides that administrative offenses are classified into grave, less grave and light,
depending on the gravity of the nature of the act complained of. The less grave
offenses of simple neglect of duty and of simple misconduct carry the penalty of
suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense.
ANANONYMOUS COMPLAINTAGAINSTATTY. PORTIA DIESTA, BRANCH
CLERKOF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 236, PASIG CITY AND
LUZ SANTOS-TACLA, CLERK III, SAME COURT, A.M. No. P-05-1970 (Formerly
A.M.OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1962-P), May 30, 2011
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our
judicial system. Thethrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. v.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, it is provided that administrative
investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. The
weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence.
SHERYLL C. DELA CRUZ, COMPLAINANT v. PAMELA P. MALUNAO, CLERK III,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, BAYOMBONG, NUEVA VIZCAYA, A.M.
No.P-11-3019, March 20, 2012
The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does
not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its
resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal
injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been
committed against the public service. The subsequent desistance by the
complainant does not free the public officer from liability, as the purpose of an
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administrative proceeding is to protect the public service based on the timehonored principle that a public office is a public trust. CARLITO C. ENCINAS v.
PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR. and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG, G.R. No. 187317,
April 11, 2013
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself
or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if
resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the
intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it
admits exceptions. One exception which is relevant to the case is where no
administrative review is provided by law. The case falls squarely under the
aforementioned exception since the law per se provides no administrative review for
administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service
law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30
days.
MARK
JAMES
S.
MAGLALANGv.PHILIPPINEAMUSEMENTANDGAMINGCORPORATION(PAGCOR),
as represented by its incumbent chairman, EFRAIM GENUINO, G.R. No.
190566, December 11, 2013
In an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the evidence at
hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings. Instead, the lowest
standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion, applies. Because
administrative liability attaches so long as there is some evidence adequate to
support the conclusion that acts constitutive of the administrative offense have
been performed (or have not been performed), reasonable doubt does not ipso facto
result in exoneration unlike in criminal proceedings where guilt must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.JESSE PHILIP B. EIJANSANTOS v. SPECIAL
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE 156, G.R. No. 203696, June 2, 2014
As established by the facts, petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and to
adduce his evidence. This opportunity was enough for one to comply with the
requirements of due process in an administrative case. The formalities usually
attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative investigation,
as long as the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their
respective sets of evidence.
As defined in the landmark case AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations(1940), all
that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact is substantial evidence,
which is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. The evidence presented in the present case is
more than enough to support the conclusion reached. Where the findings of fact of a
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quasi-judicial body are supported by substantial evidence, these findings are
conclusive and binding on the appellate court. EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN
JOEL LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014
The procedure for appeals to the Office of the President is governed by A.O. No. 18,
Series of 1987. Section 1 thereof provides: Unless otherwise governed by special
laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days
from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of
or appealed from we interpreted the above provision and declared that a
decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the
Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode
of appeal. EMMANUEL B. MORAN, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No.
192957,September 29, 2014
ELECTION LAW
CANDIDACY
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic

projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis
and no authority to issue the Certification. VICTORINO B. ALDABA, et al. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must
demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3)
acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. LUIS A. ASISTIO v. HON. THELMA CANLAS
TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010
The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of
one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the Section 6(8) of R.A. 7941 provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting. PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC.
(PGBI) v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.190529, April 29, 2010
R.A. 7941, the Party-List System Act, covers all youth sector nominees vying for
party-list representative seats. A nominee of the youth sector must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. MILAGROS AMORES v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND EMMANUEL VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010
Where a dwelling qualifies as a residence i.e., the dwelling where a person
permanently intends to return to and to remain his or her capacity or inclination to
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decorate the place, or the lack of it, is immaterial. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010
Nowhere in the Section 40 of the Local Government Code will one find defective
certificate of candidacy as a ground for disqualifying a candidate. Nor does it specify
that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate.
SERGIO G. AMORA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARNIELO S.
OLANDRIA, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011
Filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative while holding a judicial
post constitutes grave misconduct with a penalty of dismissal from service.ASHARY
M. ALAUYA v. JUDGE CASAN ALI L. LIMBONA, A.M. No. SCC-98-4, March 22,
2011
The three-term limitation made under R.A. 9164 has no retroactive application.
CONSTANCIO
F.
MENDOZAv.SENENC.FAMILARAANDCOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,G.R.No.1910
17, November 15, 2011
There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidates compliance with residency
requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention.
Notwithstanding, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that
domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one
domicile at a time. ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND DAN ERASMO, SR., G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Hence, the second placer candidate is
deemed to have garnered the highest number of votes and is entitled to hold the
corresponding elective position. EFREN RACEL ARATEA v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND ESTELA D. ANTIPOLO, G.R. No. 195229, October 09, 2012
Existence of a valid certificate of candidacy is a condition sine qua non for a valid
substitution, hence a declaration of a candidates disqualification which rendered
his COCinvalid cannot be properly substituted MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C.
TALAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RODERICK A. ALCALA , G.R.
No. 196804, October 09, 2012
A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes. Hence, if a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, all votes for that candidate
are stray votes. DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND AGAPITO J. CARDINO, G.R. No. 193237, October 09, 2012
A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time, otherwise the residence of
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origin should be deemed to continue. SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013
The existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate
to be validly substituted.If the COC is thereby cancelled or denied due course, the
candidatecannot be validly substituted. SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES
GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
A candidate whose COC is cancelled or denied cannot be substituted by another on
the ground that the former was merely disqualified. In case of disqualification, there
can be substitution because a candidates disqualification does not automatically
result to the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. However, when the
certificate of candidacy of a person is denied or is cancelled, substitution cannot be
had because the effect of cancellation is as if there is no candidate at all. SILVERIO
R. TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013
The law (Section 8 of R.A. 7941) expressly requires the submission of a list
containing at least five qualified nominees. Failure to submit the list of five
nominees before the election warrantsthe cancellation of its registration. The
requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is primarily a statutory
requirement for the registration of party-list groups and the submission of this list is
part of a registered partys continuing compliance with the law to maintain its
registration. A party-list groups previous registration with the COMELEC confers no
vested right to the maintenance of its registration. In order to maintain a party in a
continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its continued
possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance
with the basic requirements of the law. COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT
PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No.
207026, August 6, 2013
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely
future performance. There is no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist
that groups seeking registration under the party-list system still need to comply
with the track record requirement. Nowhere in R.A. 7941 is it mandated that groups
seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show their track record as
a group. ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code reveals that false representation in the
contents of the COC must refer to material matters in order to justify the
cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of
the Code refers to eligibility or qualification for elective office, whereas, false
representation must consist of deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a
fact which would render a candidate ineligible. Here, the respondents nickname is
not a qualification for a public office which affects his eligibility. VILLAFUERTE v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014
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Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate
is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false material
representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected,
cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or
her citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter
falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in
the COC. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under
Section78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible."
Section74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his COC "that he is eligible
for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office. If
a candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the
municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate
clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under
Section 78.
A cancelled COC is void cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes. Whether a certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is
immaterial, because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a
candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void. We then
found that since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was
void, he was never a candidate at all and all his votes were considered stray votes,
and thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified candidate, who actually
garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor. MAYOR HAYUDINI
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014
The minimum requirement under our Constitution and election laws for the
candidates' residency in the political unit they seek to represent has never been
intended to be an empty formalistic condition; it carries with it a very specific
purpose: to prevent "stranger[s] or newcomer[s] unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community" from seeking elective offices in that community.
The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day,
seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
The fact that Osmea has no registered property under his name does not belie his
actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not among the
qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should
live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use
ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of
domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the
residency requirement.
To successfully challenge a winning candidates qualifications, the petitioner must
clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
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and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. The reason for such liberality stems from the
recognition that laws governing election contests must be construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.
We wish to remind that COC defects beyond matters of form and that
involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that
COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after
the people shall have spoken. Where a material COC misrepresentation under
oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as
well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our
laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials,
on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other,
we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorates will. LINA JALOVER
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014
NUISANCE CANDIDATE
It is a well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests
especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will
of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities.An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the
need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is
imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at
preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate.
Thus, in certain situations, final judgmentsdeclaring a nuisance candidate should
effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election
day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral
process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and
delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until
elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed. CELESTINO A.
MARTINEZ III v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010
The votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment,
particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the
legitimate candidate, are not stray but must be counted in favor of the latter.
CASIMIRA S. DELA CRUZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOHN LLOYD
M. PACETE, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012
To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their
certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent.
This denial or cancellation may be "motupropio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party," "subject to an opportunity to be heard." COMELEC's power to
motuproprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the
candidate's opportunity to be heard. In election cases, due process requirements
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are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. The clarificatory hearing was an
ineffective opportunity to be heard, since COMELEC declared Timbol a nuisance
candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for
office. COMELEC had already issued the resolutions when Timbol appeared before
Election Officer Valencia in the clarificatory hearing. JOSEPH TIMBOL v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015
CAMPAIGN
When the printed election propaganda was published, there arises a presumption
that there was written acceptance by petitioner of the advertisement paid for or
donated by his friends in the absence of evidence to the contrary. ALVIN B.
GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TOMAS R. OSMEA, G.R. No.
170256, January 25, 2010
REMEDIES AND JURISDICTION INELECTION LAW
The ruling in Divinagracia v. COMELEC stressed that if the appellants had already
paid the amount of P1,000 to the lower courts within the five-day reglementary
period, they are further required to pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the
appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the
notice of appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the P3,200
within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed. Divinagracia,
however, contained the following final caveat: that for notice of appeal filed after
the promulgation (July 27, 2009) of this decision, errors in the matter of nonpayment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no
longer excusable. MATEO R. NOLLEN, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSAND
SUSANA M. CABALLES, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010
The general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of
votes for each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the
ballotsthemselves.However, thisrule applies only if the ballots are available and
their integrity has been preserved from the day of elections until revision. BAI
SANDRA S.A. SEMA v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
AND DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by
all the courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed, to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may
not be defeated by merely technical objections. PEDRO MANZA et al. v.
EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, et al., G. R. No. 42181,March 15, 2010
If the Court were to tabulate the results reflected in the ERs, it would, in effect,
convert itself into a board of canvassers. This would entail a function which,
obviously, this Court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot perform. JESUS TYPOCO v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010
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The period for filing a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy based on
false representation is covered by Rule 23 and not Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Section 3 of Rule 25 allowing the filing of a petition at any time after the
last day for filing of COCs but not later than the date of proclamation is merely a
procedural rule that cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC). FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R.
No. 192856, March 08, 2011
A petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy, are two distinct remedies to prevent a candidate from
entering an electoral race. Both remedies prescribe distinct periods to file the
corresponding petition, on which the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
over the case is dependent. ALFAIS T. MUNDER v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONSAND ATTY. TAGO R. SARIP, G.R. No. 194076, October 19, 2011
The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two
different appeal fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the
notice of appeal, and the other to be paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the
15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal. BIENVENIDO WILLIAM D.
LLOREN v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROGELIO PUA, JR., G.R.
No. 196355, September 18, 2012
When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number
of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. RENATO M. FEDERICO
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013
An opposition to a petition for registration of a party-list is not a condition precedent
to the filing of a complaint for cancellation of the same. ANTONIO D. DAYAO, et
al. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 193643 and 193704, January29, 2013
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the
contents of the COC must refer to material matters in order to justify the
cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus Election
Code refers to qualifications for elective office(residency, age, citizenship, or any
other legal qualifications necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the
Local Government Code) coupled with a showing that there was an intent to deceive
the electorate. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTA v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE,
G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014
ELECTION PROTEST
Decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial
evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at
least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers.
This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the
case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
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In election protest cases, disruption of public service is an element that has been
weighed and factored in and cannot per se be a basis to deny execution pending
appeal. JESUS M. CALO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 185222, January 19, 2010
A one-day delay in filing a Preliminary Conference Brief, does not justify the outright
dismissal of an electoral protest based on technical grounds where there is no
indication of intent to violate the rules on the part of petitioner and the reason for
the violation is justifiable. SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOAN V. ALARILLA, G.R. No. 194143, October 4, 2011
An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a
contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
electoral frauds and irregularities. Its purpose is to determine who between them
has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the
office. CONGRESSWOMAN LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ v. EUFROCINO C.
CODILLA, JR. AND HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, G. R. No. 195191, March 20, 2012
The winning elected official in an election protest grants the local elected official the
right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO,
SR. v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 201716, January 08, 2013
Picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise
official ballotsthat faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the
voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are
the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may
be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.
The ballot images in the compact flash (CF) cards, as well as the printouts of such
images, are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the
voters, and may be used in an election protest. Both are original documents and
carry the same evidentiary weight as official physical ballot.LIWAYWAY VINZONSCHATO
v.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVEELECTORALTRIBUNAL,G.R.No.
199149, January 22, 2013
Where the party received, through his counsel, notices from the COMELEC of an
examination requested by the opposing party and filed a motion for reconsideration
against the same examination; he cannot claim that his right to due process was
violated. In administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013
COMELEC
The discretion to allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division
that rendered the assailed decision, order or resolution, or the COMELEC en banc, as
the case may be not to the Presiding Commissioner. MAYOR QUINTIN B.
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SALUDAGA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ARTEMIO BALAG, G.R. Nos.
189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010
The COMELEC is mandated to make the source codes for the AES technologies it
selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG
and all other interested political parties or groups for independent review. CENTER
FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCEv. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010
Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of all factual issues as the
Constitution and the Rules of Court provide, in the presence of grave abuse of
discretion, however, the Courts constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy
away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been given the
authority to resolve the factual issues. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, etal., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court in election contests involving elective
municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. FESTO R. GALANG, JR. v. HON.
RAMIRO R. GERONIMO and NICASIO M. RAMOS, G.R. No. 192793, February
22, 2011
The COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the
registration and accreditation of a party-list and not the HRET as although it is the
party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization
that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the
party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of
Representatives over which the HRET has jurisdiction over. ABC (ALLIANCE FOR
BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS
CHAIRMAN, JAMES MARTY LIM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of
B.P. 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of
groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. This
process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only
limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration. MAGDALO PARA SA
PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 190793, June 19,
2012
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. ROMEO M.
JOLOSJOS, JR. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DAN ERASMO, SR.,
G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012
The COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the party is
well established. This singular power to rule upon questions of party identity and
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leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), et al., G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012
In correcting the erroneous entry, the COMELEC need not order the opening of the
ballot box for the purpose of recounting the votes of the candidates affected if the
correction sought is such that it can be made without the need of opening the ballot
box. ANTONIO P. CERON v. COMMISSIONON ELECTION GRACE P. VALDEZ, et
al., G.R. No. 199084, September 11, 2012
There is no impediment for the COMELEC and the DOJ to create the Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team for the purpose of conducting a thorough investigation of the
alleged massive electoral fraud and the manipulation of election results in the 2004
and 2007 national elections relating in particular to the presidential and senatorial
elections. Neither does the creation of the said Committee violate the constitutional
rights of an individual. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et
al., G.R. No. 199085, September 18, 2012
Cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the
COMELEC which the COMELEC in division should first decide. The COMELEC en banc
cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a
division because it denies due process to the candidate. KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM
v. COMELEC and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, G.R. No. 192289, January 08, 2013
The express grant of power to the COMELEC to resolve election protests carries with
it the grant of all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to the effective and
efficient exercise of the power expressly granted. Verily, the exclusive original
jurisdiction conferred by the constitution to the COMELEC to settle said election
protests includes the authority to order a technical examination of relevant election
paraphernalia, election returns and ballots in order to determine whether fraud and
irregularities attended the canvass of the votes. GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI
AND VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY M. SAHALI, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 201796, January 15, 2013
A protesting candidate cannot file a petition with the Supreme Court when the
COMELEC decision is equally divided and a rehearing is not conducted; otherwise
the petition shall be considered premature and shall be dismissed. When the
COMELEC En Banc is equally divided in an opinion and the necessary majority
cannot be had, there shall be a rehearing. To break the legal stalemate in case the
opinion is equally divided among the members of the COMELECen banc, Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where parties are
given the opportunity anew to strengthen their respective positions or arguments
and convince the members of the COMELEC en banc of the merit of their case. It is
provided also that when the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing
no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed
from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall
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be denied. MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
RENATO R. SO, G.R. No. 203833, March 19, 2013
The COMELEC has authority to effect the re-clustering of precincts when the act
shall prevent failure of elections and promote free, orderly, and honest elections.
Unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the Court
cannot interfere with the actions of the COMELEC. SALIC DUMARPA v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013
Where another person takes the civil service examination on behalf of another, the
act constitutes dishonesty which is punishable by dismissal from service. The public
officers or government employees length of service in the judiciary is
inconsequential. The CSCs discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of her civil
service eligibility and her insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her
Personal Data Sheet when she had been already found guilty of an administrative
charge even after the finality of the CSC Resolution and even after her seeking
clemency tell that she has not and does not live up to the high standards demanded
of a court employee. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA,
Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City, A.M. No. P-08-2531,
April 11, 2013
The COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election. It is the COMELECs duty to cancel
motuproprio the Certificate of Candidacy of a candidate who is clearly disqualified
under the law to run for public office, notwithstanding the absence of any petition
initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G.
CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA, AHMAD
NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY,
AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable
before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of a party-list organization. Hence, the due process violation was
committed when a party-list group was not apprised of the fact that the termsharing agreement entered into by the nominees of the said party-list group in 2010
would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations
qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, said
party-list group was not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they
were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the
termsharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their
position.
COALITION
OF
ASSOCIATIONSOFSENIORCITIZENSINTHEPHILIPPINES,INC.(SENIORCITIZENS
PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee,
FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. Nos. 20684445; COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIORCITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent
Representative in the House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V.
ARQUIZA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206982, July 23, 2013
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Under the present law (Section 43 of R.A.9369), the COMELEC and other prosecuting
arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in
the investigation and prosecution of election offenses. With this, where there is Joint
Panel created to investigate over an alleged commission of election fraud and is
granted a concurrent jurisdiction with the COMELEC over the offense, the accused
cannot claim that the constitution of the Joint Committee is invalid for violating the
mandate of the COMELEC. Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the
COMELEC and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order
whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election
offenses shall still be approved by the COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the
creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the COMELECs independence
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, et al., G.R. No. 199082; BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. v. HON.
LEILA
DE
LIMA,
et
al.,
G.R.
No.
199085;GLORIAMACAPAGALARROYOv.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,et al.,G.R. No.199118, July 23, 2013
Factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of
justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in
support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the
COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC
created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself on a level
higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment
of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. The COMELEC may
motuproprio cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any party-list
organization if it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections. ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase
"election, returns, and qualifications" refers to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestees title. WIGBERTO R. TAADA, JR. v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS ANGELINA D. TAN, AND ALVIN JOHN S. TAADA, G.R. Nos.
207199-200, October 22, 2013
The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall. The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of
ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. It is thus not novel for the Supreme
Court to uphold the COMELECs broad power or authority to fix other dates for a
plebiscite to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. MARC DOUGLAS
IV C. CAGAS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al., G.R. No. 209185,
October 25, 2013
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Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. The COMELEC has exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections
for the purpose of ensuing free, orderly and honest elections.
Furthermore, Section 5 of Omnibus Election Code provided for the power of the
COMELEC to set the elections to another date for any serious cause. In the case
herein, the tight time frame of the enactment, signing into law and effectivity of R.A.
10360, coupled with the subsequent conduct of May 2013 National and Local
elections, rendered impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of
province of Davao Occidental.
In the exercise of its powers to protect the integrity of elections, COMELEC should
not and must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in the exercise of its
discretion to resolve election disputes. The right of suffrage should prevail over
mere scheduling mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites. CAGAS v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous
COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements.
This essentially consists in computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving
all the media of broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done
on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately obvious that there was
effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and
political parties would be able to campaign through the air. The question is
accordingly whether this is within the power of the COMELEC to do or not. The Court
holds that it is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so.
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily
authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without
limitationsor reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations
just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be
concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be
exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to
simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision
in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must
be properly explained with sufficient basis.
While stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable, there is no
demand that the NTC slavishly follow precedent. However, we think it essential, for
the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides
inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result
is warranted, or if need be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or
should be overturned. Such explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently
establish a decision as having rational basis. Any inconsistent decision lacking
thorough, ratiocination in support may be struck down as being arbitrary. And any
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
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What the COMELEC came up with does not measure up to that level of requirement
and accountability which elevates administrative rules to the level of respectability
and acceptability. Those governed by administrative regulations are entitled to a
reasonable and rational basis for any changes in those rules by which they are
supposed to live by, especially if there is a radical departure from the previous
ones.
The law, on its face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable
airtime should be based on the totality (aggregate) of possible broadcast in all
television or radio stations. Senator Cayetano has called our attention to the
legislative intent relative to the airtime allowed that it should be on a per station
basis.
It is therefore ineluctable to conclude that Congress intended to provide a more
expansive and liberal means by which the candidates, political parties, citizens and
other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully
explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the
electorate to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the
candidates. In this regard, the media is also given a very important part in that
undertaking of providing the means by which the political exercise becomes an
interactive process. All of these would be undermined and frustrated with the kind
of regulation that the respondent came up with. GMA NETWORK v. COMELEC,
G.R. 205357, September 2, 2014
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were
transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as any personnel
movement from one government agency to another or from one department,
division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or
without the issuance of an appointment; while detail as defined in
the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency
to another without the issuance of an appointment. Having acquired technical and
legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as such.ELSIE S. CAUSING
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199139, September 9, 2014
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district
only in the immediately following election.In short, a city must first attain the
250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city
shall have a district representative. VICTORINO ALDABA v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, G.R No. 188078,March 15, 2010
The constitutional provision draws plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a
district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum
of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C.
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AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to
respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress but measured on the very purpose of the
LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a). Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the
capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of
their respective provinces. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) et al.
v. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS et al., G.R. Nos. 176951, February 15, 2011
A province may be created without complying with Section461 of the LGC requiring
contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers. RODOLFO
G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, AND RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
In computing the quorum in of the SangguniangPanglungsod, its entire membership
must be taken into account including that of the City Vice Mayor as presiding officer.
LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL AND THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD OF LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. ATTY. REX G.
ROJO, G.R. No. 181367, April 24, 2012
Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC requires that, while the authorization of the
municipal mayor need not be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which the
said local executive is authorized to enter into must be made pursuant to a law or
ordinance. When the said obligation was approved through a mere resolution, it
shall not confer any right to a person. The distinction between ordinances and
resolutions is well-perceived. While ordinances are laws and possess a general and
permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment or
opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. As
opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a
resolution." LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN,
G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013
Section10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution states: No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Section453 of the LGC, meanwhile,
states:It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized
within 30 days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in
a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into
an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries. As the phrase implies, "substantial
alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a change in the
geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase
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"boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes
and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a
modification of the demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the
LGUs exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And as a
qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the
constitutional provision.
The changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial that there is a
necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the
enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions result in material
changes in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given
the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that the
plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to
conversions as well.AURELIO M. UMALI V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203974, April
22, 2014
Section16 and 76 of the Local Government Code do not confer authority upon any
local government unit to create a separate or supplementary retirement benefit
plan. Such a type of retirement benefit plan must first be granted to the local
government by law before a local government can use it. CITY OF GENERAL
SANTOS v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014
PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY
A liberal interpretation of the zoning power of city and municipal boards and
councils, as to include the power to accordingly reclassify the lands within the
zones, would be in accord with the avowed legislative intent behind the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959, which was to increase the autonomy of local governments.
BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC. v. E. M. RAMOS
AND SONS, INC., G.R. No. 131481, March 16, 2011
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve
devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or
standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of
local governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources
among the different local government units and local officials have been placed by
the Constitution in the hands of Congress under Section 3, Article X of the
Constitution.
The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the smallscale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and
higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural
resources. Further, the DENR Secretary has the power to review and, therefore,
decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale
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Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of
what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect
to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the
adjudication
of
their
respective
rights.
LEAGUE
OF
PROVINCES
OFTHEPHILIPPINESv.DEPARTMENT
OFENVIRONMENTand
NATURAL
RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of
DENR, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner citys issuance of
E.O. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams as an initial step for its
organization development masterplan. Local autonomy also grants local
governments the power to streamline and reorganize.
The text of the ordinance indicates its purpose of encouraging employees,
especially those who are unproductive due to health reasons, to avail of the
program even before they reach the compulsory retirement age. Section 6 provides
for a form of severance pay to those who availed of GenSan SERVES, which was
executed in good faith.
The use of the term "retirement" in Section6 is misleading in determining the nature
of the benefits it provides. Labels are not determinative of substantive content. It is
the purpose behind these incentives, as read from the text of the ordinance and as
inferred from the effect of the ordinance as applied, which must govern.
The benefits provided in Section 6 serve its purpose of inducing petitioner citys
employees, who are unproductive due to health reasons, to retire early.
Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan SERVES were only given to a select few
the sickly and unproductive due to health reasons. Certainly, this negates the
position that the benefits provide for supplementary retirement benefits that
augment existing retirement laws.CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS v. COA, G.R. No.
199439, April 22, 2014
The prior approval of the concerned Sanggunian requirement is an attribute of the
autonomy granted to and enjoyed by the LGUs under the Constitution. However,
R.A. 7227 provided the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) the broad powers
to accept any local or foreign investment, business, or enterprise. The Court finds
that the implementation of the subject project (power plant in Subic, Zambales)
does not need prior approval of the concerned sanggunians as required by Section
27 of the Local Government Code, because the SBMAs decision to approve the
project prevails over the objections of the sangguanians of the LGUs, by virtue of
the provisions and powers granted by R.A. 7227. HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE v.
HON. TEODORO A. CASIO, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A fifth-class municipality like Midsalip is not absolutely prohibited from adopting a
salary schedule equivalent to that of a special city or a first-class province,
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provided, that it complies with the provision ofR.A. 7160. PAULINO M. ALECHA
AND PRECIOSO M. TAPITAN v. ELMER BEN V. PASION et al., G.R. No.
164506, January 19, 2010
Although Section 152 (c) of the Local Government Code requires a barangay
clearance for any activity within its jurisdiction, such clearance cannot be denied
when the activity is in a permissible zone, otherwise such denial is
illegal.Thesameprovisionallowsthecityormunicipalitytowhich the barangay unit
belongs to issue the required license or building permit despite the withholding of
the barangay clearance. GREENHILLS EAST ASSOCIATION, INC. v. E. GANZON,
INC., G.R. No. 169741, January 20, 2010
R.A.7160 requires that where the head of the office or department requesting the
requisitionsitsina
dual
capacity,
the
participation
ofa
Sanggunianmember(electedfromamongthemembersof
the
Sanggunian)
is
necessary. ROLANDO SISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
170339, March 9, 2010
Being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, the questioned
Resolution did not have to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and
hearing. THE LEARNING CHILD, INC., etal.v. AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, et al., G.R. Nos. 134269, 134440, 144518, July 7, 2010
Under the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor is required to secure the
prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract in
behalf of the municipality. MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
OF TIWI v. ANTONIO B. BETITO, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President,
the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance
benefits does not need the approval of the President to be valid. THE PROVINCE
OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
et.al, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010
The Revised Charter of Quezon City expressly provided that the city government
had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected
within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them. The MMDA
does not have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the
power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. EMILIO GANCAYCO v. CITY
GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011
The Local Government Code establishes the duties of national government agencies
in
the
maintenance
of
ecologicalbalance,andrequiresthemtosecure
priorpublicconsultationand approval of local government units for the projects
described therein. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. v.THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN,
REPRESENTED BY GOV. CARLITO S. MARQUEZ, et al., G.R. No. 196870, June
26, 2012
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Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent
authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the
local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of
the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly
circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. ARNOLD D. VICENCIO v. HON.
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012
A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces
at his own bidding. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President, and an exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section
465 of the Local Government Code. Neither is the provincial governor authorized to
convene a local civilian group or an organization of private citizens as it is
proscribed pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force and under
Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution. JAMAR M. KULAYAN, et al. v.GOV.
ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012
While the Local Government Code charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, the Local Government Code provides an exception in cases
involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et al.,
G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012
In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply
with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by
the local government unit where his business is situated. The permit to extract
sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial
governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the SangguniangPanlalawigan. PROVINCE
OF CAGAYAN, represented by HON. ALVARO T. ANTONIO, et al. v. JOSEPH
LASAM LARA, G.R. No. 188500. July 24, 2013
An ordinance is deemed approved upon failure of the SangguniangPanlungsod to
declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with
Section 56 of the LGC. RAMONITO O. ACAAC, et al. v. MELQUIADES D.
AZCUNA, et al., G.R. No. 187378, September 30, 2013
The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order under R.A. 9262 by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely
orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such
function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance
of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances,"
and to "maintain public order in the barangay. TUA v. HON. MANGROBANG, G.R.
No. 170701, January 22, 2014
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The Constitution and the Local Government Code grants Local Government Units
the power to create its own sources of revenue even if not provided in the NIRC or
the LGC, so long as such are not oppressive and confiscatory.
If the generation of revenue was the primary purpose and regulation was merely
incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact
that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax. If the
main purpose of the ordinance is to regulate certain construction activities of the
identified special projects, which included cell sites or telecommunications towers,
the fees (charges fixed by law or Ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a
business or activity) imposed in the said ordinance are primarily regulatory in
nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR, BATANGAS, G.R. No.204429, February 18, 2014
The power of the cities and municipalities, such as the Municipality of Calamba, to
adopt zoning ordinances or regulations converting lands into non-agricultural cannot
be denied. In BuklodngMagbubukidsaLupaing Ramos, Inc. v. E. M. Ramos and Sons,
Inc. (2011), this Court recognized said power in the following manner: Section 3 of
R.A. 2264, otherwise known at the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal
Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an
ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it
certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word
regulation under the provision. As a matter of fact the same section declares that
the
power
existsany
provision
of
law
to
the
contrary
notwithstanding.KASAMAKA-CANLUBANG v. LAGUNA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 200491, June 9, 2014
Under R.A. 7160, local government units, such as the Municipality of Malolos,
Bulacan, are vested with the power to reclassify lands. However, an ordinance is
required in order to reclassify agricultural lands, and such may only be passed after
the conduct of public hearings.
The petitioner claims the reclassification on the basis of Municipal Resolution No.
16-98. Given the foregoing clarifications, however, theresolution was ineffectual for
that purpose. A resolution was a mere declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the
lawmaking body on a specific matter that was temporary in nature, and differed
from an ordinance in that the latter was a law by itself and possessed a general and
permanent
character. HOLY
TRINITY
REALTY
&
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION v. VICTORIO DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 200454, October 22, 2014
LOCAL OFFICIALS
The law does not intend to place local government officials in the difficult position of
having to choose between disobeying a reassignment order or keeping an
allowance. Thus, absent a legal basis for its discontinuance, a government official
who has been reassigned is still entitled to receive RATA. DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT v. OLIVIA LEONES, G.R. No. 169726, March 18,
2010
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Where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may
properly secure the services of private counsel. ROMEO A. GONTANG v. ENGR.
CECILIA ALAYAN, G.R. No. 191691, January16, 2013
On the matter of counsels representation for the government, the Administrative
Code is not the only law that delves on the issue. Specifically for local government
units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court
actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government units legal officer.
Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a
local government units legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who
may represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being
a special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made
applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of
the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject
matter.THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL v. THE HONORABLE CA,
G.R. No. 199027, June 9, 2014
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
The Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 R.A. 8762 is valid and constitutional.
While Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino
entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. Neither does the lessening of restraint on the foreigners' right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, amounts to a denial of the
Filipinos' right to property and to due process of law. REPRESENTATIVES
GERARDO S. ESPINA, et al. v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY), etal.,G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010
Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR's franchise is subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under
Section 1 of R.A. 9377. Hence, theprovision in Section 1 of R.A. 9337, amending
Section 27 (c) of R.A. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate
income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR's transactions with private
parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) v. THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR) et al., G.R. No. 172087, March 15,
2011
The sale of government-owned Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to a
foreign corporation is not prohibited but only Filipino citizens and corporations 60%
of whose capital is owned by Filipinos may be granted water rights. INITIATIVES
FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL
SERVICES, INC., et al. v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM), et al., G.R. No. 192088, October 09,
2012
GMA cannot rely on the temporary permits to justify its continued operation on an
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expired Provisional Authority (P.A.). As the NTC itself discloses, a temporary permit is
not intended to be a substitute for a PA which must be constantly renewed despite
the issuance of a temporary permit.
A P.A. refers to an authority given to an entity qualified to operate a public utility for
a limited period during the pendency of its application for, or before the issuance of
its Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC). It has a general scope because it is akin
to a provisional CPC in that it gives a public utility provider power to operate as such
and be bound by the laws and rules governing public utilities, pending the issuance
of its actual CPC.
On the other hand, a temporary permit is a document containing the call sign,
authorized power, frequency/channel, class station, hours of operation, points of
communication and equipment particulars granted to an authorized public utility. Its
scope is more specific than a P.A. because it contains details and specifications
under which a public utilityshould operatepursuant to a previously updated P.A.
As may be gleaned from the NTCs statement, the operational validity of a
temporary permit flows only from "a previously updated P.A." This means that there
should be an effective P.A. before a temporary permit is issued. The latter is a
specific issuance which proceeds from a pre-requisite PA.GMA NETWORK, INC. v.
NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R.
No.
196112,
February 26, 2014
The Regalian doctrine, embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Unless public land is
shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain for land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved. And the applicant bears the
burden to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable.REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES v. CRISANTO S. RANESES, G.R. No. 189970, June 9, 2014
This Court has had a few occasions to rule that a franchise from Congress is not
required before each and every public utility may operate. Unless there is a law that
specifically requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility, particular
agencies in the executive branch may issue authorizations and licenses for the
operation of certain classes of public utilities. In the instant case, there is no law
that states that a legislative franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities.
"Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses
for, or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally
recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly
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designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently
been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In
pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local
authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as
though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature. RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL v. TRB, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015
BALANCE AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of
the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and TawiTawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right of
citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in
the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own
and future generations. Thus: Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as hereinafter expounded, considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology.PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16,
2014
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
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A government contract is essentially similar to a private contract contemplated
under the Civil Code. The legal requisites of consent of the contracting parties, an
object certain which is the subject matter, and cause or consideration of the
obligation must likewise concur. Otherwise, there is no government contract to
speak of. SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, et al.
v. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 170530. July 5, 2010
Competitive bidding is an essential element of a public bidding. It has been held in a
long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required
by law is void and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it.
PHILIPPINE SPORTS COMMISSION, et al. v. DEAR JOHN SERVICES, INC., G.R.
No. 183260. July 4, 2012
A mere operator, under an operating agreement, cannot file a Mineral Product
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) application in its name without a sufficient and valid
authorization from its principal or from the holders of the mining claims and
interests included therein. DIZON COPPER SILVER MINES, INC. v. DR. LUIS D.
DIZON, G.R. No. 183573, July 18, 2012
Price escalation is expressly allowed under Presidential Decree 1594, which law
allows price escalation in all contracts involving government projects including
contracts entered into by government entities and instrumentalities and
Government Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs). PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC
ZONE AUTHORITY v. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 188866, October 19, 2011
Competitive selection involves a selection process based on transparent criteria,
which should not constrain or limit competition, and is open to participation by any
interested and qualified private entity. Selection by negotiated agreements or
negotiated projects, on the other hand, comes about as an end result of an
unsolicited proposal from a private sector proponent, or if the government has failed
to identify an eligible private sector partner for a desired activity after subjecting
the same to a competitive selection.
Relevant to the case at bar is the selection modality by negotiated agreement
arising from the submission and acceptance of an unsolicited proposal, known as
the Swiss Challenge method, in esse a hybrid mechanism between the direct
negotiation approach and the competitive bidding route. With the availability of the
Swiss Challenge method for utilization by those in the private sector, PSEs have
studied, formulated, and submitted numerous suomoto or unsolicited proposals with
the ultimate goal of assisting the public sector in elevating the countrys place in
the global economy, as in the case herein. SM LAND, INC.v. BASES
CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13,
2014
Needless to say, allowing government agencies to retract their commitments to the
project proponents will essentially render inutile the incentives offered to and have
accrued in favor of the private sector entity. Without securing these rights, the
business community will be wary when it comes to forging contracts with the
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government. Simply put, the failure of the government to abide by the rules it itself
set would have detrimental effects on the private sectors confidence that the
government will comply with its statutory and contractual obligations to the
letter.SM
LAND,
INC. v. BASES
CONVERSION
AND
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, G.R. No. 203655, August 13, 2014
PUBLIC FUNDS
Coco-levy funds are public funds as these funds are affected by public interest: to
provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry, the
coconut industry. PETITIONER- ORGANIZATIONS, NAMELY: PAMBANSANG
KOALISYON NG MGA SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA AT MANGGAGAWA SA
NIYUGAN (PKSMMN), COCONUT INDUSTRY REFORM MOVEMENT (COIR) et
al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY et al., G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012
Section 2 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered
special and/or fiduciary funds nor part of the general funds of the national
government of P.D. 755 contravenes the provisions of the Constitution. PHILIPPINE
COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), etal. v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 177857-58, September 04, 2012
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the disallowance of the
payment. However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by
law to a covered person, agency or office of the Government may be barred by the
good faith of the approving official and of the recipient. BRENDA L. NAZARETH v.
COMMISSIONERS of the COMMISSION on AUDIT, G.R. No. 188635,
January29, 2013
TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established under the TESDA Act of
1994. Under the Act, the TESDA budget is included in the annual GAA; hence, the
TESDP Fund, being sourced from the Treasury, are funds belonging to the
government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials. The
Constitution provides, No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. In this case, TESDA failed to point out
the law specifically authorizing it to grant additional reimbursement for
Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the
explicit requirement in the Constitution. TESDA v. COA, G.R. No. 204869, March
11, 2014
The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) is not a GOCC or government
instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity especially entrusted by the
government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in Taiwan.
However, despite its nongovernmental character, the MECO handles government
funds in the form of the verification fees it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the
consular fees it collects under Section 2(6) of E.O. 15, s. 2001. Hence, under
existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such
verification fees and consular fees should be audited by the COA. Section 14(1),
Book V of the Administrative Code authorizes the COA to audit accounts of non
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governmental entities required to pay or have government share but only with
respect to funds... coming from or through the government. This provision of law
perfectly fits the MECO. DENNIS FUNA v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
OFFICE AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 193462, February 04,
2014
EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
The constitutional mandate to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels is directed to the State and not to the school. THE PARENTSTEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PTA) OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, et al.
v. THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., G.R. No. 176518. March 2,
2010
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof,
mandating the teaching of ageand development-appropriate Reproductive Health
Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of
academic freedom.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on
age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners
and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms
the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role
shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is
superior to that of the State.
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parenspatriae to aid parents in the
moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building. Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriatereproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and
teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's
rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the
RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible
teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among
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adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed
provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in
the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health
education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teachercommunity associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well
be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing
such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section
14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before
it. JAMES M. IMBONG, et al. v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., et al., G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning,has been enshrined in our Constitutions of 1935,
1973, and 1987[T]he four essential freedoms of a university [are]: To determine
for itself on academic grounds (1) who may teach;(2) what may be taught;(3) how it
shall be taught;and (4) who may be admitted to study. An educational institution
has the power to adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed expedient for its
government, this being incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the college. It can decide for itself
its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or
interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for
some restraint. Indeed, academic freedom has never been meant to be an
unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it
responsibly. An equally telling precept is a long recognized mandate, so well
expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, that every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The schools power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their
academic freedom and that the establishment of rules governing universitystudent relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be
regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
but to its very survival. In this regard, the Court has always recognized the right of
schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to dismiss or
expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules.
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after
graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto.
As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the
right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and
regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System in particular.
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The minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process for students in disciplinary cases are: (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate a cadets honor violation need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding. There is aversion to undue judicialization of an
administrative hearing in the military academy.FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF
P. CUDIA v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
(PMA), G.R. NO. 211362, February 24, 2015
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The State is the sole judge to decide whether to prosecute claims on behalf of an
individual. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which
may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the
particular case. ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et al. v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH between the IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral
component of the Guarantee Agreement executed by the Government of the
Philippines as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-making capacity,
and the IBRD, which, as an international lending institution organized by world
governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of repayment by the
borrowing sovereign state, is likewise regarded a subject of international law and
possessed of the capacity to enter into executive agreements with sovereign states.
Being similar to a treaty but without requiring legislative concurrence, Loan
Agreement No. 4833-PH following the definition given in the Bayan Muna case
is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international law. Owing to this
classification, the Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its
terms and conditions under the rule of pactasuntservanda, a fundamental maxim of
international law that requires the parties to keep their agreement in good faith.It
bears pointing out that the pactasuntservanda rule has become part of the law of
the land through the incorporation clause found under Section 2, Article II of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that the Philippines "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations."LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC.,
G.R. No. 193796, July 2, 2014
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The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners claim against
the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the
Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of
the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we
cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to
conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. ISABELITA C. VINUYA
v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, G.R. No.
162230, August 12, 2014
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a longstanding rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of
democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his
representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the
acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign
from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem,
non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment
against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state
itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
We also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is notan
immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing
legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without the formers consent or waiver has evolved into a
restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) from private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the
restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure
imperii.The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and
its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of
the USS Guardian on the Tubataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) was committed while
they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a
judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of
funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The
principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
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over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.During the deliberations,
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the
US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. 10067
and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He
explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Article 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this
rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal
State regarding passage through the latters internal waters and the territorial sea.
Under Article 31, [t]he flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss
or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or
other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or
with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.
We fully concur with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does
not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State
over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
international responsibility under Article 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been
actively supporting the countrys efforts to preserve our vital marine resources,
would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship
while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government
exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS
directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the
marine environment as provided in Article 197.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond
dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws
and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by
their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial
purposes under Article 31.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter
of
compensation
and
rehabilitation
measures
through
diplomatic
channels.Resolution of these issues impinges on our relations with another State in
the context of common security interests under the VFA. It is settled that [t]he
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution
to the executive and legislativethe political departments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R.
206510, September 16, 2014
TREATIES
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National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within
the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by
the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines
may decide to trypersons of the US, under our national criminal justice system or it
may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over
USpersonscommitting high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary
criminal
jurisdiction
of
the
ICCoverthem.BAYANMUNAv.ALBERTOROMULOANDBLASF.OPLE,
G.R.No.
159618, February 1, 2011
The international law of the sea is generally defined as a body of treaty rules and
customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources,
and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public
international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the
oceans.
The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December
10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but
came into force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60 th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State
sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare
liberum). The freedom to use the worlds marine waters is one of the oldest
customary principles of international law.
The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the
different zones of the sea which are: (1) internal waters; (2) territorial sea; (3)
contiguous zone; (4) exclusive economic zone; and (5) the high seas. It also gives
coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the
vessel is located.
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State
exercises sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law.
Such sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its
bed and subsoil.PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510, September 16,
2014
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines to promote common security interests between
the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern
such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States
and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus
improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military
ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the
agreement. As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to
criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for
issuance of a writ of kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of
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the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately: The filing of a petition for the issuance
of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or
administrative actions.PEDRO ARIGO v. SCOTT SWIFT, G.R. 206510,
September 16, 2014
TREATMENT OF ALIENS
In deportation proceedings, there is no due process violation when the summary
deportation proceedings were held and when the Summary Deportation Order was
issued. In addition, the actual designation of the offense is not material so long as
the act constituting the offense was clearly alleged in the Charge Sheet and
sufficient enough to inform the alien of the specific ground for his deportation.
Summary deportation shall be observed in cases where the charge against the alien
is overstaying or expiration of his passport, including those aliens with cancelled
passport. In such cases, a full-blown deportation hearing is not necessary. THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION v. JUNG KEUN PARK, G.R. No. 159835, January 21, 2010
Page 119 of 119

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Jurisprudence Political

VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT AND BACK SALARIES

Sequestration is simply a provisional remedy. It is an extraordinary measure

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic

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