Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Course Outline
I.
Art. 2 NCC; Art.5 Labor Code; Sec. 3(1) & 4, Ch. 2, Book VII,
Administrative Code of 1987; BSP Circular 799
Effects and application of law
Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Article 2 of the NCC does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity.
Tanada vs Tuvera,146 SCRA 446 (1986)
If the law provides for its own effectivity date, then it takes effect on the
said date, subject to the requirement of publication. The clause unless
otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not the to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Basa vs Mercado, 61 Phil 632
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published
for the dissemination of local news and general information, that it has
bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and that it is published
at regular intervals.
PASEI vs. Torres, G.R. NO. 101279,Aug. 06, 1992 212 SCRA 298
Although the questioned circulars are a valid exercise of the police power
as delegated to the executive branch of Government, they are legally
invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and
filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1)
and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
Rep. vs. Extelcom, G.R. NO. 147096,Jan. 15, 2002 373 SCRA 316
Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or
regulations can take effect. There is nothing in the Administrative Code
of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center
is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Rep., G.R. NO. 180705, Nov. 27,2012 686 SCRA
472
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco AG.R.eement by
reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact
terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was acopy thereof attached to
the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said
AG.R.eement the status of a law.
NMSMI vs. DND,G.R. NO. 187587,June 5, 2013 697 SCRA 359
The Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of
Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never
had any legal force and effect.
Roy vs CA, G.R. NO 80718 Jan. 29, 1988
The term laws do not include decisions of the Supreme Court because
lawyers in the active practice must keep abreast of decisions, particularly
where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in
advanced reports and the SCRA.
Article 8. Stare Decisis; Case Law; See also Article 36, FC; article 9,
10, 11, 12 , 13, 14 NCC
Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. NO. 166562, Mar. 31, 2009 582 SCRA 694
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible, whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. It is only
Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8, 1985 139 SCRA
139
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989 174 SCRA
652
Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint. The person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
Recio vs. Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2, 2001 366 SCRA 437
Whether or not the divorce must be proved before it is to be recognized in
the Philippines. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Roehr v. Rodriguez,G.R. NO. 142820 ,Jun. 30, 2003 404 SCRA 495
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.
Morigo v. People, G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6, 2004 422 SCRA 376
7
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should
there be an abuse of rights. The concept of abuse of rights prescribes
that a person should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith;
otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. There is an
abuse of rights if when the act is performed without prudence or in bad
faith. In order that liability may attach under the concept of abuse of
rights, the following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith,
and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. There is no
hard and fast rule that can be applied to ascertain whether or not the
12
Figueroa vs. Barranco, SBC Case NO. 519. July 31, 1997 276 5CRA
445 - His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000 325
SCRA 805
A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade
but was later on prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The
negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school,
for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only
imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
UP v. Philab, G.R. NO. 152411, Sept. 29, 2004 439 SCRA 467
Whether or not UP is liable to pay PHILAB considering that it is only a
donee of FEMF, FEMF being the one which funded the project, and
despite being a donee, unjust enrichment still applies to UP. In order that
accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present:
(1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has
suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just
or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
Beumer vs. Amores, G.R. NO. 195670, Dec. 03, 2012 686 SCRA 770
An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been
designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as
in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine.
Padalhin vs. Lavia, G.R. NO. 183026,Nov. 14, 2012 685 SCRA 549
Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of
Lavina's residence without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor
violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's
13
Civil Personality; Birth; Death; Arts 37, 38, 39 40, 41, 42; 390, 391,
712, 777 NCC; Art. 41, 96 &124, 99 & 126, 142 FC
14
Marriage
Definition, Marriage as contract and social institution, Presumption
of Marriage, Proof of Marriage,Offer of Marriage
15
16
17
Requirements of Marriage
Essential requisite
Legal Capacity and Consent
Formal Requisite
Marriage License ; Civil Wedding v. Church Wedding; Certificate of
Civil Registrar;
Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA
446
Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a
non-resident invalidates the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties,
and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage
Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. NO. 183896 , Jan. 30, 2013 689 SCRA 636
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to
the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued,
and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. The fact that the names
in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search
of the records of her office.
Compare the case of Abbas v. Abbas and Alcantara v. Alcantara
Sy v. CA, G.R. NO. 127263 , Apr. 12, 2000 330 SCRA 550
In this case the marriage license was issued on September 17,1974,
almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973.
The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license.
18
19
Marriage Ceremony
Morigo vs People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004)
Petitioner and Lucia Barrette merely signed the marriage contract on
their own. The mere act of signing a marriage contract by the contracting
parties without the presence of the solemnizing officer will not result to
marriage.
Infante vs Arenas, June 29, 1951
The failure of the solemnizing officer to ask the parties whether they take
each other as husband and wife cannot be regarded as a fatal omission if
the parties nonetheless signed the marriage contract in the presence of
the solemnizing officer. A declaration of word of mouth of what the
parties and already stated in writing would be a mere repetition, so that
its omission should not be regarded as fatal.
People v. Opea, L-34954, Feb. 20, 1981
If a man and a woman deport themselves as if they were husband and
wife, they are presumed to be validly and legally married to each other
and this presumption is not rebutted by a mere denial by the man (or
woman) of the fact of marriage.
20
Given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of
his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal
partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to the respondents
as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
Petitioner questions the decision of the RTC, dismissing her petition for
the recognition of her second marriage as valid, for failing to comply
with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code that is
obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute
divorce in our country. The SC however ruled that a divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven and like any other fact. Hence, instead of
filing a petition for the recognition of her second marriage as valid,
petitioner should have filed a petition for the judicial recognition of her
foreign divorce from her first husband.
EDELINA T. ANDO v DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, G.R No.
195432 August 27, 2014. J. SERENO
Edelina Tungol married a Japanese man, Yuichiro Kobayashi, in 2001. In
2004, Kobayashi obtained a divorce valid under Japanese law. Believing
the divorce capacitated her to marry, Edelina married Masatomi Ando
in 2005. When Edelina applied for a renewal of her passport using
Andos last name, the DFA told her that she needed to prove by a
competent court decision that her second marriage to Ando is valid
until otherwise declared.
22
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA
266
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. But
while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decrees registration.
Classification of Marriages, Relationships. Parties In Interest;
NCC;FC;AM 02-11-10 SC
Valid
Voidable
Void
Terminable
Others Classifications
Legal Separation
Separation in Fact
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25
The appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to
explain the root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The
evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner
is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no
factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant
person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
27
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517
In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of
many military officials. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas
alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after
her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
Yambao v. REP., G.R. NO. 184063 , Jan. 24, 2011 640 SCRA 355
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.
Rep. v. Galang G.R. NO. 168335 , Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 524
In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to
encash a check, of stealing the respondents ATM, and of squandering a
huge portion of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her,
while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these
were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts.
Aurelio v. Aurelio, G.R. NO. 175367 , Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 561
Whether or not a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity may be dismiss for failure to comply with the
guidelines set forth in the Molina Ruling. Let it be remembered that each
case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. NO. 166357 , Sept 19, 2011 657 SCRA 822
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Sexual
infidelity per se is a G.R.ound for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
28
Toring v. Toring, G.R. NO. 165321 , Aug. 03, 2010 626 SCRA 389
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of
Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological
tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical in
considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived
solely from one-sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the
nullity of the marriage.
Baccay v. Baccay, G.R. No 173138 , Dec, 1, 2010 636 SCRA 350
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient
to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.
Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual
intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after
their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage.
Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existed at the
inception of the marriage.
Republic v. Encelan, G.R. NO. 170022 , Jan. 9, 2013 688 SCRA 215
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling,
even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these
are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented
the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Evidentiary requirement
GLENN VIAS vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIAS, G.R. No. 208790,
January 21, 2015, J. Reyes
The lack of personal examination or assessment by a psychologist or
psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the
case at bar, the assessment of the psychological incapacity of the wife
was based solely on the information provided by the husband whose
bias in favor of his cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance
alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her
report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more
rigid and stringent set of standards. Hence, if the totality of the
evidence presented provides inadequate basis to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented her
from complying with the essential obligations of marriage, the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage cannot be obtained. It has
been settled that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not
due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule.
30
Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. NO. 158298 , Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA 27
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
31
32
33
34
Rep. v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062 , Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code
Navarro v. Domogtoy, A.M. NO.MTJ-96-1088, Jul. 19, 1996 259
SCRA 129
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a
missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.
Rep. v. Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. NO. 160258 , Jan. 19, 2005 449
SCRA 57
Although the result of the Court of Appeals denial of the appeal would
apparently be the same, there is a big difference between having the
supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact
that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and
executory, and the denial of the appeal for lack of merit. In the former,
the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry
of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still
raise the matter to this Court on petition for review and the RTC
judgment cannot be executed until this Court makes the final
pronouncement.
Rep. v. Granada, G.R. NO. 187512, June 13, 2012 672 SCRA 432
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
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37
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executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the
petitioner simply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned."
Pre-nuptial
Agreement;
Concept
Property regime by default
Marriage settlement
Parties to Marriage settlement
Laws governing Property Relations
CHAPTER 2. DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE (Articles 8287)
39
40
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union.
Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. NO.146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila
and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY (Articles 88-104);
R.A. 8369
Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 88-90)
Section 2. What constitutes Community Property (Articles 91-93)
Section 3. Charges Upon & Obligations of the Absolute Community
(Articles 94-95)
Section 4. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment & Disposition of
the Community Property (Articles 96-98)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime (Arts 99-101)
Section 6. Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets &
Liabilities (Arts 102-104); Succession; Probate;
Sec. 3, Rule 87
Rules governing ACP
Commencement of the ACP
Prohibition on waiver of Rights, Interest, Shares and Effects
Abalos vs Macatangay Jr., 439 SCRA 649, 662-663 (2004).
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each
spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
41
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen
into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a
result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or remanente liquido (haber ganancial)
resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its
dissolution.
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY (Articles 88-104);
R.A. 8369
Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 88-90)
Section 2. What constitutes Community Property (Articles 91-93)
Section 3. Charges Upon & Obligations of the Absolute Community
(Articles 94-95)
Section 4. Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment & Disposition of
the Community Property (Articles 96-98)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime (Arts 99-101)
Section 6. Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets &
Liabilities (Arts 102-104); Succession; Probate;
Sec. 3, Rule 87
Concept
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo, 453 SCRA 283, 290
(2005)
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and
those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance.
Rules governing CPG
Commencement of CPG
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General Provisions
FRANCISCO LIM vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, now known as the
BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK INC., January 15, 2014, J. del Castillo
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is
shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this
presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered
in the name of the husband or the wife alone 2and that the consent of
both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be
mortgaged. However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing
presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property
was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before
this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the
said property was conjugal in nature.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v JOSE GARCIA and CHILDREN
NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA and JIMMY
GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO
GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA,
HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA and
JANE GARCIA, G.R No. 182839, June 2, 2014 J. BRION
of one of the spouses. The burden of proving that the property belongs
exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests upon the party asserting
it.
Dewara v. Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11, 2011 647 SCRA 483
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the
wife alone does not destroy this presumption.
De Leon v. De Leon G.R. NO. 185063 , Jul. 23, 2009 593 SCRA 768
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered
by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred
during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. Evidently, title to the
property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the
purchase price on June 22, 1970.
Section 2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse (Articles 109-115)
Villegas v. Lingan G.R. NO. 153839 , Jun. 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63
Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of
the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are
transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the
redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that
property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the
spouses redeeming the property.
44
the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear, the
presumption applies and it will be considered conjugal property.
Imani v. MBTC, G.R. NO.187023,Nov. 17, 2010 635 SCRA 357
The party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership.
Pisuea vs. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. NO. 132803 , Aug. 31, 1999
313 SCRA 384
The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Petra Unating's status
at the time the lot was awarded and registered in her name. Since Petra
Unating did not leave any other property, will or debt upon her demise in
1948, the property in question was thus inherited by her children, Felix
and Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino Villar.
Improvement on Separate Property
Determination of Ownership
Ferrer v. Ferrer, G.R. NO.166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570
The obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of
the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the
purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the ownerspouse.
Section 4.Charges Upon & Oblig.of the Conjugal Partnership (Articles
121-123)
Alipio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 134100, Sept. 29, 2000.
A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary
proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the
conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim
in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
45
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo, 453 SCRA 283 (2005)
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming
as such.
Ayala Investment & Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 286
SCRA 272 (1998)
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ching vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642 , Feb. 23, 2004 423 SCRA 356
The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the
corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of
the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitionerhusband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
Carlos vs. Abelardo, G.R. NO. 146504 , Apr. 09, 2002 380 SCRA 361
On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the
defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and
defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
SBTC v. Mar Tierra Corp., G.R. NO. 143382 , Nov. 29, 2006 508
SCRA 419
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the
husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the
solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The underlying concern
of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it
limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and
46
47
In the present case, the fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
on September 22, 1986, one month after Leonardo died. Auroraas one
of the heirs and the duly appointed administratrix of Leonardos estate,
had the right therefore to seek for the annulment of the Deed of Sale
as it deprived her and the other legal heirs of Leonardo of their
hereditary rights.
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA v HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,
represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLEROLUNA, G.R No. 171914, July 23, 2014. J. BERSAMIN
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner
being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on
co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code.
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of
proof to confirm such fact.To establish co-ownership, therefore, it
became imperative for the Lavadia to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of coownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant
no relief in her favor.
Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan, Sr., NO. L- 45418, October 30, 1980, 100
SCRA 619.
A husband may sell property belonging to the conjugal partnership even
without the consent of the wife if the sale is necessary to answer for a big
conjugal liability which might endanger the familys economic standing.
This is one instance where the wifes consent is not required and,
impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Spouses Guiang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172. June 26,
1998,
Under the Civil Code, the encumbrance or alienation of a conjugal real
property by the husband absent the wifes consent, is voidable and not
void.
Roxas vs. CA G.R. NO. 92245, Jun. 26, 1991 198 SCRA 541
48
49
50
MBTC v. Pascual, G.R. NO. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the
Nature of Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of
Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the
conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before
such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and
after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution
of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to
cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Espinosa v. Omaa, AC. 9081, Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1
Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving
the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaa did in this case.
The "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against
public policy.
Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets &
Liabilities (Articles 129-133);
Agtarap v. Agtarap, G.R. NO. 177099, Jun. 8, 2011 651 SCRA 455
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of
third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue.
More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties
51
Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260
SCRA 221
Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and
129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in
cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spouses.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, G.R. NO. 136803, Jun. 16, 2000 333 SCRA
628
The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists
between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through
their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
Dio v. Dio, G.R. NO. 178044,Jan. 19, 2011 640 SCRA 178
Petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent
are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, partition may be made by
aG.R.eement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Lacbayan v. Samoy, G.R. NO. 165427, Mar. 21, 2011 645 SCRA 677
53
San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 76 of the Civil Code
54
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal
effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who
is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros,
and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros
family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA 104 (1970)
The enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as member of the same family
does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that case, then Chief Justice
Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brother-inlaw") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of
the same family.
55
enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it
and his heirs.
Taneo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 108562, Mar. 09, 1999 304
SCRA 308
By the very definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling
house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is
situated, it is understood that the house should be constructed on a
land not belonging to another.
Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the
family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides
but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the
subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which
it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a
family residence 20 years back
Modequillo vs. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as
required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises,
it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law
Patricio vs. Dario, G.R. NO. 170829, November 20, 2006.
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the
benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the
Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent
for legal support upon the head of the family.
Cabang v. Basay, G.R. NO. 180587, Mar. 20, 2009 582 SCRA 172
The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute
community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property
56
Benitez-Badua vs. CA G.R. NO. 105625, Jan. 24, 1994 229 SCRA 468
57
Article 170 of the Family Code is inapplicable to this case because this is
not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not
the decedent's child at all.
Liyao vs. Tanhoti-Liyao,G.R. NO. 138961, Mar. 07, 2002 378 SCRA
563
The grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262
of the Civil Code.
Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which
only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.
Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73
In this case the husband and the wife continued to live in the same
province after their alleged separation, the Court did not discount the
possibility of physical access to each other considering their proximity to
each other and considering further that the wife still visited and
recuperated in her mothers house where her spouse resided with their
children.
Andal vs. Macaraig, 89 Phil 165
The court held that just because tuberculosis is advanced in a man does
not necessarily mean that he is incapable of sexual intercourse. There
are cases where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal
act even in the most crucial stage of health because then they seemed to
be more inclined to sexual intercourse.
58
It must be concluded that Rodolfo who was born during the marriage
of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their
respective deaths has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate
issue of the Aguilar spouses. He correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS
satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the
Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said
document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
59
Solinap vs. Locsin Jr. G.R. NO. 146737 , Dec. 10, 2001 371 SCRA
711
Whether or not the certificate of live birth (Exhibit D) as presented by the
respondent, including the photograph showing that he and his mother
attended the deceased funeral, is sufficient to proof filiation of the
petitioner to the deceased. A birth certificate offers only prima facie
evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
Verceles v. Posada, G.R. NO.159785, Apr. 27, 2007 522 SCRA 518
The court held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of
the child, and no further court action is required
De Asis vs CA, 303 SCRA 176
Paternity or filiation, or the lack of it, is a relationship that must be
judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence.
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. NO. 190710, Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 667
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test.
Rodriguez vs. CA, G.R. NO. 85723, Jun. 19, 1995 245 SCRA 150
When a recognition has been made by one parent, the name of the other
parent may be revealed in an action by the child to compel such other
parent to recognize him also.
Heirs of Cabais vs. CA, G.R. NO. 106314-15,Oct. 08, 1999 316 SCRA
338
A baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being hearsay, is not
a conclusive proof of filiation.
60
Cenido vs. Apacionado, G.R .NO. 132474, Nov. 19, 1999 318 SCRA
688
Under the law, this statement must be made personally by the parent
himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the
concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, or
if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or
maternity of children born outside wedlock.
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor, G.R. NO. 174680, Mar. 24, 2008 549 SCRA 68
Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that respondents successional
rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel
recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged
and recognized as an illegitimate child. Respondent in this case had not
been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had
been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father
because of petitioners opposition to her petition and motion for hearing
on affirmative defenses.
Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA
585
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate
child on the information of a third person.
Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. NO. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012 678 SCRA 436
We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pediG.R.ee, admission
by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." In this case, the
respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
61
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.
Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.
Lucas v. Lucas, G.R . NO. 190710, Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 667
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test.
Guy v. CA, G.R. NO. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006 502 SCRA 151
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription
depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in
proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the
same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet.
De La Cruz v. Gracia G.R. NO. 177728, Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 648
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the
62
Uy v. Chu, G.R. NO. 183965, Sept. 18, 2009 600 SCRA 806
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation
of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and
filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or aG.R.eement of the parties.
63
Republic vs. Miller, G.R. NO.125932, Apr. 21, 1999 306 5CRA 183
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a
vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of
a new law disqualifying him.
64
Republic vs. Toledano, G.R. NO.94147, Jun. 08, 1994 233 SCRA 9
The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife
"must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the
said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory
Cang vs. CA, G.R. NO.105308, Sept. 25, 1998 296 SCRA 128
Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children.
In re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim G.R. NO.168992-93, May
21, 2009 588 SCRA 98
The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and
Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of
marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists.
That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required.
Republic vs. CA & Bobiles, G.R. NO.92326, Jan. 24, 1992 205 SCRA
356
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the
right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her
husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law.
Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. NO. 143989, July 14, 2003
R.A. NO. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a
consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where
the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable.
TITLE VIII. SUPPORT
65
Concept of Support
G.R.ounds for Action for Support
Right to support
Order of liability for support
Contractual support vs Legal Support
Mangonon v. CA, G.R. NO. 125041 , June.30, 2006 494 SCRA 1
The grandparents are liable to support their grandchildren if the parent
cannot give support or sufficient support.
Lim v. Lim, G.R. NO. 163209, Oct. 30, 2009 604 SCRA 691
The inability of the parents to sufficiently provide for their children shifts
a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both
in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in
Article 199.
Gan vs. Reyes, G.R. NO.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357
A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite
pendency of appeal.
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. NO.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176
Whether or not, a renunciation of the existence of filiation of the child
and the putative father, made by the mother, is valid. It is true that in
order to claim support, filiation and,or paternity must first be shown
between the claimant and the parent, however, paternity and filiation or
the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established
and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence.
67
It was improper for BBB, knowing that CCC was not his biological son,
to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAAs
marriage. The legal process of legitimation was trifled with when BBB
voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. The principle of
estoppel under Article 1431 thus applies, and it now bars BBB from
making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He
should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own
misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation
process. CCC remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant to Article 179 of
the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a
legitimate child, including the receipt of his fathers support.
Duty of Representation
Obedencio vs. Murillo, A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1753. Feb. 5, 2004 422
SCRA 21
Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, on May 22, 2001, when
she was presented before respondents sala to affirm the execution of her
affidavit of desistance. This being the case, said affidavit should have
been executed with the concurrence of her parents. Licel could not
validly give consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a minor is
incompetent to execute such an instrument.
Lindain v. CA, G.R. NO. 95305 , Aug. 20, 199 212 SCRA 725
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished
from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children,
does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said
children without judicial approval.
69
Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop, G.R. No 194366, Oct. 10, 2012 683
SCRA 253
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and
the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any
act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or
mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority,
does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter
CHAPTER 5. SUSPENSION
AUTHORITY (Arts 228-233)
OR
TERMINATION
OF
PARENTAL
Bondagjy vs. Bondagjy, G.R. NO. 140817, Dec. 07, 2001 371 SCRA
64
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents.
Cang vs CA,296 SCRA 128
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.
Title X. EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY; See RA 6809;
2176 & 2180 NCC
Concept
Effects of Emancipation
70
INVOLVING
PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children [VAWC]) &
IRR
A.M. NO. 02-11-12-SC- Re: Proposed Rule on Provisional Orders
(March 4, 2003)
A.M. NO. 03-02-05-SC- Re: Proposed Rule on Guardianship of Minors
(April 1, 2003)
A.M. NO. 03-04-SC- Re: Proposed Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (April 30, 2003)
CHAPTER 4. OTHER MATTERS
PROCEEDINGS (Article 253)
SUBJECT
TO
SUMMARY
Uy (Jardeleza) vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109557, Nov. 29, 2000 346 SCRA
246
Rule 95 of the ROC, not the Rule on Summary Proceedings in the Family
Code, shall apply in a sale of a conjugal property where one spouse is is
an incompetent. A comatose spouse is incompetent.
71
Republic v. Tango, G.R. NO.161062, Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Rep. v. Bermudez-Lorino G.R. NO. 160258 , Jan. 19, 2005 449 SCRA
5
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247,
Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
72
PROPERTY
73
Concept of Property
Classification of Property
Immovable vs Movable Properties
Laurel vs. Abrogar,
Jan.
13,
2009
74
In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as Real
Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage, instead of just Real Estate
Mortgage if indeed their intention is to treat all properties included
therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate
LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT. These facts, taken together,
evince the conclusion that the parties intention is to treat these units of
machinery as chattels.
Caltex Phils.,
Inc.,
vs.
CBAA, May
31,
1982
CBAA,
May
31,
1982
While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may,
nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its
utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the
two tanks have been installed with some deG.R.ee of permanence as
receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations.
Rights as property
MBTC v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 812, 819 (2001)
A real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself.
Concept
Kinds of Movable Property
Chapter 3 Property in Relation to the Person to whom it belongs
Public Dominion vs Private Ownership
Classification of Property depending on ownership
Constitutional basis of State Ownership Jura Regalia
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 415 SCRA 403 (2003)
Submerged lands are part of the States inalienable natural resources
and classified as property of public dominion.
Republic v.
144
Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all
lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus,
pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those
acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether
express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had
been let into private ownership through the States imprimatur, such
land is presumed to belong to the State
Public ownership vs State Ownership
Public Service vs Public Use
Villarico v. Sarmiento, 442 SCRA 110, 115 2004
Public use means use which is not confined to privileged individuals,
but is open to the indefinite public.
76
77
20,
2010
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between
the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to
the flow of the tide. The land's proximity to the waters alone does not
automatically make it a foreshore land.
78
Reclaimed Properties
Republic vs.
Paraaque, G.R. NO. 191109,July 18, 2012
677 SCRA 246
The subject reclaimed lands are still part of the public domain,
owned by the State and, therefore, exempt from payment of real
estate taxes.
Here, the subject lands are reclaimed lands,
specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part of
the public domain.
Title II Ownership
Ownership in General
80
Concept of Ownership
Attributes of Ownership
Recovery of Property
82
170575,June
8,
In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only
issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer,
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration
or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession
is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in
actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of
the defendant's right to continue in possession.
Jose v. Alfuerto, G.R. No 169380, Nov. 26, 2012
Acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person
to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or
benefits which ones property can give to another without material injury
or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or
courtesy.
Barrientos v.Rapal, G.R. NO. 169594,July
20,
2011
83
German Management & Services, Inc. v. CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989)
The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession, and not when possession has already been
lost.
Right to Enclose or Fence
Limitations on Ownership
84
General Provision
Accession
VILLASI VS. GARCIA, G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014, J. Perez
to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there
are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the
lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be
treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be,
can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. VICENTE VICTOR C.
SANCHEZ ET AL.; GENEROSO TULAGAN ET AL. vs. VICENTE
VICTOR C. SANCHEZ ET AL.; REYNALDO V. MANIWANG vs.
VICENTE VICTOR C. SANCHEZ and FELISA GARCIA YAP, G.R. No.
179518; G.R. No. 179835; G.R. No. 179954, November 19,
2014, J. Velasco Jr.
Article 453 of the Civil Code clearly reads that a landowner is
considered in bad faith if he does not oppose the unauthorized
construction thereon despite knowledge of the same. The fact that the
Sanchezes did take action to oppose the construction on their property
by writing the HLURB and the City Building Official of Quezon City. The
Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that Garcia and TSEI are
builders in bad faith. They knew for a fact that the property still
belonged to the Sanchezes and yet proceeded to build the townhouses
not just without the authority of the landowners, but also against their
will.
Prevailing jurisprudence reveals the following established rules:
1. Well settled is the rule that all persons dealing with property covered
by a torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. When there is nothing on the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than what the torrens title upon its face indicates in
quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently
defeat his right thereto.
2. This rule, however, admits of an exception as where the purchaser
or mortgagee has knowledge of a defect or lack of title in the vendor,
or that he was aware ofsufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the property in litigation.
3. Likewise, one who buys property withfull knowledge of the flaws and
defects in the title of the vendor is enough proof of his bad faith and
estopped from claiming that he acquired the property in good faith
against the owners.
86
4. To prove good faith, the following conditions must be present: (a) the
seller is the registered owner of the land; (b) the owner is in possession
thereof; and (3) at the time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any
claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect
or restriction in the titleof the seller or in his capacity to convey title to
the property. All these conditions must be present, otherwise, the
buyer is under obligation to exercise extra ordinary diligence by
scrutinizing the certificates of title and examining all factual
circumstances to enable him to ascertain the sellers title and capacity
to transfer any interest in the property.
Definition
Kinds of Accession
Accession Discreta
Kinds of Fruits
Accession Continua
Fundamental rules
Industrial Accession
87
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead
the owner of the building or improvement to remove it from the land.
88
Alluvion
Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from owners, the latter
being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lakes or other
tidal waters.
Vda. de Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 598 (1996)
Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust
by the Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art.
457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject land is part of the public domain.
Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408.
The right of the owners of the bank adjacent to rivers to the accretion
which they receive by virtue of the action of the waters of the river is ipso
jure and there is no need of an action of the owner of the bank to possess
the new addition since it belongs to him by the very fact of the addition.
Cureg v. IAC, 177 SCRA 313 (1989)
The accretion to registered land does not preclude acquisition of the
additional area by another person through prescription.
Avulsion
Definition
Avulsion vs Alluvion
Rules Governing Avulsion
Change of course of River
Agne v. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)
There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their
ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the mode of
acquisition becomes evident, without need of any formal act of
acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership
90
of the owner of the land through which the new river bed passes even
without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof
will be considered as a trespasser.
Formation of Island
Right of Accession with respect to Movable Property
Adjunction or Conjunction
Rules governing Adjunction or Conjunction
Presence and absence of badfaith
Commixtion or Confusion
Specification
Chapter 3 Quieting of Title
Action to Quiet Title
HEIRS OF PACIFICO POCIDO, ET AL. VS. ARSENIA AVILA AND
EMELINDA CHUA G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014, J. Carpio
The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which
held that lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation belong to the
public domain and are no longer registrable under the Land
Registration Act. The Office of the President ordered the disposition of
the disputed property in accordance with the applicable rules of
procedure for the disposition of alienable public lands within the
Baguio Townsite Reservation, particularly Chapter X of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and other applicable rules.
Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial
court was therefore correct in dismissing the complaint to quiet title for
lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who
among the parties have better right over the disputed property which
is admittedly still part of the public domain.
91
latters name. The Supreme Court ruled that for an action to quiet title
to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff
or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy. Petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. TM1118 failed to allege these two requisites for an action to quiet title.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PHIL-VILLE
DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL) AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA
DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN, G.R. No. 160728, March 11, 2015, J.
Leonardo-De Castro
Thus, both requisites in order for an action for quieting of title to
prosper have been met in this case: (1) Phil-Ville had established its
equitable title or interest in the 16 parcels of land subject of the action;
and (2) TCT No. T-177013, found to overlap titles to said properties of
Phil-Ville, was previously declared invalid.
Chung Jr. vs. Mondragon, G.R. 179754,Nov.
21,
2012
The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff
need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a
legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and
that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy."
Bahais v.
11,
2012
Under Articles 476and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title.
In this case, an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy because
93
95
96
Extinguishment of Co-ownership
VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I.
QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I. DANCEL, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and CATALINO L. IBARRA v
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA,
PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA,
HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R., IBARRA,
APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses
RECTO CANDELARIO and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO. G.R No.
210252, June 16, 2014. J. VELASCO, JR.
A partition case of a land co-owned by ten siblings was dismissed for
the failure of the parties and counsels to appear despite due notice
under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Later, in a quieting of
title case involving the same property, the siblings demanded partition.
The occupant of the lot claimed that the action for partition is barred
by res judicata.
It is indeed true that dismissal with prejudice under the above-cited
rule amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata. However,
dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time,
provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares
yet.
A perusal of Article 494 of the Civil Code shows that the law generally
does not favor the retention of co-ownership as a property relation,
and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-owners specific shares
97
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others, hence, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners
is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Pangan v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 375, 382, Oct. 17, 1988
If the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion
over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he
98
can acquire sole title to it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive
period.
Heirs of Flores Restar v. Heirs of Dolores R. Cichon 475 SCRA 731,
Nov. 22, 2005
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not
prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription
where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the coowners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.
Delima v. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 641, Sept. 24, 1991
From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute
and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of
ownership
Maritegui v. Court of Appeals 205 SCRA 337,
When a co-owner or co-heir registered the properties in his name in
fraud of other co-owners or co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to
have commenced from the time the latter discovered the formers act of
defraudation.
Lacbayan v.
Mar.
21,
2011
The first phase of a partition and,or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary aG.R.eement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited.
Cruz v.
Feb.
12,
2008
99
The Court ruled that PNB has the right to the writ. The allegedly
invalidity of the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay is not a ground to
oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not
affect PNBs right to possess the subject property. As the registered
owner, PNB is entitled to the possession of the subject property as a
matter of right.
NORMA V. JAVATE vs. SPOUSES RENATO J. TIOTUICO AND
LERMA C. TIOTUICO, G.R. No. 187606, March 09, 2015, J.
Peralta
If the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the
redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether
possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is
100
101
CARMENCITA SUAREZ VS. MR. AND MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY JR. AND
MARILOU P. EMBOY-DELANTAR G.R. No. 187944 March 12, 2014, J.
Reyes
103
without any allegation in the complaint that the entry of the defendant
was by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
172547,
Jun.
30,
2009 591
175604,
Apr.
10,
2008
105
Chua-Bruce
v.
109595,
Apr.
27,
2000
Effects of Possession
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR, et al. vs. CARMELING CRISOLOGO, G.R. No. 204626,
June 9, 2014, J. Mendoza
107
facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said
conditions.
EDCA Publ.
184 SCRA
V.
Santos, G.R. NO.
614
80298,
Apr.
26,
1990
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership
over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by
the private respondents to the books.
BPI Family
v.
123498,
Nov.
23,
2007
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraud. We have held that it is a breach
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
Title VI Usufruct
108
109
Restrictive Covenant
Fajardo v. Freedom
Bicol Agro-Ind
v.
Obias, G.R. NO.
172077,
Oct.
09,
2009 - The easement of right of way the privilege of persons or a
particular class of persons to pass over anothers land, usually through
one particular path or linen is characterized as a discontinuous
easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man.
Because of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be
acquired by virtue of a title.
Quintanilla v.
110
Quimen v.
112331,
May
29,
1996
Unisource
v.
173252,
Jul.
17,
2009
Classification of Nuisance
LINDA RANA vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and
RUBEN ANG ONG and SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY; SPS. ROSARIO and
WILSON UY; WILSON UY as attorney-in-fact of TERESITA LEE WONG, and
SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and RUBEN ANG ONG vs. SPS. REYNALDO and
LINDA LANA, G.R. No. 192861; G.R. No. 192862, June 30, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
111
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court
finds that the same is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not
injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built
primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their
house which was admittedly located on a higher elevation than the
subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties. Since the
subject portion is not a nuisance per se, it cannot be summarily
abated. The demolition order secured by Wong was thus unwarranted,
entitling the spouses Rana to nominal and temperate damages.
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO v MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN,
represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BA
YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES,
DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO,
JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL ENGINEER,
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF,
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF,
MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES. G.R
No. 211356, September 29, 2014. J. VELASCO
112
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that
(1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property.
Challenging the validity of the public respondents actuations,
petitioner posits that the hotel cannot summarily be abated because it
is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of
capital infused in the venture. Petitioner also argues that respondents
should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the
demolition.
SC said that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance
per se, but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all,
is not the litmus test for such a determination. More controlling is the
propertys nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to see if it
qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.
Nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per
accidens. The first is recognized as a nuisance under any and all
circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health
or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the
undefined law of necessity. The second is that which depends upon
certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a
question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a
tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing does in law
constitute a nuisance. cralawlawlibrary
In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a
nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is generally defined as an
act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding.
Here, it is merely the hotels particular incidentits locationand not
its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had
it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could
have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner
is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but, it is still a
nuisance per accidens.
Remedies
113
Telmo v.
182567,
Jul.
13,
2009
Quezon
11,
2011
The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety
of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a
structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.
Perez v.
Madrona G.R. NO. 184478,
Mar.
21,
2012 Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not
injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built
primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders
from entering it.
Donation
CHARLES BUMAGAT, JULIAN BACUDIO, ROSARIO PADRE,
SPOUSES ROGELIO and ZOSIMA PADRE, and FELIPE DOMINCIL v
REGALADO ARRIBAY, G.R No. 194818, June 9, 2014. J. DEL
CASTILLO
Under Article 749 and 709 of the Civil Code, it may be inferred that as
between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is
required is for said donation to be contained in a public document.
Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective.
However, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be
registered in the Registry of Land Titles and Deeds. Although the nonregistration of a deed of donation shall not affect its validity, the
necessity of registration comes into play when the rights of third
persons are affected, as in the case at bar.
In this case, the donation executed by Gonzales in favor of his
grandchildren, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been
registered in accordance with law. Hence, while the deed of donation is
valid between the donor and the donees, such deed, however, did not
bind the tenants-farmers who were not parties to the donation. Nonregistration of a deed of donation does not bind other parties ignorant
of a previous transaction. It is of no moment that the right of the
114
115
Insular
Life
v.
44059,
Oct.
28,
1977
116
premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the
beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance.
Zamboanga
v.
Sept.
30,
2008
126444,
Dec.
4,
1998.
Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee
comply with the condition, the latter remains the owner so long as he
has tried to comply with the condition within a reasonable period. Only
then - when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought
to the donor's knowledge - that ownership of the donated property
reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of the
deed of donation.
PRESCRIPTION
METROPOLITAN FABRICS INC. ET AL. VS. PROSPERITY CREDIT
RESOURCES ENC. ET AL. G.R. No. 154390 March 17, 2014, J.
Bersamin
With the contract being voidable, petitioners action to annul the real
estate mortgage already prescribed. Article 1390, in relation to Article
1391 of the Civil Code, provides that if the consent of the contracting
parties was obtained through fraud, the contract is considered voidable
and may be annulled within four years from the time of the discovery
of the fraud. The discovery of fraud is reckoned from the time the
document was registered in the Register of Deeds in view of the rule
that registration was notice to the whole world. Thus, because the
117
120
I. DEFINITION
121
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE vs. CAMPOS, G.R. NO. 138814, April 16,
2009
Respondent used the terms "right and obligation" in his Petition from
which he concluded that that such Petition sufficiently states a cause of
action. Right and obligation are legal terms with specific legal meaning;
A right is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is
enforceable by law, while an obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a
juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do and in the words of Arias
Ramos "An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the
creditor) may demand from another (called the debtor) the observance of
a determinative conduct (the giving, doing or not doing), and in case of
breach, may demand satisfaction from the assets of the latter."
II. ELEMENTS OF AN OBLIGATION
DEGAOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 162826,
October 14, 2013
122
For failure to pay on time the amortization, SSS imposed the 12% penalty
contained in the penal clause of the contract entered into between the
parties.
Inpositive obligations, (to give and to do), the penalty is
demandable when the debtor is in mora; hence, the necessity of demand
by the debtor unless the same is excused.
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 153827
April 25, 2006
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or
natural, "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their
performance, while Natural obligations, not being based on positive law
but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce
their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they
authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason
thereof".
DBP vs. CONFESSOR, G.R. NO. L-48889 May 11, 1989
124
Delfin, the father, was held jointly and severally liable with his minor son
Dante arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. The civil
liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is a necessary consequence of the
parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" .
2. OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM CONTRACTS
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ANA GRACE
ROSALES AND YO YUK TO, G.R. No. 183204, January 13, 2014 J.
del Castillo
Petitioner bank uses as basis for its refusal The Hold Out clause
found in the agreement it entered into with respondents. The Supreme
Court held that the Hold Out clause applies only if there is a valid and
existing obligation arising from any of the sources of obligation
enumerated in Article 115779of the Civil Code, to wit: law, contracts,
quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi-delict. No such ground exists in this
case, hence the bank is guilty of breach of contract when it
unjustifiably refused to release respondents deposit despite demand.
125
Cruz alleged that Tuason had been enriched at the expense of Cruz by
virtue of an agreement made by Cruz and the Deudors in the clearing,
improving, subdividing and selling the large tract of land for the reasons
that said improvements are being used and enjoyed by Tuason. A
presumed quasi-contract cannot emerge as against one party when the
subject matter thereof is already covered by an existing contract with
another party.
A. NEGOTIORUM GESTIO
126
B. SOLUTIO INDEBITI
ANDRES vs. MANUFACTURERS HANOVER & TRUST CORPORATION,
G.R. NO. 82670 September 15, 1989
The City Treasurer of Manila refused to refund the retail dealer's tax
erroneously paid by the petitioner on it's belief that it was not exempted
from such, on the ground that the tax was voluntarily paid and not
under protest which was a condition sine qua non in order that a legal
127
NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of water in its dam
brought damages to defendants but asserts that the damages, if any,
were due to the heavy rains and should be regarded as a fortuitous event.
Negligence or imprudence is human factor which makes the whole
128
Petitioner fell into the open drainage holes, causing him physical injuries,
in a public market being managed by Asiatic Integrated Corporation but
such public market is still under the control and supervision of the City
of Manila. As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict,
one must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. (Art.
1173 of the Civil Code).
VI. NATURE AND EFFECTS OF OBLIGATION
A. OBLIGATION TO GIVE A DETERMINATE THING vs A GENERIC
THING
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
130
It is clear upon the records that the sole and principal reason for the
cancellation of the allocation of rice contracted by the appellee herein in
Burma, was the failure of the letter of credit to be opened by NARIC
within the contemplated period which resulted in the consequent
damage. Every debtor who fails in performance of his obligations due to
fraud, negligence, or delay is bound to indemnify for the losses and
damages caused thereby.
TELEFAST vs. CASTRO, G.R. NO. 73867, February 29, 1988
131
Cortes admission agreed that the Corporations full payment of the sum
would depend upon his delivery of the TCTs of the three lots.
Considering that their obligation was reciprocal, performance thereof
must be simultaneous and the mutual inaction of Cortes and the
Corporation therefore gave rise to a compensation morae or default on
the part of both parties because neither has completed their part in their
reciprocal obligation.
Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation
under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents failure to
increase the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will
accommodate their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to
perform their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of
the other party to perform the obligation renders the other party to
demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the rescission of the
contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement.
132
D. NEGLIGENCE
1. DEGREE OF DILIGENCE
SICAM vs. JORGE, G.R. NO. 159617, August 8, 2007
Sicam exempts himself from liability on the ground that the robbery of
his pawnshop is a fortuitous event which is by definition is an
extraordinary event not foreseeable or avoidable. In order for a fortuitous
event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss and
robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event for it does
not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein
petitioners.
MERALCO vs. RAMOY, G.R. NO. 158911, March 4, 2008
134
NAKPIL & SONS v. CA, G.R. NO. L-47851 April 15, 1988
There was an earthquake which caused the building heavy damage but
the other nearby structures had less damages as compared to the said
building, the architects, engineers and contractors are claiming
fortuitous event as a defense. To be exempt from liability due to an act of
God, the ff must occur:
1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor
2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or agG.R.avation of the
industry to the creditor.
3. EXTRAORDINARY INFLATION
ALMEDA vs. BATHALA MARKETING,G.R.NO.150806, January 28,
2008
135
137
which is not a breach of contract, but simply an event that prevented the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
SPS. SANTOS vs. CA, G.R. NO. 120820, August 1, 2000
In view of our finding in the present case that the aG.R.eement between
the parties is a contract to sell, it follows that the appellate court erred
when it decreed that a judicial rescission of said aG.R.eement was
necessary. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a
positive suspensive condition and failure to pay the price agreed upon is
not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.
CONDITION PRECEDENT
PARKS vs. PROVINCE OF TARLAC, G.R. NO. L-24190, July 13, 1926
RESOLUTORY CONDITION
ART 1181
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY vs. CA, G.R. NO. 112230. July
17, 1995
138
Petitioner claimed that respondents are liable for the whole amount of
their debt and the interest thereon, after they defaulted on the monthly
installments, due to acceleration clause therein. Respondents, on the
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other hand, countered that the installments were not yet due and
demandable, evidenced by the blank space left for the date on which the
installments should have commenced and theorized that fulfillment of
the obligation is dependent on the sole will of the debtor, hence proper
court should first fix a period for payment. The act of leaving blank the
due date of the first installment did not necessarily mean that the
debtors were allowed to pay as and when they could, since the presence
of an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, showed the
intention of the parties that the installments should be paid at a definite
date, this is an obligation with a period.
LIM vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-34338 November
21, 1984
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision of the lower court which
convicted her of the crime of Estafa when she failed to give the proceeds
of the sale of the tobacco in accordance with their agreement which says
that ''...payment should be given as soon as the tobaccos are sold...'' and
contended that the court should first fix the period. It is clear in the
aG.R.eement, that the obligation was immediately demandable as soon
as the tobacco was disposed of hence, Article 1197 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that the courts may fix the duration of the obligation if it
does not fix a period, does not apply.
ART 1197
ARANETA, INC., vs.PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES, G.R. NO. L-22558
May 31, 1967
Araneta, who was not able to comply with his obligation to create side
streets on the sides of the land which were sold to the PSE due to the
presence of squatters, questions the decision of the lower court ordering
him to comply with his obligation within 2 years from the finality of the
decision. It must be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a
two-step process, the Court must first determine that "the obligation
does not fix a period", or from the nature and the circumstances it can
be inferred that a period was intended, because courts can not fix a
period merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable and the
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complaint not having sought that the court should set a period, but must
set the time that the parties are shown to have intended.
4. OBLIGATIONS WITH A PENAL CLAUSE
SSS vs. MOONWALK DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING CORPORATION,
G.R. NO. 73345, April 7, 1993.
Is the penalty demandable even after the extinguishment of the principal
obligation? For all purposes the principal obligation of defendantappellee was deemed extinguished as well as the accessory obligation of
real estate mortgage, the penal clause which is also an accessory
obligation must also be deemed extinguished, it would be otherwise, if
the demand for the payment of the penalty was made prior to the
extinguishment of the obligation because by then the debtor would be in
mora and therefore liable for the penalty.
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., vs. ESPIRITU, G.R. NO. L-28497
November 6, 1928
Defendant alleged that the decision of the lower court to pay 25 percent
of the amount of the trucks in addition to the amount of the trucks plus
12 per cent per annum is unconscionable and exceeds the rate fixed by
law. The penalty agreed upon does not include the interest, and which
may be demanded separetely and the penalty is not to be added to the
interest for the determination of whether the interest exceeds the rate
fixed by the law, since said rate was fixed only for the interest.
ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
CFI, G.R. NO. L-41093, October 30, 1978
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages and nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of
loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or
invaded.
5. RECIPROCAL OBLIGATION
GOLDEN VALLEY EXPLORATION, INC. vs. PINKIAN MINING COMPANY
and COPPER VALLEY, INC., G.R. No. 190080, June 11, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe
142
Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation
under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents failure to
increase the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will
accommodate their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to
perform their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of
the other party to perform the obligation renders the other party to
demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the rescission of the
contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement.
AGCAOILI vs. GSIS, G.R. NO. L-30056, August 30, 1988
OLONGAPO CITY vs. SUBIC WATER AND SEWERAGE CO., INC., G.R. No.
171626, August 6, 2014, J. Brion
Solidary liability must be expressly stated. In the present case, the joint
and several liability of Subic Water and OCWD was nowhere clear in
the agreement. The agreement simply and plainly stated that
Olongapo City and OCWD were only requesting Subic Water to be a comaker, in view of its assumption of OCWDs water operations. Under
these circumstances, Olongapo City cannot proceed after Subic Water
for OCWDs unpaid obligations. The law explicitly states that solidary
liability is not presumed and must be expressly provided for. Not being
a surety, Subic Water is not an insurer of OCWDs obligations under the
compromise agreement.
ESTANISLAO AND AFRICA SINAMBAN VS. CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION G.R. No. 193890. March 11, 2015, J. REYES
A co-maker of a promissory note who binds himself with the maker
jointly and severally renders himself directly and primarily liable with
the maker on the debt, without reference to his solvency.
INIMACO vs. NLRC, G.R. NO. 101723, May 11, 2000
144
PNB assails the order of dismissal of the lower court dismissing its
complaint against several solidary debtors on the gr.ound that one of the
defendants died during the pendency of the case and therefore the
complaint, being a money claim based on contract, should be prosecuted
in the testate or intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection and in case of the
death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor may, if he so chooses,
proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing
a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
JOINT OBLIGATIONS
TOPIC: JOINT and SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS
RONQUILLO vs.CA, G.R. NO. L-55138September 28, 1984
145
Philtranco Bus has been held solidarily liable with its bus driver, Calang,
when Calang accidentally collided with a jeepney killing a bystander and
two jeepney passengers while other passengers were seriously injured.
Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, Philtranco
cannot be held jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasidelict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code which pertain to
the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee
has committed.
IX. EXTINGUISHMENT OF OBLIGATIONS
MODES OF EXTINGUISHING OBLIGATIONS
SAURA IMPORT and EXPORT CO., INC. vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. L-24968
April 27, 1972
RFC turned down the request of Saura, Inc. for an additional loan which
prompted Saura, Inc. to ask that the mortgage be cancelled, which was
done. The action thus taken by both parties was in the nature mutual
desistance what Manresa terms "mutuo disenso" which is a mode of
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147
Under Article 1256, the only instances where prior tender of payment
is excused are: (1) when the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not
appear at the place of payment; (2) when the creditor is incapacitated
to receive the payment at the time it is due; (3) when, without just
cause, the creditor refuses to give a receipt; (4) when two or more
persons claim the same right to collect; and (5) when the title of the
obligation has been lost. None of these instances are present in the
instant case. Hence, the fact that the subject lots are in danger of
being foreclosed does not excuse petitioner and her co-heirs from
tendering payment to respondents, as directed by the court.
LEONARDO BOGNOT vs. RRI LENDING CORPORATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, DARIO J.
BERNARDEZ, G.R. No. 180144, September 24, 2014, J. Brion
Novation: In order to give novation legal effect, the creditor should
consent to the substitution of a new debtor. Novation must be clearly
and unequivocally shown, and cannot be presumed.
RODRIGO RIVERA VS. SPOUSES SALVADOR C. CHUA AND
VIOLETA S. CHUA/ SPOUSES SALVADOR C. CHUA AND VIOLETA
S. CHUA VS. RODRIGO RIVERA, G.R. Nos. 184458/184472.
January 14, 2015, J. Perez
There are four instances when demand is not necessary to constitute
the debtor in default: (1) when there is an express stipulation to that
effect; (2) where the law so provides; (3) when the period is the
controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the
obligation; and (4) where demand would be useless. In the first two
paragraphs, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for
performance; it must further state expressly that after the period
lapses, default will commence. Based on a promissory note the parties
evidently agreed that the maturity of the obligation at a date certain,
31 December 1995. Until 31 December 1995, demand was not
necessary before Rivera could be held liable for the principal amount
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made in the receipt of the discrepancy and, on the contrary, the payment
was acknowledged "as per contract". When the obligee accepts the
performance, knowing its incompleteness or irregularity, and without
expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed fully
complied with.
J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Javier, NO. L-28569, February 27, 1970
Apart from the initial installment of P396.12, paid upon the execution of
the contract, the defendant religiously satisfied the monthly installments
accruing thereafter, for a period of almost eight (8) years and although
the principal obligation under the contract was P3,691.20, the total
payments made by the defendant
including stipulated interest,
aggregated P4,134.08.
If the obligation has been substantially performed in good faith, the
obligor may recover as though there had been a strict and complete
fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.
ART 1240
TO WHOM PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE
SPOUSES MINIAN0 vs. CONCEPCION, G.R. 172825, October 11,
2012
Admittedly, payment of the remaining balance of P200,000.00 was not
made to the creditors themselves, but rather, it was allegedly made to a
certain Losloso who was the authorized agent of petitioners.
Respondents obligation consists of payment of a sum of money, and in
general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation,
must be made to the proper person, thus, payment must be made to the
obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to
receive the particular payment. Payment made to one having apparent
authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual
authority had been given for its receipt. If payment is made to one who by
law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work as a discharge.
ARANAS vs. TUTAAN, 127 SCRA 828
151
All dividends accruing to the said shares after the rendition of judgment
belonged to Aranas but UTEX paid the co-defendants despite its
knowledge and understanding of the final judgment. It is elementary
that payment made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot
extinguish the obligation of such debtor to its creditor.
PAYMENT NOT IN PHIL CURRENCY
HYDRO RESOURCES vs. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,
G.R. NO. 160215, November 10, 2004
The contract between NIA and Hydro is an internationally tendered
contract considering that it was funded by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). As a contract funded by an
international organization, particularly one recognized by the
Philippines,3 the contract is exempt from the provisions of R.A. No. 529,
as amended by. R.A. No. 4100 (Act To Assure Uniform Value to Philippine
Coin And Currency).
PONCE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-49494
May 31, 1979
The promissory note in question provided on its face for payment of the
obligation in Philippine currency, but the aG.R.eement between the
parties originally involved a dollar transaction.
If there is any agreement to pay an obligation in a currency other than
Philippine legal tender, the same is null and void as contrary to public
policy, pursuant to Republic Act No. 529, and the most that could be
demanded is to pay said obligation in Philippine currency, hence, a
creditor herein cannot oblige the debtor to pay him in dollars, even if the
loan were given in said currency.
KALALO vs. LUZ, G.R. NO. L-27782, July 31, 1970
Appellant claims that lower court erred in declaring and holding that the
balance owing from defendant-appellant to plaintiff-appellee on the IRRI
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Project should be paid on the basis of the rate of exchange of the U.S.
dollar to the Philippine peso at the time of payment of judgment. Even if
the obligation assumed by the defendant was to pay the plaintiff a sum of
money expressed in American currency, the indemnity to be allowed
should be expressed in Philippine currency at the rate of exchange at the
time of judgment rather than at the rate of exchange prevailing on the
date of defendant's breach.
LEGAL TENDER
TIBAJIA vs. CA, G.R. NO. 100290, June 4, 1993
Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and
their acceptance in the payment of debts, both public and private, is at
the option of the creditor.
ROMAN CATHOLIC vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO.
72110. November 16, 1990.
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not
money, the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as
payment. A check, whether a managers check or ordinary check, is not
legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid
tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor.
PAPA vs. VALENCIA, G.R. NO. 105188, January 23, 1998
Petitioner received the payment partly in cash and partly in check but
was not able to encash the check, and now questions the said payment
after 10 years. Respondents, on the other hand, want the petitioner to
deliver to them the owners duplicate of the title and the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the lot in question.
The geneal rule is delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only
when it is cashed, pursuant to Art. 1249 of the Civil Code. The rule does
not apply, however, if
the debtor is prejudiced by the creditors
unreasonable delay in the presentment of the check. Acceptance of a
check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for
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consignation which is the act of depositing the thing due with the court
or judicial authorities but it generally requires a prior tender of payment.
ART 1259
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
155
156
157
In opposing the money claim, Respondent alleged that the surety bonds
and the indemnity agreements had been extinguished by the execution of
the deed of assignment, because this amounted to dation in payment
whereby the former is considered to have alienated his property in favor
of the latter in satisfaction of a monetary debt (Artide 1245).
The
transaction could not be dation in payment because the deed of
assignment was executed on December 4, 1959, the obligation of the
assignor to refund the assignee had not yet arisen, hence, there was no
obligation yet on the part of the petitioner.
D. COMPENSATION
FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTIONS CORPORATION AND BLUE STAR
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. BAHANIHAN AUTOMOTIVE
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 164985, January 15, 2014, J. Bersamin
A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are determined.
Accordingly, an unliquidated claim set up as a counterclaim by a
defendant can be set off against the plaintiffs claim from the moment
it is liquidated by judgment. Article 1290 of the Civil Code provides that
when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 of the Civil Code are
present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and
extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount. With petitioners
expenses for the repair of the dump truck being already established
and determined with certainty by the lower courts, it follows that legal
compensation could take place because all the requirements were
present. The legal interest rate to be imposed from February 11,
1993,the time of the extrajudicial demand by respondent, should be
6% per annum in the absence of any stipulation in writing in
accordance with Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.191555, January 20, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe
Compensation is defined as a mode of extinguishing obligations
whereby two persons in their capacity as principals are mutual debtors
and creditors of each other with respect to equally liquidated and
demandable obligations to which no retention or controversy has been
timely commenced and communicated by third parties
In this case, Union Bank filed a motion to seek affirmation that legal
compensation had taken place in order to effectively offset (a) its own
158
SOLINAP vs. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. L-50638 July 25, 1983
160
The award for attorney's fees is made in favor of the litigant, not of his
counsel, hence, it is the litigant, not his counsel, who is the judgment
creditor and who may enforce the judgment by execution, such credit,
therefore, may properly be the subject of legal compensation.
ART 1278
PNB vs VDA. DE ONG ACERO, G.R. NO. L-69255, February 27, 1987
PNB's main thesis is that when it opened a savings account for ISABELA,
it (PNB) became indebted to ISABELA, so that when ISABELA itself
subsequently came to be indebted to it on account of ISABELA's breach
of the terms of the Credit Agreement, ISABELA and PNB became at the
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165
166
Rescission under Article 1191 takes place through either of two modes:
(1) through an extrajudicial declaration of rescission; or (2) upon the
grant of a judicial decree of rescission.
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The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either
case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfilment,
if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just
cause authorizing the fixing of a period. This is understood to be
without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the
thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage
Law.
The cause of action supplied by the above article, however, is clearly
predicated upon the reciprocity of the obligations of the injured party
and the guilty party. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from
the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of
the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the
obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such
that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous
fulfillment of the other. When Nuguid failed to deliver the agreed
amount to Chiok, the latter had a cause of action against Nuguid to ask
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for the rescission of their contract. On the other hand, Chiok did not
have a cause of action against Metrobank and Global Bank that would
allow him to rescind the contracts of sale of the managers or cashiers
checks, which would have resulted in the crediting of the amounts
thereof back to his accounts.
THE WELLEX GROUP, INC. vs. U-LAND AIRLINES, CO., LTD., G.R.
No. 167519. January 14, 2015, J. Leonen
Wellex and U-Land bound themselves to negotiate with each other
within a 40-day period to enter into a share purchase agreement. If no
share purchase agreement was entered into, both parties would be
freed from their respective undertakings. For Article 1191 to be
applicable, however, there must be reciprocal prestations as
distinguished from mutual obligations between or among the parties. A
prestation is the object of an obligation, and it is the conduct required
by the parties to do or not to do, or to give. Parties may be mutually
obligated to each other, but the prestations of these obligations are not
necessarily reciprocal. The reciprocal prestations must necessarily
emanate from the same cause that gave rise to the existence of the
contract. U-Land correctly sought the principal relief of rescission or
resolution under Article 1191. The obligations of the parties gave rise
to reciprocal prestations, which arose from the same cause: the desire
of both parties to enter into a share purchase agreement that would
allow both parties to expand their respective airline operations in the
Philippines and other neighboring countries.
SWIRE REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. JAYNE YU.
G.R. No. 207133. March 9, 2015, J. PERALTA
Based on the ocular inspection conducted on the subject condominium
project and subject unit shows that the amenities under the approved
plan have not yet been provided as of May 3, 2002, and that the
subject unit has not been delivered to respondent as of August 28,
2002, which is beyond the period of development of December 1999
under the license to sell. Incontrovertibly, petitioner had incurred delay
in the performance of its obligation amounting to breach of contract as
it failed to finish and deliver the unit to respondent within the
stipulated period. The delay in the completion of the project as well as
of the delay in the delivery of the unit are breaches of statutory and
contractual obligations which entitle respondent to rescind the contract
under Article 1191, demand a refund and payment of damages.
UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. CA, G.R. NO. L-29155, May
13, 1970
169
In the present case, the failure of respondents to pay the balance of the
purchase price within ten years from the execution of the Deed did not
amount to a substantial breach. Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
the right to rescind an obligation is predicated on the violation of the
reciprocity between parties, brought about by a breach of faith by one of
them however, rescission is allowed only where the breach is substantial
and fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation.
PALAY vs. CLAVE , G.R. NO. L-56076 September 21, 1983
170
CARTON
The CA added that even assuming that the agreement was for
respondent to deliver the boxes, respondent would not be liable for
breach of contract as petitioner had not yet demanded from it the
delivery of the boxes. Without a previous demand for the fulfillment of
the obligation, petitioner would not have a cause of action for rescission
against respondent as the latter would not yet be considered in breach of
its contractual obligation, since the right to rescind a contract arises
once the other party defaults in the performance of his obligation.
OSMEA III vs SSS, September 13, 2007
171
resolutions, all have a common subject: the Shares the 187.84 Million
EPCIB common shares, which, as a necessary consequence of the BDOEPCIB merger which saw EPCIB being absorbed by the surviving BDO,
have been transferred to BDO and converted into BDO common shares
under the exchange ratio set forth in the BDO-EPCIB Plan of Merger. As
thus converted, the subject Shares are no longer equity security
issuances of the now defunct EPCIB, but those of BDO-EPCI, which,
needless to stress, is a totally separate and distinct entity from what
used to be EPCIB.
Under the law on obligations and contracts, the obligation to give a
determinate thing is extinguished if the object is lost without the fault of
the debtor, and per Art. 1192 (2) of the Civil Code, a thing is considered
lost when it perishes or disappears in such a way that it cannot be
recovered.
VILLAMAR vs. MANGAOIL, G.R. NO. 188661 : April 11, 2012
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SPOUSES VICTOR AND EDNA BINUA vs. LUCIA P. ONG, G.R. No.
207176, June 18, 2014, J. Reyes
Article 1390(2) of the Civil Code provides that contracts where the
consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence
or fraud are voidable or annullable.
Intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the
following requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation must be the
determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to
be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the
threat be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion
between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to
the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a
reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from
whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the
threatened injury.
Based on the petitioners own allegations, what the respondent did was
merely inform them of petitioner Ednas conviction in the criminal
cases for estafa. It might have evoked a sense of fear or dread on the
petitioners part, but certainly there is nothing unjust, unlawful or evil
in the respondent's act. The petitioners also failed to show how such
information was used by the respondent in coercing them into signing
the mortgages.
SC affirmed the finding of the CA that if the judgment of conviction is
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the only basis of the [petitioners] in saying that their consents were
vitiated, such will not suffice to nullify the real estate mortgages and
the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. No proof was
adduced to show that [the respondent] used [force], duress, or threat
to make [petitioner] Victor execute the real estate mortgages.
Also, the threat to prosecute for estafa not being an unjust act, but
rather a valid and legal act to enforce a claim, cannot at all be
considered as intimidation.
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Pending resolution of the case, both parties freely and voluntarily entered
into an agreement for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this
case. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent,
however, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the
parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the
court and reduced to a judgment.
LAGUNZAD vs. VDA. DE GONZALES, G.R. NO. L-32066 August 6,
1979
Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the
Agreement because of private respondent's demand, for payment for the
"exploitation" of the life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call
a press conference declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a
hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television
and that they were going to Court to stop the picture." It is necessary to
distinguish between real duress and the motive which is present when
one gives his consent reluctantly because a contract is valid even though
one of the parties entered into it against his own wish and desires, or
even against his better judgment.
The defendants admitted the principal obligation but claimed that the
additional amount constituted usurious interest. Under Article 1354 of
the Civil Code, the agreement of the parties relative to the additional
amount is presumed to exist and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the
contrary. Since no evidentiary hearing had been held, the defendants
therefore had not proven that the obligation was illegal.
C. CONSIDERATION
ART. 1354
PENTACAPITAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. MAHINAY, G.R. NO.
171736, July 5, 2010
Petitioner Lao Sok promised to give his employees their separation pay,
as soon as he receives the insurance proceeds for his burned building,
but contends that the contract was orally made hence unenforceable
since it does not comply with the Statute of Frauds. Contracts in
whatever form they may have been entered into are binding on the
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parties unless form is essential for the validity and enforceability of that
particular contract.
ART 1356
GALLARDO vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
G.R. NO. L-67742 October 29, 1987
The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale can be
considered as a valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of
sale of a parcel of land registerd under the Torrens System.
The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are
obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present, except when the law so
requires requiring a contract to be in some form for validity or
enforceability.
IV. STAGES , PERFECTION
Bugatti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138113. October 17, 2000
A contract undergoes three distinct stages preparation or negotiation,
its perfection, and finally, its consummation. Negotiation begins from the
time the prospective contracting parties manifest their interest in the
contract and ends at the moment of agreement of the parties. The
perfection or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree
upon the essential elements of the contract. The last stage is the
consummation of the contract wherein the parties fulfill or perform the
terms agreed upon in the contract, culminating in the extinguishment
thereof.
ART 1315 , 1319
TONG BROTHERS CO., vs. IAC, G.R. NO. 73918 December 21, 1987
From the exchange of telegrams between the two parties, there was not
yet a meeting of the minds as to the cause of the contract. The cause of a
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contract has been defined "as the essential reason which moves the
contracting parties to enter into it (8 Manresa, 5th Edition, p. 450). In
other words, the cause is the immediate, direct and proximate reason
which justifies the creation of an obligation thru the will of the
contracting parties (3 Castan, 4th Edition, p. 347)." (General Enterprises,
Inc. v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., 11 SCRA 733, 739). For the private
respondent, the cause of the contract was the repair of its vessel
Zamboanga-J while for the petitioner the cause would be its commitment
to repair the vessel and make it seaworthy. The telegrams dated January
17, January 20, and January 28, 1975 sent by the petitioner to the
private respondent, however, indicate that the former had not accepted
the repair of Zamboanga-J, the reason being that the extent of the repair
to be made necessitated a major expense so that the petitioner insisted
on the presence of the private respondent for evaluation before it
accepted the repair of the wooden vessel. That the petitioner had not yet
consented to the contract is evident when on January 28, 1975, it sent a
telegram stating: "... NO AGREEMENT AS TO THE EX TENT OF REPAIRS
AND PAYMENT WILL UNDOCK VESSEL." The fact that the private
respondent who received this telegram ignored it, confirms that there
was no perfected contract to repair Zamboanga-J.
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration,
the promisor is not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw
it, and pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes,
however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a
perfected contract of sale.
V. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
CITIZENS SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-48958 June 28, 1988
It is a basic and fundamental rule in the interpretation of contract that if
the terms thereof are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulations shall
control but when the words appear contrary to the evident intention of
the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former and in order to judge
185
ART 1410
TONGOY vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L45645 June 28, 1983
The issue in this case is whether or not the rights of herein respondents
over subject properties, which were the subjects of simulated or fictitious
187
188
Respondent, through fraudulent means was able to transfer the lot from
his parents to himself without consideration or cause through a
purported deed of The IAC held that the action had already prescribed
because an action to annul a contract based on fraud prescribes in four
years. The SC, however, held that the alleged contract of sale is vitiated
by the total absence of a valid cause or consideration which is an
indispensable requisite for the existence of a valid contract. Thus, Article
1410 of the Civil Code provides that '(T)he action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION vs. LUI SHE, G.R. NO. L17587, September 12, 1967
The illicit purpose becomes the illegal causa rendering the contracts
void.
TEJA MARKETING vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-65510 March 9, 1987
The vendor Eligio, Sr. entered into an agreement with petitioner, but that
the formers capacity to consent was vitiated by senile dementia. Insane
189
Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals
ruled that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia
are considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property
by their mother.
Ratification means that one under no disability
voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or
defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on
him , hence, an alleged silence and inaction may not be interpreted as an
act of ratification on their part.
C. UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE vs. HEIRS of BERNARDINO
TAEZA, G.R. No. 179597, February 3, 2014, J. Peralta
Unenforceable contracts are those which cannot be enforced by a
proper action in court, unless they are ratified, because either they are
entered into without or in excess of authority or they do not comply
with the statute of frauds or both of the contracting parties do not
possess the required legal capacity. In the present case, however,
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Bernardino Taeza, had already
obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name over the property in
question. Since the person supposedly transferring ownership was not
authorized to do so, the property had evidently been acquired by
mistake. This case clearly falls under the category of unenforceable
contracts mentioned in Article 1403, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code,
which provides, thus: (1) Those entered into in the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers.
YUVIENCO vs. DACUYCUY, G.R. NO. L-55048 May 27, 1981
190
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Atty. Adolfo Amor was entrusted,
as receiver, with the administration of BISTRANCO and it business, but
the act of entering into a contract is one which requires the authorization
of the court which appointed him receiver. The questioned contracts can
rightfully be classified as unenforceable for having been entered into by
one who had acted beyond his powers, due to Receiver Amor's failure to
secure the court's approval of said Contracts.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
AINZA vs. SPOUSES PADUA, G.R. NO. 165420, June 30, 2005
191
Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold the subject property to Antonita, the
purchase price payable on installment basis, thus, Gabriel Sr. appeared
to have been a recipient of some partial payments but after his death, his
son questions the verbal sale contract between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita,
and alleged that the contract is unenforceable for non-compliance with
the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a
contract for the sale of real property or of an interest therein shall be
unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in
writing and subscribed by the party or his agent. Where the verbal
contract of sale, however, has been partially executed through the partial
payments made by one party duly received by the vendor, as in the
present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of the Statute.
HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-41132 April 27,
1988
Both courts were of the view essentially that the evidence did not bear
out the claim of fraud; that under the Statute of Frauds, the parties'
covenant as to their properties' metes and bounds was unenforceable
since it was not reduced to writing. Not every agreement "affecting land"
must be put in writing to attain enforceability, under the Statute of
Frauds, Article 1403(2) (e) of the Civil Code, such formality is only
required of contracts involving leases for longer than one year, or for the
sale of real property or of an interest therein.
D. RESCISSIBLE CONTRACTS
CABALIW vs. SADORRA, G.R. NO. L-25650 June 11, 1975
192
fraud of creditors, and the decision or attachment need not refer to the
property alienated and need not have been obtained by the party seeking
rescission.
AIR FRANCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 104234
June 30, 1995
193
ART 1306
WILLIAM GOLANGCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 142830
March 24, 2006
The provision in the construction contract providing for defects liability
period was not shown as contrary to law, morals, good customs, pubic
order or public policy, and by the nature of the obligation in such
contract, the provision limiting liability for defects and fixing specific
guaranty periods was not only fair and equitable but was also necessary.
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R. NO. 163512 February 28,
2007
It is admitted by both parties that the phrase "they shall not sell to
others these three lots but only to the seller Vicente Santiago or to his
heirs or successors" is an express prohibition against the sale of the lots
described in the "Compraventa" to third persons or strangers to the
contract. Parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
DEL CASTILLO Vda. DE MISTICA vs. SPOUSES NAGUIAT, G.R. NO.
137909. December 11, 2003
In the Kasulatan, it was stipulated that payment could be made even
after ten years from the execution of the Contract, provided the vendee
194
paid percent interest. The stipulations of the contract constitute the law
between the parties; thus, courts have no alternative but to enforce them
as aG.R.eed upon and written.
MARIMPERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-40234 December
14, 1987
A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and when there is
nothing in it which is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
policy or public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained.
ART 1159
OCCENA vs. HON. JABSON, G.R. NO. L-44349, October 29, 1976
Respondent's complaint seeks that the court "render judgment modifying
the terms and Conditions of the Contract by fixing the proper shares that
should pertain to the herein parties out of the gross proceeds from the
sales of subdivided lots of subject subdivision", citing ART 1267 of the
New Civil Code. The cited article does not grant the courts this authority
to remake, modify or revise the contract between the parties as
contractually stipulated with the force of law between the parties, so as
to substitute its own terms for those covenanted by the parties
themselves.
CABAHUG vs NAPOCOR, G.R. NO. 186069, January 30, 2013
195
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS vs. NAVARRO, G.R. NO. L-46591, July 28,
1987
Escalation clauses to be valid should specifically provide: (1) that there
can be an increase in interest if increased by law or by the Monetary
Board; and (2) in order for such stipulation to be valid, it must include a
provision for reduction of the stipulated interest "in the event that the
applicable maximum rate of interest is reduced by law or by the
Monetary Board" in order to be valid which is known as deescalation
clause.
SPOUSES FLORENDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101771
December 17, 1996
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law
between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based
on their essential equality, hence, a contract containing a condition
which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled
will of one of the contracting parties, is void.
ART 1308
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SPOUSES AGUSTIN, G.R. NO.
164549
September 18, 2009
The spouses Rocamora posit that their loan would not have bloated to
more than double the original amount if PNB had not increased the
interest rates and had it immediately foreclosed the mortgages. Any
increase in the rate of interest made pursuant to an escalation clause
must not be left solely to the will of one of the parties, but must be the
result of a mutual agreement between the parties, hence, a de-escalation
clause that would authorize a reduction in the interest rates
corresponding to downward changes made by law or by the Monetary
Board must be included, otherwise, the change carries no binding effect.
4. RELATIVITY , PRIVITY OF CONTRACTS
196
Being an heir there is privity of interest between the heir and the
deceased, hence, heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising
therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3)
provision of law.
METROPOLITAN BANK vs. REYNADO, G.R. NO. 164538, August 9,
2010
197
There was no express contract between the parties for the payment of
attorney's fees, but the respondent rendered legal services to petitioner.
The payment of attorney's fees to respondent may be justified by virtue of
the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based
on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another" and under Article 1307 such contracts shall be regulated by
the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of
obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous
nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people.
B. DIVISIBLE CONTRACTS
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, ET AL., G.R. NO. L-23559, October 4, 1971
198
It is the position of the petitioner that because Lee See Guat was illiterate
and spoke only Chinese, she could not be held guilty of concealment of
her health history because the applications for insurance were in English
and the insurer has not proved that the terms thereof had been fully
explained to her. The obligation to show that the terms of the contract
had been fully explained to the party who is unable to read or
understand the language of the contract, when fraud or mistake is
alleged, devolves on the party seeking to enforce it.
BUENAVENTURA ANGELES, ET AL. vs. URSULA TORRES CALASANZ,
ET AL., G.R. NO. L-42283
March 18, 1985
The plaintiffs-appellees, eager to acquire a lot upon which they could
build a home, affixed their signatures and assented to the terms and
conditions of the contract and they had no opportunity to question nor
change any of the terms of the agreement since it was offered to them on
a "take it or leave it" basis. Such contracts are called contracts of
adhesion, because the only participation of the party is the signing of his
signature or his "adhesion" thereto hence must be construed against the
party causing it.
IX.
BONIFACIO BROS., INC., ET AL., vs. MORA, ET AL., G.R. NO. L20853
May 29, 1967
The appellants seek to recover the insurance proceeds, relying upon the
insurance contract executed by and between the State Bonding &
Insurance Company, Inc. and Mora. Contracts take effect only between
the parties thereto, except where the contract contains some
stipulations, known as stipulations por atrui, in favor of a third person,
who is allowed to avail himself of a benefit granted to him by the terms of
the contract, provided that the contracting parties have clearly and
deliberately conferred a favor upon such person, however such third
person not a party to the contract has no action zagainst the parties
thereto, and cannot generally demand the enforcement of the same, if he
did not communicate his acceptance thereto to the obligor before the
revocation.
FLORENTINO vs. ENCARNACION, SR., G.R. NO. L-27696 September
30, 1977
To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and
intent of the stipulating parties to benefit the third. It is not sufficient
that the third person may be incidentally benefited by the stipulation.
G.R. NO. 120554 September 21, 1999
SO PING BUN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise
at the expense of respondent corporation. Although petitioner took
interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it,
nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party, lack of malice, however,
precludes damages.
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