Submission Statement

Paper Title: Lockean Limits: Knowledge of Essences and Internal Constitution

Abstract: John Locke explores the limits of human knowledge throughout his storied
career. Many commentators have waded through his work, and attempted to shed light on
what exact limits Locke imagined when it comes to our epistemological aims. This paper
is an attempt to articulate the limits of knowledge by way of internal constitution. I will
argue that internal constitution and real essence differ in Lockes writing, and that the
former is within the scope of potential human knowledge whereas the latter is not
knowable as such. I will explore secondary literature concerning linguistic evidence for
this position, and then provide a glimpse at the possible means by which internal
constitution might be known.
Autobiographical Statement: Connor McCarthy is pursuing a Bachelors of Arts Degree in
Philosophy at Georgetown University. He expects to graduate in 2016, and his
philosophical interests vary but he has a particular interest in methods for tracing
epistemic limits, phenomenology, and role specific morality.

John Lockes An Essay Concerning Human Understanding1 provides a look at his account of the structure
of reality and the potential inroads as well as limits of knowledge related to the structure of things.
Exploring his work illuminates the potential for contentious debate on the possibility of knowing the real
essence of anything within the universe. This question alone seems to split the community at large on the
basis of what exactly Locke intends to signify when writing of real essence.2 I aim to survey the accounts
of the difference, or lack thereof, between real essence and internal constitution, and provide a case for
understanding internal constitution as within the scope of potential human knowledge and real essence as
something that cannot be known as such. This argument coupled with Lockes work on knowledge and
limitation provide for the accommodation of scientific progress within John Lockes system.
This survey requires a look at what existing philosophers have to say about essence itself. Much
of Locke scholarship, at least for a significant time, accepted a basic account of real and nominal essence:
nominal essence referring to an abstraction within the realm of ideas, and real essence referring to a thing
that causes a thing x to be x. I will revisit what I will call the standard view of Lockes essence after
presenting the view I find to be most consistent with Lockes writing and intent. Let me make my overall
goal clear before attempting to illuminate my account of the essences and internal constitution: internal
constitution and real essence arent wholly equivalent, and the point of distinguishability affords an
important route to knowledge. That point of distinguishability exists because of Lockes work on the
limitations of knowledge, and thus will be discussed later on in the paper when I delve into Lockes theory
of knowledge. The following work leads to my eventual argument: internal constitution lends us the ability
to more clearly and powerfully understand and articulate our findings and observations of the world while
real essence is the underlying force that serves to explain why something is, and actually causes things to
be as such. First, nominal essence speaks to the sort of thing X3 is. For example, the essence of anything
human speaks to the essence of the species human. This view is extensively espoused by Locke when he

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in Modern Philosophy: An Animation of

Primary Sources, eds. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 2009), 317-421.
2
Jean-Michel Vienne argues for a distinction between real essence as written and internal constitution
in Locke on Real Essence and Internal Constitution.
3
I use the variable X here to signify a thing that is the object of observation to enable myself to speak
generally of a thing.

writes about essence: That essence, in the ordinary use of the word4, relates to sortsand that it is
considered in particular beings no further than as they are ranked into sortsappears from hence: that, take
but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and then
the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes; we have no notion of the one without
the other; which shows their relation.5 This emphasis isnt without reasonreal essence is meant to speak
to something that causes a certain set of qualities to consistently be manifested within similar objects to a
degree sufficient for classification as the same type of thing or object. This point is made to illuminate what
nominal essence chiefly is not on this account: that which causes particular things to be particular in
whatever ways that make them the particular things that they are. This idea of real essence as something
that causes things to be the things they are is only true on the account of real essence. This discussion
provides a potential route to another reason why a question of human knowledge concerning the
fundamental reality of a thing cannot be directed at its real essence in its true sense. There are many ways
to understand what Locke is working towards when he writes of real essence, nominal essence, and internal
constitution. For example, there is potential reason to believe that real essence and internal constitution
could be species of each other. By this, I mean that the two are entirely distinct, but still different in some
regard. This too provides many points of departure for Locke scholars, as there is more than one way for
real essence and internal constitution to be different: they could be different insofar as the epistemic
relations that we might have to each of them, they could be different in the way that they relate to nominal
essence, and they could be completely different things. Susan Goodin6 explains just how tying their
meaning to nominal essence might work: the internal constitution that underlies the nominally essential
properties, whereas the [true] internal constitution of a substance is simply its physical make-up,
independently of considerations of its nominal essence.7 Jean-Michel Viennes work bridges Goodins
interpretation of the distinction between real essence and internal constitution in Lockes Essay8: But there

By ordinary, I am referring to the period specific understanding of the word which took its meaning
from Aristotles work on essence.
5
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 382.
6
Goodin, Susanna, Why knowledge of the internal constitution is not the same as knowledge of the real
essence and why this matters, Southwest Philosophy Review, 14(1), 1998, 149155.
7
Jones, Jan-Erik, "Locke on Real Essence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition),
ed. Edward N. Zalta .
8
I will refer to Lockes An Essay Concerning Human Understanding as Essay throughout the body of my
paper in an effort to keep the work concise and more easily readable.

are the following important differences between the two notions: real essence is supposed (intended),
whereas internal constitution is an undoubted hypothesis.9 Internal constitution is the only suitable goal of
human knowledge if we are to accept the tenets of Lockes theory of epistemology because it imposes
purposefully high thresholds for certain knowledge and rather tempered hopes for the future of human
knowledge throughout the Essay.10
Now, this view is in conflict with the standard interpretation because the standard interpretation
seems to conflate the meaning of internal constitution and real essence, finding real essence to be within the
realm of possible knowledge. This standard view is still very popular. In fact, the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Stanford characterized nominal and real essences in a manner consistent with this view: a real
essenceis what makes something what it is, and in the case of physical substances, it is the underlying
physical cause of the object's observable qualitiesA nominal essence, on the other hand, is an abstract
idea that we make when we identify similar qualities shared by objects.11 This account of Lockean
essences is fairly straightforward, and doesnt seem to be readily problematic or flawed upon first glance.
In fact, a survey of relevant Locke texts seem to confirm this view as factually accurate and relevant: the
real constitution of anything, which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in, and are
constantly found to coexist with the nominal essencethat particular constitution which everything has
within itself, without any relation to anything without it.12 However, this view seems problematic per two
nuanced, albeit significant considerations: context of Lockes use of terms in relation to their meaning at
his time and his specific intention, and the use of a problematic dichotomy between real or nominal essence
when speaking of how things can be used in understanding objects. The first of which is a mere error of our
place in time: failure to contextualize the language Locke uses within his Essay. This misstep is largely due
to Lockes use of the word essence. Locke almost always attempted to decide questions of discursive
framing based on the connotations and meanings popular amongst readers (Vienne even goes as far as to
call this Lockes precept and practice).13 Thus, modern readers often read subtle Aristotelian notions of
essence or other modern understandings of essence into the text when Locke himself doesnt intend them.

Vienne, Jean-Michel, Locke on Real Essence and Internal Constitution, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, New Series, Vol. 93 (1993), 151.
10
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 393.
11
Jones, "Locke on Real Essence", 4.4.
12
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 383.
13
Vienne, Jean-Michel, Locke on Real Essence and Internal Constitution, 143.

This point is rather non-contentious as this rule is explicitly applied to essence,14 as Locke uses common
language in his writings, opting to connect the correct notions to the common dicta rather than subvert
common writing practices. The second failure is considering Lockes view of the causal and epistemic
implications of observation and interaction with things to be strictly defined as either getting at real or
nominal essence. This dichotomy fails to address internal constitution, and this failure isnt easily done
away with. Internal constitution is what our current definitions of real essence, like those presented above
by Jones in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, seem to be attempting to access. Readers might
wonder why such a strong objection should be leveled at what seems to be mere semantic hair-splitting,
privileging a word to serve as a linguistic marker for the same concept (what will be internal constitution
within this paper), but the true meaning of terms is extremely important to the limits of human knowledge.
Lockes beliefs concerning human knowledge provide foundational elements for a limitation
thesis by way of a consistent insistence on skepticism concerning the fallibility of human knowledge. Two
types of limits on knowledge exist, essential limitations and contingent limitations. Essential limitations are
permanent and cannot be exceeded regardless of advances in means of acquisition of knowledge. The most
readily available example of an essential limit is knowledge of the nature of the soul, its immortality or
mortality. Locke examines this problem in great detail, and ultimately concludes, It is a point which seems
to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge. And he who will give himself leave to consider freely,
and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarcely find his reason able to determine
him fixedly for or against the souls materiality.15 Here, we see an essential limit, and Locke goes on to tie
certainty to limits: our very doubts about what it is confirm the certainty of its being, though we must
content ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is.16 The other type of limit is contingent,
meaning its an accident of history. The limit isnt permanent, and depends on technology and all other
means of increasing how deeply we can see into what we perceive. This limit can clarify the role of
certainty in knowledgecertainty is that which establishes and grounds knowledge. The distinction
between types of limits is the theoretical space needed to make my distinction between real essence and
internal constitution viable and useful. These considerations prompt a natural wonder of knowledge as

14

Vienne, Jean-Michel, Locke on Real Essence and Internal Constitution, 143.

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 394.
16
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 394.
15

accounted for by Locke. We must establish what knowledge is and how it can be acquired on Lockes
account before considering if the internal constitution of some X can be included in the set of potential
human knowledge. Locke offers a definition and consistent characterizations of knowledge throughout
Book IV, Of Knowledge and Opinion: Knowledge is the perception of the agreement, or disagreement of
two ideas.17 Lockes work continues to describe knowledge and its potential limits, writing, Knowledge
then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and
repugnance, of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and
where it is not, there, though we may fancy a guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge.18
This leads to the four sorts of agreement or disagreement of idea: 1. Identity or diversity. 2. Relation. 3.
Coexistence or necessary connection. 4. Real existence,19 with 2 and 3 being relational. These sorts dont
mean that knowledge must necessarily be directly through one of the four sorts, the important exception
being intervening ideas, which serve to show the agreement of any two otherscalled proofs.20 A survey
of the sorts of knowledge should naturally be followed then by the degrees of knowledge possible within
Lockes system. He divides degrees of knowledge between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge,
defining them respectively as the knowledge in which we find agreement of ideas immediately and
perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas by the mind but not in an immediate fashion.21
Intuitive knowledge provides a stronger claim to knowledge by way of immediate realization and certainty
of its agreement or disagreement, so much so that Locke argues intuition is necessary in all the
connections of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty22 with
those intermediate steps being a part of demonstrative knowledge. Further, Locke lays out certain
conditions surrounding the nature of demonstrative knowledge that are pertinent to a discussion of real
constitution. The following conditions are established and developed by Locke in the text:
1.

Doubt differentiates the two types of knowledge: doubt always precedes demonstrative
knowledge but doesnt precede intuitive knowledge.

17

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 386.

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 386.
19
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 386.
20
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 390.
21
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter II, 1-2, 389-390.
22
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 389.
18

2.

Demonstrative knowledge is less clear than intuitive knowledge per its refraction through
intermediaries, even though each intermediate must be intuitive knowledge.

3.

Demonstration isnt limited to mathematics.

4.

The clearness of our perception of agreement between ideas (not ideas themselves) is what
grants us clear knowledge.23

These principles form Lockes theory of knowledge and knowledge acquisition.

With this idea of Lockes epistemological outlook in mind, we can now ask if the real constitution
of things can be within the set of knowledge of humans (currently or in the future). Locke acknowledges
that current limits of knowledge are malleable, at least insofar as what humanity had learned at the point of
his reading: I do not question but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings
and constitutions, may be carried much further than it has been up to now, if men would sincerely and with
freedom of mind employ all that industry and labor of thought in improving the means of discovering
truth.24 This concession grants humans the ability to make advancements in our ability to improve our
access to ideas, perception of those ideas, and thus knowledge. If something isnt known at the time of
Lockes writing, he might still believe it to be possible to know for future generationsa limit contingent
on our knowledge. The question this paper aims to resolve then is a valid one: is internal constitution
something that Locke would consider within the possible realm of knowledge?
Internal constitution should be considered within the realms of possible knowledge for Locke
because he finds ideas to be in agreement by intuitive knowledge and demonstrative knowledge
(constituted by intermediate intuitive truths), and internal constitution is an undoubted hypothesis,25 as
previously established by Vienne. By undoubted hypothesis, I mean it is a theory that we can be certain
of just as we are certain of knowing that we cannot resolve the problem of immortality or mortality of a
soul. The hypothesis can be considered undoubted because of how we come about knowing it,
Our knowledge of internal constitution then is merely a matter of knowledge acquisition. The
26

example of that famous clock at Strasbourg used by Locke should shed some light on why

23

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter II, 5, 7, 9, 15, 391-392.
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 384.
25
Vienne, Jean-Michel, Locke on Real Essence and Internal Constitution, 151.
26
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 384.
24

internal constitution can be seen as such. Locke uses an example concerning two human figures
for the basis of comparing actual knowledge and apprehension of the thing qua thing (by this I
mean a thing as metaphysical entity independent of our epistemic relations to it), and mere
nominal knowledge of that thing (an idea of an idea, meaning many abstract things combined).
These two figures being the countryman and the clockmaker, granting nominal knowledge and
knowledge of internal constitution to these two figures respectively. Locke writes of the
countryman:
Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently (which is the end of
sorting) denominate them by their real essences, because we do not know them.
Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction of
substances than a collection of those sensible ideas which we observe in them
which, however made with the greatest diligence and exactness we are capable
of, yet is more remote from the true internal constitution from which those
qualities flow than, as I said, a countrymans idea is from the inward contrivance
of that famous clock at Strasbourg, of which he only sees the outward figure and
motions.
The passage provides two useful points of analysis for us: it provides an interesting example that
helps to suggest the distinction between real essence and internal constitution as postulated in the
beginning of this paper, and it shows the ways in which internal constitution is knowable but
requires something beyond a nominal relation to the idea of the thing qua thing. Knowing the
internal constitution of the clock tower is to know the structures that cause the clock tower to run
and be a clock tower. Within this example, the clockmaker knows the internal constitution of the
clock tower. This example seems to situate the clock tower as analogous to the physical world
and the clockmaker analogous to God, which would raise worries about placing knowledge of the
internal constitution outside of humanitys reach and solely within the category of divine
knowledge. Lockes text, and a closer reading of the analogy though can resolve the potential
problems presented here. First, being the true creator of something is clearly sufficient for
knowing somethings internal constitution, but it isnt necessary. The material structure of
something is within human reach because of the capacities of perception that we are naturally
endowed with. Lockes work serves to reinforce this point: The workmanship of the all-wise and

powerful God, in the great fabric of the universe, and every part of it, further exceeds the capacity
and comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent man than the best contrivance of the
most ingenious man does the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore,
we in vain pretend to range things into sorts and dispose them into certain classes, under names,
by their real essences, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension.27 Locke confirms
that it is the real essence, not the internal constitution, which is wholly relegated to divine
categories of knowledge. This survey of Locke reveals internal constitution, the material structure
that causes anything to be what it is, to be potentially within the ranks of human knowledge.
I will use the example of water to hopefully show that at least one instance of internal
constitution can be known. Our modern understanding of biochemistry can apprehend water as
H20, and if Locke were to have had access to these modern scientific tools, it is reasonable to
believe that he would find our ideas of water in agreement with their being the internal
constitution of water qua water. Again, let us be reminded that internal constitution is a
hypothesis that is without doubt per its truth. Waters behavior can be understood, explained,
prescribed, and predicted with certainty because of our understandings of the substructure of
water. We know why water moves as such, why water interacts with other things in the ways it
does, and we know why water becomes what we understand to be ice or steam. If all these things
are possible, the hypothesis for internal constitution seems to be certain. We have apprehended
waters internal constitution, namely what causes water to be water.
This conclusion runs up against a general tendency within Locke to be skeptical, but the
conclusion can be fairly construed outside of the general uncertainty about human knowledge.
The cause of waters being water is demonstrated in our perceiving of water, and the specificity
of the situation is reason enough to prefer this to general skepticism. Put another way, since its
causation is clearly perceived by interconnected truths, a general skepticism that doesnt contain a
warrant for rejecting or even doubting this specific claim of knowing internal constitution

27

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 384.

shouldnt cast doubt on the claim. Without general skepticism, a specific instance of knowing the
internal constitution of water seems to be demonstratively valid. There is a serious concern about
science as induction not meeting the conditions of constituting knowledge. However, science as a
form of induction doesnt roundly disqualify it as knowledge outright, nor does it make scientific
knowledge not worthwhile. Scientific progress is made on the premise that we are never done
with the process of knowledge; we can never have complete knowledge of everything unless we
are granted access to divine levels of knowledge. The objection to science is only troublesome if
one claims that science can grant us knowledge of real essence, but that claim isnt being made.
Real essence explains an entire causal chain because it is that which is causally efficacious within
all things. Internal constitution is only the structure that helps explain some point in the causal
chain, Kants conditioned points.28 Thus, science is a fair means of examining the structure of
things at more and more detailed levels. This type of analysis though cannot absolutely explain
the complete chain of causation.
The specific case of waters internal constitution seemingly shows that internal
constitution is within the realm of human knowledge, as John Locke would understand it. The
only reason Locke might doubt internal constitutions potential epistemic access that remains is
personal stubbornness, but stubbornness isnt a reason to believe that we cannot know internal
constitution. This suggestion of knowing internal constitution, and even its distinction in
reference to real and nominal essences, are undoubtedly controversial and thus this project is
ongoing just like the overall project of human knowledge. Still, the claim about internal
constitution should not go without serious consideration of Lockes epistemic project and how he
frames that project. This paper aims to contribute to the vast array of Locke scholarship by
providing a reading of Locke that perhaps makes his account more palatable so it can allow for
and adapt to scientific progress.

28

Kant, Immanuel. The Antinomy of Pure Reason Third Conflict of the Transcendental Idea. Critique of
Pure Reason. 484-547.

Bibliography
Goodin, Susanna, Why knowledge of the internal constitution is not the same as knowledge of the real
essence and why this matters, Southwest Philosophy Review, 14(1), 1998, 149155.
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ed. Edward N. Zalta .
Kant, Immanuel. The Antinomy of Pure Reason Third Conflict of the Transcendental Idea. Critique of
Pure Reason. 484-547.
Locke, John, 1689, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in Modern Philosophy: An Animation of
Primary Sources, eds. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 2009),
317-421.
Vienne, Jean-Michel, Locke on Real Essence and Internal Constitution, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, New Series, Vol. 93 (1993), 139-153.