[G.R. No. 128538.

February 28, 2001]

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.,
DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondents.
R E S O LUTIO N
QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742 entitled State
Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al., and SCC Chemical Corporation. The questioned
decision affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, dated
March 22, 1993, in Civil Case No. 84-25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiff the following: a) To pay plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the sum of
P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum reckond (sic) from April, 1984
until the whole amount is fully paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25%
of the total amount due and demandable as attorneys fees and to pay the cost(s) of
suit.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of the appellate court dated February 27,
1997, denying SCC Chemicals Corporations motion for reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals, is as
follows:
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its
chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo,
obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of
P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per
month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12,
1984. To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo Halili
executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the
obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent
demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was
made.

On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a prayer
for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the
promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort
to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts
was agreed upon:

1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and
that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the
defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date
which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation
the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed
a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with
maturity date on January 12, 1984.[2]
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were
liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was
calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite
notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the
witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a preponderance of evidence,
that the latter had a case against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove
its claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not established and there was no
showing that he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no proof

was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally,
SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents were not presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed from.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied in its resolution dated February 27, 1997.
Hence, petitioners recourse to this Court relying on the following assignments of error:
I

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF ACTION AND
OVERCAME ITS BURDEN OF PROOF.
II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING

ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to be:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an error of law in holding that private respondent
SIHI had proved its cause of action by preponderant evidence; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the award of attorneys fees to SIHI.

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI introduced documentary evidence
through the testimony of a witness whose competence was not established and whose personal
knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not demonstrated. It argues that the
same was in violation of Sections 36[3] and 48,[4] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was
manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that
the sole witness of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document presented in evidence
executed or written by SCC. Thus, no proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul
of Section 2,[5] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires proof of due execution and
authenticity of private documents before the same can be received as evidence. Petitioner
likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the documentary evidence presented by
SIHI were offered in evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of the
requirement of Section 34,[6] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It was thus an error of law on the
part of the appellate court to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the non-production
of the originals of the documents presented in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of
evidence provided for in Section 3 (e),[7] Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, to come into play.

Petitioners arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.

We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear several times on
scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing
dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove its
case. Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to
disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A

witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule,
hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. [8] However, the rule does admit of
an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.
[9]
The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is
settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters
testified to by a witness are hearsay.[10] However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The
repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other partys
witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing partys witness. It is now too late for petitioner to
be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the
witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal
knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Respecting petitioners other submissions, the same are moot and academic. As correctly
found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners admission as to the execution of the promissory note
by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question
of the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pretrial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, [11] Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence rule[12] advance its cause. Respondent SIHI
had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial admission by

petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It
is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of
these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any
evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.
No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its
obligation, pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having
sustained the trial courts award of attorneys fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of
the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899,909 (1990), where we held that when attorneys fees
are awarded, the reason for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts
decision. Petitioner submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the
same, the award of attorneys fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court.
We find for petitioner in this regard.
It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is
necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within
the exception and justify the grant of the award. [13] Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial
court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be
disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to explain
the award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The decision dated November
12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of
attorneys fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128538

February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent
DaniloArrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State
Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried
an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining
balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To
secure the payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent LeopoldoHalili

executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally

to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to
SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended
that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void,
and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-ofcourt in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the
following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and
the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits
and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued
in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant
SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account
of even date which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC
Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and
Pablito
Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the
amount of
P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the
defendants were liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said
witness was postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of
either party. The case was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or
its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to
have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the testimony of private respondents witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as
required
by law.
3. Whether the best evidence rule should be applied.
RULING:

1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a
competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the
rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence,
then the same is admissible.The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of
a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which
negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.However, the
right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine
the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several
opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner
repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed
by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for
petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through
private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of
the genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of
facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section,
4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as
there was already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the
promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be
questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these documents was
sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the
contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No
reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable
on its obligation

FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

-versus-

RODRIGO SALAFRANCA
y BELLO,
Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 173476

Present:
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
*
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:

February 22, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide
that meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res
gestae, or both.
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and tried for murder for the
fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and was ultimately found guilty of the felony by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On appeal,
his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision
promulgated on November 24, 2005.[1]
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal, continuing to challenge
the credibility of the witnesses who had incriminated him.

The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was
stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing
Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of
his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the
Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon
told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually
succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that
the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still
a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.[2]
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a
long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He was finally arrested
on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila City Jail.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
The evidence is clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered
two (2) stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with
his left arm encircled around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter with the
use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which caused Bolanons
death. Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but
corroborated by Rodolfo Estao, the victims uncle who brought Bolanon
to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided Bolanon
and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering from
hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to say that it was Rodrigo
Salafranca who stabbed him.[3]

The
RTC
appreciated
treachery
based
on
the
testimony
of Prosecution witness Mendoza on how Salafranca had effectedhis attack
against Bolanon, observing that by encircling his (accused) left arm, while behind
the victim on the latters neck and stabbing the victim with the use of his right hand,
Salafranca did not give Bolanon any opportunity to defend himself. [4]The RTC
noted inconsistencies in Salafrancas and his witness testimonies, as well as the fact
that he had fled from his residence the day after the incident and had stayed away
in Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that had he not been
hiding, there would be no reason for him to immediately leave his residence,
especially because he was also working near the area.[5]

The RTC disposed thus:

With the above observations and findings, accused Rodrigo Salafranca is
hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder defined and punished under
Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code with the presence of the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as amended) without
any mitigating nor other aggravating circumstance attendant to its
commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua.
He shall be credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
His body is hereby committed to the custody of the Director of the
Bureau of Correction, National Penitentiary, MuntinlupaCity thru the
City Jail Warden of Manila.
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum
of P50,000.00 representing death indemnity.
There being no claim of other damages, no pronouncement is hereby
made.
SO ORDERED.[6]

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,[7] citing the
dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, [8] and
Salafrancas positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.[9] It stressed that
Salafrancas denial and his alibi of being in his home during the incident did not
overcome the positive identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the
stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a circumstance highly
indicative of his guilt.[10]
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that the State did not prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against Salafranca would be
unwarranted. The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estao

were credible and reliable. The determination of the competence and credibility of
witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC as the trial court due to its unique
and
unequalled
position
of
observing
their
deportment
during
testimony, and of assessing their credibility and appreciating their truthfulness,
honesty and candor. Absent a substantial reason to justify the reversal of the
assessment made and conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing
court was bound by such assessment and conclusions, [11] considering that the CA as
the appellate court could neither substitute its assessment nor draw different
conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC misappreciated the
circumstances or omitted significant evidentiary matters that would alter the result.
[12]
Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by the RTC.
Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo or to contradict the
findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great weight and respect.[13]
Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the face of his positive
identification by Mendoza as the assailant of Bolanon. The lower courts properly
accorded full faith to such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca
did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled Mendoza to testify
against him unless it was upon the truth.[14]
Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind
and had encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the
stabbing blow using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways
and another one encircling the blow towards below the left nipple. [15] Relying on
Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found
treachery to be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We
join the CAs concurrence because Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of
attack remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The
method and means Salafranca employed constituted a surprise deadly attack
against Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive physical control of the
latters movements that ensured the success of the attack without any retaliation or
defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code,[16]treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.

The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the utterance by Bolanon of

statements identifying Salafranca as his assailant right after the stabbing incident.
The testimony follows:
Q Can you tell what happened on the said date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a stab wound on his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab wound, what did he say?
A Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak ako.
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my nephew who stabbed him?,
and he answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami.
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered by the name of Rod
Salafranca.)

COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant what was his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I told him not to talk
anymore because he will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I cannot remember the time because I was already confused at that
time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When he was brought to the emergency room what happened?
A He was pronounced dead.[17]

It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had gone to the
residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca;
that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General
Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who
had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had been
Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a
hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore; and that
about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital,
Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified
the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour
before his death and right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of
a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the
hearsay rule.[18]

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its

hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made,
the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that the declarant
is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case
for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.[19]
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At
the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing
great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a
few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing.
There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of
his death can be shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by
the opinion of his physician.[20] Bolanon would have been competent to testify on
the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was
offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.[21]
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was
then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no
time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as
the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances which are the
undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when
illustrative of such act.[22] In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to
exclude
the
idea
of
deliberation
and
fabrication.[23] The
rule
on res gestaeencompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or
immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by
the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. [24] The test of admissibility of evidence
as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation
is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.[25]
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the
death indemnity of P50,000.00. We declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon
were entitled by law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be
awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim (which was granted herein); (b) actual or
compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e)
temperate damages.[26]
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further granted moral
damages which were different from the death indemnity.[27] The death indemnity
compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral
damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the
surviving family of the victim.[28]Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings
of the surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court
must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to
their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00 is
reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, [29] we
are bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs

mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on
human nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional
pain and anguish on the part of the victims family. It is inherently human
to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing.Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives
them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them
with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. [30]

The CA and the RTC committed another omission consisting in their nonrecognition of the right of the heirs of Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already
settled that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not
substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted,
for it would certainly be unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them
compensation by way of actual damages.[31]
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed
in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances.[32] The Civil Code permits such damages to
be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. [33] Conformably with such
legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement
of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages because of the attendance of
treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in
murder, and, as such, inseparable and absorbed in murder. The Court explained so
in People v. Catubig:[34]
The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law
not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect,
one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the
accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The
increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating
circumstances,
whether
ordinary
or
qualifying,
in
its

commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State

concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It
would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be
due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather
than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of
the Civil Code.

For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages, the sum of P30,000.00 is
deemed reasonable and proper,[35]because we think that a lesser amount could not
result in genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on November 24, 2005, butMODIFIES the awards of civil damages
by adding to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the amounts
of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, all of which awards shall bear interest of
6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155208

March 27, 2007

NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING,
and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision1 dated February
22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
64122, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental, Branch 60.
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated as Lot 56 of
Subdivision plan Psd-31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The subject lot,
containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 issued by the Registry of Deeds of the
City of Cadiz.3
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena
Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred
in the name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real
estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. 6 However, the land
remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer
title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the
subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered
that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of
Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.7
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio,
Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the
sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding
from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. 9 Nena did
not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the nullification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the
name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela. 10 The
complaint also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and
litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with leave of court
for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, he having died intestate and without issue in
March 1991.11 He left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the
subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos. She
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court for the
award of actual, exemplary and moral damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. 12
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the following dispositive
portion:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale dated October 14, 1969 (Exh.
"Q") executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID
and further ordering:
1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu thereof to issue a
new title in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion of the
property; Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion; Julio Tating,
Pro-indiviso owner of one-fourth () portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso owner of
one-fourth () portion, all of lot 56 after payment of the prescribed fees;
2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143-00672 and in lieu
thereof issue a new Tax Declaration in the names of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso portion;
Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso portion; Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso portion; and
Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-indiviso portion, all of lot 56 as well as the house standing
thereon be likewise declared in the names of the persons mentioned in the same proportions
as above-stated after payment of the prescribed fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 by way of
moral damages,P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages, P5,000.00 by way of attorneys
fees and P3,000.00 by way of litigation expenses; and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC.14
Nenas Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated August 22, 2002. 15
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA "has decided the instant
case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this Honorable
Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not
supported by and is even against the evidence on record."16
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA
finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion. On
the other hand, the petition actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are
the proper subjects of a petition for review oncertiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court decided to treat the present
petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed
within the reglementary period for filing the same.17

As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests on
the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because
Danielas actual intention was not to dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by
providing her with a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both the
RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela
dated December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been
rejected outright by the lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead when the
document was offered in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn
Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was discovered only after the
death of Daniela in 1994.18Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed simulated, Daniela
would have taken action against the petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that up
to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never
uttered a word of complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine held time and
again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance
is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also argues that the RTC
and the CA erred in its pronouncement that the transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a
trust relationship between them because of the settled rule that where the terms of a contract are
clear, it should be given full effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show that
the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed judgments; that
Danielas Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of sale by and between
her and petitioner was merely simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between petitioner and
Daniela created a trust relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is simulated.
A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the
parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).19 The primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. 20 Such intention is determined
from the express terms of their agreement as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts.21
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving their allegation
that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the sworn
statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as
part of private respondents evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative
weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. 22 The admissibility of evidence depends on
its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted
and its tendency to convince and persuade.23Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules

of evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. 25 Moreover,
the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. 26 For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon.27 The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error
in giving the sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the
witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on
Danielas sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and
petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that
Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of
sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material
allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private
respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she
entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court ruled that the most protuberant index of simulation is the
complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any manner to assert his rights of
ownership over the disputed property.30 In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows
that petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner
has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes due on the said lot and
that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and
declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in
themselves, incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property.31 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention
to contribute needed revenues to the Government. 32 Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership.33 On the other hand, private respondents failed to present even a single
tax receipt or declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she
claims ownership thereof. The only Tax Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private
respondents presented in evidence, refers only to the house standing on the lot in
controversy.34 Even the said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot
(Lot 56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really
reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never told
any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to
make known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977,
the existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that
she is appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete step to
recover the subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she executed the
subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was transferred in petitioners

favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the
meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila. However, it is well-established that ownership
and possession are two entirely different legal concepts.35Just as possession is not a definite proof of
ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph of Article 1498
of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution
thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with ownership,
is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of conveyance. 36 Thus, in light of the
circumstances of the present case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual
possession or occupation of the disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor
because she was already able to perfect and complete her ownership of and title over the subject
property.
As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the validity of
the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no probative value, as the sworn statement
earlier adverted to, for being hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not able to cross-examine
the deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.
However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance
of evidence37 that the contract of sale between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal
presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the party who impugns its regularity has the
burden of proving its simulation.38 Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden of
proving their allegation that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be
valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or
not a trust relationship was created between them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. 278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.