Professional Documents
Culture Documents
August 6, 2002
Whether the RTC & CA erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the
persons and property of Julieta;
February 6, 2007
February 6, 2007
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing
the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the
Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing
at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent
does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that
the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of
the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed
in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds
and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent
filed
on
March
5,
1994
her
Legislative Intent
Joseph,
Gloria,
and
Teresa
filed
their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong
to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon
Lucias death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners
of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built
with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the
expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by
Gloria and Teresa, while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant)
was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business
partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as
administrator on the following grounds: (1) he is not physically
and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is minimal;
and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that
the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as
special or regular administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution
appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquins
estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an
answer in intervention, alleging that Mercedes is survived not
Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered in the
name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia. He also
admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting
marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with
Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however,
were able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254
and 38255 were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239,
dated March 17, 1920, in the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR
38255. And as found by both the RTC and the CA, Lucia was
survived by her compulsory heirs Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and
Jose.
sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the RTC
found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and
SO ORDERED.
October 10, 2012
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-muchstretched imbroglio over the estate of Cristina AguinaldoSuntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute
as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the
decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel)
of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010,
directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over
the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by
each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case
No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a
determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as
proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal
interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle
the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with
dispatch. No costs.3
independent
proprietary
interests
and
moral
circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily
related to the demand for representation being repeatedly
urged by respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared
the mandatory character of the rule on the order of
preference for the issuance of letters of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes
the order of preference in the issuance of letters of
administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving
spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that
sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator.
It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate
court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that
directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we
expounded on the legal contemplation of a "next of kin,"
thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of
appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next
of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of
kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the
statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one
whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in
the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving,
therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent,
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his
unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure to "make
and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which
became proven fact when he actually filed partial
inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on
two occasions of Federicos exclusion of Cristinas other
compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the
list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a
bond and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the
duties of settling the decedents estate with the end in
view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to
do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio IIIs omission
and inaction become even more significant and speak
volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it
demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately
interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the
pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the inescapable
fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep
15
(Emphasis supplied)
(5) comply with the order within three days from receipt.
of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the
Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year.7
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on
December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to
Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the
inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the
release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three
granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date
of first publication of the notice to creditors.8 The court
stated thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx
SO ORDERED.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE
LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE
SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE
AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED
THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased
were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of
the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate
court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and
assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent
Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any
condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position
contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the
holographic will of the deceased did not include nor
mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and,
as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active
participation and resistance of respondent Florence S.
Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners
claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim
presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any
one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to
the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition
involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid.
The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had
already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the
deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of
them in any way without the probate courts approval is
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court
cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be
a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its
jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine
the identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant
case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint
agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it
was executed, the probate of the will was still pending
before the court and the latter had yet to determine who
the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and
respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act,
and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors
all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may
be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
Where an executor or administrator commences an action,
or prosecutes an action already commenced by the
deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by
answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each
other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in
favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though
the claim had been presented directly before the court in
the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate
in the probate court is mandatory.30 As we held in the
vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the
estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and
obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law
strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of
the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle
February 5, 2007
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision1 in
the above-entitled case, ruling in favor of the petitioners.
The dispositive portion2 reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August
2001, affirming the Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint for
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by
the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby
DISMISSED.
On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration3 of the
foregoing Decision was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of the
Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents, heirs of
Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006, petitioners Erlinda
Pilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata Ortiz Vda. de
Briones, through counsel, filed an Opposition to
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration,4 to which the
respondents filed a Rejoinder5 on 23 May 2006.
xxxx
The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2
October 1952, awarding ownership of the aforementioned
real properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960, Donata had
the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of
the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new
TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas
nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda
and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as
administrators of Donatas intestate estate. Controversy
arose among Donatas heirs when Erlinda claimed
exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, covered by
TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds
of Donation, both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly
executed in her favor by her aunt Donata. The other heirs
of Donata opposed Erlindas claim. This Court, however,
was no longer informed of the subsequent development in
the intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as
far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata,
including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.
On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew
of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which
was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an
Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect
rentals from Maximinos properties. But then, Gregorio
filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated
5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were
already under his and his wifes administration as part of
Our Ruling
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court
officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property
involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of
their courts. Said provision reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
ESCHEATS
On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a Deed of SelfAdjudication and Transfer of Rights[3] over Lot 5 in favor of
Amelita, who agreed to assume all the obligations, duties, and
conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No.
V-81066. The document of transfer was filed with the Bureau of
Lands.[4] The pertinent portions of the deed provide:
xxx
That I, FERMINA A. LOPEZ, of legal age, Filipino, widow of
Pedro C. Lopez and a resident of Port San Pedro, Cebu City,
Philippines, am the AWARDEE of Lots Nos. 4, 5, 3-B, 3-C
and 6-B, Sgs-3451 And being the winning bidder at the auction
sale of these parcels by the Bureau of Lands held on May 12,
1982, at the price of P150.00 per square meter taking a
purchase price of P282,900.00 for the tract; That I have made
as my partial payment the sum of P28,290.00 evidenced by
Official Receipt No. 1357764-B representing ten (10%) per
cent of my bid, leaving a balance ofP254,610.00 that shall be in
not more than ten (10) years at an equal installments
of P25,461.00 beginning June 17, 1983 until the full amount is
paid.
the Transferee Mrs. Amelita L. Sola, agrees to assume, all the
obligations, duties and conditions imposed upon the Awardee
in relation to the MSA Application No. V-81066 entered in
their records as Sales Entry No. 20476.
[I] hereby declare that I accept this Deed of Self-Adjudication
and Transfer of Rights and further agree to all conditions
provided therein.[5]
Amelita assumed payment of the lot to the Bureau of Lands.
She paid a total amount of P282,900.[6]
On April 7, 1989, the Bureau of Lands issued an order
approving the transfer of rights and granting the amendment of
the application from Fermina to Amelita.[7] On May 2, 1989,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3439 was issued in favor
of Amelita.[8]
SO ORDERED.[15]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its decision dated March
23, 1999 reversed the RTC. Thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in
the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she
registered the land in her name and, based on the
abovementioned rules, he has a better right over the property
because he was first in material possession in good faith.
However, this allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola
in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support. For one,
the execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits
of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of regularity,
hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert
them.[25] Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439 was issued
in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioners
bare allegation to defeat the Original Certificate of Title which
on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of
issuance.[26] A Torrens title, once registered, serves as notice to
the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can
plead ignorance of its registration.[27]
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title
to the disputed property in bad faith, only the State can institute
SO ORDERED.
3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get
up from bed without outside assistance, and she has to be
moved by wheel chair;
4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal
properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas, with an
aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million
Pesos[;]
5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself,
and that she needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her
interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises;
6. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of
the full blood, namely, petitioner Amparo Ledesma Gustilo,
Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the Religious of the
Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given
their consent to the filing of this petition as shown by their
signatures at the bottom of this petition[;]
7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business
management of commercial, agricultural and corporate
enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where
Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is in a position
to monitor and supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
2. Bart Lacson;
3. Fely Montelibano;
4. Jose T. Revilla; or
5. a qualified and reputable person as may be determined fit by
this Honorable Court.
law.
Accordingly, let letters of guardianship issue to petitioner upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to guarantee
the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's
decision was, by Order of November 4, 19963 , denied in this
wise:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Oppositor
thru counsel, and finding no merits on the ground stated
therein, considering that petitioner appears to be most
qualified and suitable to act as Julieta Ledesma's guardian after
taking into consideration the qualifications of the oppositor and
her other recomendees [sic], aside from the fact that
petitioner's appointment as such was not objected to by any of
her nearest kin, in contrast to the hostile interest of oppositor,
the same is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision on the following ratiocination:4
Indeed, oppositor-appellant (Pilar) has not shown the
authenticity and due execution of the letters which purport to
show the existence of a rift between Julieta and her family and
dissatisfaction as to how the businesses were managed. At any
rate, while it is correct to say that no person should be
While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there
is no sufficient showing that petitioner is hostile to the best
interests of the latter. On the contrary, it was the petitioner
who, realizing the need for the appointment of a person to
guard her sister's interests, initiated the petition for
guardianship. We see no indication that petitioner is animated
by a desire to prejudice Julieta's health as well as financial
interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who had
initially concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta
from the court. Oppositor's advanced age of 90 years also
militate against her assuming the guardianship of the
incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not
interested to be appointed legal guardian (p. 21[,] Appellant's
Brief, Rollo, p. 59). But the persons that she points to as being
better choices as Julieta's guardian over the appellee have not
acted, nor even indicated, their desire to act as such. In any
case, We see no cogent reason why We should reverse the wellreasoned disquisition of the trial court.
xxx
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For the last time I will repeat even if I have to kneel before you
and Carlos I have no interest anymore in any future investment
due to my age and being single and alone in life. I would like to
October 21, 1992, 10 the RTC held that the "action by which the
issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion
publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation . .
demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of
possession cognizable in the first instance by the Regional Trial
Court."
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision
of October 21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a decision 11
promulgated on June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court 12 affirmed
the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy
for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an
accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have
not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants
by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family
of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the
holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless
and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not
be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is
indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza
that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their
occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's
supervening incompetency can not be said to have vested in
her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out."
13
Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C.
Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively were by this
Court's leave, substituted for her. 17
10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly
notified the defendants, for them to vacate the said house, but
the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and the defendants
refused to vacate the same. . .
despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its
repudiation, . . (its) continuing possession . . became illegal and
the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the. . (plant's
owner) was its proper remedy.
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where
there had been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year
period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be
reckoned from the date of the last demand, 28 the reason being
that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based
on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in
the premises. 29 Now, the complaint filed by Caiza's guardian
alleges that the same was "filed within one (1) year from the
date of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
Although this averment is not in accord with law because there
is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate, dated February
27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint
was actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one year
from the second (last) written demand to vacate.
The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the
owner's express permission. That permission was subsequently
withdrawn by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial
that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian,
the latter being indisputably clothed with authority to do so.
Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Caiza had executed
a will bequeathing the disputed property to the Estradas; that
circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises
after demand to vacate on the theory that they might in future
xxx
xxx.
xxx
should be 20 years.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
indeterminate sentence can be anywhere within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree to the penalty prescribed by
the Code for the offense. The minimum range of the penalty is
determined without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime and
without reference to the periods into which it may be
subdivided.31 The modifying circumstances are considered only
in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.32 Since the penalty prescribed in Article 315 is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower in degree would be prision correccional minimum to
medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty
should be anywhere within 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and
2 months.33
Accordingly, the Court finds a need to modify in part the
penalties imposed by the trial court. The minimum penalty for
each count of estafa should be reduced to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional.
As for the civil liability arising from the criminal offense, the
question is whether as the signatory for ARMAGRI, petitioner is
personally liable pursuant to the provision of Section 13 of the
Trust Receipts Law.
In Prudential Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,34 the Court
discussed the imposition of civil liability for violation of the
Trust Receipts Law in this wise:
heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. It, however, did not
preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes
from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the
subsequent saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique
and hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they have the right
to dispose of their respective shares as they consider necessary
or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that
time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey
failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso
found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long
period of time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following
errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE"
AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE
CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR
INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE"
WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS,
THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET
IN.
Eutropia
1/16
Victoria
1/16
Napoleon
1/16
Alicia
1/16
Visminda
1/16
Rosa
1/16
Douglas
1/16
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time
of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural
guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the
transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that
time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of
administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their
2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the
time of the execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than
two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered
a guardian of the childs property, subject to the duties and
obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
the
following
question
for
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
December 5, 2012
the Vancil vs. Belmes case cited by the court a quo which
held that "courts should not appoint as guardians persons
who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts" pertains
to persons who are not residents of the country.
However, we do not find that the court a quo, by deciding
to appoint the oppositor-appellee as guardian, has fallen
into grievous error.
For one, the oppositor-appellee, like petitioner-appellant,
is also a relative, a nephew of the incompetent. There are
no vices of character which have been established as to
disqualify him from being appointed as a guardian.
xxxx
Anent the claim of the petitioner-appellant that he has
been expressly chosen by her aunt to be her guardian as
evidenced by her testimony, although it could be given
weight, the same could not be heavily relied upon,
especially considering the alleged mental state of the
incompetent due to her advanced age.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 42
is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[10
TRUSTEES
ADVENT CAPITAL AND
FINANCE
CORPORATION,
- NICASIO I. ALCANTARA and
versus
2[14] of the Trust Agreement, includes not only the principal but
The real owner of the trust property is the trustorbeneficiary. In this case, the trustors-beneficiaries are the
Alcantaras. Thus, Advent Capital could not dispose of the
Alcantaras portfolio on its own. The income and principal of the
portfolio could only be withdrawn upon the Alcantaras written
instruction or order to Advent Capital.[16] The latter could not
also assign or encumber the portfolio or its income without the
written consent of the Alcantaras.[17] All these are stipulated in
the Trust Agreement.
Ultimately, the issue is what court has jurisdiction to hear
and adjudicate the conflicting claims of the parties over the
dividends that Belson held in trust for their owners. Certainly,
not the rehabilitation court which has not been given the power
to resolve ownership disputes between Advent Capital and third
parties. Neither Belson nor the Alcantaras are its debtors or
creditors with interest in the rehabilitation.
Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection
to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the trial
courts authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for
the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the
contract, all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for
payment which is a proper subject for an ordinary action for
collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a
motion in the rehabilitation case for delivery of money
belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third party.
the first place, the Interim Rules do not exempt a company under
rehabilitation from availing of proper legal procedure for
collecting debt that may be due it. Secondly, Court records show
that Advent Capital had in fact sought to recover one of its assets
by filing a separate action for replevin involving a car that was
registered in its name.[19]
Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and nonadversarial in nature, and do not contemplate adjudication of
claims that must be threshed out in ordinary court
proceedings. Adversarial proceedings similar to that in ordinary
courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a
SO ORDERED.
was it true that Wilma Soco was a neighbor and family friend of
the Clavanos as she was residing in Mandaue City seven (7)
kilometers away from the Clavanos who were residents of Cebu
City. Petitioner insisted that the testimony of Wilma Soco
should not have been given weight for it was only during the
hearing of the petition for adoption that Jose Clavano, a brother
of Ronald, came to know her and went to her residence in Iligan
City to convince her to be a witness for monetary
considerations. Lastly, petitioner averred that it would be
hypocritical of the Clavanos to claim that they could love the
children much more than he could. 11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
is now before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption
was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a
natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article
188 (2) of the Family Code.
Art. 31 of P.D. No. 603 provides
Art. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. The written consent of
the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or, over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian of the
Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed child
placement agency under whose care the child may be;
(3) The natural children, fourteen years and above, of the
adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Sincerely,
was not always satisfied with her dolls and things but Joeton
was full of surprises. He ended the letter with "Love your son,
Keith." The letter was mailed on February 6, 1985 (Exh. 5-D).
6. Exh. 6 an undated letter Charmaine. She thanked
petitioner for the bathing suit, key chain, pencil box, socks, half
shirt, pencil sharpener and $50.00. She reminded him of her
birthday on January 23 when she would turn 9 years old. She
informed him that she wore size 10 and the size of her feet was
IM. They had fun at Christmas in Lahug but classes would start
on January 9 although Keith's classes had started on January 6.
They would feel sad again because Mommy would be leaving
soon. She hoped petitioner would keep writing them. She
signed, "Love, Charmaine."
7. Exh . 7 an undated letter of Keith. He explained to
petitioner that they had not been remiss in writing letters to
him. He informed him of their trip to Manila they went to
Malacaang, Tito Doy Laurel's house, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the executive house, Tagaytay for three days and
Baguio for one week. He informed him that he got "honors,"
Charmaine was 7th in her class and Joeton had excellent
grades. Joeton would be enrolled in Sacred Heart soon and he
was glad they would be together in that school. He asked for
his "reward" from petitioner and so with Charmaine and
Joeton. He asked for a motorbike and dollars that he could save.
He told petitioner that he was saving the money he had been
sending them. He said he missed petitioner and wished him the
best. He added that petitioner should call them on Sundays.
petitioner would be happy with the letter that had taken him
so long to write because he did not want to commit any
mistakes. He asked petitioner to buy him perfume (Drakkar)
and, after thanking petitioner, added that the latter should buy
something for Mommy.
12. Exh. 12 another Christmas card, "Our Wish For You" with
the year '83 written on the upper right hand corner of the inside
page, from Keith, Charmaine and Joeton.
unchanged. Neither the law not the courts allow this affinity to
suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to
the well being of the child.
Since the incorporation of the law concerning adoption in the
Civil Code, there has been a pronounced trend to place
emphasis in adoption proceedings, not so much on the need of
childless couples for a child, as on the paramount interest, of a
child who needs the love and care of parents. After the passage
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code and the Family Code, the
discernible trend has impelled the enactment of Republic Act
No. 8043 on Intercountry,Adoption 58 and Republic Act No.
8552 establishing the rules on the domestic adoption of Filipino
children. 59
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent
laws, such as the following policies in the "Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998":
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and
custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided with love, care,
understanding and security towards the full and harmonious
development of his/her personality. 60
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of
a child, his/her interest shall be the paramount consideration
in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations
(UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child. 61
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from
his/her biological parent(s). 62
that there was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a
record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob
merely placed his "thumbmark" on said contract purportedly
on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a
Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and
Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage or on 15
September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as
husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his
customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the
"thumbmark" was logically "not genuine". In other words, not
of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the
circumstances of the loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant
Msgr. Yllana never mentioned that he allegedly "gave the
copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for
registration". And as admitted by appellant at the trial, Jose
Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at
the date of the marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact,
on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one
"Benjamin Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name
of Jose Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose
Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the
purported marriage entered in the book of records in San
Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and
wife,34 we find that the presumption of marriage was not
rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr.
Jacob and that the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the
Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the
presumption that the judge had acted in the regular
performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave
credence to the testimony of respondents handwriting expert,
for "the assessment of the credibility of such expert witness
rests largely on the discretion of the trial court . . . "35
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are
accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts, because
it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a
testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present
case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the
ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert
witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify
a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an
exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be
reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge
the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will
you please recall whether you issued this Order and whether
the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your
signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and
the signature reading Jose[;] I cant make out clearly what
comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.41
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the
Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the
signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not
his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken
does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could with
medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the
defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him.42
Indeed, we find no reason and the respondent has not
presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert
testimony of NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who
declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in
February 9, 1996
xxx
xxx
requisites
therefor
being
set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the
purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor
any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the
petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of
discernment.
The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely
over a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor
engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor
petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral,
criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It
stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any
person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin
Earl's first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the
intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused
to be published together with the petition for adoption. 16
Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms
the legal effects of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the
adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except
that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the
adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be
exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and
other blood relatives.
Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and
obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance
of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's
surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and
necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must
specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even
if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or
Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to
change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The
automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption
thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a
petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be
granted.
The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should
be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, 17 and shall
continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise.
Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in
the civil register is a substantial change in one's official or legal
name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are
matters of public policy. 42 They are matters of public order and
interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by
agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for
their singular convenience. 43
In Garcia vs. Republic, 44 we are reminded of the definiteness in
the application of the Rules and the importance of seeking
relief under the appropriate proceeding:
. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should
not confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest we
create confusion in the application of the proper remedy.
Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets
aimed at achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He
exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of
name, his order being unsupported by both statutory and case
law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he
adjudicated this case may be characterized as a regrettable
abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law
and jurisprudence.
II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant
the petition for change of name without citing or proving any
lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the
change of name was the fact of the adoptee's baptism under
the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since
he came to live with private respondents. 45
Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination,
assert that upon the grant of adoption, the subject minor
xxx
xxx
The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for
no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth
certificate by a woman who had all intentions of giving him
away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners
upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of
naming the minor at birth. 47
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this
attenuated ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it
aside.
It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's
right to name the minor adoptee after such right to name the
child had already been exercised by the natural parent.
Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law,
hence, the right assertes by private respondents herein
remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed
as a right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent
upon compelling grounds. 61
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname.
If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name
and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing
her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another
person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the
legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as
though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the
younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or
surname as will avoid confusion.
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that
she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Middle Name
x x x"
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of
the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.27
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it
is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary
so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when
the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the
law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be
allowed to use her mothers surname "GARCIA" as her middle
name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name
be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
additional time and expenses for them as. well as for the
Government and the Courts.
Hence this petition for review. Private respondents
were required to comment. Despite opportunity given to
them, however, they did not file any comment.
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents petition
for adoption. Petitioners contention is that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption
because the notice by publication did not state the true
name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the ruling
in Cruz v. Republic.[3] There the petition for adoption and
the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal
name of the child -(Rosanna E. Cruz) instead of her name
in the record of birth (Rosanna E. Bucoy). it was held that
this was a substantial defect in the petition and the
published order of hearing. Indeed there was a question of
identity involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very
well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as
common experience would indicate.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious
clerical error in the name of the child sought to be
adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the
substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so that what
appears as Midael as given name would read Michael.
Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly
clerical one. Changing the name of the child from Midael
C. Mazon to Michael C Mazon cannot possibly cause any
confusion, because both names can be read and
pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono,
tunog, himig). The purpose of the publication requirement
is to give notice so that those who have any objection to
SO ORDERED.
3.
4.
In
Braza
v.
City
Civil
Registrar
Habeas corpus
involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right
of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see
his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without
threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right. Es m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded
visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda
never even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent
with the finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also
emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such
assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not
EDWARD
SERAPIO,
SANDIGANBAYAN and
respondents.
petitioner,
PEOPLE OF
vs.HONORABLE
THE PHILIPPINES,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116
EDWARD
SERAPIO,
petitioner,
vs.HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by
petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail,
motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a
petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No.
26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused
together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose
"Jinggoy" P. Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board
of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth
Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the hearings on the
petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination.
The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with
the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive
to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing
considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing
shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it
on June 18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June
15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending
incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June
26, 2001.9
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001
did not again proceed because on said date petitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended
Information on the grounds that as against him, the amended
Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts
indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the
while this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of
probable cause to charge a person for an offense in a given
case, it may do so in exceptional circumstances, which are
present in this case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (4)
where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the
lust for vengeance.36 Petitioner claims that he raised proper
grounds for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the
questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded
evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder and
committed errors of law or irregularities which have been
prejudicial to his interest.37 He also states that during the joint
preliminary investigations for the various charges against
Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge
was only one of the eight charges against Estrada et al., he was
not furnished with copies of the other complaints nor given the
opportunity to refute the evidence presented in relation to the
other seven cases, even though the evidence presented therein
were also used against him, although he was only charged in
the plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's omnibus
motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found probable
cause to charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the
Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over the case
and to proceed to try the same. They further argue that "a
finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and prefatory
of the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused," and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose
his defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or innocence
may finally be determined.39
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
omnibus motion asking for, among others, a reinvestigation by
the Ombudsman, because his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's joint resolution did not raise the grounds of
either newly discovered evidence, or errors of law or
irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only
grounds upon which a motion for reconsideration may be
filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to
charge petitioner with plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph
Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan42 , the Court
ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable
cause, the Ombudsman's discretion is paramount. Thus, in
Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the
denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the
Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case.
Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due
process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges
against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to
determine whether a crime has been committed and whether
there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of
the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.49 As the Court held in Webb vs. De Leon, "[a] finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said
officer's finding and determination of probable cause, since the
determination of the existence of probable cause is the
function of the prosecutor.51 The Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was
tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint
resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts,
the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused
in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the
People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to
the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong
evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5)
Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in
Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be released from
detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his
petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and
entered a plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be
arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, does not require that he be arraigned first prior to
the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and
must, of necessity, be heard immediately.55 Petitioner
maintains that his arraignment before the bail hearings are set
is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense
charged, as is evident in his earlier statements insisting on his
innocence during the Senate investigation of the jueteng
scandal and the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced
even if it would present all its evidence before his arraignment
because, under the Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession
of guilt is mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution,57 and petitioner admitted that he
they will participate only during the trial proper itself, then
everybody will be faced with the daunting prospects of having
to go through the process of introducing the same witness and
pieces of evidence two times, three times or four times, as
many times as there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such
procedure is not conducive to the speedy termination of a case.
Neither can such procedure be characterized as an orderly
proceeding."78
cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and
the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the
observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has
a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic
individual protections, including those surrounding criminal
prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become
careless or complacent when that fashion has become rampant
over the earth.79
the original schedule for the bail hearings which was on May
2125, 2001.86
2001;98 and
Rules of Court).1wphi1.nt
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations
likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at bar.
G.R. No. 147780
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest,
petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao pray that the
"appropriate court before whom the informations against
petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and
proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition
is finally resolved." This relief is clearly premature considering
that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed
against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event
that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal
prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court,
for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant of a
duly issued warrant.
June 8, 2007
Pizza Hut, respondent was already there waiting for them. They
immediately approached her and the informant introduced Yap
to respondent as his former customer. They had a short
conversation and Yap asked respondent if she has with her the
item. Respondent told him that it is in her car at the parking
area. Respondent asked where the money is. Yap told her no
problem as long as she has the item, he will give her the money.
Respondent instructed Yap to go with her at the parking area
so that she could give it to him and there, she got inside her car.
She took the shabu inside the compartment of her Toyota
Fortuner with plate number YCX 965 and handed to him one (1)
packed medium size of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
filled with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu.
Upon receiving the said item, Yap pressed it to determine if it
was really shabu or not and when he noticed that it was shabu,
he immediately miscalled the members of the team informing
them that the transaction was consummated and subsequently
held respondent. He then introduced himself as PDEA 7
operative. Tuliao, who was just at the side of the car, assisted
Yap in apprehending the suspect. They also seized her cellular
phone and the Toyota Fortuner which she used in delivering
and transporting illegal drugs. Thereafter, they informed her
that she is under arrest for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA
9165 and likewise apprised her of the Miranda Doctrine in the
language she knew and understood but she opted to remain
silent. After which, they asked her name and she introduced
herself as Lovely Adam y Impal, 29 years old, married,
latter, on the other hand, hand a green bag to Ana. Rose then
left. As respondent was about to leave, Ana requested that she
be allowed to hitch a ride and respondent agreed. When they
were outside, respondent noticed a vehicle blocking her car,
making it impossible for her to back out into the road, without
hitting the car. She then beeped her car. Instead of moving their
car, one of the men went down and thereafter, entered her
vehicle and demanded for the bag that was allegedly given to
Ana by Rose. Respondent told them to ask Ana since they
claimed that it was given to Ana. However, the men pointed
their guns at respondent, including her children, claiming that
they were elements of PDEA and they were placing her under
arrest for illegal drug trafficking. They then grabbed
respondents green bag and from then on, she was never able
to recover the contents thereof, including the bag itself.
Thereafter, respondent was brought to the PDEA office where
a certain Ryan Rubi was also booked for alleged drug trafficking.
During her conversation with Ryan Rubi, she found out that he
was arrested a few hours earlier likewise by the PDEA, and
during his alleged arrest, he was required to produce a drug
trafficker in exchange for his release. Having been unable to
produce any, he was charged. The name of Rose cropped up,
and he said that during his arrest, the police officers informed
him that they were after Rose. His wife was out to raise money
for his release, or to produce a drug trafficker so that he can be
released. It was further ascertained by Ryan Rubi that this Rose
was actually arrested by the police officers but was
Antecedents
On June 16, 2003, seven criminal complaints charging
petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated
estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, and
with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995)
were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Puerto
Princesa City (MTCC), docketed as Criminal Cases No.
16916 to No. 16922. The complaints arose from the
recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and
the others to the private complainants as overseas
contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the
collection of visa processing fees, membership fees and
on-line application the private complainants without lawful
authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).1
On the following day, June 17, 2003, Judge Heriberto M.
Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC, conducted a
preliminary investigation on the complaints. After
examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the
complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the
arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail.2 On the
next day, the entire records of the cases, including the
warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor
of Puerto Princesa City for further proceedings and
appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing
rules.3
Change of NAME
May 9, 2002
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once in a week for three 93)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice,
file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register are(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon
the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to
(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of
the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2)
any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a
petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the
record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as
'summary'. xxx"12
21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as
"Marivel."
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel,
the corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name
of Carlitos father from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the
latters citizenship from "Filipino" to "Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC
Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the
petition for correction of entries in the subject documents
despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors
mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer
sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to
the questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings
parents, and the latters citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of
the name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for noncompliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied
petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
outlines the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry, was observed in the case.
Regarding Carlitos minor children Kevin and Kelly, the
appellate court held that the correction of their mothers first
name from "Maribel" to "Marivel" was made to rectify an
innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and
Marivel, albeit the CA conceded that it is a substantial
alteration, it held that the date would not affect the minors
filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at
the time of their respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father
Carlitos first marriage was still subsisting as it had been
annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlitos legal impediment to marry Marivel at the
time they were born, their children Kevin and Kelly were
illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on to state, that Marivel
was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having
been represented by their father as required under Section 5 of
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had
complied nonetheless with the jurisdictional requirements for
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlitos
birth record, it noted, falls under letter "o" of the enumeration
under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the
changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature,
they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding
in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and
respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements
beginning;
(g)
legitimations;
(h)
adoptions;
(i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (o) changes of name. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which
governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with,
observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the
correction sought for.
Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in
Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there
together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was
born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons
name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name
which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be
asking whether they are brother and sister since they have
different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores
Mandarin language since they do not have the letter "R" but if
there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed
to Julian Lin Wang.1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the
petition.2 The trial court found that the reason given for the
change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner
Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore
because of his middle namedid not fall within the grounds
recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change sought
is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has
an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed
to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the
Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason
why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name
"Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment and the
difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his
social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean
community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial
court to have denied the petition for change of name until he
had reached the age of majority for him to decide the name to
use, contrary to previous cases9 decided by this Court that
allowed a minor to petition for change of name.10
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State
has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a
privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate
of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.14
December 4, 2009
Date of Birth :
01 January 1996
Mother :
Father :
Pablito S. Braza
"Late Registration"
showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998,
drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23,
2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth
record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the
supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage
being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the
correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to
all between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court
ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the
petitioners mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu
Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral
attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial
proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who
sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth
records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their
citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents
were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes
sought to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous,
the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be
adversarial in nature, upheld the lower courts grant of the
petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly
different from those obtaining in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change
of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the
Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named
a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate,
nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of
the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence
his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,[9]change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the
requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change
his name shall present the petition to the Regional
Trial Court of the province in which he resides,
[or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for
change of name shall be signed and verified by
WHEREFORE,
the
Republics
petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
: NORMA
Middle Name
: SY
Last Name
: LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioners nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondents petition would
neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It
also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and
"Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially
since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has
effected the correction. Considering that respondent has
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition
assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
The Facts
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a
fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment.
If the office which has custody is in a foreign country
such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition
for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition,51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the
RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f
every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT
APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE
ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR
CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE
ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED
MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries
sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the entries
made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided