Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Explain why Apple in 2005 might have been considered to be a monopoly in digital players and digital
downloads. [4]
Note: In your answers, you have to state the characteristic of a monopoly very explicitly before elaborating
with evidences.
Characteristics
of
a
monopoly
Single seller:
100% market share and the
firm is the industry
Evidences
From para 1, Apple had a share of 63 per cent for its iPod in the US
market and in the world markets, it had an 83 per cent share for legal
digital downloads.
Clearly, Apple does not enjoy the theoretical monopoly. However, in
practice it enjoys monopoly power because it has a large proportion
of the market and the rest of the market is highly fragmented.
It is considered a near monopoly.
There are significant barriers of entry to both iPod and iTunes
market.
Para 2, Apple has devised a simple to use, iconic must-have product
which other manufacturers have to date found impossible to
replicate. With iTunes, it has a simple to use piece of software which
allows digital downloads only to iPods.
b) Using a monopoly diagram, explain how Apple succeeded increasing its profits ten-fold, mainly through sales
of iPods, between 2003 and 2005. [4]
Price/Revenue/
Cost ($)
MC
P1
P0
MC
C0
C1
AC
B
Y
MR0
0
State
Elaborate with
economic analysis
Exemplify with
evidences from
Q0
AR1
AR0
MR1
Q1
Output
Apple was able to increase its profits ten-fold because demand for its iPod product
increased enormously.
Apple did it by creating the iconic must-have in people and also worked with recording
companies for legal download. These increased the demand for iPods significantly.
This can be shown in the above diagram when AR and MR increase. Output increased
from Q0 to Q1, price increased from P0 to P1 and total revenue increased from 0P0AQ0 to
0P1XQ1. Total costs increased from 0C0BQ0 to 0C1YQ1 and profits increased from
P0C0BA to P1C1YX.
In 2005, Apple sales were more than double those of 2003 but profit increased from
$1.3 billion in 2003 to $137 billion in 2005.
(c) Discuss whether Apples strategy of charging high prices for its iPod was in its best long term
interests. [6]
Yes
Perspective for evaluation: Best interests Increase profits
Thesis: Yes it is in its best interests
Apple can earn high revenue and
profits through charging high prices.
Elaborate
Demand for iPod is price-inelastic.
with
Hence by increasing price, quantity
economic
demanded
falls
less
than
analysis
proportionally, and total revenue
earned by Apple increases. Hence,
even by charging high prices, Apples
revenue
remains
high,
which
contributes to supernormal profits.
State
Exemplify
with
evidence
from Data
Elaborate
with
economic
analysis
Exemplify
with
evidence
from Data
Stand
Apple has the first mover advantage in that it has already gained a huge market share and the iconic must-have
image of iPod is a strong barrier to entry and thus allows Apple to continue charging high price in the short-run. In
such a competitive market, Apple needs to constantly upgrade its product and reinforce its image by heavy
advertising (to defend their monopoly position) and this warrants to charge a high price to ensure it has the money to
pump into R&D and advertisement.
However, Apple must always be on a lookout for potential rivals and it might have to match the price cut of worthy
competitors to prevent a huge loss in revenue and thus profits.
(a) (i) Compare the EU price of sugar with the world price of sugar over the period shown. [2]
(a)
EU price was a guaranteed price floor which is fixed and controlled and as a result more stable [1]. The world
price on the other hand was determined by the forces of supply and demand which explains the huge
fluctuations [1].
OR
The EU price is higher than world price because of the import quotas of sugar cane in the EU that raised the
cost of production and thus the price. [1] On the other hand, the subsidies given to EU exports of sugar
lowered the world price. [1]
Evidence
Para 2 mentioned that BSC enjoys a large market share of
the market for refined white sugar.
Para 2: BSC is the sole processor of sugar beet grown in the
UK
Para 3: Imports of sugar cane are limited by quotas and that
ensures BSC faces little competition.
Para 4: Blocking the entry of another firm into the market.
Control of raw material supplies e.g. ownership of sugar beet plantations through backward
integration. This will prevent rival firms from having access to essential input or gaining cost advantage
through purchase of raw material supplies at competitive price. This is also known as vertical price
squeezing, where a vertically integrated firm, which controls the supply of an input, charges competitors
a high price for that input so that they cannot compete with it in selling the finished good i.e. refined
white sugar.
Predatory pricing policy: By selling below cost to drive competitors from the market. This is possible
if BSC cross-subsidize prices in a competitive market, thereby driving out competitors and establishing
itself as a monopoly in that market. Cross-subsidize refers to the use of profits in one market to
subsidize prices in another.
(c)
With the aid of a diagram, explain the impact of BSC's monopoly power on producer surplus and
consumer surplus in the market for sugar. [4]
Cost/Rev($)
MCMonopoly = SSPC
E
Price & Output comparison for a
monopoly & a PC industry under
Constant Cost Conditions
PM
C
PPC
B
D
MR
X
0
QM
Dd = AR
QPC
Output
In a perfectly competitive market, equilibrium will be achieved at output Q PC where P=MC and there is
allocative efficiency maximising consumers surplus as shown by area EBPPC.
The impact of BSC's monopoly power would result in equilibrium at profit maximizing level of MC=MR at pt
D, setting price higher at PM and lowering output to QM.
This results in a reduction of consumer surplus to a smaller area of EAP M and the loss of consumer surplus
of area PM ABPPC.
PM AC PPC, is translated as a gain to producer in the form of producer surplus. Producer surplus changes
from PpcBX to PmADX. [1]
However, there is a deadweight loss of area ABD as output [QPC - QM] is not produced.
Examiners comments:
Many candidates failed to identify the correct producer surplus.
Diagram is important for this question.
Producer surplus is not the same as total excess profit.
With the aid of a diagram, discuss what the impact would be on BSC's profits if free trade were
allowed in the European sugar market. [5]
P0
P1
C1
C0
MC
AC
X
Y
B
MR1 MR0
0
AR1
AR0
Output
Q1 Q0
Will there still be supernormal profits? Or will there be normal profits? Or subnormal profits?
It depends on how much the demand has fallen for BSC. Given that it is an incumbent firm and consumers
might have certain brand loyalty and assuming the price and quality difference is minimal, demand will not fall
drastically.
Queries from students:
1) Why cant demand for BSCs sugar increase with free trade since there will be a bigger market?
EUs price is higher than world price with opening up of the market to free trade, it is more likely that
consumers will turn to imports.
2) Another common question is that will cost change with free trade as BSC might be able to import
cheaper raw materials.
This is not quite possible as BSCs raw material comes from UK not the rest of the world unlike Tate & Lyle
where the cane sugar is imported.
Examiners comments:
Use the CORRECT diagram for explanation.
A large no. of candidates responded with a market SS and DD diagram. With an appropriate explanation,
this was a valid approach in explaining the process in terms of the impact upon price and market share. This
was insufficient to explain the impact on profits. The decline in price of sugar is likely to lower revenue. But,
to explain the impact on profits, it is necessary to refer to costs, which could be shown on a monopoly firm
diagram but will not appear on a market SS and DD diagram.
5-6
3-4
1-2
Objectives
Market
Interventions
Raise and
prices
Coupled
Subsidies
Direct
Support
2009
Expenditure
Main Instruments
stabilise
Income Reward
farmers'
support entitlements
market Intervention
subsidies
buying;
export
premia;
area
3,410
4,846
Source: Financial Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the European Agricultural
Guarantee Fund 2009 Financial Year.
926
Cereals
10
501
19
15
29
33
201
118
Source: European Commission, 2009. Annexes to the Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the 2nd
Financial Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the European Agricultural
Guarantee Fund - 2008 Financial Year: SEC(2009) 1368
Part II.
10
Direct Aids
Pillar 2
Sum
Austria
752
533
1285
Belgium
615
78
693
Denmark
1049
106
1155
Finland
571
289
859
France
8521
1279
9800
Germany
5853
1387
7240
Greece
2217
672
2888
Ireland
1341
352
1692
Italy
4370
1441
5811
Luxembourg
37
13
50
Netherlands
898
103
1001
Portugal
606
611
1217
Spain
5139
1284
6424
Sweden
771
267
4737
United Kingdom
3988
749
4737
EU-15
36727
9163
45890
Bulgaria
580
396
976
Cyprus
53
21
75
Czech Republic
909
424
1334
11
Estonia
101
113
214
Hungary
1319
585
1904
Latvia
146
151
298
Lithuania
380
254
634
Malta
11
16
Poland
3045
1851
4896
Romania
1264
1356
2620
Slovakia
388
320
708
Slovenia
114
113
257
EU-12
8336
5595
13930
Total
45062
14758
59821
12
EU agricultural tariffs and subsidies distort the economy. European agriculture is not
aligned with its comparative advantage, but skewed in favor of those products that receive
disproportional protection. Worse, support to agriculture acts like an invisible tax on the
manufacturing and service sectors.
The CAP harms EU trade interests. It discredits the free-trade argument and serves as a
pretext for maintaining barriers to trade in agriculture, manufacturing and services.
The CAP is socially unfair. Poor farmers benefit little from the CAP. 20% of recipients reap
roughly 80% of the direct income support. More generally, social policies should be targeted at
the poor and not at farmers or any other sector.
The CAP has a weak environmental record. Only a tiny fraction of its budget is spent on
efficient agri-environmental payments, while environmentally harmful farming practices, such
as drainage of wetlands, are still subsidized.
13
The CAP undermines global food security and the fight against poverty. The EU
subsidizes exports which disrupt production abroad. Furthermore, investing in agricultural
research and development, especially if adapted to developing country needs, is much more
effective than subsidizing European farm income and production.
The CAP is a burden on European integration. It creates an image of a bureaucratic, nontransparent, and ill-managed EU. It wastes resources that could, if employed more wisely,
convince European citizens of the benefits of integration. It nurtures a culture of national
egoism that stymies rational, efficiency-oriented decision-making on EU expenditures and
budget financing.
The Opportunity
There is a good chance that the CAP will be revolutionized after 2013 when a new long-term
EU budget comes into force. The economic crisis has left a heavy burden on public budgets,
strengthening the hand of finance ministers.
The ecological crisis requires substantial shifts from wasteful handouts to programs that
preserve the climate, biodiversity, soils, and water.
The long-term trend of increasing agricultural prices and incomes weakens the case for
income-supporting subsidies that do not promote the provision of public goods.
The Solution
European money should only be spent on European public goods. If agricultural policies
do not have positive effects that spill across national borders, they should be fully financed by
the member states that are in a better position than the EU to pursue local preferences with
financial responsibility.
14
Accordingly, the CAP budget should be significantly reduced. The first pillar of the CAP
should be progressively abolished and many policies under the second pillar should be
removed.
15