B.

PURPOSE
Simex International Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 88013
March 19, 1990]
Facts: Simex International is a private corporation
engaged in the exportation of food products. It buys
these products from various local suppliers and then
sells them abroad, particularly in the United States,
Canada and the Middle East. Most of its exports are
purchased by the petitioner on credit.
Simex is a depositor of TRB and maintained
a checking account in its Cubao branch. Simex
maintained an account in the amount of P100,000.00,
thus increasing its balance as of that date to
P190,380.74. Subsequently, the petitioner issued
several (8) checks against its deposit but was
surprised to learn later that they had been dishonored
for insufficient funds.
As a consequence, actions on the pending orders of
SIMEX
with
the
other suppliers (California
Manufacturing Comp., Malabon Longlife Trading
Corp., etc.) whose checks were dishonored
was deferred. And thus made these companies send
demand letters to SIMEX threatening prosecution if
the checks were not made good.
SIMEX complained to TRB and found out that the
sum of P100,000.00 deposited had not been credited.
The error was rectified on June 17, 1981, and the
dishonored checks were paid after they were redeposited. SIMEX sent demand letter for reparation
against TRB, which was not met, thus a complaint
was filed in CFI Rizal by SIMEX. The court denied
the moral & exemplary damages but upheld and
ordered TRB to pay for nominal damages in the
amount of P20,000.00 plus attys fees & costs, which
was then affirmed by the CA. The CA found with the
trial court that the privaterespondent was guilty of
negligence but agreed that the petitioner was
nevertheless not entitled to moral damages. It said:
The essential ingredient of moral damages is proof
of bad faith (De Aparicio vs. Parogurga, 150 SCRA
280). Indeed, there was the omission by the
defendant-appellee
bank
to
credit
appellant'sdeposit of P100,000.00 on May 25, 1981.
But the bank rectified its records. It credited the said
amount in favor of plaintiff-appellant in less than a
month. The dishonored checks were eventually paid.
These circumstances negate any imputation or
insinuation of malicious, fraudulent, wanton and
gross bad faith and negligence on the part of the
defendant-appellant.

It is this ruling that is faulted in the petition now

before us.
Issue: Whether or not TRB is guilty of negligence
which warrantsSIMEX reparation for damages.
Held: YES. Award SIMEX with moral damages
(P20,000) and exemplary damages (P50,000).
The initial carelessness of the respondent bank,
aggravated by the lack of promptitude in repairing its
error, justifies the grant of moral damages. This
rather lackadaisical attitude toward the complaining
depositor constituted the gross negligence, if not
wanton bad faith, that the respondent court said had
not been established by the petitioner.
There was also prejudice suffered by SIMEX in the
fact that the petitioner's credit line was canceled and
its orders were not acted upon pending receipt of
actual payment by the suppliers. Its business
declined. Its reputation was tarnished. Its standing
was reduced in the business community. All this was
due to the fault of the respondent bank which was
undeniably remiss in its duty to the petitioner.
We shall recognize that the petitioner did suffer
injury because of the private respondent's negligence
that caused the dishonor of the checks issued by it.
The immediate consequence was that its prestige was
impaired because of the bouncing checks and
confidence in it as a reliable debtor was diminished.
In the case at bar, it is obvious that
the respondent bank was remiss in that duty and
violated that relationship. What is especially
deplorable is that, having been informed of its error
in not crediting the deposit in question to the
petitioner, the respondent bank did not immediately
correct it but did so only one week later or twentythree days after the deposit was made. It bears
repeating that the record does not contain any
satisfactory explanation of why the error was made in
the first place and why it was not corrected
immediately after its discovery. Such ineptness
comes under the concept of the wanton manner
contemplated in the Civil Code that calls for the
imposition of exemplary damages.

C. BURDEN OF PROOF
RAAGAS vs TRAYA
FACTS:
- spouses Raagas filed a complaint with the CFI
Leyteagainst
spouses
Traya
andBienvenido
Canciller.- Complaint alleges that on or about April 9,
1958, whileCancillerwas "recklessly" driving a truck
owned by the Traya spouses, the vehicle ran over
theRaagas' three-year old son Regino, causing his
instantaneous death.Rulings of the Trial Court and
Court of Appeals
- On June 24 it rendered a judgment onthe
pleadings,condemning the defendants, jointly and
severally, topay damages,attorneys fees and costs of
suit.
-The Court of Appeals certified thecase to SC
becausethe issues raised are purely of law
ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT :
Whether or not the court a quo acted correctlywhen it
rendered judgment on the pleadings
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral, nominal
andcorrective damages, was controverted by the
avermentin the answer to the effect thatthe
defendants "haveno knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to thetruth of the
allegations" as to such damages,"the truth of the
matter being that thedeath of ReginoRaagas was
occasioned by an unforeseen event and/orby the fault
of the small boy Regino Raagas or hisparents." Such
averment has the effect of tenderingavalid issue.In a
long line of cases, SC has consistently held thateven
if the allegationsregarding the amount of damages in
the complaint are not specifically denied in
theanswer, such damages are not deemedadmitted.in
no uncertain terms that actual damages must
beproved, and that a court cannot rely on
"speculation,conjecture orguesswork" as to the fact
and amountof damages, but must depend on actual
proof thatdamages had been suffered and on evidence
of theactual amount.although anallegation is not
necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded
No. L-21879September
Brewery, Inc.
plaintiff-appellant
vs. Francisco Magno,
defendant-appellee

29,

1967San

Miguel

Facts:
1.
The Mun. Board of Butuan passed Ordinance No. 11
imposing a tax of 2% on the grosssales or receipts of
those engaged in the sale, trading in, or disposal of all
alcoholic or malt beverages, wines and mixed or
fermented liquors, including tuba, basi, & tapuy.The
same Municipal Board passed Ordinance No. 110
amending Ordinance No. 11,fixing a tax on the sale
of beer at the rate of Php 0.25 per case of 24 bottles,
& on thesale of soft drinks at the rate of PhP 0.10 per
case of 24 bottles of soft drinks or anycarbonated
drinks.
2.
San Miguel Brewery (San Miguel) maintains a
warehouse on the city of Butuan andalthough
consistently & promptly paid the required taxes under
Ordinance No. 11,suddenly stopped paying &
incurred back taxes. Verbal demands were made by
the CityTreasurer to San Miguel and warned them
that a warrant of distraint & levy will be
issuedagainst them if they continue to refuse to pay
their taxes.3.San Miguel answered the demands and
questioned that the power of the citygovernment to
distraint & levy can only be exercised with respect to
the delinquencies inthe payment of real estate
taxes.4.Later, a formal letter for demand was made by
the City Treasurer and San Miguelrequested more
time to act on the demand and refer the matter to its
Manila Office.
5.
More written demands were made by the Treasurer
but failed to collect from San Miguel.The Treasurer
then issued a warrant of distraint & levy against the
properties of SanMiguel at its branch office. Taxes
and penalties amounted to Php 24,747.32.6.The
notice of seizure by virtue of the warrant of distraint
& levy was served to the BranchManager of San
Miguel and San Miguel voluntarily surrendered 2
delivery trucks.
7.
San Miguel filed at the Court of First Instance of
Manila against Francisco Magno in hisindividual
capacity to release the delivery trucks and to pay
them the amount of Php6,000 & Php 3,000.00 for
each day that the trucks were impounded. Francisco
Magnofiled an Answer and stated that his actions
were in furtherance of his duties as the CityTreasurer
of Butuan City. During the pendency of the action,
San Miguel paid under protest the taxes assessed to
them. The impounded trucks were then
released.8.San Miguel filed a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Court of Appeals but was
denied.

Issue:1.Whether the Ordinance No. 26 is

constitutional2.Whether Francisco Magno should be
personally liable for damages
3.
Whether San Miguel shall pay Magno for nominal
damages & attorneys fees
.Decision:
1.
Magno, as the City Treasurer of Butuan issued the
said warrant through Ordinance No.26 of Butuan
City. The appeal of San Miguel questioned the
validity of the saidordinance. As a general rule, the
question of constitutionality should be raised at
theearliest opportunity. If it was not raised in the
pleadings, the issue cannot be raised atthe trial court
as well as on appeal. The exemptions are made in
criminal cases wherethe issue of constitutionality can
be raised at any stage of the proceedings and in
civilcases where the determination of the
constitutionality is important in the decision. In
civilcases also, the appellate court may consider the
question on the constitutionality of thestatute when it
involves the jurisdiction of the court below. Since
there are noexemptions in this case where the
question of the constitutionality of Ordinance No.
26may be raised, the appeal of the petitioners cannot
question the same.In addition, it is not correct that
Magno should be sued in his individual capacity
since heis not the proper party against whom the
invalidity of the statute should be pleaded.
Amunicipal ordinance is not subject to collateral
attack & public policy forbids collateralimpeachment
of legislative acts.2.Magno should not be held
personally & individually liable to pay for damages
to SanMiguel since he issued the warrant of distraint
and levy in good faith & in hisperformance of his
duties as the City Treasurer under Ordinance No. 26
of Butuan City.
3.
San Miguel should be made to pay for the attorneys
fees made by Magno. Since SanMiguel sued Magno
in his individual capacity, Magno is now forced to
hire a privatecounsel to defend his rights. Because of
this, it is only proper for San Miguel to pay for he
expenses Magno made for hiring his own counsel.

D. WHEN AWARDABLE, WHEN NOT

FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO,
petitioner, vs.
CITY
OF
DAGUPAN,
and
the
HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Keyword:
COURT INTERPRETER fell into a MANHOLE,
NATIONAL ROAD under controlof city
Topic:
Primary Liability

Municipal Corporations
Date:
March 21, 1989
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
GUILATCO was a Court Interpreter of CFI-Dagupan.
While shewas about to board a motorized tricycle at
the sidewalk of Perez Blvd., she accidentallyfell into
a manhole, thus causing her right leg to be fractured.
She was confined in 2hospitals for a period of more
than 16 days. She suffered excruciating pain;
incurredhospitalization and medication expenses; had
difficulty in locomotion; has not been ableto report
for duty as court interpreter, hence deprived of
income.
The manhole on thesidewalk along Perez Blvd was
partially covered by a concrete flower pot and left a
wide open hole about 2 ft. long by 1.5 feet wide.
Defendant government officialTANGCO, who took
on the DUAL role of being (1) City Engineer of
Dagupan City (LOCALgovt capacity) and (2) Exofficio Highway Engineer of Bureau of Public
Works(NATIONAL govt capacity), admitted the
existence of said manhole.
CITY

SCONTENTION:
that Perez Boulevard is a national road that is not
under the control orsupervision of the City of
Dagupan. Hence, no liability should attach to the city.
It is theMinistry of Public Highways that has control
or supervision through the HighwayEngineer which,
by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by the
same person who isalso the City Engineer of
Dagupan.
ISSUE: WON the City of Dagupan exercises
controlor supervision over a national road in effect

binding the city to answer fordamages in accordance

with article 2189? YES. City of Dagupan is Liable.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code requires only that
either control or supervision isexercised over the
defective road or street.
It is not even necessary for the defectiveroad or street
to belong to (or be owned by) the province, city, or
municipality forliability to attach.
The article only requires that either control or
supervision isexercised over the defective road or
street.
The charter of Dagupan clearly indicates that the city
indeed hassupervision and control over the sidewalk
where the open drainage hole islocated.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is
provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer. The same
charter of Dagupan alsoprovides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues
andalleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use
thereof, may be legislated by theMunicipal Board.
Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed
has supervisionand control over the sidewalk where
the open drainage hole is located.Liability of the city
to the petitioner under Article 2189 of the Civil Code
isclear. There is, therefore, no doubt that the City
Engineer exercises control orsupervision over the
public works in question. Hence, the liability of the
city to thepetitioner under article 2189 of the Civil
Code is clear.
COMPLETE DIGEST

25 Jul 1978: GUILATCO, a Court Interpreter of

Branch III, CFI-Dagupan City, whileshe was about to
board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at
Perez Blvd. (aNational Road, under the control and
supervision of the City of Dagupan)
accidentally fell into a manhole located on said
sidewalk
, thereby causing her
right leg to be fractured.

As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized,

operated on, confined in 2 hospitals(Karen: 1
st
hospital - at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for a
period of 16 days;2
nd
hospital - Medical City General Hospital, case did not
say number of days)
o

She incurred hospitalization, medication and other

expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 or a total of P
10,000.00 in all, as other receipts were eitherlost or
misplaced;
o
during the period of her confinement, GUILATCO
suffered severe orexcruciating pain not only on her
right leg which was fractured but also onall parts of
her body;
o
the pain has persisted even after her discharge from
the Medical CityGeneral Hospital on October 9,
1978, to the present.
o
Despite her discharge from the Hospital GUILATCO
is presently stillwearing crutches and the Court has
actually observed that she hasdifficulty in
locomotion.
o
From the time of the mishap up to the present,
GUILATCO has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotionin
going up the stairs of her office, located near the city
hall in DagupanCity.
o
She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her
monthly salary andother means of income, but since
the mishap up to the present she hasbeen deprived of
said income as she has already consumed her
accruedleaves in the government service.
o
She has lost several pounds as a result of the accident
and she is no longerher former jovial self, she has
been unable to perform her religious, social,and other
activities which she used to do prior to the incident.

All her doctors have confirmed the extent of the

fracture and injuries sustained bythe GUILATCO as a
result of the mishap.

On the other hand,

Patrolman Claveria
, De Asis and Cerezo testified and
confirmed the existence of the manhole on the
sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time of the
incident which was partially covered by a concrete
flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. long by

1 1/2 feet wide or 42 cms. wide by75 cms. long by

150 cms. Deep.

(3)Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant City of

Dagupan and defendant CityEngr. Alfredo G. Tangco,
for lack of merit.

Defendant government official Alfredo Tangco

(TANGCO) was the: (Karen: takenote of local govt
capacity vs. national govt capacity)
o
City Engineer of Dagupan City (LOCAL govt
capacity)
- As CityEngineer of Dagupan City (local govt
capacity), he supervises themaintenance of said
manholes or drainage system and sees to it that
theyare properly covered, and the job is specifically
done by his subordinates,Mr. Santiago de Vera
(Maintenance Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto
Solermoalso a maintenance Engineer.
o
Ex-officio Highway Engineer of Bureau of Public
Works (NATIONALgovt capacity) As ex-officio Highway Engineer (national govt
capacity)for Dagupan City he exercises supervision
and control over Nationalroads, including the Perez
Blvd. where the incident happened.

TANGCO admitted the existence of said manhole

along the sidewalk in PerezBlvd
., a National Road in front of the Luzon Colleges.

ALS 3C. Torts. Atty. Go. 2013

2
o
He also admitted that said
manhole (there are at least 11 in all in PerezBlvd.) is
owned by the National Government
and the sidewalk onwhich they are found along Perez
Blvd. are also owned by the NationalGovernment.

CFI-Dagupan RULING:
(1) Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay
GUILATCOactual damages in the amount of P
15,924 (namely P8,054.00 as hospital, medical,lost
income for 1 year, bonus and other expenses.
P150,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees
(2) DismissingGUILATCOs complaint as against
defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco; and

CA RULING: REVERSED CFI-Dagupan on the

ground that no evidence waspresented by the
GUILATCO to prove that the City of Dagupan had
"control orsupervision" over Perez Boulevard.

CITY

S CONTENTION:
that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal drainage hole
islocated, is a national road that is not under the
control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence,
no liability should attach to the city. It submits that it
is actuallythe Ministry of Public Highways that has
control or supervision through theHighway Engineer
which, by mere coincidence, is held concurrently by
the sameperson who is also the City Engineer of
Dagupan.
ISSUE:
WON the City of Dagupan exercises control or
supervision over a national road ineffect binding the
city to answer for damages in accordance with article
2189? YES
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the respondent CA
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the CFI-Dagupan is hereby
REINSTATED with the indicated modifications as
regards theamounts awarded: (1) Ordering the
defendant City of Dagupan to pay the
GUILATCOactual damages in the amount of P
15,924 (namely P 8,054.00 as hospital, medical
andother expenses; P 7,420.00 as lost income for one
(1) year and P 450.00 as bonus); P20,000.00 as moral
damages and P 10,000.00 as exemplary damages. The
attorney's feesof P 3,000.00 remain the same.
RATIO:

The liability of public corporations for damages

arising from injuries sufferedby pedestrians from the
defective condition of roads is expressed in the
CivilCode
as follows:
o
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable fordamages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective

condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,

andother public works
under their control or supervision.

It is not even necessary for the defective road or

street to belong or be ownedby the province, city or
municipality for liability to attach. The article
onlyrequires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defectiveroad or street.

In the case at bar,

this control or supervision is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer
who has the followingduties: (remember that
manholes are for yucky sewers)
o
Sec. 22. The City Engineer x x x He shall have the
following duties:

(j) He shall have the

care and custody of the public system of waterworks
and sewers, and all sources of water supply
, andshall
control, maintain and regulate
the use of the same, inaccordance with the ordinance
relating thereto; shall inspect andregulate the use of
all private systems for supplying water to thecity and
its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and
theirconnection with the public sewer system.

The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the

laying out, construction andimprovement of streets,
avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of
theuse thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal
Board.
Thus the charter clearlyindicates that the city indeed
has supervision and control over the sidewalk where
the open drainage hole is located.

The express provision in the charter holding the city

not liable for damages orinjuries sustained by persons
or property due to the failure of any city officerto
enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used
to exempt the city, asin the case at bar.
o

general rules
regulating the liability of the city.On the other hand
article 2189 applies
in particular
to the liability arisingfrom "defective streets, public
buildings and other public works."

Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City

Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex-Officio Highway
Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau
of PublicWorks, and, last but not the least, as
Building Official for Dagupan City, receives
thefollowing monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from
Dagupan City; P 200.00 from theMinistry of Public
Highways; P 100.00 from the Bureau of Public
Works and P500.00 by virtue of P.D. 1096,
respectively." This function of supervision
overstreets, public buildings, and other public works
pertaining to the City Engineer iscoursed through a
Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.
Althoughthese last two officials are employees of the
National Government, they are detailedwith the City
of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and
supervision from thecity through the City
Engineer.There is, therefore, no doubt that the City
Engineer exercises control or supervision overthe
public works in question. Hence, the liability of the
city to the petitioner underarticle 2198 of the Civil
Code is clear.OTHER ISSUES: PERTAIN TO THE
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES and GARNISHMENT.
Seefootnote if you want to browse through it
1
1
Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to
the petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00 should
bereduced to the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only.
The trial court should not have rounded off the
amount. Indetermining actual damages, the court can
not rely on "speculation, conjecture or guess work" as
to the amount.Without the actual proof of loss, the
award of actual damages becomes erroneous.
3Reference:
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be liable for damages forthe death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control
orsupervision. (n)
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded
even without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuchas the

The charter only lays down

determination of the amount is discretionary on the

court.
Though incapable of pecuniary estimation,moral
damages are in the nature of an award to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered but which
forsome reason can not be proven. However, in
awarding moral damages, the following should be
taken intoconsideration:(1) First, the proximate cause
of the injury must be the claimee's acts.(2) Second,
there must be compensatory or actual damages as
satisfactory proof of the factual basisfor damages.(3)
Third, the award of moral damages must be
predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the
CivilCode.In the case at bar, the physical suffering
and mental anguish suffered by the petitioner were
proven. Witnessesfrom the petitioner's place of work
testified to the degeneration in her disposition-from
being jovial to depressed.She refrained from
attending social and civic activities.Nevertheless the
award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive.
Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her
only during her treatment which lasted for one year.
Though evidence of moral lossand anguish existed to
warrant the award of damages, the moderating hand
of the law is called for. The Court hastime and again
called attention to the reprehensible propensity of
trial judges to award damages without basis,resulting
in exhorbitant amounts.Although the assessment of
the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial
court underpreceding jurisprudence, the amount of
moral damages should be reduced to P 20,000.00.As
for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court
correctly pointed out the basis:To serve as an
example for the public good, it is high time that the
Court, through this case, shouldserve warning to the
city or cities concerned to be more conscious of their
duty and responsibility to theirconstituents, especially
when they are engaged in construction work or when
there are manholes on theirsidewalks or streets which
are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in
order to minimize or prevent accidents to the poor
pedestrians.Too often in the zeal to put up "public
impact" projects such as beautification drives, the end
is moreimportant than the manner in which the work
is carried out. Because of this obsession for showing
off, suchtrivial details as misplaced flower pots
betray the careless execution of the projects, causing
public inconvenienceand inviting accidents.Pending
appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the
trial court to the appellate court, thepetitioner was
able to secure an order for garnishment of the funds
of the City deposited with the PhilippineNational
Bank, from the then presiding judge, Hon. Willelmo
Fortun. This order for garnishment was
revokedsubsequently by the succeeding presiding

judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and became the basis

for the petitioner'smotion for reconsideration which
was also denied.We rule that the execution of the
judgment of the trial court pending appeal was
premature. We donot find any good reason to justify
the issuance of an order of execution even before the
expiration of the time to appeal.
Lopez V. Pan American (1966)
G.R. No. L-20434

July 30, 1966

Lessons Applicable: Factors in determining amount

(Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable:
FACTS:
August 1, 1960: Pan American Employees
Association staged a strike so Pan Am forced them to
take a leave of absence without pay on February 22,
1961 to February 23, 1961
court a quo: affected them financially and
economically, it ordered Pan America to pay them
their two days salaries
CA: affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the employees should be awarded back
wages.
HELD: NO. AFFIRMED in so far as it declares
petitioner Pan American World Airways, Inc. not
guilty of unfair labor practice, but IS REVERSED in
so far as it orders said petitioner to pay the members
of the respondent labor union, Pan American
Employees Association, their wages or salaries for
February 22 and 23, 1961 when they were made by
the petitioner to go on furlough. The petitioner is
absolved from paying the said back wages. No
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
The dismiss employee is not entirely without remedy
if his charge of unfair labor practice fails and his
complaint dismissed, because the breach by the
employer of the obligation to him may be redressed
like an ordinary contract or obligation
in placing its employees on furlough for two days,
petitioner acted in good faith. The record shows that
before laying them off it asked permission from the
industrial court and only effected the furlough after
said court authorized it to do so.
the step taken by respondent was necessary to protect
its interest whose business is mainly dependent on
the flight of its planes," giving as additional reason
that "lack of work as a cause of lay-off is justified.

Inasmuch as petitioner acted in good faith, it should

not be ordered to pay back wages to its laid off
employees.
not paid their wages for only two days, We do not
believe that the same would place them in such a
financial and economic distress as to warrant the
award of their back wages
RAMOS VS. RAMOS Case Digest
RAMOS VS. RAMOS
61 SCRA 284
FACTS: Spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate
died on October 4, 1906 and October 26, 1880,
respectively. They were survived by their 3 children.
Moreover, Martin was survived by his 7 natural
children. In December 1906, a special proceeding for
the settlement of the intestate estate of said spouses
was conducted. Rafael Ramos, a brother of Martin,
administered the estate for more than 6 years.
Eventually, a partition project was submitted which
was signed by the 3 legitimate children and 2 of the 7
natural children. A certain Timoteo Zayco signed in
representation of the other 5 natural children who
were minors. The partition was sworn to before a
justice of peace.
The conjugal hereditary estate was appraised at
P74,984.93, consisting of 18 parcels of land, some
head of cattle and the advances to the legitimate
children. thereof represented the estate of Martin.
1/3 thereof was the free portion or P12,497.98. The
shares of the 7 natural children were to be taken from
that 1/3 free portion. Indeed, the partition was made
in accordance with the Old Civil code. Thereafter,
Judge Richard Campbell approved the partition
project. The court declared that the proceeding will
be considered closed and the record should be
archived as soon as proof was submitted that each
he3ir had received the portion adjudicated to him.
On February 3, 1914, Judge Nepumoceno asked the
administrator to submit a report showing that the
shares of the heirs had been delivered to them as
required by the previous decision. Nevertheless, the
manifestation was not in strict conformity with the
terms of the judges order and with the partition
project itself. 8 lots of the Himamaylan Cadastre
were registered in equal shares in the names of
Gregoria (widow of Jose Ramos) and her daughter,
when in fact the administrator was supposed to pay
the cash adjudications to each of them as enshrined in
the partition project. Plaintiffs were then constrained
to bring the suit before the court seeking for the
reconveyance in their favor their corresponding

participations in said parcels of land in accordance

with Article 840 of the old Civil Code. Note that 1/6
of the subject lots represents the 1/3 free portion of
martins shares which will eventually redound to the
shares of his 7 legally acknowledged natural children.
The petitioners action was predicated on the theory
that their shares were merely held in trust by
defendants. Nonetheless, no Deed of Trust was
alleged and proven. Ultimately, the lower court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds of res
judicata, prescription and laches.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs action was
barred by prescription, laches and res judicata to the
effect that they were denied of their right to share in
their fathers estate.
RULING: YES, there was inexcusable delay thereby
making the plaintiffs action unquestionably barred
by prescription and laches and also by res judicata.
Inextricably interwoven with the questions of
prescription and res judicata is the question on the
existence of a trust. It is noteworthy that the main
thrust of plaintiffs action is the alleged holding of
their shares in trust by defendants. Emanating from
such, the Supreme Court elucidated on the nature of
trusts and the availability of prescription and laches
to bar the action for reconveyance of property
allegedly held in trust. It is said that trust is the right,
enforceable solely in equity to the beneficial
enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is
vested in another. It may either be express or implied.
The latter ids further subdivided into resulting and
constructive trusts. Applying it now to the case at bar,
the plaintiffs did not prove any express trust. Neither
did they specify the kind of implied trust
contemplated in their action. Therefore, its
enforcement maybe barred by laches and prescription
whether they contemplate a resulting or a
constructive trust.
YASONA V. DE RAMOS
G.R. No. 156339 October 6, 2004
Facts: Aurea Yasona and her son, Saturnino, went to
the house of Jovencio de Ramos to ask for financial
assistance in paying their loans to Philippine National
Bank (PNB), otherwise their residential house and lot
would be foreclosed. Jovencio acceded to the request.
They agreed that, upon payment by Jovencio of the
loan to PNB, half of Yasonas subject property would
be sold to him.
Jovencio paid Aureas bank loan. Aurea therefore
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Jovencio
over half of the lot consisting of 123 square meters.

Thereafter, the lot was surveyed and separate titles

were issued in the names of Aurea and Jovencio.
Twenty-two years later, Aurea filed an estafa
complaint against brothers Jovencio and Rodencio de
Ramos on the ground that she was deceived by them
when she asked for their assistance in 1971
concerning her mortgaged property.
Jovencio and Rodencio filed a complaint for damages
on the ground of malicious prosecution. They alleged
that the filing of the estafa complaint against them
was done with malice and it caused irreparable injury
to their reputation, as Aurea knew fully well that she
had already sold half of the property to Jovencio.
Issue: Whether or not
prosecution in this case.

there

was

malicious

Ruling: Petitioners are liable for malicious

prosecution. Malicious prosecution has been
defined as an action for damages brought by one
against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or
other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously
and without probable cause, after the termination of
such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of
the defendant therein. To constitute malicious
prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution
was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate
a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a
case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution.
The pieces of evidence indicate that Aurea had long
acknowledged Jovencios ownership of half of the
property. Furthermore, it was only in 1993 when
petitioners decided to file the estafa complaint against
respondents. If petitioners had honestly believed that
they still owned the entire property, it would not have
taken them 22 years to question Jovencios ownership
of half of the property. The only conclusion that can
be drawn from the circumstances is that Aurea knew
all along that she was no longer the owner of
Jovencios portion after having sold it to him way
back in 1971. Likewise, other than petitioners bare
allegations, no other evidence was presented by them
to substantiate their claim.