Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Workshop Proceedings
Keynote paper
Work Package 2 Seminar 8
Data communication needs and
standards
[FP6 Project: SES6-CT-2003-503516]
Document Information
Document Name:
ID:
S8_Proceedings-Keynote_Siemens_V2.doc
WP :
WP2
Task :
Task 2.1
Revision:
V2
Revision Date:
08/10/2004
Author:
Diffusion list
EU-DEEP Partners Contact Points
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Name
Company
Author
C. Schwaegerl
Siemens AG
J. Deuse
Tractebel
Coordinator
E. Gehain
GDF
Date
Visa
Document history
Revision
Date
Modification
Author
22.3.04
C. Schwaegerl /
B. Buchholz
V0
20.4.04
C. Schwaegerl
V1
20.5.04
C. Schwaegerl
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Content
DOCUMENT INFORMATION ................................................................................................. 2
GENERAL PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT ............................................................................ 3
CONTENT ............................................................................................................................ 4
1.
2.
2.2.
2.2.1
2.2.2
Communication paths............................................................................................ 6
2.2.3
Supervisory system............................................................................................... 7
2.2.4
2.3.
2.4.
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
2.4.5
2.5.
3.
2.5.1
2.5.2
STANDARDS ............................................................................................................. 19
3.1.
3.2.
IEC 61850........................................................................................................... 20
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.2.5
3.2.6
GOOSE .............................................................................................................. 26
3.3.
4.
5.
WHAT MUST BE ABANDONED FROM THE PAST IN THIS AREA TO FAVOUR DER? ...... 28
6.
7.
ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... 29
8.
LITERATURE ............................................................................................................. 30
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The large scale integration of DER units requires monitoring and control of these systems. It is
done to accomplish a stable, save and energetically and economically optimised operation of the
plants and the grid. The main concerns are energy management and plant operation. Therefore,
one of the main challenges is to ensure a fast, reliable, fault-tolerant, powerful, flexible und
cheap communication between larger DER units with control centres, substation automation
systems, and/or DER management systems also in geographically widespread installations.
Energy management comprises all methods to acquire an efficient and therefore cost optimised
use of energy of dispersed energy supply systems, a combination of DER, load and storage
devices. Different solutions are possible, from simply metering the generation (for billing or
payment purposes) up to complex energy management systems with generation forecasts, unit
scheduling and online control of the scheduled values. Peak load management, demand and
supply side management and load matching are further key words in the optimisation process.
Aggregation of smaller units like household PV plants enables to include these plants in energy
management systems.
Monitoring and control of the plant operation respectively the cooperation of the plants with the
Area EPS covers all operational aspects. The Distribution System Operator (DSO) monitors all
required information, i.e. status of the plants, power quality or protection information. Up to
now control is mainly done to switch off the plants in case of power failures or maintenance of
the grid. With an increased number of DER and RES they also have to be integrated in grid
operation, i.e. providing ancillary services:
voltage control
assuring the supply reliability
reduction of network losses
avoiding of unit overload
grid recovery after shortages.
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With these additional tasks the volume of communication is significantly increased. The amount
of information to be processed rises, and consequently the costs for communication rise.
Suitable communication solutions have to be found.
Up to now in low voltage networks and to certain extend in medium voltage networks mostly no
communication is realised. There is no supervision of voltage; information about the power
produced is not available. A communication structure for the data transmission from the control
centre to the DER units does not exist. It is not possible to parameterise or control DER online
to optimise the grid operation using DER. However, the connection of DER at any level makes
the operation of the distribution network similar to transmission with the constraint of low
automation, large amount of assets and non controlled generation and consumption.
2.2.
2.2.1
sf
unct
i
ons,di
f
f
er
entcommuni
cat
i
ont
asksmustbe
accomplished to enable the data exchange between and within the levels. There are different
communication needs of Energy Management Systems (EMS), Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) Systems, Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), IEDs, Substation Automation,
Power Plants, and Energy Services to customer sites. Each level has its own corresponding
communication structure (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Communication relations and hierarchy levels of power supply system control.
2.2.2
Communication paths
For DER and RES units external and internal communication has to be distinguished (Figure 2).
External Communication
Depending on the system configuration and the location of the intelligence there is
communication betweent
hegener
at
or
scont
r
ol
l
erandanyon-site controller, between the local
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cont
r
ol
l
er(
orgener
at
or
scont
r
ol
l
eri
fnoon-site controller is used) and a supervisory system
and between a supervisory system and any external actors or systems via different hierarchical
levels.
2.2.3
Supervisory system
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production volumes tend to have much more effect on the equipment price. Instead of
minimizing local intelligence it is better to minimize variety of devices, especially hardware.
Centralised decisions allow simpler and cheaper on-site equipment but require extended
communication efforts and make response times higher and increases vulnerability. Meeting
data security requirements without local intelligence is a challenge and causes restrictions on
possible system structures and business models. When you have access management,
encryption and fire wall locally the cost of having other equally data processing intensive
functions is rather insignificant. Also requirement for easy installation or even
Plug and Play
cannot be met without significant embedded intelligence. Fault tolerance requires some local
intelligence, too. On the other way if an optimisation is required, i.e. for scheduling the plants
with an energy management system, only central solutions can find a global optimum;
optimisation tasks with local intelligence provide only local optima which could be different from
the global one. For different business plans, generator types and sizes, there are different levels
where the efforts, costs and therefore the solutions for monitoring and control are considered
acceptable.
Central communication server
Today, within the DER structures there is mostly one central communication server that is
interconnected to the DER units. Communication can take place with normal PCs or with special
hardware/software configurations. The communication server is usually a PC that is located near
or that is identical to the supervision system. It can be integrated in a substation automation
system, a control centre or a decentralized energy management system and handles all the
required communication for all applications. Billing, maintenance, process management,
telecontrol, etc. is also possible, but can also be established by separate systems. Measured
values can be directly imported from the meters or imported from a meter management system
that collects all data, checks the plausibility and corrects possible outages.
The PC solution enables coupling to other applications, like SAP or data bases. Additional
internet services can be implemented like routing, firewall, access server, web server, internet
domain name service, mail- and news server, SMS - gateway (Short Message System), print
service, terminal and file service, time service, network management and alarming system.
2.2.4
Transmission media
A communication media is needed to reach the actors of the energy sector. Depending on the
communication requirements and the infrastructure available the communication grid has to be
configured. Decisions on network topology and required data volume have to be derived.
Transmission media for local data exchange are transmission cables (electrical: V.24/V.28
(RS232) and V.11 (RS485), optical link, etc.).
For data transmission over a geographical distance different communication media can be used
depending on the time requirements:
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The conventional line bound kind of data transmission via modem (ISDN, analogue) by copper
lines is still the cheapest and fasted way.
Mobile transmission
Radio transmission over wide distances requires a GSM network. There are suitable modems
available, but only have a low transmission rate. The costs for using GSM services are still high.
Higher transmission rates are achieved by the new UMTS standard.
Future trends
In some regions with suitable infrastructure, i.e. close to centres of population, it is possible to
use existing communication media like telephone line (analogue, ISDN) or follow the trend is to
replace them with always-on packet-switched access techniques with TCP/IP communication,
using such media as ADSL / VDSL, GPRS and WLAN, Ethernet.Internet connection is possible
with mature, cheap but reliable PC solutions. If the site enables this technology it will dominate
further installations. Inexpensive computers equipped with suitable communication and control
software are able to manage the distributed resources. Moreover, the creation of a separate
communication backbone for exclusive usage with DER systems will be a costly attempt. Sharing
the communication infrastructure with several applications is thus an other trend. For remote
installations such as bigger wind farms or wave power plants communication will be more
difficult. A more expensive radio transmission (GSM, UMTS) has to be applied.
2.3.
Communication layer
Protocols are set of rules that determine the behaviour of functional units in achieving and
performing communication. All 7 layers of the ISO/OSI reference model for open systems
(Physical, Data Link, Network, Transport, Session, Presentation, and Application Layer) have to
be specified. In order to minimize the response times, in some protocols only the layers 1,2, and
7 are used, in accordance with the three-layer Enhanced Performance Architecture (EPA)
model. The tasks of these layers are described for the current mainstream protocols for
distribution automation such as the IEC 60870-5 series.
Layer 1: Physical Layer
The physical layer performs the tasks:
Conversion of the serial signal into parallel characters, and vice versa
Safeguarding of the telegrams against loss and errors by generating and verification
of check codes.
Layer 2: Link Layer (including data flow control)
The link layer controls the transmission procedure. It performs essentially the following tasks:
Providing the basic services for symmetrical and asymmetrical transmission (e. g.
SEND / CONFIRM; SEND / NO REPLY)
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- Analogue values
- Transformer taps
- Metered values
- Bit patterns
- Protection data
Buffering of process information in process and transmission images
Providing transmission mode control with different priorities for
- Spontaneous (event driven) transmission
- Requested transmission (data transfer on demand)
- Cyclic/periodic transmission (all data or only data that has changed since last
transfer)
Command processing and management for
- Pulse commands
- Setpoints
- Organisational commands
Application and communication are not separated in the IEC 60870-5 series. As communication
technologies will change in future but data will not a separation of both is the idea of the new
standard IEC 61850 that is explained because of its importance in detail in chapter 2.3. In this
standard the model is based in a hierarchical decomposition of three levels: information models,
information exchange methods as service interface, and the communication profiles like the
mapping to MMS and TCP/IP Ethernet. The main objective of this layering is to keep the
information (application) free from any information exchange method and communication
network.
2.4.
Subject of communication
Basically the communication system must assist operators, users and other interested parties in
performing their tasks, by provision of services. The system must be flexible to support future
r
equi
r
ement
sandf
ut
ur
edevel
opment
s.I
tmustbeopeni
nt
hesenset
hat
anyoneshal
lbeabl
e
t
ogeti
nf
or
mat
i
ononanyt
hi
ngf
r
om anywher
e
,af
t
erbei
ngaut
hor
i
sed. It shall be adapted to
individual users and services by means of configurations, set-ups, etc. The basic functions of the
system can be grouped in two main categories, supervisory, control and data acquisition
(SCADA) functions and system management functions.
2.4.1
Operational functions
The operational functions are needed for the normal daily operation of the DER. In these
functions a HMI, either local or remote is included. The operational functions are used to present
process or system information to an operator or to provide him with the control. These include:
Access security management access to operational functions has to be controlled by a set
of rules. Access control will allow restricting an authenticated client to a pre-determined set
of services and objects.
Supervision local or remote monitoring of the status and changes of states in operational
devices belonging to the generator itself or to the interconnection subsystem (network part).
Control control functions allow an operator or an automatic function to operate the
equipment (e.g. switchgear or transformer, a protection, etc). Control is subjected to
miscellaneous filters that check that no damage will be caused by its performing.
Parameter Changes (online) in addition to single parameters, an application may have
several possible pre-defined parameter sets (but only one active set).
Alarm Management an alarm is generated when a data of the system goes out from the
limits specified by the operator. In other words, there is a need for attracting attention to
some abnormal state. Alarm management functions allow an operator to visualise,
acknowledge and clear alarms.
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Event and Log Management functions for continuous scanning of devices searching for
alarms, operator control actions and changes in state, and for recording events
chronologically with date and time information.
Retrieval of configuration data and settings functions to check parameter setting should
include services to retrieve all parameters (names, values and units for all set points) or to
retrieve only those that differ from the default values.
Fault Record Retrieval for displaying or analysing purposes.
Measuring and metering.
2.4.2
System management functions include system support functions and system configuration and
maintenance functions. System support functions are used to manage the system itself (e.g.
network management, time synchronisation, self-checking of communication equipment, etc.).
The functions support the total system and have no impact on the process. System
configuration or maintenance functions are used to set-up or evolve (maintain) the system. The
system configuration and maintenance functions include the setting and changing of
configuration data and the retrieval of configuration information from the system. The most
important examples of System Management functions are:
System Support:
Network Management functions needed to configure and maintain the communication
network. The basic task is the identification of communication objects/devices.
Time Synchronisation of devices within a communication system.
Self-checking detects if an object or device is fully, partially or not operational at all.
System Configuration and Maintenance:
Software Management includes version control, download, activation and retrieval of
software.
Configuration Management is used to download, activate and retrieve configuration data.
Operative mode control allows an authorised operator to start and stop functions or
objects within the system, including manual activation or reset of subsystems.
Setting function allows an operator to read and to change offline one or more parameters
affecting the behaviour of the object/device.
Test Mode gives the possibility to check a function avoiding impact on the process
(blocking the process outputs).
System Security Management allows the control and supervision of the security system
against unauthorised access.
2.4.3
The Data
PICOM concept
To describe the data being exchanged the PICOM (Piece of Information for COMmunication)
concept introduced by CIGRE WG34.03 can be used. Components or attributes of a PICOM are:
DATA meaning the content of the information and its identification as needed by the
functions (semantic) (established in IEC 61850-5)
TYPE describing the st
r
uct
ur
eoft
hedat
a,i
.
e.i
fi
t
sananal
ogueorbi
nar
yval
ue,i
fi
t
sa
single value or a set of data, etc.
PERFORMANCE meaning the permissible transmission time (defined by performance class),
the data integrity and the method or cause of transmission (periodic, event driven,
requested ..)
LOGICAL CONNECTION containing the logical source (sending logical node) and the logical
sink (destination or receiving logical node) (A logical node (LN) is the smallest part of a
function that exchanges data).
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2.4.4
Data requirements
Each specific kind of data has specific requirements on the communication system. Alarms, for
example, need to reach the remote control centre much faster than events and need therefore a
higher transmission priority. Protection data have to be transmitted and processed immediately
within milliseconds, the time span for monitoring and control data transmission is seconds to
minutes, occasionally hours.
The different kinds of data can be grouped and named real-time/on-line data,
historical/retrospective data or forecasts/schedules.
Generally there are the following requirements:
Analogue signals. All analogue process values shall be accessible in standard SI-units.
Analogue values "at the source" shall be available as real-time on-line instant data, as well as
time averaged values (with different average periods). The values may be used for display on
operator HMIs as well as for storage (databases). Updating of analogue on-line values may
be selectable down to an interval of 1 second. All averaged values must be stored in the plant
controller for retransmission on demand. Some process values are not required as
measurements directly at the source. The values shall be accessible as processed data in a
condensed and analysed format.
All the analogue measured values should have readable properties like signal quality and
scanning rate. This information does not have to be included in every data transfer. The
averaging time and the measuring and averaging method should be documented for all data.
It should be possible to time stamp all data. Time-stamped data shall be stamped with the
last updated date + time (UTC time).
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Commands. Setting values that have impact on the behaviour of the function of a device
require special attention to when (e.g. immediate or deferred) and how (e.g. select before
operate) set the values. A handshake procedure is required for all commands that start or
stop a mechanical component, influence the status or operation mode, or change the
software.
Alarms. Operational alarms may be transmitted immediately after a triggering. A triggering is
typically initiated at any event that results in an automatic stop of the generator, any event
that causes an emergency stop or any other alarm-causing event. Alarms should include the
time of the occurrence. Alarms may optionally be stored in a log in the device controller
(server).
Events. Operational events shall be stored in an event log in the plant device for transmission
on demand. Log entries shall be time-stamped.
Counters. Counters shall be understood as values accumulated in the process such as hour
counters, production counters, counters for operational modes, timers, counts of transitions
on relays, motors, pumps, etc. The values shall be stored with a corresponding date and time
stamp. Updating counters may be selectable down to an interval of 1 second. All values shall
be stored in the plant device for transmission on demand. It should be possible to reset all
t
het
i
mer
sandt
he
r
esetdat
eshal
lbest
or
edasasepar
at
ei
t
em.
Grouped data. Data values can be grouped based on logical relationships as chronologically
ordered data, as text, etc. Some of the different ways to put together sets of data are:
Data structures (typically include several kinds of related data, for example the data value,
the time stamp, the quality information or the description of an object).
Time series data (time based data values for a specific object attribute, for example
sampled data, metering data, etc.)
Short text messages (text messages exchanged between the generator and the control
centre)
Files (files for upload/download of programs, etc.)
2.4.5
The communication shall be based on open and widely accepted methods with a high degree of
interface possibilities. Decisions on network topology and required data volume have to be
derived to enable a reliable, fault-tolerant, powerful und cheap data transmission; but it shall
not be used for the safe and secure internal operation of the unit. Faults in the communication
system shall not cause malfunction of the distributed generator.
For this basic requirements exist:
Security
Remote monitoring and operation of devices requires strict security measures for several
reasons: protect the data from being stolen, corrupted, and intentionally falsified; protect the
device from unauthorised use or to preserve the privacy of monitoring data. Security services
must prevent loss of information and detect false information. To enforce these security
requirements the following functionalities are needed:
Authentication. Server authentication shall ensure the client that he is truly operating on
the intended site. Client authentication ensures that an authorised client/operator is
operating the equipment. Each user might have different rights to operate functions
and/or to see data on different levels in the object hierarchy.
Data Integrity. Non-corruption of transferred data is necessary, i.e. the communication
system must be able to deliver data from its origin to its destination with an acceptable
residual error rate. This prevents both malicious and erroneous operation.
Data confidentiality. Transferred data items might need to be encrypted to prevent both
malicious and erroneous operation, as well as spying.
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Communication via internet should use https (Secure http) as a transmission protocol. VPN
(Virtual Private Network), SSL-encoding with client certificates or firewalls are other
alternatives.
Performance
The hardware has to fit with the corresponding communication software. It has to handle the
expected data volume, data throughput and the number of connections. The performance of
the communication system is limited by the factors:
The time of response of most operational functions and, therefore, of the related
communication does not need to be much faster than one second. System management
functions, which shall be available for the operators and control systems, are of low time
critical nature. Delay in execution of these functions however should not be more than 2
seconds.
The use of web technologies can not guarantee the required reaction times for real-time
transmission. All functions regarding safety of people or of the generator like online control or
protection of units supervised have to be enabled by control centre solutions existing or must
be self-contained in the main controller and will trip automatically.
Regarding optimisation of the operational functions, the communication system has a major
role. The time critical functions include both control and supervision functions. Set points for
power control and start and stop commands are the most critical functions. Periodic on-line
operational data is essential for the optimisation of the operation. Finally, the operator needs
to know the status of the communication system to be able to rely on the presented data.
The time critical functions shall use short messages with high priority. Delays can occur due
to transmission errors, low capacity or low bandwidth of the transport lines, or due to
network faults. It is essential for the design of the communication system to select methods
that minimise such kind of problems. The critical functions must be based on fast and reliable
transmission of a number of selected data types. The overall transfer time for services in time
critical functions shall not be more than 0.5 seconds.
Reliability
Reliability is essential in the sense that data can be retransmitted, reconstructed or
reprocessed if lost or inaccessible. Data may be inaccessible because of faults in the main
controller, faults in data transport or faults in data processing units. It must be possible to
restore information, including the sequence of events. Local procedures for recovery may
include redundancy of selected functions and backup of data.
Redundancy in the communication channels will be optional depending on the criticality of the
communication needs. In that case, automatic procedures for detection of communication
faults and for managing redundancy of the system components shall be established. The
physical transport lines should be redundant to a certain degree.
Data integrity
Compatibility to other manufacturers must be accomplished.
In case of data transmission errors due to electromagnetic interference, ground potential
differences, ageing of components and other causes of noise or interference, an effective
protection of the communication ensures that
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In case of a detected transmission error, i.e. like not completely received data packages, a
new transmission is initiated. The data not or not completely received can be again requested
by the communication partner. All errors are documented in a communication protocol.
Transmission data have to be stored in databases that no data loss occurs in case of a
connection failure.
Monitoring of operation
Self-Monitoring of the software ensures the correct function and has to raise an indication in
case of any malfunctions. Additionally the availability of the communication hardware has to
be checked. A complete system request of all data transmission devices should regularly
happen, i.e. every 60 seconds. The results of this cyclic supervision of the operation status of
the transmission devices are stored as status information.
Connection data like time, date, partner identification, initialization, and connection time and
status information are stored in a communication protocol. This can be a text-based log-file
or a database.
General
The external communication hardware should be operated by grid voltage. There must not be
any interference with other components.
2.5.
The architecture of communication systems should be as open as possible to promote plug and
play and interoperability to the fullest extent possible. The required performance has to be met
considering requested data throughput, fault tolerance and reliability.
2.5.1
Autonomous networks
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Figure 3: Possible communication infrastructure for monitoring and control of a distributed power supply system.
2.5.2
Grid-connected DER
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turbines for yield control, remote diagnostics and early detection of failures. Data is normally
scanned once a day. As a communication system, dialup telephone line is used, which connects
the modems of turbine and operator.
Decentralised Energy Management System and Virtual Power Plants
An intelligent decentralized energy management system (DEMS) that predicts loads and
generation and schedules the units, enables to optimise the operation of the units.
Communication between the units under control and the management system is required.
Measured values, metered values, setpoints and status information have to be transmitted
bet
weent
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The communication realised in different projects operates using switched and dedicated lines
with transmission media PLC, fibro optic, telecom network and radio transmission, to which the
individual elements of generation, storage and load are connected via the generation and load
management system and via automation units. Depending on cost-benefit analysis, larger units
are controlled using two-way communication, whereas in some cases, distributed smaller units
are provided only with one-way communication. The effect of the control command is then
taken into account by means of estimation. The performance of elements without control
capabilities may be predicted. Specified values for energy import, supply and contracts are input
from outside to the energy management system.
Daily profiles can be transmitted via switched lines, while single values with commands or
metered values in a 1 min cycle require a dedicated line (Figure 4). Costs for operation and
installation of the communication must not be higher than the savings and other operational
benefits by an optimized management of the units. It has to be decided which units will provide
a significant weight and will have to be connected to the communication network.
Pow er System
Control
Decentralized
Energy M anagmt.System
Purchase Optimization
Contract M anagement
Power Exchange
SL
Billing
G
Biomass
Power Plant
SL Switched Line
Profiles
DL
DL
Dedicated Line
Indiv.Values
SL
Weather
Forecast Service
SL
Communication
Communication
Grid
Grid
DL
Blocktype
Power Heat Cogen.
SL
SL
Concentrated
Loads
DL
SL
SL
SL
Remote Metering
PV-Plant
with Battery Storage
Concentrator
...
Distrib.
Loads
Mod.
Fuel Cell
Distributed
small FC
Large
Virtual
Wind Energy Unit
Mod.
Z
Mod.
Mod.
Mod.
Mod.
Z
Z
Specified values for energy import, market impacts, electricity prices and supply contracts are
input to the energy management system from outside. In a liberalised market contractors,
aggregators and traders can fulfil supply contracts operating these virtual power plants.
A huge number of very small decentralised generators like PV plants can be integrated in the
energy management systems with data concentrators that reduce those objects to a single
element with a higher power that is considered in the management system. Groups with similar
structure information like model type, building type, operator identification, kind of
communication or grid location are handled like a bigger unit of corresponding type. For an
automated operation connect or disconnect signals with structure information and measured
time series of the small generators have to be communicated. The data concentrator then
performs the aggregation of the generator data and transmits it to the DEMS. DER units are
management without individual solutions for every unit.
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In a simpler variant standardised communication protocols could enable real-time costs of power
to be translated into price signals that flow through the entire power system, thus assisting in
the creation of more readily identifiable revenue streams for distributed energy systems to
capture.
With an increased share of DER, a harmonization of the interfaces is required for a reliable and
cost-effective communication while up to now mainly different proprietary solutions are applied.
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3. Standards
3.1.
The market is today characterised by vendor specific and hardware oriented solutions. As a
consequence there is a large number of protocols for communication. Devices from different
manufacturers and even devices from different generations from the same manufacturer cannot
communicate with each other or only with disproportionate expenditures for development,
engineering and maintenance, i.e. using a gateway to carry out the protocol conversion. Due to
the increasing number of modern information systems, the increase of data and the fact that
the innovation cycles of hard- and software are constantly becoming shorter the number of
incompatible protocols is expected to rise. Costs for data integration and maintenance are
exploding. Vendors of power systems have limited resources to implement and apply hundreds
of proprietary communication systems. A reduction of variety in a relatively small market is
extremely beneficial for both vendors and users. Thus standardisation is the key for the
advancement of the connectivity and interoperability of systems. Through standardisation both
users and suppliers arrive at economically suitable, reliable solutions.
Today in Europe the communication is done by different media and protocols. Figure 5 shows
the variety of current protocols like the IEC 60870-5 series and DNP 3.0 or 5 or IEC 60870-6
TASE.2 that are applicable between substations, IEDs and control centres. The cloud in the
figures represents every kind of communication connection or association like point-to-point or
router network, etc. A detailed description of all standards and applications is provided in the
annex.
There is a mix of terms all dealing with communication. Thus data exchange is realised via OPC
(OLE for Process Control), COM/DCOM/ActiveX (Component Object Model, Distributed COM),
XML (eXtensible Mark-up Language), ODBC (Microsoft Open Database Connectivity), JMS
(Java Messaging System) or web services, all covering different layers in the ISO/OSI reference
model.
IEC 61970 EM S
EC, EDI
1
IEC 62
95 TR
M arket
Participant
Control
Centre 2
ISO 9735
IEC 61968 DM S
Control Centre 1
IEC 62210
Server
IEC 60870-5-101, -104,
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IEEE P1525,
ELCOM 90, DNP3
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M etering
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PU
Substation
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and supervisory systems and to external systems, but are not used when interfacing directly to
the hardware.
A new global standard, the IEC 61850, was required to improve substation device data
integration and to enable interoperability. The standard provides common data models, service
models, protocols, communication physiques, engineering data exchanges and conformance
tests.
3.2.
3.2.1
IEC 61850
Special features
Since 1995, about 60 experts from 14 countries have been tackling these issues by IEC TC 57
Working Groups 10, 11, and 12. They responded to all these challenges and created a single,
global and future-proof standard forsubst
at
i
oncommuni
cat
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ons,t
heI
EC 61850
communi
cat
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on
net
wor
ksandsyst
emsi
nsubst
at
i
ons
(
seeal
sowww.61850.com). Very high objectives were set
for the standard:
To cover all the information in substations, down to small digital units for driving the
processes, which thus include digital transducers or sensors, and actuators located close to
the processes.
Openness for extension of the information to be communicated in the future according to
the principle: All that are known are incorporated, and any future applications can be filled
in according to the set rules.
Openness for future high-efficiency data transfer.
To promote the idea of interoperability in systems, which surpasses the specifications of
data-coding and communication services like IEC 60870-5. The requirements on
engineering and on the sustainability of products within the service life of the
corresponding system are included in the standard.
IEC 61850 defines a comprehensive communication standard for substations. This includes a
consistent data and service model at all communication level. Operational information
(indications, commands, and measured values) are coded and transmitted in the same way on a
possible process bus and station bus. The use of the same application interfaces and protocol
stacks at the station bus and process bus levels ensures that "gateway-free" communication
links are established within the station.
The objective of IEC 61850 is to design a communication system that provides interoperability
between the functions to be performed in a substation, but residing in equipment (physical
devices) from different suppliers, meeting the same functional and operational requirements.
Functional requirements have to be met independent of substation size and operational
conditions.
IEC 61850 differs from most previous utility protocols in its use of object models of device
functions and device components. There are logical devices composed of logical nodes and data
objects. These models define common data formats, identifiers, and controls, e.g., for
substation and feeder devices such as measurement unit, switches, voltage regulators, and
protection relays. The models specify standardized behaviour for the most common device
functions, and allow for significant vendor specialization. These models support multi-vendor
interoperability and ease of integration.
With the new standard only one protocol for all needs is required (Figure 6). All substation
automation functions comprising monitoring, control and protection are fully supported. The
architecture is future proof and facilitates future extensions, therefore it safeguards
investments. Modelled functions (typicals) are reusable. That simplifies definition, configuration,
naming and maintenance of data and their integration to higher levels and saves cost for
engineering. The standard defines the availability requirements, environmental conditions and
the auxiliary services of the system. Further on it specifies the engineering process and its
supporting tools, system life cycle and the quality assurance requirements. It provides
engineering and maintenance support by means of the substation configuration language based
Document Name: Keynote paper Seminar 8 WP2
ID: S8_PRO~2
Revision: V2
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Control
Centre
50
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3.2.2
To accomplish interoperability
common standardised
common standardised
common standardised
common standardised
common standardised
common standardised
data model
service model
protocol
communication physique
engineering data exchange
conformance test
Title
IEC 61850-1
IEC 61850-2
Glossary
IEC 61850-3
General requirements
IEC 61850-4
IEC 61850-5
IEC 61850-6
IEC 61850-7-1
Basic communication structure for substations and feeder equipment Principles and models
IEC 61850-7-2
Basic communication structure for substations and feeder equipment Abstract communication
service interface (ACSI)
IEC 61850-7-3
Basic communication structure for substations and feeder equipment Common data classes
IEC 61850-7-4
Basic communication structure for substations and feeder equipment Compatible logical node
classes and data classes
IEC 61850-8-1
Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) Mappings to MMS (ISO/IEC 9506) and to
ISO/IEC 8802-3
IEC 61850-9-1
Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) Sampled values over serial unidirectional
multidrop point to point link
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Parts of
IEC 61850
Title
IEC 61850-9-2
Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
IEC 61850-10
Conformance testing
IEC 61850 does not automatically ensure interoperability. To reach interoperability a well-done
engineering is necessary. Relevant for this are the parts IEC 61850-4 System and project
management (Clause Engineering Requirements) and IEC 61850-6 Configuration description
language for communication.
The Abstract communication service interface (ACSI, 61850-7-2) provides a common set of
communication services for data access, reporting, logging, control applications and related
support. The information exchange methods and services shall be as specified in the profile of
the ACSI services of the IEC 61850-7-2. To become concrete the abstract ACSI services are
mapped to existing communication application layer standards by a Specific Communication
Service Mapping (SCSM). Ethernet/MMS (Manufacturing Message Specification)(ISO 9506) with
100 MBit optical fibre link is the service specification at the moment applied in 61850-8-1.
Generally the standard is open for other transmission media like PLC or radio transmission as
long as uniform services are defined.
IEC 61850-9-1 specifies the specific communication service mappings for the communication
between bay and process level and specially it specifies a mapping on a serial unidirectional
multidrop point-to-point link. The scope of this part is for the use in substations as a link
between electronic current (ECT) or voltage transducers (EVT) and bay devices such as
protection, meter or bay controller. The intended use of this mapping is for low cost applications
with simple protection schemes, and for retrofitting in existing substations only. If higher
requirements on sampling rate, further sampled measured value data sets in addition to the
universal data set, inter-bay communication and synchronisation apply, these will be covered by
IEC 61850-9-2.
IEC 61850-9-1 applies to newly manufactured electronic current and voltage transducers (ECT
and EVT) having a digital output, for use with electrical measuring instruments and electrical
protective devices. For digital output, IEC 61850-9-1 takes into account a point-to-point
connection from the electrical transducer to electrical measuring instruments and electrical
devices. This mapping allows interoperability between devices from different manufacturers. IEC
61850-9-1 does not specify individual implementations or products, nor does it constrain the
implementation of entities and interfaces within a computer system. IEC 61850-9-1 specifies the
externally visible functionality of implementations together with conformance requirements for
such functionality.
IEC 61850-9-2 defines the specific communication service mapping for the transmission of
sampled values according to the abstract specification in IEC 61850-7-2. The mapping is that of
the abstract model on a mixed stack using direct access to an ISO/IEC 8802-3 link for the
transmission of the samples in combination with IEC 61850-8-1. The purpose of this SCSM
definition is to supplement IEC 61850-9-1 to include the complete mapping of the sampled
value model. This part of IEC 61850 applies to electronic current and voltage transformers (ECT
and EVT) having a digital output, merging units, and intelligent electronic devices e.g. protection
units, bay controllers and meters.
Conformance claims and the establishment of their validity are important parts of the
acceptance of systems and equipment. IEC 61850-10 specifies conformance testing methods for
conformance testing of devices of substation automation systems and in addition gives
guidelines for setting up test environments and system testing, thus supporting interoperability
of devices and systems.
The standard IEC 61850 defines no communication network architecture. It provides solutions
for different communication requirements independent of a station or process bus and defines
Ethernet for all levels.
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3.2.3
The model is based in a hierarchical decomposition of three levels (Figure 7): information
models, information exchange methods as service interface, and the communication profiles like
the mapping to MMS and TCP/IP Ethernet. The main objective of this layering is to keep the
information (application) free from any information exchange method and communication
network. This separation of data and communication technologies is the idea behind IEC 61850.
Data did not change and will not change but the latter will.
The information models can be easily extended according to specific and flexible rules as
required by another application domains, for example, for additional functions within substations
or for other application domains such as wind power plants.. Communication stacks may be
exchanged following the state of the art in communication technology.
Separation of:
Application
(e.g. Protection)
IEC 61850:
Example:
Protection
Device
Data
DataModel
Model
IEC 61850:
Function
Protection
Data
DataM
Model
odel
Services,
Services,Rules
Rules
Service
(e.g. Control, Report)
Services,
Services,Rules
Rules
Communication Module
M apping
Ethernet
XYZ
Communication
(Protocol)
Mapping
Mapping
M
Mapping
apping
XYZ
3.2.4
To cope with fast innovation of communication technology the standard specifies a set of
abstract services and objects which may allow applications to be written in a manner which is
independent from a specific protocol. This abstraction allows both vendors and utilities to
maintain application functionality and to optimise this functionality when appropriate. A set of
abst
r
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di
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obeusedbet
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onsand
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cat
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s
allowing for compatible exchange of information among components of a substation automation
system. This Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI) is a virtual interface to an
Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) providing abstract communication services, for example
connection, variable access, unsolicited data transfer, device control and file transfer services,
independent of the actual communication stack and profiles used. The concrete implementation
of the device internal interface to the ACSI services is a local issue and is beyond the scope of
the standard.
However, these abstract services/objects must be instantiated through the use of concrete
application protocols and communication profiles. The specific syntax (format) and especially the
encoding of the messages that carry the service parameters of a service and how these are
passed through a network are defined in a Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
(Figure 8). The SCSM is a standardised procedure which provides the concrete mapping of ACSI
services and objects onto a particular protocol stack/communication profile.
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Application
ACSI
Specific
Mapping
Abstract Interface
SCSM 2
SCSM 1
SCSM n
Application layer 7
communication stacks
The standard provides an assortment of mappings in the parts 8-x and 9-x of the series which
can be used for communication within the substation; the selection of an appropriate mapping
depends on the functional and performance requirements. To facilitate interoperability it is
intended to have a minimum number of standardized mappings. One SCSM is the mapping of
the services to MMS and other provisions like TCP/IP and Ethernet.
The concept of the SCSM has been introduced to be independent from communication stacks
including application protocols.
The SCSM maps the abstract communication services, objects and parameters to the specific
application layers which provide the concrete coding. Depending on the technology of the
communication network, these mappings may have different complexities, and some ACSI
services may not be supported directly in all mappings, but equivalent services shall be
provided.
3.2.5
The modelling methods of the IEC 81650 series define the information and information
exchange in a way that it is independent of a concrete implementation by using abstract
models. With the concept of virtualisation only those aspects of a real device that are required
to provide interoperability of devices are defined.
The information model comprises:
Logical node (LN) classes,
Data classes, and
Common data classes.
A logical node (LN) is the smallest part of a function that exchanges data. A LN is an object
defined by its data and methods (concept described in Figure 9). Logical nodes can only
interoperate with each other if they are able to interpret and to process the data received
(syntax and semantics) and the communication services used. Thus it is necessary to
standardise data objects assigned to logical nodes and their identification within the logical
nodes. The content of the data exchanged between the LNs are the PiCOMs. Common data
classes are used by the one or the other logical node.
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Configuration
Output
Data
Input
Data
Function
(e.g. Protection)
The functions still remain vendor specific while the data exchange the interfaces - becomes
standardised. With the idea of logical nodes there is a data exchange between functions and not
between devices that can cover different functions (Figure 10).
The server represents the external visible behaviour of a device. All other ACSI models are part
of this server. A server communicates with a client and sends information to peer devices. The
logical device contains the information produced and consumed by a domain-specific application
function as defined as logical nodes.
StV
Attribute
(1 to n)
PhA PhB
Data
(1 to n)
Pos
LN1
LN2
(XCBR)
(MMXU)
Logical Node
(1 to n)
Logical Device
(1 to n)
Logical Device
(BayA)
Server
Server
(network address)
Within IEC 61850 there are about 90 different logical nodes (Figure 11) covering the most
common applications of substations and feeder equipment and more than 350 data classes
(Figure 12). Data provide means to specify typed information.
Group Indicator
Automatic Control
Supervisory control
Protection functions
Sensors
Instrument Transformer
Switchgear
Power Transformer
M M XU
M M TR
M SQI
M HAI
M DIF
PSCH
PTEF
PZSU
PDIS
more
Protection Scheme
Transient Earth Fault
Zero speed or underspeed
Distance protection
XCBR
XSWI
Circuit Breaker
Circuit Sw itch
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Data Classes
Number
System information
13
11
M easurands
66
M etered values
14
Controllable Data
36
Status information
85
Settings
130
355
A modelling example in (Figure 13) shows logical nodes of functions within IEDs with a
communication interface. The bay unit with Time Over Current Protection, Control, and
Automatic Recloser contains 4 logical nodes.
Logical Device
Auto Reclosing
RREC
CSWI
Current
Transducer
MMXU
IED1
BayA
IED3
IED2
TCTR
XCBR
T1
Switch Control
Measurement Unit
Circuit Breaker
Q0
3.2.6
GOOSE
The GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Event ) service included in the IEC 61850
protocol set enables fast inter-device communication with time critical real time communication
over wide-band communication links.
A device is sending information per multicast. Only the IEDs that have subscribed this
information receive the message. A GOOSE message of an IED can therefore be received and
processed by several units at the same time.
Only IEC 61850 makes use of the possibilities of the modern 100 MBIT-Ethernet technology with
real-time data transmission by tagging of GOOSE telegrams (Figure 14). Thus it is possible to
transmit different GOOSE messages and i.e. fault records using the same Ethernet.
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Ethernet-Switch
bypass for IEC GOOSE
fast
GOOSE
normal telegram
Buffer for normal telegrams
3.3.
Current trends in IEC TC 57 indicate the further extension of IEC 61850. Additionally to the
existing application for substation automation the main scope of IEC 61850 - the following
applications are known today:
Remote control and monitoring of wind power plants (IEC 61400-25)
Remote control and monitoring distributed power stations, new proposal (IEC
57/660/NP)
Remote control and monitoring water power stations, new proposal
(IEC 57/661/NP)
Tel
econt
r
olofsubst
at
i
ons
sTCA
,ongoi
ng
(Ad Hoc Working Group 07 in TC 57 of IEC)
Power Quality Monitoring, Addendum to IEC 61850 (initiative started)
Product standard for switchgear equipment (IEC 62271-003)
Metering (EPRI, IEEE) (in discussion)
Gas, Water, etc.(in discussion)
Future tasks will be to continue standardisation for all kinds of DER units and LTS strategies with
further extensions of IEC 61850.
IEC 61400-25
Work is going on within IEC TC88 project 25 to develop a communication standard for
monitoring and control of wind power plants. The future standard IEC 61400-25 provides
requirements relevant to the specification, engineering, use, testing, diagnosis, and
maintenance of the information to be shared in wind power systems. It re-uses portions of IEC
61850 to specify information models and information exchange methods. The object models are
detailed data templates for the information exchange needed for monitoring and controlling the
DER device within the architecture of the power distribution system.
The approach with an abstract communication service interface has been used. The abstract
communication service interface provides the ability to specify separate communication profiles
for particular network topologies. MMS and OPC/XML are two candidates to communication
protocols for the future standard.
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What data elements are to be collected from the DER installation to provide an effective
picture of its current configuration and status? How often should this process take place?
What conditions within the DER plant constitute a case of alarm, that requires attention?
Classification of alarms is required.
What conditions within the DER plant constitute an event, that needs to be recorded ?
What operational functions have to be communicated for the normal daily operation of
the DER unit?
What operations are envisaged to safeguard the DER unit in case of fault and/or
abnormal situation? Which of these operations can be automated, which shall be carried
out manually?
What procedures are to be applied for DER unit recovery after the occurrence of a fault?
Which of these procedures can be automated, which have to be manual, which have to
be communicated?
2. Performance Requirements
-
What is the response time required for each identified critical function?
What is the response time allowed for each identified operation or control function?
What is the permissible response time for each system management function?
3. Security Requirements
-
What rules are to be set for operator access control to services and functions?
Generally there are no guidelines available about the configuration of the communications
network depending on the different requirements for different locations.
Further no experience exists what will be the best way for the transition from current protocols
to the IEC 61850 protocols that make the specification of communications interfaces of
equipment significantly easier. Interfacing to existing equipment or systems is usually much
more difficult, but it is often necessary. These existing equipment are also rather poor in
meeting the present level of requirements.
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7. Abbreviations
ACSI
DEMS
DER
DSM
EPA
EPS
HMI
IED
LN
Logical Node
MMS
PICOM
SCSM
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8.
Literature
[IEC61850]
Annext
oDel
i
ver
abl
e14,
Act
i
onpl
ant
owar
dsst
andar
di
sedcommuni
cat
i
on
i
nt
er
f
aces
,out
comeofpr
oj
ectENI
RDGNet
,
5th EC research programme
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