CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

G.R. No. L-976

October 22, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO ABAD, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: The defendant is a former insurgent officer.
Assuming, for the purposes of the present motion,
that the defendant is guilty of the offense, there is no
evidence in the record showing that it was
committed pursuant to orders issued by the civil or
military insurrectionary authorities, or that it grew
out of internal political feuds or dissensions between
Filipinos and Spaniards of the Spanish authorities, or
that it resulted from internal political feuds or
dissensions among the Filipinos themselves. If it is
covered by the amnesty it must be because it is
embraced within the words employed in the
proclamation to designate the first class of offenses
amnestied, namely, "offenses of treason and
sedition.
In the present case the act by which the defendant is
found by the court below to have violated the oath
was that of denying to an officer of the United States
Army the existence of certain rifles, which had been
concealed by his orders at the time of his surrender
in April, 1901, and of the existence and whereabouts
of which he was cognizant at the time of the denial.
ISSUE: WON the defendant-appellant should be held
liable
HELD:There are a variety of offenses in the criminal
codes of all countries which are not directed primarily
against individuals, but rather against the existence
of the state, the authority of the government or the
general public tranquility.
G.R. Nos. 145357-59 August 23, 2006
PEDRO S. GIRON, JR., LETICIA GUJILDECRIZALDO, and FELIXBERTO B.
ARREZA, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS:The present petition involves alleged
irregularities in the construction of a two-kilometer
road connecting Barangays Kinayan and Kauswagan
in Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
The accused Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Gertrude S. Sucias,
Orlando B. Cedro, Robert G. Lala, all public officers
being then District Engineer, Civil Engineer Aide II,
Chief, Construction Section, and Supervising Civil
Engineer I, respectively, of the Office of the District
Engineer of Surigao del Sur, conspiring together and

with accused Felixberto B. Arreza, of the same office

who was the project engineer of the road project
treated herein, taking advantage of their official
positions and committing the crime herein charged in
relation to their office, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify Physical Status
Report of Projects costing P2.0M and Below under CY
1988 Infrastructure Program as of January 1989, an
official document required for submission to the XIth
DPWH Regional Office, by stating on page 14 thereof
that the Kinayan-Kauswagan barangay road project
at Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was fully completed as of
January 25, 1989, a matter the truth of which
accused was under obligation to disclose, when in
truth and in fact, as accused fully well knew, the said
road project as of said date was not yet finished as
the road surfacing materials for use therein were not
yet delivered then and were only delivered on March
18-21, 1989, thereby making an untruthful statement
in a narration of facts.
ISSUE: whether or not the accused took advantage of
their official position to falsify a document.
HELD: No. The offender takes advantage of his
official position when he has the duty to make or to
prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation
of the document, or he has the official custody of the
document which he falsified.
There is no doubt that all three are public officials, as
they were employees of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) at the time of the
questioned act. There is serious doubt, however, as
to whether anyone among Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza
actually took advantage of his official position. The
offender takes advantage of his official position when
he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise to
intervene in the preparation of the document, or he
has the official custody of the document which he
falsifies.
Giron testified that:
In preparing these reports, the project engineer
reports to the Construction Section the degree of
work they had accomplished with respect to the
project assigned to them. The reports of the project
engineers were to be consolidated into one hence
arriving at a Monthly Status Report. These reports
were being submitted every 25th of the month and it
takes the Office of the District Engineer three (3) to
five (5) days to prepare the said report.14
The Monthly Status Report was typed by Crizaldo,
checked by Cedro, and submitted by Salang in lieu of
Giron. Engr. Cedro, who supervised the preparation of

the Monthly Status Report and checked the same,

was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "he
never signed the subject reports."15 Salang was also
acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "his
participation [was] seemingly limited to the acts
before the actual construction of the project."16
Crizaldos item was that of a General Construction
Foreman but she was not assigned to the project
site.17 Crizaldo was assigned in the office and was
tasked to type the Monthly Status Report. The
prosecution never proved that Crizaldo had
knowledge of the actual status of the KinayanKauswagan Road Project at the time she prepared
the Monthly Status Report. Crizaldo could have
merely relied on field reports submitted to her,
precluding her from making, on her own, untruthful
statements at the time she prepared the Monthly
Status Report. Crizaldo could not have conspired with
any other party because the Sandiganbayan found
that "there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of
conspiracy on the part of the accused herein to
falsify the subject reports."18 The Sandiganbayan
ruled that "any criminal liability should be based on
their individual participation in the questioned act."19
Girons testimony as to the usual procedure cannot
be used against him because he did not sign the
Monthly Status Report. Girons facsimile signature
was merely stamped on the Monthly Status Report.
The stamped facsimile signatures of Giron do not
establish his personal participation in the preparation
of the Monthly Status Report. To use this portion of
Girons testimony to establish his personal
participation is to extrapolate and speculate. This will
not suffice in a criminal action, which requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt for conviction.20
Arreza was the Project Engineer of the KinayanKauswagan Road Project. However, like Giron and
Crizaldo, the prosecution was unable to prove his
actual participation in the questioned reports. The
Sandiganbayan found that Arreza "had no
participation in the preparation and execution of the
said document[s]."21 The Sandiganbayan also found
that Arreza "did not take advantage of his public
position,"22 and thus Arreza is liable under Artcle 172
of the Revised Penal code for falsification of a private
document. In the dispositive portion of its Decision of
9 May 1997, however, the Sandiganbayan adjudged
Arreza guilty as charged in Criminal Case No. 17352,
which was for falsification of a public document.
In sum, we acquit Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza for
failure of the prosecution to satisfy the requisites for
the conviction of the crime of falsification of public
documents. All are public officers, however, the
prosecution has failed to prove their criminal
culpability beyond reasonable doubt. There is no
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moral certainty that Giron, Crizaldo, and Arreza took

advantage of their positions to make a false
statement in a narration of facts in a public
document.
WHEREFORE,the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision promulgated on 9 May 1997 and the
Resolution promulgated on 4 October 2000 of the
Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE. Pedro S. Giron, Jr.,
Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo, and Felixberto B. Arreza
are ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.

G.R. No. L-7447

January 2, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NICASIO CAPULE, defendant-appellant.
FACTS: Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of
appropriating to himself a tract of coconut land
without the knowledge or consent of the owners
thereof, the married couple Aniceto Maghirang and
Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation with the
notary public, Inocente Martinez, who later died,
prepared and drew up a document setting forth the
sale in his favor of the said land, pretending that it
was made and executed by the said owners of the
tract, stating in the document that they had made
the declaration that they had sold said land for the
sum of 550 pesos paid at the time of the sale to the
vendors, and Jacinto Peaflor and Jorge Tolentino
appear in said document as witnesses of the
execution thereof; and Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo
Guia as the signers of the deed of sale, because the
alleged vendors did not know how to do so. Recorded
at the bottom of the document was their ratification
of its contents in the presence of said notary, before
whom the said married couple appeared. The
defendant Capule exhibited said document later,
although he had been assured that it was false, in a
trial before the justice of the peace of that town in
the attempt to sustain his alleged right to the said
piece of land.
ISSUE: WON the accused is liable
HELD: Yes. Nicasio Capule is not a public officer and,
moreover, as he is accused of the crime of
falsification of a notarial document of official
character equivalent to a public document the

principle laid down in said decision is totally

inapplicable in his favor.
Further keeping in mind that the act of falsification of
a public document in itself constitutes a crime,
morally and legally punishable, even though to date
the penal law with respect to falsification of a public
document committed by public officers, in lieu of said
article 300 of the code, has not yet been
promulgated; but article 301, applicable to the
present case, has not been repealed and subsists in
all its force.
A person who, taking advantage of the occasion
when a power of attorney is presumably being drawn
up, prepares instead thereof, contrary to the wishes
of the interested parties and with malice
aforethought, an instrument of sale in his own favor,
using deceit as to the parties and the witnesses, and
afterwards induces a notary to certify falsely that the
supposed vendors actually appeared and ratified
such instrument, is guilty of the falsification of a
notarial or public document.

Found guilty after trial and sentenced to a

term of imprisonment and a fine

Quasha appealed to this Court

Primary purpose: to carry on the business of

a common carrier by air, land or water

Baylon did not have the controlling vote

because of the difference in voting power between
the preferred shares and the common shares

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer,

employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts.

People vs. Quasha, GR L-6055, June 12, 1953

FACTS:

William H. Quasha

o
a member of the Philippine bar, committed
a crime of falsification of a public and commercial
document for causing it to appear that Arsenio
Baylon, a Filipino citizen, had subscribed to and was
the owner of 60.005 % of the subscribed capital
stock of Pacific Airways Corp. (Pacific) when in reality
the money paid belongs to an American citizen
whose name did not appear in the article of
incorporation,

ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals

and use of falsified documents. The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum
period and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall
be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any

of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or
letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document.

ISSUE: W/N Quasha should be criminally liable

to circumvent the constitutional mandate

that no corp. shall be authorize to operate as a public
utility in the Philippines unless 60% of its capital
stock is owned by Filipinos.

HELD: NO. Acquitted.

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falsification consists in not disclosing in the

articles of incorporation that Baylon was a mere
trustee ( or dummy as the prosecution chooses to
call him) of his American co-incorporators, thus
giving the impression that Baylon was the owner of
the shares subscribed to by him

For the mere formation of the corporation

such revelation was not essential, and the
Corporation Law does not require it

meritorious and ordered the amendment of the

information.
Hence, this appeal by the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information in question should
allege the following facts in order to be sufficient to
convict the defendant of the crime of falsification:
1)

That the accused had the obligation to

disclose the truth in the document
allegedly falsified;

Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the

information in question, the law is clear that
wrongful intent on the part of the accused to
injure a third person is not an essential
element of the crime of falsification of public
document.

2)

That the accused had the wrongful

intent to injure a third

Article 172, par. 1, in connection with Art. 171, par. 4,

of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first

element allegedly lacking in the information, that is,
the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose
the truth as to the facts that should appear in a
residence certificate, is inherent in the very nature
and purpose of said document.

ART. 171. Falsification by the public officer,

employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister.
The penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position
shall falsify a document by committing any
of the following acts:

The moment for determining whether a

corporation is entitled to operate as a public utility is
when it applies for a franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for that purpose.
o
that can be done after the corporation has
already come into being and not while it is still being
formed
HELD:

so far as American citizens are concerned,

the said act has ceased to be an offense within the
meaning of the law, so that defendant can no longer
be held criminally liable therefor.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PO GIOK TO

Section 3 Commonwealth Act 465 provides:

FACTS:
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the defendant
appellee Po Giok To was charged with the crime of
falsification. He misrepresented to the City Treasurer
of Cebu that his name is Antonio Perez, that his place
of birth is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is
Filipino. From such misrepresentation of facts the
City Treasurer issued him a residence certificate.
The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground
that the information does not allege sufficient facts
to constitute the crime of falsification. The City Fiscal
opposed the motion to quash claiming that the
information alleges all the integral elements of the
offense charged as defined by the statute. The lower
Court, however, found the motion to quash

There is, therefore, no question that the

accused had the duty to disclose the true facts
about his name, place of birth, and citizenship
to the officer or employee who issued his
residence certificate and such duty being
inherent in the transaction, there was no need
for the criminal charge to allege that the
accused had such duty.

"that the residence certificate for persons

shall contain the full name, place and date
of birth, citizenship, civil status, length of
residence in the city or municipality where
the certificate is issued, occupation or
calling.
Needless to say, this provision implies that the
person to whom the certificate is issued must state
to the officer who issues the same, the true facts,
required to appear therein, the latter having merely
the ministerial function of recording thereon the facts
as supplied by this person. And to guarantee that the
facts given correctly and truly identify the holder of
the certificate, he is also required by Sec. 3 above to
sign the document and affix his right hand thumb
mark thereon.

4. Making untruthful
narration of facts.

statements

in

ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals

and use of falsified documents. The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit
any of the falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any other kind of
commercial document.
On the other hand, Art. 172, par 2, defining
the crime falsification of private document,
provides:

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2. Any person who, to the damage of a third

party, or with intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document commit any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in the
next preceeding article.
The distinction made by the law between falsification
by private persons of PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND
PRIVATE DOCUMENTS IS CLEAR.
The first (FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BY
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS) is committed by the mere
performance of any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Art. 171

not the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, should

apply in this case. RPC can still apply since under Art.
10 of the RPC has supplementary application to all
special laws, unless the latter should provide the
contrary, and CA No. 465 makes no provision that it
exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence
certificates.
Thus the information was sufficient, and its dismissal
for insufficiency by the Court below was improper
and erroneous.

While the second (FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE

DOCUMENTS BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS) is committed
not only by the performance of any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Art. 171 but it must
likewise be shown that such act of falsification was
committed to the damage of a third party or with
intent to cause such damage.
The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain in the case of People
vs. Pacana that in the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the
idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for
the reason that, in contradiction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
Moreover, the acts charged, if true, would result in
confusion in the government records, since the
fingerprint of the accused would not correspond to
that of the person whose personal circumstances are
recited in the certificate. Such confusion in its
records evidently operates to the Government's
prejudice. Being the natural and direct result of the
criminal act charged, the accused must be presumed
to have intended it.
Side issue: It is argued for the defendant that there
being a special law with respect to residence
certificates expressly punishing their falsification
(Commonwealth Act No. 465), this special law, and

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36345

November 25, 1932

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO MONTANO and WENCESLAO
CABAGSANG, defendants-appellants.
BUTTE, J.:
FACTS: The defendant WenceslaoCabagsang was
the chief of police and the defendant Pedro Montano
was the justice of the peace of the municipality of
Tanza in the Province of Cavite, in the month of
September, 1930, when the crimes for which they
were convicted occurred.
It appears from the evidence that on September 5,
1930, a criminal complaint against one Arturo A.
Soriano for the crime of qualified seduction was filed
with the said justice of the peace. The justice,
apparently to favor Soriano, delayed the preliminary
investigation until the offended woman on
September 18, 1930, filed with him a motion
demanding immediate action and calling his

attention to the fact that his delay was a violation of

the circular of instructions of the judge of the Court
of First Instance of said province. The case was then
set for hearing on September 22, 1930. Thereafter
administrative charges against the justice of the
peace were filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, alleging that the delay in the preliminary
investigation was a violation of the circular of the
Court of First Instance, dated November 15, 1928,
requiring all justices of the peace to dispose of all
preliminary investigations within ten days from the
date on which the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.lawphil.net
The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that
prior to the hearing of said administrative case, the
defendants, in order to make it appear that there had
been no violation of the said instructions to the
justices of the peace, falsified official records in their
custody as follows:
The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered
and falsified the municipal police blotter and the
book of records of arrests and the return of the
warrant of arrest and Soriano's bail bond so as to
make them show that the said Arturo A. Soriano was
arrested and gave bond on the 13th day of
September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in fact, as
said records showed before said falsification, the said
Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and released on bond
on the 6th day of September, 1930; that the
defendant Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated
with his codefendant in making said falsifications in
order to meet the administrative charges then
pending against him.
HELD: The court below rejected the defense of the
accused that said alterations were made in good
faith and corresponded to the true facts of the case.
There is no issue of law raised in the assignment of
errors. We have made a careful review of the
evidence and have come to the conclusion that the
judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with
costs against the appellants. So ordered.

People vs Felix Manansala

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Facts: Manansala was accused of altering the

duplicate copy of the Traffic Violation Report (TVR)
previouslyissued to him as a temporary drivers
permit. He erased the originally written figure III
and the wordthree after the words pending
cases, and superimposed thereon number I and
the word one. Thealterations made changed the
meaning of the document. It was made to appear
that he has only one pending case of traffic violation.
The practice was proved to be to arrest a driver who
commits a fourth traffic violation instead of merely
issuing to him a TVR, which is usually done for the
first, second and third violations. The accused had in
his possession the falsified TVR and had been using it
as a temporarydrivers permit from its issuance to
the time he was caught committing the fourth traffic
violation.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of
falsifying an official document.
Ruling: It is an established rule that when a person
has in his possession a falsified document and makes
use of the same, the presumption is justified that
such person is the forger. The circumstances that the
accused made use of and benefited from the falsified
TVR is a strong evidence that he either himself
falsified it or caused the same to be falsified.
Us vsalejandromateo
Facts: Falsification of cedula; erroneous conviction;
defendant acquitted.
Mateo being required in October, 1911, for the
purposes of an affidavit, to present his cedula for the
year 1911 to a justice of the peace, produced also his
cedula for the year 1910; on reading the cedula for
the year 1910, something which he had not done
before, mateo discovered that his age was stated
incorrectly therein and he, fearing the result of
presenting to a public official a cedula which
contained an incorrect statement regarding his own
age, changed his age, making it 25 instead of 23; the
change having been discovered by the justice of the
peace on the presentation of the cedula, mateo,
without hesitation, detailed the part he had taken in
the change and the reason therefor; it is admitted
that the age in the cedula was incorrect and that the
change made the cedula give his true age; mateo

was tried for falsification of a cedula and was

convicted.
Held: In the case in hand, the change did not affect
in the remotest degree the privileges or immunities
which the accused could enjoy under the cedula. The
judgment is reversed and the accused acquitted.
LeonilaBatulanon, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006
Criminal case: Falsification of private
documents and Estafa
FACTS: Petitioner LeonilaBatulanon was employed as
cashier/manager of Polomok (Polomok) Credit
Cooperative Inc. from May 1980 up to December
1982 (so thats two years). She was in charge with
the receiving of deposits and releasing loans to
members of the said cooperative (Polomok).
During an audit conducted in December 1982,
certain irregularities were found out. Thereafter, four
informations of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents were filed against herein
petitioner.
1. Criminal case 3625 petitioner Batulanon falsified
CASH/CHECK VOUCHER of PCCI in the name of
ERLINDA OMADLAO, making it appear that latter was
granted loan where in truth and in fact said person
never received, never granted a loan and never
signed such document.
2. Criminal case 3626 same situation as above
stated but this time in the name of GONAFREDA
ORACION.
3. Criminal case 3453 Batulanon falsified
commercial documents namely Individual deposits
and ledger of FERLYN ARROYO making it appear that
the said person made a fixed deposit and was
granted a loan where in truth and in fact ARROYO
never made such deposit and never received such
loan.

4. Criminal case 3627 same situation as the next

preceding case but this time in the name of his son
Dennis Batulanon.
In all cases, accused did then and there release to
herself the same and received the loans and
thereafter misappropriated and converted them into
her own use and benefit. Also in all cases, she
refused to bring back the same despite demands.
These informations were filed in the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City. Petitioner pleaded not
guilty.
Prosecution presented its witnesses:
Modallo (posting clerk) testified that Batulanon
released 4 cash vouchers. He also said that Omadlao,
Oracion and Batulanon were not eligible and not
members of Polomok Cooperative. Moreover,
according to him, although Arroyo was a member but
there was no proof that she applied for a loan. He
also said he witnessed Petitioner Batulanon signed
Oracion and Arroyo in cash vouchers.
Jayoma (Vice chairman of the PCCI Board of
directors) testified that laons to Omadlao and
Oracion never passed through the PCCI board of
directors.
Petitioner Batulanon denied charges against her. She
contended that she did not sigh vouchers of
Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo who according to her
are nonetheless members of the cooperative. Lastly,
she said that its been an accepted practice that she
can release loan in the absence of GopioJr who is in
charge with such responsibility.
RTC convicted her guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought it to Court of Appeals (CA)but the
latter affirmed with modifications the ruling of RTC.
CA modification is that petitioner is guilty of
falsification of PRIVATE documents.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but CA denied
it.
Petitioner brought it up to the Supreme Court (SC)
and contended that:

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1. Best witness is person whose signature is forged

2. Requires prejudice to 3rd person
3. PCCI not prejudiced by loan transactions because
loans are accounts receivable by cooperative

Batulanon) falls within the ambit of the crime of

estafa. The latter having no untruthful statements
but there was conversion and misappropriation;
hence elements of estafa are present in the last
criminal case.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

HELD:
SC: Petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged is estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, appellant
could be convicted of falsification of private
documents.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 68203 September 13, 1989

Elements of falsification of private document are

present in this case:

METUROGAN L. SAREP, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

1. She made it appear that Omadlao, Oracion, and

Arroyo were granted loans

PADILLA, J.:

2. She made it in private document

****(cash/check vouchers are not public
documents because they are not notarized and not
documents used by merchants to promote trade nor
regulated by Code of commerce)
3. It caused damage to the cooperative.
Regarding best witness SC cites sec. 22 of Rule 132
according to this rule handwriting may be proved by
any person who believes it to be belonging to such
person; or who acquired knowledge of such
handwriting
Regarding prejudice to Polomok such loans could
have granted to other members but werent because
of illegal acts done by Batulanon such constituted
damage or prejudice to Polomok
On complex crime of estafa through falsification:
Falsification committed as means to commit estafa
Estafa may be carried out even without falsification
SC ruled that 1st, 2nd, and 3rd criminal cases herein
fall within the purview of falsification of private
documents but the 4th criminal case (with Dennis

FACTS:Petitioner, Meturogan L. Sarep, appeals from

the decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan. That on or
about December 30, 1977, or sometime prior
thereto, in the City of Cotabato, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused being then employed as Soil
Technologist II under the Bureau of Soils, Region XII,
Cotabato City, with a Temporary Appointment,did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take without permission from the records of said
Office the appointment paper proposed in his name
dated January 19, 1976, which appointment paper
was replaced due to an incorrect entry, by another
one bearing the same date; and theaccused once in
possession of said appointment paper, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously change,
alter and falsify the date, figures and words written
thereon, thus changing its meaning and attributing
to the person who caused the preparation of the
same, statements other than those in fact made by
him; that the falsification and alteration were
committed for the purpose of converting the
Temporary Status of his appointment to a Permanent
Status, and which accused succeeded by having said
falsified appointment paper attested by the Civil
Service Commission in Manila without the knowledge
of the Civil Service Commission, Region XII, who has

the jurisdiction and authority to attest appointments

under Region XII. 2
petitioner appealed to this Court, after his motion for
reconsideration was denied.
On 19 January 1976, Director KundoPahm of the
Bureau of Soils, Region XII, extended an appointment
in favor of Meturogen L. Sarep (herein petitioner) to
the position of Soil Technologist II (Exh. "C"). After
signing the appointment paper, Pahm noticed an
error in the item on civil service eligibility. The entry
therein read "First Grade Unassembled" instead of
"Unassembled Examination" which was the
appropriate eligibility for the position of Soil
Technologist; whereupon, Director Pahm called the
attention of the acting personnel officer, Usman
Salic, to the error and directed him to prepare
another appointment paper (Exh. "B") which Pahm
signed after noting the correction made by the
personnel officer. The appointment was approved by
the Assistant Regional Director of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) as "temporary."
It was ruled that there can be no conviction for
falsification of a public document in the absence of
proof that the defendant maliciously perverted the
truth with wrongful intent of injuring third person. 6
Finally, petitioner invokes good faith in his defense.
He claims that after the personnel officer handed him
the questioned document, which bore the erasures
and alterations as well as the Director's signature, he
brought it to the Civil Service Commission in Manila
upon suggestion and with the permission of the
personnel officer.
The Court does not accept petitioner's defense of
good faith. He admitted that he knew that Director
Pahm was not only uninclined to extend him a
permanent appointment due to his lack of civil
service eligibility but he also did not authorize him
(Sarep) to follow up his appointment with the Civil
Service Commission in Manila. More importantly, he
knew that if the falsified document had been
presented before the CSC Regional Office, it would
have surely been attested as temporary only. Hence,
he purposely avoided filing the appointment paper
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with the CSC Regional Office, which is the practice

and standard procedure in the regional office of the
Bureau of Soils and, instead, personally brought it to
Manila where somehow he was able to have it
stamped approved as permanent.
The Court also rejects Sarep's argument that there is
no falsification, as the alleged falsified document
bears the correct item number and appropriate
eligibility. We agree with the respondent court that
"(I)t is falsification, and not a correction, which the
law punishes (People vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324; Arriola
vs. Republic, 103 Phil. 730)." Likewise, "(I)n the
falsification of public or official documents, whether
by public officials or by private persons, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or
the intent to injure a third person, for the reason
that, in contradiction to private documents, the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed (Decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain of December 23, 1885, cited in People vs.
Pacana, 47 Phil. 56)." 9
Since petitioner is the only person who stood to
benefit by the falsification of the document that was
found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the
material author of the falsification. Petitioner has
failed to convince the Court that a person other than
himself made the erasures, alterations and
superimpositions on the questioned appointment
paper (Exh. "C").
The Sandiganbayan in qualifying the offense and
arriving at the penalty imposed on the petitioner
held:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused
herein with the benefit of the circumstance that he
did not maliciously pervert the truth with the
wrongful intent of injuring some person (People vs.
Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that
his CSC eligibility based on his having passed the
Regional Cultural Community Officer (Unassembled)
Examination and educational attainment were
sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position,
then he should only be held liable for falsification
through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando,

36 O.G. 2937, People vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People

vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
HELD:The Court finds no reversible error in the
Sandiganbayan's decision finding petitioner,
Meturogan L. Sarep, guilty of the crime of falsification
of public document through reckless imprudence.
However, the penalty imposed should be
imprisonment of THREE MONTHS AND ONE DAY TO
ONE YEAR, SEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS, instead
of imprisonment of THREE MONTHS under the
appealed decision, since the period of the penalty
imposed, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prisioncorreccional in its medium period is four
months and one day to four years and two months
reduced by appreciating the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
KOH TIECK HENG VS PEOPLE
FACTS:Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh, alias Tomas P.
Flores was charged of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document in the following manner: after
opening a savings account with SBTC under the
name Tomas P. Flores and somehow illegally obtained
a PBC check issued by one F. Dycaico, accused
making or causing alterations and changes in a
genuine document w/c changed its meaning and
thereby affixing his signature at the back of the
check, which check was cleared by the PBC. On the
second instance, accused did not perform all the acts
of execution which should have produced the crime
of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document
by reason of some cause other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, by timely discovery
made by officials/employees of said bank of the
forgery and falsification made on the aforesaid check
before payment could be made which led then and
there to the apprehension of said accused. Under the
two Informations, the mode of falsification attributed
to the accused is that of having erased and altered
the dates and amounts of the checks in question,
and superimposing over the original dates and
amounts, thereby making alterations and changes in
genuine documents which changed their meaning.
Accused misappropriated, misapplied and converted
to his own personal use and benefit checks in various
amounts.

ISSUE:Did accused committed the crime of

attempted estafa in the absence of deceit and
damage?
HELD: Yes. The fact that appellant was the possessor
and utterer of the checks in question and having
benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well
as having attempted to gain by trying to withdraw an
amount thereon. The use of the spurious checks is by
itself fraud or deceit. The appellant made use of and
benefited from the falsified document is a strong
evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused
the same to be falsified, he being criminally
responsible in either case. Since Heng is the only
person who stood to be benefited by the falsification
of the document that wasfound in his possession, it is
presumed that he is the material author of such
falsification.
LOPEZ VS PARAS
FACTS: In the month of February 1964, petitioners
Roy P. Villasor, as administrator of the intestate
estate of the spouses Manuel M. Mejia and Gloria
Lazatin (Special Proceedings No. 48181 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila), together with his copetitioners Angelina Mejia Lopez and Aurora Mejia
Villasor and other heirs of said spouses, entered into
a contract with respondent Trinidad T. Lazatin for the
development and subdivision of three parcels of land
belonging to said intestate estate. Subsequently
Lazatin transferred his rights under the contract to
the Terra Development Corporation. Months later,
petitioners and other co-heirs filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No.
Q-8344) for the rescission of said contract for alleged
gross and willful violation of its terms. Thereafter,
Lazatin and the Terra Development Corporation, in
turn, filed with the Fiscal's Office of the City of
Angeles a complaint against petitioners for an
alleged violation of the provisions of Article 172 in
relation to those of Article 171, paragraph 4, of the
Revised Penal Code. After conducting a preliminary
examination in connection therewith, the City Fiscal
of Angeles filed with the Court of said City an
information charging petitioners with the crime of
falsification of a private document upon the
allegation that they made it appear in the contract
mentioned heretofore that Aurora M. Villasor was the
"guardian" of the minor George L. Mejia and that
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

Angelina M. Lopez was similarly the "guardian" of the

minor Alexander L. Mejia, when in truth and in fact
they knew that they were not the guardians of said
minors on the date of the execution of the document
(Criminal Case No. C-2268).
ISSUE: whether or not there is a commission of
art.172? and when and where is the offense of
falsification of a private document deemed
consummated or committed?
RULING:YES but the court of angeles has no
jurisdiction over the criminal act, but the importance
of this case is when and where a falsification of
document comes in.
In the present case, it is the claim of petitioners a
claim supported by the record that Angelina M.
Lopez and Aurora M. Villasor signed the private
document wherein they are alleged to have made a
false statement of fact, the first within the territorial
jurisdiction of Makati, and the second within the
territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City, both within the
province of Rizal.
We now come to consider the question of when and
where is the offense of falsification of a private
document deemed consummated or committed.
Upon this point, We have ruled clearly and definitely
in U.S. vs. Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that the crime of
falsification of a private document defined and
penalized by Article 304 of the Penal Code (now
paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)
is consummated when such document is actually
falsified with the intent to prejudice a third person,
whether such falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was
intended.

Article 304 of the Penal Code, the offense is

consummated at the time when and at the place
where the document is falsified to the prejudice of or
with the intent to prejudice a third person, and this
whether the falsified document is or is not put to the
improper or illegal use for which it was intended. It is
evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is
committed is the place where the document is
actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use
of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or
essential element of the crime of falsification of a
private document; . . . .

place. Respondent Judge was not persuaded; he

accepted the view set forth in the objection to the
motion to dismiss that the municipal court of Tigaon,
his station, was vested with jurisdiction as it "is one
of the intervening municipalities where the jeep
carrying the ballot box (the contents of which were
allegedly falsified) passed through." 4 He maintained
that falsification is a continuing offense. He did not
budge, notwithstanding his attention being called to
authoritative decisions that affirmed the contrary.
Clearly then, there is merit to this petition. certiorari
and prohibition lie.

Applying the above ruling to the facts before Us, it

would appear that if the private document subject of
the information was falsified by the persons therein
charged, the act of falsification the signing of the
document and the coetaneous intent to cause
damage was committed and consummated
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Angeles, and that whether the falsified private
document was thereafter put or not put to the illegal
use for which it was intended, or was signed by the
other contracting party within the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Angeles is in no wise a
material or essential element of the crime of
falsification of the private document, nor could it in
any way change the fact that the act of falsification
charged was committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City. Thus, that the City Court
of Angeles has, no jurisdiction over the offense
charged is beyond question.

The principal petitioner, Felix O. Alfelor, and

respondent Felix A. Fuentebella were congressional
candidates in the second district of Camarines Sur in
the 1965 elections, with the latter being proclaimed
as winner resulting in the filing of an electoral protest
by the former. 5 Respondent Fuentebella in turn
charged his opponent and the other petitioners in the
municipal court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, presided
by respondent Judge, with falsification of public or
official documents contained in the ballot box of a
precinct in Parubcan, Camarines Sur, the alleged
criminal act having taken place in still another
municipality, Iriga, Camarines Sur. 6 There was on
the part of petitioners a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, the situs of the alleged
falsification being in another municipality, Iriga,
Camarines Sur. 7 Respondent Judge in the challenged
order issued on April 29, 1967 denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground that falsification was a
continuing offense. 8 A motion for reconsideration
was filed. It was denied. 9 Hence this petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

ALFELOR SR. VS BONIFACIO

Jurisprudence sited in this case to serve as a
guide for art.172

As noted at the outset, the petition merit.

FERNANDO, J.:
Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36 Phil. p. 207, We said:
. . . The contention of counsel would seem to be that
the information was defective, in that it fails to set
forth expressly the place where improper and illegal
use was made of the falsified document, an
allegation which counsel for appellant insists was
absolutely essential for the proper determination of
the court clothed with jurisdiction over the alleged
offense. But under the definition of the crime of
falsification of a private document as set forth in

The Judiciary Act 1 and the Rules of Court 2 set forth

with clarity the jurisdiction of a municipal court over
crimes. That was the point stressed by petitioners to
respondent Judge. 3 It did not avail, their motion to
dismiss a falsification charge against them having
been denied. They did point out that in the very
complaint itself it was admitted that it was in another
municipality where such alleged falsification took

1.
Reference was previously made both to the
Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court as to the
jurisdiction of municipal courts to try criminal cases
being confined only to such offenses committed
within the limits of the territories appertaining to
their position. 10 In the latest case in point, Lopez v.
City Judge, 11 Justice Dizon, as ponente, restated the
basic rule thus: "It is settled law in criminal actions
that the place where the criminal offense was
committed not only determines the venue of the
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action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S.

v. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265). Thus, under the
provisions of Section 86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
municipal courts have original jurisdiction only over
criminal offenses committed within their respective
territorial jurisdiction." 12 As was pointed out by him,
such a doctrine goes back to U.S. v. Pagdayuman, 13
a 1905 decision. Beltran v. Ramos, 14 Ragpala v.
Justice of the Peace of Tubod, 15 People v. Yumang 16
and People v. San Antonio 17 may likewise be cited
on this point.
2.
That much, as was pointed out by Justice
Dizon, is settled law. It is to be assumed that
respondent Judge would not deliberately ignore what
it commands. His persistence can be ascribed to his
view that falsification is a continuing offense. He was
led to conclude, therefore, that an ingredient thereof
took place within his jurisdiction. Here his stand is
decidedly opposed to what this court has uniformly
and consistently held. Again, Lopez v. City Judge 18
points the way: "We now come to consider the
question of when and where is the offense of
falsification of a private document deemed
consummated or committed? Upon this point, We
have ruled clearly and definitely in U.S. v. Infante, ...
that the crime of falsification of a private document
defined and penalized by Article 304 of the Penal
Code (now paragraph 2, Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code) is consummated when such document is
actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a third
person, whether such falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use for which it was
intended." 19 United States v. Infante 20 was
decided as far back as 1917, almost sixty years ago.
Less than a month later that same year, United
States v. Barreto, 21 which spoke to the same effect,
was promulgated. As was pointed out by Justice
Carson who likewise penned the Infante opinion: "It is
evident, therefore, that the place where the crime is
committed is the place where the document is
actually falsified, and that the improper or illegal use
of the document thereafter is in no wise a material or
essential element of the crime of falsification of a
private document; and even if it were otherwise, the
charge that the crime was committed in a specific
place would seem to be a sufficient allegation that all
of the acts necessary to its consummation were in
fact done at the place indicated." 22 There is also
this opinion of Chief Justice Avancena in People v.

Villanueva: 23 "The falsification of each of these six

money orders committed separately by means of
different acts constitutes independent crimes of
falsification. (U.S. v. Infante and Barreto, 36 Phil.
146), and the appropriation of the respective
amounts thereof by the defendant, likewise
constitutes different crimes of malversation." 24 All
of the above cases explicitly ruled on the specific
point at issue. It does not admit of doubt though that
while no such categorical statement may be found in
other decisions of this Court, it has always been
assumed that falsification is not a continuing offense.
25
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and
the order of respondent Judge of April 29, 1967 and
the order of May 25, 1967 denying the motion for
reconsideration are reversed, nullified and set aside
and declared to be of no force and effect. The writ of
prohibition is likewise granted, respondent Judge
being enjoined to desist from taking any further
action on the complaint for falsification of public
and/or official documents filed against petitioners in
his sala except for the purpose of dismissing the
same. No costs.
PEOPLE VS DIZON
FACTS; That in or about the month of January, 1922,
at Camp Stotsenburg, in the province of Pampanga,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court of First Instance, the above-named defendant
Jose S. Dizon, at that time assistant bookkeeper of
the Post Exchange of said Camp, voluntarily, illegally,
and criminally, and with intent to defraud said Post
Exchange, altered and falsified the entries on the
books kept by him, and destroyed and rendered
unless certain documents and papers relative to the
accounts of said Post Exchange, succeeding, through
such fraudulent means, to swindle away the amount
of three thousand nine hundred and sixty-four pesos
and ninety-one centavos (P3,964.91), equivalent to
19,824 pesetas, belonging to the Post Exchange, said
defendant having embezzled said amount to the
prejudice of said Post Exchange, and in violation of
law.

ISSUE: whether or not the accused committed acts of

falsification. And estafa
RULING:
Yes,A thorough study of the evidence shows that the
accused, Jose S. Dizon, during the period from
October, 1920, to January, 1922, was in the employ,
as assistant bookkeeper at the Post Exchange of
Camp Stotsenburg, an army post in the Province of
Pampanga; that during the time of his employment
he brought on credit various articles from the several
stores of the Post Exchange, for which he signed
chits (vales) showing the nature and value of the
articles so brought; that said chits as well as chits
signed by other customers were recorded in the
books of the corresponding stores from which the
articles were bought; that every morning all of the
chits of the preceding day were turned over to the
office of the Post Exchange, also to be recorded in
the books of said office, including the ledger
(personal accounts) of the customers; that said chits
were kept in the office of the Post Exchange, and
were returned to the customers only upon payment
of their account; that Jose S. Dizon, as such assistant
bookkeeper, was the employee in charge of recording
the sales of the several stores, in cash as well as on
credit, in the books of the office of the Post
Exchange, and also of the keeping of the said chits
and the recording thereof in the personal accounts of
the customers; that he voluntarily did not record in
his personal account most of the chits signed by him
for articles bought on credit, amounting to P3,964.91
(Exhibit J-2), except a few of them amounting only to
P653.77, which latter amount he paid, leaving only a
balance of P29.43 (Exhibit J-1); that all the chits for
the said amount of P3,964.91 have disappeared, and
that only a few chits amounting to P199.99 were
found properly kept in separate envelopes (Exhibits I
to I-4).
The foregoing facts clearly show that the accused
voluntarily falsified the ledger (personal accounts) of
the office of the Post Exchange, which was a
commercial document, by not recording in his own
personal account the chits for articles bought by him
from the stores of the Post Exchange amounting to
P3,964.91, thereby violating article 301 in relation
with No. 4 of article 300 of the Penal Code, evidently
for the purpose of evading the payment of said
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

amount. The same facts also lead us to the

conviction that the accused maliciously destroyed
those chits, for the same purpose, and also to
obliterate, to some extent, the traces of his
indebtedness, which act constitutes a violation of
paragraph 9 of article 535 of the Penal Code. (U.S.
vs. Tan Jenjua, 1 Phil., 38; U.S. vs. Kilayko, 31 Phil.,
371.)

The evidence clearly establishes the guilt of the

accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and the findings
of facts of the lower court are in full harmony
therewith. The fifty thousand errors attributed to the
lower court by counsel for appellant could not be
found in spite of our careful and painstaking study of
the whole record. The only error of said court noted
by us is the finding, that in the commission of the
crime of estafa the accused violated article 534
instead of article 535, No. 9, of the Penal Code. This
error, however, is immaterial as far as the appellant
is concerned, in view of the fact that under the
provisions of either article the penalty remains the
same.
US VS PONTE
FACTS: That on or about the 6th day of September,
1909, the defendant Rufino Ponte was a bonded
employee of the provincial and municipal
government of Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and as
municipal treasurer of said pueblo had in his
possession and in his charge the sum of P3,795.53
and safe valued at P50. The defendant Pedro Pedraza
was the janitor or porter of the municipal treasury of
Calabanga, and Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades,
AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram and Esteban Verata
were municipal policemen of said pueblo of
Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and as such officers
had committed to them the guardianship and
custody of the municipal treasury of Calabanga,
where the said sum of P3,795.93 and the safe
containing it were kept.
That the said defendant Rufino Ponte did maliciously,
criminally and unlawfully misappropriate and make
personal use of the said sum of P3,795.93, and
refused and failed to render account of the same, as
well as of the safe containing it.

That the defendants Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida,

Ignacio Narvades, AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram,
and Esteban Verata, did, each and every one of
them, maliciously, criminally and unlawfully, directly
aid said Rufino Ponte in this malversation by taking
said safe with the said amount from the municipal
treasury and carrying it to the sitio of Inarian: in
violation of law.
Counsel for the defendants Juan Alamida, Ignacio
Narvades, AgapitoCada, Alejandro Metram, and
Esteban Verata, demurred to the information on the
ground that as to these defendants the facts set out
in the information did not constitute the crime with
which they were charged. The grounds upon which
they base this contention are stated by counsel as
follows:
The crime with which the above-named defendants
are charged is provided for and penalized by a
special Act, No. 1740, which has repealed such
provisions of the Penal Code relating to malversation
and misappropriation as conflict with the provisions
of said Act.
According to the information cited, the above-named
accused were municipal policemen of Calabanga,
where the crime was committed, and their sole
participation therein was that they directly aided
Rufino Ponte, the municipal treasurer, in said
malversation by taking the safe with the sum
misappropriate and carrying it from the municipal
treasury to the sitio of Inarian.
ISSUE: whether or not Public malversation extends to
those who aid the prinicipal
RULING:
YES, Groizard, in his Commentaries on article 405 of
the Spanish Penal Code, which is substantially
identical with article 390 of the Philippine Code, says
that:
Doubt, weighty doubt may arise, nevertheless,
regarding the definition of the crime and of the
penalty to be imposed upon the private party who
abstracts funds with the consent of the officer
charged with their custody. Shall the person so doing
be guilty of the crime of malversation here provided

for, and shall he suffer the same penalty as the

unfaithful officer, or shall he be guilty only to the
crime of theft and undergo the punishment he
deserves therefor?
Without overlooking the force of the arguments we
have just cited, we are inclined to take the first point
of view. We are led thereto by the consideration that
in contending for the imposition of the same penalty
upon the private party who abstracts public funds as
upon the employee who gives his consent thereto we
recognize the differentiation with which crimes are
always described and penalized in the code. In the
action which the text describes as a crime there is
perfect unity: the private party does not act
independently from the public officer: rather, he
knows that the funds of which he wishes to get
possession are in the latter's charge, and instead of
trying to abstracts them by circumventing the other's
vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer's
unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most
reprehensible means for accomplishing a deed which
by having a public officer as its moral instrument
assumes the character of a social crime. If the article
were not so interpreted, it would be necessary to
agree that the act, in spite of its evident unity, would
constitute not one but two distinct crimes, and the
persons participating therein, although they acted
together throughout, would be guilty of two different
kinds of wrongdoing. Moreover, the rule of article 80,
which prevents extension from some culprits to
others of the responsibility that arises from their
personal qualities, is restricted by fundamental
principles and by the article itself, wherein it is
applied to the consideration of the extenuating and
aggravating circumstances which may affect the
persons respectively responsible for the crime, and it
neither can nor must influence in any way the
characterization of the facts. One who helps a son kill
his father is an accomplice of parricide: one who
plans with a servant to commit a theft (hurto), and
does commit it, is guilty of hurtodomestic. When the
law clearly defines a crime, as it has here defined the
crime of malversation, those who in any way
participate therein must be principals, accomplices or
abettors thereof. (Vol. 4, p. 275.)
Viada, in his Commentaries upon the same article,
says:
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

Shall the person who participates or intervenes as

co-perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime of
malversation of public funds, committed by a public
officer, have the penalties of this article also imposed
upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by
some jurists and commentators (among others the
learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question
affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis
mutandis) we have already advanced in Question I of
the commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence
has also settled the question in the same way on the
ground that the person guilty of the crime
necessarily aids the other culprit in the acts which
constitute the crime.(Vol. 2, 4th edition, p. 652.)
The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support
their views as to the correct interpretation of the
provisions of the Penal Code touching malversation
of public funds by a public official, is equally
applicable in our opinion, to the provisions of Act No.
1740 defining and penalizing that crime, and we
have heretofore, in the case of the United States vs.
Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty
prescribed by this section of the code upon a public
official who took part with another in the
malversation of public funds, although it was not
alleged, and in fact clearly appeared, that those
funds were not in his handy by virtue of his office,
though it did appear that they were in the hands of
his coprincipal by virtue of the public office held by
him

On October 12, 1997 in Navotas City, the herein

appellant was charged of robbery with homicide. And
that he conspired, confederated and mutually helped
one another, with intent to gain and by means of
force, violence and intimidation employed upon the
person of one DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob and carry away one (1) gold necklace, one
(1) gold ring, one wristwatch, all of an undetermined
value, and a wallet containing unspecified amount of
cash owned by and belonging to DONALDO
SALMORIN, JR. Y SOLIS to the damage and prejudice
of the latter, and that on the occasion of or by reason
of the said robbery the said accused, conspiring with
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, attack, assault, stab with a bladed
weapon, the said DONALDO SALMORIN, JR. inflicting
upon him serious physical injuries which directly
caused his death.

Accused-appellants contention that the animus

lucrandi was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or
intent to gain is an internal act which can be
established through the overt acts of the offender.
Although proof of motive for the crime is essential
when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial,
intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed
from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining
to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The
intent to gain may be presumed from the proven
unlawful taking.1[6] In the case at bar, the act of
taking the victims wristwatch by one of the accused
Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a
knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the
presumption.

US VS. PIO CASTILLO (FALSIFICATION)

Issue:

Whether or not the Court erred in convicting him

notwithstanding the fact that his guilt has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt

G.R. NO. 2829 SEPTEMBER 19, 1906

Facts:

Held:

No. The court did not err in its decision.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DANILO REYES
(ROBBERY)
G.R. NO. 135682. MARCH 26, 2003

Facts:

This is an appeal for the decision rendered by the

RTC.

A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof

of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal
property with violence or intimidation against
persons or with force upon things; (b) the property
taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with
animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof,
homicide in its generic sense was committed. The
offense becomes a special complex crime of robbery
with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal
Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by
reason of the robbery.

1
11 | P a g e

CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

It was proven at the trial of the case on the morning

of the 2d of December, 1905, the appellant Pio
Castillo, presented a check for the sum of 56 pesos,
Philippine currency, to Chinese merchant named Lim
Ponso; that the said check was made payable to
bearer and purported to be drawn by one James J.
Watkins; that the amount of the check was paid to
Pio Castillo; that the signature of the drawer upon
said check was a forgery made in imitation of the
genuine signature of James J. Watkins, sheriff of the
city of Iloilo, and that, in fact, the said James J.
Watkins never signed or issued the said check; that
the blank upon which the check was written was
stolen from a book of blank checks between the
hours of 12 noon on the 1st of December, 1903, and
11 a. m. on the 2d of December, 1903, when the
check was presented for payment; that this blank
check book was kept in a drawer in the office of the
said James J. Watkins, and that Pio Castillo was one of
three clerks employed by Watkins in the office; that
Castillo was in the office on the evening of December
1 and early in the morning of December 2, and that
he was the last person let alone in the office on the
evening of December 1, he having locked the office
after all the other clerks had gone.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of falsification

Held:
The court held that the evidence is not enough to
render the accused guilty of falsification but found
the accused guilty of the crime of knowingly using
with intent to gain a falsified mercantile document as
defined and penalized in article 302 of the Penal
Code, and sentenced him to five months
imprisonment (arresto mayor) with the accessory
penalties.
In Massachusetts, wherein it has been held that the
mere fact of uttering is not proof of forgery (Com.
vs.Parmenter, 5 Pick., 279, 1827), it has been
decided, nevertheless, that "possession of a forged
instrument by a person claiming under it is strong
evidence tending to prove that he forged it or caused
it to be forged." (Com. vs. Talbot, 84 Mass. (2 Allen),
161.) In several jurisdiction it has been held that one

found in the possession of a forged order issued in

his own favor is presumed either to have forged it or
procured it to be forged. (Hobbs vs. State, 75 Ala., 1;
State vs. Britt, 14 N. C. (3 Div.), 122.)
For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to
hold, and we do not hold, that the mere fact that the
accused uttered the check in question is proof of the
fact that he also forged it or caused it to be forged,
but we do hold that the utterance of such an
instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence
tending to establish the fact that the utterer either
himself forged the instrument or caused it to be
forged, and that this evidence, taken together with
the further evidence set out above and brought out
on the trial of the case, establishes the guilt of the
accused of the crime with which he was charged
beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is urged on appeal that the information filed in this
case is fatally deficient because it charges the
accused with falsification and further alleges that he
received the sum of money realized as a result of
said falsification, and it is contended that the
accused was thus charged as principal and as
accessory after the fact. It is sufficient answer to this
connection to say no objection was raised on this
ground at the trial; and it is further to be observed
that this allegation was not in fact or intention a
charge against the accused as accessory after the
fact, and appears to have been set out in the
information merely to fix the civil responsibility upon
which the court is required to pass, under the
provisions of the Spanish Penal Code.

MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental which granted the petition for naturalization
of Ong Hock Lianalias Julian Ong.
Appellee, a citizen of the Republic of China, arrived in
the Philippines on April 30, 1927. He used to reside in
Zamboanga City but since March 1, 1940 he has
been living in Dumaguete City. He is married to Tan
KoKiem, also known as Alice Tan, a Chinese national,
by whom he has three children, two of whom are
school age and are enrolled at the St. Paul's College,
Dumaguete City, an educational institution
recognized by the government, not limited to any
particular race or nationality and where subjects on
Philippine history, government and civics are part of
the curriculum. Appellee himself finished his first
year high school education at the Zamboanga
Chinese High School, Zamboanga City. He speaks the
English, language and the Cebuano-Visayan dialect.
A merchant by occupation, he has a store in Colon
Street, Dumaguete City where he sells rice, corn and
general merchandise. He has two cargo trucks worth
P17,000 and office equipment worth about P200. His
net income was P5,939.36 in 1958; P4,114.49 in
1959, and P5,659.30 in 1960. To prove that he has
none of the disqualifications enumerated in the
Naturalization Law, he presented tax and police
clearances; clearances from the Philippine
Constabulary, the City Fiscal, the Provincial Fiscal, the
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and the
Municipal Court of Dumaguete City; and a medical
certificate of the City Health Officer.
Issue:

ONG HOCK LIAN ALIAS JULIAN ONG VS.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-21197

Whether or not the accused violated the anti-alias

law

MAY 19, 1966

Held:

Facts:
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

Yes. Under the law, except as a pseudonym for

literary purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was christened
or by which he has been known since childhood, or
such substitute name as may have been authorized
by a competent court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act
142). Aside from the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee
is using the alias "Julian Ong." There is no evidence
that appellee has been baptized with the latter name
or that he has been known by it since childhood, or
that the court has authorized the use thereof.
Appellee has therefore committed a violation of the
Anti-Alias Law.

his testimony given under oath before the provincial

fiscal Jacosalem, but in the proceedings brought
against CiriacoSingson for robbery, commenced on
September 24, 1913, Jurado, testifying as a witness
for the defense, stated under oath that he had known
Vicente Lizarraga since the month of June, 1913, and
that he was already acquainted with Alejandro Albao
on the date of the crime.

matter which he does not believe to be true, or that

such false testimony tend to establish something
which conflicts with the truth of an essential or
important fact which has been proven by the
evidence; because, if the false testimony of the
witness is not important, essential, or material
to the principal matte under investigation, it
can not properly be held that the crime of
perjury has been committed.

Issue:
People vs Michael Madarang
Facts:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of perjury

THE UNITED STATES VS FRANCISCO JURADO

G.R. NO. 10719G.R. NO. 10719

Facts:

This is an appeal by the accused on the decision

rendered which convicted him guilty of the crime of
perjury.

Held:

No. The testimony of Juradois not contradicted by

any evidence in the record. For lack of sufficient
proof of the falsity of that statement by the owner of
the house, the defendant Jurado, for it was not
proven that it was false and, as he certainly was in
his own house on the said night of the robbery, it
cannot be held that, in testifying as he did, he
perjured himself.

Madarang, together with Cirilo Juan, was charged

with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No.6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675). The two
were arrested in an entrapment operation, conducted
by a combined team of Integrated National Police
(INP)/Naval Intelligence Bureau(NIB) composed of
Alejandro Basallo, Roberto Viloria, Eduardo Pascua
and Douglas Abalos of Poro Point, La Union, for
selling Eight Hundred (800) grams of dried Marijuana
with flowering tops to the poseur buyer for 600.00
inside a jeepney. They were apprehended and
brought to the police station in San Fernando, La
Union, where they were investigated, detained and
subsequently released. The Provincial Fiscal ordered
that
they be
re-arrested
wherein
Madarang
voluntarily surrendered and upon arraignment
pleaded not guilty.
Issue:

On July 9, 1913, the acting provincial fiscal of Cebu,

DionisioJacosalem, proceeded to investigate the
matter of the robbery of some tins of opium,
committed in the house of Francisco Jurado by
Alejandro Albao, a municipal policeman, through
threats and intimidation and by availing himself of
his office. This opium belonged to Vicente Lizarraga
who had taken it to the said house to sell it to some
residents of the town. Lizarraga, the owner of the
drug, stated that Francisco Jurado was present,
among others, at the time of the robbery; but when
Jurado was called to testify as an eyewitness to the
crime he denied that he was at home on the night of
the robbery, as he was then in a cinematograph with
his family. He further testified that he did not know
either Vicente Lizarraga or Alejandro Albao. Such was

Moreover, the testimony of the witness does not

determine whether or not the defendant's testimony,
alleged to be false, was material and important in its
bearings on the said testimony of the other
witnesses given in connection with the said crime of
robbery.

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in discrediting

the eyewitness testimony of Felix Biwang.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding
him guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt.
Ruling:

In order that a witness, in testifying under oath

before a public official authorized to administer same
commit the crime of perjury and incur the penalty
prescribed by section 3 of Act No. 1697 , it is
necessary and indispensable that he testify to and
declare under oath with regard to some material

The lower court correctly rejected the testimony

of Biwang. By his own admission, he was too far
to hear what was being said by the persons inside
the jeepney. His version therefore cannot prevail
over that of the police officers who were actually
present in the vehicle when Madarang, in conspiracy
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

with Juan, negotiated the sale of the marijuana

leaves for 600.00 a kilo.
Madarangs defense that he only accompanied Juan
and that he was completely unaware that the plastic
bag actually contained illegal drugs cannot overcome
the positive and unequivocal statements of the two
peace officers that it was none other than Madarang
who personally fixed the price of the marijuana
leaves of 600.00 a kilo and who stood firm against
Vilorias (who posed as buyer) attempts at haggling.
Ownership
and
possession are
not
indispensable elements
of
the crime
under
consideration. The mere act of selling or even acting
as broker in a sale of marijuana and other prohibited
drugs
consummates
the
crime
under Section 4. When Madarang negotiated the sale
without authority of Juans marijuana leaves to
Viloria, he took a direct and active part in
the crime. His guilt has been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE VS. DE JESUS
Facts:
Carlito de Jesus (alias "Carling") appeals from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124 in
Caloocan City, convicting him in Criminal Case No. C21861 for violating Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and in
Criminal Case No. C-21862 for violating Sec. 8 of the
same Act and sentencing him to:
(1) Life imprisonment-together with
all
the
accessory
penalties
provided by law-and a fine of
P30,000.00 in Criminal Case No.
21861; and
(2) TWELVE (12) Years and a fine of
P12,000.00 in Criminal Case No.
21862.
The two informations filed against the accused.

The prosecution's evidence upon which the lower

court based its finding of guilt was summarized by
the court as follows:
... Tipped of drug-trafficking at the
Bisig Ng Nayon area, a heaven for
drug users/pushers, the antinarcotics group of the Caloocan
City Police conducted a campaign
thereat on January 17, 1984.
Apprehended on that occasion-it
was around one o'clock in the
afternoon-was accused Carlito de
Jesus alias "Carling." Aside from
selling five sticks of marijuana
(worth P10.00) to police officer
Jesus Nadonga, who had posed as
a drug-buyer, accused Carlito de
Jesus alias "Carling" was also found
in possession of 32 sticks of
marijuana-when frisked by the
police.
Those
sold
by
and
confiscated from accused Carlito de
Jesus alias "Carling"
were
examined
by
the
forensicchemistry unit of the National
Bureau of Investigation-and were
found
"positively
marijuana."
Immediately
after
his
apprehension, accused Carlito de
Jesus alias "Carling
owned
the
crime charged-and even gave a
statement which he acknowledged
before the inquest fiscal.
On the other hand, the defense adduced evidence as
follows:
. . . Carlito de Jesus alias "Carling"
had a tooth-extraction on the date
he was arrested-and, therefore, he
could not have perpetrated the
crimes charged as he was then
resting when apprehended. Carlito
de Jesus alias "Carling" did not give
any statement to the police-he was
merely coerced by the police into
signing a prepared statement.
Fistic blows were rained on him by

the police soon after his arrest-on

the way to and at the police
headquarters. Nonetheless, no step
was taken by him and his family
relative to what happened to him
(particularly the alleged injuries
inflicted).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting
the accused on two separate informations (for
violation of section 4 and section 8, art. ii, r.a. 6425
as amended) despite the fact that the latter offense
is an essential element and inherent in the offense
for violation of section 4, art. 11 of r.a. 6425 and
therefore deemed absorbed in the former offense;
HELD:
0On the first assigned error, the appellant claims that
possession of marijuana as prohibited under Sec. 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425 is absorbed in the offense of
selling marijuana as prohibited in Sec. 4 of the same
Act. He, therefore, contends that there should have
been only one charge which is that of unlawful sale
of marijuana.
The fiscal filed two separate informations because
when the appellant was bodily searched, after he
was apprehended for selling 5 marijuana sticks, 32
more such sticks were found in his pants back
pocket. Thus, he was also charged for possession of
prohibited drugs.
The lower court justified conviction on the basis of
two informations by stating:
As a last-ditch effort to lighten the
resulting criminal liability, the
defense tried to convince the Court
that the charge in Criminal Case
No. 21861 has absorbed that in
Criminal
Case
No.
21862.
Considering the gravity of the
offenses charged-taking note of the
ill-effects of dangerous drugs and
the
proliferation
thereof-such
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

interpretation
should
not
be
countenanced. Use of prohibited
drugs is bad in itself. But pushing,
vending, selling or circulating the
same is worse. Such act is worse
than murder-and the perpetrator/
perpetrators thereof should be
meted out the maximum penalty
allowable, if only to deter others
from doing the same. Let this be a
warning for those who deal with
dangerous drugs-that the law will
give them the severest blow
possible. Dura lex, sedlex.
We agree with the appellant's first assigned error,
sustained by the Solicitor General, that the trial court
erred in penalizing de Jesus separately under the two
informations:

The appellant contends that the court erred in giving

fun weight to his extrajudicial confession taken
during custodial investigation. He repudiated this
confession during trial on the ground that it was
extorted by force, coercion, and intimidation.
The appellant's defense that he was beaten up by
the police and forced to admit the sale of marijuana
is negated by his testimony that he suffered no
injuries. However, we completely disregard the
extrajudicial confession, there being no showing by
the prosecution that there was sufficient compliance
with the constitutional duty to inform the accused of
his rights to silence and to counsel, without which
there could be no intelligent waiver of said rights.
(See People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289).
With
the
extrajudicial
confession
completely
disregarded, there is still more than enough evidence
to sustain a judgment of conviction.

As the Solicitor General stated:

The trial court's severe stand
against
traffic
in
drugs
is
understandable.
But
the
assumption is that the legislature
will not indulge in absurdities.
Since possession of prohibited
drugs is inherent in the crime of
selling them, it is to be assumed
that, in punishing selling, the
legislature took into account the
need to possess them first.
The
penalty
for
selling-life
imprisonment to death-is already
quite harsh. The legislature should
not have intended to attach a
further penalty of 12 years to 20
years for possession It would be
superfluous
especially
if
the
accused have been imposed a
death sentence for selling.
The second and third assigned errors center on the
issue of whether or not the prosecution evidence is
sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. C-21861.

Pat. Jesus Nadonga who acted as poseur-buyer

clearly and positively Identified appellant de Jesus as
the seller of the marijuana. The appellant's defense
is that he was not there at the scene of the crime. He
was recuperating from a tooth extraction. The denial
and explanations cannot overcome the positive
evidence. (People v. Chavez, 117 SCRA 221; People v.
Dondoy, G.R. No. 63728, September 15, 1986). We
agree with the lower court when it cited the wellestablished rule that greater weight is given to the
positive testimony of the prosecution witness than to
the accused 's denial (People v. Mostoles, Jr., 124
SCRA 906).
Regarding the alibi offered by the appellant, as
stated in the case of People v. Dondoy, supra:
it is well settled that against the
positive
Identification
of
the
accused, alibi is unavailing (People
v. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321) and
that as a minimum requirement for
the theory of alibi to be accepted,
the accused must also demonstrate
that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime
(People v. Bihasa, 130 SCRA 62;

People v. Munoz, 107 SCRA 313;

People v. Capillas, 108 SCRA 173;
and People v. Sambangan, 125
SCRA 726).
De Jesus testified that he was resting outside their
house at BisigngNayon Street at about the time of
the incident. It was not impossible for him to be at
the scene of the sale of marijuana as it was
transacted in the same street.
We have carefully examined the records and we find
no reason to depart from the trial court's
appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and
that of the defense. The trial court stressed the
inconsistencies and incredulities in the testimony of
De Jesus, his evasive answers, and failure to respond
spontaneously. It believed the prosecution witnesses.
On the credibility of the witnesses, it is a wellestablished rule that we have usually accorded the
highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial
court, the latter being in the position to observe the
demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses.
We give credence to the narration of the incident by
the prosecution witnesses, more so as they happen
to be law enforcers who are presumed to have
regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary. (Rule 131, Sec. 5(m), Rules of
Court).
Furthermore, there is nothing in the records to
suggest that they were motivated by any reason
other than to accomplish their mission. As stated
in People v. Patog (G.R. No. 69620, September 24,
1986)
Where there is no evidence, and
nothing to indicate that the
principal
witness
for
the
prosecution
was
actuated
by
improper motives, the presumption
is that he was not so actuated and
his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit. (See also People v.
Campana, 124 SCRA 271).

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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

And finally, the accused manifested before trial his

willingness to plead guilty to the lesser offense of
unlawful possession of marijuana but the prosecuting
fiscal objected and insisted on the prosecution of
both offenses.
All considered, we hold that the guilt of appellant de
Jesus has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. C21861 for the sale of prohibited drugs is AFFIRMED.
The judgment in Criminal Case No. C-21862 for
possession, custody, and control of prohibited drugs
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
QUELNAN VS. PEOPLE

search warrant.Whether or not Quelnan was validly

arrested.
RULING:
Yes. There is no provision of law that requires the
search warrant must name the person who occupies
the described premises, that where the search
warrant is issued for the search of a specifically
described premises only and not for the search of a
person, and failure to name to owner or occupant of
such property in the affidavit and search warrant
does not invalidate the warrant. Yes. Quelnan
was arrested inflagrante delicto. In the prosecution
of illegal possession of shabu the following requisites
must be present:
1. the accused is found in possession of regulated dr
ug.

G.R. No. 166061, July 06, 2007

FACTS:
Sometime in 1996, the Police Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) was tasked to
implement a search warrant to a certain Berard Lim
for probably possessing MA HCI (Shabu). The team
was escorted to the unit by the security officer
(Punsaran), upon arrival at the place to be searched,
a male person naked from the waist up opened
the door, which was later identified as Quelnan. The
team presented the search warrant and proceeded
with the search. In the presence of Quelnan
and Punsaran, they found on top of a bedroom table
3 pieces of transparent plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance which was later
examined as Shabu. The next day, Quelnan was
arrested for violation of Sec.16 Art. III of RA
6425.Quelnan in his defense averred that he is not
residing in the said unit, but he is the registered
owner of the said unit, which he lwased to Sung
Kok Lee beginning May 1996. That he was there
during the search for he was collecting the rent. That
he was forced to sign some documents at gun point,
handcuffed and brought to PARAC Office. Two days
later, he was brought to Makati Prosecutors Office
for inquest and a case was filed against him.

2. the person is not authorized by law or by duly cons

tituted authorities; and
3. the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a
regulated drug.That there must be intent to possess
the drug, which includes actual possession or
constructive possession.
Actual possession exist when the drug is immediate
physical possession or control of the accused, while
constructive possession exist when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion over the place
where it is found. Quelnan was found and caught in
flagrante when the shabu was found in his
constructive possession.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERARDO

ORTEZA
G.R. No. 173051 July 31, 2007
Justice Tinga

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant was properly
enforced provided that he was not the subject of the

The information charged appellant with

illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165. In the course of the trial,
the prosecution alleged that a team comprised of
police officers was formed to conduct a buy-bust
operation to apprehend suspected drug peddlers.
The suspects have previously been under a weeklong surveillance after the police officers received
reports about their illegal activities. The appointed
poseur-buyer SPO1 Ramos, together with the
informant, approached the two (2) suspects
LengLeng and Buboy while the back-up team
positioned itself nearby. SPO1 Ramos purchased one
(1) sachet of shabu for One Hundred Pesos (P100.00)
from Buboy. Then, SPO1 Ramos gave the prearranged signal. Immediately, the rest of the team
rushed to the scene and placed the two (2) suspects
under arrest. After a body search, the marked money
was recovered from Buboy and another sachet of
shabu was confiscated from LengLeng. Thereafter,
the suspects were brought to Camp Macabulos
where Buboy identified himself as Gerardo Orteza.
Later upon examination, Engr. MarceneAgala of the
Regional Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, confirmed that the two (2)
sachets recovered from the scene were positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.

ISSUE:
Is the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer
fatal to this case?
HELD:
Yes. In a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (a)
that the transaction or sale took place; (b) the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (c) that the buyer and seller were
identified. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with
the presentation in court of the prohibited or
regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to
the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money consummate the buy-bust transaction
between the entrapping officers and the accused.

FACTS:
The Court believes that the prosecution was
not able to establish with certainty all the elements
16 | P a g e

CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

necessary for the conviction of appellant for illegal

sale of shabu.

First, there appears nothing in the records

showing that police officers complied with the proper
procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified
in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team having
initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia
should, immediately after seizure or confiscation,
have the same physically inventoried
and
photographed in the presence of the accused, if
there be any, and or his representative, who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

Secondly, the Court observes that the

prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who
had personal knowledge of the transaction. In this
case, though, after the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Ramos,
failed to appear in court despite having been
subpoenaed six (6) times, the prosecution did not
even bother to offer any explanation for his nonappearance considering that he, a police officer, was
no different from the other witnesses who were
presented in the end by the prosecution. In Ramos's
place, the prosecution presented two other police
officers, who although members of the back-up team
of the buy-bust operation were, in the Court's view,
not reliable eyewitnesses to the transaction.

Moreover, the testimonies of the two police

officers did not include any positive face-to-face
identification in open court of appellant as the seller
of shabu, an aspect which was crucial to establish
appellant's role in the alleged transaction. As such,
the testimony of the poseur-buyer, in this case
Ramos, was pivotal as only he could testify on what
had really transpired during the moment of the
alleged sale of shabu. His non-presentation in this
case was fatal, absent any explanation for his nonappearance and reliable eyewitness who could
testify in his place.

Justice Chico-Nazario

FACTS:
In an Information dated 7 August 2002,
accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a.
Bernie, was charged with Violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, for allegedly
having sold one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 0.42 gram of white crystalline
substance which was found positive to the test for
methamphetamine
hydrochloride
(shabu),
a
dangerous drug, to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco.

During trial, the prosecution testified that

the accused was caught in a buy-bust operation
conducted by the team of PO2 Danilo S. Damasco,
PO2 Montefalcon, PO2 Orig and SPO2 Zipagan
through the information given by a confidential
informant, who went with the said team during the
operation. Accused, however, refuted said claims,
saying that: 1) there was no buy-bust operation and
that the shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride)
allegedly sold by him to the poseur buyer was
planted evidence; and 2) the trumped-up charge is a
way of getting even with him because he, together
with his wife, had filed a case before the National
Police
Commission
(NAPOLCOM)
for
grave
misconduct against several policemen (PO2 Joel
Tapec, PO1 Christopher Semana and five John Does)
assigned at the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Pasig Police Station, for entering and robbing their
house on 5 February 2002.

In support of his first argument, accused

claimed that the non-conduct of a surveillance and
the absence of any agreement as regards the money
to be used in buying the shabu and as regards the
signal to inform the back-up policemen that the
transaction has been consummated shows that there
is so much doubt as to the existence of a buy-bust
operation.

affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this

appeal.

ISSUE:
Are the non-conduct of surveillance and the
absence of any agreement as regards the money to
be used in buying the shabu and as regards the
signal to inform the back-up policemen that the
transaction has been consummated essential to
establish the existence of a buy-bust operation?
HELD:
No. Settled is the rule that the absence of a
prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect
thelegality of the buy-bust operation. There is no
textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations.
The Court has left to the discretion of police
authorities the selection of effective means to
apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much
less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where
the police operatives are accompanied by their
informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait
of good police work. In the case at bar, the buy-bust
operation was conducted without need of any prior
surveillance for the reason that the informant
accompanied the policemen to the person who is
peddling the dangerous drugs.

The fact that the team leader and the other

members of the team did not discuss or talk about
the marked money does not necessarily mean that
there was no buy-bust operation. As explained by
SPO2 Zipagan, since PO2 Damasco was the
designated poseur buyer it was the latter's discretion
as to how to prepare the marked money. It is not
required that all the members of the buy-bust team
know how the marked money is to be produced and
marked inasmuch as they have their respective roles
to perform in the operation. As this Court sees it, the
other members of the team left the matter of the
marked money to one person the poseur buyer
because it was he who was to deal directly with the
drug pusher.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARDO F.

NICOLAS
G.R. No. 170234 February 8, 2007

After trial, the lower court decided

convicting the accused. The Court of Appeals then
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As to the absence of a pre-arranged signal,

same is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The
employment of a pre-arranged signal, or the lack of
it, is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. What
determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous
drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements
of the offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to
be a valid means of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. The elements necessary for
the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefore. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti. In the case under consideration, all
these elements have been established.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. DANGEROUS

DRUGS BOARD and PDEA, G.R. NO. 157870
FACTS: In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive
Dangerous
Drugs
Act
of
2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutors office
with certain offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for reelection in the May elections, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23,
2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only

prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant,
among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory
drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug
free. He adds that there is no provision in the
Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates
for senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and
Resolution 6486 are constitutional.
HELD:
No. Pimentels
contention
is
valid.
Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional.
It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance
is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is
the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In
the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to
yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.

Doctrine:
A lottery is defined as a scheme for the distribution
of prizes by chance among persons who have paid,
or agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the
chance to obtain a prize. Its elements are: (1) a
consideration; (2) chance: (3) a prize, or some
advantage or inequality in amount or value which is
in the nature of prize.
FACTS: Filart and Singson took part in a lottery or
raffle of an automobile, which was the property of
Filart.
The winner was determined in the following
manner: The numbers composing the 450, each
written on a separate piece of paper, were placed
together in a box and thoroughly mixed. A boy was
selected who placed his hand in the box and drew
out a number. This he delivered to a person who
unfolded the paper and read the number in a loud
voice while Filart, with a list of the 450 numbers
referred to, struck from the list the number
corresponding to that drawn from the box. This was
repeated until all of the numbers were drawn from
the box and stricken from the list. It was agreed that
the last number drawn from the box should be the
winning number and that the owner of that number
should win the automobile.
Both defendants were charged for violating the
following provisions of the law:
Section 7 of Act No. 1757 provides, as follows:

The provision [n]o person elected to any public

office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he
has undergone mandatory drug test is not tenable
as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in
the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
U.S. v. JAIME FILART AND HILARIO SINGSON
G.R. No. L-10263 March 13, 1915
Moreland, J.

The playing at and the conducting of any game of

monte, jueteng, or any form of lottery or policy . . . is
hereby prohibited, and any person taking any part
therein . . . shall be punished as provided in section 3
hereof. . . . .
This section also provides that:
It shall be no defense to any criminal action under
this section that the defendant acted as the agent of
another or that he had no interest in the result.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants conducted lottery

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HELD:
Yes. The facts of record place this case within the
definition generally given of a lottery.
A lottery is said to be a species of gaming, which
may be defined as a scheme for the distribution of
prizes by chance among persons who have paid, or
agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the
chance to obtain a prize. It was held in the case
of Equitable Loan Co. vs. Waring, 117 Ga., 599, that
three elements enter into a lottery scheme: (1) A
consideration; (2) chance: (3) a prize, or some
advantage or inequality in amount or value which is
in the nature of prize.
G.R. No. L-19982 December 29, 1922
"EL DEBATE," INC., petitioner,
vs.
JOSE TOPACIO, Director of Posts, respondent.
FACTS: The Director of Posts, following the advice of
the Attorney-General, refused to admit the issues
of El Debate, containing the advertisement, to the
mails, for the reason that it fell within the provisions
of the Administrative Code concerning non-mailable
matter. Not satisfied with the ruling of the Director of
Posts, the publishers of El Debate have had recourse
to these original proceedings in mandamus to settle
the controversy between the newspaper and the
Government.
The argument, while brilliant and informative to an
unusually high degree, has covered a somewhat
wider range than is essential. The issues will be more
sharply defined and, correspondingly, our burden will
be lightened, if all extraneous matter is thrown
overboard.
The demurrer interposed by the Government serves
to admit the fact pleaded in the complaint. The
applicable law is, likewise, conceded, as is also the
extent of power of the Director of Posts.
Section 1954 (a) of the Administrative Code includes,
as absolutely non-mailable matter, "Written or
printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or
in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or
purporting to convey any information concerning any

lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme depending

in whole or in part upon lot or chance. . . ." As
previously announced, the courts will not interfere
with the decision of the Director of Posts as to what
is, and what is not, mailable matter, unless clearly of
opinion that it was wrong.
In the next place, the fact that an Attorney-General
of the Philippines had held one way and another
Attorney-General an opposite way (and to make the
record complete, we would add that an AttorneyGeneral in 1912 also rendered an opinion on the
subject), with reference to carnival lotteries and
newspaper guessing schemes; the fact that three
Attorneys-General of the United States sustained the
validity of guessing contests, only to be overruled by
an Attorney-General subsequently in office; the fact
that the older authorities in the United States refused
to hold such contests illegal, while a contrary view is
now entertained; and the fact that guessing contests
are held not to be lotteries in England, Canada, and
other foreign countries, is relatively unimportant.
Passing by the historical phases, what we want to
know is the actual state of the law, and if the
doctrines announced in the authorities rest on a
sound basis of reason.
In the next place, advancing one step further toward
the issues, while countless definitions of lottery have
been attempted, the authoritative one for this
jurisdiction is that of the United States Supreme
Court, in analogous cases having to do with the
power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.:
The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the
distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy
playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at
fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of lottery are: First, consideration;
second, prize; and third, chance.
Reverting then to the admitted facts, to the admitted
law, and to the admitted judicial doctrines, the
fundamental question is this: Was the decision of the
Director of Posts, refusing the privileges of the mails
to El Debate, clearly erroneous? And the subsidiary
question is this: Is the guessing contest of El
Debate a "lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme
depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance"
within the meaning of the law?

Counsel for the petitioner is the first to admit that

the element of prize is present. We are, therefore,
relieved from considering this point. But he maintains
that the element of chance "has been reduced to a
minimum and is practically nil, while the element of
consideration is totally absent." Taking up, therefore,
these two points in order, we finally arrive at our
task.
What may be termed "the pure chance doctrine" is
no longer upheld by the weight of authority in the
United States. The element of chance is present even
though it may be accompanied by an element of
calculation or even of certainly. Counsel, therefore,
practically admits himself out of court when he
concedes that any element of chance is present, for
let it be remembered that our law includes the
phrase "depending in whole or in part upon lot or
chance It is difficult to select one of the cases cited
to elucidate the point under consideration, because
each and every one of them contains well considered
opinions. It was thus the decision of the United
States
Supreme
Court
in
Public
Clearing
House vs. Coyne which marked the turning point
toward a stricter application of the law. It was the
decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York in People ex rel. Ellison vs. Lavin, which included
the best dissertation on the philosophical subject of
what constitutes chance. While it was the decision of
the Federal Court in Waite vs. Press Publishing
Association which had a splendid rsum of the
situation, followed by all the encyclopaedias. We
choose the latter because the more recent and
because the briefest.
As indicated, in the case of Waite vs. Press Publishing
Association, the question before the court was
whether a guessing contest inaugurated by a
publishing association prior to an election, offering
certain rewards or prizes to those persons who, prior
to such election, submitted to the association the
nearest correct estimates of the total number of
votes cast for the office of President of the United
States, and at the time paid a certain sum as the
subscription to a named periodical, was a contest of
chance and a lottery, in violation of the laws of the
United States and the laws of the State of Michigan.

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ISSUE: Whether a so-called guessing contest was

valid or not.
HELD: "It is strictly and philosophically true in nature
and reason that there is no such thing as chance or
accident it being evident that these words do not
signify anything really existing, anything that is truly
an agent or cause of any event; but they signify
merely men's ignorance of the real and immediate
cause. But though nothing occurs in the world as a
result of chance, the occurrence may be a matter of
chance to the observer from his ignorance of
antecedent causes or of the laws of their operation."
The court refers at some length to the Coyne and
reaches the conclusion that the scheme before it falls
far within the requisites of a lottery as defined in that
case, under a statute very similar to the New York
one. The two cases referred to, the Coyne case and
the Lavin case, are cited by Attorney-General Moody
in his opinion of Nov. 28, 1904 (25 Opinions of
Attorneys-General, 286), as authority for the reversal
of the opinions of his predecessors holding that
"guessing contest" were not within the prohibition of
the federal statutes. The schemes presented to
Attorney-General Moody for his decision were
dependent, the one upon estimates of the total
number of paid admissions to the World's Fair at St.
Louis, and the other upon estimates of the total vote
cast for President in 1904. The conclusions he
reached were as follows:
"Conceding that the estimates in such a contest (the
World's Fair contest) will be to some extent affected
by intelligent calculation, the conclusion is,
nevertheless, irresistible that it is largely a matter of
chance which competitor will submit the nearest
correct estimate. The estimates cannot be predicated
upon natural and fixed laws, since the total number
of admissions may be affected by many conditions
over which the participants in this scheme have no
control and cannot possibly foresee."
And again:
"Neither of these contests is a "legitimate business
enterprise." In each thousands invest small sums in
the hope and expectation that luck will enable them

to win large returns. A comparatively small

percentage of the participants will realize their
expectations, and thousands will get nothing. They
are, in effect, lotteries, under the guise of 'guessing
contests,
"It is true that one acquainted with the results of the
elections of the state in previous years and educated
in politics would have some advantages over one
ignorant in those respects, yet it must be apparent
even to a casual observer that the result would
depend upon so many uncertain and unascertainable
causes that the estimate of the most learned would
be after all nothing more than a random and
undeceive judgment. In the sense above indicated
there is an element of skill, possibly certainty,
involved, but it is clear that the controlling
predominating element is mere chance. It was a
chance as to what the total vote would be; it was
equally a chance as to what the guesses of the other
guessers would be."
We think, for the reasons given by the courts in the
cases from which we have already quoted, the
guessing contest before us came within the terms of
the Michigan law and the mischief at which it was
aimed. At the time the estimates on which this suit is
based were submitted, the vote was yet to be cast;
indeed, on June 6, 1904, when the Battrick estimate
was sent in, one of the leading candidates for
President had not yet been nominated. The number
of persons who would be qualified to vote at the
election, and the number who would cast votes
which would be counted, were not only undetermined
but impossible of ascertainment at the time the
estimates were submitted. A thousand causes might,
in one way or another, intervene to affect the total
vote cast, so that at the best an estimate, if at all
near the total vote cast, would be but a lucky guess.
In so great a vote the necessary margin of chance
would be so large that no element of skill or
experience could operate to predict the result. While
one skilled in national politics and conversant with
existing conditions might make a closer estimate
than one wholly ignorant, yet, after all, the successful
persons in such a contest would be but makers of
lucky guesses in which skill and judgment could play
no effective part.

Conceding that the views of the American decisions

are sound, and upon this point they are so full and
clear that little remains to be said; conceding that
the estimates in the contest of El Debate will, to
some extent, and possibly to a great extent, be
effected by intelligent calculation, as has been
ingeniously argued by counsel for the petitioner, the
conclusion is nevertheless irresistible that the
scheme depends in part upon chance. The estimates
cannot be predicated upon natural and fixed laws,
since the total number of votes that will be cast for
the winning candidates for carnival queen may be
affected by many conditions, over which the
participants in this scheme have no control and
cannot possibly foresee. We think it is perfectly clear
that the dominating and controlling factor in the
awarding of the prizes is chance.
In respect to the last element of consideration, the
law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, if no consideration is derived
directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but does condemn as criminal, schemes in
which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid
directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
But what may appear on its face to be a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance has often been
held to be merely a device to evade the law.
Predicated on these legal assumptions, it is argued
here with much force that there is no consideration,
for the reason that a subscriber to El Debate receives
the full value of his money by receiving the paper
every day for the number of months that he
subscribes. The position is tenable, as respects those
persons who would subscribe to the paper regardless
of the inducement to win a prize, for as to them there
is no consideration. The position is fallacious, as to
other persons who subscribe merely to win a prize
(and it is to such persons that the scheme is
directed), for as to them it means the payment of a
sum of money for the consideration of participating
in a lottery. Moreover, the subscriber do not all
receive the same amount, for there are a few of them
who will receive more than the others, and more, too,
than the value paid for their subscriptions, through
the chance of a drawing. The general rule, therefore,
is that guessing competitions or contests are
lotteries within the statutes prohibiting lotteries.
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Indeed, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the

most ingenious and subtle mind to devise any
scheme or plan short of a gratuitous distribution of
property, which will not be held to be in violation of
the Gambling Law, and repugnant to the Postal law. It
is for the courts to look beyond the fair exterior, to
the substance, in order to unmask the real element
and the pernicious tendencies which the law is
seeking to prevent.
The purpose of El Debate in devising its advertising
scheme was to augment its circulation and thus to
increase the number of newspaper readers in the
Philippines which is commendable. But the
advertisement carries along with it a lottery scheme
which is not commendable.
The evils to society arising from the encouragement
of the gambling spirit have been recognized here and
elsewhere. Experience has shown that the common
forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when
placed in contrast with the widespread pestilence of
lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons
and places, but the latter infest the whole
community; they enter every dwelling; they reach
every class; they prey upon the hard-earned wages
of the poor; they plunder the ignorant and simple.
Punitive and condemnatory laws must, therefore, be
interpreted and enforced by the courts in a way
calculated to secure the object sought Open the door
of chance but a little, for one scheme, however
ingeniously and meritoriously conceived, to pass
through, and soon the whole country will be flooded
with lotteries.
Meeting, therefore, the issues in the case, we rule
that the Director of Posts acted advisedly in refusing
the use of the mails for the issue of El Debate which
contained the announcement of its guessing contest,
and that said contests is a lottery, or gift enterprise
depending in part upon lot or chance, within the
meaning of the Postal Law.
The demurrer interposed by the Attorney-General is
sustained, and unless the petitioner shall, within five
days, so amend the complaint as to state a cause of
action, the case shall be dismissed, with costs. So
ordered.

UY HA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, ET AL.,
respondent. THE CITY OF MANILA, intervenorappellant.
FACTS: On December 24, 1957, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance no. 3941,
which was approved by the mayor on January 3,
1958, providing, among others, that "no license for
the installation and/or operation of machines and
apparatus commonly known as 'Pinball' machines
shall be granted under any circumstances."
Thereafter, the mayor ordered the confiscation of all
"pinball machines" which are being used in violation
of said ordinance within the city. Petitioner, who was
engaged in the business of operating "pinball
machines" within the city prior to the approval of said
ordinance, applied for license for the current year,
but was refused, whereupon he filed the present
petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila
seeking to enjoin the enforcement of said ordinance
on the ground that said "pinball machines" are
devised for amusement and not for gambling and so
said ordinance is invalid and unconstitutional.
On February 20, 1958, respondents filed their answer
stating that the "pinball machines" operated by
petitioner are specially designed for gambling and as
such their operation is prohibited by law; that said
ordinance is not discriminatory; that "pinball
machines" being designed for gambling, the
operation of which chiefly depending on chance, are
a constant temptation to young people in whom
gambling may easily become deep-rooted; and that
"pinball machines" are deleterious to the moral,
economic and physical well-being of the people who
indulge in them, especially youngsters and
schoolchildren, so that their operation may be
prohibited under Section 18 (kk) of Republic Act No.
409.
The City of Manila, which has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, was allowed to intervene, and in
its complaint it alleged that petitioner had been
engaged in the business of operating eight "pinball
machines" in the City of Manila from the first quarter
of 1956 up to the present without first paying the
annual license fee of P300.00 for each machine in

accordance with the provisions of Section 774 of the

Revised Ordinance, as amended by Ordinance No.
3628, thereby becoming indebted to the intervenor
in the total sum of P4,620.00, including the
surcharge of 10% for non-payment. Petitioner
answered this complaint stating that he had already
paid the corresponding fees for his eight "pinball
machines" for 1956 and the first half of 1957 and
that tender of payment for the second half of 1957
was refused by the intervenor. He also claims that
Ordinance No. 3628 is null and void as it is not
merely regulatory but a revenue measure which is
beyond the power of the City of Manila to enact.
After trial, the court rendered decision holding that
"pinball machines" are gambling devices and as such
are proper subjects of the general welfare clause of
the city and that pinball machine joints cannot be
considered places of amusements within the purview
of Republic Act 1224. However, it denied the claim of
intervenor for unpaid license fees on the ground that
"it is doubtful whether the increase of annual license
fee from P50.00 to P300.00 can be justified under its
police power, or under Section 18(1) of its Charter,
neither of which authorizes the imposition of a tax
measure."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT, "pinball machines"
gambling devices the operation of which is prohibited
by law; and (2) is Ordinance No. 3941 of the City of
Manila valid and constitutional?
HELD:
With regard to the first issue, we quote with approval
the following observation of the trial court:
Pinball machines generally consists of a playing
surface, containing obstacles and apertures, upon
which balls or marbles, obtained by inserting the
required coin in the slot, are propelled by various
methods but uniformly with the object of dropping
such balls or marbles into particular apertures
designated as scoring or "pay-off" holes (39 CJS 66).
Dets. Cezar Zaballa and Numeriano Cortez upon
order of the Chief of the Detective Bureau conducted
a three-day observation on the operation of the oneball pinball machine and found that the chance of
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winning of a skilled player is 4.5% while that of a

non-skilled player is only 3.34% (Exhibit 6, pp. 1-4).
They further observed that the persons patronizing
these joints are school children carrying books and
idle adults.
The foregoing observation made with respect to the
non-flipper or one-ball type which are invariably
played for money is not radically different from the
conditions obtaining in the flipper or 5-ball type
which where the object of ocular inspection. During
the ocular inspection, the Fiscal spent P0.60 without
winning a replay, while the presiding Judge spent
P1.00 with only one replay. In other words, for three
games, P1.00 was lost. The result depends mainly on
chance or luck. The criterion is based not on the
skilled player but on the general public patronizing
same. in the flipper type, the prize is a chance at
replay and the chances are enhanced in proportion to
the amount paid per game. Then too, the replays one
wins may be easily converted into cash by the
operator.
Pinball machines have generally been held gambling
devices, it has been held that "Under statute
penalizing as a misdemeanour operation of any
game of chance played with any devise of money,
checks, credit or any representatives of value, a pinball machine in the operation of which the certain
amount of skill could be developed, but which as
played by patronizing public was purely a game of
chance, and which paid off in trade checks if metal
ball shot from spring or mechanical device fell into
proper hole designated by lighted number on back of
machine which changed each time machine was
played, was a "gambling device" and building in
which it was used was properly enjoined as a
"nuisance". And in State ex rel. Green vs. One 5c
Fifth Inning Base Ball Machines, 3 So. 2nd 27, 28, it
has been held that "A device which was termed a
"fifth winning baseball machine" and was operated
by placing nickel in slot, which released certain balls
and by ejecting balls on board by pulling a plunger
and striking againsts the balls, which would then
strike projections or bumpers on the board, a higher
score resulting by striking a certain number than by
striking others, was a "game of chance" subject to
condemnation as a "gambling device" under codal
provisions relating to suppression of gambling

devices." The proper test as to whether a machine is

a gambling device is whether it encourages the
gambling
instinct (Dussault
Case, Supra).
Furthermore, "a machine which return merchandise
of the value of the coin played therein and, in
addition, a chance of receiving a varying amount of
checks which may be used to pay the machine for
amusement only is a gambling device the right to
continue the operation of the machine for
amusement being a thing of value within statutes
directed against gaming. Under the foregoing
authorities, petitioner's non-flipper machines are
clearly gambling devices; while the flipper type
should likewise be considered as gambling devices
due to their tendency to encourage the gambling
instinct, which lead to idleness, economic waste,
dislike for work and criminality especially among
children of school age who are attracted by the lure
and novelty of the machine. They are, therefore
proper subjects and object of the general welfare
clause of the City of Manila. It further results that
pinball machines joints cannot be considered "places
of amusements" within the purview of Republic Act
1224 as to affect the question at issue.
We fully agree with the trial court that "pinball
machines" in the different forms in which they are
operated are gambling devices in that the winning
therein depends wholly upon chance or hazard. They
are inimical to the general welfare because they tend
to corrupt the people especially youngsters and
schoolchildren robbing them of their money and of
their savings earned by the sweat of their brow. Their
operation should therefore be suppressed not only
because they are prohibited by law but because they
are injurious to public welfare. Being gambling
devices or contrivances the operation of which
depends upon chance, they are not only prohibited
but are penalized by Article 195 of the Revised Penal
Code.
"Pinballl machines" being specially designed for
gambling and as such prohibited by law had been
properly suppressed when the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 3941 providing
therein that no license for their installation or
operation shall be granted under any circumstances.
In this sense, said ordinance cannot be held to be
invalid or unconstitutional; on the contrary, it

properly comes under the general welfare clause of

the Charter of the City of Manila.
It is true that under Section 18(1) of Act 409, known
as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, the
municipal board is given the power to regulate and
fix the amount of license fees for the operation of
certain devices, among them,slot machines, but this
provision should be understood as referring merely to
those types of slot machines that are not per
se gambling devices, for what is prohibited by law
cannot be the subject of regulation. In this sense,
Ordinance No. 3941 is valid and proper, for it only
seeks to regulate, as it does, the installation and
operation of any mechanical contrivance not
otherwise prohibited by law. But "pinball machines"
are not included in this proviso. They have been
properly suppressed.
A slot machine is not per se a gambling device, since
it may be used and played upon for innocent
purposes, and courts cannot, therefore, take judicial
notice that every slot machine is a gambling device
because use to which it is put must determine its
character.
"Slot machine" is not per se a gambling device, but is
only such where it delivers some commodity in
varying quantity, or where player may receive,
depending on chance, something of value or token of
some kind redeemable for something of value, or
where there is some other element that appeals to
the gambling instinct
Since Ordinance No. 3628 seeks to regulate and
license the operation of "pinball machines" within the
City of Manila upon payment of an annual license of
P300.00 for each "pinball machines", the same
is ultra vires, it being an exercise of power not
granted by law to the intervenor. As already stated,
those devices are prohibited by law and as such are
not subject to regulation. The attempt, therefore, on
the part of the intervenor to collect the sum of
P4,620.00 as unpaid license fees under said
ordinance cannot be entertained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

MANUEL UY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as
Postmaster General, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Manuel Uy filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 55678) against the
Postmaster General, praying for an injunction to
restrain
said
Postmaster
General
and
his
subordinates, agents or representatives from
enforcing Fraud Order No. 3, dated November 22,
1963, declaring Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency as
conducting a lottery or gift enterprise and directing
all postmasters and other employees of the Bureau
of Posts concerned to return to the sender any mail
matter addressed to Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency
or to any of its agents or representatives with the
notation "Fraudulent" stamped upon the cover of
such mail matter, and prohibiting the issuance or
payment of any money order or telegraphic transfer
to the said agency or to any of its agents and
representatives.

The salient facts gathered from the stipulation of

facts and culled from the briefs of the parties are as
follows:
Manuel Uy (appellee, for short) is a duly authorized
agent of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO for short), a government entity created and
empowered by law to hold sweepstakes draws and
lotteries for charitable and public purposes. As such
agent of the PCSO appellee is engaged in the sale
and distribution of sweepstakes and lottery tickets
which the PCSO prints and issues for each and every
one of the not less than twenty draws that said office
annually holds. To carry out its business of selling
sweepstakes and lottery tickets issued by the PCSO
appellee, upon authority of the said office, employs
sub-agents throughout the Philippines, through which
sub-agents not less than 70% of appellee's total
sales for each draw are made; and, with the consent
of the PCSO appellee agrees to give 50% of the
agent's prize to the sub-agent selling the prizewinning ticket. The agent's prize is 10% of the prize
won by the ticket sold.
ISSUE:

As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of preliminary

injunction was issued ex parte by the lower court.
The Postmaster General moved for the dissolution of
the writ of preliminary injunction, but the motion was
denied.
The Postmaster General filed an answer to the
complaint, setting up the defense that Manuel Uy
was conducting a lottery or gift enterprise that is
prohibited by law; that as Postmaster General he has
the authority to issue the fraud order in question and
he did not abuse his discretion in doing so; and that
Manuel Uy had not exhausted all the administrative
remedies before invoking judicial intervention.
The lower court, on the basis of the stipulation of
facts submitted by the parties declared Fraud Order
No. 3 contrary to law and violative of the rights of the
plaintiff and made permanent the preliminary
injunction previously issued.
The Postmaster General appealed to this Court.

Whether or not appellee's "Grand Christmas Bonus

Award" plan constitutes a lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme proscribed by the Postal Law,
aforequoted, as would authorize the appellant to
issue the fraud order in question.
HELD:
Before we resolve the question, however, we wish to
advert to the claim of the appellant that he had
made his decision based upon satisfactory evidence
that the "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan of
appellee is a lottery or gift enterprise for the
distribution of gifts by chance, and his decision in this
regard cannot be reviewed by the court. 4 Thus, the
appellant, in his brief, 5 says:
It is respectfully submitted that corollary to the rule
that courts cannot interfere in the performance of
ordinary duties of the executive department is the
equally compelling rule that decisions of the
defendant on questions of fact are final and

conclusive and generally cannot be reviewed by the

courts. For it cannot be denied that the Postmaster
General is charged with quasi-judicial functions and
vested with discretion in determining what is
mailable matter and in withholding from the plaintiff
the privilege of using the mail, the money order
system and the telegraphic transfer service... As the
disputed, Fraud Order No. 3 was issued pursuant to
the powers vested in the defendant by the Postal Law
and in accordance with satisfactory evidence
presented to him, it cannot be said that the
defendant was palpably wrong or that his decision
had no reasonable basis whatever. Neither can it be
said that he exceeded his authority nor that he
abused his discretion.
That the conduct of the post office is a part of the
administrative department of the government is
entirely true, but that does not necessarily and
always oust the courts of jurisdiction to grant relief to
a party aggrieved by any action by the head, or one
of the subordinate officials, of that Department,
which is unauthorized by the statute under which he
assumes to act. The acts of all its officers must be
justified by some law, and in case an official violates
the law to the injury of an individual the courts
generally have jurisdiction to grant relief.
Considered in the light of the foregoing elucidations
the conclusion is irresistible that since in the instant
case the element of consideration is lacking, the plan
or scheme in question is also not a "gift enterprise"
or a "similar scheme" proscribed by the Postal Law.
Not being a lottery, gift enterprise or similar scheme,
appellee's "Grand Christmas Bonus Award" plan can
be considered a scheme for the gratuitous
distribution of personal property by chance which the
Postal Law does not condemn. Thus, in labelling said
scheme as a lottery or gift enterprise when it is not,
appellant not only committed a palpable error of law
but also exceeded his statutory authority in issuing
the fraud order in question. The power of the
appellant to issue a fraud order under the Postal Law
is dependent upon the existence of a lottery, gift
enterprise or similar scheme.
Accordingly, the lower court did not err in declaring
the fraud order in question contrary to law and in
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

substituting its judgement for that of the appellant.

The lower court did not also err in issuing the writ of
injunction, the remedy adequate, speedy and
appropriate under the circumstances.lawphi1.nt

The correct construction of this article well stated by

Viada in his commentary on article 457 of the Penal
Code of Spain, which exactly corresponds with the
article in question.

... The Postmaster General's order being the result of

a mistaken view of the law, could not operate as a
defense to his action on the part of the defendant,
though it might justify his obedience thereto until
some action of the court. In such a case as the one
before us there is no adequate remedy at law, the
injunction to prohibit the further withholding of the
mail from complaint being the only remedy at all
adequate to the full relief to which the complainants
are entitled.... 27

There can be no doubt that the accused committed

the offense defined and penalized in No. 2 of the
article 571 of the Penal Code, which corresponds with
the above-mentioned number 2 of article 586 of the
Penal Code of Spain, and provides that a penalty of
from one of ten days' arrest and a fine of from 15 to
125 pesetas shall vbe imposed upon--

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be,

as it is hereby, affirmed. No pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
August 23, 1906
G.R. No. 2785
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

2. Those who, by exhibiting prints or engravings, or

by means of other acts, shall offend against good
morals and custom without committing a crime.
Since this is a lesser offense that the one charged in
the complaint, and is included therein, we find him
guilt of a violation of the provisions of the said article
and, reversing the sentence of the trial court, we
impose upon the accused, Jose Catajay, the penalty
of the ten days' imprisonment (arresto), and the
payment of a fine of 125 pesetas, and the costs of
the trial in both instances. After the expiration of ten
days from the date of final judgment let the cause be
remanded to the lower court for proper procedure. So
ordered.

JOSE CATAJAY, defendant-appellant.

G.E. Campbell, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The trial court found be accused guilty of the crime
of public scandal in violation of the provisions of
article 441 of Penal Code.
It appears, however, that the acts complained of
were committed at night, in a private house, and at a
time when no one was present except the accused,
the mistress of the house, and one servant, and we
are of opinion that these circumstances do not
constitute that degree of publicity which is an
essential element of the crime defined and penalized
in article 441 of the Pnal Code. (Decision of the
supreme court of Spain, April 13, 1885.)

People vsPelegrino
FACTS:
About last week of July or early week of August of
1991, accused Atty. Buenafe delivered a letter of
authority dated July 4, 1991 to complainant Dr.
Antonio N. Feliciano in the latters office at Valgozon
Bldg., Pasong Tamo, Makati. Said Exhibit K is
addressed to Dr. Antonio [N.] Feliciano signed by one
Eufracio D. Santos a [d]eputy [c]ommissioner of the
BIR stating inter alia that x xx the bearer(s) hereof
Revenue Officer EutiquioPeligrino to be supervised by
Buenaventura Buenafe is/are authorized to examine
your books of accounts and other accounting records
for income and business for the calendar/fiscal

year(s) ending 1988 & 1989. About two weeks later,

the complainant received a telephone call from
accused Atty. Buenafe asking him if his accountant
had not told him anything, and when he
(complainant) inquired from his accountant Ellen
Quijano about the matter, he was informed that the
accused were demanding half a million
pesos. Surprised about the demand, since the books
were not even examined, he instructed Ellen Quijano
to further clarify the matter. Thereafter about Sept.
1991, Atty. Buenafe called him up requesting for a
meeting in his office.
On October 10, 1991 accused EutiquioPeligrino and
Atty. Buenaventura Buenafe appeared in the
complainants office and told the latter that his tax
deficiencies would amount to [f]ive [h]undred
[t]housand [p]esos (P500,000.00)[.]
Flabbergasted, because his books were not even
examined, complainant entertained the idea that it
was the beginning of an extortion, and he tried to
negotiate for a smaller amount, and finally the two
(2) accused agreed to the amount of [t]wo [h]undred
[t]housand, of which [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos would
be paid to the BIR, and the rest to them. The pay-off
would take place on that coming Monday. He
immediately wrote a letter to the NBI requesting for
assistance, and an NBI Agent Atty. Rafael Ragos,
went to his office where they talked and arranged for
an entrapment which was set on October 14. At
around noon-time of the said date, he provided the
NBI with the pay-off money consisting of [t]hree
[t]housand (P3,000.00) pesos as the entrapment was
scheduled at 4:00 p.m. Prior to this, he had executed
an affidavit (Exhibit C). On the said entrapment
date, October 14, 1991 neither accused appeared.
The accused denied all the allegations and
contended that he did not accept the money and
demanded for a check payment and not for cash.
Complainant merely threw an brown envelope and
said yanangbayad,suddenly the NBI came out and
arrested the complainant.
ISSUE:

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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

1.
That the Sandiganbayan erred in
convicting the petitioner on the basis of the lone
testimony of Dr. Feliciano, an admittedly discredited
witness;
2. That petitioner was denied his right to equal
protection of the law.\

We see no cause to fault the lower court. The

assessment of the credibility of a witness is primarily
the function of a trial court, which had the benefit of
observing firsthand the demeanor or deportment of
the witness. It is well-settled that this Court will not
reverse the trial courts assessment of the credibility
of witnesses in the absence of arbitrariness, abuse of
discretion or palpable error.[26]

against petitioner and that against his co-accused

were simply not at par with each other.

HELD:
1.Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan with
inconsistency. Supposedly, while stating on the one
hand that complainant was not a credible witness on
account of his character, on the other hand it
accorded credibility to his testimony that petitioner
had received the boodle money. Likewise, petitioner
adds, the same court found complainants testimony
insufficient to establish Buenafes complicity, yet
deemed the same testimony sufficient to prove
petitioners guilt.
The Sandiganbayan findings adverted to are as
follows:
While the Court is reluctant to consider this
declaration of the offended party as satisfactory
proof that the accused [therein petitioner] requested
or demanded x xx the sum of P200,000 not only
because it was vehemently denied by the
accused but likewise considering the nature and
character x xx [or] person of the said offended party
(Exhibit 14 to 18), we are at a loss why in the
ensuing event, particularly in the entrapment laid out
by the complainant and the NBI agents, this accused
was present and x xx a brown envelop[e]
containing the boodle money was retrieved [f
rom him]. x x x.[25]
Obviously, the anti-graft court did not tag
complainant as a discredited witness. It simply said
that his testimony by itself was not sufficient
evidence of the commission of the offense. But,
taken together with the other pieces of corroborating
evidence, it established a quantum of evidence
strong enough to convict petitioner. While the case
is weakened by the many suits filed for and against
complainant, the court a quo did not say that he was
not at all worthy of belief.

It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan

to weigh the evidence presented by the parties, as
well as to accord full faith to those it regards as
credible and reject those it considers perjurious or
fabricated.[27]
Petitioner further contends that he tested
positive for fluorescent powder, because the NBI
agents had pressed the envelope to his body.
We are not persuaded. Petitioner failed to
ascribe to the NBI agents any ill motive to
deliberately implicate him. No malice was imputed,
either, to the chemist who had examined and found
him positive for the chemical; thus, we see no
cogent reason to disbelieve her testimony. In the
absence of any controverting evidence, the
testimonies of public officers are given full faith and
credence, as they are presumed to have acted in the
regular performance of their official duties.[28]

2. Petitioner asserts that he should be accorded

the same treatment and, thus, acquitted because of
his right to the equal protection of the law. After all,
the Sandiganbayan believed the testimony of
Buenafe that the latter had not asked for any payoff
money; and he was, thus, cleared of the charge
against him.
We disagree. Petitioner alludes to the doctrine
that if the conviction of the accused rests upon the
same evidence used to convict the co-accused, the
acquittal of the former should benefit the latter.
[29]
Such doctrine does not apply to this case. The
strongest pieces of evidence against petitioner were
the ones obtained from the entrapment, in which
Buenafe was not involved. Hence, the evidence

G.R. Nos. L-45376-77 July 26, 1988

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, in his capacity as
Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 16th Judicial
District, Davao City and City Mayor ANTONIO C.
ACHARON & ROSALINA BERNABE, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: 2 Informations filed before the Office of the
Prosecutor of General Santos alleging some overt
acts committed by the incumbent City Mayor Antonio
C. Charon. One of the information filed was about the
issuance of the cockpit operation permit that was
denied to Emilio Evanghelista but then issued a
permit to a certain Luis Acharon who is a 3rd civil
degree relative. On the same day, another
information was filed about the buying of 1,635 sacks
of rice for a very low price by using his authority as
Mayor. The prosecution filed a motion to suspend
them from their office. The trial court thereupon
issued a "show cause" order in both criminal cases,
directing the accused to show the invalidity of the
informations filed against them. court subsequently
issued an Order, dated 28 October 1976, deciding
the cases on the merits by making findings of fact
based on its assessment of the records of the
antecedent proceedings had in the cases, taking into
consideration matters of defense of the accused,
resolving that the informations in both cases are
"invalid ab initio" and consequently dismissing said
cases. The prosecution moved for reconsideration;
however, on 20 December 1976, the trial court
issued its Order denying the same.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the court erred in dismissing
the case at bar
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

HELD:
under Sec. 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public
officer is mandatory. 4However, suspension cannot be
automatic, the reason being that "a hearing on the
validity of the information appears conformable to
the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious
and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an
elective public official even before his conviction and
that public interest demands a speedy determination
of the issues involved in (the) cases." 5 Thus, before a
suspension order can be issued, a hearing on the
issue of the validity of the information must first be
had. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to
determine basically the validity of the information,
from which the court can have a basis to either
suspend the accused, and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of
the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of
the proceeding which impairs its validity
The Court has previously ruled that, under Sec. 13,
Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer is
mandatory. 4However, suspension cannot be
automatic, the reason being that "a hearing on the
validity of the information appears conformable to
the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious
and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an
elective public official even before his conviction and
that public interest demands a speedy determination
of the issues involved in (the) cases." 5 Thus, before a
suspension order can be issued, a hearing on the
issue of the validity of the information must first be
had. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to
determine basically the validity of the information,
from which the court can have a basis to either
suspend the accused, and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of
the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of
the proceeding which impairs its validity.
Considering the mandatory suspension of the
accused under a valid information, the law does not
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the
strength of the evidence of culpability against him,
(2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether
or not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the records and other evidence, so that a court

can have a valid basis in evaluating the advisability

of his suspension pending the trial proper of the case
filed against him. 10 Besides, a requirement that the
guilt of the accused must first be established in the
pre-suspension proceeding before trial proper can
proceed would negate the ruling of the Court that the
" ... mandatory suspension ... requires at the same
time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly
protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension
envisioned by the Act" 11 and make the trial proper a
surplusage.
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
practically held that the prosecution failed to
establish the culpability of the accused in a
proceeding which does not even require the
prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of
discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it
preemptively dismissed the cases and, as a
consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its
right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby
violating its fundamental right to due
process." 16 With this violation, its Orders, dated 28
October 1976 and 20 December 1976, are therefore
null and void. 17 Likewise, for being null and void,
said orders cannot constitute a proper basis for a
claim of double jeopardy.

ALAMPAY, J.:
128 SCRA 383 Criminal Law Crimes Committed By
Public Officers RA 3019 Preventive Suspension
Not a Penalty
Reynaldo Bayot was an auditor for
the Commission on Audit. He was allegedly involved
in certain anomalous transactions while serving as
such hence in 1978, he was charged with 32 cases of
Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before
the Sandiganbayan.
In 1980, he won as the mayor of Amadeo, Cavite.
In 1982, while serving as mayor and while his estafa
cases were pending Batas PambansaBlg. 195 was
passed which amended Republic Act No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
amendment provided that incumbent public officers
facing graft cases shall be suspended from office.
Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
suspension of Bayot as the mayor of Amadeo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension under RA
3019 is a penalty hence an ex post facto law.

.R. No. L-54645-76 December 18, 1986

REYNALDO R. BAYOT, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Alfredo Estrella and Ramon Quisumbing, Jr. for
petitioner.
Fred Henry V. Marallag for petitioners-intervenors.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

HELD: No. The preventive suspension provided in RA

3019 as amended shall not be considered as a
penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed
as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension.

G.R. No. L-33362 July 30, 1971

JOSE R. OLIVEROS, petitioner,
-versusTHE HONORABLE JUDGE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ,
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CRIMINAL LAW 2 DIGEST

Judge, Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial

District; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR EMILIO GANCAYCO;
STATE PROSECUTOR EDILBERTO BAROT, JR.,
and ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL ELISEO C.
DE GUZMAN of Rizal, respondents..
Coronel Law -Office for petitioner.
Chief State Prosecutor Emilio A. Gancayco, State
Prosecutor EdilbertoBarot, Jr. and Rizal Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Eliseo C. de Guzman for and in their
own behalves.
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz for and in his own behalf.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

An information filed on 31 March 1971 in the Circuit
Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District, and signed by
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliseo C. de Guzman of
Rizal and State Prosecutor EdilbertoBarot, Jr., and
docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-753, Rizal
(People vs. Jose RentoriaOliveros, et al.), charged
herein petitioner Oliveros with a violation of Sections
3(a) and 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (Republic Act No. 3019). In substance, it was
alleged therein that between 1 August 1968 and 31
January 1969 said petitioner, as Municipal Mayor of
Antipolo, Rizal, in conspiracy with other persons
unknown, in bad faith and with intent to defraud the
Government of the Philippine Republic, appointed his
brother, Simplicio to the position of confidential
agent to the office of the mayor, knowing the
appointee to be an employee of the Far East Bank &
Trust Company, and caused the salary as confidential
agent from 1 August 1968 to 31 January 1969, in the
sum of P1,080, to be charged to the general funds of
the Municipality of Antipolo, without the appointee
rendering service nor presenting proof of service, as
required by the applicable regulations.
On 31 March 1971, the presiding judge, respondent
Onofre A. Villaluz, without previous hearing, issued
an order (Annex "A", Petition) suspending the

accused Oliveros, under Section 13 of Republic Act

No. 3019, and stating, inter alia the following:
Considering that information is sufficient in form and
substance, the same being duly approved by the
Chief State Prosecutor Emilio Gancayco and filed by
State Prosecutor EdilbertoBarot, Jr. and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Eliseo C. de Guzman, they having
certified that a preliminary investigation has been
conducted in the above-entitled case in accordance
with law; that the accused was given a chance to
appear in person or by counsel; that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the offense
complained of has been committed and that the
accused are probably guilty thereof, the accused Jose
RentoriaOliveros is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from
office within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of
this order.
Petitioner applied to this Court for writs of certiorari
and prohibition, pleading grave abuse of discretion
and excess of jurisdiction, in that (a) the prosecutors
who filed the information had no authority to do so,
and that they filed it without giving him proper
preliminary investigation; (b) that he was ordered
suspended without giving him opportunity to contest
the sufficiency of the information.
We find the charge of lack of preliminary
investigation to be without merit. The annexes to the
petition and the answer plainly show that a
preliminary investigation was first conducted by
respondent Assistant Fiscal Eliseo de Guzman, who
recommended to his chief, the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, that an information be filed for violation of the
Anti-Graft law (Republic Act 3019); that upon
petitioner Oliveros' motion, the Provincial Fiscal had
the case reviewed by First Assistant Fiscal Luis Victor
and State Prosecutor Joel Tiangco, who later
recommended dismissal of the charges, with which
Provincial Fiscal Castillo concurred. However, the
latter, on 20 January 1971, submitted the
recommendation to quash the charges and the entire
record of the case to the Secretary of Justice, for
review by the Department (Answer, Annex "2"). The
case was referred to State Prosecutor EdilbertoBarot,
Jr., who, after study, concurred with Assistant Fiscal
de Guzman, and recommended that the charges be
filed (Answer, Annex "3"). The Department of Justice

returned the records to the Provincial Fiscal, with

instructions to take appropriate action in conformity
with the Barot report; but as the Provincial Fiscal
considered the action asked of him to be contrary to
his convictions, upon his suggestion and request
(Annex "5"), the Department of Justice by
Administrative Order No. 130, designated respondent
Barot to handle the case (Annex "6"), and thus the
information came to be filed.
Thus petitioner's claim that the original charges
against him had been quashed by the Provincial
Fiscal, and that no information could be thereafter
filed against him without another investigation, is
unfounded. The quashing of the charges never
became operative, since the Secretary of Justice, in
the exercise of his supervisory power as Department
Head (Sections 83, 74 and 76, Revised Administrative
Code), reversed the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal,
and designated State Prosecutor Barot to handle the
case as special prosecutor, as authorized by Section
3, Republic Act No. 5783, as amended by Republic
Act No. 5184. This authority of the Secretary has
been repeatedly upheld by this Court. 1
We agree with petitioner Oliveros, however, that the
order of suspension issued by respondent Judge
Villaluz was premature and in grave abuse of
discretion, being contrary to the doctrine set by this
Court in Luciano vs. Wilson, L-31347, 31 August 1970
(34 SCRA 638, 643). There, upon review of a
similar ex parte order of suspension under petition
13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, this
Court held that before an order of suspension should
be, issued,
a hearing on the validity of the
information appears conformable
to the spirit of the law, taking into
account the serious and far
reaching consequences of a
suspension of an elected public
official even before his conviction.
and accordingly set aside the order of suspension
issued by Judge Herminio Mariano of Rizal, and
directed him to "forthwith hold a hearing on the
validity of the information".
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The same rule applies to this case. It goes without

saying that should the court judicially uphold the
validity of the information, after due hearing of the
parties, it may reissue the suspension order.
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is granted, and
the order of respondent Judge dated 31 March 1971
suspending petitioner Mayor of Antipolo is set aside,
and said respondent is ordered to hold a preliminary
hearing on the validity of the information, Criminal
Case No. CCC-VII-753, Rizal, after due notice to the
parties. The petition is dismissed as to the other
respondents. The preliminary injunction is dissolved.
No costs.
Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan235 SCRA 103
August 4, 1994Justice Mendoza
Facts:
Antonio M. Bolastig is the governor of the province of
Samar. Information was filedagainst him and two
others Pedro Ason the provincial treasurer
and PrudencioMacabenta the property officer of the
province- for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of
onion skin paper inviolation of Anti-graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan acting upon the
motion of the Special Prosecutor suspended the
Petitioner for 90 days with the strength of the
provision of sec. 13 of the Anti graft and corrupt
practices act which provides for the preventive
suspensionof public officers if they are under criminal
prosecution under valid information under the
sameact or under title 7, Book II of the RPC, or for
any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property as basis. However, herein
petitioner contends that his suspension was
amindless and meaningless exercise and it was
imposed without regard to the spirit and intent of the
law in which it is based. He further contends that his
suspension may deprive his constituentsof
the services of an elected official elected by them.
Sandiganbayan rejected the motion of theaccused
hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan is correct in suspending
herein petitioner as Governor withthe strength of
Sec. 13 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Held:

Yes, it is now settled that sec 13 of Republic Act No.

3019 makes it mandatory for
theSandiganbayan to suspend any public officer agai
nst whom a valid information chargingviolation of the
law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involvi
ng fraud upongovernment or public funds or property
is filed. The fact that an elected officials
preventivesuspension may deprive his constituents
of the official elected by them is not a sufficient
basisfor reducing what is otherwise a mandatory
suspension provided by law.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
Petitioner: Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Respondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
and People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Bellosillo
FACTS:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A.
No. 7659 substantially provides that any public
officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires illgotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being
prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its
constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes
the element of mensrea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a
violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in
R.A. No. 7080 is a malumprohibitum.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover,
the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that
plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of
plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, and are committed willfully,
unlawfully and criminally by the offender, alleging
his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is
a malum in se.

Rios vsSandiganbayan
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated March 24,
1997, granting the motion of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) to suspend petitioner Dindo C.
Rios pendente lite, and its resolution dated June 25,
1997 denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
On March 6, 1996, an information was filed against
petitioner who is the incumbent Mayor of the
Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon for alleged
unauthorized disposition of confiscated lumber, in
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
information alleged:
That on or about May 16, 1994, in San Fernando,
Romblon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, a public officer, x
xx while in the performance and taking advantage of
his official functions, and with evident bad faith, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
cause the disposition of confiscated, assorted and
sawn tanguile lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces
without proper authority therefor, thus, causing
undue injury to the Government.
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash Information and Recall Warrant of Arrest,
dated August 4, 1996, on the ground that the
information was invalid as there was no probable
cause to hold him liable for violation of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019. [1]
On September 16, 1996, the OSP filed a Motion to
Suspend Accused (herein petitioner) Pendente Lite,
to which petitioner filed an Opposition, reiterating
the same ground stated in his motion to quash.
The Sandiganbayan overruled the argument in its
resolution of October 14, 1996. Thereupon,
petitioner filed a verified petition with this Court
which was docketed as G.R. No. 126771. Among the
issues raised was the alleged invalidity of the
information. The Court resolved to deny this petition
on December 4, 1996 on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the questioned judgment.
On March 24, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the
OSPs motion to suspend petitioner in an order which
provides in part:accused Dindo C. Rios is ordered
suspended from his position as Mayor of the
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Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon and from any

other public position he may be holding for a period
of ninety (90) days counted from receipt of this
Resolution.
Held: The first argument propounded by petitioner
has already been passed upon by this Court when it
held that the act of disposing of confiscated lumber
without prior authority from DENR and the
Sangguniang Bayan constituted a violation of Sec.
3(e) of R.A. 3019. Therefore, there is probable
cause to hold petitioner liable for such act, for
which the information was validly
filed. Although any further discussion of this
issue would be unnecessary, the
Sandiganbayans ruling is herein reiterated as
a reminder to public officials of their crucial
role in society and the trust lodged upon them
by the people.
The act complained of in this case is the disposition
(by petitioner) of confiscated, assorted and sawn
lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces without proper
authority therefor, thus causing undue injury to the
Government.
Petitioner maintains that the mere fact that he
acted beyond the scope of his authority by
selling the confiscated lumber without the
prior approval of the DENR through its
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office and without a resolution from
the Sangguniang Bayan, does not constitute a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. What
renders the disposition of lumber contrary to law is
any resulting undue injury which, however, is
absent in this case because the proceeds of the
disposition went to the coffers of the Municipal
Government.
The Sandiganbayan, however, asserted:
First, any act or omission that is not in consonance
with the prescribed norms of conduct inflicts injury to
the Government, for the reason that it is a
disturbance of law and order. This is more so when,
as in this case, the alleged offender is the highest
officer in the Municipal Government, because he sets
a reprehensible example to his constituents.
Second, the assertion that no undue injury was
caused because the proceeds of the disposition of
confiscated lumber went to the Municipal
Government gratuitously assumes that the price at

which the lumber was disposed of was the

reasonable market value thereof and that all the
proceeds were paid to the local government. The
assertion is further based on the wrong assumption
that the lumber belonged to the municipality of
which the accused was mayor. It was the National
Government, as distinguished to (sic) local
governments, that owned it, (Sec. 2(a), RA 3019)
there being no evidence that the National
Government had disposed of the lumber in any
manner. [3]
We cannot agree more with the Sandiganbayan. This
Court would like to stress adherence to the doctrine
that public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. Public servants
must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all
times to guide them in their actions during their
entire tenure in the government service.[4] The good
of the service and the degree of morality which every
official and employee in the public service must
observe, if respect and confidence are to be
maintained by the Government in the enforcement of
the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his
part, affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while
holding office should be left without proper and
commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances
taken into account. [5]
The suspension pendente lite meted out by the
Sandiganbayan is, without doubt, a proper and
commensurate sanction against petitioner. Having
ruled that the information filed against petitioner is
valid, there can be no impediment to the application
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which states, inter alia:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act
or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office.
It is settled jurisprudence that the aforequoted
provision makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan
to suspend any public officer who has been validly
charged with a violation of R.A. No. 3019, Book II,
Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense

involving fraud upon government or public funds or

property. [6]
The court trying a case has neither discretion nor
duty to determine whether preventive suspension is
required to prevent the accused from using his office
to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office.[7] This is
based on the presumption that unless the public
officer is suspended, he may frustrate his
prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or
both.
On the other hand, we find merit in petitioners
second assigned error. The Sandiganbayan erred in
imposing a 90 day suspension upon petitioner for the
single case filed against him. Under Section 63 (b) of
the Local Government Code, any single preventive
suspension of local elective officials shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days. [8]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED subject to
the MODIFICATION that the suspension be reduced
to 60 days.
People vs. Lacson, G.R. 149453, October 7,
2003

Facts: Petitioner asserts that pursuant to a long line

of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial practice
in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule 117 of the
RRCP should be applied prospectively and
retroactively without reservations, only and solely on
the basis of its being favorable to the accused. He
asserts that case law on the retroactive application of
penal laws should likewise apply to criminal
procedure, it being a branch of criminal law. The
respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely
crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce
the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of his case. Accordingly, prospective
application thereof would in effect give the
petitioners more than two years from March 29, 1999
within which to revive the criminal cases, thus
violating the respondents right to due process and
equal protection of the law.
ISSUE: What is the time-bar rule? Being favorable to
the accused , can the time-bar rule be applied
retroactively?

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HELD:
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the
Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the
benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only. The Court emphasized in its assailed
resolution that: In the new rule in question, it has
fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with
the express consent of the accused and with a priori
notice to the offended party. In fixing the time-bar,
the Court balanced the societal interests and those of
the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State
and the accused. It took into account the substantial
rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process. The Court believed that the time limit is a
reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and
notice to the offended parties.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply
the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period
commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the
public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution
of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule.
Instead of giving the State two years to revive
provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so.
Us vsUdarbe
Facts: "The undersigned fiscal of the Province of
Ilocos Sur charges Clemente Udarbe with violation of
section 28 of the Municipal Code, committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Said Clemente Udarbe, the defendant above named,
being municipal president in the municipality of
Magsingal of the Province of Ilocos Sur, P. I., did in
January, 1913, and prior and subsequent thereto,
become interested and take direct part willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally in the fishery business of
the municipality of which he was president, having at
said time and place leased various fishponds In
violation of law."cralaw virtua1aw library
After trial, judgment was rendered by said Court of
First Instance, under date of April 4 of the same year,
sentencing the defendant, as guilty of the violation of
said section 28 of the Municipal Code, to six months
imprisonment and payment of the costs. Said
defendant has appealed therefrom, alleging as his
defense in this instance that the court erred in
making various findings of fact in the judgment and
in declaring that such facts constituted a clear

violation of the section cited and in imposing upon

the defendant the penalty set forth.
"No municipal officer," says said section 28 [as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 663], "shall be
directly or indirectly interested in any contract work,
or cockpits, or any other permitted games and
amusements, or business of the municipality, or in
the purchase of any real estate or any other property
belonging to the corporation," and further states that
violation of said provision shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more
than two years.
It is plainly proven: (1) That the defendant was
appointed municipal president of the municipality of
Magsingal on October 28, 1912, on which date he
entered upon the duties of his office, and while on
duty as said president, the municipal council on
December 9 of the same year, 1912, and under his
presidency, approved and passed Regulation No. 7,
for the leasing of fishponds in the said municipality,
article 10 whereof provided that the lease holders of
various sections of said fishponds, among which was
section 102, should continue in their leases so long
as they paid the rental fixed for each of the
respective sections, without prejudice to granting
them to others who might desire to bid for them, in
case such lease holders should waive their
preferential right (Exhibit 1 of the defense); (2) that
on the 16th of the said month of December, when
the auction or bidding for the different sections of
said fishponds was held in the town hall of said
municipality, it was recorded in Minute No. 54, series
of 1912, entered for that purpose (folio 13, back of
13 and folio 14 of the Minute Book, Exhibit A of the
prosecution), that the accused, who participated
therein and moreover presided over the auction, took
part in the bidding for the said section No. 102 of the
fishpond of Pagsanaan, and that that section was
adjudicated to him as the highest bidder for the sum
of two pesos a year; (3) that said defendant paid the
municipal treasurer of Magsingal on January 10 of the
following year, 1913, the sum of P2 as the price of
the lease for the said section No. 102 up to the close
of that year; (4) that said defendant, who held the
office of president of the said municipality from
October 28, 1912, as has already been stated, and
who still held it on March 30, 1914, when this case
was tried, continued in the lease of the said section
No. 102 of said fishpond, which was awarded to him
on December 16, 1912, until the same month of
December of said year 1913, that is, for a period of
one year.
Issue: WON the respondent is guilty of the crime
article 397 of the Penal Code

Held: "No municipal officer," says section 28 of the

Municipal Code [as amended by Act No. 663], "shall
be directly or indirectly interested in any contract
work, or cockpits, or any other permitted games and
amusements, or business of the municipality, or in
the purchase of any real estate or any other property
belonging to the corporation," and further states that
violation of said provision shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more
than two years.
The municipal president who becomes interested or
takes direct part in the lease of property of the same
municipality of which he forms a part and in which
contract he has to intervene by reason of his office,
even though said contract may have been the
continuation or extension of one he had with the
same municipality prior to entering upon the duties
of the office, openly violates the provision in said
section 28 of the Municipal Code.
The prohibition in said section is analogous to that
contained in article 397 of the Penal Code, which
punishes as guilty of fraud the public official who
becomes directly or indirectly interested in any kind
of contract or operation in which he must intervene
by reason of his office; and even though in doing so
the public official or municipal officer does nothing
more than violate a prohibition, for no fraud occurs
therein, yet the possibility that he may perpetrate
fraud does exist, as Viada says in his commentaries
on the Penal Code in dealing with this article, or at
least that he may defer the states interests to his
own, as in this case the municipal officer may defer
those of the municipality to his own, this being the
reason for the prohibition contained in said section
28 of the Municipal Code.
Article 397 of the Penal Code punishes the same
thing as is penalized by subsection (b) of section 28
of the Municipal Code, to wit, the action, of a public
official in the former and of a municipal officer in the
latter, of becoming interested in any kind of contract
or operation in which he must intervene by reason of
his office. In performing such an action, as Viada says
in his commentaries on the Penal Code, the officer
does nothing more than violate a prohibition; hence
no fraud exists therein, but there does exist the
possibility that he may perpetrate fraud, or at least
that he may subordinate the states interest to his
own. In connection with the municipality, this is
certainly the reason why said section 28 of the
Municipal Code prohibits municipal officers from
taking part directly or indirectly in contracts,
cockpits, or other permitted games and amusements
or in business of the municipality.
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The defendant became interested and took direct

part in the leasing of property of the municipality of
Magsingal, wherein he had to intervene by reason of
his office as president of said municipality, and he
has therefore openly violated the provisions of said
section of the Municipal Code.
The lower court did not, therefore, incur any error in
holding in the judgment appealed from that the guilt
of the defendant had been proven and in imposing
upon him the corresponding penalty, in accordance
with the provision in said section.

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