[G.R. No. 152230.

August 9, 2005]
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA,respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59050, and its Resolution dated February 18, 2002,
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed
the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the
respondent Municipality (now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and
take possession of the subject property.

Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by
letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the property but
they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a
photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. [6]
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property
based on the latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiffs motion,
the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated.
On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is
Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the
property.[7]Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a
width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street.
In their answer,[8] the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993,
they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of
sale[9] bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.

The Antecedents
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a
municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig,
where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The road
had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire
trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. [2] Likewise, the residents in the
area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. [3] The municipality then
decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-66585, [4] which is abutting E.
R. Santos Street.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance[5] authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings
to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6,
1993, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under
Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local

When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to
intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted on August
26, 1994.[10]
In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and
affirmative defenses, that the plaintiffs exercise of eminent domain was only for
a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged
that the property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road
and the least burdensome to it. The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its codefendants for reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated. [11] In
its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and
enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed in the middle portion
and that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest. The intervenor, likewise,
interposed counterclaims against the plaintiff for moral damages and attorneys
fees.[12]
During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiffs messenger, testified on direct
examination that on February 23, 1993, he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the
Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his
store at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street, Kapasigan, Pasig. A lady received the same
and brought it inside the store. When she returned the letter to him, it already

bore the signature of Luz Bernarte. He identified a photocopy of the letter as

similar to the one he served at the store. On cross-examination, he admitted that
he never met Luz Bernarte. [13]
Edgardo del Rosario, a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid since 1982 declared that
he would pass through a wooden bridge to go to E. R. Santos Street. At times, the
bridge would be slippery and many had met accidents while walking along the
bridge. Because of this, they requested Mayor Vicente Eusebio to construct a
road therein. He attested that after the construction of the cemented access
road, the residents had water and electricity. [14]
Augusto Paz of the City Engineers Office testified that, sometime in 1992,
the plaintiff constructed a road perpendicular from E. R. Santos Street to Sto.
Tomas Bukid; he was the Project Engineer for the said undertaking. Before the
construction of the road, the lot was raw and they had to put filling materials so
that vehicles could use it. According to him, the length of the road which they
constructed was 70 meters long and 3 meters wide so that a fire truck could pass
through. He averred that there is no other road through which a fire truck could
pass to go to Sto. Tomas Bukid.[15]
Manuel Tembrevilla, the Fire Marshall, averred that he had seen the new
road, that is, Damayan Street, and found that a fire truck could pass through it.
He estimated the houses in the area to be around 300 to 400. Tembrevilla also
stated that Damayan Street is the only road in the area. [16]
Finally, Bonifacio Maceda, Jr., Tax Mapper IV, testified that, according to their
records, JILCSFI became the owner of the property only on January 13, 1994. [17]
The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes
addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and
valid offer to acquire the property to the co-owners. However, the RTC rejected
the same letter for being a mere photocopy.[18]

Danilo Caballero averred that he had been a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid for
seven years. From his house, he could use three streets to go to E. R. Santos
Street, namely, Catalina Street, Damayan Street and Bagong Taon Street. On
cross-examination, he admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid
except through the newly constructed Damayan Street.[20]
Eduardo Villanueva, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and President of
JILCSFI, testified that the parcel of land was purchased for purposes of
constructing a school building and a church as worship center. He averred that
the realization of these projects was delayed due to the passing of the ordinance
for expropriation.[21]
The intervenor adduced documentary evidence that on February 27, 1993,
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and the co-owners agreed to sell their property covered by
TCT No. PT-66585 for P1,719,000.00.[22] It paid a down payment of P1,000,000.00
for the property. After payment of the total purchase price, the Ching Cuancos
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[23] over the property on December 13, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, TCT No. PT-92579 was issued in the name of JILCSFI. [24] It
declared the property for taxation purposes under its name.[25]
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67
of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court Resolves to DECLARE the plaintiff as
having a lawful right to take the property in question for purposes for which the
same is expropriated.
The plaintiff and intervenor are hereby directed to submit at least two (2) names
of their recommended commissioners for the determination of just compensation
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[26]

For the defendant-intervenor, Normita del Rosario, owner of the property

located across the subject property, testified that there are other roads leading to
E. R. Santos Street. She asserted that only about ten houses of the urban poor
are using the new road because the other residents are using an alternative rightof-way. She averred that she did not actually occupy her property; but there were
times that she visited it.[19]

The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21,
there was substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most
convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.

Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA on the following assignment

of errors:
First Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUS[LY] ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE LAW WHEN IT EXPROPRIATED JILS
PROPERTY TO BE USED AS A RIGHT OF WAY.
Second Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING JILS EVIDENCE PROVING THAT
THERE WAS NO PUBLIC NECESSITY TO WARRANT THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.[27]
The Court of Appeals Decision
In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC.
The CA agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff substantially complied with
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, particularly the requirement that a valid and definite
offer must be made to the owner. The CA declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes,
inviting Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road
project and the price of the lot, was a substantial compliance with the valid and
definite offer requirement under said Section 19. In addition, the CA noted that
there was also constructive notice to the defendants of the expropriation
proceedings since a notice of lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of
TCT No. PT-92579 on November 26, 1993.[29]

letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco because the same was not admitted in evidence
by the trial court for being a mere photocopy. It also contended that the CA erred
in concluding that constructive notice of the expropriation proceeding, in the form
of annotation of the notice of lis pendens, could be considered as a substantial
compliance with the requirement under Section 19 of the Local Government Code
for a valid and definite offer. JILCSFI also averred that no inspection was ever
ordered by the trial court to be conducted on the property, and, if there was one,
it had the right to be present thereat since an inspection is considered to be part
of the trial of the case.[31]
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It held that it
was not precluded from considering the photocopy [32] of the letter,
notwithstanding that the same was excluded by the trial court, since the fact of
its existence was duly established by corroborative evidence. This corroborative
evidence consisted of the testimony of the plaintiffs messenger that he
personally served the letter to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and Municipal Ordinance
No. 21 which expressly stated that the property owners were already notified of
the expropriation proceeding. The CA noted that JILCSFI failed to adduce
controverting evidence, thus the presumption of regularity was not overcome. [33]

[28]

Finally, the CA upheld the public necessity for the subject property based on
the findings of the trial court that the portion of the property sought to be
expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient access to the interior of
Sto. Tomas Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area,
particularly fire trucks. Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of
Article 33 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
which regards the construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks as
public use, purpose or welfare.[30]
On April 6, 2001, JILCSFI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision alleging that the CA erred in relying on the photocopy of Engr. Reyes

The Present Petition

In this petition, petitioner JILCSFI raises the following issues: (1) whether the
respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the
filing of the complaint; (2) whether its property which is already intended to be
used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent; and (3)
whether the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657
of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with.
The petitioner stresses that the law explicitly requires that a valid and
definite offer be made to the owner of the property and that such offer was not
accepted. It argues that, in this case, there was no evidence to show that such
offer has been made either to the previous owner or the petitioner, the present
owner. The petitioner contends that the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes,
notifying Lorenzo Ching Cuanco of the respondents intention to construct a road
on its property, cannot be considered because the trial court did not admit it in
evidence. And assuming that such letter is admissible in evidence, it would not
prove that the offer has been made to the previous owner because mere notice of
intent to purchase is not equivalent to an offer to purchase. The petitioner further

argues that the offer should be made to the proper party, that is, to the owner of
the property. It noted that the records in this case show that as of February 1993,
it was already the owner of the property. Assuming, therefore, that there was an
offer to purchase the property, the same should have been addressed to the
petitioner, as present owner.[34]
The petitioner maintains that the power of eminent domain must be strictly
construed since its exercise is necessarily in derogation of the right to property
ownership. All the requirements of the enabling law must, therefore, be strictly
complied with. Compliance with such requirements cannot be presumed but
must be proved by the local government exercising the power. The petitioner
adds that the local government should, likewise, comply with the requirements for
an easement of right-of-way; hence, the road must be established at a point least
prejudicial to the owner of the property. Finally, the petitioner argues that, if the
property is already devoted to or intended to be devoted to another public use, its
expropriation should not be allowed.[35]
For its part, the respondent avers that the CA already squarely resolved the
issues raised in this petition, and the petitioner failed to show valid and
compelling reason to reverse the CAs findings. Moreover, it is not the function of
the Supreme Court to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over again. [36] The
respondent contends that the Ching Cuancos were deemed to have admitted that
an offer to purchase has been made and that they refused to accept such offer
considering their failure to specifically deny such allegation in the complaint. In
light of such admission, the exclusion of the photocopy of the letter of Engr.
Reyes, therefore, is no longer significant.[37]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.

Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope

The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of
the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty
for a public purpose. The nature and scope of such power has been
comprehensively described as follows:
It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary
duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare.
Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government
without the necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in
modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of property for
the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit
the power which would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution
provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act
as additional safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental
power.[41]
Strict Construction and Burden of Proof
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. [42] It is one
of the harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign
delegates the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be
given against the agency asserting the power. [43] The authority to condemn is to
be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. [44] When
the power is granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the
express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.
[45]

At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised
by the parties and passed upon by the Supreme Court in petitions for review
oncertiorari.[38] Findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. [39]

Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of

proving all the essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation. [46] It has
the burden of proof to establish that it has complied with all the requirements
provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

Nonetheless, where it is shown that the conclusion is a finding grounded on

speculations, surmises or conjectures or where the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts, the Supreme Court may reexamine the evidence on
record.[40]

The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is

grounded on Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 which reads:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.
The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain by a local government unit must be complied with:
1.

An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the

local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property.

ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale. (a) The offer to buy private
property for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the property
sought to be acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered.
(b)
If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale
shall be executed and payment forthwith made.
(c)
If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher
than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them to a conference
for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price. The chairman of
the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any
member of the sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in
the conference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale
shall be drawn and executed.
(d)

(1)
Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to
enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the terms and conditions
to be embodied in the contract;
(2)

2.

The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or

welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

3.

There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,

Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4.

A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. [47]

Valid and Definite Offer

Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code provides:

The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:

Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and

(3)
Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds together
with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or spent for any purpose
other than to pay for the purchase of the property involved.
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a
valid and definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and
the rejection thereof by the latter. [48] It is incumbent upon the condemnor to
exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement.
[49]
Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the
dismissal of the complaint.[50]
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for
the celebration of a contract. [51] It creates a power of acceptance permitting the
offeree, by accepting the offer, to transform the offerors promise into a
contractual obligation.[52] Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with
sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the

essential conditions of the proposed contract. [53] An offer would require, among
other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration
of the envisioned contract.[54]
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made
to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property
needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court
action.[55] The law is designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land
without the expense and inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation.
This is a substantial right which should be protected in every instance. [56] It
encourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only the landowner but
also the condemnor, the expenses and delays of litigation. It permits the
landowner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property,
immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A reasonable offer in good faith,
not merely perfunctory or pro formaoffer, to acquire the property for a reasonable
price must be made to the owner or his privy. [57] A single bona fide offer that is
rejected by the owner will suffice.
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid
offer to all the owners of the property. However, it has a right to rely on what
appears in the certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is
required to make its offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all,
it is well-settled that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens
certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face. [58]
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its
complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for
public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to
prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the
photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to
only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. The letter reads:
MR. LORENZO CHING CUANCO
18 Alcalde Jose Street
Capasigan, Pasig
Metro Manila

Dear Mr. Cuanco:

This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos Street, Barangay Palatiw,
Pasig, Metro Manila embraced in and covered by TCT No. 66585, a portion of
which with an area of fifty-one (51) square meters is needed by the Municipal
Government of Pasig for conversion into a road-right of way for the benefit of
several residents living in the vicinity of your property. Attached herewith is the
sketch plan for your information.
In this connection, may we respectfully request your presence in our office to
discuss this project and the price that may be mutually agreed upon by you and
the Municipality of Pasig.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
ENGR. JOSE L. REYES
Technical Asst. to the
Mayor
on Infrastructure[59]
It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to
prove its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way. [60] The
document was not offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid
offer to acquire the property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because
the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof. [61] The
respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent
to and received by all the co-owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.
The respondent sought to prove, through the testimony of its messenger,
Rolando Togonon, that Lorenzo Ching Cuanco received the original of the said
letter. But Togonon testified that he merely gave the letter to a lady, whom he
failed to identify. He stated that the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo Ching

Cuanco, and later gave the letter back to him bearing the signature purportedly
of one Luz Bernarte. However, Togonon admitted, on cross-examination, that he
did not see Bernarte affixing her signature on the letter. Togonon also declared
that he did not know and had never met Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and Bernarte:
Q

And after you received this letter from that lady, what did you do
afterwards?

I brought it with me, that letter, and then I went to Caruncho.

So, [M]r. Witness, you are telling this Honorable Court that this
letter intended to Mr. Lorenzo was served at Pasig Trading which
was situated at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street on February 23, 1993?

Yes, Maam.

ATTY. TAN:
That is all for the witness, Your Honor.

Mr. Witness, do you know Mr. Lorenzo Ching [Cuanco]

I do not know him.

As a matter of fact, you have not seen him even once, isnt not
(sic)?

Yes, Sir.

This Luz Bernarte, do you know her?

I do not know her.

As a matter of fact, you did not see Mrs. Bernarte even once?

That is correct.

And as a matter of fact, [M]r. Witness, you did not see Mrs. Luz
Bernarte affixing her signature on the bottom portion of this
demand letter, marked as Exh. C-2?

Yes, Sir.[62]

COURT:
Do you have any cross-examination?
ATTY. JOLO:
Just a few cross, Your Honor, please. With the kind permission of
the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Proceed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. JOLO:

Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a
valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price
certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually
acceptable to both parties.
There is no legal and factual basis to the CAs ruling that the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioners TCT No. PT-92579 is a
substantial compliance with the requisite offer. A notice of lis pendens is a notice
to the whole world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or
possession of real property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in
the property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result of the
litigation over it.[63]Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion
of the title only on November 26, 1993, long after the complaint had been filed in
the RTC against the Ching Cuancos.

Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance

that the property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent
to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road, a substantial
compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of
R.A. No. 7160. Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous
premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the property. In
the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent made a definite
and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr.
Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A.
No. 7160.

project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or
parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long
as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes
into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any
doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private
enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirements of public use.

The respondent contends, however, that the Ching Cuancos, impliedly

admitted the allegation in its complaint that an offer to purchase the property was
made to them and that they refused to accept the offer by their failure to
specifically deny such allegation in their answer. This contention is wrong. As
gleaned from their answer to the complaint, the Ching Cuancos specifically
denied such allegation for want of sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to its
correctness. Under Section 10,[64] Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, such form of
denial, although not specific, is sufficient.

Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that
is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to meet
adequately whatever problems the future has in store. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a
noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has
ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as public
welfare.

Public Necessity
We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be
expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a
place for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by
this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals,[65] thus:
It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co., that:
A historical research discloses the meaning of the term public use to be one
of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual
increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual
may be devoted. for whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a
public use.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt
that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever

Petitioners ask: But (w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation
of (Felix Manalos) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for
the exercise of the power of eminent domain when only members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the
case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal
objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of
the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines,
rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar
advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed,
that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property, does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more
specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least prejudicial to the
servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway.
The petitioner asserts that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is
located at the middle portion of the petitioners entire parcel of land, thereby

splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to put
up its school building and worship center.
The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road.
The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an
easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the
absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain
may determine the location and route of the land to be taken [66] unless such
determination is capricious and wantonly injurious.[67] Expropriation is justified so
long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character.
[68]
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be
taken.[69]
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from
E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of
Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which
one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter
the area except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more
than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction
of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable
and practical necessity will suffice.[70]
Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing
the road particularly in the petitioners property and not elsewhere. [71] We note
that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is
the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R.
Santos Street. The respondents complaint also alleged that the said portion of
the petitioners lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress.
However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove
its claims.

expropriation is considerably longer than the proposed access road. The area to
be served by the access road is composed of compact wooden houses and
literally a slum area. As a result of the expropriation of the 51-square meter
portion of the property of the intervenor, a 3-meter wide road open to the public
is created. This portion of the property of the intervenor is the most convenient
access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid since it is not only a short cut to the
interior of the Sto. Tomas Bukid but also an easy path for vehicles entering the
area, not to mention the 3-meter wide road requirement of the Fire Code. [72]
However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in
the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the
trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial,
the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of
its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the
trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at
any stage of the trial. [73] Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was
not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the
court based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the
trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be
rejected.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice
to the refiling thereof.
SO ORDERED.
epublic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

On this point, the trial court made the following findings:

EN BANC
The contention of the defendants that there is an existing alley that can serve
the purpose of the expropriator is not accurate. An inspection of the vicinity
reveals that the alley being referred to by the defendants actually passes thru
Bagong Taon St. but only about one-half (1/2) of its entire length is passable by
vehicle and the other half is merely a foot-path. It would be more inconvenient to
widen the alley considering that its sides are occupied by permanent structures
and its length from the municipal road to the area sought to be served by the

G.R. No. L-14355

October 31, 1919

THE
CITY
OF
MANILA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

City
Fiscal
Diaz
for
appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien, Williams, Ferrier and Sycip, Delgado and Delgado, Filemon
Sotto, and Ramon Salinas for appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:
The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation
proceedings by the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof
upon, the necessity of the expropriation?
That question arose in the following manner:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition
in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein
particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged:
That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement,
namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the
plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land
situated in the district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said
district, and within the jurisdiction of this court.
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of
Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands,
having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community
of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land
described in paragraph 2 of the complaint; that itdenied that it was either
necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes;
that existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the
public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the
construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other
routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much
less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a
Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by
the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were

buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would
disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large
sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site
and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing
monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create
irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and
interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that
the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any
part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was
not necessary as a public improvement.
The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each
and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation was not
a public improvement; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to acquire the
parcels of land in question; that a portion of the lands in question was used as a
cemetery in which were the graves of his ancestors; that monuments and
tombstones of great value were found thereon; that the land had become quasipublic property of a benevolent association, dedicated and used for the burial of
the dead and that many dead were buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed it
necessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had offered and still offers to grant a right
of way for the said extension over other land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order
that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors may not be disturbed;
that the land so offered,free of charge, would answer every public necessity on
the part of the plaintiff.
The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria
Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by theComunidad de Chinos de
Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred to.
The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been
inserted in order to show the general character of the defenses presented by
each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary.
The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation
and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such
for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the
same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.
Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the
Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with very

clear and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance of authorities, decided that

there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the
complaint, without any finding as to costs.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above
question as its principal ground of appeal.
The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the
law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may
desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the
value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land
can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any
questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere
appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value
of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in
favor of the defendant for its value.
That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands
for public purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the
city of Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn privateproperty
for public use."
The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said
authority may be carried into effect. We are driven, therefore, to the procedure
marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority may be exercised.
From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right of
eminent domain may be exercised. Said section 241 provides that, "The
Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or
of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by
law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right
in the manner hereinafter prescribed."
Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be
presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned
together with the interest of each defendant separately.
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to
expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners.

Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of
the commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the Supreme
Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the
plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of
expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with
a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and
that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the
possession of the plaintiff.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section,
"and if the court shall find the rightto expropriate exists," means simply that, if
the court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then
the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to
proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the
expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial question.
Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function
exclusively, and that the courts cannot intervene except for the purpose of
determining the value of the land in question, there is much legal legislature.
Much has been written upon both sides of that question. A careful examination of
the discussions pro and con will disclose the fact that the decisions depend
largely upon particular constitutional or statutory provisions. It cannot be denied,
if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of
a certain or particular parcelof land for some specified public purpose, that the
courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general
authority to
a
municipal
corporation
to
expropriate private
land for public purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in this
jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear
proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands
were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. In other words, have
no the courts in this jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the questions relating to
expropriation must be referred to them (sec. 241, Act No. 190) for final decision,
to ask whether or not the law has been complied with? Suppose in a particular
case, it should be denied that the property is not private property but public, may
not the courts hear proof upon that question? Or, suppose the defense is, that the
purpose of the expropriation is not public butprivate, or that there exists no public
purpose at all, may not the courts make inquiry and hear proof upon that
question?

The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands

for public purposes. Can it be possible that said authority confers the right to
determine for itself that the land is private and that the purpose is public, and
that the people of the city of Manila who pay the taxes for its support, especially
those who are directly affected, may not question one or the other, or both, of
these questions? Can it be successfully contended that the phrase used in Act No.
190, "and if the court upon trial shall find that such right exists," means simply
that the court shall examine the statutes simply for the purpose of ascertaining
whether a law exists authorizing the petitioner to exercise the right of eminent
domain? Or, when the case arrives in the Supreme Court, can it be possible that
the phrase, "if the Supreme Court shall determine that no right of expropriation
exists," that that simply means that the Supreme Court shall also examine the
enactments of the legislature for the purpose of determining whether or not a law
exists permitting the plaintiff to expropriate?
We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that
question. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring
the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must
only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the
authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private;
and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither
of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be
contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is
public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact; and,
in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine
Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of
eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof
upon, those questions. Is it possible that the owner of valuable land in this
jurisdiction is compelled to stand mute while his land is being expropriated for a
use not public, with the right simply to beg the city of Manila to pay him the value
of his land? Does the law in this jurisdiction permit municipalities to expropriate
lands, without question, simply for the purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense
of those who happen for the time being to be in authority? Expropriation of lands
usually calls for public expense. The taxpayers are called upon to pay the costs.
Cannot the owners of land question the public use or the public necessity?

As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority
of the court to question the necessity or advisability of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain. The divergence is usually found to depend upon particular
statutory or constitutional provisions.
It has been contended and many cases are cited in support of that
contention, and section 158 of volume 10 of Ruling Case Law is cited as
conclusive that the necessity for taking property under the right of eminent
domain is not a judicial question. But those who cited said section evidently
overlooked the section immediately following (sec. 159), which adds: "But it is
obvious that if the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of a public
improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being taken for a
use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the
courts. While many courts have used sweeping expression in the decisions in
which they have disclaimed the power of supervising the power of supervising
the selection of the sites of public improvements, it may be safely said that the
courts of the various states would feel bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of
the discretion delegated by the legislature, by an attempted appropriation of land
in utter disregard of the possible necessity of its use, or when the alleged purpose
was a cloak to some sinister scheme." (Norwich City vs. Johnson, 86 Conn., 151;
Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs.
Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368; State vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)
Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in
support of the contention of the appellant, says:
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating
private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may
select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well
settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the
public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it,
the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity
of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for
the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere,
or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the
people.
Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been
examined, and we are justified in making the statement that in each case the

legislature directly determined the necessity for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain in the particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is presented to the legislative department
of the government and that department decides that there exists a necessity for
the exercise of the right in a particular case, that then and in that case, the courts
will not go behind the action of the legislature and make inquiry concerning the
necessity. But, in the case ofWheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72
Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St. rep., 622, 628]), which was cited in support of the
doctrine laid down in section 158 above quoted, the court said:
But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken
nor how may be taken, then the necessity of taking particular property is
a question for the courts. Where the application to condemn or
appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of necessity)
should be raised and decided in limene.
The legislative department of the government was rarely undertakes to
designate the precise property which should be taken for public use. It has
generally, like in the present case, merely conferred general authority to take
land for public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it can be
confidently asserted that, under such statute, the allegation of the necessity for
the appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to
decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes, 161 Mass., 302 [42 Am. St. Rep., 402, 407].)
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a
municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, and a
decision by the municipality that there exist a necessity for the exercise of that
right in a particular case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist reasons
why the right should be conferred upon municipal corporation, while the second is
the application of the right to a particular case. Certainly, the legislative
declaration relating to the advisability of granting the power cannot be converted
into a declaration that a necessity exists for its exercise in a particular case, and
especially so when, perhaps, the land in question was not within the territorial
authority was granted.
Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality
the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the
courts are not concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised for the
purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this

jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular
case, and not the general authority.
Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.), page 629, is
cited as a further conclusive authority upon the question that the necessity for
the exercise of the right of eminent domain is a legislative and not a judicial
question. Cyclopedia, at the page stated, says:
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the necessity andexpediency of exercising the right of eminent
domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their
character. The determination of those questions (the necessity and the
expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the legislative department
is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to review it (the
necessity and the expediency) . . . . It (the legislature) may designate the
particular property to be condemned, and its determination in this
respect cannot be reviewed by the courts.
The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites many cases in support
of the doctrine quoted. While time has not permitted an examination of all of said
citations, many of them have been examined, and it can be confidently asserted
that said cases which are cited in support of the assertion that, "the necessity and
expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially
political and not judicial," show clearly and invariably that in each case the
legislature itself usually, by a special law, designated the particular case in which
the right of eminent domain might be exercised by the particular municipal
corporation or entity within the state. (Eastern R. Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11
Mass., 125 [15 Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn Park Com'rs vs. Armstrong, 45 N.Y., 234 [6
Am. Rep., 70]; Hairston vs. Danville, etc. Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598;
Cincinnati vs. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 223 U. S., 390; U.S. vs. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53; U.S. vs. Gettysburg, etc. Co., 160 U. S., 668;
Traction Co. vs. Mining Co., 196 U.S., 239; Sears vs. City of Akron, 246 U.S., 351
[erroneously cited as 242 U.S.].)
In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U.S., 239), the Supreme
Court of the United States said: "It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is
beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent domain,
either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular
property. For if the use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the

legislature cannot authorize the taking of private property against the will of the
owner, notwithstanding compensation may be required."
In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaa (14 Porto Rico, 339,
356), we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, speaking through Justice
MacLeary, quoting approvingly the following, upon the question which we are
discussing: "It is well settled that although the legislature must necessarily
determine in the first instance whether the use for which they (municipalities,
etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a public one or not, their (municipalities,
etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to correction by the courts, who may
undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that the
use for which it is proposed to authorize the taking of private property is in reality
not public but private." Many cases are cited in support of that doctrine.
Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says:
"At any rate, the rule is quite well settled that in the cases under consideration
the determination of the necessity of taking a particular piece or a certain amount
of land rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley etc. Co. vs. San Mateo, etc.
Co., 64 Cal., 123.) .
In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L.
R. A., N. S., 1024]), the Supreme Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted the
following doctrine from Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), section 599: "In all
such cases the necessity of public utility of the proposed work or improvement is
a judicial question. In all such cases, where the authority is to take property
necessary for the purpose, the necessity of taking particular property for a
particular purpose is a judicial one, upon which the owner is entitled to be heard."
(Riley vs. Charleston, etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457, 489 [110 Am. St. Rep., 579];
Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390, 403.)
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the
necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature
to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc.
Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)
In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. (37 Md., 537,
564), the Supreme Court of the State of Maryland, discussing the question before
us, said: "To justify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain) where
the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist,

in order to accomplish the purpose of the incorporation, as in this case, the party
claiming the right to the exercise of the power should be required to show at least
a reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise. Any rule less strict than this,
with the large and almost indiscriminate delegation of the right to corporations,
would likely lead to oppression and the sacrifice of private right to corporate
power."
In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 Ill., 426, 433), the court
said: "Its right to condemn property is not a general power of condemnation, but
is limited to cases where a necessity for resort to private property is shown to
exist. Such necessity must appear upon the face of the petition to condemn. If the
necessary is denied the burden is upon the company (municipality) to establish
it." (Highland, etc. Co. vs. Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856; Kiney vs. Citizens' Water
& Light Co., 173 Ind., 252, 257 ; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill.,
544 [137 Am. St. Rep. 338].)
It is true that naby decisions may be found asserting that what is a public
use is a legislative question, and many other decisions declaring with equal
emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional or
statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a public
use, it occurs to us that the question whether any particular use is a public one or
not is ultimately, at least, a judicial question. The legislative may, it is true, in
effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the operation of the wellknown rule that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a
case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the
action of the legislature unless it appears that the particular use is clearly not of a
public nature. The decisions must be understood with this limitation; for,
certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to declare that any and every
purpose which the legislative might happen to designate as a public use shall be
conclusively held to be so, irrespective of the purpose in question and of its
manifestly private character Blackstone in his Commentaries on the English Law
remarks that, so great is the regard of the law for private property that it will not
authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a
very great necessity therefor.
In the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland (2 Pet. [U.S.], 657), the Supreme Court
of the United States said: "That government can scarcely be deemed free where
the rights of property are left solely defendant on the legislative body, without
restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that the
rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no
court of justice in this country would be warranted in assuming that the power to

violate and disregard them a power so repugnant to the common principles of

justice and civil liberty lurked in any general grant of legislature authority, or
ought to be implied from any general expression of the people. The people ought
no to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-being
without very strong and direct expression of such intention." (Lewis on Eminent
Domain, sec. 603; Lecoul vs. Police Jury 20 La. Ann., 308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7
La. Ann., 182.)

inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of
the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the
law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it
from abuse. Not only must the authority of municipal corporations to take
property be expressly conferred and the use for which it is taken specified, but
the power, with all constitutional limitation and directions for its exercise, must
be strictly pursued. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and
cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)

Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law said that the right to
own and possess land a place to live separate and apart from others to
retain it as a home for the family in a way not to be molested by others is one
of the most sacred rights that men are heirs to. That right has been written into
the organic law of every civilized nation. The Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902, and
of August 29, 1916, which provide that "no law shall be enacted in the Philippine
Islands which shall deprive any person of his property without due process of
law," are but a restatement of the time-honored protection of the absolute right of
the individual to his property. Neither did said Acts of Congress add anything to
the law already existing in the Philippine Islands. The Spaniard fully recognized
the principle and adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
against the encroachment upon the private property of the individual. Article 349
of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his property unless it
be by competent authority, for some purpose of proven public utility, and after
payment of the proper compensation Unless this requisite (proven public utility
and payment) has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect
the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its possession to him ,
as the case may be."

It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take

property for some public use unless some public necessity existed therefor. The
right to take private property for public use originates in the necessity, and the
taking must be limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch
as the legislature has given it general authority to take private property for public
use, that the legislature has, therefore, settled the question of the necessity in
every case and that the courts are closed to the owners of the property upon that
question. Can it be imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act
No. 2711, that it thereby declared that it was necessary to appropriate the
property of Juan de la Cruz, whose property, perhaps, was not within the city
limits at the time the law was adopted? The legislature, then, not having declared
the necessity, can it be contemplated that it intended that a municipality should
be the sole judge of the necessity in every case, and that the courts, in the face
of the provision that "if upon trial they shall find that a right exists," cannot in that
trial inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity for the appropriation in a
particular case?

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State,
or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the
rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of
property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the
constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public
purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
(Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec.,
576].)

The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property
for public use. Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully proves
that the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not be
justified in inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if no
public purpose was proved? Can it be denied that the courts have a right to
inquire into that question? If the courts can ask questions and decide, upon an
issue properly presented, whether the use is public or not, is not that tantamount
to permitting the courts to inquire into the necessity of the appropriation? If there
is no public use, then there is no necessity, and if there is no necessity, it is
difficult to understand how a public use can necessarily exist. If the courts can
inquire into the question whether a public use exists or not, then it seems that it
must follow that they can examine into the question of the necessity.

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent
is one of the most delicate exercise of government authority. It is to be watched
with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine

necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of

the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73
Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

cemetery is public property. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of
Manila cannot appropriate it for public use. The city of Manila can only
expropriate private property.

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and other entities within the
State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be
questioned by the courts, but that general authority of municipalities or entities
must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances. The
moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise
the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But
whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former
is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while
the latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or
neighborhood. (11 C. J., 50.)

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for
the exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in
authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question
of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks
Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the
exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and
for the purposes designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn.,
540.)
And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has
definitely decided that their exists a necessity for the appropriation of the
particular land described in the complaint. Exhibits 4, 5, 7, and E clearly indicate
that the municipal board believed at one time that other land might be used for
the proposed improvement, thereby avoiding the necessity of distributing the
quiet resting place of the dead.
Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged
improvements, the defendants further contend that the street in question should
not be opened through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said

Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the

ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this
immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in
good faith for future use. (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)
The cemetery in question seems to have been established under
governmental authority. The Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the
same, used the following language:
The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having
been founded and maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal
contribution of their protector, merchants and industrials, benefactors of
mankind, in consideration of their services to the Government of the
Islands its internal administration, government and regime must
necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those
born and educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated
the founders may be perpetually effectuated.
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by
the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be
denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the
law to expropriate public property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its
appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those
specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of
great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it
is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor.

While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living,
and while it is a matter of public knowledge that in the process of time sepulchres
may become the seat of cities and cemeteries traversed by streets and daily trod
by the feet of millions of men, yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of
the places of the dead should not be made unless and until it is fully established
that there exists an eminent necessity therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchres
and
the
places
of
the
burial
of
the
dead
are
still
within
the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still
devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the
legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such
circumstances, should be violated.
In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of
damages at law, for the wounded sensibilities of the living, in having the graves
of kindred and loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common highway or
street for public travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and
inadequacy of a remedy at law is too apparent to admit of argument. To disturb
the mortal remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad
duty of the living; but, except in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the
sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be maintained,
and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for that object. (Railroad
Company vs. Cemetery
Co.,
116
Tenn.,
400;
Evergreen
Cemetery
Associationvs. The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234; Anderson vs. Acheson, 132
Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)
In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of
the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening
the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent
lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every
purpose of the plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the
lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998]

MUNICIPALITY
OF
PARAAQUE, petitioner,
CORPORATION, respondent.

vs. V.M.

REALTY

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot
authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its
lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an
ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the
sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand,
the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the
expropriation of the same property when all the legal requirements for its valid
exercise are complied with.
Statement of the Case
These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review
on certiorari of the July 22, 1996 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals [2] in CA GR CV
No. 48048, which affirmed in toto[3] the Regional Trial Courts August 9, 1994
Resolution.[4] The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as follows:
The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not
disputed. However, such right may be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance
(Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160). In the instant case, there is no such ordinance passed
by the Municipal Council of Paraaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief
Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain. The complaint, therefore,
states no cause of action.
Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior
judgment. On September 29, 1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for
expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice
on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed,
hence, the same became final. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue the
present action without violating the principle of [r]es [j]udicata. While defendant
in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine of res
judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is

conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio

vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). The herein defendant is the successor-ininterest of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the Deed of Assignment
Exchange executed on June 13, 1990.

judicata. On private respondents motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to

dismiss.[14] On March 24, 1994,[15] petitioner filed its opposition, stressing that the
trial courts Order dated February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA
7160, and that the principle of res judicata was not applicable.

WHEREFORE, defendants motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. The

order dated February 4, 1994 is vacated and set aside.

Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution [16] nullifying
its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case. Petitioners motions for
reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the trial court in a
Resolution dated December 2, 1994.[17] Petitioner then appealed to Respondent
Court, raising the following issues:

This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]

1.

Whether or not the Resolution of the Paraaque Municipal

Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993 is a substantial compliance of
the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiffappellant.

2.

Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of

action.

3.

Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to

the rule of procedure resulted in technicality standing in the
way of substantial justice.

Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993,[6] the
Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for
expropriation[7] against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a
combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio,
Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No.
48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the
living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless
through a socialized housing project.[8] Parenthetically, it was also for this stated
purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577,
Series of 1991,[9] previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the
property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. [10]

4.
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present
case.[18]

Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, [11] giving it
due course. Acting on petitioners motion, said court issued an Order dated
February 4, 1994,[12] authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15
percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.

As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial

courts Decision. Respondent Court, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on
January 8, 1997,[19] denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.

On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing

affirmative defenses and a counterclaim,[13] alleging in the main that (a) the
complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government
Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res

The Issues

Hence, this appeal.[20]

Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:

1.
A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and
effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause
of action.
2.
The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not
applicable when public interest is primarily involved. [21]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:

landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the

Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based
on
the
current
tax
declaration
of
the
property
to
be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value
at the time of the taking of the property. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain:

Resolution Different from an Ordinance

Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for
the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the
requirements of the law[22] because the terms ordinance and resolution are
synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government
unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. [23] Petitioner seeks to bolster this
contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private
property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may
expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its
chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.[24] (Italics supplied.)
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to
LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. [25] An LGU may therefore exercise
the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and
subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring
the power or in other legislations. [26] In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which
delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters
for its exercise. It provides as follows:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing

the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over
a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not
accepted.[27]
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there
was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through
an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals [28] to show that
a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU.
[29]
This case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at that time was
BP 337,[30] the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere
resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA
7160,[31] the present Local Government Code which was already in force when the

Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this
purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution
and ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter.[32] An ordinance
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in
nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by
a majority of all the Sanggunian members.[33]
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a
mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local
Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the
local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, [l]egislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. [34] In the
instant case, there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an
ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of
a fundamental or private right of the people. [35] Accordingly, the manifest change
in the legislative language -- from resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under
RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction. No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws
more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should
not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.[36]
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which
requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This
is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails
over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. [37] It is axiomatic that the clear
letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative
rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to

indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the implementing rules, since

Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent
domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides that territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. It merely upholds the law as worded in
RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights
are sourced therefrom. It has therefore no power to amend or act beyond the
authority given and the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the
power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but
inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation,
and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. [38] Indeed, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its
will or modify or violate it.[39]
Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that
its Sanguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated
its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of its mayor
regarding the subject expropriation.[40]
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged
the existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy
thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not raise this point before this
Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. [41] In
any event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioners
Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine
that:
x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the question submitted before the court for determination
is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those
allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? [42]
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the
Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The absence

of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause of

action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
affirming the trial courts Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.
Second Issue:
Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals [43] and the trial court,[44] all the
requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a
previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving
identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which
finds application in generally all cases and proceedings, [45] cannot bar the right of
the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent
domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the
power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The
scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can reach every form
of property which the State might need for public use. [46] All separate interests
of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement
or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent
domain, the highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government,
or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have
the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the public interest
requires it.[47] Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred
from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any
legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State
to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous
case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the
ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same
issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying
with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its
power of eminent domain over the same property. [48] By the same token, our
ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain
through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings,
once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly

complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true of
the principle of law of the case. In Republic vs De Knecht,[49] the Court ruled
that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not
diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be
expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its
authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not
only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat
social justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to
petitioners proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject
property. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125218. January 23, 1998]
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDGE FELIPE S. TONGCO and THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondent.
[G.R. No. 128077. January 23, 1998]
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs., COURT OF
APPEALS, ORLANDO MALIT, ANTONIO CAGUIAT, ALICIA CABRERA,
ARMANDO LACHICA, JACINTO CAGUIAT, GLORIA ANTONIO,
ELIZALDE NAVARRA, DOLORES FUENTES, SUSANA ROY, ANTONIO
IBANEZ, BENIGNO BASILIO, LUCERIA DEMATULAC, FLORENCIA
GOMEZ, LAZARO GOMEZ, JOSE GOMEZ, VENANCIO MANALOTO,
CRISTINO UMALI, DEMETRIA GATUS, PRISCILLA MALONG,
DOMINGO AGUILA, RAMON SAN AGUSTIN, JULIAN FERRER, JR.,
FRANCISCO GALANG, FLORENTINO MALIWAT, SEVERINA VILLAR,
TRINIDAD NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, FORTUNATO AGUSTIN CABRERA,
GAUDENCIO INTAL, DANILO DAVID, ENRIQUE DAVID, VICENTE DE
GUZMAN, POLICARPIO LUMBA, BELEN PALMA, ELEN SOMVILLO,
LEONARDO MANICAD, OPRENG MICLAT, BENITA MATA, GREGORIO

LOPEZ, MARCELINA SAPNO, JESUS MERCADO, and CALIXTO

GOMEZ, respondent.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
In resolving the instant petitions, the Court is tasked to strike a balance
between the contending interests when the state exercised its power of eminent
domain. On one side we have the owners of the property to be expropriated who
must be duly compensated for the loss of their property, while on the other is the
State which must take the property for public use.
Petitioner, Filstream International Inc., is the registered owner of the
properties subject of this dispute consisting of adjacent parcels of land situated in
Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila, with a total area of 3,571.10 square
meters and covered by T.C.T. Nos. 203937, 203936, 169198, 169199, 169200 and
169202 of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch 15) docketed as Civil Case No. 140817CV against the occupants of the abovementioned parcels of land (herein private
respondents in G.R. No. 128077) on the grounds of termination of the lease
contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC on
September 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay
back rentals to petitioner.[1]
Not satisfied, private respondents appealed the decision to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 4 (Civil Case No. 93-68130) which in turn affirmed the
decision of the MTC in its decision dated February 22, 1994. Still not content,
private respondents proceeded to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review
(CA-G.R. SP No. 33714). The result however remained the same as the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC in its decision dated August 25, 1994. [2]
Thereafter, no further action was taken by the private respondents, as a
result of which the decision in the ejectment suit became final and executory.
However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment
proceedings private respondents filed on May 25, 1993, a complaint for

Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner Filstream which was docketed

in Civil Case No. 93-66059 before the RTC of Manila, Branch 43. It was at this
stage that respondent City of Manila came into the picture when the city
government approved Ordinance No. 7813[3] on November 5, 1993, authorizing
Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation,
purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land registered under T.C.T. Nos.
169193, 169198, 169190, 169200, 169202, and 169192 of the Registry of Deeds
of Manila which formed part of the properties of petitioner then occupied by
private respondents. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No.
7855[4] declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land situated along
Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerero streets in Tondo, Manila which were
owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano Gutierez, petitioners predecessor-in-interest. The
said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
On May 23, 1994, respondent City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent
domain (Civil Case No. 94-70560) before the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, [5] seeking
to expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by petitioner Filstream which
are situated at Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. [6]
Pursuant to the complaint filed by respondent City of Manila,the trial court
issued a Writ of Possession [7] in favor of the former which ordered the transfer of
possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila.
At this juncture, petitioner Filstream filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
for eminent domain as well as a motion to quash the writ of possession. The
motion to dismiss was premised on the following grounds: no valid cause of
action; the petition does not satisfy the requirements of public use and a mere
clandestine maneuver to circumvent the writ execution issued by the RTC of
Manila, Branch 4 in the ejectment suit; violation of the constitutional guarantee
against non-impairment of obligation and contract; price offered was too low
hence violative of the just compensation provision of the constitution and the said
amount is without the certification of the City Treasurer for availability of funds.
[8]
With respect to the motion to quash the writ of possession, petitioner raised the
following objections: failure to comply with Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, Ordinance No. 7813 is a void enactment for it was approved without a
public hearing and violative of the constitutional guarantee against impairment of
obligation and contracts; the price is too low and unconscionable violating the just
compensation provision of the constitution, and the said writ is tainted with
infirmity considering the absence of a certification from the City of Manila that
there is an immediately available fund for the subject expropriation.[9]

Respondent City of Manila filed its opposition [10] to petitioner Filstreams two
motion and to which petitioner accordingly filed a reply. [11] On September 30,
1994, the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, issued an order denying petitioner Filstreams
motion to dismiss and the motion to quash the Writ of Possession and declared as
follows:
IN FINE, the defendants motion to dismiss and motion to quash writ of
possession are both without merit and are hereby DENIED and the subject parcels
of lands covered by TCT Nos. 203937, 203936, 169198, 169199, 169200, and
169202 (of the Register of Deeds of Manila) located at Antonio Rivera Street,
Tondo II, Manila with a total area of 3,571.10 square meters are hereby declared
CONDEMNED in favor of the City of Manila for distribution and resale to all poor
and landless qualified residents/tenants in the said area under the citys land-forthe-landless program upon payment of just compensation which is yet to be
determined by this Court.[12]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[13] as well as a supplemental
motion for reconsideration[14] seeking the reversal of the above-quoted order but
the same were denied.[15] Still, petitioner filed a subsequent motion to be allowed
to file a second motion for reconsideration but it was also denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed on March 31, 1996, a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 36904) seeking to set aside the September
30, 1994 order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 42. However, on March 18, 1996,
respondent CA issued a resolution dismissing the petition in this wise:
It appearing that the above-entitled petition is insufficient in form and substance
-- it does not comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals which requires that the petition shall be x x x accompanied by x
x x other pertinent documents and papers, aside from the fact that copies of the
pleadings attached to the petition are blurred and unreadable -- this Court
resolved to summarily DISMISS the same (petition).[16]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached clearer copies of
the pertinent documents and papers pursuant to Section 2(a) Rule 6 of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. But on May 20, 1996, respondent
CA issued a resolution denying the motion as petitioner failed to submit clearer
and readable copies of the pleadings.[17] This prompted petitioner to proceed to
this Court giving rise to the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
and docketed herein as G.R. No. 125218, assailing the dismissal of its petition by

the CA in its resolution dated March 18, 1996 as well as that of its motion for
reconsideration in the resolution dated May 20, 1996.
Meanwhile, owing to the finality of the decision in the ejectment suit (Civil
Case No 140817 CV), the MTC of Manila, Branch 15, upon motion of petitioner
Filstream, issued a Writ of Execution as well as a Notice to Vacate the disputed
premises.[18] Private respondents filed a Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of
Execution and Notice to Vacate[19] alleging the existence of a supervening event
in that the properties subject of the dispute have already been ordered
condemned in an expropriation proceeding in favor of the City of Manila for the
benefit of the qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall be
stayed. Petitioner opposed the motion, reiterating that the decision in the
ejectment case is already final and executory and disputed private respondents
right to interpose the expropriation proceedings as a defense because the latter
were not parties to the same.
For its part, the City of Manila filed on March 13, 1996, a motion for
intervention with prayer to stay/quash the writ of execution on the ground that it
is the present possessor of the property subject of execution.
In its order dated March 14, 1996, the MTC of Manila, Branch 14, denied
private respondents motion as it found the allegations therein bereft of merit and
upheld the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate in petitioners
favor.[20] Subsequently, the trial court also denied the motion filed by the City of
Manila.
On April 22, 1996, the trial court issued an order commanding the
demolition of the structure erected on the disputed premises. To avert the
demolition, private respondents filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 14, a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction (docketed as Civil Case No. 9678098). On April 29, 1996, the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, issued a TRO enjoining
the execution if the writ issued in Civil Case No. 140817-CV by the MTC of Manila,
Branch 14.[21] Subsequently, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction on May
14, 1996.[22]
On May 15, 1996, the City of Manila filed its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction which was raffled to Branch 23 of the RTC of Manila
(docketed as Civil Case No. 96-78382), seeking the reversal of the orders issued

by the MTC of Manila, Branch 14, which denied its motion to intervene and quash
the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 140817-CV.
Thereafter, upon motion filed by the City of Manila, an order was issued by
the RTC of Manila, Branch 10, ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. 9678382 with Civil Case No. 96-78098 pending before Branch 14 of the RTC of
Manila.[23] On May 21, 1996, the RTC of Manila, Branch 14, issued an injunction in
Civil Case No. 96-78098 enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution
until further orders from the court. [24] Petitioner Filstream filed a Motion to
Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to be allowed to post a counterbond but the trial court denied the same. Filstream then filed a motion for
reconsideration from the order of denial but pending resolution of this motion for
voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch 14. The
motion for inhibition was granted [25] and as a result, the consolidated cases (Civil
Case No. 96-78382 and 96-78098) were re-raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 33.
During the proceedings before the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, petitioner
Filstream moved for the dismissal of the consolidated cases (Civil Case No. 9678382 and 96-78098) for violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 (forum
shopping) because the same parties, causes of action and subject matter
involved therein have already been disposed of in the decision in the ejectment
case (Civil Case No. 140817) which has already become final and executory prior
to the filing of these consolidated cases.
On December 9, 1996, an order was issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 33,
ordering the dismissal of Civil Cases Nos. 96-78382 and 96-78098 for violation of
Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94.[26] Immediately thereafter, petitioner Filstream
filed an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of Demolition and Ejectment
and a supplemental motion to the same dated January 10 and 13, 1997,
respectively,[27] before the MTC of Manila, Branch 15, which promulgated the
decision in the ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 140817-CV). On January 23, 1997,
the court granted the motion and issued the corresponding writ of demolition.
As a consequence of the dismissal of the consolidated cases, herein private
respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction before the
Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43101)[28] assailing the abovementioned order of dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch 33, as having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.

In a resolution dated January 28, 1997, the Court of Appeals granted herein
private respondents prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
directed the MTC of Manila, Branch 15, to desist from implementing the order of
demolition dated January 23, 1997, unless otherwise directed. [29]
At the conclusion of the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the Court of Appeals, in its resolution dated February 18, 1997, found
merit in private respondents allegations in support of their application of the
issuance of the writ and granted the same, to wit:
Finding that the enforcement or implementation of the writ of execution and
notice to vacate issued in Civil Case No. 140817-CV, the ejectment case before
respondent Judge Jiro, during the pendency of the instant petition, would probably
be in violation of petitioners right, and would tend to render the judgment in the
instant case ineffectual, and probably work injustice to the petitioners, the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P150,000.00, let a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents, their employees,
agents, representatives and anyone acting in their behalf from enforcing or
executing the writ of execution and notice to vacate issued in Civil Case No.
140817-CV of the court of respondent Judge Jiro, or otherwise disturbing the
status quo, until further orders of this Court. [30]
In turn, petitioner Filstream is now before this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 (G.R. No. 128077), seeking to nullify the Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1997 and February 18, 1997 which
granted herein private respondents prayer for a TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, the same being null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion.
Upon motion filed by petitioner Filstream, in order to avoid any conflicting
decision on the legal issues raised in the petitions, the Court ordered that the
later petition, G.R. No. 128077 be consolidated with G.R. No. 128077 in the
resolution of March 5, 1997.[31]
The issue raised in G.R. No. 125218 is purely procedural and technical
matter. Petitioner takes exception to the resolutions of respondent CA dated
March 18, 1996 and May 20, 1996 which ordered the dismissal of its Petition
for Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal

Rules of the Court of Appeals by failing to attach to its petition other pertinent
documents and papers and for attaching copies of pleadings which are blurred
and unreadable. Petitioner argues that respondent appellate court seriously erred
in giving more premium to form rather than the substance.

rooted in the assertion of the conflicting rights of the parties in this case over the
disputed premises. In order to determine whether private respondents are
entitled to the injunctive reliefs granted by respondent CA, we deemed it proper
to extract the source of discord.

We agree with the petitioner. A strict adherence to the technical and

procedural rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as
it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in
the appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights
over the disputed premises which have been expropriated and have in fact been
ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their
appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is
tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would
automatically validate the expropriation proceedings based on the
aforementioned grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law as it would automatically validate the expropriation proceedings
which the petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized that where
substantial rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of
procedural rules may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial justice.

Petitioner Filstream anchors its claim by virtue of its ownership over the
properties and the existence of a final and executory judgment against private
respondents ordering the latters ejectment from the premises (Civil Case No.
140817-CV).

In these instances, respondent CA can exercise its discretion to suspend its

internal rules and allow the parties to present and litigate their causes of action
so that the Court can make an actual and complete disposition of the issues
presented in the case. Rather than simply dismissing the petition summarily for
non-compliance with respondent courts internal rules, respondent CA should
have instead entertained petitioner Filstreams petition for review on Certiorari,
and ordered petitioner to submit the corresponding pleadings which it deems
relevant and replace those which are unreadable. This leniency could not have
caused any prejudiced to the rights of the other parties.
With regard to the other petition, G.R. No. 128077, petitioner Filstream
objects to the issuance by respondent CA of the restraining order and the
preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the writ of demolition issued in
the ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 140817-CV) as an incident to private
respondents pending petition assailing the dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch
33, of the consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by private respondents and the
City of Manila on the ground of forum shopping.
The propriety of the issuance of the restraining order and the writ of
preliminary injunction is but a mere incient to the actual controversy which is

Private respondents claim on the other hand hinges on an alleged

supervening event which has rendered the enforcement of petitioners rights
moot, that is, the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 94-70560) undertaken
by the City of Manila over the disputed premises for the benefit of herein private
respondents. For its part, the City of Manila is merely exercising its power of
eminent domain within its jurisdiction by expropriating petitioners properties for
public use.
There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in
favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from
the properties subject of this dispute. The judgment in the ejectment suit
became final and executory after private respondents failed to interpose any
appeal from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 25, 1994
in CA-G.R. SP No. 33714. Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution
of this decision as it had already became final and executory.
However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable
right to exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to
expropriate private property for public use is expressly granted to it under Section
19 of the 1991 Local Government Code, to wit:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, that the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper

court of at least fifteen (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally,
That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by
the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property. (Italics supplied)
More specifically, the City of Manila has the power to expropriate private
property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program as explicitly
laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409) as follows:
General powers The city may have a common seal and alter the same at
pleasure, and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of
real and personal property for the general interest of the city, condemn private
property for public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and
prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the
powers hereinafter conferred. (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Italics supplied).
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city
and to subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city
residents, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands,
and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of
this section, the city may raise necessary funds by appropriations of general
funds, by securing loans or by issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the
lands through expropriation proceedings in accordance with law, with the
approval of the President x x x. (Italics supplied).
In fact, the City of Manilas right to exercise these prerogatives
notwithstanding the existence of a final and executory judgment over the
property to be expropriated has been upheld by this Court in the case of
Philippine Columbian Association vs. Panis, G.R. No. 106528, December 21, 1993.
[32]
Relying on the aforementioned provisions of the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, the Court declared that:
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power
to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for
sale to bona-fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried
employees of the city.

That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does
not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at
once land and shelter for all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA
461 [1987]).
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore
confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nol 103125, May 17, 1993; J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]). It is therefore of no moment
that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than the half a hectare
only (Pulido v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved
into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v.
Guerrero, supra; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987];
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes
the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including a particular,
urban land reform and housing.[33]
We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a
paramount task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas
particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious
dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled authority when
exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these
problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1,
1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution). Thus the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain is not without
limitations. Even Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is very explicit
that it must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws, to
wit:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: x x x. (Italics supplied).

The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposed
of urban land reform and housing in Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10 of which specifically provide as
follows:
Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities,
or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet
been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have
not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands.

Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes
of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping,
land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint
venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however,
That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to,
parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes
of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be
reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure
laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed
properties shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the National
Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase: Provided, That
qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land shall be given the
right of first refusal. (Italics supplied).
Very clear from the abovequoted provisions are the limitations with respect
to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation
proceedings as means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory
because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private
property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.
Proceeding from the parameters laid out in the above disquisitions, we now
pose the crucial question: Did the city of Manila comply with the abovementioned
conditions when it expropriated petitioner Filstreams properties? We have
carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found nothing that would
indicate the respondent City of Manila complied with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A.
7279. Petitioners Filstreams properties were expropriated and ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the
acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved
futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstreams right to due
process which must accordingly be rectified.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in
exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the
right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use

always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However
we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the
exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the
exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process
extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard,
vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. In G.R. 125218, the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36904 dated March 18, 1996
and May 20, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 128077, the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43101 dated January 28, 1997
and February 18, 1997 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72126 January 29, 1988
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, HON. ADRIANO D. DAEZ,
MUNICIPAL
MAYOR,
MEYCAUAYAN,
BULACAN, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
and
PHILIPPINE
PIPES
&
MERCHANDIZING CORPORATION,respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution dated April 24,1985 by
the former Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, setting aside its
earlier decision dated January 10, 1985 and dismissing the special civil action for
expropriation filed by the petitioner.

In 1975, respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the
Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit
to fence a parcel of land with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37
meters covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 215165 and 37879. The
fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's
heavy equipment and various finished products such as large diameter steel
pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge components, prestressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost
housing.
In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor
Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the
intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 37879.
An opposition to the resolution was filed by the respondent with the Office of the
Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four members
to investigate the matter.
On March 10, 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial
Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there
was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the
respondent's property for use as a public road.
On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution No.
238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution No. 258, Series of
1975, of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan. The respondent, then, reiterated
to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the
aforesaid parcels of land.
On October 21, 1983, however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now
headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for
the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's land. The Provincial Board of
Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25, 1984.
Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation.

Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land,
with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court on March 1, 1984 issued a writ of
possession in favor of the petitioner.
On August 27, 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the
property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court
commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for
the property.
The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for review.
On January 10, 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
However, upon motion for reconsideration by the respondent, the decision was reexamined and reversed. The appellate court held that there is no genuine
necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several
other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the
proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the location and size of
the land, also opined that the land is more Ideal for use as storage area for
respondent's heavy equipment and finished products.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner went to this Court
on petition for review on certiorari on October 25, 1985, with the following
arguments:
Petitioners most respectfully submit that respondent Court has
decided a question of substance not in accord with law or with
applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court; that the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts and the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, and conjectures, because:
a. It concluded, that by dismissing the complaint for
expropriation the existence of legal and factual circumstance of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
committed by the respondent Judge without any shred of
evidence at all contrary to the law on evidence;
b. It concluded, in its decision that respondent Philippine Pipes
and Merchandising Corporation has no need of the property
sought to be condemned on the use to which it is devoted as a
private road but allegedly for storage contrary to the allegations

of respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation

itself;
c. It anchored its decision on factual situations obtaining a long,
long time ago without regard to the relatively present situation
now obtaining. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
In refuting the petitioner's arguments, the private respondent contends that this
Court may only resolve questions of law and not questions of fact such as those
which the petitioner puts in issue in this case. The respondent further argues that
this Court may not also interfere with an action of the Court of Appeals which
involves the exercise of discretion.
We agree with the respondent.
The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is
limited to the review of errors of law (Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, 135 SCRA
15, 24), factual issues not being proper in certiorari proceedings (See Ygay et al.
v. Hon. Escareal et al., 135 SCRA 78, 82).
This Court reviews and rectifies the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals only
under certain established exceptions such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its finding, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee (Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88).
None of the exceptions warranting non-application of the rule is present in this
case. On the contrary, we find that the appellate court's decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
The petitioner's purpose in expropriating the respondent's property is to convert
the same into a public road which would provide a connecting link between
Malhacan Road and Bulac Road in Valenzuela, Bulacan and thereby ease the
traffic in the area of vehicles coming from MacArthur Highway.

The records, however, reveals that there are other connecting links between the
aforementioned roads. The petitioner itself admits that there are four such cross
roads in existence. The respondent court stated that with the proposed road,
there would be seven.
Appreciating the evidence presented before it, with particular emphasis on the
Special Committee's report dated March 10, 1976, the Court of Appeals declared:
xxx xxx xxx
FACTS ESTABLISHED ON OCULAR INSPECTION
In the ocular inspection, the following facts came into the
limelight:
(1) The property in question of the Philippine Pipes and
Merchandazing Corporation intended to be expropriated by the
Municipality of Meycauayan is embraced under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 37879 and is a private road of the
company used in the conduct and operation of its business, with
the inhabitation in nearby premises tolerated to pass the same.
It extends from Bulac Road to the south, to Malhacan Road on
the north, with a width of about 6 to 7 meters, more or less.
(2) Adjoining this private road on the eastern side, is a vacant
property also belonging to the Philippine Pipes and
Merchandising Corporation and extending also from Bulac Road
to Malhacan Road, with a high wall along the property line on
the east side thereof serving as a fence.
(3) Opposite the private road, after crossing Bulac Road, is the
gate of the factory of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising
Corporation.

(4) From the private road of the firm on the eastern direction
about 30 to 40 meters distance are subdivision roads of an
existing subdivision with a width of 6 to 7 meters, more or less,
running parallel to the said private road of the firm and likewise
extending from Bulac Road to Malhacan Road. Whether said
subdivision roads had already been donated to the municipality
is not known.
(5) On the western side of the private road is a vacant lot with
an area of l6,071 square meters offered for sale by its owner
extending also from Bulac Road to Malhacan Road.
(6) Bulac road, a municipal road with a width of about 6 to 7
meters and all the nearby subdivision roads are obviously very
poorly developed and maintained, and are in dire need of repair.
Like the Malhacan Road, Bulac road extends from the McArthur
Highway with exit to North Diversion Road.
xxx xxx xxx
The Sketch Plan (Rollo, p. 26 or p. 97) clearly and conclusively
shows that petitioner does not need this strip of land as a
private road. The Sketch Plan clearly shows that petitioner's
factory site is adjacent to Bulac Road which has a width of
about seven meters, more or less. Petitioner can use Bulac Road
in reaching McArthur Highway on the west or in reaching the
Manila North Expressway on the east for the purpose of
transporting its products. Petitioner does not need to go to
Malhacan Road via this so-called private road before going to
McArthur Highway or to the Manila North Expressway. Why
should petitioner go first to Malhacan Road via this so called
"private road" before going to McArthur Highway or to the
Manila North Expressway when taking the Bulac Road in going
to McArthur Highway or to the Manila North Expressway is more
direct, nearer and more advantageous. Hence, it is beyond
doubt that petitioner acquired this strip of land for the storage
of its heavy equipments and various finished products and for
growth and expansion and never to use it as a private road. This
is the very reason why petitioner filed an application with the

Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan to fence

with hollow blocks this strip of land.
Third, We will determine whether there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate this strip of land for use as a public road.
We hereby quote a relevant part of the Special Committee's
Report dated March 10, 1976, which is as follows:
OBSERVATION OF COMMITTEE
From the foregoing facts, it appears obvious to this Special
Committee that there is no genuine necessity for the
Municipality of' Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid
property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation
for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there
are other available road and vacant lot offered for sale situated
similarly as the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot
sought to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to
be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy
equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant
lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be
very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified
damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of
Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of
traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other
available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without
causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business
therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion
of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider
public road to attain decongest (sic) of traffic because as
observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to
be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and
therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the flow of
traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area. ...
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted that this strip of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. 215165 and 37879 were acquired by

petitioner from Dr. Villacorta. The lot for sale and lying Idle with
an area of 16,071 square meter which is adjacent and on the
western side of the aforesaid strip of land and extends likewise
from Bulac Road to Malhacan Road belongs also to Dr.
Villacorta. This lot for sale and lying Idle is most Ideal for use as
a public road because it is more than three (3) times wider that
the said strip of land.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Since there is another lot ready for sale and lying Idle, adjacent
and on the western side of the strip of land, and extending also
from Malhacan Road to Bulac Road and most Ideal for a public
road because it is very much wider than the lot sought to be
expropriated, it seems that it is more just, fair, and reasonable if
this lot is the one to be expropriated. (Rollo, pp. 22-26)
The petitioner objects to the appellate court's findings contending that they were
based on facts obtaining long before the present action to expropriate took place.
We note, however, that there is no evidence on record which shows a change in
the factual circumstances of the case. There is no showing that some of the six
other available cross roads have been closed or that the private roads in the
subdivision may not be used for municipal purposes. What is more likely is that
these roads have already been turned over to the government. The petitioner
alleges that surely the environmental progress during the span of seven years
between the first and second attempts to expropriate has brought about a change
in the facts of the case. This allegation does not merit consideration absent a
showing of concrete evidence attesting to it.
There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for
public use upon payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the
existence of a genuine necessity therefor.
As early as City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila (40 Phil. 349) this Court
held that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and
there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have

the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor (Republic
v. La Orden de PP. Benedictos de Filipinas, 1 SCRA 646; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413).
In the recent case of De Knecht v. Bautista, (100 SCRA 660) this court further
ruled that the government may not capriciously choose what private property
should be taken. Citing the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration (supra), the Court held:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] and the

Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals[3] dated March 25, 1998 and January 14, 1999,
respectively, which ordered the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City, Branch 17, to proceed with the hearing of the expropriation
proceedings regarding the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B
while setting aside the Orders dated August 4, 1997 [4] and November 3, 1997 of
the said Regional Trial Court which ordered the peaceful turnover to petitioner
Estate of Salud Jimenez of said Lot 1406-B.
The facts are as follows:

... With due recognition then of the power of Congress to

designate the particular property to be taken and how much
thereof may be condemned in the exercise of the power of
expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is
the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal protection
clause will not allow. (At p. 436)
There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate lot for
the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the subject of the
petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another
connecting road.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned
resolution of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137285. January 16, 2001]
OF
SALUD
JIMENEZ, petitioner,
PROCESSING ZONE, respondent.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

More than ten (10) years later[6], the said trial court in an Order [7] dated July
11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZA to expropriate, among
others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by
petitioner contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public
purpose.
In an Order[8] dated October 25, 1991, the trial court reconsidered the Order
dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the
expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable,
private respondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

ESTATE

On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippine Export Processing Zone

(PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation proceedings [5] on three (3)
parcels of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B)
of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of 29,008
square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez under TCT No. T113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering two (2)

proposals, namely:
vs. PHILIPPINE

EXPORT
1. Withdrawal of private respondents appeal with respect to Lot 1406A in consideration of the waiver of claim for damages and loss of
income for the possession of said lot by private respondent.

2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772
since private respondent has no money yet to pay for the lot.
Private respondents Board approved the proposal and the compromise
agreement was signed by private respondent through its then administrator
Tagumpay Jardiniano assisted by Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I.
Garcia. Said compromise agreement[9] dated January 4, 1993 is quoted
hereunder:
1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the
Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A
from the expropriation proceedings. On the other hand, defendant
Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its
claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by reason
of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the
present.
2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall
transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters which
forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the
same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of
14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be
transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.
3. That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B
covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud
Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government
based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11,
1991. However, instead of being paid the just compensation for
said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434
covered by TCT No. T-14772.
4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the
foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered
based on this Compromise Agreement is immediately final and
executory.

The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of
the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent
with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the Order[10] dated
August 23, 1993, the trial court approved the compromise agreement.
However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to
petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT No. T14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner
Estate filed a Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993. [11]
In the Order[12] dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said
compromise agreement entered into between the parties and directed private
respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. Disagreeing with
the said Order of the trial court, respondent PEZA moved [13] for its
reconsideration. The same proved futile since the trial court denied
reconsideration in its Order[14] dated November 3, 1997.
On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance [15] of petitioner,
corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 by declaring
that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should be surrendered and returned
to petitioner.
On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari and prohibition [16] seeking to nullify the Orders dated
August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the trial court. Petitioner filed its
Comment[17]on January 16, 1998.
Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals in a Decision [18]dated March 25,
1998 upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, ratiocinating thus:
A judicial compromise may be enforced by a writ of execution, and if a party fails
or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand. This is in accordance with Article 2041 of the
Civil Code which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party
may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.

The Supreme Court had the occasion to explain this provision of law in the case of
Leonor v. Sycip (1 SCRA 1215). It ruled that the language of the abovementioned
provision denotes that no action for rescission is required and that the aggrieved
party by the breach of compromise agreement, may regard the compromise
agreement already rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of the same
Code, which speaks of a cause of annulment or rescission of the compromise
and provides that the compromise may be annulled or rescinded for the cause
therein specified, thus suggesting an action for annulment or rescission, said
Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned not a cause for rescission, or the
right to demand rescission, of a compromise, but the authority, not only to
regard it as rescinded, but, also, to insist upon his original demand. The
language of this Article 2041, particularly when contrasted with that of Article
2039, denotes that no action for rescission is required in said Article 2041, and
that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he
chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if
there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for
rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration of rescission, for he
may regard the compromise agreement already, rescinded.
Nonetheless, it held that:
Having upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, what is then the
status of the expropriation proceedings? As succinctly discussed in the case of
Leonor v. Sycip, the aggrieved party may insist on his original demand as if there
had never been any compromise agreement. This means that the situation of the
parties will revert back to status before the execution of the compromise
agreement, that is, the second stage of the expropriation proceedings which is
the determination of the just compensation.[19]
x

Thus, the appellate court partially granted the petition by setting aside the order
of the trial court regarding the peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez
of Lot No. 1406-B and instead ordered the trial judge to proceed with the
hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just
compensation over Lot 1406-B.[20]

Petitioner sought[21] reconsideration of the Decision dated March 25,

1998. However, public respondent in a Resolution [22] dated January 14, 1999
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FILED BY
RESPONDENT PEZA IN CA-G.R. SP. NO. 46112 WHEN IT WAS MADE A
SUBSTITUTE FOR LOST APPEAL IN CLEAR CONTRAVENTION OF THE
HONORABLE COURTS RULING IN SEMPIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (263
SCRA 617) AND ONGSITCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (255 SCRA 703) AND
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORDER OF THE CAVITE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
II
GRANTING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF
CERTIORARI IS PROPER, THE COURT OF APPEALS NEVERTHELESS
WRONGLY INTERPRETED THE PHRASE ORIGINAL DEMAND CONTAINED
IN ARTICLE 2041 OF THE CIVIL CODE. THE ORIGINAL DEMAND OF
PETITIONER ESTATE IS THE RETURN OF THE SUBJECT LOT (LOT 1406-B)
WHICH IS SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED AND NOT THE DETERMINATION
OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE LOT. FURTHERMORE, EVEN IF THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OR THE IMPORT OF THE
PHRASE IN QUESTION IS CORRECT, IT IS ARTICLE 2039 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AND NOT ARTICLE 2041 WHICH IS APPLICABLE TO COMPROMISE
AGREEMENTS APPROVED BY THE COURTS.[23]
We rule in favor of the respondent.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in entertaining the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
same being actually a substitute for lost appeal. It appeared that on August 11,
1997, respondent received the Order of the trial court dated August 4, 1997
annulling the compromise agreement. On August 26, 1997, the last day for the
filing of a notice of appeal, respondent filed instead a motion for

reconsideration. The Order of the trial court denying the motion for
reconsideration was received by respondent on November 23, 1997. The
reglementary period to appeal therefore lapsed on November 24, 1997. On
November 27, 1997, however, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 46112. Petitioner claims that
appeal is the proper remedy inasmuch as the Order dated August 4, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court is a final order that completely disposes of the case. Besides,
according to petitioner, respondent is estopped in asserting that certiorari is the
proper remedy inasmuch as it invoked the fifteen (15) day reglementary period
for appeal when it filed a motion for reconsideration on August 26, 1997 and not
the sixty (60) day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals did not err in entertaining the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of The Rules of Court. A petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. [24] Grave abuse of
discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of judgment committed in the exercise
of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion. An
abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari. The abuse must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily and despotically. [25]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the
proper remedy thereto such as when an error of judgment as well as of procedure
are involved. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely
abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely
appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in
certain exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court
which are technical rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be
justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party
where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or
where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal
would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the
judgment complained of.[26]

Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends
either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to take the land
and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of
dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it finally disposes of the
case. The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation to be
ascertained by three (3) commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount
to be paid to the defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this
order finally disposes of the second stage. To both orders the remedy therefrom
is an appeal.[27]
In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11, 1991
order of expropriation became final and the parties subsequently entered into a
compromise
agreement
regarding
the
mode
of
payment
of
just
compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the terms of the compromise
agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the
trial could only validly order the rescission of the compromise agreement anent
the payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the
compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely abused its
discretion when it ordered the return of Lot 1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the
Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 which was already final and executory.
We affirm the appellate courts reliance on the cases of Aguilar v.
Tan[28] and Bautista v. Sarmiento[29] wherein it was ruled that the remedies
of certiorari and appeal are not mutually exclusive remedies in certain
exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion, or when
public welfare so requires. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by setting
aside the order of expropriation which has long become final and executory and
by ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its action was clearly
beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and executory order. A final and
executory order can only be annulled by a petition to annul the same on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction[30] or a petition for relief from a
final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition
to that effect was filed. Hence, though an order completely and finally disposes
of the case, if appeal is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law or the
interest of substantial justice requires, a petition for certiorari may be availed of
upon showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.
According to petitioner the rule that a petition for certiorari can be availed of
despite the fact that the proper remedy is an appeal only applies in cases where
the petition is filed within the reglementary period for appeal. Inasmuch as the

petition in the case at bar was filed after the fifteen (15) day regulatory period to
appeal, said exceptional rule as enshrined in the cases of Aguilar v.
Tan[31] and Bautista v. Sarmiento[32] is not applicable. We find this interpretation
too restrictive. The said cases do not set as a condition sine qua non the filing of
a petition for certiorariwithin the fifteen (15) day period to appeal in order for the
said petition to be entertained by the court. To espouse petitioners contention
would render inutile the sixty (60) day period to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. In Republic v. Court of Appeals[33], which also involved an expropriation
case where the parties entered into a compromise agreement on just
compensation, this Court entertained the petition for certiorari despite the
existence of an appeal and despite its being filed after the lapse of the fifteen
(15) day period to appeal the same. We ruled that the Court has not too
infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper
remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations
would warrant such a recourse.[34] If compelled to return the subject parcel of
land, the respondent would divert its budget already allocated for economic
development in order to pay petitioner the rental payments from the lessee
banks. Re-adjusting its budget would hamper and disrupt the operation of the
economic zone. We believe that the grave abuse of discretion committed by the
trial court and the consequent disruption in the operation of the economic zone
constitutes valid and compelling reasons to entertain the petition.
Petitioner next argues that the instances cited under Section 1 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court[35] whereby an appeal is not allowed are exclusive grounds for a
petition forcertiorari. Inasmuch as the August 4 1997 Order rescinding the
compromise agreement does not fall under any of the instances enumerated
therein, a petition for certiorari will not prosper. This reasoning is severely
flawed. The said section is not phrased to make the instances mentioned therein
the sole grounds for a petition for certiorari. It only states that Rule 65 may be
availed of under the grounds mentioned therein, but it never intended said
enumeration to be exclusive. It must be remembered that a wide breadth of
discretion is granted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings.[36]
In the second assignment of error, petitioner assails the interpretation by
the Court of Appeals of the phrase original demand in Article 2041 of the New
Civil Code vis-a-vis the case at bar. Article 2041 provides that, If one of the
parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand. According to petitioner, the appellate court erred in interpreting
original demand as the fixing of just compensation. Petitioner claims that the
original demand is the return of Lot 1406-B as stated in petitioners motion to

dismiss[37] the complaint for expropriation inasmuch as the incorporation of the

expropriation order in the compromise agreement subjected the said order to
rescission. Since the order of expropriation was rescinded, the authority of
respondent to expropriate and the purpose of expropriation have again become
subject to dispute.
Petitioner cites cases[38] which provide that upon the failure to pay by the
lessee, the lessor can ask for the return of the lot and the ejectment of the
former, this being the lessors original demand in the complaint. We find said
cases to be inapplicable to this instant case for the reason that the case at bar is
not a simple ejectment case. This is an expropriation case which involves two (2)
orders: an expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation. Once the
first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the incorporation of the expropriation
order in the compromise agreement did not subject said order to rescission but
instead constituted an admission by petitioner of respondents authority to
expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was
expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the compromise
agreement which states that the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot
1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is
considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the Order of the
Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. It is crystal clear from the contents of the
agreement that the parties limited the compromise agreement to the matter of
just compensation to petitioner. Said expropriation order is not closely
intertwined with the issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent will
also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement to this effect was
mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only to
clarify what was subject to payment.
This Court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
interpreting original demand to mean the fixing of just compensation. The
authority of respondent and the nature of the purpose thereof have been put to
rest when the Expropriation Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly
admitted by petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for
consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to petitioner. In fact,
aside from the withdrawal of private respondents appeal to the Court of Appeals
concerning Lot 1406-A, the matter of payment of just compensation was the only
subject of the compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993. Under the
compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to receive respondents Lot No.

434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B. When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to
deliver Lot 434, petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return
of the expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of Appeals is in
accordance with Sections 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
We also find as inapplicable the ruling in Gatchalian v. Arlegui[39], a case
cited by petitioner, where we held that even a final judgment can still be
compromised so long as it is not fully satisfied. As already stated, the
expropriation order was not the subject of the compromise agreement. It was
only the mode of payment which was the subject of the compromise
agreement. Hence, the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 can no longer
be annulled.
After having invoked the provisions of Article 2041, petitioner inconsistently
contends that said article does not apply to the case at bar inasmuch as it is only
applicable to cases where a compromise has not been approved by a court. In
the case at bar, the trial court approved the compromise agreement. Petitioner
insists that Articles 2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code should apply. Said
articles provide that:
Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions
of Article 1330 of this Code.
However, one of the parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the other if
the latter, by virtue of the compromise, has withdrawn from a litigation already
commenced.
Article 2039. When the parties compromise generally on all differences which
they might have with each other, the discovery of documents referring to one or
more but not to all of the questions settled shall not itself be a cause for
annulment or rescission of the compromise, unless said documents have been
concealed by one of the parties.
But the compromise may be annulled or rescinded if it refers only to one thing to
which one of the parties has no right, as shown by the newly discovered
documents.(n)

Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,

intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.[40]
The applicability of the above-quoted legal provisions will not change the
outcome of the subject of the rescission. Since the compromise agreement was
only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and
purpose to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of
compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded.
This Court holds that respondent has the legal authority to expropriate the
subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public
purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero[41], this Court has ruled that,
the public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this
jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows:
this Court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for public use. There was
a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as
in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise expropriation is not allowable. It is not
anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use. [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220
(1983) at 234-235 quoting E. Fernando, the Constitution of the Philippines 523-4
(2nd Ed. 1977)
The term public use has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the
literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has
been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, this Court has also held that what ultimately
emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as public welfare. [42]
Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30, 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand
Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in
its original charter, Presidential Decree No. 66, which provides that:

Section 23. Eminent Domain. For the acquisition of rights of way, or of any
property for the establishment of export processing zones, or of low-cost housing
projects for the employees working in such zones, or for the protection of
watershed areas, or for the construction of dams, reservoirs, wharves, piers,
docks, quays, warehouses and other terminal facilities, structures and
approaches thereto, the Authority shall have the right and power to acquire the
same by purchase, by negotiation, or by condemnation proceedings. Should the
authority elect to exercise the right of eminent domain, condemnation
proceedings shall be maintained by and in the name of the Authority and it may
proceed in the manner provided for by law. (italics supplied)
Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated for the construction of
terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto. The authority is broad
enough to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for what public use
the expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority,
respondent leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was
made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by
Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending respondent PEZAs original charter, which
provides that:
Sec. 7. ECOZONE to be a Decentralized Agro-Industrial, Industrial,
Commercial/Trading, Tourist, Investment and Financial Community. Within the
framework of the Constitution, the interest of national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic, ECOZONE shall be developed, as much as possible, into
a decentralized, self-reliant and self-sustaining industrial, commercial/trading,
agro-industrial, tourist, banking, financial and investment center with minimum
government intervention. Each ECOZONE shall be provided with transportation,
telecommunications and other facilities needed to generate linkage with
industries and employment opportunities for its own habitants and those of
nearby towns and cities.
The ECOZONE shall administer itself on economic, financial, industrial, tourism
development and such other matters within the exclusive competence of the
national government. (italics supplied)
Among the powers of PEZA enumerated by the same law are:
Sec. 12. Functions and Powers of PEZA Board. ---- The Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA) Board shall have the following function and powers:

(a)
Set the general policies on the establishment and operations of the
ECOZONE, Industrial estate, exports processing zones, free trade zones, and the
like;
x

(c)
Regulate and undertake the establishment, operation and maintenance of
utilities, other services and infrastructure in the ECOZONE, such as heat, light and
power, water supply, telecommunications, transport, toll roads and bridges, port
services, etc. and to fix just, reasonable and competitive rates, fares, charges and
fees thereof.[43]
In Manila Railroad Co. v. Mitchel[44], this Court has ruled that in the exercise
of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary for the
legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term necessary, in this
connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a
reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future
needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and
viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding areas are
hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their
properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other facilities is better
served if respondent directly owns the areas subject of the expansion program.
The contention of petitioner that the leasing of the subject lot to banks and
building terminals was not expressly mentioned in the original charter of
respondent PEZA and that it was only after PEZA devoted the lot to said purpose
that Republic Act No. 7916 took effect, is not impressed with merit. It should be
pointed out that Presidential Decree No. 66 created the respondent PEZA to be a
viable commercial, industrial and investment area. According to the
comprehensive wording of Presidential Decree No. 66, the said decree did not
intend to limit respondent PEZA to the establishment of an export processing
zone but it was also bestowed with authority to expropriate parcels of land for
the construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto.
Republic Act No. 7916 simply particularized the broad language employed by
Presidential Decree No. 66 by specifying the purposes for which PEZA shall devote
the condemned lots, that is, for the construction and operation of an industrial
estate, an export processing zone, free trade zones, and the like. The
expropriation of Lot 1406-B for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the
construction of a terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation
facilities easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in

PEZA. The expropriation of adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter of

necessity to bring life to the purpose of the law. In such a manner, PEZAs goal of
being a major force in the economic development of the country would be
realized. Furthermore, this Court has already ruled that:
(T)he Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private
property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact
location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of
the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location
selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the
courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people.
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the
necessity and expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character.[45]
Inasmuch as both Presidential Decree No. 66 and Republic Act No. 7916, bestow
respondent with authority to develop terminal facilities and banking centers, this
Court will not question the respondents lease of certain portions of the
expropriated lot to banks, as well as the construction of terminal facilities.
Petitioner contends that respondent is bound by the representations of its
Chief Civil Engineer when the latter testified before the trial court that the lot was
to be devoted for the construction of government offices. Anent this issue, suffice
it to say that PEZA can vary the purpose for which a condemned lot will be
devoted to, provided that the same is for public use. Petitioner cannot impose or
dictate on the respondent what facilities to establish for as long as the same are
for public purpose.
Lastly, petitioner appeals to the sense of justice and equity to this Court in
restoring the said lot to its possession. From the time of the filing of the
expropriation case in 1981 up to the present, respondent has not yet
remunerated the petitioner although respondent has already received earnings
from the rental payments by lessees of the subject property.
We have ruled that the concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt

payment, compensation cannot be considered just inasmuch as the property

owner is made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his
land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss. [46] Payment of just compensation should
follow as a matter of right immediately after the order of expropriation is
issued. Any delay in payment must be counted from said order. However, the
delay to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and
inexcusable; it must be deliberately done by a party in order to defeat the ends of
justice.
We find that respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving what is due to
petitioner. In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the trial court
in 1991. The compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the
trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the present, respondent has failed
in its obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the latter. Respondent
caused damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect that it had a good title
to the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has
been reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the said expropriated
lot. We cannot tolerate this oppressive exercise of the power of eminent domain
by respondent. As we have ruled in Cosculluela vs. Court of Appeals:[47]
In the present case, the irrigation project was completed and has been in
operation since 1976. The project is benefiting the farmers specifically and the
community in general. Obviously, the petitioners land cannot be returned to
him. However, it is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven
years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate
expropriation proceedings, seize a persons property, allow the judgment of the
court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that
there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We
condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier attitude of government
officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance.
Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot,
however, grant the petitioners prayer for the return of the expropriated Lot No.
1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July 11, 1991, has long become final
and executory. Petitioner cited Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Rosa E. Vda.
De Villaroya[48] to support its contention that it is entitled to a return of the lot
where this Court ruled that under ordinary circumstances, immediate return to
the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious remedy. However, the said
statement was not the ruling in that case. As in other cases where there was no
prompt payment by the government, this Court declared in Sorsogon that the

Provincial Government of Sorsogon is expected to immediately pay as

directed. Should any further delay be encountered, the trial court is directed to
seize any patrimonial property or cash savings of the province in the amount
necessary to implement this decision. However, this Court also stressed and
declared in that case that In cases where land is taken for public use, public
interest, however, must be considered.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The Regional Trial

Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the
expropriation proceedings, docketed as Civil Case No. N-4029, regarding the
determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B, covered and described in TCT
No. T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this case be
remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation proceedings on the
determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt payment to
the petitioner.