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Errol Lord
Franklin & Marshall College
forthcoming in Analytic Philosophy
Facts about human life are the ones we should call on to develop an account
of practical rationality: that is an account of goodness in respect of the recognizing and following of reasons for action as it is for creatures situated as
human beings are. Moral virtues are needed for this practical rationality, as
is a modicum of self-love, and the rightful pursuit of more desire-dependent
ends. Someone acts well in all these respects only if he recognizes what he has
reason to do in each area, and allows this to in uence his conduct. Wherever
exactly we want to use the word "irrationality," we must admit that someone
is de cient in practical rationality if he fails to recognize moral reasons as reasons for acting; as also if he thinks he has no reason to look a er himself, or
to take trouble to a ain his more particular ends. Foot (1997)
Introduction
S
rational only when you have particular beliefs, intentions, desires,
or perform particular actions. To give some examples, given that the evidence overwhelmingly supports believing that the earth is older than 300 years (and I'm considering whether
it is), it would be irrational for me to not believe that the earth is older than 300 years. Similarly, given my (rational) intention to provide for my children's basic needs and my (required) belief that in order for me to provide for them I must make money, it seems like I
anks to an audience at Princeton, especially Jack Woods, Richard Ye er Chappell, Sarah McGrath
and Whitney Schwab.
anks also to Michael Smith, omas Kelly, Gideon Rosen, Kurt Sylvan, and
several anonymous referees. My largest debts are to Shyam Nair and Jonathan Way. Both provided outstanding comments that signi cantly improved the paper.
Dra of November 17, 2013. is is the penultimate dra . You may cite without permission (and are
encouraged to!), but please ask permission before you quote (errol.lord@fandm.edu).
T
for the current debate in the literature on practical reason is the fact
that you are irrational if you are incoherent in certain ways. e paradigm is means-end
incoherence. You are means-end incoherent when you intend to , believe that in order to
you must , but fail to intend to . Other examples include akrasiabelieving that you
ought to but failing to intend to and having inconsistent intentions. For the most
part, the whole debate about rationality is about what best explains why you are irrational
when you are incoherent in these ways.
Given this motivation, the debate has focused on conditional requirements. is is be1
Indeed, on the view of the most famous defender of these views, John Broome, rationality never requires one to perform any actions at all. See, e.g., (Broome, 2013, ch. 1).
2
is is true for dierent reasons in the metaethics literature than it is in the epistemology literature.
It's true in the metaethics literature because most think that the view is false. It's true in the epistemology
literature because most people think it's obviously trueat least since the death of a particularly nave
form of coherentism.
3
As I say above, the context will be the literature on practical reason. at said, a good bit of the paper
is about epistemology. is is in line with the literature on practical reason since the default view is that
the practical and epistemic will be treated in similar ways (see, e.g., Broome (2013); Kolodny (2007b);
Schroeder (2008)).
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Although this has been accepted by nearly everyone in the debate, I have argued elsewhere that the
best version of the narrow-scope requirements don't forbid one from giving up the antecedent a itudes
(see Lord (2011) and Lord (FCb)). Despite this, I am ultimately unsympathetic to the narrow-scope
approach because I think that it unlikely that one's antecedent a itudes have the rational signi cance that
the narrow-scoper a ributes to them.
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Schroeder (2004, 2005) argued that this isn't in fact implausible. He seems to have later given that up
(see especially Schroeder (2009)).
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A Be er Way
T
come to dominate all corners of normative philosophy.
is, I
think, has not been a mistake. Reasons are, at the very least, some of the most fundamental normative entities. Indeed, I'm very tempted by the thought that reasons are the most
6
Wide-scopers might try to temper this bad result a bit by arguing that, at least sometimes, I won't be
able to give up some of the antecedent a itudes. ey could then follow Greenspan (1975) and hold that
if you ought ( or ) and you can't , then you ought (for further discussion of this principle, see Setiya
(2007); Schroeder (2009)). e pure coherence result would thus not follow in cases where you can't give
up one of the antecedent a itudes. Indeed, the wide-scope requirements would collapse into the narrowscope ones if it was never possible to give up the antecedent a itudes. Because of this, nearly everyone
since Greenspan has thought that this is a objection to wide-scoping. But in our context it helps with the
pure coherentism charge (of course, it only helps insofar as you think the narrow-scope requirements are
plausible). anks to Michael Smith for raising this possibility.
7
As it happens, even Broome agrees that coherence isn't always sucient for a particular token a itude
to be rational. is is because he thinks there are some negative 'basing' requirements. ese requirements
forbid having or dropping a itudes for particular reasons. e paradigm example is dropping your belief
that you ought to because you realize you aren't going to , anyway. is seems irrational. Broome explains this by appealing to the basing principles. e basing principles never require you to have particular
a itudes, though. ey only forbid you for having or dropping particular a itudes for particular reasons.
us, on Broome's view, it's always permissible to drop your belief that you ought to , just so long as you
don't do it for particular reasons (cf. Way (2011) for a similar view).
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See, e.g., Scanlon (1998, MS), Par t (2011), Schroeder (2007), Dancy (2000, 2009), Skorupski
(2011).
9
In fact, I can motivate my view using a weaker and even more plausible assumption. Namely, that
the deontic reduces to reasons. It's plausiblerecent skepticism notwithstandingthat rationality is deontically signi cant (i.e., that rationality aects what you ought to do). It's very plausible that the deontic
reduces to reasons because deontic facts seem to be grounded in contributory facts.
e most natural
normative contributory facts are reasons. anks to Richard Ye er Chappell for suggesting I point this
out.
10
I argue for this in chapters 3 and 7 of Lord (2013).
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Although I caution the reader that I might sometimes speak as if these views are false.
Note that by being ocially neutral between whether the normative reasons that are relevant are
objective or subjective I avoid problems having to do with the rational signi cance of false beliefs. On
views that hold that only objective reasons ma er, the contents of false beliefs cannot be the type of thing
that aects the rational status of -ing (since objective normative reasons are constituted by facts). ese
views thus face a problem with cases where it seems as if the contents of false beliefs are playing a role
in determing the rational status of -ing. Views that hold that subjective reasons ma er don't face these
problems since subjective reasons can be false. At the end of the day I do have this problem since I ultimately hold that only objective reasons ma er. But the views defended in this paper do not have this
problem. For an early statement of my solution to this problem, see Lord (2010). For my current take on
the problem, see chapter 6 of Lord (2013).
13
is view is discussed most prominently in Kolodny (2005, 2007a,b) and Broome (2005a,b, 2007b,
2008).
14
More carefully, I'm not interested in the type of view Broome discusses in the papers cited in the last
note. I am interested in a type of view Broome discusses in Broome (2007a).
12
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Broome's Challenge
I B
'
, the views under consideration hold that rationality consists
in correctly responding to reasons. He wants to know whether it does. He argues that it
doesn't via counterexample.
Broome is interested in showing that Equivalence is false:
Equivalence: Necessarily, you are rational if and only if you correctly respond to
reasons.
Equivalence is weaker than Determination. It merely says that correctly responding to reasons is a necessary and sucient condition for being rational. Determination entails this,
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In Broome (2013) he doesn't give a speci c case, but merely the schema for the type of case he provides in the earlier paper.
16
is, like all claims of interest to philosophers, is controversial. Some, most notably Gibbons (2010),
hold that only facts within your perspective can be normative reasons. His argument for this, roughly, turns
on the thought that in order to be a normative reason , a fact must make -ing reasonable. But, he claims,
only facts within one's perspective can make -ing reasonable. I think this is to throw the baby out with
the bath water. Facts outside of our perspective can have the hallmark features of normative reasons. We
can explain their added powers once they are in our perspective by appealing to the distinction between
normative reasons there are and the normative reasons one possesses.
17
It's very controversial whether this is also necessary. I don't take a stand on this here.
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You might worry that this is ne as far as it goes when it comes to non-culpable ignorance, but won't
adequately account for cases of culpable ignorance. It's plausible that sometimes when you are culpably ignorant of some reason r to , r does aect whether it's rational to . I agree with this, and that's why I argue
in chapter 3 of Lord (2013) that the epistemic condition on having reasons is a non-holding conditioni.e.
you can meet it without holding beliefs. It's worth pointing out that some cases of culpable ignorance are
cases where you are culpable because you do something that you were required not to do that prevents
you from meeting the epistemic condition (even if it is a non-holding condition). In those cases I think
you don't possess the reason you are culpably ignorant of, but you've obviously still done something you
were required not toviz. the thing that prevented you from meeting the epistemic condition.
19
is is thus a counterexample to nearly all views of possession defended in the literature, which
hold that having the relevant epistemic access is both necessary and sucient for possession (see, e.g.,
Schroeder (2008), Neta (2008), Williamson (2000), Lord (2010)). I discuss these ma ers much more
in (Lord, 2013, ch. 3).
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ere he says that the reason why the fact that there is salmonella doesn't aect the rationality of
eating is because Jane doesn't believe that the salmonella constitutes a reason not to eat. In a dierent
context (namely, Broome (FC)) he argues that believing p is a reason to is not necessary for treating p
as a reason to , for reasons similar to the ones articulated below.
21
For reasons that I make clear in chapter 3 of Lord (2013) I don't think actually treating p as a reason
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A classic early statement of this view is Par t (1997). See also Brunero (2010); Reisner (2009);
Broome (2013).
25
I'm not the only one who thinks this. Most of the theorists cited in the last note also think this (save
Par t).
26
ese are the cases that many wide-scopers lean on in recent literature. See especially Brunero (2010,
2012); Way (2011).
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5.1
I 2.2 I
that it is a datum that you are irrational when you are incoherent in certain
ways. I have yet to say how the view I'm advocating accounts for this. I have said, of course,
that I reject certain views that do capture this. In particular, I reject views that hold that
being coherent is both necessary and sucient for being rational. I do think being coherent
is necessary, and I'll now explain why.
I'll oer the explanation via examples. In the second example, I'll give a rst pass explanation that is, as we'll see, not strictly speaking adequate. ere is a hitch which will be
dealt with in due course.
Suppose that you believe p, if p then q, but fail to believe q.29 You are closure incoherent, and, I think, irrational. Why are you irrational? Recall that on my view, Belief Possess
is a (schema for a) requirement of rationality:
Belief Possess: If the set of reasons you possess decisively supports p, then you are
rationally required to believe that p.30
27
See, among many others, Scanlon (2008); Jackson (1991); Ross (2012); Zimmerman (2008);
Kiesewe er (2011). I argue against objectivism in Lord (FCa) and in (Lord, 2013, ch. 7) I show how
my view of rationality vindicates the deontic signi cance of rationality, given the failure of objectivism.
28
I defend this claim in detail in Lord (MSc) and Lord (FCa). See also Ross (2012); Gibbons (2006,
2010).
29
And suppose that you are considering q, q is a ma er of importance for you et cetera.
30
is is not the most general requirement applying to doxastic stances towards propositions. is will
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Some think that a similar puzzle arises in the case of belief. It should be noted that although it's
uncontroversial that there are cases of mere permissibility when it comes to practical ma ers, it's very
controversial whether there are cases of mere permissibiliy in the epistemic case. Many explicitly reject
that such cases are possible. See, e.g., Kolodny (2007a); White (2005); Feldman (2003, 2007). Some
defenders of the claim that there are cases of epistemic mere permissibility include Harman (1986); Kelly
(2010); Rosen (2001); Ballantyne & Coman (2011); Schroeder (2012). Although I think it's plausible
that there are cases of mere permissibility in the epistemic case, the details would take us too far a eld
here. I don't think it makes a dierence to my explanation of Reasons-Coherence, Closure.
34
See, e.g., Broome (2001); Brunero (2007); Schroeder (2009); Scanlon (2004); Kolodny (2007a,
MS); Way (2010, 2011).
33
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Questions: Does this really ma er for the main issues in this paper, viz., the relationship between
rationality and coherence?
at is, do all participants in the debate about rationality have to deal with
the problem of mere permissibility? In a word, Yes. However, Jonathan Way has recently argued that the
wide-scope view has serious advantages over the kind of view defended here precisely because it is the
only view that can oer a satisfying explanation of cases of mere permissibility (see Way (FCa) and Way
(FCb)). Given this, I think it is worth pointing that I have another explanation to oer of these cases. I
defend this explanation more fully in Lord (MSb). anks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to say
something about the motivation for including this.
36
Schroeder (2009) tentatively defends a solution to the mere permissibility problem by appealing to
Intentions Provide Reasons. I think that Way (FCa) raises several damning worries.
37
Cf. Chang (1997).
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See Hare (2009, 2010) for arguments that these reasons are decisive
It's also plausible that intending the end won't intensify other reasons to take the means.
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e fact that
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5.2
e explanation oered above of why one is always irrational when incoherent (and why
one is always coherent when rational), is very similar to things that have been said by Joseph
Raz and Niko Kolodny (see, e.g., Raz (2005); Kolodny (2005, 2008a,b)). Both Raz and
Kolodny are skeptical about coherence requirements of rationalityrequirements that directly require coherence. Despite the similarities between my view and theirs, I think there
is a very important dissimilarity that should be explicitly pointed out. I'll explain this a er
brie y spelling out Raz and Kolodny's views.
Both Raz and Kolodny are skeptics about coherence requirements of rationality. However, they see the appeal of the coherence requirements, and thus a big part of their debunking strategy is an explanation of why we are tempted to think that there are coherence
requirements.
eir explanation holds that we are tempted by coherence requirements
because it is true that, whenever we comply with all the requirements of reason, we are coherent, and that whenever we are incoherent, we don't comply with the requirements of
reason. us, the coherence facts fall out of more basic requirements of reason. Since all
we wanted to account for were the coherence facts, there is no reason to posit requirements
that directly require coherence.
is is obviously very similar to my view. However, it must be stressed that for Raz
and Kolodny, the requirements of reason are completely independent of rationality. e
requirements of reason, on their view, are determined by all of the reasons. ey assume
that these requirements are the one's that determine what we ought to do and believe. ey
think that rationality is about coherence. ey thus become skeptics about rationality by
being skeptics about coherence.
41
Of course, other defeaters might come about a er one forms the intention. But those, I claim, will
also defeat the suciency of one's reasons to pursue the end.
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Just to be clear, I'm not endorsing Inheritance. It leads to lots of problems. I mention it here because
I think it is important to notice that the so-called myth view requires supplementation if it is going to help
explain why the wide-scope requirements are false.
43
I draw out this point more in Lord (MSc) and Lord (MSa).
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Recall what the debate between the wide- and narrow-scoper is about. In the rst place,
it is about what the best explanation is of why you are irrational when you are incoherent.
at is to say, it is about what the best explanation is of the fact that it is necessary to be
coherent in order to be rational.
Narrow-scopers think that being coherent is necessary, but not sucient. However, as
the wide-scopers are keen to point out, the narrow-scope view seems to deny suciency
in an implausible way. It seems like the narrow-scoper's account of the insuciency of
coherence is simply implausible. It doesn't seem like you are always rationally required to
intend to when you intend to and believe that in order to you must . Sometimes
you are rationally required to give up one of the antecedent a itudes instead.
Wide-scope requirements are compatible with saying that sometimes you should give
up the antecedent a itudes.
e wide-scope viewthe view that holds that all the requirements are wide-scopeholds that the narrow-scope view is implausible because, in
fact, being coherent is both necessary and sucient for being rational. e failures of the
narrow-scope view directly motivate the claim that being coherent is both necessary and
sucient for being rational.
is itself is implausible for a variety of reasons. Most fundamentally, it's implausible
because it seems obvious that sometimes rationality requires us to hold particular a itudes
or perform particular actions. Without some alternative account of why being coherent is
insucient, perhaps we should throw up our hands, be wide-scopers, and call it a day.
is is no longer our epistemic position. For I've oered another account of why being coherent is insucient. It's because what's rational is determined by the reasons you
possess, and the reasons you possess sometimes require you to hold particular a itudes
or perform particular actions. Moreover, my view lacks the problems that the traditional
narrow-scope view has. My view not only is compatible with the claim that sometimes you
are rationally required to give up the antecedent a itudes, it can give a principled explanation of what needs to obtain for this to be the case.
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References
Ballantyne, N. & Coman, E. (2011). Uniqueness, evidence, and rationality. Philosophers'
Imprint. [cited on pg. 17]
Broome, J. (2001). Are intentions reasons? and how should we cope with incommensurable values? In C. Morris & A. Ripstein (Eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference:
Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press. [cited on pg. 17, 20]
Broome, J. (2005a). Does rationality give us reasons? Philosophical Issues, 15, 321--337.
[cited on pg. 7]
Broome, J. (2005b). Have we reason to do as rationality requires?a comment on Raz.
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 1. [cited on pg. 7]
Broome, J. (2007a). Does rationality consist in responding correctly to reasons? Journal
of Moral Philosophy, 4, 349--374. [cited on pg. 7, 8, 9, 10]
Broome, J. (2007b). Wide or narrow scope? Mind, 116(462), 359--370. [cited on pg. 7]
Broome, J. (2008). Is rationality normative? Disputatio, 11. [cited on pg. 7]
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality
e Philosophical Quarterly,
e Journal of
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