Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

133676 [April 14, 1999]

FACTS

In the May 11, 1998 elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), the automated election system was implemented pursuant to R.A.
No. 8436. However when the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in
the municipality of Pata, a manual count was ordered by the COMELEC. The problem in
Pata was traced by the technical experts of COMELEC and the suppliers of the
automated machines to an error in the printing of the ballots caused by the
misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates and while the local ballots
in the other nearby five municipalities contained the wrong sequence code. The ballot
boxes were then transported to Manila. After a manual count, respondent Tan was
proclaimed governor-elect.
Petitioner Loong was third in the count and Intervenor Jakiri placed second. The
latter two questioned the resolutions of the COMELEC ordering a manual count of the
votes cast in Sulu claiming denial of due process and illegality of manual count in light
of R.A. No. 8436.
ISSUE

W/N the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered a manual count
of the 1998 Sulu local elections?
HELD

NO.
In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy
where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing.
COMELEC is given the broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall". This
provision gives COMELEC all the necessary powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit
manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
N.B. PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion:
R.A. 8436 explicitly mandates the Comelec to "use an automated election
system . . . for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing, consolidation
of results" in the ARMM. However, Comelec abandoned the ongoing automated
counting of votes in Sulu and substituted it mid-stream with the manual system. This
reversion to the manual election system is nowhere authorized in the same or any
law. Clearly, the poll body has no legislative power to modify, much less to
contravene, the law. Thus, the order authorizing the manual count must be set aside
and declared null and void for having been issued with the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, [July 28, 1999]

FACTS
Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same mayoralty post. Private respondent Antonio
M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
which was granted by the Comelec and
further moved to disqualify Jose
"Pempe" Miranda. Thereafter, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, petitioner Joel G. Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty
post, supposedly as a substitute for his father, Jose and subsequently won the
elections. Private respondent filed a petition and prayed for the nullification of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of
candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had
already been cancelled and denied due course. Comelec's First Division dismissed the
case motu proprio. Thereafter an MR was filed by respondent which was granted by the
COMELEC En Banc nullifying said substitution.
ISSUES
1.) Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
2.) Whether the order of the Comelec directing the proclamation of the private
respondent was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
HELD

1. NO. The Court found neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion
attended the annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner. Under the
express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person, but only "an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted.
In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly
ruled that "a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy". The law
provides that: SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any
elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein. By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely
mandatory.
2. YES. The Court ruled that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the city board of Canvassers of Santiago to reconvene, prepare a new
certificate of canvass and proclamation and proclaim the winning candidate among
those voted upon because this was inconsistent with the ruling applied in the case
of Labo vs. Comelec, Aquino vs. Comelec, Reyes vs. Comelec and Nolasco vs.
Comelec. The Court reiterated that: The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which

excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
(Reyes v. COMELEC)

RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC, GR NO. 206666 [January. 21, 2015]

FACTS
The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder
under R.A. No. 7080 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification. However, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada which consequently
restored his political and civil rights. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed
a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila. Atty. RisosVidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former
President Estrada before the COMELEC on the ground that Former President Estrada is
Disqualified to Run for Public Office arguing that Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral turpitude. The Second Division
of COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration filed was also denied. Hence this present petition. While this case was
pending before the Court, the elections were conducted and F.President Estrada was
voted and proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
Lim moved intervened in this case and subscribed to petitioners theory that
former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon
granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual disqualification. Further, all
the votes obtained by the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer
with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the rightful winning
candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of Manila.
ISSUE

W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be
voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President
Arroyo?

HELD

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of

the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance
of the absolute pardon granted to him.
The subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively
restored his right to seek public elective office. This is made possible by reading
Section 40 (a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC. While it may be apparent
that the proscription in Section 40 (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence||| of
the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape
from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run
for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek
public elective office (RA 9225), the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.