CASE 7

MINETTE BAPTISTA vs. ROSARIO VILLANUEVA

July 31, 2013
FACTS: On suspicion of union mismanagement, petitioners, former union members of Radio Philippines
Network Employees Union (RPNEU), filed a complaint for impeachment of their union president before the
executive board of Radio Philippines Network (RPN) which was eventually abandoned. They later re-lodged
the impeachment complaintagainst all the union officers and members of RPNEU before the Department of
Labor and Employment.
Complaints were filed against petitioners and several others before the Chairman of RPNEUs Committee on
Grievance and Investigation (the Committee) citing as grounds the "commission of an act which violates
RPNEU Constitution and By-Laws, specifically, for joining or forming a union outside the sixty (60) days
period and for urging or advocating that a member start an action in any court of justice or external investigative
body against the Union or its officer without first exhausting all internal remedies open to him or available in
accordance with the CBL." Thereafter, petitioners received a memorandum notice requesting them to answer
the complaint and attend a hearing. Petitioners and their group denied the charges imputed against them and
contested the procedure adopted by the Committee in its investigation. The Committee submitted their
recommendation of expulsion from the union to RPNEUs Board of Directors which affirmed said
recommendation. Petitioners wrote to RPNEUs President and Board of Directors that their expulsion from the
union was an ultra vires act because the Committee failed to observe the basic elements of due process because
they were not given the chance to physically confront and examine their complainants.RPNEUs officers then
informed RPN of the expulsion of petitioners from the union and requested the management to serve them
notices of termination from employment in compliance with their CBAs union security clause to which RPN
complied. Aggrieved, petitioners filed complaints for ULP against the respondents questioning legality of their
expulsion from the union and their subsequent termination from employment.
Petitioners posit that the procedure that should have been followed by the respondents in resolving the charges
against them was the article on settlement of internal disputes specifically, Section 2 thereof, requiring members
to put their grievance in writing to be submitted to their union president, who shall strive to have the parties
settle their differences amicably. Also, petitioners point out that they were not given the opportunity to
personally face and confront their accusers, which were violative of their right to examine the complainants and
the supposed charges against them.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners were denied substantive and procedural due process of law when they were expelled
from the RPNEU.
2. Whether petitioners were not given the opportunity to personally face and confront their accusers
RULING:
1. No. Based on RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws, the charges against petitioners were not mere internal
squabbles, but violations that demand proper investigation because, if proven, would constitute grounds for
their expulsion from the union. As such, the article on investigation procedures and appeal process was correctly
applied under the circumstances.
Besides, any supposed procedural flaw in the proceedings before the Committee was deemed cured when
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. Due process, as a constitutional precept, is satisfied when a
person was notified of the charge against him and was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side,
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. It cannot be denied that
petitioners were properly notified of the charges filed against them and were equally afforded the opportunity to
present their side.
2. No. Mere absence of a one-on-one confrontation between the petitioners and their complainants does not
automatically affect the validity of the proceedings before the Committee. Not all cases necessitate a trial-type
hearing. As in this case, what is indispensable is that a party be given the right to explain ones side, which was
adequately afforded to the petitioners.

CASE 9
CRISPINO PANGILINAN vs. JOCELYN N. BALATBAT
September 12, 2012
FACTS: Respondent spouses Balatbat were found by the PARAD to have landholdings which consisted
riceland and sugarland. The riceland was covered by land reform while the sugarland was subdivided by
respondents, some of which were utilized in a subdivision/condominium project and others subdivided among
their children. This case involves only Lot 21-F which was transferred to petitioner as evidenced by a TCT,
registered in the Register of Deeds pursuant to Emancipation Patent issued by the DAR. Respondents sought to
cancel the said emancipation patent on the ground that they applied to retain the land covered by it.
PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. PARAD held that the area of seven hectares that can be
retained under P.D. No. 27 can no longer be awarded to respondents, since they already owned an aggregate
area of more than seven hectares used for residential and other urban purposes from which they derive adequate
income to support themselves and their family. Respondents appealed before the DARAB which affirmed the
decision. Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of respondents.
Petitioner contends that he was deprived of the right to be heard and denied due process of law because he was
not personally furnished a copy of the petition, which copy was furnished to Fernando Dizon, his legal counsel
before the PARAD and the DARAB. According to petitioner, the legal services rendered to him by Dizon was
merely an accommodation to him in Dizons capacity as Legal Officer for the Legal Services Division of the
DAR. Petitioner asserts that after the case was decided and resolved by the DARAB, the legal assistance
extended to him by Dizon ended, simply because Dizon is not a full-fledged lawyer, which the respondents
knew very well. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals cannot be enforced against him.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to be heard and to present evidence when CA decided the
case before it without requiring that petitioner herein be furnished with a copy of the petition
RULING: No. Petitioner was not denied due process or the right to be heard as he was furnished with a copy of
the petition through his counsel of record, Fernando Dizon. As Dizon was his counsel of record before the
PARAD and the DARAB, it may be presumed that petitioner and Dizon communicated with each other as
Dizon even filed a Comment to the Petition for Review filed by respondents before the Court of Appeals. The
filing of the said Comment would show that petitioner was informed by Dizon that respondents filed a Petition
for Review of the Decision of the DARAB with the Court of Appeals. Section 2, Rule 13 (Filing and Service of
Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers) of the Rules of Court provides that if any party has appeared by
counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself
is ordered by the court.As petitioner had a counsel of record, service was properly made upon the said counsel,
absent any notification by petitioner to the court of circumstances requiring service upon petitioner himself.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. Such process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.In this case, petitioner was not denied due process as he
was able to file a comment before the Court of Appeals through his counsel of record, Dizon. Moreover, records
show that petitioner, with the assistance of two lawyers filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals which motion was denied for lack of merit.
CASE 12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERT CASTILLO
April 20, 1998
FACTS: Around one oclock in the morning, Eulogio Velasco, floor manager of the Cola Pubhouse was sitting
outside the Pubhouse talking with his co-worker. Soon, Antonio Tony Dometita, one of their customers, came
out of the pubhouse. As he passed by, he informed Eulogio that he was going home. When Tony was about an
arms length from Eulogio, Robert Castillo suddenly appeared and, without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan
knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, Castillo stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left hand.

Responding to Tonys cry for help, Eulogio placed a chair between Tony and Castillo to stop Castillo from
further attacking Tony. He also shouted at Tony to run away. Tony ran, but Castillo pursued him. Eulogio came
to know later that Tony had died.
Castillo declares that the trial judge was biased against him, for propounding questions that were well within the
prerogative of the prosecution to explore and ask. More pointedly, Castillo alleges that the trial judge took over
from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner, interrupted the cross-examination to help the
witness give answers favorable to the prosecution, and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion
and allusions of bad moral character, which could not be objected to by defense counsel, because they have
been ventilated by the judge himself.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court in many instances showed its prejudice against the accused when in several
instances it asked questions that were well within the duty of the prosecution to explore and ask
RULING: No. It is a judges prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. On the
whole, the Court finds that the questions propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature.
Questions which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial
prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be
received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a
judges queries is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test
of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that
he was prejudiced by the questions propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions and the
answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted. As correctly observed by the solicitor
general, there was no showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the
case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process. That the trial judge believed the
evidence of the prosecution more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He simply
accorded greater credibility to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused.
CASE 14
TERESA C. AGUILAR vs. MICHAEL J. O'PALLICK
July 29, 2013
FACTS: A Contract To Sell was executed between Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI), and Reynaldo
Poblete and Tomas Villanueva, over Unit 3301 of the Makati Prime Citadel Condominium in Makati
City. Poblete and Villanueva in turn executed in favor of respondent Michael J. OPallick a Deed of
Assignment covering the unit. PPGI issued a Deed of Sale in favor of OPallick after the latter paid the purchase
price in full. Although OPallick took possession of the unit, the Deed of Sale in his favor was never registered
nor annotated.
Meanwhile, in a case between PPGI and petitioner Teresa C. Aguilar filed in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, Aguilar was able to obtain a final and executory Decision in her favor, and as a result, Sheriff
Cesar D. Raagas of the RTC of Makati City, caused several properties of PPGI to be levied, including the
subject condominium unit. Before the scheduled auction sale OPallick filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim. Raagas conducted the public auction where Aguilar was declared the highest bidder for the subject unit.
A certificate of sale was issued in her favor. Because PPGI failed to redeem the property, a final Deed of
Sale was issued in favor of Aguilar. Aguilar moved for the issuance of a Writ of Possession which HLURB
granted. OPallick instituted a civil case for quieting of title and to set aside the levy on execution of the subject
unit, to annul the certificate of sale issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit. The CA sustained
OPallicks argument that since he was not a party to the HLURB case, he could not be bound by its disposition
as well as the incidents and actions taken therein; thus, he had the right to file a separate action to protect and
vindicate his claim.
Petitioners argue that Aguilars title had been the subject of final determination in G.R. No. 157801 where this
Court held that Aguilar is the absolute owner of the unit, and is entitled to a writ of possession over the same.
ISSUE: Whether the decision of the Supreme Court is binding upon OPallick

RULING: No. It is true, as OPallick claims, that in G.R. No. 157801 the Court did not foreclose the possibility
that a separate action questioning Aguilars title may be instituted, either by PPGI or anyone claiming a right to
the subject condominium unit. Thus, contrary to petitioners claim, this Courts pronouncement in G.R. No.
157801 can in no way constitute a final determination of OPallicks claim. The principle that a person cannot
be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Thus, we agree with the CAs pronouncement that since
respondent was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein.
Because he was not impleaded in said case; he was not given the opportunity to present his case therein. But,
more than the fact that OPallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he had the right to vindicate his claim
in a separate action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser of the very same condominium unit, he had the right to
be heard on his claim.
CASE 15
JANE CARAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
October 2, 2001
FACTS: The evidence for the prosecution showed that Jane Caras obtained from complainant Chu Yang T.
Atienza, on installment, various gift checks and purchase orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof,
the accused issued to the Atienza fifteen checks drawn against Philippine Commercial Bank. When the checks
were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Despite
repeated verbal and written demands made on her to replace the dishonored checks with cash, she failed and
refused to do so.
Petitioner admits having issued the checks but insists that she issued them merely to guarantee payment of her
obligation to the sister of the complainant; they were not supposed to have been deposited in a bank. She also
asserts that she was not properly notified of the dishonor of her checks. She maintains that the prosecution
failed to show that she received the notices of dishonor purportedly sent to her.For its part, the Office of the
Solicitor General argues that B.P. 22 does not make any distinction regarding the purpose for which the checks
were issued. Thus, criminal liability attaches whether the checks were issued in payment of an obligation or to
guarantee payment of that obligation. The Lower court ruled against the accused. Consequently, the appealed
decision is affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was accorded due process
RULING: No. The prosecution presented no evidence that would establish petitioners actual receipt of any
demand letter that could have served as notice to petitioner. No acknowledgement receipt or return card for the
first and second demand letters was offered in evidence.The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily
deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process
clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand that
the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution
under B.P. Blg. 22.Although it is true that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum and is
punishable under B.P. 22, the failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of
dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal. However, this decision in no way prejudices the civil obligations, if
any, that the complainant might have incurred by reason of her transactions with private complainant.
CASE 16
RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA vs. SANBIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
EDWIN N. NACIONALES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
July 15, 2013
FACTS: Coscolluela served as governor of the Province of Negros Occidentalfor. During his tenure,
Nacionales served as his Special Projects Division Head, Amugod as Nacionales subordinate, and Malvas as
Provincial Health Officer. The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas received a letter-complaint from
Peoples Graftwatch, requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural
equipment for the Province in the amount of P20,000,000.00 which allegedly happened around a month before
Coscolluela stepped down from office. Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of
the Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final Evaluation Report which

upgraded the complaint into a criminal case against petitioners. Consequently, petitioners filed their respective
counter-affidavits.
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer Butch E. Caares prepared a Resolution, finding
probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,"
and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On even date, the Information was prepared and
signed by Caares and submitted to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro for recommendation.
Miro recommended the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval of Acting
Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro (Casimiro), came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the
Information was filed before the SB. Petitioners alleged that they learned about the March 27, 2003 Resolution
and Information only when they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the SB.
Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases was violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the
complaint was instituted. Nacionales, Malvas, and Amugod later adopted Coscolluelas motion. In reply, the
respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash, explaining that although the Information was originally
dated March 27, 2003, it still had to go through careful review and revision before its final approval. It also
pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during
the interim.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners right to speedy disposition of cases was violated
RULING: Yes. A persons right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial
or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice. It must be noted, however, that the right to speedy disposition of cases
should be understood to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not be sufficient. Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the
length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay. Examining the incidents in the present case, the Court holds that
petitioners right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.
First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete.
Second, the above-discussed delay in the Ombudsmans resolution of the case largely remains unjustified.
Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of
case but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dutiful performance should not only be
gauged by the quality of the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. Thus, barring
any extraordinary complication, such as the degree of difficulty of the questions involved in the case or any
event external thereto that effectively stymied its normal work activity any of which have not been adequately
proven by the prosecution in the case at bar there appears to be no justifiable basis as to why the Office of the
Ombudsman could not have earlier resolved the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners.
Third, the Court deems that petitioners cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy
disposition of cases. Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their case because
they were unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. They were only informed of the
March 27, 2003 Resolution and Information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or when they
received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June 19, 2009. In this regard, they could have
reasonably assumed that the proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a plausible
reason as to why petitioners never followed-up on the case altogether. Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the
prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against them. Lest it be
misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring
dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective"

is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration
of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages
carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.
CASE 17
ZALDIVAR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. These include:
(a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on
Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the
COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the Court;" and (c) that in
several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and
was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the
SCs order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the
people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free was publicized in
leading newspapers.
The Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt of
court for making such public statements reported in the media. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt
of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. He assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of
speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather
than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.
RULING: No. Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What respondent
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression
itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within
the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community.
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section
3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including:
"any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice." Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the statements made
by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as
to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to
confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a
particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country
and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of
the courts, which has some implications to the society.
CASE 18
PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR., vs. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO
September 24, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office, detailed
respondents Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Assistant of the Civil Aviation Training
Center, to the Office of DOTC Undersecretary. After the lapse of 90 days, petitioner failed and refused to
reinstate respondents to their mother unit.Respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to
order their return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also sought the

intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and
refused to reinstate respondents to their mother unit.
Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against petitioner. The trial court granted respondents prayer and issued a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction ordering petitioner to comply with the order of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall
respondents to their mother unit until further orders by the trial court. For petitioners continued failure to
comply with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents
also moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer within the period prescribed in the trial
courts order.The trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. Moreover,
the trial court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file an answer to the petition for mandamus and
damages.
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted
the OSG a non-extendible extension within which to file petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed
to file the memorandum. Petitioner, through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the trial
courts decision never became final and executory as the trial court deprived him of his right to due
process. Petitioner claimed that the OSG failed to file petitioners memorandum resulting in the dismissal of his
appeal. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to inform him of the dismissal of his appeal and of
the trial courts order granting respondents motion for execution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of
the trial court from becoming final and executory. In short, the OSGs negligence binds petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court denied petitioner of his right to due process?
RULING: No. Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this opportunity was not
denied petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner
had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioners former counsel, the OSG, was
negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the
negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence and prevent the decision of the
trial court from becoming final and executory.
As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when the application of the general
rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for. In the present case, there was
no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the general rule that the negligence of the
counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the respondents allegations in the petition for
mandamus and damages.Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the
OSGs failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring
petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another lawyer. However,
petitioner still retained the services of the OSG, despite its apparent lack of interest in petitioners case, until the
trial courts decision became final. Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSGs errors. Petitioner
should have taken the initiative of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the
status of his case
CASE 19
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO BARAOIL
July 09, 2012
FACTS: Antonio Baraoil was charged with two counts of rape. Both rapes happened on the same day in the
comfort room adjacent to the Apo Rice Mill. The first was committed at 2pm through insertion of the penis and
the finger into the vagina of AAA (Statutory Rape), a 5 year old minor, while the second happened at 2:30pm by
sucking the vagina of AAA (Sexual Assault).Baraoil pleaded not guilty during arraignment for both charges.
During the trial, AAA narrated the facts that (1) while walking near the house of Baraoil, who was a honorary
uncle for her family, the latter invited her to ride with him in his bicycle (2) Baraoil drove her towards the rice
mill and was seen by her elder sister (3) after parking his bicycle on the wall of the mill, accused pulled AAA
into the comfort room, sat on the toilet, pulled her pants off as she has no underpants, unzipped his pants and
lifted the girl to insert his penis into her vagina and later inserted a finger into her vagina.The three sisters of the
victim heard thumping sounds coming from the comfort room then the accused went out and was followed by

AAA. AAAs sister told the accused that she will take AAA home but he replied that he will bring her home
after buying slippers. The accused and AAA took off and after 30 minutes went back to the same comfort room
where the accused undressed AAA again and sucked her vagina.
Baraoil, told the court that he was out at the fish pond with his friend during 7:30-10am and drank gin at 3pm
and went home at 4pm. He also added that the accusations against him were due to revenge for the
disconnection of AAAs familys jumper.
The trial court sentenced Baraoil to 6 years indeterminate (PC max) sentence to 10 years (PM max) as
maximum for the charge of sexual assault and Reclusion perpetua for statutory rape [with aggravating
circumstance less than 7yo]. The court of appeals modified the sentence of the sexual assault to Acts of
lasciviousness for imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen 15 years, 6
months and 20 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (based on RA 7610 and Revised Penal Code)
Issue: Whether the testimony of the child is sufficient to overturn the accuseds right to be presumed innocent
Held: Yes. The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proven.
This basic constitutional principle is fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden
of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the
degree of proof has been met is largely left to the trial courts to determine.
Courts use the following principles in deciding rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it
is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature
of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of
this crime, conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainants testimony provided it is credible,
natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her honor
tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect
and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against her.
CASE 20
SPOUSES SY v. ANDOK'S LITSON CORPORATION
November 21, 2012
FACTS: Petitioner Cely Sy and Andok's entered into a 5-year lease contract covering the parcel of land owned
by Sy. Andok's alleged that while in the process of applying for electrical connection, it was discovered that Sy
has unpaid electric bill amounting to P400,000.00. Andok's further complained that construction for the
improvement it intended for the leased premises could not proceed because another tenant, Mediapool, Inc.
incurred delay in the construction of a billboard structure also within the leased premises. In its letter, Andok's
first informed Sy about the delay in the construction of the billboard structure on a portion of its leased property.
Three more letters of the same tenor were sent to Sy but the demands fell on deaf ears. Consequently, Andok's
suffered damages. The complaint for rescission was filed three years after continued inaction on the request to
have the billboard construction expedited.
In her Answer, Sy stated that she has faithfully complied with all the terms and conditions of the lease contract
and denied incurring an outstanding electricity bill. Andok's filed a motion to set the case for pre-trial. An
Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-Trial Conference was filed by Sy's counsel on the allegation that on the pre-trial
date, he has to attend a hearing on another branch of the RTC in Manila. During the pre-trial conference, Sy and
her counsel failed to appear. Sy's urgent motion was denied, and the RTC allowed Andok's to present its
evidence ex-parte. No motion for reconsideration was filed on the trial court's order allowing ex-parte
presentation of evidence. Thus, on the hearing, Andok's presented ex-parte the testimony of its General Manager
detailing the breach of contract committed by Sy. The trial court rendered a decision favoring Andok's.
On appeal, Sy decried deprivation of her right to present evidence resulting in a default judgment against her.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed that the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of
evidence ex-parte as there was no valid reason for the urgent motion for postponement of the pre-trial filed by

Sy. The appellate court found that Sy repeatedly failed to comply with her obligation under the lease contract
despite repeated demands. The appellate court awarded damages for breach of contract.
ISSUE: Whether the default judgment amounted to an infringement of the right to due process of the spouses
RULING: No. Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court requires the parties and their counsel to appear at pretrial. Section 5 of the same rule states the consequences of failure to appear during pre-trial, thus: failure on
the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex-parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.What constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsels
from appearing at the pre-trial under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court is subject to the sound discretion
of a judge. Such discretion was shown by the trial court, which was correct in putting into effect the
consequence of petitioners' non-appearance at the pre-trial. While Sy filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-trial,
she cannot assume that her motion would be automatically granted. As found by the Court of Appeals, the
denial of petitioners' motion for postponement is dictated by the motion itself. A perusal of the Urgent Motion to
Reset Pre-Trial Conference discloses that the allegation that counsel will attend a hearing in another branch of
the same court in Manila failed to substantiate its claim. It did not state the case number nor attach the Calendar
of Hearing or such other pertinent proof to appraise the court that indeed counsel was predisposed.
We cannot allow Spouses Sy to argue that their right to due process has been infringed.In The Philippine
American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. Where
the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can
present its side or defend its interest in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process.
CASE 21
VIRGILIO ALMARIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
July 16, 2013
FACTS: A joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to
discuss, among others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening of the National
Artist Award Secretariat. When the First Deliberation Panel met, a total of 87 nominees were considered during
the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 names was compiled. When the Second Deliberation Panel
met, it shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary shortlist. The final deliberation was conducted by
the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the living National Artists. From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a final list of four
names was agreed upon. The final list, according to rank, follows:
Name
Art Field/Category
Number of Votes
Manuel Conde (+)

Film and Broadcast Arts (Film)

26

Ramon Santos

Music

19

Lazaro Francisco (+)

Literature

15

Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz
Visual Arts
15
A letter was sent to the President informing her of the final list of nominees for the National Artist Award.
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the
Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various
sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo
Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Maosa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed
these nominations and invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the
CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. Acting on this
recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued. Subsequently,
Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.

Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board
of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry
into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for
restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment
of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno be enjoined and
declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether Abad, one of the petitioners, could be granted legal standing in the case-at-bar
RULING: Yes. Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal and
substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Maosa and Moreno, he was among the 87 nominees for the
2009 Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the preliminary shortlist. As he did not
make it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by the Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former
President.
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the
Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Maosa and Caparas did not make it to the
preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were
treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of
the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former
President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as a preferred class.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno fails to pass
rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown
that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an
exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it
contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect.
While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be given an
equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right
to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
CASE 22
ROQUE vs. OMBUDSMAN
May 12, 1999
DOCTRINE: Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the
Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public
officials. Thus, the failure of said office to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years is clearly
violative of this mandate and the public officials rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is entitled to the
dismissal of the complaint.
FACTS: Felicidad Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of DECS assigned in Koronadal, South
Cotabato, until her compulsory retirement on May 17, 1991. Prudencio Mabanglo was a Schools Division
Superintendent of DECS assigned in Tagum, Davao Province, until her compulsory retirement on May 8, 1997.
Soriano and Enriquez of COA conducted an audit on the Php9.36 M allotment released by the DECS Regional
Office No. 11 to its division offices. The auditors found major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The auditors filed complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against
several persons, including two petitioners on May 7, 1991. On June 11, 1991, the Office of OmbudsmanMindanao found the complaints proper for a preliminary investigation. After which, the petitioners filed their
respective counter-affidavits. On March 18, 1997, Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao issued a resolution,
finding that all the respondents were probably guilty of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It
was also approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on September 19, 1997.
Petitioners instituted an instant petition for mandamus premised on the allegation that it has been more than 6
years and no resolution and no case has been filed with the appropriate court against them. The Court issued a
TRO directing respondents to cease and desist from further proceeding with the cases filed against petitioners.
ISSUES: Whether there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the complaints against the petitioners
which violated their constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases

RULING: Yes. The inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy
disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases.
CASE 23
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.
February 27, 1940,
FACTS: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgement in previous case
rendered by the majority of the Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a
new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false
and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather.
2. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal.
3. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
4. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations.
5. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
ISSUE: Whether the motion for new trial should be granted
RULING: Yes. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103. It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system of the nation. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. CIR is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
The fact that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof; In the language of Chief Hughes: the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself; This principle emanates from the more fundamental
principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
7. The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not

satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. The interest
of justice is better served if there is an opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in the
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
IS GRANTED, case remanded to CIR.
CASE 24
PATRICIO DUMLAO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
January 22, 1980
FACTS: Patricio Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position for the January 30, 1980 elections. Dumlao questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 which provides that, as a special disqualification, any retired elective provincial, city of
municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and
who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected,
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Dumlao alleges that the
aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on
"purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.
ISSUES: Whether Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection
HELD: No. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If
the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribed is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification which is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to
the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid even if at times, it may
be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO,C .J .,concurring:
If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal
protection, then his plea for nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the
Court makes a clear, such imputation is not deserving of credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as
lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement and the receipt of
retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to
impose. As was pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: "It suffices then that
the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and
security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." It cannot be denied that others
similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The most that can be said is that he
falls within the proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded
in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a
system of priorities. This it did under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a
measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached the retirement age and having received retirement
benefits once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was enacted. A portion of
the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc.finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that
called for correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary
palliative. That it stopped short of possibly attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not

stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to the principle underlying the
exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not
required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by
petitioner of the equal protection clause is futile and unavailing."
TEEHANKEE,J .,dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary
provision of Sec. 4 of Batas PambansaBlg. 52. To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired
elective local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in this case) previously held by
him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not
similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because
the disqualification is for the retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from which he retired) but
petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees,
yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this not an arbitrary
discrimination against petitioner who has cause to complain that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and
designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva
Vizcaya (since no other case of a former governor similarly barred by virtue of said provision can ever be
cited). Is there not here, therefore, a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional guarantee that equal protection
and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous if not identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse
new blood in local governments" but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the
same elective local office) is not rational nor reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of
"infusing new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in local governments since they are not
disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-governor, city,
municipal or district mayor and vice-mayor to member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan,
SangguniangPanglunsod and SangguniangBayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government
are not in any manner disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First
Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as
such judge in 1978 at age 70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official KBL candidate for
governor of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only
when they have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which
amount to very little, compared to retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary).
If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or
non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge on such an
irrelevant question or whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinction which make
for real differences that would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on
a presumption that elective local officials who have retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the
functions of the office they seek as those who are differently situated." Such presumption is sheer conjecture.
The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be more
efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65-year old like petitioner who has had experience on the job
and who was observed at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit. Suffice it to cite the outstanding case of
the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected at 80 as a member
of the Interim BatasanPambansa and who has just this month completed 81 years of age and has been hailed by
the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had."
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. At the most, a minimum age to
hold public office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity (now reduced to 21 years
in the present batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elective public office
since the right and will of the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his
age, has always been recognized as supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that
all persons subjected to legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the

privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and
individual or class privilege on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression of inequality on the
other. The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it
would disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid
distinction could be made as to the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand
or hostility on the other. Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus ruled out. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest."
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of
the 1973 Constitution that "Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination."
CASE 25:
CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA)
April 1995
FACTS: Governing Board Resolution 1 amended and increased the compensation and other benefits as
specified under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract
for Seafarers, providing therein that "In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000 and an
additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under the age of 21 but not exceeding four children at the
exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. Where the death is caused by warlike activity while
sailing within a declared warzone or war risk area, the compensation payable shall be doubled. The employer
shall undertake appropriate warzone insurance coverage for this purpose." It also provided that "The maximum
rate provided shall likewise be adjusted to US$50,000 regardless of rank and position of the seafarer"; that
"Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits herein provided shall apply to any Filipino seafarer
on board any vessel, provided, that the cause of action occurs after this Resolution takes effect"; and that the
"Resolution shall take effect after sixty (60) days from publication in a newspaper of general circulation."
Memorandum Circular 5 by the POEA Administrator and addressed to all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies,
shipowners, managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers, informed them that Governing Board Resolution
1 adjusted the rates of compensation and other benefits in the POEA Standard Employment Contracts for
Seafarers and that "Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits shall apply to any Filipino
seafarer already on-board any vessel, provided, that the cause of action occurs after the said compensation and
benefits take effect."
The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., and incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning
agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in
behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals, filed the petition to annul Resolution 1 and
Memorandum Circular 5on the grounds that, among others, the resolution and the memorandum circular are
unconstitutional because they violate the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts clauses
of the Constitution.Petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing
Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal
protection clause
Whether the issuance of the challenged resolution and memorandum circular violate the non-impairment of
obligation of contracts clause
RULING:
No. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must

rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. There can be no dispute
about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other
things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and
spiritual activities.
No. The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read
with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which
confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects
within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public
welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police
power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general
welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by
contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them.
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must
be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code,
contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts
but are impresses with public interest.

CASE 26
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
February 3, 2000
FACTS: Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE: Whether being an elective official results in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment
which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under
law
RULING: No. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call
of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane
to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
CASE 27
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
June 19, 1967
FACTS: Upon application of the officers of the governmenthereinafter referred to as RespondentsProsecutorsseveral judgeshereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judgesissued, on different dates, a total
of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to
the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioners contentions are:
1. they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
2. cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
3. the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them;
4. the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
5. the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law
Respondents-prosecutors contentions
1. that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
2. that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
3. that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of
the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations,
and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
ISSUES:
Whether those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally.
Whether those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally.
RULING: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties.
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural
and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It
would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"as alleged in the aforementioned
applicationswithout reference to any determinate provision of said laws.

CASE 28
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO BELOCURA
August 29, 2012
FACTS (STATE): At 11 oclock in the morning, Chief Insp. Divina was in his office in the headquarters of the
Western Police District (WPD) on United Nations Avenue when he received a call from a male person who
refused to identify himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a robbery to be staged along
Lopez Street, Tondo. After relaying the tip to his superior officer, he was immediately ordered to form a team
composed of operatives of the District Intelligence Group and to coordinate with the Special Weapons and
Attack Team (SWAT) and the Mobile Patrol of the WPD.
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives proceeded to Lopez Street, reaching the site before
1:00 pm. Chief Insp. Divina and PO2 Eraldo Santos positioned themselves along Vitas Street. At around 2:00
pm, Chief Insp. Divina spotted an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious government plate (SBM-510) cruising
along Vitas Street and told the rest of the team about it. The driver was later identified as Belocura. Chief Insp.
Divina signaled for Belocura to stop for verification but the latter ignored the signal and sped off towards Balut,
Tondo. The team pursued Belocuras jeep until they blocked its path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle, forcing
Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and the rest of the team approached the jeep and introduced
themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp. Divina queried Belocura on the government plate. SPO1
Rojas confiscated Belocuras Berreta 9 mm. pistol that was tucked in his waist and its fully loaded magazine
when he could not produce the appropriate documents for the pistol and the government plate. They arrested
him. PO2 Santos searched Belocuras jeep, and recovered a red plastic bag under the drivers seat. Chief Insp.
Divina directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspaper. Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD Headquarters on
board the Tamaraw FX. The team turned over the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the General
Assignment Section for proper disposition. Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office received
from the General Assignment Section of the WPD one red plastic bag labeled "SHIN TON YON" containing
two bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops individually wrapped in newspaper. She conducted a
chemical examination of the marijuana bricks pursuant to the request for laboratory examination from Chief
Insp. Nelson Yabut of the WPD; and concluded as the result of three qualitative examinations that the submitted
specimen tested positive for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
FACTS (ACCUSED): Belocura was a police officer assigned in Police Station 6 of the WPD with a tour of
duty from 3:00 pm to 11:00 pm. At 2:00 pm of that day, he was on his way to work on board his owner-type
jeep when about thirty police officers blocked his path. He introduced himself to them as a police officer, but
they ignored him. Instead, they disarmed and handcuffed him, and confiscated the memorandum receipt
covering his firearm, his money and his police ID card. He recognized some of his arrestors as former members
of the CIS. They forced him into their jeep, and brought him to the WPD headquarters, where they locked him
up in a room that looked like a bodega. They subjected him to interrogation on his alleged involvement in a
robbery hold-up. They informed him of the drug-related charge to be filed against him only three days later.
Belocura denied owning or possessing the bricks of marijuana, saying that he saw the bricks of marijuana for
the first time only in court. He insisted that it was physically impossible for the bricks of marijuana to be found
under the drivers seat of his jeep on account of the clearance from the flooring being only about three inches.
Belocura said that his arrest was effected possibly because he had incurred the ire of a superior; that it was not
unusual for a policeman like him to incur the ire of a superior officer or a fellow policeman; that he had arrested
a suspect for drug pushing and had detained him in Police Precinct 2, but the suspect turned out to be the
nephew of Captain Sukila of Precinct 2 who admitted to him that Captain Sukila owned the drugs; that on the
day following the arrest of the suspect, Captain Sukila called Belocura to request the release of the suspect (inaarbor ang huli ko); that he told Captain Sukila that they should meet the next day so that he could turn over the
suspect; and that on the next day, he was surprised to learn that the suspect had already been released.
Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt;
that his warrantless arrest was unlawful considering that his only violation was only a breach of traffic rules and
regulations involving the illegal use of a government plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the warrantless
search of his jeep was contrary to law for violating his right against illegal search and seizure protected under

Section 17, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution; and that the bricks of marijuana supposedly
seized from him, being the fruit of a poisonous tree, were inadmissible against him.
ISSUES:
Whether there was illegality of the seizure of evidence due to the absence of a valid search warrant
Whether accuseds guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
RULING:
No illegality of seizure. Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139
(The Land Transportation and Traffic Code). In flagrante delicto means in the very act of committing the crime.
To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or
eyewitnesses. Such identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in dispute
without the aid of any inference or presumption." Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a
crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was
apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid,
therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly search his person
and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the
crime or might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his reach
or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident purpose of the incidental search
was to protect the arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon.
Accordingly, the warrantless character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.
No, guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a
prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, depends on the
integrity of the chain of custody of the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its presentation as
evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because the State fails to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In convicting Belocura as charged, the RTC relied on the
testimonies of Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas to establish the fact of possession of the marijuana bricks.
An evaluation of the totality of the evidence on record indicates, however, that the corpus delicti of the crime
charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, are that: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. What
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be
done by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person
who has the direct knowledge of the possession.
The Prosecution presented no other witnesses to establish the seizure of the marijuana bricks from Belocura.
Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas declarations were insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict
him. If neither of them was personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana
bricks from Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative value, considering that the Rules of
Court requires that a witness could testify only to facts that he knew of his own knowledge, that is, only to those
facts derived from his own perception.
The Prosecution failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized by PO2
Santos from Belocuras jeep following his arrest and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented
as evidence in court. That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens of
marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana allegedly seized from
Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the confiscated marijuana to the marijuana
ultimately presented as evidence against Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded
that unwavering exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti the body of the crime whose
core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established.
CASE 29
GAMBOA vs. CHAN
July 24, 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Meanwhile, respondent
Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, of the Ilocos Norte Police
Provincial Office.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O.
275), Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country. The body, which was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission, was formed to investigate the
existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May
2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the
Zearosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled A
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies Report to the President (the
Report).
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to
the Zearosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming
Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a
PAG also appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the
basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa
Commission.As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and otherpeople
identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas dataagainst respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Gamboas right to privacy was violated.
RULING: The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional
right. Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. Howeverthis Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute. In the case at bar, The
Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is
national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to
the Zearosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining
PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa
Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or
security.The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body
specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the
Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to
Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or
threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence- gathering
and investigation.
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it
was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that
Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there

are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
CASE 30
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO
October 8, 1985
FACTS: The case at bar is a question on the validity of the search warrant and arrest of the petitioner charged
for the crime of rebellion. Prior to August 6, 1984, AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion.
She was then still at large. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG,
applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a
"suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." On the same day at 11:30 A.M., AGUILAR-ROQUE and
NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P.
Margall Street, Quezon City. No warrant of arrest had previously been issued against NOLASCO. Elements of
the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City "late on the same day". 428 documents, a
portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and
rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive
materials.
ISSUE: Whether the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been
properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness.
RULING: Yes. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized
The disputed Search Warrant describes the personalities to be seized as follows: Documents, papers and other
records of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front,
such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive
books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all-embracing description, which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what
the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and
infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the
recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too
general.
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for
Search Warrant. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such
facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. The
examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant
may issue.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under
an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILARROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an

arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant.
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order;
that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within
the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her
arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not
need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in
the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
CASE 31
GARCIA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
July 30, 2012
FACTS: Major General Carlos Garcia was charged with Failure to disclose his assets on his SALN (statement
of assets and liabilities), stating/making untruthful statements with regard his assets and bank deposits on banks
which resulted to the conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman by maintaining an
immigrant/permanent residence in the U.S.A. He was tried under the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial
(GCM) on violations of the articles of war, he was also arraigned while being detained in a military facility of
the AFP, then after the petitioner turned 56 years old and had retired from service while his case pending.
Thereafter sentence was rendered upon him by the military board review finding him guilty of all charges.
Petitioner served 6 years in detention in the PNP facility in quezon city. Then after President Aquino acting as
Commander in Chief of the AFP confirmed the sentence of the Military board review of discharge from duty
without any retirement benefit dishonorably and a term of imprisonment of 2 years not to be deducted from his
6 years of detention, with this petitioner filed for certiorari and petition for habeas corpus with this court.
ISSUES:
Whether Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to petitioner
Whether petitioners right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated
RULING:
Yes. The application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It, however, does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." In the present case, petitioner belongs to the
class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to them. Clearly,
there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature
under military courts and the civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled
to the basic and time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused. It must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner
violated are penal in nature.
No. No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy disposition of
cases. However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and

circumstances peculiar to each case.45 In determining whether or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases
has been violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons
for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by
the delay. In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being
questioned by petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the case has
already been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the proper reviewing
authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation of sentence by the President.
The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the decision of the General Court Martial was
promulgated until the sentence was finally confirmed by the President, petitioner took any positive action to
assert his right to a speedy disposition of his case. This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of
Appeals, where, in spite of the lapse of more than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could
not rightfully complain of delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part
of the reason for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution.
CASE 32
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JULIETA G. ANDO
July 25, 2012
FACTS: Respondent Julieta G. Ando was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manilaof three (3)
counts of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(2) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The MeTC found Ando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of making it appear that Tees
father, Tee Ong, who was the owner of To Suy Hardware, signed, executed and sworn a Deed of Sale, an
Affidavit, and a Transfer of Rights.
Andos conviction was premised on the following factual findings: (i) Tee Ong was already dead at the time the
allegedly falsified documents were executed and notarized on January 31, 1996; (ii) Ando was in possession of
the allegedly falsified documents, giving rise to the presumption that she was responsible therefor; and (iii)
Ando used the allegedly falsified documents to cause the transfer in her favor of the rights to the business name
"TO SUY HARDWARE". On appeal, of the RTC of Manila affirmed the MeTCs findings.
The CA gave due course to Andos appeal and reversed the RTC Decision. According to the Court of Appeals,
Ando deserves to be acquitted of the charges against her in view of the prosecutions failure to prove that the
subject documents were indeed falsified. Specifically, the prosecution did not present any expert witness or
caused the examination of the subject documents to determine whether Tee Ongs thumb mark and signature
were indeed forged. The CA found the lower courts to have erred in sweepingly concluding that the signatures
on the Deed of Sale, Affidavit, and Transfer of Rights were forged on the basis of the undisputed fact that Tee
Ong was already dead at the time that such documents were notarized on January 31, 1996.
According to the CA the prosecution did not eliminate the possibility that Tee Ong may have signed the said
documents before he died on December 15, 1995, thus, clouding Andos supposed guilt with moral uncertainty.
What the CA found as certain from the evidence of the prosecution is the notarization of the subject documents
after Tee Ongs death and not the impossibility of Tee Ongs voluntary execution thereof before his death.
Accordingly, it is the notary public who notarized the subject documents, not Ando, who should be held liable
for any irregularities that may have attended the notarization. The execution and notarization of the subject
documents are two (2) different acts and the irregularities attending their notarization do not necessarily affect
the validity of their execution.
In this petition, Tee attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA, alleging that the latter has no
reason to reverse the MeTCs and RTCs finding of guilt as the inconsistencies in Andos statements and her
possession and use of the subject documents prove beyond reasonable doubt that she was the one who forged
Tee Ongs thumb mark and signature. There was likewise no necessity to produce an expert witness to
determine if Tee Ongs thumb mark and signature were forged. That Tee Ong was already dead at the time the

subject documents were executed and notarized coupled with Andos use thereof to her benefit sufficed to
conclude that there was forgery and that Ando was responsible therefor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs decision and acquitting the petitioner
herein?
RULING: No. Dismissal of this petition is inevitable in view of the principle of double jeopardy, making it
unnecessary to address and extrapolate on the numerous factual issues raised by Tee against the CAs Decision
and the procedural lapses Ando attributes to Tee. The mere fact that the decision being brought for this Courts
review is one for acquittal alerts ones attention to a possible violation of the rule against double jeopardy.
Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity
to present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. The burden is on the
petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
The petition is bereft of any allegation, much less, evidence that the prosecutions right to due process was
violated or the proceedings before the CA were a mockery such that Andos acquittal was a foregone
conclusion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the alleged errors in the interpretation of the applicable law or
appreciation of evidence that the CA may have committed in ordering Andos acquittal, absent any showing that
the CA acted with caprice or without regard to the rudiments of due process, the CAs findings can no longer be
reversed, disturbed and set aside without violating the rule against double jeopardy.
CASE 33
DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING vs. PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC.
February 4, 2005
FACTS: Dr. Maquiling was employed by respondent Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTS). On 8 June
1991, he was dismissed from service as Deputy Executive Director after serving PTS for twenty-three (23)
years. The records disclose that Dr. Maquiling received a memo dated 2 April 1991 from the PTS OICExecutive Director Andres B. Soriano (Soriano) directing him to submit within five (5) days from notice a
written explanation on the following matters:
1. The delayed GSIS remittances;
2. The reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our financial statement for 1990;
3. The expenses you approved and incurred in connection with the Dale Carnegie and Silva Mind Control
Seminar;
4. The P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our financial statement; and
5. Your reasons for renewing our service contract with Ultra.
Dr. Maquiling submitted his explanatory letter. On 15 April 1991, Dr. Maquiling had a thirty (30) minute
conversation with Soriano at the latters instance. No further related proceedings were undertaken before Dr.
Maquiling received a letter-notice informing him of his dismissal effective immediately, without any retirement
benefits.
Dr. Maquiling continued to report for work. In the meantime, he elevated his case to the PTS Board of Directors
through a memorandum.
Dr. Maquiling wrote the President of PTS a letter. Receiving no response, Dr. Maquiling stopped reporting for
work at the PTS in the last week of September 1991.
On 10 October 1991, Dr. Maquiling filed his complaint with the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement or, in the
alternative, for payment of full backwages and separation pay in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor
Code, as well as moral damages in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) and exemplary
damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering PTS to immediately reinstate Dr. Maquiling and to pay Dr.
Maquiling backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Upon appeal by PTS to the
NLRC, the Commission upheld the decision of the labor arbiter and dismissed the appeal. PTS appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter by ordering the
dismissal of the complaint and declaring that his dismissal from employment as legal and valid. It, however,

ordered PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling damages or indemnity for violation of his right to procedural due process and
separation pay in the interest of social justice.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of his right to procedural due process and thus is he entitled to reinstatement
according to the ruling in Serrano?
HELD: We agree with the appellate court that Dr. Maquiling was dismissed from employment for just
cause consisting of loss of trust and confidence. The unnecessary expending of funds in the administration
and operation of PTS is evidently an act of mismanagement which could bring PTS to severe financial distress.
These acts if committed by a responsible officer wither the trust and confidence lodged in him by his superior
and may serve as a valid and sufficient basis to impose disciplinary sanctions to an erring employee which may
even result to dismissal from employment if the gravity of the offense warrants as in the instant case.
Recent decisions of this Court distinguish the treatment of managerial from that of rank-and-file personnel
insofar as the application of the doctrine of loss of trust and confidence is concerned. Thus, with respect to rankand-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in
the alleged events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not
suffice. But as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee
has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal.
However, PTS was remiss in its duty to observe procedural due process in effecting the dismissal of Dr.
Maquiling. Under this second requirement, two notices must be sent to the employee who is the subject of an
investigation for acts which may warrant his eventual dismissal from employment. The notices required before
an employee may be validly dismissed are: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the grounds
for termination and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his/her side; (b) a hearing or
conference wherein the employee, with the assistance of counsel if so desired, is given opportunity to respond
to the charge, present his evidence or rebut evidence presented against him/her; and (c) written notice of
termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify termination.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute elements of due process in cases of employees
dismissal; the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employers intent to
dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand the requirement of hearing affords the
employee an opportunity to answer his employers charges against him and accordingly to defend himself
therefrom before dismissal is effected.
Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee that an investigation will be conducted on the
charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result to his dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a
plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must categorically state the effect on his
employment if the charges are proven to be true. Absent such statement, the first notice falls short of the
requirement of due process.
It must be noted that the first notice (confidential memo) dated 2 April 1991 is a mere instruction to explain the
matters enumerated therein. It did not apprise Dr. Maquiling of any investigation to be conducted or being
conducted that will warrant his dismissal from service if found guilty of charges specified therein. Thus, such
notice fell short of the requirement of law that an employee must be afforded.
Dr. Maquiling invokes our ruling in Serrano as basis for appropriate relief. The Serrano ruling awarded full
backwages and separation pay to the employee who was dismissed for just cause but without the observance of
the procedural due process requirement. However, in Agabon v. NLRC, this Court modified the Serrano ruling
and awarded nominal damages in the amount of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) including holiday pay,
service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay to the petitioners in the said case. This case clarified the
criticisms and answered the questions created by the Serrano ruling.
The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal is for just cause but statutory due process
was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it
should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with
the procedural requirements of due process.
Where the dismissal is for just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not
nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to

discourage the abhorrent practice of "dismiss now, pay later," which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling.
The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case,
taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer.
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages as a vindication or recognition of this right granted to employees
under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
In the instant case, the records fail to show that Dr. Maquiling suffered pecuniary loss by reason of his dismissal
from service. Any such loss must be proved by Dr. Maquiling to be entitled to an award for actual damages.
Besides, the two-notice rule was not at all disregarded although it was observed defectively by PTS. Thus,
actual damages may not be awarded.
Neither will an award for moral damages nor exemplary damages prosper. The instant controversy fails to show
that the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith, fraud, or was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy, or that the employer committed an act oppressive to labor to warrant an award
for moral damages. Exemplary damages may avail if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner to warrant an award for exemplary damages. Hence, Dr. Maquiling shall only be entitled
to an award for nominal damages.
CASE 34
THE UNITED STATES vs. FELIPE BUSTOS
March 8, 1918
FACTS: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and
signed a petition to the Executive Secretary, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan,
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. The petition transmitted was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing,
including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in the
information as libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace were:
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of
the peace, who first told her that he would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would
take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her
two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial before the justice of the
peace, went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice
of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the
justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the office
of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay
P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four persons, on the day of the trial
the justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the
complaint was thereupon shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District
requesting investigation, proper action, and report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges.
The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result,
the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to
the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the
Executive Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted the motion and
reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six
councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was the victim of prosecution, and that
one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the
judge of first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October 12, 1916.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant-appellants are guilty of libel for filing a petition for malfeasance against the
justice of the peace to the Executive Secretary?
RULING:NO, defendants-appellant are not guilty of libel ACQUITTED. Complaint was filed in GOOD
FAITH and WITHOUT MALICE by the defendants-appellants, and such is guranteed by the
constitutional right of free speech. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. Moreover, the complaint was filed before the proper authority and thus, such
statements against the justice is covered by PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be
too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity
of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual
is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official or
set of officials, to the Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of
Government public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the
same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public
opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of
a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand
up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State
to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of
those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so
largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or
with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection
for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the
doctrine of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and
unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce,
Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified
privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is
thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has
an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege
would be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q.
B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board
having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable
cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover
the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking
motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is
social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in

fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in
intemperate terms.
A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule
is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered
libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or
corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the
beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press,
but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express
malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a
frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient
in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was
given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And
finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the
Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the
Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of
First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the
Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matter.
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the case of the United States vs. Julio
Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe
Bustos case, with the exception that there has been more publicity in the present instance and that the person to
whom the charge was made had less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case.
Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication. Moreover, in the
Julio Bustos case we find wild statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the
judiciary, "to persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue communications are not
privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to which we invite especial attention is United States vs.
Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege,
growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest
endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. The
defendants and appellants are acquitted
(2 pages lang ang digest pero ito additional lang, History ng freedom of speech in the Philippines from pre1900s to American period, for discussion purposes Pati na rin ang Concurring Opinion, para sure lang ):
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain principles which make up the law of libel
and slander, we feel warranted in seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and general discussion of
freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition in the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the time is
ripe thus to clear up certain misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in their proper light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that freedom of speech as cherished in
democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was
consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Aos" (The Philippines a Century Hence,
pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "
The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in
the Philippines free and by instituting Filipinos delegates.
The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" and by other means invariably in
exposing the wants of the Filipino people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and associations." (See

Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill
of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition.
Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition that a reform so sacred to the people of
these Islands and won at so dear a cost, should now be protected and carried forward as one would protect and
preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The Constitution of the United States and the
State constitutions guarantee to the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition.
We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the
Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no
law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, in the nature of organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not
unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which the American people demanded before giving their approval to the
Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the position never to be forgotten for an instant that the
guaranties mentioned are part and parcel of the Organic Law of the Constitution of the Philippine Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The language carries with
all the applicable jurisprudence of great English and American Constitutional cases. (Kepner vs. U. S. [1904],
195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907],
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur. I think it proper to observe, however, that in my opinion the Attorney-General is entirely correct when
he says that this case is substantially identical with the former "Bustos case (The United States vs. Bustos, 13
Phil. Rep., 690). I believe that a careful reading of our decisions in these cases is sufficient to demonstrate that
fact. The truth is that the doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case has long since been
abandoned by this court; and in my opinion it would make for the more efficient administration of the Libel
Law in these Islands to say so, in so many words. (Cf. U. S. vs. Sedano, [1909], 14 Phil. Rep., 338, 339; U. S.
vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil. Rep., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil. Rep., 595; and U. S. vs. Galeza
[1915], 31 Phil. Rep., 365.)
CASE 35
LUZ vs. PEOPLE
February 29, 2012
FACTS: The accused Rodel Luz was flagged down and was apprehended by Police Officers Alteza and
Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of helmet by motorcycles
and riders in the City of Naga. The Police Officers noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket. The police officers required the accused to take off all the contents of his jacket
which were found as follows: (1) nickle like tin container contained 4 sachets of suspected shabu; (2) 2
cellphones; (3) 1 pair of scissors; (4) 1 swiss knife. As a result thereof, the accused was arrested for illegal
possession of Dangerous Drugs. The RTC convicted the accused which was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUES:
Whether the accused was validly arrested
Whether the warrantless search was legal
RULING:
No. There was no valid arrest of the accused in this case. When the accused was flagged down for the
commission of an offense for violation of a traffic ordinance, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason
arrested. It appears that, according to the City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by the accused, the
failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as corollary
that neither can the warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
No. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following
are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (1) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2)

search of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5)
customs search; (6) a stop and frisk search; (7) exigent and emergency circumstance. None of the above
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest are applicable to this case.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizure. Any evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible as evidence for any purpose and for any proceeding.
CASE 36
BALDOZA v. DIMAANO
FACTS: The Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the
same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine
the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report
on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent, in answer to the complaint, stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official
court records; that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by the
parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such inspection, yet the same
is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further
asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and
the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and
legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public
scandal. Respondent significantly observed that under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and
unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder
and chaos might result defeating the very essence of their request.
Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation
among officers in the same municipality. This motion was denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal
investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge denied the petitioners right to access on matters of public
concern.
RULING: No. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view
the docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown
that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records
predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a
democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance.
The New Constitution expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public
concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision making
if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases."However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by
law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of
immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
CASE 37
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et. al. vs. CA, SSS et. al.
July 28, 1989
FACTS: The SSS filed a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners, alleging that the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members
from transacting business w/ the SSS. And notwithstanding the Public Sector Labor-Management Councils

order for strikers to return to work, they refused to return to work. As such, SSS suffered damages as a result of
the strike. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included:
1. implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA CBA on check-off of union dues;
2. payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
3. conversion of temporary or contractual employees w/ six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other
regular employees of the SSS;
4. and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the
salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and ULP.
Trial Court and CA on appeal denied the Motion to Dismiss of petitioners and affirmed the contention of SSS
that the strike was illegal since the employees of the SSS are government employees, they are not allowed to
strike.
ISSUE: Whether the employees of the SSS have the right to strike
RULING: No. The employees of SSS, being those subjected to Civil Service Law, are prohibited to stage
strike. Although the 1987 Constitution, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance w/ law", the President issued EO No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the
right to organize of Govt employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the Govt service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that
may be enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6 of the
Civil Service Commission which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by
Govt employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all Govt officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service."
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes? The Court is of the considered view
that they are. Considering that under the Constitution the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Govt, including GOCCs w/ original charters", therefore they are covered
by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by
the employees of the SSS was illegal.
CASE 38
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. FILEMON REMIGIO and COURT OF APPEALS
MARCH 21, 1994
FACTS: On 25 August 1967, private respondent obtained from petitioner a loan secured by a real estate
mortgage covering five (5) parcels of land in Isabela. Private respondent defaulted; hence petitioner bank
extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and it acquired the encumbered assets.
In its letter-offer of 15 February 1971, petitioner bank invited private respondent to repurchase the
foreclosed property. On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 27 was enacted into law that
mandated an agrarian reform. Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched;
among the areas it covered were said parcels of land. On 17 April 1974, private respondent offered to buy
the foreclosed property. On 24 December 1974, the Deed of Promise to Sell was executed between petitioner
bank and private respondent.
In a letter, dated 25 August 1978, sent to and received by petitioner bank on even date, private respondent,
through counsel, inquired why he was still being made to buy the property for P284,000.00 when, in truth, he
had already paid P40,000.00 of the P87,082.00 previously offered by petitioner for the redemption of the
property. There was no reply or response from petitioner. As of 02 November 1977, private respondent had paid
petitioner the total sum of P207,243.85. Private respondent, instituted an action for "Annulment of
Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum of Money and Damages" against petitioner bank.
While the case was yet pending with the trial court, petitioner bank additionally received from the Land Bank of
the Philippines P26,348.12 in cash and P160,000.00 worth of Land Bank Bonds in payment of the foreclosed
parcels. The Court of Appeals adjudged, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the court declares the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties to be without force and
effect; ordering the defendant bank to release the properties and the plaintiff to transfer the rights to the
tenants-beneficiaries in favor of the Land Bank of the Philippines; declaring the deed of promise to sell
executed by the plaintiff and the defendant bank rescinded; ordering the defendant bank and the Land
Bank of the Philippines to recalculate the amounts of payments due for the transfer of the subject
properties in accordance with this Decision subject to the provisions of P.D. No. 27 and in accordance
with the mechanics of the Operation Land Transfer; and annulling the order of the lower court for the
plaintiff to pay the defendant the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether the parties are protected by the non-impairment clause
RULING: No. In passing, the Secretary of the Department of Justice has himself opined thus:
I am aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosure
proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27
had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands.
There is no question, however, that the land reform program of the government as accelerated under P.D.
No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the
police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court that the
Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the state. One limitation on the contract clause arises from the police power,
the reason being that public welfare is superior to private rights. The situation here, is like that in
eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for public use, and the
only condition to be complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically, the
condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but merely
appropriate or take for public use. As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by the
mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any compensation.
The opinion deserves respect. This Court, likewise, in a number of cases has expressed the dictum that police
power subordinates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
CASE 39
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON and FELIPE RAMOS
July 7, 1989
FACTS: Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned
at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of
plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter. On the day
before the investigation, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten note stating that he is willing to settle
irregularities allegedly charged against him.
At the investigation, Felipe Ramos was informed of the finding of the Audit Team. Thereafter, his answers in
response to questions by PAL Branch Manager Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the
effect inter alia that the proceeds had been misused by him; that although he had planned on paying back the
money, he had been prevented from doing so, perhaps by shame; that he was still willing to settle his obligation,
and proferred a compromise to pay on staggered basis; and that he was willing to sign his statement. No
compromise agreement was reached much less consummated. About two (2) months later, an information was
filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence, which included "the
statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos", as well as his "handwritten admission". The defendant's attorneys filed
"Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs Evidence." The objection was that "such documents, which appears to be a
confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer."
The respondent judge did not admit said documents. He declared Ramoss statement "inadmissible in evidence,
it appearing that it is the statement of the accused in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager since it
does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel,
and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He
also declared inadmissible " the handwritten admission made by the accused for the same reason since it does
not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."

ISSUE: Whether the evidence should be admitted

HELD: Yes. It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with namely:
1. The right against self-incrimination
2. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation
A person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court, has
the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1. BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some
significant way, and on being interrogated by the police:
a. the continuing right to remain silent and
b. to counsel, and
c. to be informed thereof,
d. not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the
free will; and
e. to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2. AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a. to refuse to be a witness;
b. not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c. to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d. WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is
also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation, and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, just as it is obvious that the
note that he sent to his superiors the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the
alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground
that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
CASE 40
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENITO BRAVO
November 22, 1999
FACTS: On January 15, 1994 the decomposing body of nine year old girl Juanita Antolin (Len-len) was found
in a vacant lot about 700 meters from her house. Her body was found between two concrete fences half naked,
shirtless and skirt pulled up, her panty stuffed in her mouth. The scalp on the left side of her head was detached
exposing a fracture on the left temporal lobe of her skull. Vaginal examination showed fresh and old lacerations.
The cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage. An Information for rape with homicide was filed against Benito
Bravo.
Evelyn San Mateo, an eight year old second grader and neighbour and cousin of the victim, testified that she
was with the deceased the night before she disappeared. She stated that while they stood on the roadside
watching "Home Along Da Riles" from an open window of a neighbor's house the appellant approached them
and asked Len-Len to come with him to a birthday party and then he will buy her Coke and balut. Len-Len
asked her to go with them but she did not want to because she was watching television. Len-Len went alone
with the accused. The following morning Len-Len's mother told Evelyn and her mother that Len-Len was
missing. In court, Evelyn positively identified the appellant as the person last seen with Len-len before she was
found dead.
The Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Police Department, Alexander Mico, testified that he interviewed
Evelyn who pointed to Bravo as the man last seen with the deceased. Mico found Bravo at his place of work.
Upon seeing Bravo, Mico informed him that he is a suspect in the killing of a girl and asked him to come with
him for questioning. Bravo agreed. Mico further narrated in court that at the police station Bravo admitted he

was with the girl and he carried her on his shoulder but he was so drunk that night that he does not remember
what he did to her. On cross-examination Mico admitted that he did not inform Bravo of his constitutional rights
to remain silent, to counsel and of his right against self-incrimination before Bravo made the said admission
because according to Mico he was only informally interviewing the accused when he made the admission and
that custodial interrogation proper was conducted by the assigned investigator.
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of accused's constitutional rights
RULING: Yes. Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded a
person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the correlative duty of the State and its agencies
to enforce such mandate. The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the
time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime
or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody. The
exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for
coercion, physical and psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It
was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires
but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue. Law enforcement
agencies are required to effectively communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it
is fully understood. Any measure short of this requirement is considered a denial of such right. Courts are not
allowed to distinguish between preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the
exclusionary rule. Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear
harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struck
down as inadmissible.
The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin and any statement allegedly made by
him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is
inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the
admission was made during an "informal talk" prior to custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The
appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inquiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time the alleged admission was made the appellant was in
custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary
rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such
presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial confession to that effect and the appellant's denial in court
of the alleged oral admission. The alleged admission should be struck down as inadmissible.
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
FACTS: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he was identified by
the complaining witness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a
signed, written confession. At trial, the oral and written confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was
found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment on each count. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Mirandas constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the
confession.
ISSUES:
Whether statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation are
admissible against him in a criminal trial
Whether procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself are necessary
RULING:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court
proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. As such, the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

Yes. Without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of
crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would otherwise do so freely. Therefore, a defendant must be warned prior to
any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
NOTE:
After Mirandas conviction was overturned by the Supreme Court, the State of Arizona retried him. At
the second trial, Mirandas confession was not introduced into evidence. Miranda was once again
convicted and sentenced to 20-30 years in prison.
The Miranda decision was widely criticized when it came down, as many felt it was unfair to inform
suspected criminals of their rights, as outlined in the decision. Richard Nixon and other conservatives
denounced Miranda for undermining the efficiency of the police, and argued the ruling would contribute
to an increase in crime. Nixon, upon becoming President, promised to appoint judges who would be
"strict constructionists" and who would exercise judicial restraint. Many supporters of law enforcement
were angered by the decision's negative view of police officers. The federal Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 purported to overrule Miranda for federal criminal cases and restore the
"totality of the circumstances" test that had prevailed previous to Miranda.