Wills and Succession Midterms

1. TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix,

petitioner-appellee, vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and
ROBERTO RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
Doctrine: Fideicommissary Substitution is a disguised case of Successive Institution because
the law requires that (limitations):

The First heir (Fiduciary) and Second heir (Fideicommissary) must inherit from the
testator and not from one another;
The Fiduciary and Fideicommissary must be :One Degree Apart with respect to relation
to one heir.

FACTS: The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July
27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an
inventory of the estate as follows:
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction
of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda
propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar
substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo
Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs
Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are
also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree,
as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property in the
Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine
Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta)
Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this
property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not an impairment of legitime occurred in the instant case.
HELD: Yes. The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full
ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art.
900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of
the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his
estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It appears
that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides for a
usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-

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half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the
will is not entitled to have any
additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's
intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V.
Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Ramirez vs Ramirez (no fideicommissary)
Doctrine: No fideicommissary because two persons not related to the original heir is
instituted.
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow
as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on
July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en plenodominio in satisfaction
of her legitime; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez en nudapropriedad.
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining
two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
-widow
-French who lives in Paris
-received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix
-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because

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a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the
testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not related to the second heirs or
substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and appellants
violates testators express will to give this property to them
-LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WON the partition is valid insofar as
a. widows legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the widow[1]and over which he could impose no
burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever[2]-the proposed creation by the
admininstratix in favor of the testators widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testators
estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the testators express will. The Court erred for Marcelle
who is entitled to of the estate enpleno dominio as her legitime and which is more than what she is
given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than
her legitime will run counter to the testators intention for as stated above his disposition even impaired
her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar
substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept
inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not
related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that
such substitution does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir originally instituted. Another is that there is
no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact the apellee
agrees that the testator contradicts the establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits
the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked
owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
-Art XIII[3]Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except toindividuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land
of the public domain in the Philippines.[4]
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation
of law but also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece
of land BUT an alienmay be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines.
Therefore, the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does not vest title to

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the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace
Ramirez.

2. CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-13876
February 28, 1962
FACTS: A testatrix instituted as her heir, a grandniece, to 1/2 of her properties. She also provided in her
will that should said grandniece die BEFORE or AFTER then testatrix, the inheritance will go to the three
brothers of the testatrix or their respective compulsory heirs (in case any of the brothers should
predecease the grandniece). Upon the testatrixs death, will the grandniece (still alive) inherit said 1/2 of
the property as full owner or as mere usufructuary? In other words, what was contemplated: a vulgar
substitution or a fideicommissary substitution?
ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary disposition provided for what is called substitucion vulgar or for a
sustitucion fideicomisaria.
RULING:
It is clear that what the testatrix had in mind was a simple or vulgar substitution (not a fideicommissary
substitution). Therefore, the grandniece inherits as owner, and not as mere usufructuary.
Doctrine: Only Simple substitution because it merely provides that upon the granddaughters
death, whether it happens before or after that of testator, her property shall belong to the
brothers of the testator. Substitution becomes effective only upon such death.
FACTS:
Leona Singson died with a will wherein she devised one half of a big parcel of land to her three brothers,
Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, and the other one-half to a grandniece, Consolacion Florentino, but subject
to the condition that upon Consolacions death, whether before or after that of the tes tatrix, to Evaristo,
Manuel and Dionisio, or their heirs should anyone of them die before Leona and Consolacion. After the will
was admitted to. probate, Consolacion demanded for the partition of the property. Evaristo, Manuel and
Dionisio, however, contended that since she is only a usufructuary she cannot demand for the partition of
the property.
ISSUE:
Is this contention tenable?
HELD:
This contention is untenable. Art. 785 (now Art. 865) of the Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary
substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly either by giving it such name or by imposing
upon the first heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to the second heir. The testamentary
clause under consideration does not call the institution a fideicommissary substitution nor does it contain a
clear statement that Consolacion enjoys only a usufructuary right the naked ownership being vested in the
brothers of the testatrix. The will therefore, establishes a simple or common substitution, the necessary

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result of which is that, upon the death of the testatrix, Consolacion became the owner of an undivided half
of the property. She can, therefore, demand for partition.
3. CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Manila,defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-31703
February 13, 1930
Doctrine: Provision in the will that the whole estate shasll pass unimpaired to the children of heiress in
the event heiress should die after the testatrix, was held a fideicommissary substitution. It implied an
obligation to preserve and to transmit. Necessary consequence derived from the nature of fideicommissary
is that second heir does not inherit from fiduciary but from testator.
FACTS: Ana instituted Carmen as her heir with the following stipulations in her will:
(a) Should Carmen die, the whole estate should pass unimpaired to Carmens children.
(b) The estate should never pass out of the hands of Carmen and her children as long as this was
legally possible.
(c) Should Carmen die after Ana while Carmens children are still minors, the estate would be
administered by the executrix.
It should be noted that in the will, no express mention was made of a fideicommissary substitution. Neither
was there any statement as to whether Carmen was to die before or after Ana. It was thus alleged that
no fideicommissary substitution was made, and so, after Carmens death, the property
belonged to her estate and not to the children as substitutes, and therefore, creditors could
attach the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, or a fideicommissary substitution.
HELD: The properties belonged to the children, and not to Carmens estate. This is because all the
requirements of a fideicommissary substitution are present here, and consequently, the creditors cannot
go against the property. The requisites for a fideicommissary substitution are present because the
first and second heirs exist, in the proper relationship, and were both alive at the testatrixs
death. The phrase shall pass unimpaired and the phrase should never pass out of the
hands, show an obligation to preserve and transmit. Finally, the phrase should Carmen die
after Ana anticipates a situation where a first heir, Carmen, will later die after having enjoyed
the inheritance.

4. Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
G.R. No. L-22595
November 1, 1927
FACTS: Joseph G. Brimos will provided that even if he was a Turk, still he wanted his estate disposed of in
accordance with Philippine laws; and that should any of his legatees oppose this intention of his, his or her
legacy would be cancelled. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, did not want this disposition
in accordance with Philippine laws, and so he opposed practically every move that would divide the estate
in accordance with Philippine laws.
ISSUE: Does Andre Brimo lose his legacy?

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HELD: No, Andre Brimo does not lose his legacy, because the condition, namely, the disposal of the
testators estate in accordance
with Philippine law, is against our laws which provide that intestate and testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law (Turkish law) of the person whose
succession is under consideration whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (2nd paragraph, Art. 16). The condition being disregarded,
the legacy becomes unconditional, and therefore Andre Brimo is entitled to his legacy

5. TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS (Executrix), petitioner and
appellee, vs.
FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant.
G.R. No. L-22797
September 22, 1966
Doctrine: Timely withdrawal of opposition to the probation of no contest and forfeiture will
must not be penalized.
FACTS:
Decedent: Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.
Nearest kin: Brothers, a sister, nephews and nieces.
Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee, is one of the nieces.
Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not executed in
accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima was
secured through fraud; and that at the time of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.
After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositions, but before the
latter could close their evidence, Flora filed a manifest action that she is withdrawing her opposition to the
probate of the will.
The will provides a NO-CONTEST & FORFEITRURE clause.
ISSUE:
Did Flora actuations amount to violation of no-contest and forfeiture clause of the will?
HELD:
No. Where after realizing her mistake in contesting the will a mistake committed in good faith because
grounded on strong doubts appellant withdrew her opposition and join the appellee in the latters petition
for the probate of the will, appellant must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. Such act of
withdrawing before she rested her case contributed to the speedy probate of will.
6. LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-15737
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

February 28, 1962.

FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor gave, among other things, a legacy to his wife by virtue of which she was
given the use and possession of a certain piece of property on condition that she would never remarry,

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OTHERWISE, the legacy would go to a grandniece. The widow NEVER remarried. Upon the widows death,
the grandniece claimed full ownership over the property, but it was contended by the heirs of the widow,
that they (the heirs) should own the property because the widow never remarried.
HELD: The grandniece gets the property, for although the widow never remarried, still she was never
given the full ownership of the property (she had been given merely its use and possession). If the testator
had intended otherwise, why did he have to specify use and possession.
FACTS: The testator, Nicolas Villaflor, died in 1908 with a will wherein he left most of his properties to his
wife, Fausta Nepo muceno, and his brother Fausto Villaflor. In addition, he also left the use and
possession of certain specifi ed properties to his wife while alive subject to the condition that she does
not remarry; otherwise, said properties shall pass to a grandniece, Leonor Villafl or. The widow, never
remarried. She died in 1956. Who is now entitled to these properties the estate of the widow or Leonor
Villaflor?
HELD: The plain intent of the testator was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the
properties, subject
to the further condition that if she remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her lifetime.
That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in the properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expression used in the will, use and possession while she lives. If the
testator had intended to impose as sole condition the nonremarriage of his widow, the words use and
possession while she lives would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her
lifetime. It follows, therefore, that the testators grandniece, Leonor Villafl or, is entitled to these properties
upon the widows death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime

7. SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, vs.MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE
DEOCAMPO
G.R. No. L-13386 . October 27, 1920
JOHNSON, J.:
Nieva v. Alcala
FACTS: Juliana, with an acknowledged natural daughter, married Francisco. Their union resulted in a
common child. When Juliana died, some of her properties were inherited by said common child, who then
died without issue. The property was now inherited intestate by the father, Francisco. When Francisco died,
the acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana claimed the property as a reservee in a case of reserva
troncal.
ISSUE: Is the acknowledged natural daughter entitledto the property?
HELD: No, because she was an illegitimate, not a legitimate daughter of Juliana Art. 891 applies
only to legitimate relatives.
Nieva vs. Alcala
4 Phil. 915
The property here in question was inherited by operation of law by Francisco de Ocampo from his son Alfeo
de Ocampo,
who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo de Ocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which
the property in question came.

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Was Francisco de Ocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefi t all the plaintiff, and
illegitimate relatives within the third degree of Alfeo de Ocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the
plaintiff and not his son the defendant Jose de Ocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the
plaintiffs action must fail.
Answering the question in the negative, the Supreme Court, Held:
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by any court or tribunal.
However, eminent commentators of the Spanish Civil Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and
solution of the intricate and diffi cult problems that may arise under the provisions of the Code, have dealt
with the very question now before us and are unanimous
in the opinion that the provisions of Article 811 (now Art. 891) apply only to legitimate relatives. One of
such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do not better
than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us. In determining the persons
who are obliged to reserve under Article 811 (now Art. 891), he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or
grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811
(now Art. 891) does not distinguish. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an
indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate
ascendants.
Let us not overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or does not recognize the
existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only the bond established by the acknowledgment
between the father or mother who acknowledged and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it
may be stated as an indisputable truth that in said Code, the legitimate relationship forms the general rule
and natural relationship the exception; which is the reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many
articles speaks only of children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is
of course made to those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a provision applicable only to
natural relationship, it
does not say father or mother, but natural father or natural mother; it does not say child, but natural child;
it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of natural ascendants, natural
brothers or natural parents.
Articles 809 (now Art. 889) and 810 (now Art. 890) themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any
way be maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish
the legitime of the legitimate ascendants
included as forced heirs in number 2 of Article 807 (now Art. 887). And Article 811 (now Art. 891) continues
to treat of this same legitime. Therefore, the place which Article 811 (now Art. 891) occupies in the Code is
proof that it refers to legitimate ascendants.
8. CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
FACTS:
Esteban Javellana, Sr., married Salustia Solivio on December 1916 or barely ten months
before his death. Salustia Solivio brought paraphernal properties to the marriage. Salustia died on
October 11, 1959, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban Jr., including a house and lot where
she, her son, and her sister had lived. The titles of all the properties were transferred in the name of
Esteban Jr. During the lifetime of Esteban, he expressed his plan to place his estate in a foundation to help
the poor and deserving students obtain a college degree to honour his mother. However, he died on

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February 26, 1977, single and without issue. Petitioner and Private Respondent entered into an agreement
to put all the properties of the decedent to a foundation, just as planned by the decedent. Petitioner later
filed a petition to declare herself as the sole heir of the deceased on the ground that the properties of the
estate of the decedent came from her sister, mother of the decedent, and that she was the decedents
nearest relative by degree on his mothers side. After being declared as such, she proceeded to put up the
foundation. However on August 7, 1978, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the declaration
of petitioner as the sole heir claiming that she too, respondent, was a heir of the deceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property may be subject of reserva troncal?
RULING:
No, the property of the decedent is not a reservable property. In order for a property to be
reservable, the property must be inherited by an ascendant from his descendant which the descendant has
acquired such property by gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, pursuant to Art.
891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came
The decedent in this case is not an ascendant but a descendant of the origin of the property, mother of the
descedent, therefore the principle of reserva troncal does not find applicability in this case.
HELD 2:
Court held that the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban,
Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his
aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mothers side. The reserva troncal
applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or a brother or a sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Art. 891.
9. MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,
-versusPABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
G.R. No. 6878
September 13, 1913
Doctrine: The reservees are entitled to have their right annotated when the property is being
registered under the Torrens System, so that the reservation may be annotated as a lien on
the property. Unless this right is done, the reserva is extinguished, after the one-year period,
insofar as innocent third parties are concerned.
FACTS: The two parcels of land, which constitute the subject matter of this appeal, were inherited by
Marcelina Edroso from her son, Pedro Sablan, who died unmarried and without issue in 1902. The records
show that these lands had been inherited by Pedro from his father, Victorian Sablan, who died in 1882.
After the death of Pedro, Marcelina Edroso applied for registration of these disputed lands, but the
application was opposed by two paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan on the ground that said lands are
reservable in accordance with the provision of Art. 811 (now Art. 891) of the Civil Code and, therefore,
cannot be registered in the applicants name, since she is merely a usufructuary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is reservable.

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HELD: Supreme Court, however, held:

The ascendant who inherits from a descendant, whether by the latters wish or by operation of law,
acquires the inheritance
by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is
inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered, in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in
the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and
absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line
whence the property proceed, then a limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and
scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes
to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the
condition of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to
have any support in the law. There is marked difference between the case where a mans wish institutes
two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the
ascendant in Article 811 (now Art. 891). In the first case there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the
hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and only he can dispose of and recover it, while the
usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property except that he may
dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the provision of Article 489 (now Art. 572) of the Civil
Code, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendant who holds the property required by
Article 811 (now Art. 891) to be reserved, can dispose of the property itself, and recover it from anyone
who may unjustly detain it, while the person in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either
case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
The ascendant acquires the property with a condition subsequent, to wit: whether or not there exist at the
time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendant in the line whence the property
proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendant. If
they do not exist, the ascendant can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property
subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendant may alienate the property
required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can
give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The
relatives within the third degree will in turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives,
an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree.
After the person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the
alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will acquire it and all the rest that has the
same character in complete ownership in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been
terminated by the death of the usufructuary
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 (now Art. 891) to reserve the right has, beyond
any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title
and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property
reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it,
because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and
revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while
he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a
genuine owner can do.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application, recording in the reg istration the right required by Article 811 (now Art. 891) to be reserved to

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either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her, without special
finding as to costs.
EDROSO v SABLAN
September 13 1913
Topic/Doctrine: RESERVA TRONCAL
FACTS:
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on Sept. 22, 1882.In this marriage they
had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two
said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,1902, unmarried and without issue, and by his decease the two
parcels of land inPagsanjan, Laguna, passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.Hence
the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.-Two legitimate
brothers of Victoriano Sablan [uncles german of Pedro] appeared in the case to oppose the registration,
claiming either (1) that the registration be denied OR (2) that if granted to her the right reserved by law to
the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel.-The Court of Land Registration denied the
registration and the applicant appealed through a bill of exceptions. Registration was denied because the
trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be
reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother
and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
ISSUE:
WON the lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved

HELD:
YES.-The hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title]. He who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives-Art. 811, OCC provides: The ascendant who
inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from
another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the
property proceeded.-Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels
of land which he acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another
ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve
them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they
partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.-If
Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death
would not be required by law to be reserved, but only that he would have perforce left her as the legal
portion of a legitimate ascendant.[Art. 809, OCC.] In such case only the half constituting the legal portion
would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by operation of law would fall to the mother
from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is that in
article 811 of the Civil Code says.-Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges
it. In this case, the interested party has not proved that either of the lots became Marcelinasinheritance
through the free disposal of her son. Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished
in the Civil Code. Article 968: "Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower
contracting a second marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first
marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have acquired from the deceased spouse by will,
by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer w/out a valuable consideration."-From principles of
jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of Spain, it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July,
1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such

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right would have been able to institute, against the ascendants who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that articles 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under
article 977, are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry
of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under
article978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.Article 199 of amended Mortgage Law: "The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by
article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be
reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be required by the persons who should legally represent them.
In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the
same requisites as set forth in the preceding articles (relative to the right reserved by article968 of the
Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."The lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the exercise of this right
of action by the persons in whose favor the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof,
and enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limit is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right
required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry
of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an
allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained. What are the
rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil
Code?-The person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of
use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent.
Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to
dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one
who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word,
the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right
required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.-On the
other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and,
moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple which they can transmit to another, on
the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they
acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the
descendant of whom they are relatives within the third-degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in
said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in
whose favor the right is reserved should, after their right has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose
of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for
it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised
the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of
his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just
as it may even become absolute should that person die."-No act of disposal inter vivos of the person
required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such
person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a
condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring
a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis
causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendant from whom he got
the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law:
"To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein. Can the heir of the property required by law to be reserved himself
alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited?-YES when the persons in whose favor the
reservation must be made agree thereto and provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of
land is recorded, as the law provides.

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10. CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

-versusFIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-12957
March 24, 1961
DIZON, J.:
FACTS: The subject lot was originally owned by the deceased Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa
Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife,
Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. Upon the death of Saturnino properties were left to
all of his children, among which, Lot 3368 to Francisco.
Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his
sole heir, executed the public instrument entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among
other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to
appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia,
the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter
refused.
Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, declared the property in their
name executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is reservable.
HELD: Yes. It is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable property.
Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death,
unmarried and without descendants; it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter
was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that
Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died
only on January 13, 1952.
This court has held in connection with this matter that reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting
only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being
revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice
to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the
reconveyance of the property in question.

11. FRANCISCA MAGHIRANG and SERGIA GUTIERREZ, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ATILANO BALCITA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-22066
December 2, 1924
FACTS: The subject property was inherited by a minor, Gertrudis Balcita, in 1902 directly from her
maternal grandfather, Bonifacio Gutierrez, in representation of her predeceased mother. In 1906, Atilano
Bautista, father of Gertrudis, representing himself to be the absolute owner of the land, sold it to Esteban
Reyes with right or repurchase within ten years. Upon buying the property, Reyes immediately took
possession thereof. In 1912, Gertrudis died survived by her father, Atilano Bautista, and a maternal aunt,
the plaintiff Sergia Gutierrez. In 1918, the latter brought an action for registration of the land in her
capacity

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as reservatario or reservee under Art. 911 (now 891) of the Civil Code.
The lower court ruled that Reyes had already acquired absolute ownership over the property by acquisitive
prescription because he had been in continuous and adverse possession thereof for more than ten years.
HELD:
We are of the opinion that the conclusion thus reached is erroneous. We may accept the legal proposition
that occupancy by Esteban Reyes, pursuant to the contract of sale with pacto de retro by which he
acquired the property, and prior to the expiration of the period for redemption, may be considered an
adverse possession as against everybody having a prescriptive interest, notwithstanding the existence of
the stipulation for repurchase. As was said by this court in Santos vs. Heirs of Crisostomo and Tiongson (41
Phil. 342, 352), the insertion of a stipulation for repurchase by the vendor in a contract of sale does not
necessarily create a right inconsistent with the right of ownership in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in
the nature of an option, and the possible exercise of it rests upon contingency. It creates no subsisting right
whatever in the property, and so far from being inconsistent with the idea of full ownership in the
purchase, it really rests upon the assumption of ownership in him.
But it must be borne in mind that the true owner of this property was Gertrudis Balcita, a minor, and the
period of limitation did not begin to run against her or any person claiming in her right until the date of her
death, which was December 9, 1912. It must furthermore be remembered that the plaintiff does not claim
in the character of an ordinary successor to the rights of Gertrudis Balcita; her claim is based upon a
positive provision of law, which could not operate in any wise until the death of Gertrudis Balcita, when the
reservable character fi rst attached to the property in question. From this it is obvious that the right of the
plaintiff which even yet is of a purely contingent nature could not be affected by anything that had
occurred prior to the death of Gertrudis Balcita; and as this action was begun in May, 1918 the ten-year
period necessary to confer a complete prescriptive title had not then elapsed.
What has been said makes it unnecessary to express any opinion upon the more recondite question
whether Sergia Gutierrez really has a prescriptible interest in the parcel B, but we may observe that the
position of the reservee under the Spanish law is very much like that of the ordinary remainderman at
common law, who is entitled to take after the termination of a particular life estate; and it is generally
accepted doctrine in common-law jurisdictions that if the life tenant loses his life estate by adverse
possession the interest of the remainderman is not thereby destroyed. (17 R.C.L. 982; 21 C.J., 972, 975,
1013.) The reason for the rule is said to be that, during the existence of the life estate, the remainderman
has no right to possession and consequently cannot bring an action to recover it. (21 C.J., 974.) As was
said by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Webster vs. Pittsburg, etc., Railroad Co. (15 L.RA. (N.S.), 1154), No
possession can be deemed adverse to a party who has not at the time the right of entry and possession.

12. PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP vs. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and
ERNESTO BAUTISTA
BENGZON, J.P., J.: G.R. No. L-22601 October 28, 1966
FACTS: In 1943, Severino Salak sold 1/2 of a parcel of land (the subject property) to Honoria Salak. He
died in 1944 survived by a daughter, Francisco Salak de Paz. In January, 1945, Honoria, together with her
mother, Isabel Carillo Salak, and her brother, Adolfo Salak, were massacred by the Japanese. At the time of
their death, Honoria was 25 years old, Adolfo, 32 years old, and Isabel, 52 years old. They were survived
by Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo, mother of Isabel. In 1946, in the intestate proceeding for the

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settlement of the estate of Severino Salak, the entire subject property was adjudicated to the decedents
daughter, Francisca. On April 24, 1950, Agustina died. In 1963, Prima Carillo, a daughter of Agustina and
sister of Isabel, brought an action against Francisca for recovery of of the subject property in her
capacity as reservatario or reserve under Art. 891 of the Civil Code. Defendant interposed the defense of
prescription. Decide:
HELD:

The defense of prescription should be sustained.

It is of course, very true that the subject property is reservable under Art. 891 of the Civil Code. All of the
requisites are present. Since at the time they were massacred by the Japanese, Honoria was 25 years old,
Adolfo, 32 years old, and Isabel, 52 years old, under the presumptions on survivorship enunciated in Rule
123, Sec. 69 (ii) (now Rule 131, Sec. 5, ii), of the Rules of Court, Honoria was the fi rst to die, followed by
Isabel, and then Adolfo, it is obvious that 1/2 of the subject property, which
Honoria had bought from Severino Salak in 1943, passed by intestate succession to her mother, Isabel.
When Isabel died, the said 1/2 of the property also passed by intestate succession to her son, Adolfo. When
Adolfo died, it passed again by intestate succession, this time, to his maternal grandmother, Agustina.
Hence, all of the requisites of reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the Civil Code are present with:
(1) Isabel as the origin of the property;
(2) Adolfo as the descendant-propositus;
(3) Agustina as the ascendant-reservista; and
(4) Prima as the reservatario or reservee.
Thus, Agustina had inherited the property by operation of law from her descendant Adolfo; Adolfo, in turn,
had acquired said property by gratuitous title from another ascendant, his mother, Isabel; and fi nally,
Adolfo, the propositus, died without issue. From the moment Agustina inherited the property from Adolfo in
1945, it became reservable. In other words, she was obliged to reserve the property for the benefi t of
relatives of Adolfo who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which the said property
came.
Agustina finally died on April 24, 1950. From that very moment, the reserva was extinguished. Prima,
maternal aunt, and therefore, a third degree relative of Adolfo, became automatically and by operation of
law the absolute owner of the reservable property. From that very moment she had a perfect right to bring
an action against Francisca for the recovery (accion reinvindicatoria) of 1/2 of the subject property. Such
right or cause of action accrued on April 24, 1950. The law (Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure) fi xes
10 years as the period for actions to recover real property, counted from the time the cause of action
accrued. This is the applicable law (Art. 1116, Civil Code). Plaintiffs suit herein, having been fi led only in
1963, or more than 10 years from April 24, 1950, has already prescribed. (Carillo vs. De Paz, 18 SCRA 467.)
(Note: It must be noted that had the massacre of Honoria, Isabel and Adolfo taken place after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code (Aug. 31, 1950), there would have been no reserva troncal. The
presumptions on survivorship would not then apply. What would have been applicable would be the
presumption stated in Art. 43 of the New Civil Code. All of the three would be presumed to have died at the
same time. Hence, there would have been no transmission of successional rights from one to the other.)
13. Phil. Com. and Ind. Bank v. Escolin (no fideicommissary)
L-27860, 27936-37, and L-27896
Mar. 29, 1974
Doctrine: Where under the will the whole estate is bequeathed to X to be owned and enjoyed
by him as universal and sole heir with the absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion
thereof during his lifetime(inter vivos) to anyone, he cannot do so after his death(mortis
causa).
FACTS: An American citizen from Texas, Linnie Jane Hodges, died in the Philippines, leaving certain
properties,
both real and personal, in our country. In her will, she made her husband, Mr. Hodges, her only heir. She
likewise stated in the will that upon her husbands demise, the undisposed properties from her estate
would be given equally among her own brothers and sisters. Some fi ve years later, Mr. Hodges, also a
citizen of Texas, died. The administrator of the estate of Mr. Hodges, the PCIB, claims that the designation

15 | P a g e

of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges was an attempted substitution, but cannot be given effect
because it is not a simple nor a vulgar nor a fideicommissary substitution, and that under American law,
the estate of Mrs. Hodges consists of 1/4 of the total conjugal estate.
Issues:

Is the designation of Mrs. Hodges brothers andsisters valid?

If under Texas law, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is less than 1/4, how much must be regarded as her
estate?
HELD:

The designation of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges is not a valid substitution (not a simple
or vulgar substitution because the will does not say that said relatives would inherit if Mr. Hodges would
predecease, be incapacitated, or should repudiate the inheritance; and not a fideicommissary substitution
for Mr. Hodges was not obliged to preserve and transmit said properties to the relatives of Mrs. Hodges).
But this does not mean that no effect should be given to their designation, for the truth is that they were
also instituted to said remaining properties.

The institution of Mr. Hodges partakes of a resolutory condition, this is really a resolutory term,
because Mr. Hodges would surely die, sooner or later that is, ownership of the inherited properties would
end at his death (that is, while he was free, as owner, to dispose of the properties inter vivos, he was not
free to do so mortis causa). The institution of Mrs. Hodges brothers and sisters is on the other hand an
institution subject to a suspensive condition (this is really a suspensive term), their inheritance having
become vested at the time of Mrs. Hodges death, but only operative upon the death of Mr. Hodges. With
respect to the second issue, the allegation of the PCIB that Mrs. Hodges estate is 1/4 of the total mass is a
judicial admission of a fact (the existence of the foreign law being a fact), and by the principle of estoppel,
would prevent the PCIB from alleging that Mrs. Hodges estate is less than 1/4.
14. Morente v. De la Santa
9 Phil. 387
FACTS: In her will, a wife provided as follows:
1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la
Santa;
2. That my said husband shall not leave my sisters after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone;
should my husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me,
except the one-third part thereof and the two-thirds remaining shall be and remain for my brother Vicente
or his children should he have any;
3. After my death, I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one
of the properties belonging to me.
Questions:
(a) If the husband marries again, will he forfeit the devise?
(b) If the husband leaves the sisters of the wife, will he forfeit the devise?
(c) If the husband does not live in the camarin, will he forfeit the devise?
(d) if the husband has children by anyone, will he forfeit a part of the devise?
HELD:

(a), (b), and (c) No. Reason: The happening of these events should not be considered as the
fulfillment of conditions which would annul or revoke the devise. They were mere orders and there was no
condition or statement that if he should not comply with the wishes of the testatrix he would lose the
devise given him. The condition should have been expressly provided. It was not.

In this case, he would lose two-thirds of the devise. Reason: There was a statement that should he
have children by anyone, the forfeiture would take place. Here the condition was expressly provided.

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15. . Broce vs Marcellana

CA L-10896-R, June 21, 1954
(Remember that it only applies to the free portion of the estate of wife not to the legitime)
Doctrine: The condition is for the surviving spouse, should he remarry, to choose a relative of
the deceased spouse within the 6th degree.
FACTS: Wife provided in her last will and testament: I want and I direct my husband that I am dead, and
he should want to remarry, he should choose a relative of mine within the 6th degree, and if he disregard
this wish of mine, my brothers and sisters will have the right to claim or recover my properties as if they
were only the heirs.
Husband however, one month prior to his death, married another woman who was not within the 6th
degree of the deceased spouse, notwithstanding the fact that there were 3 of them available.
ISSUE: Is the condition imposed in the will for the husband to marry one of the relatives of his late wife
within the 6th degree against good morals?
HELD: Article 793 (now Article 874) of the old Civil Code which was in force that time provides: An
absolute conidition of not contracting a first or subsequent marriage shall be disregarded unless such
condition has been imposed on the widower or widow by the deceased spouse, or by the ascendants or
descendants of the latter.
Thus, the condition is valid. Undoubtedly, the purpose of the lawmakers was to preserve the property of
the testator in favor of her nearest of kin in case of non compliance with the condition. In the instant case,
the heirs of the husband are not entitled to any of the properties which he inherited from his late wife
because her heirs are entitled to recover all the properties which the husband received because of his
failure to marry any of her relatives within the 6th degree.

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