The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation

within the power of the court until the

entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not,
of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. Id., citing Romero v. Court of
Appeals, id. at 492-493 and Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173, 186.
Lispendens (lease pendense) n. Latin for "a suit pending," a written notice that a lawsuit has been filed which concerns the title to real proper
ty or someinterest in that real property. The lis pendens (or notice of pending action) is filed with the clerk of the court, certified that it has be
en filed, and then recordedwith the county recorder. This gives notice to the defendant who owns real estate that there is a claim on the proper
ty, and the recording informs the generalpublic (and particularly anyone interested in buying or financing the property) that there is this poten
tial claim against it. The lis pendens must include alegal description of the real property, and the lawsuit must involve the property. Otherwise
, if there is a petition to remove the lis pendens from real propertynot involved in the lawsuit, the plaintiff who originally recorded a false lis
pendens will be subject to payment of attorneys fees as a penalty. Example: JoePlumbob provides work and materials to Smith's home, sues t
o enforce a mechanic's lien, but records a lis pendens describing three other properties ownedby Smith; Plumbob can be penalized by court or
der.
10. LOPEZ v. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:
Sandoval and Ozaeta filed an application for registration of title in the RTC. RTC subsequently granted their request. The heirs of Enriquez
filed a motion alleging that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots in question to their deceased father, Eugenio Lopez, Sr. However, the decision
of the RTC on the application for registration of Sandoval and Ozaeta being final and executory, the LRA issued titles in their names. The
petitioners (heirs) filed a motion to nullify said OCTs.They also applied with the Register of Deeds for the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens on the back of the OCTs. The LRA denied said application on the basis of the notice not being registrable solely because of the
motion to nullify the OCTs. CA affirmed the LRAs decision.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners motion to declare void the decrees issued by the LRA is a proper basis for filing the notice of lis pendens?
HELD:
No. As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the
court where the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the number of the
certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the land affected and its registered owner. The Register of Deeds denied registration
of the notice of lis pendens because "the application was bereft of the original petition or complaint upon which this office will base its
action."
8. LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and
Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); RUBEN TORRES,
Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the
President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws,
covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order
96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on
ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in
contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines,
60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the
transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before
the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign
owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the
Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources.
2.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully foreign owned
companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine
natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or
leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands
of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource
within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the countrys natural resource, for it is given
exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present
Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign
contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by nonFilipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as
service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign
contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in
effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other
as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus
dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the
State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all
minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide
all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources
that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution.
They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which
they spring must be struck down.
2.WILFREDO T. VAGILIDAD and LOLITA A. VAGILIDAD vs GABINO VAGILIDAD, JR. and GABINO VAGILIDAD, JR.
Implied Trust (Art . 1456)
Vagilidad vs. Vagalidad
G.R. No. 161136
Facts:
A parcel of land was bought by Gabino and later on without the consent of the wife of Gabino was transferred to Wilfredo without any
payment in conformity that Wilfredo can use the lot to as a collateral to obtain loan. And when the loan was paid and the mortgaged was
cancelled. Spouses GABINO and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad (hereafter DOROTHY), as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Document, Reconveyance and Damages. But Wilfredo claimed that they are the owner the land because they already bought it to from the
former owner who sold the same to Gabino. Then Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to obtain ownership of the said property.
Issue: Who is the rightful owner of the property?
Ruling:
The contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 could be legally recognized. At the time of sale, LORETO had
an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter property or some 1,426 square meters but sold some 1,604 square meters to GABINO,
JR. We have ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.Be that as it may, the co-heirs of LORETO waived all their rights and interests over Lot No.
1253 in favor of LORETO in an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that they have previously received
their respective shares from the other estate of their parents ZOILO and PURIFICACION. The rights of GABINO, JR. as owner over Lot No.
1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not effectively transferred by LORETO to WILFREDO in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion
of Land. Nor were these rights alienated from GABINO, JR. upon the issuance of the title to the subject property in the name of
WILFREDO. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked
by WILFREDO because certificates of title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission
of fraud.

On the issue of prescription, petitioners contend that the appellate court failed to apply the rule that an action for reconveyance based on
fraud prescribes after the lapse of four years. They cite Article 1391 of the Civil Code and the case of Gerona v. De Guzman.
We disagree. This Court explained in Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals, viz.:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of
decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The
only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years.
However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June
25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code not coming into effect until August 30, 1950 xxx. It must be
stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456 are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old
Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of
title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
[Thus,] under the present Civil Code, xxx just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of xxx Art. 1456, xxx so is the
corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription,
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable[, viz.:]
Art. 1144.
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
1)

Upon a written contract;

2)

Upon an obligation created by law;

3)

Upon a judgment.