Local Community

Preparedness for an
Emergency Animal
Disease Outbreak

A Report for the Rural Industries Research

and Development Corporation
By Elaine Barclay

October 2005
RIRDC Publication No 05/131
RIRDC Project No UNE-89A

INCORPORATING THE FORMER RURAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

University of New England
Armidale, NSW 2351

 2005 Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation.

All rights reserved.
ISBN 1 74151 194 1
ISSN 1440-6845
Local community preparedness for an Emergency Animal Disease outbreak
Publication No. 05/131
Project No. UNE-89A
The information contained in this publication is intended for general use to assist public knowledge and
discussion and to help improve the development of sustainable industries. The information should not be relied
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and Development Corporation, the authors or contributors do not assume liability of any kind whatsoever resulting
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Researcher Contact Details

Dr Elaine Barclay
The Institute for Rural Futures,
University of New England
Armidale, NSW 2351
Phone: (02) 6773 5141
Fax:
(02) 6773 3245
Email: ebarclay@une.edu.au
In submitting this report, the researcher has agreed to RIRDC publishing this material in its edited form.
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rirdc@rirdc.gov.au.
http://www.rirdc.gov.au

Published in October 2005

Printed on environmentally friendly paper by Canprint

ii

Foreword
For a nation like Australia, which exports around 80% of its total agricultural production, and where
the processed food industry is the largest employer in regional areas, the risk of a major outbreak of an
Emergency Animal Disease, such as Foot and Mouth, is a major concern. An outbreak of such a
disease would devastate Australias livestock industry, cause severe financial hardship, result in
considerable social disruption for whole communities and threaten the national economy. Although
national disease control plans and strict quarantine measures mean that Australia is well prepared to
quickly and effectively deal with a possible disease outbreak, relatively little is known about how
individual farmers and small rural communities will cope if a crisis occurs.
Through a series of three independent studies, this research investigated the level of awareness and
preparedness at the individual farmer and small community level for a possible emergency animal
disease outbreak and sought to identify those social factors that may facilitate or inhibit the
implementation and maintenance of disease control plans. The research also assessed the potential
social impact of an EAD outbreak upon small rural communities.
This project was funded from RIRDC Core Funds, which are provided by the Australian Government.
This report is an addition to RIRDCs diverse range of over 1000 research publications, forms part of
our Human Capital, Communications and Information Systems R&D program, which aims to enhance
human capital and facilitate innovation in rural industries and communities.
Most of our publications are available for viewing, downloading or purchasing online through our
website:

downloads at <http://www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/Index.htm>
purchases at <http://www.rirdc.gov.au/eshop>

Peter OBrien
Managing Director
Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation

iii

Acknowledgments
The research that forms the subject of this report has been supported by a grant from the Rural
Industries Research and Development Corporation. The views expressed are the responsibility of the
author and are not necessarily those of the funding body. All errors and omissions remain the
responsibility of the author. We would like to thank Ruth McGregor for her efficiency in entering the
data and Jean Harris for her expertise in the preparation of this report.
We are indebted to the farmers who gave their time to complete the surveys and without whom; the
study would not have been possible. We are particularly grateful to those who took the time to
provide additional comments and suggestions, which provided greater insight into the views of
farmers on the issue of bio security. Appreciation goes to those farmers and support service personnel
in Devon and Cornwall who agreed to participate in interviews. Thank you to Gerry Dixon of
Queensland Department of Primary Industry who provided referrals to the UK participants.
Sincere appreciation goes to the advisory committee for providing expertise in developing the
questionnaire for the mail survey and in the selection of communities for case study. The committee
included Kevin Cooper and Graeme Eggleston (NSW DPI), Simon Bewg (Qld DPI), John Warre
(NSW Farmers), the late Tim Roseby and Peter Koob (Federal FMD Taskforce), Jamie Penrose,
(Animal Health Australia), and John Crosby (National Livestock Identification Scheme, and former
director of the Meat Industry Authority).
Our sincere thanks goes to Kevin Cooper and Lyn Stenos of New South Wales Department of Primary
Industry who gave of their time and expertise to assist with the four workshops. Thanks also to Bob
Lambell (Victorian DPI) who assisted in organising the Camperdown workshop. We are particularly
indebted to the people who took the time to attend the workshops in Casino, Roma, Armidale and
Camperdown and contributed to the discussions. Acknowledgement is provided to the following
organisations:

Armidale Dumaresq Shire Council

Richmond Tweed Shire Council
Roma/Bungil Shire Council
Corangamite Shire Council
New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian
Departments of Primary Industry
Rural Lands Protection Boards in Armidale
and Casino
New South Wales and Queensland Police
Service
New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian
Departments of Health
Community Health Departments in New
South Wales
Family Support in Queensland
New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian
Ambulance Services
New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian
Departments of Community Services
Country Womens Association

iv

New South Wales Farmers

Agforce Queensland
Local farmers in Camperdown
Salvation Army
Roma and Casino Saleyards
Casino Abattoirs
Rural Financial Counsellors in Camperdown
and Casino
Local Veterinarians in Casino, Roma,
Armidale and Camperdown
State Emergency Services in Casino, Roma,
Armidale and Camperdown
New South Wales Department of Education
Livestock Selling Agents in Roma
Local Tourism in Camperdown
New South Wales Environmental Protection
Agency
National Parks and Wildlife New South
Wales
New South Wales State and Rural Fire
Service

About the Author

Elaine Barclay is a Program Leader at the Institute for Rural Futures. Elaine has previously
conducted research in farm succession and inheritance as well as studies in information technology,
welfare services for farm families and crime in rural communities. Elaine has a degree in Social
Science, postgraduate qualifications in Psychology and a PhD in Rural Sociology. Prior to joining the
Institute in 1995, Elaine was a partner in a family farm operation in northern New South Wales.

Abbreviations
AFFA
ARIA
AQIS
AUSVETPLAN
CSM
DARD
DEFRA
DPIWE
EAD
EU
FMD
MLA
NFU
NLIS
OJD
UNE
VEIN
RAMS
RLPB
VFF

Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia
Australian Quarantine Inspection Service
Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan
Coal Seam Methane
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs
Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment
Emergency Animal Diseases
European Union
Foot-and-Mouth Disease
Meat Livestock Authority
National Farmers Union
National Livestock Identification Scheme
Ovine Johnes Disease
University of New England
Veterinary Education and Information Network
Restricted Area Management Security
Rural Lands Protection Board
Victorian Farmers Federation

vi

Contents
Foreword............................................................................................................................................................... iii
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................................ v
List of Figures..................................................................................................................................................... viii
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................................... viii
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................. ix
1: Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) ........................................................................................................... 1
1.3
FMD in Australia................................................................................................................................... 2
1.4
Objectives of the study .......................................................................................................................... 3
1.5
Structure of the report............................................................................................................................ 4
2: Background ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.1
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2
The impact of the FMD epidemic in the UK ......................................................................................... 5
2.3
The potential impact of an emergency animal disease outbreak on Australia ..................................... 11
2.4
Biosecurity in Australia ....................................................................................................................... 16
2.5
Factors affecting preparedness ............................................................................................................ 20
2.6
Conclusion and rationale for the present study.................................................................................... 22
3: STUDY 1: FMD in the UK revisited ............................................................................................................ 23
3.1
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 23
3.2
Method................................................................................................................................................. 23
3.3
The findings......................................................................................................................................... 23
3.4
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 27
4: STUDY 2: Biosecurity on Australian farms ................................................................................................. 29
4.1
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 29
4.2
Objectives ............................................................................................................................................ 29
4.3
Method................................................................................................................................................. 29
4.4
Results ................................................................................................................................................. 30
4.5
Summary and conclusions ................................................................................................................... 47
5: STUDY 3: Potential Social Impact of an EAD Outbreak Upon Small Communities in Australia.......... 51
5.1
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 51
5.2
Objectives ............................................................................................................................................ 51
5.3
Method................................................................................................................................................. 51
5.4
The immediate social impact of a FMD outbreak ............................................................................... 53
5.5
Armidale, New South Wales ............................................................................................................... 55
5.6
Casino, New South Wales ................................................................................................................... 58
5.7
Roma, Queensland............................................................................................................................... 61
5.8
Camperdown Victoria.......................................................................................................................... 64
5.9
Summary and conclusions ................................................................................................................... 67
6: STUDY 3: The Workshop Discussions ......................................................................................................... 69
6.1
Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 69
6.2
Objectives ............................................................................................................................................ 69
6.3
Method................................................................................................................................................. 69
6.4
The Armidale exercise......................................................................................................................... 72
6.5
Focus group discussions ...................................................................................................................... 73
6.6
Summary and discussion ..................................................................................................................... 89
7: Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 93
7.1
Summary and discussion ..................................................................................................................... 93
7.2
Implications of the findings ................................................................................................................. 95
7.3
Further research ................................................................................................................................... 96
7.5
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................... 96
7.6
Recommendations ............................................................................................................................... 97
References............................................................................................................................................................ 99

vii

List of Figures
Figure 2.1: FMD-free countries. Source: (OIE, 2002)..................................................................................... 16
Figure 2.2: Day 84: Exercise Minotaur: Simulated spread of disease (Koob 2004b)....................................... 18
Figure 2.3: Protect Australian Livestock Campaign (AHA, 2005)................................................................... 19
Figure 3.1: Launceston Show 2004. ................................................................................................................. 26
Figure 3.2: No-one stops to disinfect their footwear. ....................................................................................... 27
Figure 3.3: Few vehicles stop for disinfection.................................................................................................. 27
Figure 4.1 Livestock enterprises and mean herd sizes (n=1232). ..................................................................... 31
Figure 4.2: Sources of information (n=1232). .................................................................................................. 31
Figure 4.3: Primary source of information in the event of disease outbreak, by state. .................................... 32
Figure 4.4: Discussions held re biosecurity on-farm (n=1232)........................................................................ 33
Figure 4.5: Rate of checking stock across the sample. ..................................................................................... 34
Figure 4.6: Stock identification. ....................................................................................................................... 34
Figure 4.7: Biosecurity strategies on farms, by state. ...................................................................................... 35
Figure 4.8: Biosecurity, by livestock type. ....................................................................................................... 38
Figure 4.9: Factors preventing biosecurity practices. ....................................................................................... 38
Figure 4.10: Where producers would first report unusual symptoms in stock, by state. .................................. 39
Figure 4.11: How soon producers would contact vet by disease symptoms..................................................... 40
Figure 4.12: Perceptions of greatest risks of disease. ....................................................................................... 41
Figure 4.13: Typology of risk perception. ........................................................................................................ 42
Figure 4.14: Clusters of risk perception............................................................................................................ 44
Figure 4.15: Clusters by biosecurity strategies. ................................................................................................ 44
Figure 4.16: Perceptions of responsibility for biosecurity, by state.................................................................. 45
Figure 4.17: Attitudes towards NLIS as essential for biosecurity, by state. ..................................................... 46
Figure 4.18: Attitudes towards compensation, by state. ................................................................................... 47
Figure 5.1: Location of .................................................................................................................................... 52
case-study communities.................................................................................................................................... 52
Figure 5.2: Productivity Commissions (2002) estimated effect of a 12-month FMD outbreak on the value of
output over 10 years, by Statistical Division. .................................................................................................. 52
Figure 5.3: Armidale-Dumaresq Shire............................................................................................................. 55
Figure 5.4: Richmond Valley Shire. ................................................................................................................. 58
Figure 5.5: Roma and Bungil Shires................................................................................................................. 61
Figure 5.7: Corangamite Shire.......................................................................................................................... 64
Figure 6.1: The hypothetical site of a FMD outbreak in the Casino district..................................................... 71
Figure 6.2: Inspector Matt Lynch and David Steller, Local Emergency Management Committee at the
Armidale exercise. ............................................................................................................................................ 72
Figure 6.3: The general store/post office in a village near Roma. .................................................................... 86

List of Tables
Table 4.1: Biosecurity strategies for stock........................................................................................................ 36
Table 4.2: Biosecurity strategies for properties generally. ............................................................................... 37
Table 4.3: Attitudinal scale of risk perception.................................................................................................. 43
Table 6.1: The Hypothetical of a FMD outbreak in the Armidale district........................................................ 71

viii

Executive Summary
Introduction
For a nation like Australia, which exports around 80% of its total agricultural production, and where
the processed food industry is the largest employer in regional areas, the risk of a major outbreak of an
Emergency Animal Disease (EAD), such as Foot-and-Mouth, is a major concern. An outbreak of such
a disease would devastate Australias livestock industry, cause severe financial hardship, result in
considerable social disruption for whole communities and threaten the national economy. While there
are national strategy plans in place to quickly and effectively deal with an outbreak, there is some
uncertainty as to how communities will cope if a crisis occurs.

Objectives
The purpose of this research was to assess the level of preparedness at the individual farmer and small
community level for a possible emergency animal disease outbreak and identify those social factors
that facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans. The research
also assessed the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon small rural communities. The
research comprised three independent studies.

Research Outcomes
First, on a visit to Devon and Cornwall in July 2004, information was gathered on the social impact of
the 2001 Foot-and-Mouth epidemic three years on and on the current level of biosecurity on UK
farms. Interviews with farmers and support service personnel revealed that the most significant
consequences of the FMD outbreak was the poor communication between government and local
communities, the social isolation of farm families and the social divisions that occurred within some
communities. Community recovery was instigated through church and volunteer community groups
that emerged to provide a coordinated, comprehensive network of support for the farming community.
Despite the catastrophic consequences of the FMD outbreak, there was a level of complacency about
biosecurity amongst UK farmers. Most tended to believe that responsibility for biosecurity lay with
those government agencies responsible for quarantine measures and should another FMD outbreak
eventuate, there was little that farmers could do about it.
Second, a mail survey of 3000 Australian livestock producers across Queensland, New South Wales
and Victoria assessed their level of knowledge about emergency animal diseases. The study revealed a
high level of concern about the threat of disease outbreak amongst producers. Most sourced
information about emergency animal diseases from newspapers and radios. However, should an
outbreak occur, farmers would first seek advice from their local Department of Primary Industry,
RLPB officers or local vet; people they know and trust within their local community. Furthermore, if
producers found unusual symptoms in their stock they would first report it to their local vet. Few
would use the emergency disease hotline.
Few respondents were aware of biosecurity plans at the community level and only half of the sample
had instigated biosecurity precautions on their properties. Most strategies employed were basic farm
management practices such as isolating new stock for a short period of time to check for disease.
Property size, location and nature of the terrain appear to determine a farmers ability to implement
strategies. Feral pigs or goats were perceived to be a serious risk for disease particularly for producers
on large outback properties. Other perceived risks to properties included neighbours who import
animals or semen or who have a high turnover of stock, having a public road through a property or
being adjoined to a stock route or National Park, imported products or foodstuffs, deteriorating
quarantine regulations or monitoring of ports, international tourists, illegal immigrants and terrorism.
Australian farmers attitudes to biosecurity reflect those of their English counterparts; that the
responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity lies primarily with government. Specifically, if agencies
and those responsible are working efficiently, producers should not have to be concerned about

ix

disease entering Australia. Nevertheless, the study did reveal requests for more education regarding
biosecurity on farms to enable farmers to better protect their properties. The study found that farmers
who believed they would have some measure of control in the event of an outbreak were more likely
to have instigated biosecurity on their properties. Consequently, changing farmers perceptions about
their ability to control the safety of their property and livestock may be necessary for future
biosecurity extension policies.
Third, case studies of four rural communities evaluated biosecurity preparedness at the local
community level. Social impact analyses emphasised the diversity amongst small rural communities
in the nature and degree of likely social impact from an emergency disease outbreak. A communitys
experience and resilience to crisis will be dependent upon its unique geographic, economic, and social
profile, degree of social cohesion, effectiveness of community leadership and history of overcoming
crises. Understanding of these differences at the small community level will be important in planning
for recovery. The study did find that all four communities are likely to experience a similar lack of
alternative job opportunities for displaced workers from agricultural and associated industries with a
subsequent loss of people and skills from the community as workers opt to leave in search of work.
The focus groups conducted with residents of the four case-study communities assessed the potential
social impact of an EAD outbreak upon small rural communities. The study recommended that Local
Community Disaster Management Exercises should involve local farmers, owners of associated
agricultural industries, service providers and other relevant stakeholders to enhance awareness and
preparedness across all sectors of the community. Local Emergency Management Committees need to
work towards consistency in biosecurity preparedness across Local Government Areas.
Communication between government and local communities in the event of a disease outbreak was an
important consideration. Local communities should be contacted at first sign of a disease outbreak and
be provided with as much information as they require. Information must easy to access, reliable,
transparent, and consistent. Communities should be consulted by an Emergency Control Centre as to
how they would prefer to be informed in the event of a disease outbreak. A Media Plan attached to a
Community Disaster Management Plan would enable the effective flow of information between
government agencies and local communities and disseminate information that is locally relevant
through a variety of mediums but originating from a primary source. Emergency hotlines would be
more effective if they initiate calls to people to check on their welfare rather than wait for contact from
the public. There is a need to educate the public on the implications of not reporting cases of diseased
stock.
Communities need to explore options for community-based projects to sustain a displaced workforce
throughout the downturn in local agricultural industries to prevent the potential loss of people and
skills from the community. Community recovery preparedness will be enhanced if existing community
support networks remain available to provide support in the event of a disease outbreak.
Alternatively, self-help groups should be encouraged. Support networks for families of emergency
workers will also need to be established. However, recovery programs and policies will need to
account for the diversity in the experience and coping ability of individual communities for an EAD
outbreak.
The study concluded that there is a need to raise awareness across rural Australia about the potential
social impact of emergency animal diseases and encourage community leaders and various community
organisations to consider the issue and revise their disaster management and community recovery
plans to include EADs. Biosecurity awareness campaigns would be more effective if they
emphasised the social impacts of a disease outbreak, particularly the financial losses that individuals
could incur. The Industry Liaison Officer program should be encouraged for various groups (including
farmers) to encourage awareness and facilitate the flow of information between government and the
community.

1: Introduction
1.1

Introduction

Australias relative isolation from the rest of the world and strict quarantine measures have so far
protected our agricultural industries from a major Emergency Animal Disease (EAD) epidemic. There
are 87 types of emergency animal diseases that are of concern to Australia including foreign (exotic)
diseases that could escape our quarantine barriers, such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD); diseases
that emerge within Australia, such as equine morbilli virus; and those that occur within Australia that
present as a serious epidemic, such as Anthrax (AFFA 2005).
The disease of most concern is Foot-and-Mouth because an outbreak would have a devastating effect
on livestock exports and livestock products and consequently the national economy (AUSVETPLAN
2002). The threat is ever-present. FMD is endemic in many parts of the world and becoming more
prevalent in our region (Productivity Commission 2002). While there are national strategy plans in
place to quickly and effectively deal with an outbreak, there is some uncertainty as to how individuals
and communities will cope if a crisis occurs. The purpose of this research is to assess the level of
preparedness of small rural communities for a possible emergency disease outbreak and identify those
social factors that facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans.
This research consists of three studies. First, on a visit to Devon and Cornwall in July 2004, the
researcher conducted several interviews with farmers and support service personnel to gather
information on the social impact of the 2001 Foot-and-Mouth epidemic in the UK and gather an
understanding of the current level of biosecurity on UK farms. Second, a mail survey of 3000
Australian livestock producers assessed their level of knowledge about emergency animal diseases,
their access to information and support for a potential disease outbreak, their perceptions of risk of
such an outbreak, and whether or not they had instigated any biosecurity strategies on their properties.
Third, case studies of four rural communities evaluated biosecurity preparedness at the local
community level. Social impact analyses and focus groups with residents assessed the extent of the
social impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon the communities.
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the research procedure; the reasons why this
investigation was undertaken, and the methodological practices and theoretical interpretations
employed. It begins with an overview of the epidemiology of FMD, the disease used throughout the
study as an example of an emergency animal disease. FMD was chosen because it was assumed that
most Australians would be aware of this disease through media coverage of the outbreak that occurred
in the UK in 2001 and of the devastation that followed.

1.2

Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD)

Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly-contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals: cattle,

sheep, goats, pigs, deer, buffalo, alpacas and llamas. It is not a health risk to humans. The disease is
characterised by fever, loss of production, and fluid filled blisters or vesicles in the mouth, muzzle,
feet, teats and udders. The symptoms are most severe in cattle and pigs. In young animals, the virus
attacks the developing heart muscle, resulting in death without other clinical signs. FMD is rarely
fatal in adult animals but is debilitating, resulting in severe production losses (Animal Health Australia
2004; AUSVETPLAN 2002; Dixon 2002; House of Commons 2002).

FMD is spread rapidly by contact with infected animals through saliva, mucus, milk or faeces,
especially in cool damp climates where animals are penned. Animals can be infected by eating
contaminated feed (especially food refuse or swill). The disease can spread through the air and be
carried on wool, hair, grass or straw, footwear, clothing, veterinary or livestock equipment or vehicle
tyres. FMD can also be present in meat and meat products, dairy foods, soil, bones and untreated
hides as well as frozen, chilled and freeze-dried foods (Dixon 2002; QDPI 2002; Productivity
Commission 2002).
FMD includes seven serotypes and more than 60 strains (VEIN 2003). Immunity to one type does not
give immunity to another. An animal that recovers from FMD may still carry the virus for nearly a
year with no evidence of infection. Eradication of the disease requires slaughtering infected animals
and disinfecting or destroying infected materials (Forsyth and Bredahl 1992).
Currently, there are 55 countries in Africa, Russia, and parts of Europe, the Middle East, Asia and
South America that have the disease. The most serious outbreak in recent times occurred in Europe in
2001 (AFFA 2002c; Animal Health Australia 2003; AQIS 2003).

1.3

FMD in Australia

For a nation like Australia, which exports around 80% of its total agricultural production, and where
the processed food industry is the largest employer in regional areas, the risk of an FMD outbreak of
the magnitude experienced in the UK is of concern (AFFA 2002e). An outbreak of such a disease
would devastate Australias livestock industry, cause severe financial hardship, result in considerable
social disruption for whole communities and threaten the national economy. The livelihoods of many
people besides farmers and owners of infected stock would be affected. There would be repercussions
for the transport and retail industries, government agencies, consumers, and sporting and social events.
Other industries affected would include the racing industry, food processors, retailers, stock feed and
supply and tourism. Unemployment could rise, government services would be cut and the standard of
living would fall (QDPI 2002).
With several Asian countries in our vicinity experiencing or having experienced FMD outbreaks,
Australia cannot be complacent about such a threat (Jane 2002). Furthermore, there are increasing
concerns about agricultural terrorism. Such fears have been a reality in the United States since the
destruction of the World Trade Centre and subsequent attempts to target key political figures through
the spread of Anthrax spores. There are also concerns about the spread of the disease using crop
dusting planes (Donnermeyer 2003). Recent events in the world (i.e., the Bali bombing) unfortunately
indicate that Australia is also now vulnerable to acts of bio-terrorism. Anthrax and FMD are only two
of the diseases that could be deliberately introduced to this country as an act of terrorism to devastate
our agricultural industries.
The Australian Federal and State Governments are very well-prepared to quickly and effectively deal
with an outbreak through strict quarantine measures and national disease control strategies, namely the
Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN). Biosecurity strategies aim to minimise the
risk of disease entering the country or, if it does enter, ensure the outbreak is localised and does not
develop into an epidemic (House of Commons 2002). There have been discussions and reports on
preparedness, such as the economic and social impact study by the Productivity Commission, and
exercises such as Operation Minotaur, held in September 2002 to test state and federal responses to a
simulated outbreak of FMD. However, views expressed by those closely involved in the exercise
revealed some concerns that the exercise was not practical enough and that there was still a lack of
knowledge about how those in the field will know what to do if a crisis occurs. In addition, previous
research conducted by the author which examined the problem of farm crime in New South Wales
(Barclay et al. 2001) revealed that the persistence of livestock theft in Australia threatens livestock

disease control measures. It also became evident that many people (farmers, rural police) lack
sufficient knowledge and awareness of FMD to recognise the disease or know how to respond if an
outbreak occurred.
Basically there is a need for more on-farm surveillance. The most important people for identifying
and notifying an FMD outbreak will be livestock owners and others who work with livestock. They
will need to notify suspicious symptoms immediately to their local vet, and then instigate appropriate
biosecurity arrangements to contain the spread of the disease. The lesson learnt from the outbreak in
Britain in 2001 is that farmers and veterinarians must be able to recognise the problem when they first
see it and notify the authorities. By the time the disease had been confirmed in the UK, at least 57
farms had been infected (Roberts 2001).
The purpose of the present study is to raise awareness and preparedness about biosecurity amongst
producers and others within rural Australia, and provide important information on the social impact of
a disease outbreak on small communities to assist in the planning and management of state and
national responses to an emergency animal disease outbreak.

1.4

Objectives of the study

The primary objective of the present study is to develop a clearer picture of the level of awareness and
preparedness for emergency animal diseases at the individual farmer and small community level and
to make recommendations to better defend and respond to a potential crisis. The second objective is
to assess the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon rural communities. Third, the study is
designed to address some of the concerns about lack of knowledge and surveillance on farms by
conducting an education/extension exercise to educate and raise awareness while surveying farmers to
assess their levels of knowledge and preparedness. A further goal of this study is to investigate how
individuals perceive the possible risk of an emergency animal disease epidemic when the occurrence
is probable but the timing is unknown. Through mail surveys, focus groups and interviews, the study
will seek to identify those social impediments that may facilitate or inhibit the recognition, reporting
and response to an EAD outbreak. The aim is to seek a deeper level of understanding of community
preparedness, to assist policy makers and the various agencies responsible for biosecurity in Australia.
The specific objectives of the study are to:

Review the literature on the social and community effects of previous EAD outbreaks.

Liaise with EAD experts in the UK to place the Australian situation into an international
context.

Review the information on EADs available to the general public and identify the various
dissemination pathways.

Conduct a mail survey of 3000 livestock producers across Queensland, NSW and Victoria (the
States most vulnerable to a FMD outbreak) to assess their level of knowledge about EADs,
their access to information and support regarding biosecurity, their perception of risk for a
disease outbreak, and whether or not they have instigated any degree of biosecurity on their
properties.

Conduct focus groups within four small diverse rural communities across three states with
local livestock owners as well as various practitioners in first responder agencies (police, state
emergency services, veterinarians, livestock officers and other representatives of the
agricultural industries, as well as local community leaders) to facilitate discussion and
reinforce existing State and Federal biosecurity programs and projects which are applicable to
the local community.

Identify those social factors that may facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance
of disease control plans in rural communities.

Conduct a social impact study within each of the sample communities on the potential effects
of a hypothetical Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak.

1.5

Structure of the report

In Chapter 2, the literature both here and abroad relating to the social impact of emergency animal
disease outbreaks is reviewed and the implications for Australias preparedness for a possible
emergency animal disease outbreak are discussed. In Chapter 3, the findings of the first stage of the
research are presented. Interviews conducted with farmers, members of farming organisations and
support services in Devon and Cornwall are summarised and discussed. In Chapter 4, the results of
the second study: a mail survey of 3000 farmers across the eastern States of Australia, are outlined.
Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings of the third study, which was comprised of case studies of four
communities that involved a social impact analysis of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon each
community and focus group discussions conducted with residents. In Chapter 7, the findings of the
three studies are summarised and the implications for biosecurity at the small community level are
discussed.

2: Background
2.1

Introduction

This chapter presents a review of the Australian and international literature on the social impact of an
emergency animal disease outbreak which was conducted using the World Wide Web, the University
of New Englands Library and various electronic databases including ProQuest 5000, Wiley
Interscience, Expanded Academic, Sociological Abstracts, AGRICOLA (Rural Sciences), APAIS
(Australian Public Affairs), CAB Abstracts (Rural Sciences), Expanded Academic ASAP, and
Experimental Agriculture. Possible sources of unpublished material were sought through direct
contact with farmer organisations, and agricultural extension services or government departments of
agriculture. The review includes a discussion on the social impact of the 2001 FMD outbreak in the
United Kingdom as well as two crises in animal health that have occurred in Australia, namely the
outbreak of Newcastle disease at Mangrove Mountain in 1999 and Ovine Johnes Disease in southeast
Australia in 1990. The implications drawn from these events for Australias preparedness for an
emergency disease outbreak are outlined. Finally, this chapter considers factors that may facilitate or
impede the biosecurity preparedness of small rural communities.

2.2

The impact of the FMD epidemic in the UK

The FMD outbreak in Britain began in February 2001 after swill containing illegally imported,
contaminated materials was fed to pigs on a farm in Northumberland (Elliot 2002c; Oates 2003). By
the time the disease had been confirmed, at least 57 farms had been infected. Critically, the case was
not diagnosed until pigs had been sent for slaughter at an abattoir in Essex. By then, the virus is
believed to have been spread by air, to seven other farms in Tyne and Wear, and then to Hexham
market and Longton market in Cumbria. Extensive animal movements ensured that the virus was then
dispersed widely across the UK and then to France, Ireland and the Netherlands before a total ban on
livestock movements was imposed. The disease was particularly concentrated in the districts of
Cumbria, North Devon and Northumberland (Roberts 2001; European Information Service 2002).
The epidemic lasted for 32 weeks. Around 10,000 personnel including vets, field staff, soldiers,
support staff and contractors were engaged in controlling and eradicating the disease (Dixon 2002).
The cost to Britain (February to September 2001) involved:

expenditure in excess of 2.7 billion ($7.4 billion) for the slaughter and disposal of stock,
disinfection of farms, welfare slaughter scheme and compensation to farmers

the slaughter of more than four million head of livestock on 10 000 farms, with an additional
two million slaughtered under the Livestock Welfare Disposal Scheme

estimated losses of approximately 5.1 billion ($14 billion) to rural businesses (NSW
Agriculture 2002).
Furthermore, virtually every farmer in the UK was affected by the impacts of the disease through
restrictions on movements, increased costs and impacts on domestic market prices (Roberts 2001).
The outbreak highlighted the interdependencies within rural economies particularly the conflicts
between the needs of those associated with the farm sector and other rural sectors, residents, and
tourists to the regions. Downstream from the farm gate, there were losses of income and employment
associated with the closure of markets, abattoirs and the haulage industry (Roberts 2001). The effect
on farms and these other businesses had a flow-on affect for plumbers, painters and decorators, car
and machinery suppliers, livestock carriers, laundry services and food wholesalers.

Many non-farming businesses were adversely affected in areas such as tourism (hotels, restaurants,
stately homes and other visitor attractions) and recreational activities (fishing, riding stables, outdoor
equipment and saddlers). To halt the spread of the disease, the public were asked to keep away from
the countryside and to be wary of holding social events or opening visitor attractions if there was any
risk of contact with livestock. Local councils closed all footpaths in their area. Most visitor
attractions, car parks, lay-bys and picnic sites were also closed to discourage visitors (Oates 2003).
Rural pursuits such as walking, climbing, riding, recreational angling, and shooting were immediately
curtailed, many rural visitor attractions closed, and agricultural and sporting events cancelled (DEFRA
2001; Roberts 2001; Oates 2003). Caz Graham (2001:1) writes of the FMD outbreak in the UK:
Despite all the technical advances of the 21st century [sic] in a matter of months, a microscopic
organism wreaked untold havoc on the lives of thousands of people in the developed world. Its
humbling, a reminder of our human fallibility.

2.2.1 Social impact

The social impact of the FMD outbreak upon farm families and their communities as well as those
working in control programs and support services was significant and the consequences were farreaching and enduring (Dixon 2002). Lindsay and Miles (2000) define social impacts as having to do
with peoples feelings, which can be overwhelming and often unacknowledged. Such feelings have
been described as: uncertainty, stress, anger, a sense of loss of personal control over life, and despair.
These feelings impact on the way individuals behave and the way communities thrive or decline.
Lindsay and Miles (2000) note it can be difficult to separate the emotional impacts of the disease itself
from the impact of actions taken to control the disease such as the slaughter and disposal of livestock
and the movement restrictions placed upon people and livestock. It can also be difficult to separate
social from economic issues.
Most of the major reports on the economic impact of FMD in the UK have included some
observations on the social effects of the outbreak, often distinguishing between effects on individuals
and families and on rural communities as a whole (Bennett et al. 2001; Countryside Agency 2001;
Haskins 2001; Rural Task Force, 2001; CFMI 2002; House of Commons 2002; National Farmers
Union 2002; National Audit Office 2002; Royal Society Edinburgh 2002; Impact Assessment Group
2003; Mercer 2002).

2.2.2 Impact on farm families

The impact of FMD upon farm families was financial and also psychological, as they witnessed
animals being culled and transported away, or buried or burnt. Farms and businesses suffered and
their way of life were significantly altered (Graham 2002). There were several factors that caused
stress for farm families. These included:

bereavement over the loss of their stock (in some cases bloodlines which had been established
over many generations)

the sacrifice of healthy herds in the contiguous culling operations surrounding outbreak areas

distress at the sight of slaughtered animals, and the insensitivity of some officials in the
slaughtering process

delays of up to two weeks to remove the slaughtered animals from farms

being the first in an area to contract the disease which meant neighbours within a threekilometre radius would also have their animals culled

concern over animal welfare (associated with lack of feed and poor conditions in the fields at
a time coinciding with the lambing season)

the inability to access accurate and reliable information on disease locations and control
measures
the loss of control over their lives and, in the case of farms experiencing a cull, a feeling of
redundancy
restrictions on livestock movements
isolation arising from both the legislative restrictions on movements and self-imposed
restrictions on movements through fear of spreading the disease. Families became confined to
their farms even before this was enforced by the FMD restrictions. Visits to family, friends or
social venues were curtailed
some children were moved from their homes for a time to allow them to continue to go to
school. While this caused short-term distress, it may have been judged by parents to be less
severe than remaining on the farm and observing the slaughter and disposal of animals.
Others were kept at home, which led to feelings of isolation. Some children from infected
properties suffered abuse at school
constraints were placed on normal life
off-farm businesses were closed or kept in operation by the away posting of one member of
the family
falls in both farm and off farm income caused financial pressures; including short-term
financial concerns (associated with both the need to purchase stock feed and the inability to
access benefits) as well as the long-term financial worries (Bennett et al. 2001; Countryside
Agency 2001; Deaville and Jones 2001; CFMI 2002:76; Dixon 2002; Impact Assessment
Group 2003).

One farmer (Frost-Pennington, in Graham 2001:9) wrote of his experience:

It was not only the blood, the tears, the mud, the acrid plumes of smoke or the
stench of rotting carcasses. It was also the silence. The imprisonment. The lack
of information. The frustration and hopelessness. The fear. The waiting.

Another farmer whose stock was slaughtered had to wait eleven days before the carcasses were
removed. She wrote:
The most horrific thing is the terrible silence. You used to hear cows clanking
and the sheep calling. Now there is silence with the wind moaning round the
house. I find myself doing odd things. Baking, cleaning, restless, unsettled. The
bodies of the cattle lie sprawled in the yard, bloated, hEADs out-stretched, and
tongues hanging out, undignified. The stench is quite horrendous. Its always a
horrible experience seeing an animal down but to see a whole herd like that is
just indescribable.
(Graham 2001:77)

The isolation of families had a devastating effect:

Babies were born and could not be shared with families, people died and could
not be laid to rest in their own burial ground, children were separated from
parents or from education. Employment off-farm was sacrificed in the interests of
biosecurity and concern for neighbours.
(Graham 2001:193)

Requests for assistance to support agencies increased dramatically (Countryside Agency 2001; Church
of Scotland 2002). Calls to the Rural Stress Info Network increased from 200 to 2000 calls per month
(Cooper 2004). Many of the calls to help lines concerned situations where the epidemic overwhelmed
the callers ability to cope with existing family crises and economic loss (Graham 2001:193).

Haskins (2001) found the restriction on livestock movements created major problems for those
livestock properties in affected areas that did not lose stock. Unable to sell their stock, or move them
for sale or to other grassland, this group experienced greater difficulty than those who were culled out.
Farms soon became overstocked which depleted pastures and fodder reserves. Without income, these
farmers were unable to purchase feed, and animals were slaughtered for welfare reasons (Dixon 2002).
A survey of 150 livestock producers in Britain conducted by the National Farmers Union found 6%
affected by the FMD crisis reported they would leave farming. Almost half of those surveyed did not
believe compensation had been adequate. Forty per cent of livestock producers would not return to
their traditional farming practices but would come back to farming in a different way, producing a
commodity other than livestock; for example, forestry (NFU 2002).

2.2.3 Impact on other businesses

The strong message that people should stay off farmland combined with the restrictions placed on
access, affected tourism, outdoors leisure businesses and the outdoor amenity of local communities.
The tourist industry was brought to a halt. Individual small businesses, which were caught up in the
crisis, suffered distress and personal hardship. These groups included many self-employed or parttime workers, casual or seasonal workers, as well as businesses in non-farming sectors (CFMI
2002:65). The economic inter-linkages within an integrated rural economy had not been sufficiently
recognised by policy makers (Roberts 2001; CFMI 2002:70). Hutcheson (cited in Feedstuffs Editorial
2002) also noted that the British Governments decision to close the countryside was based on the
misnomer of a separate rural economy isolated from the rest of the economy and failed to
acknowledge how businesses other than agriculture also rely on high quality countryside.
A study of the impact of the FMD epidemic in Exmoor (Sheppard and Turner 2001) also highlighted
the close interdependence of the business economies of rural areas. Many businesses had interests
spanning two or more economic sectors. Furthermore, many households were dependent upon several
linked economic sectors. The survey of residents found 92% of farms, 90% of accommodation and
80% of retail businesses were negatively affected. Farms suffered from loss or delay in sales of their
products, reduced commodity prices and from additional costs. Accommodation sectors lost income
from the cancellation of bookings and the loss of passing trade. The retail sector also suffered from
the loss of passing trade. Twenty-three per cent of respondents and 42% of their families reported
experiencing worry, stress, depression, uncertainty, anger, fear and frustration. Twenty-eight per cent
felt isolated through the restrictions placed on movements, 21% lamented the loss of social contact
and community interaction while 16% resented their inability to walk, cycle or ride.
Studies of the impact of FMD upon other businesses in rural areas (Countryside Agency 2001;
Deaville and Jones 2001) reveal that the effects were largely stress-related impacts associated with the
financial problems and uncertainly caused by the outbreak. Like the farmers, owners of non-farm
businesses and other local inhabitants in affected areas experienced a lack of control over their
livelihoods. However, unlike those farmers directly impacted by the FMD outbreak, no financial
compensation was available (Impact Assessment Group 2003). Several reports concluded that the
main lesson learned from the FMD crisis was a new public awareness of the complexities and
interconnectedness of rural economies (Roberts 2001; Donaldson et al. 2002; Impact Assessment
Group 2003).

2.2.4 Impact on communities

The slaughter and disposal of animals on pyres and in mass burial sites close to settlements disturbed
the country environment and the lives of residents (CFMI 2002:57). Pyres burning slowly gave off an
acrid smoke containing particulate matter, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide as well as other products
of combustion (CFMI 2002:75). Together these events caused high levels of distress for many of the

population and there have been concerns about the short- and long-term consequences for health.
Furthermore, world wide media coverage of burning carcasses became distressing for the wider
community and did nothing to encourage tourists to visit Britain (CFMI 2002; Dixon 2002).
Rural communities were affected by the quarantine controls that restricted movements and prevented
normal community functions and interactions. Their economies were threatened as businesses
struggled with the fall in trade and visitors failed to appear. Loss of employment and income
increased family stress and problems that impacted upon communities (Dixon 2002).
Village organisations, societies and clubs went into abeyance. Sports and arts events were cancelled.
Although these activities were quickly restarted in uninfected areas, many farming families continued
to stay away from such events. Local Authorities, Health Boards and other community agencies also
found the FMD control restrictions posed difficulties to the delivery of services. Grass cutting,
rubbish collections, pathway maintenance, meals on wheels, funerals, welfare services and the like
faced problems wherever they involved services to farms or access across farmland (Bennet et al.
2001; Countryside Agency 2001; CFMI 2002:77).
Shucksmith et al. (1996) notes that the curtailment of social and community activities impacted mostly
on those considered vulnerable in rural areas; that is, the elderly, women with young children and
youths. There was concern that the outbreak would have a long-term effect on the viability of
community groups and resources. However, the studies found the outbreak actually helped to validate
the important role played by social and community groups in rural areas (National Council for
Voluntary Organisations 2002). In England and Wales, new community groups formed in response to
the crisis (Countryside Agency 2001; Impact Assessment Group 2003). In one community in
Yorkshire, up to 160 people attended regular meetings of the cull club held at the local pub to allow
farm families to discuss the issues, receive information and support, and mingle socially (Dixon 2002).
However, the extent of the impact of the FMD outbreak varied greatly between communities. Some
remained close-knit and very supportive of local farmers, while in others, the outbreak created
tensions both within the farming community and between farmers and other businesses affected.
Some communities sustained a general feeling of sympathy about the plight of the agricultural
community, while in others there were conflicts between tourism and other industries (The Impact
Assessment Group 2003).
There were also tensions between farmers pertaining to financial aspects, in particular differing
opinions on livestock valuations and the details of compensation rules. In other cases, tensions arose
between farmers in their perceptions of how the disease was being spread and certain farm
management practices. However, the Impact Assessment Group (2003) suggests that such tensions
were insignificant compared to the way in which the farming community united to overcome the
problems they faced. As Frost-Pennington (in Graham 2001:10) notes:
The biggest tragedy is the way the disease has torn communities apart.
Neighbour has been set against neighbour. Normal activities have been erased
from the calendar. Rumour, like the virus itself, spread like wildfire. Everyone
wants someone else to blame. Yet, I have been amazed by the fortitude, courage,
friendliness, kindness and strength of spirit in this most resilient group of people
farmers.

2.2.5 Impact on emergency service personnel

Those employed to implement the control policies were also adversely affected by the outbreak.
Workers directly involved in the cull, were not all used to slaughtering animals and dealing with
distraught people (Countryside Agency 2001). As the virus is shed in large quantities before infected
animals show any signs of disease, many of the animals, which appeared perfectly healthy, had to be

slaughtered (Graham 2001:9). Furthermore, workers were subject to extremely long hours and
difficult working conditions. The manager of one of the largest livestock auction sales group in
Europe who made a team of auctioneers available for the valuation of animals prior to slaughter
stated:
These were the most harrowing of times for our farming customers whom we
knew so well and whose lives were in turmoilOur auctioneers would arrive at
an infected farm at 6.00 am and depending on the numbers and complexity of the
livestock may visit another four farms in that day in an attempt to keep ahead of
the slaughter men. Biosecurity arrangements were an additional pressure with
many of our auctioneers having their own livestock and were unable to return
home in some cases for up to nine weeks at a time.

(Graham 2001:75)
The response teams were most at risk from subsequently developing health problems from the stress
incurred as a result of the long hours worked and/or in the nature of the eradication procedures. Those
operating help lines found their task very stressful. No training was available to assist the workers
respond to angry, emotional and suicidal people. As a result, they felt inadequate and unable to help
and were consequently powerless to protect themselves emotionally. Debriefing was described as
inadequate and not offered soon enough (Dixon 2002). As a consequence, emergency response
agencies have called for a corporate stress strategy so that, in the future, managers will be better
placed to deal with both their own personal stress and that of their staff (Scottish Executive 2003).
Farmers and industry were critical of the Governments handling of the eradication and control of the
outbreak. The Government experienced difficulty in effectively communicating and disseminating
accurate and reliable information to the public. Consequently, farmers took their anger and frustration
out on local government staff who were unable to assist (Dixon 2002).
One of the 20 Australian veterinarians who went to the UK to assist with the FMD outbreak found that
while his training and experience well-equipped him to deal with the task including the mass slaughter
of stock, the human cost was emotionally disturbing. He concluded that although Australia is training
to cope with such an outbreak, he did not believe any amount of training would really prepare
individuals for an epidemic on the scale of the one that Britain experienced (Daley 2001).

2.2.6 Psychological impact

The Institute of Health Research at Lancaster University is currently conducting a study into health
problems amongst farmers and farm workers, small business operators, government workers and
disease control personnel, members of the community and health professionals.
Results after the first year of this project found that amongst the core study group of 54 people:

11.1% have been clinically treated for depression or anxiety

7.4% have a family member who has been treated for depression or anxiety

20.3% are reporting signs of post-traumatic experience

44.4% report feelings of anxiety or stress that are not being dealt with

29.6% are reporting on-going health, financial or social problems that they relate directly to
the FMD crisis (CFMI 2002:79).
In a study comparing the psychological impact of the FMD outbreak upon farmers in a badly infected
area (Cumbria) and an uninfected area (Scottish Highlands), Peck et al. (2002), found farmers in
Cumbria recorded higher levels of psychological morbidity than farmers in the Highlands. The
findings are consistent with the argument that FMD increased levels of morbidity over and above
levels in the general farming community. More interestingly, only moderate differences were found in

10

the morbidity levels of farmers who had actually had their animals slaughtered and those who had not.
The authors attributed this finding to the fact that the latter, despite experiencing financial hardships,
did not receive compensation. It could also be associated with the longer duration of uncertainly faced
by uninfected farmers.
Some studies note the effects on children caused by the slaughter of stock, in some cases family pets,
and seeing parents and relatives in distress (Countryside Agency 2001). Deaville and Jones (2001) in
a telephone survey of organisations supporting individuals found that while farm women and their
children used health services to discuss issues arising from the FMD outbreak, men generally did not.
However, one study found that seven out of ten farmers wives had severe anxiety about their
husbands state of mind during the outbreak.
Emergency service personnel, help-line and other support service staff were subject to psychological
stress due to the long working hours and stressful situations they faced. Some involved in the
slaughter and disposal of animals were vulnerable to post-traumatic stress disorder (Dixon 2002).
Amongst emergency service personnel, these symptoms are described as Critical Incident Stress
(Duckworth 1986). Mitchell (1983) defines Critical Incident Stress as any situation faced by
emergency service personnel that causes them to experience unusually strong emotional reactions that
have the potential to interfere with their ability to function either at the scene or later. Zinsstag and
Weiss (2001) maintain that the FMD epidemic in the UK demonstrated a need for an overarching
social approach to livestock production and disease control.

2.3

The potential impact of an emergency animal disease

outbreak on Australia

Should there be a FMD outbreak of this magnitude in Australia, the economic and social impacts of
the outbreak could be similar to that experienced in the UK. However, there would also be some
major differences. For example, the greater value to Australia of livestock exportsalmost $10
billion in 2000-2001, or 6% of total exportsmeans that the trade effects of an outbreak would be far
greater in Australia than was the case in Britain (Plunkett and Wilson 2002; Productivity Commission
2002). The single greatest consequence of a FMD outbreak in Australia would be exclusion from
premium meat markets from FMD-free countries such as Japan and the United States. Australias
tourist industry is not linked to agriculture to the same extent as the UK and most tourist attractions
would not be directly affected by an outbreak. Tourism in areas surrounding an outbreak would most
likely be transferred to other regions (Productivity Commission 2002). However, Tasmania is one
State that could be disadvantaged through the loss of tourism (DPIWE 2004).
The Productivity Commission report found that a major FMD outbreak involving the closure of key
lamb and beef markets for 15 months would cost the nation up to $13 billion of gross domestic
product with consequences lasting for ten years beyond the outbreak. Even a small isolated outbreak
would potentially cost up to $3 billion of GDP (Plunkett and Wilson 2002; Productivity Commission
2002). An economic modelling study of the impact of three emergency diseases: FMD, classical
Swine Fever and Sheep Pox in three regional areas in Australia, found FMD caused greater economic
losses than the other diseases and was the most expensive to control (Garner and Lack 1995).
The nationally agreed strategies to control an emergency disease outbreak are set out in the Australian
Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN) and involves:

establishing a quarantine area around all known infections

slaughtering all infected herds and other herds that have been in dangerous contact with them

disposing of animals
disinfecting properties, and

11

compensating stockowners for the livestock slaughtered as part of the stamping-out activity.
Significant government and industry resources would be required to eradicate FMD. The Productivity
Commission estimated that that it would cost about $8 million per day in control and eradication costs,
the loss of up to 25,000 jobs and up to $70,000 of lost income to each producer. Control and
compensation costs could range from around $30 million for a small outbreak over three months to
$450 million for a year-long outbreak. Compensation to producers for livestock slaughtered to control
the disease could cost between $4 million for a small outbreak scenario up to around $40 million for a
large outbreak (Plunket and Wilson 2002; Productivity Commission 2002). Compensation will only
be available for livestock slaughtered for the purpose of eradication or prevention of the spread of the
disease. It will not cover loss of income or losses arising from the outbreak, such as movement
restrictions preventing stock being transported to markets (Australian Farm Journal 2003).

The Productivity Commission notes that many social impacts would flow from the pervasive effects
associated with the loss of export market revenue, while others would result directly from the
measures undertaken to control the spread of FMD within Australia and its elimination. The impact of
the control measures would vary according to the proximity to the outbreak.

In the restricted areas: Areas containing properties with known infections, or properties that
had contact with them either directly or indirectly through transfer of personnel, animals etc,
and properties within a buffer zone around infected properties, would be directly affected by
strict quarantine restrictions. These restrictions would remain until all susceptible animals and
animal products were destroyed, infected properties decontaminated and there was no longer
any evidence of the disease. The control measures are likely to have an impact on the people
on these properties and on those involved in applying the quarantine measures.

In the control areas: People would be affected by controls over the movement of susceptible
livestock and by epidemiological surveillance undertaken to confirm the disease-free status of
livestock. Until the restricted areas are more accurately delineated, there could be a
significant number of people initially affected. The movement controls would mainly affect
livestock producers and others involved in the transport of livestock and livestock products,
but all travel into and out of the area would be affected.

The balance of Australia: While most people in the remainder of Australia would be largely
unaffected by FMD control measures, those involved in the livestock industries would be
directly affected by the trade effects of the disease. Some in the related upstream input supply
and downstream processing industries would also be affected. The loss of export markets,
which would follow an FMD outbreak, would sharply lower livestock prices that would have
ramifications for livestock industries in all regions of Australia (Productivity Commission
2002, p. 118).
While Australia has not had the direct experience of a significant FMD epidemic, there have been
other episodes of emergency animal diseases that can be drawn upon to gather some understanding of
the social impact of a possible EAD outbreak occurring in the future. These include the outbreak of
Newcastle Disease, which occurred in Mangrove Mountain in New South Wales in April 1999 and the
Ovine Johnes Disease (OJD), which occurred in Victoria in 1995.

2.3.1 Newcastle Disease, Mangrove Mountain

The Newcastle Disease outbreak occurred in April 1999 in the Mangrove Mountain district on the
central coast of New South Wales. Newcastle Disease is a highly-contagious viral disease, which
causes nervous symptoms including respiratory distress in domestic poultry, caged and wild birds.
The disease sprEADs rapidly from direct contact and can also be spread through infected material in
garbage that is fed to poultry (NSW Department of Community Services 2000).
The Mangrove Mountain outbreak arose from a mutation of a local endemic virus rather than a virus
that was introduced from overseas. Once the disease was confirmed, national and state emergency

12

animal disease response plans were implemented to manage the eradication program. All birds were
destroyed on the initial infected property by 4 April, and the property decontaminated by 14 April.
Between 12 April and 15 May, eight more commercial farms within a 5 km radius of the initial farm
had become infected. A restricted quarantined area was established which was surrounded by a
control area to provide a barrier to the disease. All poultry in the restricted area were exterminated
and the properties disinfected to eradicate the virus and prevent the spread of the disease to
neighbouring districts. Restrictions were placed upon the movement of meat chickens and all other
birds out of the restricted area, which were enforced by 24-hour roadblocks on all access roads. Some
restrictions were also imposed upon farms within the control area. Of the 75 commercial poultry
businesses with a commercial flock of 5 million birds in the region, thirty farms were affected
resulting in the destruction of 1.9 million meat chickens, 13 000 laying hens, 5000 ducks, 3000 meat
pigeons, 60 000 pullets, 17 ostriches and over 2000 domestic birds. Pet birds in the restricted area
were also destroyed. Wild birds including sparrows and starlings were eradicated on commercial
farms. There were 103 freight containers of dead birds transported from infected properties and buried
in two sites. Birds on uninfected properties were burned in pits using over 120 000 railway sleepers as
fuel. During July, all properties were cleaned and disinfected and the response operation ceased.
Restocking of properties also commenced, with vaccination of restocked birds to suppress any residual
infection.
This was the largest disease eradication process ever undertaken in Australia. The total cost of the
outbreak, including the compensation paid to the owners on the basis of the value of destroyed stock,
was $26.4 million. The estimated cost to the poultry industry of the outbreak was $200 million (NSW
Department of Community Services 2000).
The Mangrove Mountain Community Recovery Committee was established to ensure a coordinated
and planned approach to service provision and facilitate community recovery. Up to $8.5 million in
compensation was paid to farmers for the loss of stock and damage to sheds, equipment or property
resulting from the destruction of disinfection process. However, no compensation was paid for loss of
income. Farmers were eligible for support under the Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment
through Centrelink and offered low-interest loans under the Rural Assistance Authority. Other
services provided included counselling through the local neighbourhood centre, a free-call information
hotline, an emergency welfare centre, and lobbying of the banks to be sympathetic to the growers
plight. A weekly newsletter providing information on developments was also distributed to farmers
and residents within the restricted and control areas at roadblocks, shops and individual letterboxes
(NSW Department of Community Services 2000).
Social impact
The NSW Department of Community Services conducted a survey of 1703 people who lived in the
Mangrove Mountain region during the outbreak of the disease to assess the long-term impacts and the
social, environmental and economical effects upon the community. The response rate was low,
producing a sample of 184 residents. Of these, 60% of the chicken farmers and 1.9% of non-chicken
farmers reported they had been unable to work for at least one month and some up to eight months.
Income ceased for three to eight months for all of the chicken farmers and 6% of the non-chicken
farmers. Chicken farmers reported their savings were depleted; some had their debt levels increase
while others sought additional loans. Non-chicken farmers reported they were unable to sell cattle,
deliveries took longer and staff were therefore absent for long periods of time. Eggs and chicken
manure had to be imported in from outside the control zone, there was less work in the area, and
property sales plummeted (NSW Department of Community Services 2000).
Most of the chicken farmers (88%) reported the outbreak had significantly affected their lives. They
experienced worry, fear and stress, isolation from the community and inconvenience. Twelve per cent
of the non-chicken farmers reported the outbreak affected their lives a lot, while the majority were
affected very little. The inconvenience of roadblocks impacted upon their daily commitments, the
smell from the eradication and disinfection process caused nausea, and many people were concerned

13

about wildlife in the area. Residents reported fear, isolation, community emotions and stigma as well
as changes in their diet. The most common symptom of stress reported by 21% of respondents was
tension followed by strong memories (19%). When asked what was the greatest impact upon the
communities, respondents identified the economic impact resulting from the loss of cash flow within
the district and secondly, the split that arose within the community resulting from the benefits that
were afforded to the chicken farmers that normal farmers could not access. Farmers noted feelings of
powerlessness with the loss of control over their farm and their lives. The majority (69%) reported that
it would take up to two years to recover from the outbreak. Most (70%) reported that they had family
or friends to support them in the recovery process. However, 30% reported that they had no such
support (NSW Department of Community Services 2000).
The Seventh Day Adventist Church was the most frequently used service provider during the
outbreak, followed by St Vincent de Paul, the Salvation Army and the local Council. As Stayner and
Barclay (2002) found in their examination of service provision for farmers during the 1996 drought,
these local, familiar and trusted agencies within rural communities are preferred over Government
agencies for accessing support. Yet, Mangrove Mountain residents found it difficult to accept offers
of assistance but noted they would not have survived without such support (NSW Department of
Community Services 2000).
The counselling service offered by the Area Health Service was the least accessed service despite a
large advertising campaign. Stayner and Barclay (2002) also found these services were poorly utilised
by drought affected farmers as most considered their problems to be economic or physically health
related rather than mental health related. Also, the confines of small rural communities precluded
residents from openly approaching mental health services.
The report concluded that all disasters may have a common thread but the unique nature of any
disaster coupled with the individual needs or underlying issues that arise as the disaster unfolds within
differing communities makes the recovery process very specialised to that community. It was also
evident that during the epidemic, attention was focused upon technical information and the need to
control further outbreaks so that the recovery process for the community and its residents was put
aside (NSW Department of Community Services 2000).

2.3.2 Ovine Johnes Disease (OJD), Victoria

Ovine Johnes Disease is an incurable, slow developing wasting disease of sheep, which is ultimately
fatal. Infected animals are unable to absorb nutrients because their intestines become thickened and
inflamed. Death usually occurs six to twelve weeks after they start to show signs of severe wasting.
The disease is insidious as symptoms may not appear for months or several years after animals
become infected. The disease is spread primarily through the movement of infected stock or the runoff of infected water. Lambs at foot may also become infected from their mothers milk, or possibly
in utero. OJD is present in virtually all Temperate sheep producing countries in the world including
New Zealand, the USA, Spain, South Africa and Iceland. It is suspected that OJD was introduced to
Australia by infected sheep imported from New Zealand and was confined to the Central Tablelands
of NSW for more than ten years. However, the number of properties and districts reporting the
disease has now increased (Lindsay and Miles 2000).
An outbreak of OJD occurred in Victoria in 1995 and resulted in the immediate quarantine of infected
properties and the eradication program of infected sheep and goats. Producers were paid the slaughter
value of the animals plus compensation according to the number and types of animals slaughtered.
However, by the end of 1999, the level and spread of the disease had become greater than first
anticipated. Costs of the control program escalated and farmers who had been affected directly by the
control program experienced considerable distress (Lindsay and Miles 2000).

14

Social impact
In a review of the impact of this event upon the Victorian community (Lindsay and Miles 2000),
farmers described a sense of losing control and of being unable to make proper provision for their
families, of being regarded as a poor neighbour or a failure at the enterprise to which they had
committed their lives. As well as farmers, the emotional strain and overwork experienced by
government staff required to implement the control program were reported.
Residents reported the whole community was stigmatised once OJD was identified within it. There
were reports of animosity developing between neighbours where some have de-stocked and others had
chosen quarantine. Uncertainty that the eradication program would prove effective added to the direct
impacts of de-stocking. At the same time, many rural communities showed considerable resilience in
the face of challenging circumstances (Lindsay and Miles 2000).
Farmers described the information about OJD as being either poor or absent. They claimed that destocking orders were presented in threatening terms and often issued with insufficient time for farmers
to prepare themselves (for example, shear sheep before they were sent for slaughter). Many farmers
appear to have thought that de-stocking was compulsory, at least in the first year or two. There was
confusion and a lack of communication on this issue. Quarantine was described as an unattractive and
hazardous option. Some producers stated that the threat of financial liability, should the OJD spread
from their property, appeared to place farmers with infected stock in an unviable position (Lindsay
and Miles 2000).

2.3.3 Implications for Australian preparedness

The incidents in Australia, although not of the magnitude of the FMD outbreak in the UK, highlight
some similarities in the types of stressors that emerged. These include:

farmers sense of loss of control over their property and lives

the isolation

farmers loss of income and associated problems over the short- and long-term

the lack of information available for farmers

lack of support for farmers not directly affected by the disease

restrictions on livestock movements

psychological stress for farmers and emergency service personnel

the need for support and training for emergency service personnel

tension amongst residents of communities, and

the lack of attention to the social aspects of the crisis with the main focus being upon the
technical aspects of controlling the disease.
Dixon (2002) has proposed several recommendations to address the potential social aspects of an
emergency animal disease outbreak in Australia. These include:

The need for a communications strategy that facilitates the effective flow of information
between government agencies and the farming community. The information should be easy to
access, accurate, transparent, conform to a consistent agenda, disseminated through a variety
of mediums but originate from a primary source. Farmers need information on the
progression of the disease. If they are informed on restrictions and control measures, they are
more compliant. Without such information, the result is stress, anger and mistrust of those
involved in policies and the process of disease control.

The need for strategies for assessing fair market values for livestock slaughtered.

15

2.4

The need for immediate and ongoing financial assistance and counselling services for farmers
affected by the outbreak, with those already experiencing financial difficulty given a priority.
As many Australian producers are facing difficulties through drought and low commodity
prices, the loss of income through a disease outbreak could be the breaking point.
The need to ensure that there are sufficient support services for unemployed workers and
small business owners who are affected by the disease outbreak.
The need for up-to-date training and adequate debriefing for support service and help lines
personnel meeting the needs of angry, emotional and suicidal callers.
The need to encourage the establishment of self-help groups during a disease outbreak.
The need for strategies such as a rural stress action plan, to recognise and practically account
for the significant and enduring psychological impacts on farm families, unemployed workers
and emergency service personnel (Dixon 2002).

Biosecurity in Australia

2.4.1 Our vulnerability to an FMD outbreak

Australia has not experienced a FMD outbreak for 120 years. The last incident occurred in Victoria in
1872 when the disease was identified in a bull imported from England. Two farms were infected
before the disease was eradicated (Animal Health Australia 2003). While there are now strong
quarantine measures in place to guard against disease, the outbreak of FMD in Europe in 2001 was a
strong reminder of the need for vigilance (AFFA 2002b, 2002d). Figure 2.1 displays those countries
declared FMD-free.
Figure 2.1: FMD-free countries. Source: (OIE, 2002).

16

Nowadays there are greater numbers of livestock and the problems of major epidemics have become
more severe. The threat of importing disease is high because of changes in livestock farming
practices; high global demand for meat and meat products; extensive international travel and transport
of meat and other foods throughout the world; improved transport routes, and climate change. A new
and more intense threat is the deliberate release of pathogens through bio-terrorism (Murray 2001). It
is likely that the risks of an outbreak of FMD cannot be completely avoided. Thus, Australia will be
better planning for when, not if, an outbreak occurs.
The most likely path of infection to Australia would be through the importation of infected animals,
semen or infected food. The UK FMD outbreak originated when pigs were fed swill comprised of
infected meat that had come from overseas. Consequently, Australia does not permit imports of any
live animals, semen or uncooked meat or unprocessed dairy products from FMD-affected countries
and has a ban on the feeding of swill to pigs. Other risks for infection are soil, straw, material that
might be on imported farm machinery, footwear or clothing, or used animal handling equipment such
as halters that could harbour the FMD virus (AFFA 2002e).
Factors that predispose the spread and establishment of the virus in Australia include increased
movement of livestock and livestock products; changes in industry practices; the nature of the disease
in sheep; as well as the characteristics of the Pan Asia strain, which is relatively resistant to
inactivation in the environment. Illicit activities and failure to report suspect FMD cases also increase
the spread of the disease (Murray 2001). For example, there were incidences in the UK epidemic
where some individuals deliberately spread the disease to ensure their access to compensation (Cooper
2004, personal communication).
Garner and Cannons (1995) analysis of weather data found that conditions in much of Australia,
particularly at night, are suitable for the spread of the FMD virus through the air. The ideal conditions
are stable atmosphere and low wind speeds which are both common in Australia. As the risk of spread
is proportional to the density of livestock downwind, large concentrations of stock in saleyards or
feedlots would be most vulnerable.
Thus animals most susceptible to infection would be those in intensively managed dairies and
piggeries, extensive cattle and sheep properties and feral animals such as pigs, goats, buffalo and
camel (AUSVETPLAN 2002). Pigs, both domestic and feral, represent a substantial disease threat. In
FMD outbreaks they can act as amplifying hosts and may be asymptomatic during viral excretion
(Australian Pork Industry 2002). Infected pigs excrete 1000 to 3000 times as much virus as cattle or
sheep. Cattle are more at risk of infection because of their higher respiratory volume than sheep or
pigs. Therefore the pattern of wind-borne spread would be from pigs to cattle (Garner and Cannon
1995).
Dr Tony English of the University of Sydney warns that feral animals such as the 20 million wild pigs
in Australia, could make it impossible to eradicate FMD should they became infected. Feral pigs
would be particularly susceptible for the pan-Asian strain of the disease (ABC 2001). Hone and Pech
(1990) suggest that the probability of detecting FMD in feral pigs would be very low because these
animals occupy large, remote uninhabited areas of Australia which receive only sporadic veterinary
surveillance.

2.4.2 Biosecurity strategies

Biosecurity strategies aim to minimise the risk of disease entering the country and, if it does enter,
ensure the outbreak is localised and does not develop into an epidemic (House of Commons 2002).
The Federal Government provided approximately $600 million dollars in 2001 for Australias border
agencies and the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service to upgrade quarantine facilities at
international airports and mail centres around the country (AFFA, 2004). FMD-free countries such as
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US, guard against the disease through strict import regulations

17

restricting imports of live cattle and pigs from infected countrieseven those using vaccination to
control the disease (unless the animals are subjected to a lengthy and controlled quarantine procedure).
Countries that rely on vaccination are treated as if the disease were present as the vaccination produces
antibodies that interfere with serological testing and may mask the clinical symptoms of FMD
(Forsyth and Bredahl 1992).

2.4.3 Exercise Minotaur

In September 2002, Australias readiness to respond to a FMD outbreak was tested through a national
exercise code named Exercise Minotaur. More than 1100 people from Commonwealth, State,
Territory government agencies, local governments and livestock industry bodies took part in the fiveday simulation which tested the ability of high-level government frameworks communications and
decision-making procedures to manage and contain a major disease outbreak across several states.
There were also 100 observers and facilitators for the exercise (AFFA 2002a; Morse 2002).
The exercise simulated a three-month period following an outbreak in pigs and cattle on a farm in the
Gold Coast hinterland. Infections were traced to northern New South Wales and Victoria. At the end
of the exercise, there were 454 infected properties, and 822 504 animals from 1819 properties had
been slaughtered (AFFA 2002b).
Once the disease was brought under control by the fourth day of the simulation, participants were
asked to deal with the social and economic effects of such an event. Unemployment, the closure of
tourism destinations, a fall in the price and domestic consumption of meat, depression in rural
communities and water contamination problems arising from the slaughter of animals were some of
the hypothetical issues examined.
Figure 2.2: Day 84: Exercise Minotaur: Simulated spread of disease (Koob 2004b).

18

Following the exercise, some participants expressed concern that the exercise did not go far enough.
Dr Andrew Nicholson of the Australian Veterinary Association stated:
Its all very well to have the paper shuffled in the right directions thats great but
we need to know that the practitioners out in the field are going to know what to
do and how to do it when the time comesand it will come.

(ABC 2002a.)
At the community level, farmers and veterinarians must be more aware of the risks and be more
familiar with the symptoms of emergency diseases (Royal Society of Edinburgh 2002). Professor
Richard Whittington, the director of Farm Animal Health at the University of Sydney, stated there is a
need to increase on-farm surveillance in Australia (ABC 2002c). Livestock producers and others who
work with livestock will be the key to Australias ability to control and eradicate FMD in the event of
an outbreak. Should a case of FMD occur, it would be vitally important for it to be diagnosed early
and for the infected and in contact animals to be immediately slaughtered before the disease has a
chance to spread (AFFA 2002c; Jane 2002). Recent biosecurity prevention programs in Australia,
such as Animal Health Australias Look. Check. Ask a Vet. program, has focused upon encouraging
producers to report ANY unusual symptoms in their animals rather than insist on them knowing and
understanding emergency disease symptoms (Animal Health Australia 2004). There are concerns that
producers may be reluctant to call a veterinarian to examine sick livestock. The tragedy of the FMD
outbreak in Britain was that the first case of the disease was not reported and diagnosed before
infected sheep had been marketed all over Britain and elsewhere. Meanwhile an outbreak in Italy,
which was diagnosed and acted upon immediately, was confined to three farms only with relatively
little economic loss (Jane 2002).
Figure 2.3: Protect Australian Livestock Campaign (AHA, 2005).

19

2.4.4 Tracing animal movements

The capability to trace animal movements is vital to bringing the spread of disease under control
(NSW Agriculture 2002). A fully implemented National Livestock Identification Scheme (NLIS)
would greatly contribute to confining a disease outbreak due to its accurate identification and rapid
trace-back capabilities (MLA 2003). The NLIS is designed to improve tracing and monitoring
systems for stock diseases and chemical residues to allow Australian producers to compete on the
international market. The European Union (EU) requires strict quality control of livestock sales and
full traceability of all cattle slaughtered for their market.
The basis of the NLIS is a consistent system of property registration, which uses an eight-character
property identification code on the identifiers applied to individual animals. These devices contain a
radio transponder, which can be read by a machine, and the information is automatically conveyed to a
computerised database. In most cases, these devices are ear-tags, but they can also be a bolus, which
is inserted down the throat of the animal where it remains lodged in the animals rumen for its
lifetime. Coupled with scanners at saleyards, feedlots and abattoirs, these devices will enable each
animal to be reliably traced from its property of birth until slaughter. Many saleyards, feedlots and
abattoirs throughout Australia are now installing readers and links to the NLIS database (MLA 2003).
When the concept was first introduced, farmer organisations were not generally supportive of the
compulsory participation in a NLIS due to the costs to producers, particularly those with large herds.
By 2003, all States agreed to participate in the scheme for both sheep and cattle. The scheme will be
introduced over a two-year period beginning with the mandatory electronic tagging of all calves born
in 2004. The next stage will be the compulsory tagging of all cattle sold through saleyards
and between properties. The final stage will include stock sold directly from the property of origin
to the export market or to abattoirs (Crosby, member of NLIS National Committee, personal
communication).

2.5

Factors affecting preparedness

2.5.1 Community dynamics

The studies of FMD in the UK found the impact of the outbreak varied greatly between communities.
Garner and Lack (1995), in an economic modelling study of the impact of emergency diseases in three
regional areas in Australia, found regional factors influenced the way the disease spread and
manifested itself and impacted upon local communities. The less diversified the economy, the greater
the effect of an emergency disease outbreak. The size of the community, diversity in geographical
location and social structure of communities will also contribute to differences in community
experience.
Within a small community, the ability of the police, emergency services and other relevant first
responder agencies to cooperate and respond effectively to a disease outbreak will be largely affected
by the cohesion and integration of a community. Community cohesion can be defined along two
dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Wilkinson 1970; Garkovich 1989; Sharp 2001 cited in
Donnermeyer 2002). Vertical integration refers to the strength of relationships between individuals or
groups at the local level and individuals or groups beyond the community; for example, local
emergency services and State and Federal Government agencies. Horizontal integration refers to the
strength of relationships between individuals and groups within the immediate boundaries of the
community (Donnermeyer 2002).

20

Sometimes close social networks that can sustain a community can also be a destructive force. A study
of farm family stress in the UK (Reed, Lobley, Winter and Chandler 2002) found that peer pressure
was placed upon those farmers who considered not restocking after FMD. Some farmers who left
farming were subject to verbal abuse. A study of livestock theft in Australia by the author (Barclay et
al. 2001) revealed attitudes and behaviours within the culture of farming communities actually
facilitated crime. A tendency to blame victims of theft for their misfortune and a reluctance by
victims to report thefts to police created a culture that allowed a certain degree of crime to go
unpunished. Similar attitudes may act as impediments to the reporting of unusual disease symptoms
in stock as well as the overall community response to an EAD outbreak should it occur.

2.5.2 Individuals perception of risk

The way people perceive risk influences the way they adjust to crises (Pijawka et al. 1988). A
significant body of research indicates that people typically underestimate risks to which they are
exposed (Burton et al. 1978; Wohlwill and Weisman 1981). Thus lack of biosecurity on farms may
result from a lack of knowledge or understanding of the negative impacts of an emergency disease
epidemic and inaccurate risk perception.
Slovic (1991) argues that experts judgments of risks tend to correlate with the technical aspects of a
hazard; for example, stock loss probabilities and financial costs, while lay people relate to other
characteristics of risks, such as the uncertainty, controllability, catastrophic potential, equity and
threats that extend into the future. Risk judgments are influenced by the memorability of past events
and the imaginability of future events. Consequently, factors that make a hazard unusually
memorable, such as heavy media coverage, can distort perceptions of risk. Uncertainty about risks
can increase anxiety. Individuals may try to reduce anxiety by denying the uncertainty, making the
risk seem so small that it can be ignored or so large that it must be avoided. People object to being
given statements of probability rather than fact preferring to know exactly what will happen. Effective
communication of the risk of an EAD outbreak will need to take account of these social values that
underlie peoples perceptions (Slovic 1991).
Lehman and Taylor (1987), in a study of students perceptions of risk of earthquake, concluded that
individuals cope with an unknown threat by ignoring or denying the seriousness of the threat. Only
5% of the participants in their study had taken any earthquake precautions. The authors suggest that
individuals may construe such events as uncontrollable and may therefore manage their emotional
response through denial rather than taking precautionary actions. Sims and Bauman (1972) found that
people who believed they had more control over their lives and the threat of tornados were more likely
to take precautions and were less vulnerable to injury than those who displayed an external locus of
control. Lehman and Taylor (1987) suggest that before people can be encouraged to learn or prepare
for a potential EAD outbreak, their perceptions about the controllability of such a disaster will need to
be modified.
An extensive literature has examined the way people cope with natural disasters such as bushfire
(McFarlane et al. 1997), cyclones (Parker 1977), as well as human disasters such as the Kempsey bus
crash (Wilson 1990) and the Granville train disaster (Raphael et al. 1984). However, most of this
literature examines how people cope after a disaster. Few studies have examined how people cope
with a potential disaster when the likelihood is probable but the timing is unknown (Lehman and
Taylor 1987). One aim of the present study is to examine how producers perceive the risk of a
possible EAD outbreak in Australia and whether their perceptions relate to the level of biosecurity on
their properties.

21

2.6

Conclusion and rationale for the present study

The above discussion has highlighted a number of key issues that require further investigation. The
literature review has revealed that an emergency animal disease epidemic has significant and enduring
impacts upon the health and wellbeing of individuals and the communities in which they reside.
While there have been several logistic exercises and economic modelling studies conducted to
estimate the potential technical and financial impacts of an emergency disease outbreak in Australia,
relatively little is known about the potential social impact of such a event.
While Federal Government and State Governments are well-prepared for such an outbreak through
strict quarantine measures and national disease control strategies, there are still concerns that those in
the field will not know what to do if a crisis occurs. For example, although there are Local
Government Emergency Action Plans in place, what factors within communities will facilitate or
impede the maintenance of such plans? Will producers have sufficient knowledge and awareness of
EADs to know how to respond if an outbreak occurs? Will they readily report unusual symptoms in
their stock to arrest the potential spread of disease? With drought and low commodity prices being
among the major concerns of Australian farmers over the past few years, focus upon biosecurity and
concern about a disease that has not previously occurred in Australia may not be a priority for
producers. As one farmer interviewed in the preparation of this study stated, This is not a front of
mind issue. Biosecurity strategies on farms may be analogous to crime prevention strategies. The
rationalisation that crime is something that happens to other people which lEADs to lax attitudes
towards security on farms (Barclay et al. 2001) may also apply to biosecurity. There is a need to
assess to what extent information about biosecurity has been taken up by producers. These issues and
others were explored within the present study to identify the readiness of producers and small
communities to cope with an emergency disease outbreak.

22

Chapter 3: STUDY 1:
FMD in the UK revisited
3.1

Introduction

In July 2004, the investigator visited Devon and Cornwall to meet with farmers and support workers
who were involved in the 2001 FMD outbreak in those regions. The purpose was to gather first-hand
observations of the social impact of the 2001 epidemic and assess farmers attitudes to biosecurity
three years since the outbreak occurred. This chapter provides a summary of the information gathered
in these meetings.

3.2

Method

Interviews were arranged via email prior to the investigators visit. Contact details for possible
interviewees were obtained from various researchers and government officers in Australia who had
established contacts in the UK when visiting or working there during the 2001 FMD epidemic. The
investigator attended a country show held in Launceston in Cornwall and visited local properties to
speak with farmers and support service personnel. Meetings were held with agricultural chaplains,
representatives of the National Farmers Union (NFU), the Farm Crisis Network and the Rural Stress
Information Network, as well as researchers who had conducted studies of the FMD crisis. Eight
formal interviews were conducted supplemented by several additional conversations with farmers and
support workers.

3.3

The findings

3.3.1 Social impact

The interviews with people in Devon and Cornwall confirmed the findings of the many reports on the
impact of the FMD epidemic reviewed in Chapter 2. Farmers and service providers alike were critical
of the Government in its handling of the outbreak, namely the tardiness in its response, particularly the
delay in closing livestock markets and banning livestock movements; the lack of information
disseminated to farmers; and the fact that control was top down with little consideration given to the
needs of local communities or the benefit of utilising local knowledge. Consequently, decisions made
were costly and impractical. Those interviewed argued that control was concentrated in London and
that there needed to be regional bases to administer control measures. They stressed that the lack of
information from government was a major problem for farmers. One stated:
In the beginning of the outbreak, nobody knew what was happening. On one
instance, I called five times on the same day and asked the same question and got
five different answers from five different people. The problem was that they
didnt have time. MAFF officials would say, Well ring you back, and as soon as
they said that you knew that would be the last you heard from them.

23

One academic who had conducted research on the FMD crisis noted that one of the main social
impacts of the disease outbreak was the social tension that arose within previously cohesive
communities. For example, farmers who had their livestock culled received compensation, which
enabled them to cancel debts and take a holiday. However, they could not discuss their situation with
anyone, as their neighbours may not have received benefits. They were also embarrassed about the
impact on their immediate neighbours who had to endure the effects of burning pyres of infected
carcasses. Conversely, those farmers who did not lose stock were confined by livestock movement
restrictions and consequently worked harder to feed and care for their animals. When bans were lifted,
they were able to sell their stock, but received low prices. Forced to reduce their labour force, the
whole family often worked twelve or more hours a day, seven days a week to manage their farm
business. These families also resorted to belt tightening to sustain their farm business. Anything
from the farm went back into the farm. Some families survived on their parents old age pension.
The crisis also led to social change. Women took up off-farm work, which often left men isolated on
farms. Gender roles changed which had an impact upon relationships. Farm-women observed how
other men lived and worked and urged their partners to find another way of life. Following the
outbreak, 6% of farmers diversified their operations or one of the partners worked off-farm. Farm
labourers left rural areas to seek alternative employment.
Another service provider noted that the FMD outbreak compounded the economic downturn farmers
were already experiencing.
The BSE outbreak in 1997 resulted in significant falls in livestock prices, which
was followed by three difficult economic years, which was then followed by the
FMD outbreak. It is only now (2004) that things are returning to normal.

3.3.2 Support services

To support farm families in crisis, some communities organised a telephone link up. At first farmers
appreciated this support service. However, as the epidemic persisted, the regular calls became
annoying for some. Farmers were asked if their stock were infected and many did not want to say.
Fear of infection would lead people to distance themselves from those who contracted the disease.
There were suspicions that some farms contracted the disease illegally, which also divided the
community.
Service providers maintained the isolation of farm families was the most demoralising social impact of
the disease outbreak. Farm families from non-infected properties self-imposed their quarantine.
Children were isolated and kept from school. Pubs and churches lost patronage. In the small
community of Bow in Devon, three pubs were soon reduced to one. The focus for service providers
was to get people mixing again. By disinfecting their vehicles and tractors, farmers were free to leave
their properties. Service providers encouraged farmers to attend dinners at pubs or at neighbouring
farms. Fodder banks, which were set up to deliver feed and straw for stock, required farmers to go to
the delivery points, which broke their isolation. In Horsham in Cornwall, one enterprising local fast
food business established a mobile caf at these sites, setting up chairs and tables and a television,
which created a meeting point for the local community. Community groups such as Young Farmers,
Womens Institutions and churches provided food parcels to farm families. A Farm Aid appeal raised
some 22,500,000 across the country in three months, which demonstrated to the farming community
that the urban community was concerned about their plight.
One service provider reported that in 2003, his organisation received 24 000 calls for assistance from
farmers who continue to struggle in the aftermath of the disease, which is about ten per cent of the
250 000 farmers nationwide. He reported that farmers find it difficult to ask for assistance. However,
neighbours who may be concerned about a farm family in their district will alert his organisation.

24

Service providers are unable to cold call on families and must wait until families contact them.
However, local vicars can visit people within their parish and a pattern has developed where vicars
will visit, counsel the family and seek their permission to allow various support services to assist
them.
Farm families present with various problems relating to financial and technical difficulties, social
isolation, depression, domestic violence, and family and relationship issues. There are about ten
mostly non-government support agencies within a network that work together to provide various types
of assistance ranging from financial to mental health support and advocacy. Some of these agencies
include the Rural Stress Information Network, National Farmers Union (NFU), Help Lines, the
Farming Advice Support Team, various churches, agricultural chaplains, the Farm Crisis Network and
the Samaritans. The Samaritans were a group that provided significant counselling support during the
FMD outbreak and now continue to provide support for service providers themselves.
Another service provider added that communication between all service providers was vitally
important throughout the FMD outbreak and regular meetings were conducted. Now meetings are
held twice a year. He stressed ongoing communication was essential to ensure service providers know
what others are doing.

3.3.3 Biosecurity in the aftermath of FMD epidemic

The representative of the NFU reported that if another FMD outbreak occurs in the future in the UK,
there will be an immediate vaccination of stock. There will never again be incineration of diseased
animal carcasses in open-air pyres. The images and stench of the pyres had a significant impact upon
the local population as well as the tourist industry. Many farmers believe the pyres contributed to the
spread of disease.
Regulations regarding matters of biosecurity have increased as a result of the FMD epidemic. For
example, a six-day ban on livestock movement is imposed upon farmers buying livestock onto a
property. The NFU representative believed the six-day period was sufficient time for any disease
symptoms to be identified. He believed farmers were not as complacent about biosecurity on-farm as
they had been prior to the FMD epidemic. Pig farmers were particularly vigilant as pigs were the
source of the FMD epidemic. However, currently, Swine Fever is the major concern for pork
producers. At the time (July 2004), Tuberculosis was a concern for beef producers. Badgers are
implicated in spread of this disease to cattle. Although this disease does not require major biosecurity
control responses, it does necessitate quarantine of infected properties. Government officials regularly
inspect stock on properties for Tuberculosis.
A Farm Assurance Scheme has been introduced to ensure farmers are maintaining a high standard of
animal welfare. Farmers are expected to regularly check their stock and insure that a veterinarian
regularly inspects their animals. However, some farmers were frustrated by the fact that while they
maintained high quality standards, livestock products are still being imported from countries where
standards are much lower. Farmers were also concerned about the recently introduced Countryside
and Right to Roam legislation which gives tourists access to privately owned land for recreation will
increase the risk of disease to properties.
Other farmers interviewed indicated that biosecurity on farms was basically commonsense. It is
common practice for containers used to transport livestock to be washed down and disinfected.
Producers comply with regulations regarding swill feeding and are also more attentive to maintaining
livestock records. Most producers take care to purchase stock from a reputable livestock owner.
There are increased biosecurity practices in place at livestock markets and abattoirs as the risk of
disease is heightened in such places. In 2003, the European Union banned the burial or burning of
animal carcasses on farms. Consequently, all animals that die from natural or accidental causes on

25

farms must be taken to incinerators at various locations. The British Government is providing 10
million to pay 30% of the costs of collecting fallen farmed stock. However, there are concerns about
biosecurity with lorries carrying animal carcasses across the country.
When asked about a NLIS in Britain for disease control, the NFU representative responded that such a
scheme will be introduced within the next two to four years. Buyers want full traceability. British
farmers have accepted the concept in principal, as the current paper system of animal identification is
laborious and extremely time-consuming. However, an electronic identification scheme will require
farmers to become more computer-literate. Currently only 50% of UK farmers use computers. As the
average age of farmers in the UK is 55 years, some older farmers may find learning new skills a
difficult process. However, it is believed that the actual average age of farmers may be considerably
younger as many of the older generation remain on family properties with their successors.
Other farmers interviewed agreed that the introduction of such a scheme would not greatly concern
British farmers. They sympathised with Australian producers concerns over the cost of the NLIS as
they have larger herds. Most properties in the Devon/Cornwall area are small, on average between
four to five acres in size and a large herd was two to three hundred animals. However, the NFU
representative expressed similar concerns to those raised by Australian producers, that a NLIS must be
foolproof and affordable. If an animal loses its identification, the system is meaningless.

3.3.3 Attitudes of farmers towards biosecurity

It was interesting to observe that many of the British farmers attitudes towards the livestock industry,
the Government and their local community were very similar to Australian farmers attitudes. The
prevailing attitude of farmers, which was evident in all interviews conducted, was that if government
agencies do their job, for example on the wharves, ports and airports, farmers should not have to be
greatly concerned about biosecurity. It was notable that at a local country show, which was held in
four fields, footbaths of disinfectant were placed at the gate of the field where cattle were displayed,
yet the investigator observed no-one abiding by this biosecurity requirement. Facilities were also in
place at the main gate with a sign instructing all vehicles leaving the ground to be disinfected. At the
end of the day, two men from the local slaughterhouse were employed to spray all vehicles as they left
the grounds. Few vehicles stopped. When questioned, the workers reported that they believed their
presence was a waste of time. Ideally, vehicles should travel through a disinfectant dip to effectively
eradicate any virus. However, they recognised that it was important that the government be seen to be
proactive regarding biosecurity.
Figure 3.1: Launceston Show 2004.

26

Figure 3.2: No-one stops to disinfect their footwear.

Figure 3.3: Few vehicles stop for disinfection.

3.4

Conclusion

The most significant social impacts of the FMD outbreak upon the farming community in the UK
according to those interviewed, was the poor communication between government and local
communities, the social isolation of farm families and the social divisions that occurred within some
communities. However, churches and volunteer community groups came together to form a network
to provide a coordinated, comprehensive support service for farm families in crisis. Similarly, in

27

Australia, networks of support services have emerged over the past decade of drought, which have
been similarly effective in supporting Australian farm families. These networks could be employed to
aid in community recovery should an emergency disease outbreak occur in Australia.
It may useful to conduct a closer investigation of the types of practices and support services that
proved to be successful in breaking down the self-imposed social isolation of the British farmers and
encouraging them to seek support. It is likely that Australian farmers will react in similar ways when
confronted with such a crisis and may respond to the same types of support programs. Gathering
information on what did and did not work in the welfare response to the UK epidemic may assist in
Australias preparedness.
The most important finding of this small study was that farmers are taking some steps towards
improved biosecurity on farms but, in general, there is a pervading belief that responsibility for
biosecurity lies with the government. Farmers believe that if quarantine measures are effectively
enforced, there should be no further problems. Furthermore, farmers seem to think that if there is
another outbreak, there is little they can do to prevent it. In the next chapter, these views will be
compared with the attitudes of Australian farmers towards biosecurity on farms.

28

Chapter 4: STUDY 2:
Biosecurity on Australian farms
4.1

Introduction

In this chapter, the findings of the second study in this research project are presented. The study
involved a mail survey of 3000 livestock producers across the eastern states of Australia, which
investigated the extent of biosecurity practices on farms and the level of knowledge of emergency
animal diseases amongst farmers. The chapter begins with an outline of the aims and objectives of the
study and the method by which the data were gathered for the study. The results are then presented
according to several aspects of biosecurity that were addressed within the survey including the sources
of information for farmers, biosecurity strategies on farms, perceptions of risks for emergency animal
disease and attitudes towards the issue of biosecurity. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
main findings.

4.2

Objectives

The aim of this second study was to conduct a mail survey of 3000 livestock owners across
Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria (the states most vulnerable to a FMD outbreak) to gather
an understanding of their level of knowledge and understanding of emergency animal diseases, their
access to information and support regarding emergency animal diseases, and whether or not they have
instigated any degree of biosecurity on their properties. A further goal of this study was to understand
how individuals perceive the possible risk of an EAD epidemic when the occurrence is probable but
the timing is unknown. The survey was designed to educate and raise awareness about emergency
animal disease while surveying farmers.

4.3

Method

From the approximately 30 000 livestock producers located throughout New South Wales, Queensland
and Victoria, a random sample of approximately 3000 was selected for a mail survey. The proportions
for each State were assessed by taking 4% of the number of livestock producers listed in the Australian
Bureau of Statistics data on Agricultural Commodities (ABS 2004). The sample comprised 656 for
Queensland, 1207 for New South Wales and 979 for Victoriaa total of 2842. The names and
addresses of the survey participants were drawn from Telstras Yellow Pages listings of livestock
producers. The sample represented a range of livestock industries, including cattle, sheep, alpaca and
llama, deer, goats, pigs, buffalo and dairies. While this sample is biased to the extent that it represents
only those producers with a telephone that choose to advertise in the Yellow Pages, it did provide
access to the target population for the survey; that is, livestock producers across a range of livestock
types.
The survey instrument was developed and reviewed by the Advisory Committee as well as
representatives of the New South Wales and Queensland Departments of Primary Industries, and the
New South Wales Farmers Association. The survey was piloted with 200 graziers in New South
Wales and Queensland before being mailed in the autumn of 2004. A covering letter outlining the
purpose of the study accompanied each questionnaire. A reminder notice and questionnaire were sent
to non-respondents after four weeks.

29

The overall response rate to the mail survey after allowing for return to senders was 55% providing
data from 1232 surveys for analysis. This rate included 47% for Queensland providing a usable sample
of 254 respondents, 55% for New South Wales, a sample of 554; and 56% for Victoria with data for
419 respondents (five respondents were unidentifiable by state).
In the questionnaire, some basic demographic information about the producers and their properties was
sought as well as information on the following aspects of biosecurity on farms.

Information: What sources of information on biosecurity are available to producers and

where they would go first to seek information in the event of a disease outbreak.

Biosecurity on farms: What safety and security precautions are employed on properties and
what are the main things that prevent producers from putting such strategies into place.
Producers were asked how often they checked their stock and what types of identification they
used. They were also asked whether they had discussed biosecurity issues with anyone in their
district.

Perceptions of risk: Producers were asked what were the greatest disease risks to their
property, how soon they would call a vet having observed illness in their stock and, if they
were concerned about unusual symptoms in their stock, where they would go first to report it.
Drawing on a risk perception scale devised by Lehman and Taylor (1987), participants were
also asked to rate seven statements pertaining to the likelihood of an emergency management
disease outbreak in Australia on a four point scale ranging from Strongly agree to Strongly
disagree. This scale produced a fourfold typology, which was then used to analyse the
responses to questions on preparedness.

Attitudes to biosecurity: Producers opinions were sought on the issues of vaccination for
stock, compensation for stock losses from disease, reporting disease outbreaks, the National
Livestock Identification Scheme and where the responsibility lay for biosecurity in Australia.
The survey was supplemented with information gathered in telephone interviews with producers in
outback Queensland, which sought an understanding of their concerns regarding biosecurity on large
outback properties.

4.4

Results

4.4.1 Profile of the sample

The survey sample of 1232 respondents included 1021 (85%) males and 180 females (15%)
(31 respondents did not indicate their gender). Their ages ranged between 21 and 86 years (Mean
53.92 years, SD 12.94 years). As the average age for farmers in Australia is 55 years (ABARE 2001),
the sample is representative of a cross-section of Australian farmers. Respondents had been farming as
an adult for an average of 35.59 years (SD 15.03). The majority (41%) had lived in their district
between 20 and 50 years, while 38% had been there most of their lives (50 years or more). Only 36
farmers (3%) were relative newcomers to the district (less than three years). Seven were absentee
landlords. The majority of farm businesses were family partnerships (62%); another 21% were private
or family companies, while sole operators managed 14%. Only five (0.4%) were public companies.
Just under half of the sample 601 (49%) were livestock only operations, the majority being in beef
(33%) or wool production (35%). Figure 4.1 displays the proportions of the various livestock
enterprises within the sample. Most of the other types of livestock carried on properties within the
sample were horses (3.4%). Herd sizes ranged from 2 to 50 000 animals. The average herd size was
3322. The larger operations were mostly beef and wool production.

30

Other
Deer (Mean 162; Range 2 to 750)
Pigs (Mean 2,173; Range 1 to 35,000)
Goats (Mean 434; Range 1 to 3,000)

Figure 4.1
Livestock
enterprises and
mean herd sizes
(n=1232).

Alapacas (Mean 46; Range 1 to 300)

Dairy (Mean 285: Range 1 to 1,300)
Sheep (Mean 1633; Range 1 to 40,000)
Beef (Mean 1,074; Range 1 to 30,000)
Wool (Mean 4,708; Range 10 to 45,000)
0

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

(per cent)

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

The remaining 51% of the respondents had mixed farming operations. Of these, the majority involved
grain cropping (20%), oilseeds (2%), fodder crops (6%), legumes (4%), rice (2%), sugar cane (1%),
timber (1%), fruit (1%), vegetables (1%) and grapes (1%).

4.4.2 Sources of information

In the questionnaire, farmers were initially asked where they sourced information on emergency
animal diseases. The majority (73%) of respondents reported that the newspaper was the most
common source of information followed by radio (68%) and television (54%) (see Figure 4.2).
Thirteen people reported that they had received no information on this topic.

No Information
Breed Society
Local C ouncil
Internet
Field Days
Neighbours or friends
Stock Agent

Figure 4.2:
Sources of
information
(n=1232).

Farmer Organisation
Government Mailouts
Local Vets
Farm Journal
RLPB/Dept Agriculture
Television
Radio
Newspaper
0

10

20

30

40
(per cent)

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

31

50

60

70

80

A follow-up question sought information on where producers would go first for information if they
heard there was an emergency animal disease outbreak in Australia. In this situation, 65% of the
respondents indicated that local Departments of Agriculture/Primary Industry or Rural Lands
Protection Boards would be the first port of call while 42.6% would contact their local vet. Clearly, in
such circumstances, well-known and trusted people within a local community will be relied upon for
advice in preference to the media. One producer noted:
There is a need to save local rural Ag Department support for farmers
centralising these services will effectively remove them from the local farmer who
wants advice based on local knowledge of their situation.

Figure 4.3 displays the proportion of sources of information by state. More Victorian producers would
contact their local vet than would their counterparts in other states. Producers from New South Wales
would be most likely to go to their local RLPB or Department of Primary Industry officers.

Field D ays
Local C ouncil
G overnment Mailouts
Neighbours or friends
Farm Journal
Internet

Figure 4.3:
Primary source
of information in
the event of
disease outbreak,
by state.

Stock Agent
Farmer Organisation
Television
Newspaper
Radio
Local Vet
RLPB/Dept Primary Industry
0

10 20

Q LD

30 40 50 60
(per cent)

NSW

70 80 90

VIC

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

Just over a third (35.3%), of all respondents had discussed strategies to protect their properties and
livestock from disease with others within their community. Of these, the most likely people were
Department of Agriculture/Primary Industries or Rural Lands Protection Board Officers, local vets and
neighbours or friends (see Figure 4.4).

32

Breed Society
Local Council
Field Days
Stock Agent

Figure 4.4:
Discussions held
re biosecurity
on-farm (n=1232).

Farmer Organisation
Neighbours or Friends
Local Vet
RLPB/Dept Agriculture
0

10

15

20

(per cent)

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

Only 112 respondents (9.2%) were aware of the existence of any biosecurity initiatives in their district.
Twenty-seven respondents (2.22%) noted Ovine Johnes Disease (OJD) exclusion zones and ten
(0.8%) cited Footrot strategies. Another 37 (2.8%) knew about community biosecurity plans through
discussions with local vets, RLPB rangers or Department of Agriculture/Primary Industry officers.
However, as one farmer suggested, it would be of use to farmers to be included in such plans.
The local RLPB and Dept of Ag have held scenarios, which centre upon major
disease outbreaks. There has been no formal local farmer orientated simulation
or plan developed.

Only three people were aware of a Local Emergency Disaster Plan. These findings suggest that local
communities that have established plans need to publicise the existence of such strategies within their
community. Thirty-two (2.6%) cited the AUSVETPLAN and other National strategies and awareness
campaigns. One producer noted:
I suggest that the ordinary livestock producer is largely unaware of these plans
(e.g., Ausvet plans) and how they will (or wont) work, and especially their role in
their formulation and implementation. Above all else, producers want, and
deserve, the best quarantine protection, adequately funded, by Australian
Governments.

4.4.3 Biosecurity on farms

A series of questions sought information about biosecurity practices on farms. Producers were
initially asked how often they checked their stock. Most checked their stock daily or at least once a
week (see Figure 4.5). This result may reflect a large number of small livestock operations in the
sample. The smaller the operation, the greater the opportunity for checking stock frequently.

33

Every 6 Months
Every 3 Months

Figure 4.5:
Rate of checking
stock across the
sample.

Once a month
Once a Fortnight
Once a week
Daily
0

10

20

30

40

50

(per cent)

The types of identification participants used for their stock were also investigated (see Figure 4.6).
Not surprisingly the majority of respondents used ear tags and ear marks. Branding was also common.
A total of 212 respondents (17%) were currently using electronic identification. Only 16
people reported they used no identification at all.

No Ide ntifica tio n

Ele ctro nic Ide ntifica tio n
Ta tto o s
Brands

Figure 4.6:
Stock
identification.

Tail Ta gs
Ear Ma rks
Ea r Ta gs
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

(per cent)

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

Just over half 718 (58.3%) reported that they had implemented some type of biosecurity strategy on
their properties. There were significant differences between the states on whether or not producers
had biosecurity plans (2=34.58 p<0.001). Of the three states, Queensland producers were the least
likely to have strategies in place (see Figure 4.7). The larger land mass and herd size on outback
stations in Queensland and also western New South Wales do inhibit the ability of producers to
implement biosecurity strategies. Many of these producers believed their geographic isolation would
protect their property from a disease outbreak. However, they were particularly concerned that their
properties and livestock would be vulnerable to diseases such as FMD being spread through feral pigs
and goats. As one wrote:
This (Biosecurity) all seems to be a blatant waste of time, when there are millions
of feral pigs running free in Australia, and no attempt is being made to eradicate
them.

34

80
70
60

(per cent)

50

Figure 4.7:
Biosecurity
strategies on
farms, by state.

40
30
20
10
0

QLD

NSW
Have Strategies in Place

VIC
No Strategies

In developing the survey, questions regarding biosecurity strategies on farms were piloted twice as an
original question that asked respondents to identify their practices from a supplied list of strategies
produced response bias. The question was then reduced to an open-ended question, which provided
data that better reflected the nature of biosecurity on farms. Table 4.1 lists the type of strategies used
by producers to protect stock while Table 4.2 lists those strategies employed to protect the property
generally.
The most common strategy practiced for the protection of stock was the isolation of all new stock
coming onto a property to check for disease (40%). One producer explained:
Stock are visually assessed on a daily basis, and paddock rotated fortnightly. Any
suspect stock are yarded and checked in a race and/or crush. New stock are
isolated in stockyards and two 10 ha holding paddocks upon arrival for seven
days to settle, be drenched and vaccinated, tagged and branded.

Others (20%) chose not to introduce new stock, preferring to breed their own replacement stock.
Strategies for the property generally included securing boundary and internal fences (14%).
It is evident that the majority of strategies reported by participants were simply sound farm
management practices rather than specific biosecurity strategies. As one respondent acknowledged:
We are not thinking of a major disease, but we are separate all new animals from
our stock, mainly to observe scouring, worms, ticks etc.

While these practices do contribute to maintaining biosecurity, these findings suggest that there is a
need for widely publicising various options for biosecurity amongst producers. Those producers who
were more aware were clearly identifiable within the range of responses.

35

Table 4.1: Biosecurity strategies for stock.

Quarantine all new stock: supervise for several days.

Classes of stock in separate paddocks (age, mobs, species); isolate young stock.
No other stock allowed in grazing areas; stock not moved to other properties.
Good stock management strategies to maintain disease-free status/general health.
Check stock regularly; footbath/check feet/trim feet; drench; vaccinate; regular vaccination and
worming; feed stock regularly.
Test annually for insect-borne viruses.
Cull poor-doers; isolate ill stock; cause of death of stock investigated (autopsy if necessary).
Physical examination of new stock on arrival; new stock blood-tested for particular diseases on
arrival; vet check if concerned about origins or advice/consultation; report anything unusual; vet
certificate for all new stock; check history of introduced stock and health statements/vendor
declaration.
Purchase vaccinated stock only.
No stock introduced; closed herd/flock; self-replacing herd/flock.
Stock fed and watered in washable troughing.
Purchase sires only; only purchase rams/bulls/semen from OJD-negative farms and/or
accredited/health checked; purchase semen only (AI/ET).
Participation in Market Assurance Program.
Stock rotation/spell paddocks between use.
Special mating yard for visiting stud animals.
Do not purchase stock from high-rainfall areas.
Maremma dogs to deter feral animals and trespassers.
Minimal time off property for mating; no contact with faeces.
No animals that leave farm returnnot allowed off truck once on.
Stock sold/purchased off-farm, not through saleyards.
Cattle kept off boundaries away from other farms.
Clean vehicles; clean truck to transport stock from property to property or use own truck for transport
no carriers.
Knowledge/awareness of symptoms/up-to-date information.
Do not purchase stock from overseas.
Good recording system of stock identification/stock movement.
Dont feed stock animal products.

36

Table 4.2: Biosecurity strategies for properties generally.

Fencing: Secure boundary fences; locked/security gates; stock proof vehicle entry; buffer/double
fences; electric boundary fences; secure internal fences.
Straying Stock: Inform neighbours immediately if stock stray; report promptly straying stock on
public roads; remove stray stock ASAP; isolate neighbours stock until they are removed; destroy
strays; vet check animals which stray onto property.
Feral animals: eradication/control.
Regular checks/vigilance; monitor areas where incoming fodder and stock have been.
Control hay purchases/dont introduce any fodder or grain.
Awareness of bringing organic materials or items from other livestock properties that may carry
disease.
Biosecurity protocols re visitors and animal contact; tourists use disposable boot covers and/or wash
shoes; no unauthorised visitors; no trespassers; visitors must sign in on arrival; limited access to
outside people and vehicles; control trucks and equipment entering the property.
Contact with neighbours and RLPB officers.
Wash troughs out; water pumped to troughs from safe source; separate water supply; manage water
flow-onto property.
Slash area along boundary fencing.
Barriers of trees/plantations separating neighbours.
Awareness of stock movements in area (including neighbours).
Fence waterways to prevent stock movement; isolate creek crossing.
Protection due to isolation of property; limited road access.
Organically-accredited and have quarantine areas.
No agistment.
Apply lime to soil.
Staff awareness; staff not to come into contact with other pigs.
Dont overstock; keep good grass cover on paddocks.
Regularly burn paddocks.
Have someone watch property when away for a period of time.

4.4.4 Biosecurity across industry

When compared across industry types, pork producers were the most likely to be diligent about
biosecurity (see Figure 4.8). This is likely to be a reflection of the pro-activity of the Pork Industry in
ensuring their producers are informed about biosecurity. Pigs were the source of infection for the
FMD outbreak in the UK. Infected pigs excrete 1000 to 3000 times as much virus as cattle or sheep
and thus will contribute to the spread of disease (Garner and Cannon 1995). One respondent
commented:
As pig farmers, we are very conscious of disease outbreaks. We are extremely
disturbed by the latest Government initiatives that affect our industry.

Dairy producers were the least likely to practice safety and security measures. This is a surprising
finding as the dairy industry has also been proactive in encouraging biosecurity amongst their
producers.

37

D airy
Beef
Wool
D eer

Figure 4.8:
Biosecurity, by
livestock type.

Sheep
Other
Alapacas
Goats
Pigs
0

20

40
60
(per cent)

80

100

4.4.5 Factors inhibiting biosecurity on farms

Respondents were also asked what were the main things that prevented them from putting biosecurity
strategies into place on their properties. Lack of money, time and information and the drought were
the main reasons (see Figure 4.9). Others 59 (4.9%) believed there was no need for biosecurity plans
on their land due to their good farm management practices. Thirteen respondents (1.5%) reported it
was impossible to implement strategies because of the nature of their properties, i.e. the property was
too large, there was a public road or river passing through their land, it was impossible to isolate new
stock on the property or because there was a lack of cooperation from people entering their property.
As one producer noted, biosecurity was impossible because my property borders a Travelling Stock
Reserve (30 km) and public roads run through the property. Eleven people (0.9%) believed
biosecurity was unnecessary because national strategies and quarantine policies will safeguard
Australia from disease. Another 14 respondents (0.11%) believed there was nothing that could be done
that would prevent disease while a further ten (0.8%) believed precautions would not be required until
an outbreak was discovered in Australia.
Not possible on my property
No need for biosecurity on my
property
Dont believe epidemic will occur
here
Other Priorities

Figure 4.9:
Factors preventing
biosecurity
practices.

Lack of support
Lack of information
Lack of time
Drought
Lack of money

38

10

20

(per cent)

30

40

4.4.6 Reporting disease in stock

When asked where they would go first to report any unusual symptoms in their stock, the majority of
respondents (70%) reported that they would go to their local vet. One stated:
Good stock management is essential and a willingness to seek professional advice
if in doubt. Thankfully, we have a good rapport with our local vet, so we feel free
to seek advice any time (free) by phone.

Others (27.4%) would call a government veterinary officer and 16% would contact a stock inspector.
Five (0.4%) would report to their local stock agent. Less than 4% reported they would use the
Emergency Disease Watch Hotline. Figure 4.10 displays participants responses by State. Victorian
producers were most likely to call their local vet in such circumstances while Queensland producers
would mostly contact their local stock inspector. One Queensland producer noted veterinary officers
were not always available:
The Government no longer places VOs in our immediate area. They do not come
immediately upon requestcan be days. Why bother with them?

Emergency
D isease Hotline

Stock Inspector

Figure 4.10:
Where producers
would first report
unusual
symptoms in
stock, by state.

Government
Veterinary Officer

Private Vet

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

(per cent)

Q LD

NSW

VIC

However, some respondents reported that negative experiences with biosecurity management in the
past would mean they would hesitate to contact authorities if they discovered disease in their stock.
As a goat producer in my locality, I have been adversely affected by the OJD
management program for no good reason. Goats are low-risk by comparison with
sheep, but the restrictions are far more severe and there is no relief in sight. In
the light of the OJD experience, anyone would be off their rocker if they report
suspicious symptoms.

The survey also endeavoured to assess how quickly producers would call a vet if they observed any
disease symptoms in their stock. The current extension policy on this issue is to encourage producers
to contact their local vet, stock inspector or the emergency hotline at the first sign of ANY unusual
symptoms in their animals. Accordingly, the question asked respondents to indicate how soon they
would report disease in their stock across a range of symptoms, including some that would be
indicative of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. The findings are presented in Figure 4.11. PLEASE NOTE:
These findings are an indication only and must be interpreted with caution. Producers responses to
this question would vary according to their level of expertise regarding animal husbandry, the size of

39

their property, industry type and many other social factors. As one noted, Because of many years
experience, we would only report things that we have not had experience with. Another qualified his
response:
Usual illnesses can be contributed to something other than an exotic disease
outbreak, but if there were FMD in the country, notification would be immediate.
Fever and loss of
appetite
Lameness: tendency to
lie down
Difficulty in rising,
abnormal posture or
poor coordination
Nervousness or
aggression
Decreased milk
production
Lost body weight
despite continued
appetite.

Figure 4.11:
How soon
producers would
contact vet by
disease
symptoms.

Drooling(excess
salivation) and
smacking of lips
Blisters on tongue, lips,
gums, teats or feet
ANY symptoms of
illness
ANY unusual symptoms
that you have not seen
before
Sudden death in young
animals
Unexplained death of
one adult animal
Unexplained death of
two or more adult
animals
0

Not Necessarily

10

20

Immediately

30

40
50
(per cent)

60

After 2-3 days

70

80

90

After 4-5 days

Note: Multiple responses to the question could be chosen.

It was possible to compare differences between respondents answers by property size and industry
type using Kruskal-Wallis tests for independent groups. Across all of the symptoms listed, dairy
farmers were most likely to immediately report disease in their cattle. Alpaca producers were most
likely to immediately call a vet for any signs of illness, but particularly for fever, lameness or
abnormal posture. There was no difference between groups on those symptoms that would indicate
Foot-and-Mouth Disease such as drooling or lesions on mouth or feet. Most producers would report
these immediately. There was no difference between groups in immediately reporting any unusual
symptoms that they had not seen before. Most would report the death of young animals immediately
or within the first few days.
There were different patterns comparing reporting by size of operation across production type. Beef
producers with smaller operations were significantly more likely than larger producers to immediately

40

report disease in stock across most of the symptoms listed. However as found above, there was no
difference between large, medium or small operations when it came to reporting unusual symptoms,
the death of young animals or symptoms of Foot-and-Mouth Disease. For dairy producers, differences
were found for posture, nervousness, weight and milk production with those with larger operations
being likely to respond earlier than those with smaller dairies. For sheep producers there were no
differences in operation size except when it came to those more serious symptoms of Foot-and-Mouth
death in young animals disease or any unusual symptoms. There were no differences in operation size
for reporting disease amongst deer, goat or pig producers.

4.4.7 Risk perception and behaviour

Risks for properties
To assess what producers believed were the greatest risks to their property for an emergency animal
disease outbreak, respondents were asked to rate nine possible sources of risk and indicate what other
concerns they might have (see Figure 4.12). Those factors identified as having a high risk were the
presence of feral pigs or goats in an area, neighbours who import animals or semen or who have a high
turnover of stock. Other potential risks noted by respondents included imported products or foodstuffs
(2%), or deteriorating or reduced quarantine laws and regulations or monitoring of ports (2%). As one
producer noted: I feel we are at the mercy of the quarantine people in preventing these diseases.
Other reported risks for disease included a public road running through a property, a property being
adjoined to a stock route or National Park (1%), international tourists (1%), illegal immigrants (1%)
and terrorism (1%).

Family members working off farm on other

properties or saleyards etc.
A local veterinarian not having enough
knowledge to identify a serious disease
Visitors to a property; i.e. tourists,
professional shooters, contractors,
tradespeople.
The close proximityof a property to a feedlot
or piggery, abattoir or saleyards.

Figure 4.12:
Perceptions
of greatest
risks of
disease.

Illegal trespassers on your land

Neighbours who have a high turnover of
stock, i.e. commercial breeders or general
traders
Neighbours who import animals or semen.

Feral pigs or goats

Neighbours who fail to report unusual

sickness or deaths in their stock

0
High Risk

41

Some Risk

10

20

30

40

(per cent)
No Risk

50

60

Queensland respondents were most concerned about the risk of FMD from feral animals. The issue
invoked several comments by participants.
A major outbreak of say FMD will not be eradicated in Australia due to the
vastness of our country, and the lack of control of wild animals such as pigs,
goats, deer, kangaroos, and the constant movement of stock in the long paddock
and stock reserves.
Should an outbreak occur in Australia, because of our vastness, number of wild
pigs etc, nothing we can do with any little local Plan will have any affect on the
outcome whatsoever. I wonder if any of you comprehend the vastness,
remoteness, roughness, and inaccessibility of some of our properties, Aboriginal
lands, and large uncontrolled heritage expanses of Queensland that harbour wild
animals.
The key to FMD containment is the pig. What is required is an eradication
program. It will work, but requires Commonwealth funding on a significant
scalein all, only 1% of the cost if we get an outbreak of FMD. Pigs are now
everywhere. In the river country, they are out of control.

Risks for the Nation

Respondents were then asked to rate seven attitude statements concerning the potential risk of an
emergency animal disease outbreak occurring in Australia. These questions were designed to
understand how farmers perceive and cope with the probability of disease outbreak when there is no
knowledge of how, when or where such an outbreak may occur. The differences in farmers
perceptions and coping styles were then assessed according to their propensity to implement
biosecurity strategies on their properties. The scale was designed to generate a fourfold typology of
risk perception based upon two factors of the reality of the risk of an impending disease outbreak and
the sense of control over that outcome (see Figure 4.13).
Uncontrollable
Outbreak will be serious

Figure 4.13:
Typology of risk
perception.

Concerned
Risk is real

Unconcerned
Risk is exaggerated

Controllable
Outbreak wont be serious

The majority of respondents were concerned about the threat of emergency animal disease occurring
in Australia. Most had thought a lot about the issue and believed an outbreak would be significant.
Most believed the threat had not been exaggerated. Yet the majority did not think an outbreak was
inevitable or that there was little anyone could do about it. Respondents were fairly evenly divided on
whether Australias isolation from other countries and strict quarantine measures will prevent
outbreaks and whether the vastness of the country will mean an outbreak will be contained. Table 4.3
presents the proportions of responses to questions regarding the risk of emergency animal disease.

42

Table 4.3: Attitudinal scale of risk perception.

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

I am extremely concerned about the likelihood of

a major disease outbreak like FMD occurring
here in Australia.

47.5

39.1

11.6

1.8

There may be a disease outbreak in Australia but

it wont be that bad.

3.3

20.9

44.5

31.3

Australias isolation from other countries and

strict quarantine measures have prevented major
disease outbreaks in the past and will continue to
prevent outbreaks in the future.

8.2

39.0

40.9

11.9

The likelihood that a major disease outbreak will

occur here has been greatly exaggerated.

2.0

16.6

61.6

19.7

It is highly likely that there will be a disease

outbreak in Australia, but the vastness of the
country will mean that the outbreak will be
contained in one area and eradicated quickly.

3.9

30.0

46.9

19.2

I think a major disease outbreak like FMD in

Australia is inevitable and there is little anyone
can do about it.

3.5

11.4

64.8

20.3

I havent thought much about the possibility of a

major disease outbreak happening here.

2.1

25.7

50.6

21.5

A typology of risk perception

To generate a typology of risk perception, a hierarchal agglomerative cluster analysis was performed
to group respondents according to their similarity in their scores around the mean. The use of
standardised scores permitted comparisons of diverse distributions within the analysis. Wards
minimum variance cluster analysis was employed with dissimilarities between scores defined by
squared Euclidean distance (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984). Inspection of the dendrogram and
scree plot resulting from the clustering procedure clearly indicated the presence of four clusters.
Quick Cluster was then used to refine the solution using interactive reallocation (k means). Figure
4.14 displays the standardised means of the various measures of risk perception across the four
clusters.
The analysis indicated that participants in Cluster Four (N=252) had thought a lot about the problem
and were the most concerned about the threat of an EAD outbreak in Australia. They believed a
potential outbreak will be significant, Australias isolation will not provide immunity, and the threat
has not been exaggerated. At the same time, this group believed such a threat was controllable. At the
other end of the continuum, participants in Cluster Three (N=211) were the least concerned about such
a threat and also believed the threat has been exaggerated and should a disease outbreak occur, it
would be contained. However, this group saw the threat as uncontrollable. Cluster Two (N=275) had
not thought much about the possibility of a disease outbreak, were unconcerned and believed the risk
has been exaggerated. They also were more likely to think that an outbreak is uncontrollable to a
degree in that they believe Australias isolation and vastness will mean that the outbreak will not be
that devastating. Participants in Cluster One were concerned about the possibility of an outbreak but
believe it will not be that bad. They were also honest enough to report they had thought little about
such a threat. This group also believed a possible outbreak was controllable.

43

I haven't thought about it

An outbreak is
inevitable:Uncontrollable

Australia's vastness will

contain outbreak

Figure 4.14:
Clusters of risk
perception.

The threat is
exaggerated

Australia's isolation and

quarantine measures:will
protect

It won't be that bad

I'm very concerned

-1.5

)Cluste r1 (N=345

-1
Disagree

-0.5
0
0.5
(Mean Standardised Scores)

)Cluste r2 (N=275

)Cluste r3 (N=211

1.5
Agree

)C luste r4 (N

The clusters were evenly apportioned across the three States and across livestock industry types and
operation size. Analyses conducted to examine whether the groups differed in their propensity to
implement biosecurity practices on farm revealed that respondents in Cluster One and Cluster Four
were more likely than those in the other three clusters to have discussed biosecurity strategies with
others in their district (2=29.33 p<0.0001), to be aware of local community biosecurity plans
(2=16.29 p<0.001), and to have implemented biosecurity strategies on their properties (2=25.79
p<0.0001) (see Figure 4.15). These findings suggest that personality factors of control have an impact
on how farmers cope with the prospect of a disease outbreak.
40
35
30

Figure 4.15:
Clusters by
biosecurity
strategies.

(per cent)

25
20
15
10
5
0
Have Biosecurity
Strategies on farm

Have discussed
biosecurity

C luster1

44

C luster2

C luster3

Aware of C ommunity
Plans
C luster4

4.4.8 Farmer attitudes towards biosecurity

Responsibility for biosecurity
To assess farmers attitudes towards responsibility for emergency animal disease prevention in
Australia, participants were asked to rate farmers, local communities, state and federal government
departments according to the degree to which they believed they were responsible. Responses ranged
from Mainly responsible, Partially responsible to Least responsible. Figure 4.16 presents the
findings. The majority of respondents believed responsibility lay with the Federal Government (84%)
and State Departments of Primary Industry (65%). Local communities were seen as least responsible.
Only 38% of respondents thought producers were primarily responsible while 43% thought they were
partially responsible. Queensland respondents were more likely to maintain that producers were
primarily responsible than respondents in the other states (2=14.85 p<0.005). Respondents generally
thought the community was partially responsible although more Queensland farmers thought the
community should be primarily responsible (2=26.49, p<0.0001). There was no difference between
the states regarding respondents beliefs that the Federal Government was primarily responsible.
Figure 4.16: Perceptions of responsibility for biosecurity, by state.

Mainly
responsible

Partially
Responsible

Least
Responsible

Mainly
responsible

Partially
Responsible

Least
Responsible

Mainly
responsible

Partially
Responsible

Least
Responsible

Mainly
responsible

Partially
Responsible

Least
Responsible

35

50.1

14.9

4.8

46.5

48.7

67.8

29.7

2.5

89

9.3

1.8

NSW

42.3

45.9

11.8

10.4

42.4

47.2

68.3

30.6

1.1

86.1

12

1.9

QLD

49.8

41

9.2

17.2

45.7

37.1

70.2

24.8

88.6

9.4

VIC

Producers

Community

State DPI

Federal Biosecurity

Reporting within small communities

Respondents were also asked if they suspected a neighbours animals had a serious disease, whether
they would find it difficult to report him/her to the authorities because they live in a small community.
While the majority (77%) reported that they would not have any problem, 205 respondents (18%)
believed that small community dynamics would influence their decision to report a neighbour.
Dobbing in a person to authorities is not consistent with Australian culture. There were no
differences between the States on this issue.
National Livestock Identification Scheme (NLIS)
A question relating to the importance of the NLIS for a means of trace-back in the event of an
emergency disease outbreak invoked a strong response from respondents. This was expected
considering the debate at the time on the mandatory introduction of this scheme across Australia in
2004. A large proportion of respondents (69%) agreed with this statement. However, there was a
significant difference between the three States in participants responses (2=140.93, p<0.0001) (see
Figure 4.17).

45

100
90
80

Figure 4.17:
Attitudes towards
NLIS as essential
for biosecurity,
by state.

(per cent)

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
QLD

NSW
Agree

VIC
Disagree

Victorian farmers were more accepting of the scheme than those in Queensland. This possibly reflects
the already established scheme in Victoria and conversely, the larger herd sizes in Queensland where
producers clearly object to the financial costs of the scheme and the relevance of the concept for their
large and usually isolated properties. As one respondent wrote:
NLIS can be an effective tool. However, feral and pest animals and birds need to
be controlled, especially pigs if we hope to contain FMD etc. NLIS is more about
market access than disease control and should not be relied on as the sole
protection alone.

Another added: All the tags in the world wont help prevention. None of the feral pigs will have tags
anyway.
Most of the concerns relating to NLIS related to the mandatory implementation of the scheme, its
unproven reliability and the costs to producers. Producers wrote:
I strongly disagree with NLIS being mandatory. It should be voluntary. Tail
tags enable a very efficient trace-back to property of origin, and are not fraught
with all the unreliability of electronic devices. You only need one failed NLIS tag
to cause potential disaster.
The mandatory NLIS is extremely unnecessary, creating much additional work
for the cattle producer, as well as being expensive. The existing scheme is
adequate, if administered by competent personnel. Some of the most efficient
primary producers are not computer-literate, but far more capable of producing
and handling cattle and property management than most with university degrees.
Not all great theories work in practice; this is the case with NLIS. As an EU
producer, we see first-hand the flaws that will cripple the NLIS if it becomes
nationwide. As it is now, it cannot keep up. It is about time that people start
listening to the producers that depend on the cattle industry for their livelihoods
and not the hobby farmers and so-called experts who are often great with theory
and not so good with practice. NLIS is not the answer to disease security.

Compensation
A further question sought participants attitudes towards the statement that: Some farmers may doubt
that they will receive adequate compensation for stock that are slaughtered, and therefore may not
bother to report unusual symptoms in their animals. Most participants (67%) agreed with this
concern. This result concurs with the finding presented in Figure 4.18, which revealed that
participants believe that neighbours not reporting disease in their stock are the greatest risk to their

46

property for a disease outbreak. A significant difference was found between the States in participants
views on this issue (2=24.96, p<0.0001). Victorian producers were far more concerned about this
issue than those from Queensland.
90
80
70

(per cent)

60

Figure 4.18:
Attitudes
towards
compensation,
by state.

50
40
30
20
10
0
QLD

NSW

Agree

VIC

Disagree

Vaccination against disease

Respondents were also asked whether they believed vaccination of stock against FMD was necessary
to protect the industry. Just over half (56%) disagreed with this statement. Several respondents noted
that they would like to know more about vaccination. Three wanted to know if a vaccine was
available. As one respondent noted: I understand that vaccination will automatically give Australia
FMD status, so it defeats the purpose. There were no significant differences between the states on
this issue.

4.5

Summary and conclusions

This study of biosecurity on Australian farms has demonstrated that livestock producers generally are
very concerned about the threat of an emergency animal disease within Australia and have thought a
great deal about the issue. Several of the written comments they provided confirmed their concern.
One of the objectives of this study was to raise awareness of these issues while surveying farmers and
that objective was clearly met. As one respondent wrote: This questionnaire frightened me into a
lengthy discussion with my local PP Board vet!
The study found that farmers primarily use newspapers and radio as sources of information on
emergency animal diseases. These findings are similar to those of a study of South Australian
farmers, Kerby (1994) which concluded that print media continues to play an important part in
information delivery particularly when the information is locally relevant or actively sought. Local
papers in particular are well-read by farmers. Although Kerby found that farmers spent less time
reading than their urban counterparts, she maintained that newspaper will continue to be important to
farmers in the future because of its familiarity, convenience of access and as a record which can be
kept. Kerby also found that radio was an important source of information for farmers. Most of
Kerbys respondents had ready access to radio during the day either in their homes, cars, farm
vehicles, tractors, headers, sheds and workshops, dairies and piggeries. The majority listened to the
ABC Country Hour. While all of her sample owned a television set, half watched less than ten hours
of television a week. Therefore, information regarding EADs and biosecurity is likely to be most
effective using radio and newspaper.

47

However, the present study also found that if an emergency animal disease outbreak occurred, farmers
would primarily source information and advice from their local Department of Primary Industry or
RLPB officers or their local vet. In such situations, farmers will turn to well-known and trusted
people within a local community for advice in preference to the media. Similarly, Kerby (1994)
found farmers listed intimates as the most important sources of information and support when making
decisions about important issues demonstrating the importance of intimacy, trust and support.
Interpersonal communication directly with others in a one-to-one situation or small groups appeared to
be the major component of farmers communication patterns and processes. The present study also
found that if producers found unusual symptoms in their stock they would first report it to their local
vet. Few would resort to the emergency disease hotline. While this finding does not suggest that the
emergency hotline is irrelevant, it does suggest that future policy and programs regarding reporting
disease symptoms will need to account for the reliance of producers upon local veterinarians.
Few respondents were aware of biosecurity plans at a community level. Biosecurity may be improved
if exercises conducted by local community emergency management committees include stakeholders
such as farmers. Not only will community preparedness be improved but also the concepts may
translate to individual properties.
Overall, the findings are disappointing with regards to the extent of biosecurity on farms. Only half of
the respondents to the survey reported they had implemented some type of precaution on their
properties. Most of these strategies take the form of basic farm management practices. Some
producers believed that was all that was required to safeguard their property. The most common type
of practice was isolating new stock for a short period of time to check for disease. Property size and
geographical location clearly affect a farmers ability to implement strategies. Those on large outback
properties particularly in Queensland were less likely to have precautions than were their Victorian
counterparts on small, more closely settled properties. Not that those on larger properties were any less
concerned about the possibility of an EAD outbreak. Other factors that impeded biosecurity on farms
were the lack of money, time and information and the drought. Some farmers found it impossible to
implement strategies because there was a public road or river passing through their land. Some
believed biosecurity was unnecessary because national strategies and quarantine policies will
safeguard Australia from disease. Others believed there was nothing that could be done that would
prevent disease or that biosecurity on farms would not be required until an outbreak was discovered in
Australia. Future programs for biosecurity on farms may need to address these particular concerns of
producers, particularly those on large outback properties.
Pork producers were the most likely to have biosecurity plans in place which clearly demonstrated
their heightened awareness of the need for vigilance for disease, particularly Foot-and-Mouth. Several
respondents were concerned that current policy regarding imported products as part of free trade
agreements negates any diligence on the part of Australian producers for biosecurity at the farm level.
As described in Chapter 3, these sentiments echo those of British farmers. Dairy farmers were the least
likely to have biosecurity plans on-farm, yet they were the most likely group to immediately report
any symptoms of disease in their stock to their local vet.
The exploration of producers perceptions of risks of disease for their properties revealed that feral
pigs or goats were considered to be a serious threat. Producers on large outback properties were
particularly concerned and felt unable to safeguard their properties. The feral animal problem is of
current political contention. However, these findings suggest that possible biosecurity strategies to
address these concerns do need to be explored. Finucane (2000, cited in Botterill and Mazur 2004) in
a review of the influence of rural locations upon perceived risk found greater independence created by
isolation may lead to greater risk tolerance. However, sometimes feelings of vulnerability resulting
from that isolation can heighten concerns about risk.
Other risks to properties noted by respondents included neighbours who import animals or semen or
who have a high turnover of stock, imported products or foodstuffs, deteriorating quarantine
regulations or monitoring of ports, having a public road through a property or being adjoined to a

48

stock route or National Park, international tourists, illegal immigrants and terrorism. Slovic (1991) in
a review of risk perception research concluded that there is wisdom as well as error in public attitudes.
Their basic conceptualisation of risk is richer than that of expert opinions and reflects legitimate
concerns that are often omitted from expert risk assessments. As a result, risk communication efforts
are destined to fail unless they are structured as a two way process. These findings suggest that future
extension policies and programs regarding biosecurity may need to address these particular concerns
of producers.
By grouping respondents according to their perceptions of risk for an EAD outbreak in Australia, it
was revealed that those who believed they would have some measure of control in the event of an
outbreak were more likely to have instigated biosecurity on their properties. Those who perceived a
disease outbreak as an uncontrollable event might cope with such a prospect by managing emotional
responses through denial, rather than taking precautionary actions (Lehman and Taylor 1987). These
findings suggest that changing farmers perceptions about their ability to control the safety of their
property and livestock may be necessary for future biosecurity extension policies.
The findings revealed that Australian farmers attitudes to biosecurity reflect those of their English
counterparts; that the responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity lies primarily with government.
Specifically, if agencies and those responsible are working efficiently, producers should not have to be
concerned about disease entering Australia. One respondents comment summarised these sentiments:
If the Government authorities do their job correctly; i.e., the coastline, our seaports,
airports and foreign fishing, we, the livestock producers, wont have a disease problem.
We havent had a disease problem in the past; why should we be expecting one in the
future? Are the Government inspection services going to fall down?

As it was observed in Chapter Three that British farmers appear to be still somewhat complacent about
biosecurity despite their recent experience of the devastation of Foot-and-Mouth Disease, perhaps it is
expecting much of Australian producers to be vigilant about a risk they have no familiarity with.
Nevertheless, the study did reveal requests for more education regarding biosecurity on farms to enable
farmers to better protect their properties. As one respondent stated: No advice has been forwarded to
suggest that such strategies should be in place or what they should be. Another suggested: The
Government should provide mail-out education and host field days. Another added: What we need is
an awareness sheetone page onlyon what to look for and what to do in the event of a disease
outbreak. Another suggested: Every farmer should be sent a booklet stating clearly the symptoms of
what to look for in FMD and BSEand their obligations to report it and who to report it to.
It can be concluded that a higher level of participation of producers and other stakeholders in risk
assessment and biosecurity planning at all levels will lead to higher levels of communication and
information exchange between the parties which may lead to a greater understanding and compliance
with biosecurity by farmers.

49

50

Chapter 5: STUDY 3:
Potential Social Impact of an EAD
Outbreak Upon Small Communities in
Australia
5.1

Introduction

In the third stage of the study, case studies of four rural communities across three states were
conducted to explore the potential social impact of a hypothetical emergency disease outbreak upon a
small rural community in Australia. Social impacts are defined as the consequences to human
populations of an event that alters the way in which people live, work and play, relate to each other,
meet their needs and cope as members of a community (Burge et al. 1994). Social impacts are felt by
people as uncertainty, stress, anger, a sense of loss of control over life and despair. These feelings in
turn impact upon ways in which individuals behave and whole communities thrive or decline. Some
communities return to normal quickly once the source of disruption is dealt with while others do not
(Richards and Hall 2000). In this chapter, the findings of a social impact analysis that examined the
possible consequences of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon four rural communities are presented.
Data for the analyses for each community were drawn from the 2001 Australian Census of Population
and Housing Profiles for Local Government Areas.

5.2

Objectives

The purpose of the third study was to conduct a social impact study within four case-study
communities on the potential social impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak. The objective was to
identify social impacts idiosyncratic to each community to raise awareness of the heterogeneity of
small communities in their ability to respond and cope with an emergency animal disease outbreak.

5.3

Method

5.3.1 Case-study communities

Four communities were selected for case-study in consultation with the Advisory Committee to the
project. The communities identified in New South Wales were Casino in the northeast and Armidale
in the Northern Tablelands. The other two communities were Roma in southwest Queensland, and
Camperdown in southwest Victoria (see Figure 5.1). Armidale was selected because it is in a major
fine wool producing area. Casino was chosen because it is in a major beef producing area and has
several associated industries, such as meatworks that would be significantly affected should an
emergency animal disease occur. Casino also played a significant role in the hypothetical FMD
outbreak within Exercise Minotaur. Roma was chosen because this community has the largest
livestock market in Australia. Roma also provided the opportunity to investigate biosecurity in
communities in more remote locations. Camperdown in Victoria was selected because of the dairying
industry there and for the fact that the area has the largest dried milk plant in the southern hemisphere.

51

Figure 5.1:
Location of
case-study
communities.

5.3.2 Analysis
Social impact is a complex phenomenon that requires assessment of several social indicators to
provide a profile of how sensitive a community might be to change. The degree of impact will depend
upon various social and economic characteristics of a community. In general, a community that has a
low level of social disadvantage and is performing well economically is likely to cope better and
recover more quickly than a community less well-equipped (Productivity Commission 2002).
However, there are other factors that contribute to a communitys ability to cope, such as the size of
the community, the level of social capital, the communitys previous history of dealing with change,
and the ability of displaced workers to find alternative employment. Communities that are expanding
will have more work opportunities. However, these opportunities may require different skills from
those possessed by displaced workers (Interorganizational Committee on Guidelines and Principles for
Social Impact Assessment 1994). The impact of losing job opportunities within a community will be
greater if those who are unemployed are ill-equipped to seek employment or create jobs for
themselves. The impact of rising unemployment within a community will be lessened if the
community is experienced in working together to deal with events that dislocate the routine patterns of
life. Furthermore, impacts are cumulative over time and industry sectors (Richards and Hall 2000).
For example, the effect of extensive drought and a disease event can combine to result in a greater
impact than either event alone. The Productivity Commission (2002) estimated the cumulative
economic impact of a year-long FMD outbreak on the value of output over ten years across Statistical
Divisions in Australia. Those regions most affected were those with greater dependence upon
livestock industries. Armidale and Roma and are in areas that would be most adversely affected,
while Casino and Camperdown are in districts that would be partially affected (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2:
Productivity Commissions
(2002) estimated effect of a
12-month FMD outbreak on
the value of output over
10 years, by Statistical
Division.

52

The Productivity Commission (2002) identified several socio-economic variables which would best
measure social impacts and assess a communitys ability to cope with a FMD outbreak. These
included:

growth or decline in regional output, employment and population

ratio of younger population to older population

age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers

median income relative to the national median

educational and skill profile of inhabitants

extent of housing ownership

unemployment rate

degree of structural change from declining industries to expanding industries

degree of remoteness; and

frequency and scale of shocks.

These criteria were used as a general guide for the social impact analyses of a hypothetical FMD
outbreak in the four case-study communities within the present study.

5.4

The immediate social impact of a FMD outbreak

Should a FMD outbreak occur in any one of the case-study communities, once the disease had been
confirmed, there would be an immediate ban placed upon all livestock movements. Australias export
markets for meat, dairy product and possibly even wool would be closed. A Rapid Response Team
would immediately be sent to the town and a Control Centre established. Strict quarantine restrictions
would be placed around areas containing infected properties, or properties that had contact with them
either directly or indirectly through transfer of personnel, animals etc. People living and working
within a buffer zone around infected properties would also be directly affected by the restrictions.
Road blocks would police those restrictions. These restrictions would remain in place until all
susceptible animals and animal products were destroyed, infected properties decontaminated and there
was no longer any evidence of the disease (DPIWE 2005). The following social impacts are likely to
occur.

With the immediate ban on all livestock movements, all livestock sales, agricultural shows
and race meetings in the district would be cancelled.

There would be mass testing of animals by teams of vets. All susceptible animals (i.e., cattle,
sheep, pigs etc.) on infected properties and on properties neighbouring those infected
properties would be slaughtered. If the disease were spreading out of control, as it did in the
UK in 2001, all other susceptible animals within a 3 km radius of an infected property might
also be slaughtered to arrest the spread of the disease.

If the movement restrictions prevented the transport of feed to animals (such as in feedlots or
in winter or drought), those animals may also be culled for welfare reasons.

The disposal of large numbers of carcasses would commence, mostly by burial in large
excavated pits. The technical aspects of this task will present significant challenges to the
community. If carcasses are to be buried, the community may divide over where the site will
be located while people living in close proximity to the site may object.

There will be flow-on effects for months as the community adjusts to the disruption that
occurs. Normal community networks will be disrupted. Informal gatherings such as those at a
hotel will cease as people limit their movements. Social events such as race meetings may be
cancelled.

53

The establishment of a very large Control Centre will monopolise important community
facilities in the town. A large number of emergency workers will enter the community (for
example, at least 5000 strong workforce was required at Mangrove Mountain). Local
infrastructure, such as accommodation, will be stretched as it endeavours to meet the
requirements of outsiders.
Local businesses will suffer. Those associated with the agricultural industry will cease
operation. This will include livestock selling agents and carriers, agricultural advisors,
shearers and other rural contractors. Jobs will be lost. In the short-term, many displaced
workers will be utilised for disease control. However, in the long-term, with no other
prospects in the district some workers will leave to seek work elsewhere, which will mean a
loss of skills and people from the community. The flow-on effect to retail and other types of
local businesses will also affect the local economy. Tourism will suffer as tourists avoid the
district.
Thirty days after the slaughter and decontamination of the last FMD case, sentinel animals
will be placed on the previously infected properties. These animals are regularly tested for
FMD for at least another 60 days. If no sign of FMD is detected, an application for the
reinstatement of FMD-free status can be made to the World Animal Health Organisation.
Once approval has been obtained, key export markets can be re-opened. However, Australia
will then have to compete with those countries that began supplying our traditional export
markets during the FMD outbreak.
The long-term social impacts of livestock movement restrictions, losses to the local economy,
public anger and residents psychological health will be social aspects that the community will
need to address (Productivity Commission 2002; Cooper 2004; Koob 2004a; DPIWE 2005).

The long-term social impacts upon the case-study communities were assessed primarily drawing upon
data from the 2001 Census of Population and Housing (ABS 2001a; 2001b; 2002c; 2002d; 2001e
2001f). Supplementary information was derived from the social plans and emergency plans of Shire
Councils within each of the communities (Armidale-Dumaresq Shire 2004; Richmond Valley Council
2001, 2003a, 2003b; Roma Bungil Council 2004; Bungil Shire Council 2004; Corangamite Council
2004). From these data, a possible social impact for each community is outlined in the following
sections.1

In the following sections, data are summarised to present community profiles for each case-study while complete data
tables are presented in Appendix 2.

54

5.5

Armidale, New South Wales

Figure 5.3: Armidale-Dumaresq Shire.

5.5.1 District
Armidale is the major centre for the Northern
Tablelands in northern New South Wales.
The city is situated 578 km north of Sydney
and 467 km south of Brisbane.
The Armidale-Dumaresq Shire covers an
area of 4223 square kilometres and includes
the villages of Wollomombi, Ebor, Black
Mountain and Hillgrove. Grazing land as
well as four national parks featuring rugged
gorge country surrounds the City of
Armidale.

5.5.2 Community profile

Population growth or decline
The estimated resident population, in June 2003, was 24 675 persons. Average population growth
declined (-4.83%) between 1991 and 2001, but currently there is a stable, or even modest, population
growth. There has been a loss of population from the city and from the rural hinterland while the
population rural residential areas within 10 to 15 km of the city has increased by 19%. The local
population is relatively mobile. Only 49% of the population aged five years or over in 2001 lived at
the same address at the previous census date in 1996 compared to 39.5% for the nation. This
difference can probably be attributed to the youthful age profile and the presence of the University of
New England in Armidale.
In 2001, there were 1241 Indigenous persons, more than 5% of the areas tota1 population. The
national proportion is 2%. In 2001, over 86% of the local population was born in Australia compared
to 72% nationally. Ten per cent were born overseas compared to 29% nationally. Over 92% spoke
English at home while 4% spoke languages other than English, namely Australian Indigenous,
Chinese and Arabic. There are approximately 53 different nationalities residing in this community.
Ratio of younger population to older population
There is a higher proportion of people in Armidale-Dumaresq in the 5 to 24 year age group,
comprising almost 38% of the total population compared to 27% for all of Australia. This is largely
due to the numbers of private and public educational facilities within the city including the University
of New England. Fifteen per cent are aged 60 and over compared with 16.6% Australia-wide. The
median age for the city is 28 years compared to 35 for Australia. Conversely, the outlying rural areas
of Armidale-Dumaresq reflect an older age demographic (with considerably smaller proportions of
people in the 15 to 24 year age groups). The median age is 38 years.

55

Age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers

Over 30% of agricultural workers are over the age of 55 compared to 27% Australia-wide. There are
several well-established grazing families in the district. The greater proportion of workers in
Armidale-Dumaresq (41%) is aged between 35 and 54 compared with 45% nationally.
Median income relative to the national average
The median weekly individual income of $300 to $399 and the median weekly family income of
$800 to $899 equates to national medians. However, the median weekly household income was $600
to $699, which is lower than the $700 to $799 for the nation.
Educational and skill profile of inhabitants
The population is relatively well-educated. At the 2001 Census, 7% held a postgraduate degree;
graduate diploma or graduate certificate, while 11% held a bachelor degree and 14% a certificate.
This compares to national proportions of 3.2%, 9.7% and 15.7% respectively. At the time of the
census, 39% of the community were undertaking some form of study at an educational institution. Yet
63.6% held no qualification or did not state a qualification compared with 65% nationally. Other nonschool qualifications were in the fields of education (5.32%), management and commerce (6.99%) and
society and culture (6.42%).
Housing ownership
Just over half of all dwellings in Armidale-Dumaresq (58%) are privately owned or are being
purchased compared to 66% nationally. Over 35% are rented compared to 26% Australia-wide.
Unemployment
The unemployment rate was 9% as at the 2001 Census for the shire compared to 7.4% nationally. The
Education Sector is the largest employer in the district (19.88%) which is greater than the Australian
average of 7%. The retail industry employed a further 15% while the health industries employed
11.42%. Agriculture employs 8.4% of the workforce compared to 4% nationally.
Remoteness
Armidale is assessed as being moderately accessible on the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of
Australia (ARIA). That is, there is a moderate restriction upon accessibility to goods and services and
opportunities for social interaction.

5.5.3 Economic sustainability

Grazing and the production of high-grade fine wool are the major sources of income for the local
economy. The Armidale Saleyard operates two days per week and is serviced by eight livestockselling agents and eleven livestock carriers. Timber processing and the production of potatoes and
stone fruits are also important agricultural industries.
Tourism opportunities include bushwalking in the national parks, to trout and fly-fishing, fossicking
and horse riding. Wool Expo and the Australian Wearable Wool Fashion Awards are held annually in
May.
Armidale is also a major educational centre with a University, two State High Schools as well as
several prominent private schools. The University of New England (UNE) in particular plays a central
role in the areas economy and social composition.

56

The district suffered economic difficulties in the early 1990's associated with a national recession,
poor seasonal conditions, weak rural commodity markets and industry and government restructuring in
the wake of National Competition Policy. However, there has been recent recovery in education,
research and development capacity, especially in the rural sector. Armidale hosts a number of Breed
Societies.
In the 2001 Socio-Economic Indexes for Country Areas (Haberkorn et al. 2004:98), ArmidaleDumaresq scored relatively well in terms of four socio-economic disadvantage factorslow income,
low educational attainment, high unemployment and people with low skilled occupations; factors
likely to influence how a community copes with crisis. The rural surrounds of Armidale were ranked
in the category 5 to 20% above the non-metropolitan average for this index while the city area ranked
0 to 5% above the average.
The Social Impact of an FMD Outbreak
The Productivity Commission (2002) estimated that the northern Statistical Division would be amongst those
districts whose economy would be most adversely affected by a FMD outbreak. As education is one of the
major industries sustaining the economy in Armidale, the city is likely to be reasonably well-placed to withstand
the crisis. However, the grazing industry in the surrounding areas would be significantly affected. This is a
prime Merino wool growing area with long established operations. The culling of stock particularly from stud
operations would mean the loss of significant bloodlines and breeding stock, which will be traumatic for the
owners and result in long-term consequences for the local economy. There will be a loss of jobs on farms, and
from associated businesses such as the saleyards, selling agents, livestock carriers, and agricultural contractors.
There would be few opportunities for farm employees within the timber processing or non-livestock farming
operations. Although many displaced workers would be utilised in the emergency response, once that task was
completed, there could be a loss of these employees and their families and their skills from the district as they
seek work elsewhere. Those agricultural workers who are older are less likely to be able to seek alternative
employment or move from the district. Although the district records a sound socio-economic index rating, an
unemployment rate of 9% means that there will be little alternative employment opportunities. However, it is
likely that the number of students within the community will sustain the local economy throughout the period of
downturn in the agricultural industries.
There are several Breed Societies located within Armidale and Livestock Cooperative Research Centres on
campus at the University of New England. These would also be affected by a disease outbreak as grower
contributions fall with the consequential loss of income from the disease outbreak. It is likely that Wool Expo
would be cancelled with the loss of income and prestige associated with that event.
While the community generally is not as dependent upon the agricultural industries for employment, the loss of
income in the rural sector would mean that the retail sector would subsequently lose income as well. This may
also result in the loss of jobs. As the Productivity Commission (2001) notes, expenditure by farm families on
household items, farm inputs and large capital items is an important source of income for local business such as
retail trade, transport and storage, finance and machinery repairs. These businesses in turn provide opportunities
for off farm employment for farm families. Such opportunities will be lost.
Tourism would suffer as tourists are diverted to other areas. Education institutions, particularly the private
boarding schools, may lose students as farm families withdraw their children because they can no longer afford
to keep them in school or because they fear the spread of disease. Communication and information delivery
during an emergency disease outbreak will need to take account of the significant numbers of different cultures
within this relatively small community. Information targeting non-English speaking residents will need to
ensure that biosecurity precautions are understood by this sector.
Local Community Preparedness
Armidale has a Local Emergency Management Plan maintained by a management committee comprised of
representatives of those government agencies that would be involved in the response and recovery to an
emergency if it occurs. The Committee convenes regular meetings and staged a tabletop exercise on the social
impact of a FMD outbreak, which is incorporated into the present study (see Chapter 6).

57

5.6

Casino, New South Wales

Figure 5.4: Richmond Valley Shire.

5.6.1 District
Casino is located 726 km north of Sydney and
228 km south of Brisbane, on the Richmond
River on the Far North Coast of NSW. The
town is the hub of all the major east/west and
north/south transport routes as the Bruxner
Highway links the Northern Tablelands with
Lismore, while the Summerland Way connects
with Brisbane and Grafton. Casino is the major
centre of the Richmond Valley Shire. The Shire
encapsulates rural farming communities and
coastal tourist communities. These include
Evans Head, Woodburn, Broadwater/Rileys Hill
and Coraki.

The district comprises mountain bush and hilly scrubland, timber country and grazing land, sugar
cane, and tea tree stands to coastal heath. Most of the area is relatively flat or gently sloping terrain.
Approximately 30% of the total area contains state forests, national parks and nature reserves. The
areas natural features (rich soils, temperate to sub-tropical climate and high rainfall) provide an ideal
environment for various agricultural and horticultural enterprises.

5.6.2 Community profile

Population growth or decline
The 2001 Census population for the Richmond Valley Shire was 20 369a fall of -4.2% since 1996.
Casino is the largest town with a population of 10 057. Yet, like many inland rural communities,
Casino has experienced an outflow of population (-6.7%) since 1996. The contributing factors in
Casino are linked to young people needing to access tertiary education and employment options in
other areas. This is reflected in the low proportion of 25 to 34 year old age groups (11%) in the town.
Conversely, the rural areas have increased their populations by 2.5% since 1996. Just over 54% of the
population was living at the same address as they did at the 1996 Census compared to 39.5% for
Australia as a whole.
Indigenous people comprise 5.5% of the total population. According to the 2001 Census, 89.8% of
the population is Australian-born while 5% of the population was born overseas. This compares to
72% and 29% respectively for the nation. Most of the shires population (94%) speaks English
compared to 79% nationally. The remainder of the population speaks Chinese, Italian, German and
Filipino languages.
Ratio of younger population to older population
The shire has an aging population. The median age for Casino is 38 years and 39 years for the
remainder of the shire compared to 35 years for Australia. Twenty-two per cent of the population are
aged over 60 years, 32% are aged 35 to 59 years and 27% are aged 5 to 24 years. Nationally 17% of

58

the total population are aged over 60 years, 34% are aged 35 to 59 years and there is the same
proportion of 5 to 24 year olds (27%) as the Richmond Valley Shire.
Age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers
Thirty-four per cent of agricultural workers are aged 55 years and over compared to 27% nationally.
The larger proportion (44%) is aged between 35 and 54 years compared with 45% across Australia.
As in the Armidale-Dumaresq Shire, these rates reflect the aging of the farming population generally.
Median income relative to the national average
The median weekly individual income was $200 to $299, compared to $300 to $399 for Australia as a
whole. The median weekly family income was $600 to $699 compared with the national median of
$800 to $899. The median weekly household income was $500 to $599 compared with $700 to $799
for the nation.
Educational and skill profile of inhabitants
Eight per cent of the population held a postgraduate degree, graduate diploma or graduate certificate,
3.3% held a bachelor degree and 15% had a certificate level qualification. This compares with 3.2%,
9.7% and 15.7% respectively nationwide. Over 79% did not hold a qualification or did not state one
compared with 65% nationally. Other skills are mostly in the area of engineering (6.68%) and
management and commerce (4.31%).
Housing ownership
Of all occupied private homes in the 2001 Census, 67% were privately owned or are being purchased
compared to 66% nationally. Over 26% are rented which equates to the national average.
Unemployment
Unemployment is high (12.5%) compared to 7.4% for the whole of Australia. Nevertheless,
unemployment has declined in the past decade. The nature of employment has changed with an
increase in the number of persons employed part-time (Richmond Valley Shire 2004). The major
industries employing people within the Richmond Valley LGA are retail (15.36%), manufacturing
(14.38%), agriculture, forestry and fishing (11.17%), and health and community services (10.41%).
The national averages are 14.6%, 12.2%, 4% and 9.7% respectively.
Remoteness
Casino is categorised as accessible by the ARIA scale. This means that geographic distance imposes
only some restriction upon accessibility to the widest range of goods and services and social
interaction opportunities.

5.6.3 Economic sustainability

Economic activity is predominantly rural. Agricultural industries include beef production, sugar cane,
tea tree, soybean, dairy farming, and poultry. There is also commercial fishing, and timber production.
A major sugar mill is located at Broadwater. The rural areas of the LGA are closely connected with
the township of Casino, in terms of major primary products processing plants including meat works
and abattoirs. Over 120 000 head of cattle are sold at the Casino Livestock Selling Centre each year.
Casino is known as The Beef Capital. It has an official Beef Week, which is held each May.

59

Tourism is a developing industry along the coastal strip, with a focus on Evans Head. According to the
Socio-Economic Index for Areas, the shire is ranked 0 to 5% below the average for non-metropolitan
areas. This would reflect the lower family and household income, low education levels and proportion
of low skilled occupations.
The Social Impact of an FMD Outbreak
With this community being so dependent upon agricultural industries it will be significantly affected by an
emergency animal disease outbreak. Such an outbreak may require the closure of the highways, which would
significantly disrupt several major road links and result in the loss of passing trade for the local economy. There
is a high unemployment rate in the district and a higher proportion of part-time work, which means that there
will be limited employment opportunities for the large numbers of displaced workers from the agricultural
operations and associated industries that will cease in the event of a disease outbreak. Although there is a sugar
industry within the area, recent economic downturns in the industry will not provide many opportunities for
those seeking work. In addition, job opportunities would be limited for the many older workers within the shire.
However, should displaced workers leave this community, there would be significant fall in the skill base. There
is a high proportion of home ownership, which means most people (particularly the older, established residents)
may not wish to leave their community. There will need to be some support systems to sustain these residents
until the community has recovered from the crisis.
However, the Productivity Commission has estimated that the Statistical Division, of which Richmond Valley is
a part, will be only partially affected by a FMD outbreak because livestock and ancillary industries employ only
11% of the workforce. The timber and tourism industries may continue to support some sectors. The districts
proximity to Lismore and the Gold Coast may provide some employment alternatives for the period of
downturn.
Local Community Preparedness
The Casino community are very well-aware of the devastating consequences of an emergency animal disease
outbreak within their district. Accordingly, they have been proactive in emergency management. The Casino
Saleyard was the first saleyard complex to develop an emergency plan. This plan has been used as a model for
saleyards in other communities. The abattoir has also been proactive in planning strategies, as it is a total
export-oriented market employing 330 full-time workers and up to 700 casual workers. Casino was also a
significant player within Exercise Minotaur. The Local Emergency Management Committee is actively
pursuing new and better ways to safeguard the community in the event of a disease outbreak.

60

5.7

Roma, Queensland
Figure 5.5: Roma and Bungil Shires.

5.7.1 District
Roma is located in South Western Queensland,
487 km west of Brisbane on the Warrego Highway.
Roma is centred in the Bungil Shire, which covers an
area of 13 302 square kilometres. Roma town
accounts for a further 77.7 square kilometres.
Bungil Shire includes the towns of Injune,
Muckadilla, Hodgson and Wallambilla.
Most of the area comprises flat grazing plains but
north of Injune is the Carnarvon Gorge National
Park. The climate is generally dry with an average
rainfall of less than 600 mm per year. Drought has
adversely affected agriculture and only recently has
the drought declaration been lifted. However, most
properties have been affected and will take time to
recover.

5.7.2 Community profile

Population growth or decline
Roma is the largest regional centre in South Western Queensland. The population according to the
2001 Census was 6346 people. This represents a decrease of (-1.4%) since the 1996 Census. For
Bungil Shire, the population was 1999, an increase of 1.1% since 1996. The larger proportion (400)
resides in the town of Injune. Roma has a high turnover of population with only 42% reporting being
at the same address as five years ago. For Bungil Shire, 55% of the population were living at the same
address as they did in 1996.
There were 469 Indigenous people (7.4%) an increase of (13.6%) in Roma and 44 (2.2%) in Bungil.
The majority of the population (91.1%) were Australian-born. The proportion of people born overseas
was (4.3%). Most (95%) spoke English while the remainder spoke Chinese, French, Hindi and
Croatian languages.
Ratio of younger population to older population
The proportion of young people (those aged 5 to 24 years) was 29% (the national average is 27%).
Only 15% are aged 60 years and over compared to 16.6% for the nation. The median age for Roma is
32 years and for Bungil Shire, it is 37 years compared to 35 years for the nation.
Age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers
Over 36% of agricultural workers are over the age of 55 years compared to 27% Australia-wide. The
greater proportion of workers (39%) is aged between 35 years and 54 years compared with 45%
nationally.

61

Median income relative to the national average

The median weekly individual income was $400 to $499, which is greater than the median for the rest
of the country ($300 to $399). The median weekly family income was $800 to $999 and the median
weekly household income of $700 to $799 is the same as the median for the nation as a whole.
Educational and skill profile of inhabitants
In 2001, postgraduate degrees, graduate diplomas or graduate certificates were held by 1.1% of the
population while 7% held a bachelor degree and 14% had a certificate level qualification. The national
proportions are 3.2% 9.7% and 15.7% respectively. Other skills were in the area of engineering
(7.11%) and health (4.35%).
Housing ownership
Of all the occupied private dwellings in the 2001 Census, (61%) were either fully owned or being
purchased, while (30%) were being rented.
Unemployment
In the 2001 Census, the unemployment rate stood at 4.3% compared to the national rate of 7.4%.
Agriculture is the principal employer in this region (16.24%) followed by retail trade (14.80%), health
services (9.24%) and construction (7.33).
Remoteness
Roma is categorised as remote on the ARIA scale. That is, there is a high level of restriction on
access to goods and services and opportunities for social interaction.

5.7.3 Economic sustainability

The economy is predominately rural. The main industries are beef production, grain growing and wool
growing. Sheep numbers have significantly decreased since 1970, while cattle numbers have
increased. Roma has a meat works and Injune has two sawmills. The district has a large natural gas
and coal seam methane gas (CSM) industry. Significant expansion to the gas fields is taking place east
of Injune and north east of Roma. There is also a winery. The tourism industry offers 4WD tracks,
bush walking, fishing and rock climbing and the Carnarvon Gorge. Roma has several historic
buildings and an oil and gas museum.
The Roma-Bungil Saleyard is a major contributor to the districts economy. The complex is the largest
cattle-selling centre in Australia with an annual throughput of 220 000 animals. The centre primarily
caters for cattle sales (mainly store cattle) and related activities, such as bull sales. Store and prime
sales are held weekly. Being in a very central location, the Centre attracts buyers and sellers across
Queensland and interstate. The saleyards employ three permanent staff and up to six casual staff.
Contractors engaged at the yards employ a further ten staff. The saleyards also impact upon
employment capability within associated businesses such as the six Stock and Station Agents that
employ 55 people as well as other indirect rural businesses. Livestock transport businesses rely upon
the saleyard for their business and therefore employment. A survey of producers, livestock buyers,
transporters and others associated with the saleyard (Livestock Exchange Consultancy and Kattle Gear
Australia 2003) found the centre is a significant place of social interaction88% of respondents had
attended the sales at the saleyard on at least six and up to 15 occasions over the previous year without
selling or buying. Livestock producers travel an average of 119 km and up to 500 km to attend sales
while buyers travelled on average 240 km. Therefore, these people would stay and shop in Roma on
sale days. Of the nine livestock transport services interviewed, most had their vehicles serviced in

62

Roma and most bought tyres, fuel and accommodation services. The study found over a quarter of the
saleyards customers come from outside the area. A survey of local businesses found 82% believed
the saleyards had a positive effect on their business. It is estimated that Roma has 412 businesses and
100 sale days, which equates to $211 000 per sale day and $21.1 million annually. This equates to
40 full-time jobs.
In the 2001 Socio-Economic Indexes for Country Areas (Haberkorn et al. 2004:98), Roma-Bungil
Shire score the highest rank 5 to 20% above the non-metropolitan average for this index. The higher
salaries, and low unemployment rate would contribute to this rating. However, Bungil Shire scored a
much higher rating than surrounding local government areas.
The Social Impact of an FMD Outbreak
The Productivity Commission (2002) rated South Western Queensland as the area that would be most adversely
affected by a year-long FMD outbreak. This assessment was based upon analyses of Statistical Divisions
according to employment growth, unemployment rate and relative socio-economic disadvantage. The district
was amongst those regions most dependent upon livestock for economic sustainability (Productivity
Commission 2002). In addition, a decade of drought will have weakened the resilience of this community to
withstand a disease outbreak.
Although unemployment is relatively low in comparison with the other communities, there will be limited
alternative work opportunities in the region. Some employment may be available within the gas industries,
depending upon the types of skills required. Education levels are low which lessens the ability of displaced
workers to find alternatives. Along with the remoteness of this region many workers will leave the area, which
will mean a significant loss of skills from the district.
The remoteness of this region will compound the isolation of farm families in restricted areas. Many are older
and will require social and economic support to sustain them over the period of downturn and re-establish their
farm businesses.
Conversely, the isolation may assist in the control of the disease although significant
infestation of feral pigs in this outback region and their possible role in spreading disease will be a major
concern.
Local Community Preparedness
Roma-Bungil Shire is well-prepared with emergency management plans that are reviewed annually or following
an emergency. The plans include a community recovery committee, which will coordinate the recovery process.
The plan incorporates the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, St Vincent de Paul and Ministers Fraternal and local
service clubs working with Community Health, the Neighbourhood Centre and the Department of Family, Youth
and Community. Training simulations are conducted periodically to test the knowledge of the response
agencies in dealing with and planning for such events. Several community groups, such as the Salvation Army,
Red Cross and the combined churches, have outlets in town and are usually part of disaster exercises and disaster
recovery operations. Welfare headquarters will be based at the Roma Neighbourhood Centre which functions as
a Family Support Service providing ongoing assistance to rural families, namely support and counselling for
family problems, an information service and assistance for community groups dealing with rural and drought
issues. This role will be extended in the event of a disease outbreak.

63

5.8

Camperdown Victoria
Figure 5.7: Corangamite Shire.

5.8.1 District
Camperdown is the largest centre within
Corangamite Shire in the centre of South West
Victoria. The shire covers an area of
approximately 4396 square kilometres. It
extends from Port Campbell in the south to
Skipton in the north, east to Lake Corangamite
and to west to Terang.
The shire also
encompasses the communities of, Cobden,
Simpson, Timboon, Princetown, Derrinallum,
Darlington, Lismore and Noorat.
The shire has a diversity of land types ranging
from lower rainfall, cropping and grazing plains
in the north through volcanic areas containing
stony rises on the eastern side and closer settled
farming areas in the south.

5.8.2 Community profile

Population growth or decline
In 2001, the population of the shire was 16 675, a decrease of 3.7% in the north of the shire and an
increase of 0.8% in the south. The population is rising in a number of townships while the number of
people living in rural areas is declining. Camperdown has the largest population of 3600 followed by
Cobden with 1400. The population is relatively stable as in 2001, over 61% of residents were living at
the same address as they did in 1996.
There were only 69 Indigenous people in the shire (0.4%). Corangamite has a high proportion of
people born in Australia (90%) and 95% speak English. The remaining 10% of overseas born residents
speak German, Netherlandic and Italian.
Ratio of younger population to older population
The shire has an aging and shrinking population. Over 20% of residents are aged over 60 years
compared to 16.6% nationally, while 27% are aged 5 to 24 years, which is the national average. The
median age is 38 years compared with a median age of 35 years for Australia.
Age of agricultural owner-operators and agricultural workers
The Census data show that 26% of farmers and labourers in agricultural operations are aged 55 years
and over while 48% are aged 35 to 54 years. This again reflects the national trend of the aging of the
farming population (Barr 2001).
Median income relative to the national average
In 2001, the median weekly individual income was $300 to $399, which equates with the rest of the
country. The median weekly family income was $700 to $799 compared with $800 to $899 for the

64

whole of Australia. The median weekly household income was $600 to $699 compared with $700 to
$799 for the nation.
Educational and skill profile of inhabitants
The greater proportion of people in Corangamite Shire (15%) held certificate level qualifications,
which is similar to national averages of 15.7%. Few (7%) held university or tertiary level
qualifications compared to (13%) nationally. Other qualifications were held mostly in engineering and
related technologies (5.98%), agriculture, environmental and related studies (4.07%) and health
(4.39%).
Housing ownership
In 2001, 75% of all occupied private dwellings in Corangamite Shire were either fully owned or being
purchased. This represents a level of home ownership and/or home purchasing that is greater than the
national figure of 66%.
Unemployment
The unemployment rate was 4.3% as at the 2001 Census compared to 7.4% nationally. Agricultural
industries employ 36.16% of the workforce compared to 4% nationally. Other major employers are
manufacturing (9.76%), and health services (8.57%).
Remoteness
The Camperdown district, being only 192 km from the city of Melbourne, is assessed as being
accessible on the ARIA scale. That is, there is only minor restriction upon accessibility to goods and
services and social opportunities.

5.8.3 Economic sustainability

Corangamite Shire is primarily a farming area, producing milk, wool, beef, fat lamb and grain. A
livestock selling complex is located in Camperdown. The Centre sells approximately 67,000 livestock
annually. Corangamite Shire is one of the largest dairying regions in the southern hemisphere and this
supports a number of milk processing and stock feed producing industries.
The region is a major provider of raw milk for processing by local manufacturers as well as
manufacturers in other regions. Bonlac in Cobden is one of the largest milk drying plants in the world.
It employs up to 30 people and has the capacity to handle 20 million litres of milk. The Cobden plant
uses milk from approximately 830 farms and employs up to 250 people in the peak season. Bonlacs
products are exported to over 50 countries worldwide with major growth to South America, Central
America and China.
Other developments in Corangamite Shire include a small food manufacturing industry, producing
ice-cream, cheeses, wines, smoked eel, production and export of stock feed pellets, and poly products
producing water tanks and troughs. A plantation forestry industry is being established in the north of
the shire. Plants have been established in several centres in the shire to treat forestry plantation
products. A large industry based on natural gas extraction and supply has developed in the southern
half of the shire. Tourism is also a major industry. Corangamite Shire offers the Great Ocean Road,
the Port Campbell National Park, fishing lakes and volcanic hills and craters.
Major industry growth includes the dairying sector, estimated to be growing at around 7% per annum
(FSS DBA Dairy Web Report 2002 cited in Corangamite Shire 2004), and tourism, which is estimated
to be growing at around 10% per annum. Over the next decade milk production is expected to double

65

and visitor numbers to Port Campbell are expected to increase to 3.5 million by the year 2009 (Parks
Victoria 2002 cited in Corangamite Shire 2004). Gas projects have brought short-term economic
growth and some ongoing employment.
According to the relative Socio-economic Disadvantage Index (Haberkorn et al. 2004:98),
Corangamite Shire scored the highest ranking (5 to 20%) above the non-metropolitan average.
The Social Impact of an FMD Outbreak

The Productivity Commission (2002) assessed that this region would be the least affected by a yearlong FMD outbreak (see Figure 5.2). However, this Local Government Area has the highest level of
employment within agriculture and related industries (36%) and therefore, these employees would lose
their positions if a FMD outbreak occurred. The local economy would suffer from the closure of local
dairy factories, stockfeed plants and other agricultural industries. Cottage industries associated with
the dairying industry would also cease.
Unemployment is relatively low and there are employment opportunities in the timber and natural gas
industries, although whether those with skills in the agricultural industries would be suitable for this
type of employment is unknown. Being within an hours drive of the city of Geelong and two hours
from Melbourne, it is highly likely that many workers would leave for more employment
opportunities. However, this community is stable with a high level of home ownership. It is also an
aging population and therefore, many people would prefer not to leave the district.
The Great Ocean Road, which is a major tourist attraction in Australia, may be closed for a period of
time. Even if there were no road closures, tourists would be deterred from entering the region.
Local Community Preparedness

Corangamite Shire is well-represented in the area of emergency services. There are 41 fire brigades
within the municipality and five State Emergency Service units. The shire has a local emergency
management planning committee, which meets regularly to update Local Emergency Plans and
discuss issues. The Committee is made up of representatives of all emergency services and support
services.

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5.9

Summary and conclusions

The above analyses have highlighted the fact that small rural communities are not homogeneous and,
accordingly, their ability to cope with an emergency disease outbreak will differ. The Productivity
Commissions (2002) economical impact study of a FMD outbreak was conducted by Statistical
Division but the above analyses have shown that within these regions, there will be variance between
communities in the degree of economic impact and consequently the social impact. A communitys
experience and response will be dependent upon its unique geographic, economic, and social profile.
However, the analyses identified some similarities between the four case-study communities. There
will be few alternative job opportunities for displaced workers from agricultural and associated
industries and therefore these communities are likely to lose people and skills as workers opt to leave
in search of work. However, there were many older farmers/agricultural workers who are likely to be
settled in these communities and will not wish to leave. It is recommended that community leaders
explore options to sustain and retain these workers in the event of an emergency management disease
outbreak.
A communitys resilience to crisis will be influenced by social factors that are not always measurable,
such as the degree of social cohesion amongst residents, the effectiveness of community leadership
and the history of overcoming other crises within the community. These aspects of community were
explored within the workshop discussions conducted within each of the case-study communities to
examine more closely how small communities would cope with the social impact of a hypothetical
Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak. The findings of the workshops are presented within the following
chapter.

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68

Chapter 6: STUDY 3:
The Workshop Discussions
6.1

Introduction

As part the third study in this research project, focus groups were conducted within each of the four
case-study communities with farmers, local community leaders as well as various practitioners in first
responder agencies (police, state emergency services, veterinarians, livestock officers and other
representatives of the agricultural industries). The purpose of the focus groups was to discuss with
residents the potential social impact of a hypothetical Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak upon their
community. The findings of this study are summarised in this chapter according to several themes
addressed within the discussions. These included the issue of information dissemination within the
community and possible communication networks that could be utilised, possible support systems that
could address the social impact of an EAD upon farm families and the wider community, the possible
unemployment and economic loss that could result from an outbreak and the steps community
organisations could take to better prepare their district to withstand such a crisis.

6.2

Objectives

The aim of the study was to facilitate discussion amongst residents within the four case-study
communities regarding the potential social impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon the
community and to explore ways to better safeguard the community should such an event occur.
Within these discussions, the study sought to identify those social factors idiosyncratic to each
community that may facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans.
The objective of the study was to highlight various social issues at the small community level that will
need to be considered in any future development of policies and programs pertaining to community
recovery.

6.3

Method

The focus of the present study, which centred upon gathering an understanding of the views of
residents on community preparedness for an EAD, supported the use of focus groups as the primary
means of gathering data. Focus groups encourage the interaction of group members towards
identifying and clarifying issues and in doing so can enhance the knowledge of participants. The
limitations of focus groups are the non-random selection of group participants and the limited numbers
of those who are able to participate (Stayner and Foskey 1997).
The fieldwork was conducted in the summer of 20042005. The workshop in Armidale was held in
conjunction with a tabletop exercise on the response to a Foot-and-Mouth Disease outbreak in that
community that was conducted by the Shires Local Emergency Management Committee. The
exercise focused primarily on the immediate social impacts of the technical response to control the
disease.
The workshops within Roma, Casino and Camperdown considered the immediate as well as the longterm social impacts of an EAD outbreak upon the community. Workshop participants were identified
by contacting various agencies located in each district. Initially, cooperation was sought with the local

69

Shire Council, namely those staff responsible for local emergency management. Organisations invited
to participate included:

Police, State Emergency Services, Ambulance, State and Rural Fire Services

National Parks and Environmental Protection Agencies

Departments of Education, Health and Community Services, and Primary Industry

Local Councils, Rural Lands Protection Boards, veterinarians, local saleyards, abattoirs and
dairy factory, livestock selling agents, livestock transport businesses; and

Community groups such as the Country Womens Association, Chamber of Commerce,

Farmer organisations, Salvation Army, and Rural Financial Counsellors.
Organisations in each community were initially contacted by telephone and invited to attend the
workshop. Information on the study and details on the workshop was then forwarded to prospective
participants by fax, mail or email. Those contacted were very interested in the project and keen to
attend. Several sought permission to invite colleagues who also wished to participate. Those who
could not attend requested information on the outcomes of the workshop. The only group that was not
interested in participating were the Chambers of Commerce in each community. While their
commitments to their local businesses may have precluded them from attending, they did not appear
to be as interested in the study as their fellow residents. Yet, small local businesses would be
significantly affected by a disease outbreak. For example, the first business to close in Mangrove
Mountain was the local childcare business. This finding may indicate that future biosecurity
awareness campaigns should be extended to the wider community to raise awareness that the impact
of an EAD outbreak will not be confined to just the agricultural industries.
Attendance at the workshop was taken as participants consent to be a part of the study. Each
participant was provided with a letter outlining the purpose of the study and advised that they were
under no obligation to participate in the workshop and need only contribute to the discussion as much
as they wished, and that they were free to leave at any time. Participants were also assured of
confidentiality. These assurances were reiterated at the commencement of each workshop discussion.
Each workshop was videotaped to record proceedings. Permission to do so was obtained from
participants prior to the commencement of each meeting. Participants were advised that the tapes
would be destroyed once the investigator had completed the final report. None of the participants
objected to the recording. The transcripts of each tape were evaluated and relevant data were
summarised for inclusion in the study. The responses to four open-ended written questions completed
by participants were assessed.
There were 27 people in attendance at the Armidale exercise, 30 at the workshop in Casino, 22 in
Roma and 15 in Camperdown. The workshops were conducted over two-and-a-half hours. Mr Kevin
Cooper, who is responsible for Emergency Disease Management with NSW Department of Primary
Industry and was an advisor to the project, attended three of the four workshops to present an
overview of his experience assisting with the FMD outbreak in Britain in 2001 and his management of
the Newcastle Disease outbreak in poultry at Mangrove Mountain in 1999.2 For the workshop in
Camperdown, Ms Lyn Stenos (NSW Department of Primary Industry) gave the presentation in
Mr Coopers absence.
Participants in the workshops were keenly interested in the presentation and clearly found it most
informative. While most were aware of the FMD outbreak in the UK, few were aware of the details of
the impact upon the Mangrove Mountain community of the Newcastle Disease outbreak and the
measures taken to control the disease. Mr Coopers presentation was followed by discussion of a
hypothetical FMD outbreak on the community. Each workshop was provided with a hypothetical,
which was used to guide the discussion on how a potential FMD outbreak would socially impact upon
2

A summary of Mr Coopers presentation is provided in Appendix 1.

70

the community. The hypothetical was devised by the committee organising the Armidale tabletop
exercise (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: The Hypothetical of a FMD outbreak in the Armidale district.
At 6.00 p.m. on Wednesday 9 June 2005 the Armidale RLPB District Vet is contacted by a local farmer advising
of a mysterious disease in a pig at a rural village 30 km east of Armidale. The RLPB District Vet arrives at the
farm on the following morning at 9.00 am and is presented with a clear case of FMD in the pig. The Armidale
cattle sale is on Thursday 10 June at the Armidale Saleyards. Cattle are already in the saleyards. The agents for
the saleyards also run the hobby farm sales in town. The village shop owner purchased the infected pig from the
hobby farm sale in Armidale on Sunday 6 June. The pig is now kept in a pen behind the shop. The other 5 pigs
in the pen all went to different purchasers around Armidale.
The village consists of about 20 houses, a shop (including the post office outlet), a pub and a school. The village
has a dog stud, as well as several hobby farmers with goats, alpacas, cows and sheep as walking
lawnmowers/pets. It is on a major road between Armidale and the coast and it services a rural community
around the village out to about 20 km. This road becomes very busy during school holidays, is a popular tourist
route and is an important transport link from the Southern Tablelands to Grafton, Coffs Harbour and Kempsey.
The June long weekend commences on Saturday 12 June and school holidays commence Friday 2 July. The
village is to host the local rodeo on the long weekend and stock are already in the yards ready for the show that
starts Friday 11th June. The shop owner does a milk run around the farms in the area and did his last run on
Wednesday 9 June where he visited amongst other cattle/sheep farms, a piggery of about 8000 pigs.
At 8.30 am on Thursday 11 June 30 local school kids start classes. There are three teachers and two additional
staff at the school. The kids were brought to the school through the village on dirt roads in school buses from
the north and south of the village. There has been sporadic rain for the last two weeks and roads in the area are
wet with vehicles coated with mud. A cold front is about to hit eastern NSW. It is expected to drop 20 mm of
rain in the Northern Tablelands and drop day temperatures to 10oC. It will be accompanied by gusty winds to
30 km/hr.
(Source: Armidale Local Emergency Management Committee 2004.)

The hypothetical was modified to reflect the characteristics of each of the three other communities. A
small village with similar characteristics to the site of the disease outbreak as described above was
identified in each area (see Figure 6.1). For example, a similar village is situated 40 km west of
Casino on the Bruxner Highway, which has a population of 140 and services a rural community within
a circumference of 20 km. There is a general store (including a post office outlet), a hotel, a garage,
several cattle studs, a livestock transport business and a primary school with about 30 pupils. Stock
graze on blocks of land that are scattered throughout the village. Farmland and significant national
parks, forests and nature reserves surround the community. The town is located on a major road,
which is a popular tourist route and an important transport link from northern inland areas to the coast.
Figure 6.1: The hypothetical site of a FMD outbreak in the Casino district.

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6.4

The Armidale exercise

The workshop in Armidale was organised

and conducted by the Armidale-Dumaresq
Shire Local Emergency Management
Committee as a real-time tabletop
exercise. The objectives of the Armidale
exercise were:

to test the response capabilities of

emergency services and functional
area teams to an EAD outbreak

to assess the socio-economic

impact of a FMD outbreak on a
rural community

to observe how disease spread can

impact on social and infrastructure
networks

to highlight to response agencies

the social impact of a FMD
outbreak.
(Armidale Local Emergency
Management Committee 2004.)

Figure 6.2: Inspector Matt Lynch and David Steller,

Local Emergency Management Committee at the
Armidale exercise.

Using the hypothetical to guide the exercise, several scenarios were introduced and the various
agencies were asked how they would respond. The exercise evolved as follows:

An immediate restriction was placed upon movement of people, livestock and livestock
products within the restricted areas, which was policed by roadblocks.

The local saleyard was locked down. All stock held at the yards would have to be destroyed.
The 300 farmers, buyers, agents and others present along with their vehicles, dogs and horses
had to be disinfected before being allowed to leave. Decontamination requires removal and
disposal of clothing and showering, and there are no showers at the site. A perimeter barrier
and decontamination units had to be established. Food, clothing and other support services for
those within the saleyard as well as the emergency workers had to be organised. The
Environmental Protection Agency requested that wastewater from the wash down area be
retained.

One person within the locked down area of the saleyard had a suspected heart attack requiring
urgent medical attention. Emergency response teams were required to handle the situation to
ensure contamination was not carried off the site. The hospital needed to secure an area to
treat the patient.

The village where the disease was first identified was also locked down. This involved the
closure of a school and a major tourist road that was policed by three police vehicles. A
decontamination unit and a drop-off point for food and clothing were set up on the periphery
of the restricted area. Parents of children at the school had to be contacted to collect their
children. Children who had been in contact with livestock within the village needed to be
disinfected. Counselling services would be required.

The restricted zone around the village also includes a National Park. There were concerns
about campers or bushwalkers likely to be in the park. There are also feral pig populations.
The National Parks and Wildlife Service provided two shooters and a helicopter to eradicate
the pigs.

The rodeo was cancelled. There were 100 steers in the yards considered to be a risk which had
to be culled. About 1000 people estimated to attend the event had to be stopped. Some
people, such as rodeo participants, would be immediately affected by this action and would

72

require accommodation and financial assistance to move on. The local shopkeeper who
sponsored the event demanded compensation.
There was a risk of disease within the remaining litter of pigs sold at the hobby sale. Other
animals may also be infected. The 350 people who attended the sale would have to be
contacted and measures taken if they had contact with livestock. Selling agents maintain
records of vendors and buyers, which would enable the trace of the source and destination of
stock sold.
The media would be utilised to disseminate information to the community to alert others who
visited the hobby sale but did not participate. This would need to be done without creating
hysteria within the wider community. It will be imperative to ensure accurate and timely
information is disseminated to the community. Few people will have prior experience with the
consequences of such a response. The community is likely to divide, as some will not realise
the importance of what needs to be done to control the emergency.
Thirty people presented to the hospital with what they believe to be FMD symptoms. The
hospital must cope with this crisis and ensure information about the disease not being
infectious to humans is communicated to the general public.
A vehicle rolled in wet and slippery conditions on the highway one kilometre west of the
quarantined village, resulting in a spill of diesel and chemicals into the table drain. The State
Emergency Services vehicle attended with three staff. The highway was closed to all traffic,
and soil used to render the area safe. The fire brigade attended to prevent diesel entering
waterways.
Support services were organised for 500 emergency workers and the public caught in
restricted areas. The Salvation Army would provide food, with St Vincent de Paul providing
clothing and bedding, and Red Cross, Seventh Day Adventist and Anglicare providing
accommodation and support. The show grounds would be used as a dissemination point.
The fire hazard may increase through a build-up of vegetation on the now empty blocks.
Farms not culled would require assistance with feed and care for stock that remained confined
by movement restrictions. (Armidale Local Emergency Management Committee 2004.)

The exercise concluded with a general discussion of the long-term social impacts of such an outbreak
upon the Armidale community. Some of the main points of the discussion are included within the
following sections which summarise the findings of the workshops held in Casino, Roma and
Camperdown.

6.5

Focus group discussions

The focus group commenced with participants being asked to list what they considered to be the
greatest risks to their community for an Emergency Animal Disease. Roma residents believed
breaches of quarantine such as swill feeding; feral pigs and goats; or imported livestock were the
greatest threats. In Casino, it was international tourists and the districts proximity to the coast where
boats could land or dump waste offshore. Armidale residents cited bio-terrorism; breakdown in
quarantine procedures; peri-urban hobby farmers not recognising disease symptoms in stock; and
international students bringing in contaminated foodstuffs.
Participants were also asked to identify what they believe would be the main social impacts of an EAD
outbreak. The perceived social impacts identified in Armidale were isolation; crime; economic
decline and division within the community. In Casino, the likely social impacts were the loss of
employment and income, isolation, the loss of community and psychological stress. Roma
participants talked about social isolation; economic loss; unemployment and people leaving the
district. In Camperdown it was unemployment; economic loss; decline in tourism; disruption to
normal life and a loss of innocence with contamination.

73

The groups were also asked what were the strengths of their community for coping with crises.
Participants were able to draw upon their previous experiences with bushfires, drought and the closure
of major businesses. Participants in all communities talked about community resilience, strong social
networks and past histories of residents uniting to support each other in times of crisis. When asked if
any barriers existed that may prevent their community coping with crisis, participants in Casino listed
the dependency of the local economy on the livestock industries; apathy, ignorance or denial within
the community about the effects of a disease outbreak; a large number of unemployed or low income
populations lacking resources to cope with the crisis; and a lack of cooperation and distrust of
officials. In Armidale, participants cited a lack of funding and resources; the lack of cohesion between
the townies and the rurals that would lead to a them and us problem; and the number of absentee
landowners in the district, which has been a problem for emergency services in the past. Roma
participants cited distance; a lack of funding, resources and manpower; and a lack of experience in
EADs combined with a culture of independence that may limit requests for outside assistance.
The workshop participants had considered the possibility of an emergency disease outbreak within
their community and the social consequences that would follow. One of the Armidale group noted:
We could be looking at an economic downturn thats five times greater than that
of the drought. We would have a major population declineprobably going from
25 000 to 20 000 fairly quickly with businesses having to close. That will have
consequences for schools. Teachers will have to leave because there are not
enough students at school and we will lose a whole host of established families.
And its hard to get people to move to regional areas like Armidalewe are
trying to grow the population all the time.

A Casino resident observed:

The impact would be huge if a major exotic disease like Foot-and-Mouth hit this
region. Casino has traditionally relied very heavily on the beef and dairy
industries. In the past, cattle price fluctuations have governed the entire
economics of the town. Recent years have seen a greater diversification of
income. However, a lot of our economic turnover is still related to cattle prices.
Assuming a stock standstill for six months and quarantine etc, the local economy
would be devastated with disastrous flow-on effects.

6.5.1 Immediate social impacts

The workshop discussions then moved to consider the immediate impacts of a FMD outbreak as
defined by the hypothetical. Much of the discussion considered many of the issues covered within the
Armidale tabletop exercise as described above. However, there were some additional points of interest
raised in the focus group discussions that are summarised in the following sections.
The local saleyards
In Roma, past incidences with diseases in stock provided some appreciation of the types of problems
that could arise at a saleyard if disease was identified. As one participant explained:
You dont need a FMD outbreak to close saleyards. Someone unloaded tickaffected cattle at Chinchilla saleyards. Fortunately the ticks were discovered
before the cattle were put in with the rest of the stock. So you could use the
saleyards but the unloading facilities were closed for nine months.

There was some discussion of the difficulties that would be encountered in ensuring the
decontamination of all people, dogs, horses and vehicles quarantined at the sale. Kevin Cooper did
advise that this may not be as arduous task as first imagined. Those required to undergo disinfection

74

will only be those with high risk of infection. There may be an agreement that producers go home or
to a motel immediately and wash their clothes and footwear.
Roma participants also raised the issue of tracing livestock movements from the saleyards.
A transport truck could have taken those cattle to different places, theyd move
in with other cattle from different places as well, so youd have to track down
where those trucks have been going. They might have only been there for an
hour.

Another agreed:
The interim stuff that they do as well, I mean, like taking a load from here to
there, and inter-property stuff in the meantime. To trace that is just mindblowing.

Another added a further concern:

I cant imagine those trucking companies volunteering the fact that their truck
was used. Theyd be keeping very quiet about it. Theyd be trying to put hoses
out very quickly themselves and let it go down the drain.

The discussion then addressed the concern that there may be drivers who might wish to report that
they may have carried infected animals across the country but have been instructed by their company
to remain quiet. The question was raised as to whether there would be an opportunity for a driver to
surreptitiously report such information. Another asked whether it would be possible to fine people
who did not voluntarily come forward. Kevin Cooper responded that past experience has shown that
the community excerpts more pressure than the regulatory bodies: Someone usually says something
to someone along the way. There is a lot of peer pressure.
Health
The groups were also asked to consider how they would cope if a farmer quarantined at the saleyards
had a heart attack. Ambulance officers in each group responded with a description of the procedures
for treating a patient in accordance with AUSVETPLAN. The response would be focused upon not
spreading disease, which would require leaving the ambulance at the perimeter of the quarantined area
and under advice of those in charge, observe quarantine procedures, stabilise the patient and then
transport him to hospital.
Hospital representatives were also asked how they would cope. The representative in Camperdown
commented that she would immediately know about a disease outbreak because she would lose staff:
Most of my staff are women from the land, either working part-time or casually. She noted that
normal staffing shortages would mean that the inevitable loss of staff would create significant
difficulties. She concluded that any increase in patients would mean they would have to be sent to St.
Elsewhere because the local hospital would be unable to cope. She also raised the issue that with
restriction zones, district nurses would be unable to move about the district to treat patients. Another
participant advised that under the Area Health Disaster Plans, patients would be moved to various
hospitals according to requirements.
Health workers were also asked to consider how they would cope with people presenting to the
hospital complaining of symptoms of FMD. A Casino participant suggested that the emergency
department might not be first point of call for these people. They may present to pharmacies and
general practitioners. Health representatives responded that they would use the media to address
misinformation within the community.

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Schools
The discussions then centred upon how the local school which was quarantined in the hypothetical
scenario would cope with the quarantine procedures and the reuniting of children with their parents.
Kevin Cooper explained that as with the saleyard, quarantine procedures would be conducted
according to the degree of risk:
Even people on infected premises can leave to get their children provided they
meet specific conditions; for example, they dont use the farm ute. People are just
expected to change clothes and disinfect shoes. If children have to feed stock, to
do that they would need to put on specific clothes and then change afterwards and
wash the clothes and shoes.
Disinfection of School Buses would be dependent upon risk assessment. If buses
were in or near infected sites, there would be a need to disinfect the wheels.
Restricted Area Management Security (RAMS) officers would enforce quarantine
requirements but they would try to make soft rather than hard restrictions, as they
have to educate as well as enforce regulations.

One of the educators within the Casino group questioned:

Something like that would be like a flood; happen very quickly. We would have
contacts for every child and would have to let parents know. We would have get
advice... While all schools have emergency management plans, lock down
procedures etc, do we need to go to the extent of having something in place
generically developed for all of the state so that everyone is aware of what to do
in the event of a major disease outbreak?

Kevin Cooper agreed that such plans should be developed but plans should also be developed in the
context of each school. Another participant maintained that such plans should not be too involved.
All that a headmaster would require is a job card outlining what to do if disease outbreak occurs. The
educators agreed that schools could establish such a scheme with knowledge of the right procedures.
For example, schools would be unable to release students to non-family members unless they were
authorised by parents.
He noted that a Hotline for schools was about to be introduced and it may be possible for the operator
to also be responsible for alerting the appropriate people in schools in an EAD emergency. The
eductors concluded that it was vitally important that policies on how to respond to disease outbreaks
be on the Education Departments agenda. Another participant suggested that such plans must be
developed in line with AUSVETPLAN to ensure consistency.
In Casino, the local shire representative noted that a school has been included in the community
consultation process currently being conducted as part of risk assessment of possible hazards within
the shire. The shire has provided the school with a list of contact details for various emergency
management services and the school in turn will provide a list of executives who can be contacted
immediately in the event of a crisis.
She noted:
The school has a checklist of what to do in an emergency and therefore what to
do in the event of a disease outbreak could be incorporated fairly easy into these
plans. But this would need to be right across the shire. There will be no point in
having plans in one district and not an adjoining one. Such plans in place would
make the job of local emergency management committees much easier.

76

She also noted that there is no consistency between Shire Councils in their level of commitment to
emergency management.
While every Local Government Area will have to assess hazards risk posed to
people and infrastructure, the level of consultation will differ between councils.
We plan to go one-step further and contact schools and we will get round to other
community organisations. This area is very vulnerable to Foot-and-Mouth.

6.5.2 Communication
The majority of the workshop discussions concentrated on several concepts of the social impact of an
EAD outbreak. First, workshop participants were asked how they could best meet the information
needs of local people in the event of a disease outbreak. One of the main complaints from farmers in
the United Kingdom during the FMD outbreak was the lack of information from government agencies.
Farmers wanted access to accurate and reliable information on disease locations and control measures,
and what they should be doing to protect their properties.
The participants in Roma initially raised concerns about how soon the local community would be
notified that a disease outbreak had occurred. As one person noted:
I just raise this because the last suspected disease outbreak near Taroom about
three years ago, it was just mentioned to me off-handedly about a day after it
happened that something was going on.

Kevin Cooper stated that the local community should know at first suspicion. He explained that in the
past, the community was not told until a disease had been confirmed. There were concerns that if tests
prove to be negative and news of an outbreak reached the outside world, it may damage export trade.
The policy now is for communities to be informed as soon as there is a high suspicion that disease will
be confirmed.
There was concern in all groups about the flow of information being top down and the needs of local
communities may not be considered. This may extend to a lack of consultation throughout the
management of the entire control and recovery response. Kevin Cooper noted that there were
problems in the UK and there are only two levels of government, central and regional; whereas in
Australia, there are three levels, namely Federal, State and Local. He informed the meetings that a
National Communications Network would prepare and authorise all official media releases. There is a
website (www.outbreak.gov.au), that will be used during an event, and a National Hotline will roll out
under Centrelinks banner immediately a disease outbreak is confirmed. While it will be important
that information is consistent and reliable, there will be a need for some local variation on that
information, namely what it will mean for local people. There is also a need to identify the best means
of reaching people within a community.
One Camperdown participant stated there would be a need to manage the flow of positive information
to ally peoples fears, reassure them that the outbreak has been isolated and contained and focus upon
their concerns about daily life; for example, their ability to move freely outside the restricted zones
and what they can do as individuals to protect their livestock and properties.
In all communities, local radio was identified as the best means of disseminating information,
followed by local newspapers and flyers sent by mail. There were discussions about the use of mobile
phones in the early stages of the crisis; for example, with the lockdown of the saleyard. Most people
(including farmers) have mobile phones. However, there were concerns that networks could soon
become overloaded in such situations. Participants also noted that there was a need for a hotline. The
Department of Community Services in Victoria has an information pack containing emergency

77

information including the hotline number, which could be distributed in the event of a disease
outbreak.
However, Kevin Cooper noted that during the Mangrove Mountain disease outbreak, getting people to
use the hotline was difficult. Only those directly infected by the disease used the hotline while the
broader community did not. What was effective for information delivery was a newsletter containing
information about the 1800 number delivered through a letterbox drop to 2300 local residents. There
were 14 editions delivered over four months. He added:
It is a question of, even if you do a newsletter, of people reading it and taking it
in. It wasnt until the fourth newsletter went out which had a fridge magnet
stapled to the front of it with the 1800 number and a logo, that a day later, our
1800 number network was overloaded. The fridge magnet was an instant success.

A farmer in Roma agreed:

I think some of the best information weve received about most things is through
the mail. We get information in flyers about whatevers going on. They send it
out in the mail and you have it right there in front of you. You can do your own
thing. Youre not always in town getting a local paper.

Kevin Cooper continued:

The community has to know the stakeholders, who they are and what is their most
likely means of receiving information. Information has to flow both waysyou
put it out but you must also get it back. The UK control centres all had hotlines
but all the volunteers did was sit and wait and all they received was complaints.
The UK has database with information on each rural holding so I got them call
out to people to ask them how they were doing, whether anyone had been to visit.
There was a significant turn around in the use of the call centre. But this is a
major change of thinking in the way of using hotlines.

One person in Casino suggested that the Shires contact details for ratepayers could provide similar
information:
You could draw a circle of 10 km around the area and calls could then be made
to farmers to check on their support needs.

Another participant pointed out, that there is an assumption that people who pay the rates live on the
property and that there will be a need to know what proportion of farmers are on a lease arrangement.
Concerns were also raised about privacy and confidentiality issues regarding access to such
information and the need to establish protocols before an outbreak occurs.
Kevin Cooper noted that one of the best ways to get information out to people in Mangrove Mountain
proved to be through the local schools. Participants representing local schools in Casino agreed and
noted that the best contact would be the district office of Education. This office would be able to
email information to every school and would know who would be the best person to contact.
However, another participant cautioned that not all residents have children at school.
In Camperdown, participants noted that the district is a closely settled area and as one person stated:
Good or bad news, it does get around. Participants in each community noted there was a need for a
consistent overall message. Casinos Shire representative suggested that as most organisations have
their own means of distributing information, there would be a need to form a full media unit to bring
those people together to ensure consistency in the information disseminated to the community. A
media plan could be attached to the communitys disaster plan structured along the lines of the

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procedures for information release used by the rural fire service, which instruct the public to listen to
the local radio station to receive up to date information.

6.5.3 Impact upon farm families

It is likely that farm families would suffer significant financial, social and psychological stress in the
aftermath of an EAD outbreak. Workshop participants were asked what they could do to assist farm
families isolated in restricted areas; for example, delivery of food to farm gates. Farmers within the
group were also asked to consider whether they would be concerned about the spread of infection if
they assisted their neighbours. The groups were asked to consider that farmers typically find it
difficult to ask for help and explore ways of overcoming that problem.
In each group, representatives of local health services noted the local mental health teams would be
assisted by teams from neighbouring communities to address the psychological health needs of farm
families, particularly those whose stock must be destroyed. Kevin Cooper noted that disease control
response teams ideally would like a counsellor to accompany them when they approach a farm family
to inform them they are about to cull their stock. In Roma, one of the participants noted that having a
farmer go with the emergency response team to help explain to a farmer what to expect and what
support was available might help. He gave an example:
Most of the oil companies around this area now when theyre dealing with
property ownersand I tell you, property owners are fairly adverse to people
coming on and digging up places and chasing cattle and stockwhat they do is,
they take on board people from the land, and have them go out and talk to
property owners and get them used to the fact that the oil companies are going to
come on, this is what theyll be doing when they get here, dont be afraid of that
because they will fix up your fences. By doing that, they save a lot of problems
down the line because theyre appeasing the worries and concerns that the
property owners have. Before they did that, they had a lot of problems. People
would stop them at the gate, You cant come on, and you cant do this. I think
all the big industries now utilise people from the land to sell what theyre doing.

Kevin Cooper added that the Mangrove Mountain response had 15 people working full-time in
community relations for 2300 households.
Every tool was used to contact people including door knocks. Some people dont
come and go from the house and you have got to know where they are. Every time
we had destruction on a property, wed make sure wed notify all the adjoining
properties. Wed ask them if they had kids, do you want your kids here, or do you
want to send them to your mothers? so children werent exposed to that sort of
environment.

Practical support
Participants were asked about practical support for the delivery of food to farm families and fodder for
livestock. One SES representative reported that agencies would organise food drops to farms as they
have in the past with floods. Kevin Cooper pointed out support services will need to be very subtle
and well-managed as farmers are proud, independent people and will not want the community to know
what support they are accessing whether its food or financial support.
One Roma participant noted the pressure local service groups experienced during the drought when
they were given the responsibility of disseminating financial assistance to farm families in need. The
responsibility was overwhelming and it was difficult to decide who were the deserving recipients
amongst their neighbours and friends. This is a task they would not like again. She explained:

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We found that in the drought, we had this problem especially with money. Money
was a bad issue all round. People were too proudthey didnt want to be seen to
be taking money. Youll only get those ones that come forward for the money that
really shouldnt be getting it anyway. Food issue was another thing. Where food
is supplied to groups or Community Health, people are still too proud to come
forward to accept it. You find that once the food is supplied to the groups to
distribute, they are given the responsibility of distributing evenly; how much does
this person get, how much that does that person get.

The difficulties of delivering fodder to livestock in restricted areas were also discussed. One Roma
participant noted:
While stock are impounded, youre going to have to start feeding them, so youre
going to have to bring fodder in from somewhere. I dont know how youre going
to get it in, whether you rail it in or not, or maybe the rail would be stopped from
travelling through the area as well.

One Armidale resident noted:

During the drought, Council was asked by ratepayers to supply fodder to farmers
who were in difficulties at no cost. How far do you go does the community start
buying fodder from outside? There is pressure on carriers to do it at low cost or
no cost. That creates tensions. There is probably a host of issues that we would
not be aware of until it happens.

Kevin Cooper noted that some companies might not wish to assist when it involves an EAD.
One of the challenges weve had, and it was the same with the UK, was that
companies didnt want to be seen to be associated with the infected area, because
of fear of contamination. We had a real problem at Mangrove Mountain, because
chickens eat a lot and the feed companies refused to deliver feed to the area, so
we had to move feed between the farms.

Social isolation
Workshop participants were also asked how they would assist farm families who would be isolated by
the legislative restrictions on movements as well as self-imposed restrictions on movements through
fear of spreading the disease. Kevin Cooper reported that Mangrove Mountain farmers chose not to
participate in any social events organised by the community recovery teams.
One of the Roma farmers recalled:
We found this a big issue during the drought. The CWA held put on things for
people just to come and have a cup of tea. We didnt really know how to help,
except, maybe, asking them to come along for a barbecue or a cup of tea to sit
down and join in and talk. We found that the women came along, mainly to talk
about issues that they had with husbands. We couldnt get the husbands to come,
because theyre too proud; they didnt want to be seen to be sitting down and
talking to women about their problems. Even if it was men amongst men, we
thought that might help, but men just wont do it. Men wont let their feelings out;
they hold them in. Whereas, the women were coming to get rid of the emotional
issues they were having with the fact that they could see their husbands
deteriorating in front of their eyes and going downhill, but they didnt want to
talk about it.

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Workshop participants who represented the local churches were asked about ministering to families in
these situations. In Roma, one Chaplain responded:
My role is to visit people and help them with their emotional feelings, more so
than actual finances. Because sometimes, people in times of a disasterand this
would be a disasterthere would be a lot of grief and loss. Farmers would be
feeling emotional, and thats what were saying about men: they wont come out
and socialise because they wont face their problems, not like women do. Men
hold a lot of emotion inside and why I go out is sometimes to talk to the men. A
lot of it is just going out there, not actually talking to them, but listening to them,
because if they open up, that will help them a lot.

When asked if he could foresee a problem with farmers being concerned about disease if they knew he
was visiting other farmers on infected properties, he responded:
I dont know. A lot of times you go out, is that fellow down the road going to
know? Youve got to be very careful. When you go and visit one farmer, you
dont say to the fellow down the road that Ive been up visiting him.

When asked the same question, a counsellor in Camperdown replied that he would respond to requests
for assistance but would point out to the farmer that he had been visiting infected properties but had
followed protocol regarding disinfection.
One of the local farmers in Roma noted that many of the traditional churches in the district had closed
and had been replaced by non-traditional charismatic congregations. The effect of such social change
in rural areas upon the loss of traditional models of support is a factor that could be explored in further
research.
The Casino community did not believe they would have problems encouraging farm families to join in
with community social events. One of the service providers reported that during the drought, local
farmers readily attended Farm Family Gatherings the local community organised. A network of
support services comprised of government and non-government agencies, such as the local Rural
Financial Counsellor, Health Services, Lifeline and the Salvation Army, facilitated ongoing support
for farmers. This type of support service also worked with dairy farmers with the deregulation of the
dairy industry. It was agreed that the network structure would be maintained ready to be instigated
should another need arise. She continued: We didnt know it would work when we started it, but it
did.
However, one person questioned whether a structure like that would work in a community divided
between those on infected properties and those not infected. Such divisions would cause the
community structure to break down. One participant cited divisions arose within the Casino
community when divisions occurred within the local dairy industry. As another noted, with the
drought, everyone was affected. This would not be the case with a disease outbreak. One farmer
disagreed and maintained that all farmers would be affected, as the livestock industry is export
orientated.
One of the Armidale participants concluded:
I think one of the big things that came out of looking at this is that communities
must be strong after such an event. They must not become insular and keep to
themselves. One of the roles of community services could be to keep social events
happening. Maybe that means shelling out dollars for events to keep them cheap
or free to keep the community vibrant and meeting with each other and talking
through the issues instead of people going their separate ways.

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Stigma
The issue of division within the community was discussed at length. Divisions may arise from some
people not realising the importance of control measures. Adjacent farmers may not be treated in a
similar way. Some would be declared exclusion and destroy zones and would receive compensation
while others would not. There can be gossip and blaming about the source of infection. Kevin Cooper
noted that such divisions were evident at Mangrove Mountain and in the United Kingdom, adding:
Nothing divides a community like this exercise. He recalled that public meetings held at Mangrove
Mountain were delightfully challenging: horrific events but worthwhile as they allowed people to
vent their anger and frustration. However, often these meetings provided an excuse for residents to air
other simmering community issues.
A Casino participant agreed: I think that this community is not going to be easy. There will be plenty
of opportunities for those things to arise. A service provider responded:
There will be a need to get people to understand the grief and loss cycle so people
understand their own actions and what is motivating them. There needs to be
stress debriefings, otherwise they will keep behaving in those ways.

However, in Camperdown one of the local farmers strongly believed that such division would not
occur in his district.
I was surprised that you suggested that there would be a stigma associated with
farmers who have the disease. Ive worked for a long time with the VFF
(Victorian Farmers Federation) and other farmer bodies. I would have thought
there would be enormous support from local farmers for their neighbours and
other farmers. I very much doubt that would be the case here. As a producer, I
believe my fellow farmers would support each other.

Yet several others in the group disagreed. One believed that farming communities in the UK were very
similar to the Camperdown community and it would be very likely that the same division would occur.
Another maintained that rumours and misinformation would be rife. There would be suspicion,
animosity and blame that someone did not get it right, alienation of the guilty that should have done
more and uncertainty about the future. He asserted that media scrutiny would magnify these feelings.
However, another farmer stated that if someone were in need, they would help:
If someone is a neighbour and a friend that you have known for many years,
youre not going to say, Im not going to bother with you.

Another participant concluded:

Farmers are incredibly reluctant to admit to weakness and will think they are
immune from negative social illnesses. If we are going to do anything as a result
of todays discussion, just getting people to talk about the fact that feelings of
anxiety, depression, loneliness and aggression and an increase in crime will
happen because of the incredible stress farmers will be under is important. We
need to let people know that if an outbreak happens to expect that they will have
all these emotions, but there will be people they can talk to even if it is their nextdoor neighbour.

The diversity in the discussions between the four communities reflects the diversity that is likely to
occur within various communities who may face an emergency disease outbreak. Some communities
that have strong social networks of support and social cohesion are more likely to have residents unite
and support each other through the crisis while other communities that are less cohesive may see more
division.

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The non-reporting of diseased stock

It was put to workshop participants that it would be very likely that some livestock owners may elect
to kill and bury sick animals and not report an outbreak to authorities. Farmers and police were asked
how they would deal with this problem.
One of the farmers in Roma agreed that killing and burying sick animals would very likely occur and
noted that considering the size of properties and the isolation in that region, no-one would ever know
about it. In Casino, one of the farmers there commented that the one case of Mad Cow Disease in
Canada had catastrophic consequences for the Canadian industry and the suggestion had been made
that it would have been better to shoot, shovel and shut up.
Another Casino participant questioned what were the moral, ethical, and legal obligations of
professional people for reporting a client for such actions.
For example, if a patient tells a doctor in confidence that he/she has infected
stock but has dealt with the problem by shooting and burying the animal and has
not reported it, does patient/doctor confidentiality prevent the doctor reporting
this to authorities?

While professionals in such positions would be legally bound to report such incidents to authorities, it
may be worthwhile for professions to clarify the issues for their workers faced with such a dilemma.

6.5.4 Impact upon emergency workers

In the UK, those employed in the control response and operating telephone help lines were also
adversely affected by what they experienced. Workers were subject to extremely long hours and
difficult working conditions. Many animals that appeared perfectly healthy had to be slaughtered.
Participants were asked to comment on this issue and explore possible supports that could be made
available for emergency workers.
One emergency service representative in Roma observed:
Coming to terms with those sorts of things would be difficult for most people.
You would have to be cautious about who you were going to utilise to deliver that
service.

Another maintained that it would be preferable to utilise people from the immediate area, as they
would be able to come to terms with what they are doing far easier than people brought in to do the
task. Another agreed: It would be better to have ten people who know what they are doingyou dont
need forty.
Kevin Cooper agreed and noted that this was a principle he applied in Mangrove Mountain.
We went to Scone, Blayney, Macksville and Edentowns that all had abattoirs
that had shut down and we got the abattoir workforce. It was good for them
because they were unemployed, but for us, we got the floor supervisor and his
team. They were in a work environment that was familiar. They understood
livestock and they understood the work environment. Youve got to work really
hard laterally, not only think laterally, and then argue the case with someone else
outside the area that this is the best way to go.

One participant advised that there are structures in place for Critical Incidence debriefing for workers
to care for their emotional health. However, what will be needed is a support network for the families
of emergency workers. She explained: This problem has arisen in the past with major fires when
emergency workers havent been home for weeks.

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Kevin Cooper recalled that it was important to organise social activities for emergency workers, such
as international soccer games, else workers tended to work from 6.00 am to 10.00 p.m. every day.
The Casino resident suggested that once an emergency occurs, workers should be scheduled to work
five days on and two days off.

6.5.5 Impact on the wider community

Unemployment
The meetings were asked to reflect upon how they could address the problems resulting from the rise
of unemployment within the district due to the probable closure of the saleyards, abattoirs, dairy
factories and other associated agricultural industries along with the restriction of the movement of
shearers and other rural contractors. While some unemployed workers would be coopted to assist with
the cull of livestock, once that work was completed, many would leave the district to seek
employment elsewhere. Workshop participants were asked whether there were any schemes that could
be implemented to employ local people to retain them and their skills within the region.
Participants were concerned about the length of time the agricultural industries would be closed for
business. Kevin Cooper explained that if the saleyard was outside the Restricted Area and was not an
infected premise, the down-time would be less, but if it was an infected premise or considered a
dangerous contact for FMD, the saleyard would be subject to the same requirements as a farm, or a
milk factory and may be closed for six to nine months. AUSVETPLAN has enterprise plans for all
types of enterprises. He explained:
As we experienced in the Northern Territory in March (2004), the saleyard
wasnt the focus of the disease, but the properties next door were all positive, so
the saleyard couldnt get active business until those properties were cleared and
had gone through the cleaning protocol.

He continued:
The challenge for you would be what else do the people, or the saleyards, or
whatever, do in that nine months. What are the options? The Canadians with
Mad Cow Disease were exceptionally clever. They held these mass barbecues
using the saleyards as the venue. They actually increased red meat consumption
per capita in Canadathe only country to have done so. This is thinking
laterallywhat do you do with this resource? Do you find some excuse to have a
major party that brings half of Queensland to Roma for some reason?

The unemployment issue was a major concern for participants. In Camperdown, residents could not
identify any other possible options for employment in the region. One stated:
The [Major Dairy Company] may be able to relocate some of the workers but I
couldnt see them accommodating all of the staff. Some people may not want to
movethey may say, We will ride this out.

However, another recalled that following the closure of the local abattoirs and the relocation out of the
area of several other businesses, about 1000 jobs were lost over a period of eighteen months, yet the
town survived. The response was: It survives but you remember what Camperdown was like at that
time. You do get through it but you have to deal with it in the short-term.
One of the Casino farmers noted that following the recent drought, finding trained staff has been a
major problem for local farmers. He also noted that there were no alternative employment

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opportunities in the area to accommodate the large group of people involved in agricultural industries
who would be unemployed if an FMD outbreak eventuated.
One other Casino participant believed most local people would not pack up and leave the district.
Another added: If they do leave, it will be for a long time. The aim would be to try and keep people
in the area with some employment until the industry is re-established.
A Casino Shire representative suggested perhaps there could be a means of displaced workers being
sent to agricultural industries in neighbouring regions on secondment. Kevin Cooper suggested that
there is a need to look for community-based projects to find work for workers for at least three to six
months. Alternatives may need to be industry driven. He suggested that the local abattoir does not
source everything locally and they could source supply from elsewhere which would keep local people
employed. However, as one of the farmers pointed out, the export industry will be stopped and
markets will cease. Kevin replied that Australia would still export to FMD positive countries albeit at
lower prices than currently received from FMD-free countries.
Yet one resident believed the Casino community would rally to support workers. He recalled when
the local abattoir faced closure in the past, a public meeting was called, and workers elected to reduce
wages to sustain the business.
Financial assistance
Farmers disadvantaged through an EAD crisis will be eligible for support under the Exceptional
Circumstances Relief Payment through Centrelink. The workshops were asked whether there would
some people who may not be eligible for assistance and what support could be offered.
In Roma, one participant noted that problems that arise from the distribution of financial support.
One issue youve also got to watch is this release of money. During the
Charleville floods, two people came out and distributed money to people in the
community that had nowhere to go. Charleville town was awash and people had
money and nowhere to spend it, other than going out to Morven, and picking up
grogand that created another issue we had to deal with. They werent going to
get food; they were waiting for us to feed them. You can imagineheaps of
people, particularly as they were all living under one roof, in an airport hangar.
And there was no record of who collected money. Ive never seen so many people
come up in a line with so many different names in one day.

An Armidale participant recalled:

With the hailstorm in 1996, the recovery team that was part of the local
emergency management committee ran for several months. There were people
who were uninsured who needed to access to government funds that they did not
know were available for fixing rooves and windows that were damaged in the
storm. There were people in financial difficulty. This was a difficult period for
the committee because everyone in the community was affected to a certain
extentpeople were driving around for years afterwards with damaged cars. So
Council couldnt really have a fundraiser to support anyonehow would we
distribute funds? Who would be the beneficiaries? Were there really needy cases
or some just too lazy to do anything about it. In the case of a FMD outbreak, it
will be a bit different. There will be people severely affected with a downturn in
income. Fortunately many farmers in this area have dual incomesnot every one
is a full-time farmer in our regionone partner will have daytime job. But people
will still have to pay off properties, they will still have operational costs, still have
to feed stock, pay bills, control weeds and then restock.

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One of the Roma participants suggested that rather than financial support being handed out to
individuals, it would be better for government to support local businesses.
I think it would be a much better idea if food were actually given to the local
shops, because theyre the ones that suffer in the long run. Theyd have no money
to buy anything. You lose your shops, your local things; they dont turn about,
they dont grow. If theyre supplied with food and the people then get vouchers
like in a war situation, and if everybody gets vouchers, then theyre not too proud
to go and use them.

Another added that: Little shops in little communities are often the ones that carry the local people.
Another participant agreed:
I can see your thing with this food distribution and the local businesses because
I saw it during the drought. I know some little towns did miss out badly. They
went broke because of outside handouts. The local community werent getting
the business.
Figure 6.3: The general store/post office in a village near Roma.

Kevin Cooper reported that during the Mangrove Mountain response, he directed every purchasing
opportunity possible towards the local community, which was often contrary to government protocol.
He explained:
Senior decision-makers started to understand that it was better to keep the shop
afloat than have to pay them unemployment benefits somewhere down the track
because the shop had gone broke. Contractors would come and work for us, and
my department would say: Why are we giving them lunch? And I replied,
Because if theyre on an infected premise, by the time they disinfect, come off, go
and buy lunch, its costing us more than $5 to give them lunch on the property.
But more importantly, we were spending that $5 in the local community.

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6.5.6 Perception of risk

Participants perceptions of the risk of an EAD outbreak occurring in Australia were also assessed.
They were asked whether they believed that:

an outbreak was something Australians should be extremely concerned about

an outbreak was inevitable and there is little anyone can do about it, or

the likelihood of a disease outbreak in Australia has been greatly exaggerated, or

the vastness of the country will mean that the outbreak will be contained in one area and
eradicated quickly, or

Australias isolation from other countries and strict quarantine measures will continue to
prevent disease outbreaks.
In Camperdown, participants thought an EAD was inevitable. Another added: Not because of a lack
of trying but Foot-and-Mouth has spread rapidly across the world in the past 25 years and someone
who is careless will bring it in.
One of the Casino farmers believed that there was a need to balance the risk against the costs. He
stated:
It was 1872 since the last outbreak of FMD. Australia has good quarantine
standards. Yet FMD is in the Philippines. We need to know, whats the
probability of an outbreak?

Another thought the risk was low. One other added: We are an island and are a bit more protected
than other countries but we have be alert and we have to have procedures. The local vet concluded:
The risk is low but the risk is increasing. People are more mobile, air travel is
more common, there are new disease agents undergoing virulent changes and
bio-terrorism. Put it all together with a declining workforce on farms, if there is
an outbreak, the impact will be very high.

In Roma, two participants maintained: Its going to happen; its just a matter of when. Others were
concerned about disease entering the northern part of Australia from neighbouring countries and
progressing across the country. One participant raised concerns about disease spread through poor
attention to livestock identification requirements or illegal activities.
Increasingly, you see more cattle coming into Queensland. Cattle are coming up
from other states with nothing more than just a tag. No NVDs or anything.
Another thing with NLIS, cattle recently stolen in Victoria all had NLIS tags. It
wasnt worth tagging them.

Kevin Cooper responded:

Part of the National cost-sharing agreement now includes that industries have
their own biosecurity systems in placesaleyard biosecurity, property and
company biosecurity etc. So, increasingly in the world we live in, theyre going
to be important for the early detection and prevention of disease. Stock might
come from Kununurra, but if youve got a two-day trip, hopefully youre going to
be seeing some symptoms by then anyway, so those systems in place will actually
detect those symptoms.

However, one participant remained concerned that a reduction in DPI staff and a lack of trained
workers will mean that unusual disease symptoms may be overlooked.

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6.5.7 Community education

The workshops also discussed ways to raise awareness within their communities about biosecurity and
enhance preparedness. The Department of Primary Industry representative in Roma noted:
We aimed to get information to people while they are getting information about
something else. They dont go to look for exotic disease information, so youve
got to get it to them when something else is happening, and thats one of the big
challenges.
We put 200 000 fliers throughout Queensland two years ago, with rate notices.
Weve been at it for probably 2627 years, trying to get people to understand
what do you look for and what to do if you see something, and dont feed swill.
Theyre the issues weve been hammering, and hammering. It does work. A
couple of years ago, we shot an anti-swill feeding video and we tried to get some
swill in Toowoomba, and nobody would give it to us, so it actually worked in
Toowoomba.

Kevin Cooper noted that his Department has projects targeting people from non-English speaking
backgrounds, as they are considered to be a high risk for bringing in contaminated foodstuffs from
overseas.
One Camperdown participant was concerned that the general public does not have an awareness of
what problems could eventuate if they do not do the right thing. Even amongst some country people
there is a perception that: It cant happen to me. He suggested that government should have a
campaign to raise the level of awareness about the consequences. Likewise, a Roma participant
commented:
Most people that are not dealing with the cattle industry or pig industry, FMD
would mean absolutely nothing to them. It would be: Foot-and-Mouth, oh yeah,
what is that? They wouldnt have a clue, except its a disease that cattle get,
whatever it is, animals. But if they knew that their job was at riskif this was
present in your community, do you realise that down the track, you could be out
of a job? That may make a difference.

The groups did agree it was important to educate people on the necessity to report disease in stock. A
representative of the Country Womens Association reported that they could send out information to
60 branches in a month, which would reach 10 000 people. While the target group will be women,
they would share the information with their families.
One of the educators within the Casino group suggested that perhaps there needed to be regulations
regarding mandatory training for livestock producers about the risks of disease. As certification is
required for farmers handling chemicals, and a disease outbreak will have dire consequences, similar
processes should apply. However, the farmers within the group disagreed:
You need to weigh up the probability of a FMD outbreak against the cost of
certifying farmers. The amount of legislation we have to deal with is
overwhelminglike Workcover. What is required is information on the ground
for people when they need it. Its OK if you are an employee and you get paid to
do a course but it is not so good if you are a farmer.

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One of the participants representing Agforce in Roma advised:

Within Agforce, weve got link-ups to 12 shires and there are 23 branches, which
are made up of that, so 1600 members. Weve recently just passed a motion that
there should be at least one or two people from each branch to be industry liaison
officers who actually get some training with how to deal with a disease outbreak.
At the moment, its more looking at the technical aspects of a disease outbreak,
but maybe theres some room to incorporate within that, the social impacts so
those people are also geared to understand that as part of what theyre doing.
Were actually looking to get people in the local areas skilled.

Kevin Cooper explained that the Industry Liaison Officer program is a recent initiative of the
government. There have been 128 people trained in over the past year in NSW.
The person that coordinates the destruction and disposal has always been a
Government person, but weve started training beekeepers, dairy producers to do
that role. Theyre not always producers. They might be CEOs. Id much rather
be dealing with these people because they have the corporate knowledge, the
industry knowledge, the understanding, and the language.

An increase in the focus of Industry Liaison Officers program upon the social impact of may lead to a
greater awareness amongst those people with whom they interact.

6.6

Summary and discussion

One of the main aims of the focus groups, was to raise awareness amongst residents of the potential
social impact of an EAD outbreak upon their local community, and this was achieved. Time did not
permit the development of concrete recommendations for increasing community preparedness.
However, many of the participants intended to return to their various organisations to further discuss
their role in community recovery in the event of a disease outbreak and in educating their members.
Following the meetings, some participants discussed ongoing collaboration between various
community services towards planning community preparedness strategies. EADs are not on the
agendas of many organisations that could be significantly affected by an outbreak; for example,
schools, small businesses and local community groups. There is a need to raise awareness across
communities of the social consequences of disease outbreaks and stress that community recovery must
begin with the control response. In many instances, this will merely require an extension of an
organisations existing disaster plans. For example, those representing local schools in Casino were
keen to submit to the Education Department that current policies and programs for disaster
management be revised to include emergency management disease outbreaks. It is also important that
these plans be tailored for each school. It is also recommended that while disaster management plans
must also be tailored to each community, Local Emergency Management Committees should be
encouraged towards some level of consistency in preparedness as noted by one Casino participant,
there is no point in one shire having certain plans in place when a neighbouring shire does not.
Observation of the Armidale tabletop exercise led to the conclusion that exercises conducted by Local
Emergency Management Committees would be greatly improved by the inclusion of local farmers,
representatives of other agricultural industries and small businesses and local service providers who
would be affected by an EAD outbreak. In particular, Chambers of Commerce should be included to
raise their awareness of the implications of an EAD for local businesses, as this group was the least
interested in participating in the workshops. Interaction between emergency services and these groups
would enhance preparedness in all sectors of the community. The involvement of farmers may lead to
greater levels of biosecurity on individual and neighbouring farms. It is also suggested that a person
within the community who has an understanding of social issues, facilitate community discussions. It
was evident within the focus groups that representatives of emergency services whose task is to

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quickly and effectively fix a problem tended to dwell upon the technical aspects of a disease response
which necessitated guiding the discussion back to focus upon the social impacts.
Unemployment in the aftermath of a disease outbreak was a major concern for participants.
Communities, therefore, should explore possible options for community-based projects that would
sustain the displaced workforce throughout the downturn in local agricultural industries.
Communication was also a concern for participants. Radio, newspapers and flyers delivered in
letterbox drops appear to be the most agreeable ways of disseminating information for farming
communities. Magnets for refrigerators containing basic emergency information were successful in
Mangrove Mountain. Also following the Mangrove Mountain experience, it is suggested that
procedures for hotlines in emergency situations be revised to initiate calls to people to check on their
welfare rather than wait for contact from the public. Furthermore, it is suggested that any issues
regarding privacy and confidentiality be resolved to enable the collation of a database of information
on farmers within a community, which can be used by a call centre in an emergency. However, Hulse
(2005) suggests that a community should be asked by a Emergency Control Centre how they would
like to be informed as community newsletters may be preferred and would be a much cheaper option
than expensive advertising. A media plan attached to a disaster plan for each community would
enable a communications strategy that facilitates the effective flow of information between
government agencies and local communities. As Dixon (2002) noted, information should be easy to
access, be accurate, transparent, conform to a consistent agenda, and be disseminated through a variety
of mediums but originate from a primary source. If farmers are informed on restrictions and control
measures, they are more compliant. Without such information, the result is stress, anger and mistrust
of those involved in policies and process of disease control (Dixon 2002).
The mail survey of farmers revealed that farmers who believed they would have some measure of
control in the event of an outbreak were more likely to have instigated biosecurity on their properties
(see Chapter 4). Thomson (2005) notes the community will be uncertain of what to expect from
central government during a disease control response. It is only when the community has a clear
appreciation of the processes that would be followed that they will be able to anticipate their role and
the role of other organisations and what they can do to effectively participate in the short and longterm. The communication process will need to be regularly and openly reviewed, which will
necessitate feedback from the community. Hulse (2005) in a review of the response to a Painted
Apple Moth outbreak in New Zealand noted that local people expect to be consulted. Hulse concluded
that local councils should be contacted at first sign of a disease outbreak, as they will know best how
to work with the community. The wider community should be involved as soon as possible and be
trusted with as much information as required to encourage collaborative solutions to problems.
Sharing problems with the community and responding to sensible requests will build trust and show
intent by Government to work in partnership with the community (Hulse 2005).
The likelihood of division within the community in the event of a disease outbreak created animated
discussion within the workshops. It can be concluded that should a major disease epidemic occur in
Australia, the experience of individual communities will differ significantly according to the nature
and structure of the community, and degree of social cohesion. As found in the UK FMD epidemic, in
some communities, there were significant tensions between farmers and between farmers and other
community groups. Yet other communities remained close-knit and supportive of local farmers.
The issue of non-reporting of diseased stock by farmers or farm employees or employees of associated
livestock industries is an issue of concern and the community needs to be educated regarding the
consequences of not reporting unusual symptoms. It may also be necessary to provide advice and
policy guidelines on the need to report knowledge of unreported disease outbreaks for counsellors,
general practitioners and other professionals who may be confronted with the dilemma of breaking the
confidentiality of a client.

90

There is a need to ensure that existing community support networks be encouraged to remain available
to provide support in the event of a disease outbreak. Alternatively, self-help groups should be
encouraged within a community. There will also be a need to establish support networks for families
of emergency workers. The loss of traditional churches from rural communities and consequently the
loss of that avenue of social support should be examined further.
The focus groups offered some ideas on ways to educate the public on the need for biosecurity. The
promotion of industry liaison officers for various groups (including farmers) appears a worthwhile
option for encouraging awareness and the flow of information between government and the
community. It was suggested that awareness campaigns should be extended across the community
with emphasis given to the direct social impact on individuals and communities, particularly the
financial loss as this may encourage responsiveness amongst the general public and ultimately
increase preparedness.

91

92

7: Summary and Conclusions

7.1

Summary and discussion

The focus of this study has been upon the degree of awareness and preparedness for an EAD outbreak
at the individual farmer and small rural community level. At a National and State level, emergency
disease control plans and strict quarantine measures are in place to quickly and effectively control a
possible disease outbreak. However, to date, there has been a lack of knowledge about how individual
farmers and small rural communities would cope if a crisis occurred. Accordingly, through a series of
three studies, the present research sought to identify the level of awareness and preparedness of
farmers and small communities for a possible EAD outbreak and identify those social factors that may
facilitate or inhibit the implementation and maintenance of disease control plans. A second objective
was to assess the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak upon small rural communities.
An initial review of the literature on the social impact of EADs on communities conducted as
background to the research revealed that disease outbreaks result in significant and enduring social
impacts upon farm families and their communities as well as those working in disease control
response and support services. However, the studies revealed the extent of the impact varied greatly
between communities. Some remained close-knit and supportive of local farmers while others
experienced significant division.
The first study conducted as part of the present research revisited Devon and Cornwall in the UK to
gather information on the social impact of the 2001 FMD epidemic three years on and to seek some
insight into the current level of biosecurity on UK farms. Interviews with farmers and support service
personnel revealed that the most significant consequences of the FMD outbreak was the poor
communication between government and local communities, the social isolation of farm families and
the social divisions that occurred within some communities. Community recovery was instigated
through church and volunteer community groups that emerged to provide a coordinated,
comprehensive network of support for the farming community. The most surprising discovery was
that despite the catastrophic consequences of the FMD outbreak, there remains a certain level of
complacency about biosecurity amongst UK farmers. Most tended to believe that responsibility for
biosecurity lay with those government agencies responsible for quarantine measures and should
another FMD outbreak eventuate, there was little that farmers could do about it.
The second study explored the attitudes of Australian farmers towards biosecurity on farms through a
mail survey of 3000 producers across the eastern states. The study revealed a high level of concern
about the threat of an emergency animal disease amongst Australian producers. Most sourced
information about emergency animal diseases from newspapers and radios. However, should an
emergency animal disease outbreak occur, farmers would first seek advice from their local
Department of Primary Industry, RLPB officers or local vet; people they know and trust within their
local community. Furthermore, if producers found unusual symptoms in their stock, they would first
report it to their local vet. Few would use the emergency disease hotline.
Few respondents were aware of biosecurity plans at a community level and only half of the sample
had instigated biosecurity precautions on their properties. Most strategies employed were basic farm
management practices such as isolating new stock for a short period of time to check for disease.
Property size, location and nature of the terrain appear to determine a farmers ability to implement
strategies.

93

The findings revealed that Australian farmers attitudes to biosecurity reflect those of their English
counterparts; that the responsibility for quarantine and biosecurity lies primarily with government.
Specifically, if agencies and those responsible are working efficiently, producers should not have to be
concerned about disease entering Australia. Others believed that biosecurity on farms was ineffectual
or unnecessary until a disease outbreak occurred. Several respondents were concerned that current
policy regarding imported products as part of free trade agreements negates any diligence on the part
of Australian producers for biosecurity at the farm level. Nevertheless, the study did reveal requests
for more education regarding farm biosecurity to enable farmers to better protect their properties. The
study found that farmers who believed they would have some measure of control in the event of an
outbreak were more likely to have instigated biosecurity on their properties. Consequently, changing
farmers perceptions about their ability to control the safety of their property and livestock may be
necessary for future biosecurity extension programs.
Feral pigs or goats were perceived to be a serious risk for disease particularly for producers on large
outback properties. Other perceived risks to properties included neighbours who import animals or
semen or who have a high turnover of stock, imported products or foodstuffs, deteriorating quarantine
regulations or monitoring of ports, having a public road through a property or being adjoined to a
stock route or National Park, international tourists, illegal immigrants and terrorism. As Slovic (1991)
noted, public attitudes reflect legitimate concerns that are often overlooked by policy makers and
consequently, risk communication efforts are likely to fail unless they are structured as a two way
process. Thus, future extension policies and programs regarding biosecurity may need to address
these particular concerns raised by producers.
In the third study, case-studies of four rural communities evaluated biosecurity preparedness at the
local community level. Social impact analyses and focus groups with residents assessed the extent of
the social impact of a hypothetical FMD outbreak upon their local community. The social impact
analyses emphasised the diversity amongst small rural communities in the nature and degree of likely
social impact from an emergency disease outbreak. A communitys experience and resilience to crisis
will be dependent upon its unique geographic, economic, and social profile, degree of social cohesion,
effectiveness of community leadership and history of overcoming crises. Understanding of these
differences at the small community level will be important in planning for recovery. The study did
find that all four communities are likely to experience a similar lack of alternative job opportunities
for displaced workers from agricultural and associated industries with a subsequent loss of people and
skills from the community as workers opt to leave in search of work.
The focus groups conducted with residents of the four case-study communities produced some
important considerations for biosecurity management planning. These included the need to place
EAD epidemics on the agendas of a variety of community organisations to enhance preparedness and
raise awareness of the potential social impact of an EAD outbreak. In many instances, this will merely
require an extension of existing disaster management plans. Furthermore, Local Community Disaster
Management Exercises should involve local farmers, owners of associated agricultural industries,
service providers and other relevant stakeholders to enhance awareness and preparedness across all
sectors of the community. Local Emergency Management Committees need to work towards
consistency in biosecurity preparedness across Local Government Areas.
Communication between government and local communities in the event of a disease outbreak was an
important consideration. Local communities should be contacted at first sign of a disease outbreak and
be provided with as much information as they require. Information must easy to access, reliable,
transparent, and consistent. Communities should be consulted by an Emergency Control Centre as to
how they would prefer to be informed in the event of a disease outbreak. A Media Plan attached to a
Community Disaster Management Plan would enable the effective flow of information between
government agencies and local communities and disseminate information that is locally relevant
through a variety of mediums but originating from a primary source. Emergency hotlines would be
more effective if they initiate calls to people to check on their welfare rather than wait for contact from

94

the public. There is a need to educate the public on the implications of not reporting cases of diseased
stock.
Finally, communities need to explore options for community-based projects to sustain a displaced
workforce throughout the downturn in local agricultural industries to prevent the potential loss of
people and skills from the community. Community recovery preparedness will be enhanced if existing
community support networks remain available to provide support in the event of a disease outbreak.
Alternatively, self-help groups should be encouraged. Support networks for families of emergency
workers will also need to be established. However, recovery programs and policies will need to
account for the diversity in the experience and coping ability of individual communities for an EAD
outbreak.

7.2

Implications of the findings

The findings of this study have implications for the education of farmers and rural communities and
for national and local community planing for biosecurity preparedness. The study has shown that
Australian farmers, those involved in associated agricultural industries, veterinarians and advisors to
the agricultural industries are very aware of the possible implications of an EAD outbreak in Australia
and are most concerned about the possibility of such an event occurring. However, it appears that
amongst farmers, this concern does not necessarily translate to being proactive about biosecurity
strategies on farms. Australian farmers attitudes towards biosecurity are similar in many respects to
British farmers who appear to be somewhat complacent about biosecurity despite their recent
experience of the devastating FMD outbreak. Consequently, it may be expecting much of Australian
producers to be vigilant about a risk they have no familiarity with.
However, the survey of farmers revealed that those producers who perceived the risk of an EAD as
controllable were more likely to have instigated biosecurity strategies on their farms. As Slovic (1991)
notes, uncertainty about risks can increase anxiety. Individuals may try to reduce anxiety by denying
the uncertainty, making the risk seem so small that it can be ignored or so large that it must be
avoided. Effective communication of the risk of an EAD outbreak will need to take account of these
social values that underlie peoples perceptions (Slovic 1991). Consequently, farmers perceptions
about the controllability of an EAD will need to be modified to encourage them to learn and prepare
for a potential EAD outbreak. It is suggested that future policies and programs focus upon the
practical strategies that can be applied to farms to provide farmers with a greater sense of control of
the potential risk of disease. As farmers themselves requested, what they would like is a one-page of
information on what to look for and what to do in the event of an EAD.
It is suggested that future extension policies and programs regarding biosecurity seek to address the
particular concerns of producers about potential risks for disease. Producers perceived risks
identified within the present study included feral pigs or goats particularly on large outback properties,
neighbours who import animals or semen or who have a high turnover of stock, having a public road
through a property or being adjoined to a stock route or National Park and imported products or
foodstuffs. By addressing these concerns with practical advice and information, farmers may more
readily accept biosecurity concepts.
Farmers will be most receptive to educational programs and information generally about EADs that is
disseminated through radio, newspaper and flyers sent in the mail. However, in the event of a disease
outbreak, there is a need for disease control response plans to recognise that it will be local vets or
agricultural advisors that farmers will depend upon for advice and information. Furthermore, it will be
important for local communities to be consulted as to how they would like information delivered.
The findings suggest that biosecurity on farms and within whole communities will be improved by a
higher level of involvement of producers and other interested groups in risk assessment and

95

biosecurity planning which will lead to higher levels of communication and information exchange
between all parties. This may also lead to a greater understanding and compliance with biosecurity by
farmers. This is occurring in Tasmania where the State Department of Primary Industry and several
local governments have organised a series of EAD workshops that are designed specifically to step
local community leaders through the issues and challenges they may confront if there were to be an
EAD outbreak. The aim of the workshops and follow up sessions is to ensure that local community
leaders have an understanding of how a Local Community Disaster Management Committee operates
and the ways they and the committees can work together to provide an effective response to a disease
outbreak (DPIWE 2004). Greater emphasis on the social impacts of an EAD outbreak for individuals
and communities may provide them with a heightened sense of reality of biosecurity preparedness.
Finally, the study has consistently found that rural communities are not homogeneous and
consequently, control and recovery programs will need to take account of the fact that each
communitys response and recovery process in the event of an EAD will differ greatly.

7.3

Further research

The research has highlighted some key issues that require further investigation. First there is a need to
conduct a review of the types of practices and support services used in the FMD outbreak in the UK
that proved to be successful in breaking down the self-imposed social isolation of the British farmers
and encouraging them to seek support. It is likely that Australian farmers will react in a similar way
when confronted with such a crisis and may respond to the same types of support programs.
Gathering information on what did and did not work in the welfare response to the UK epidemic may
assist in Australias preparedness. Second, the study found that traditional churches are declining in
rural communities and consequently, traditional means of social welfare supports may also have
declined. While non-traditional churches are emerging in some communities, further research is
necessary to establish how these social changes will impact upon the ability of communities to
respond to crises. Third, there may be a need to review the process of disseminating financial aid to
people in crisis. While well-known and trusted agencies such as the Salvation Army Red Cross and
the Country Womens Association have shown to be the most accepted and effective vehicles for
delivering aid within rural communities, some groups have found the experience of determining the
deservingness of their neighbours most difficult. Other alternatives, such as providing support for
local businesses, should be explored.

7.5

Conclusion

It is clear that an EAD outbreak in Australia will result in significant social impacts for rural
communities. What is not clear is the nature and extent of these social impacts upon individuals and
the communities in which they reside. There will be diversity in the way individuals experience,
respond and cope with the crisis and this diversity will be reflected in the way communities
experience, respond and cope. There is a need to raise awareness across rural Australia about the
potential social impact of emergency animal diseases and encourage community leaders and various
community organisations to consider the issue and revise their disaster management and community
recovery plans accordingly towards enhancing the level of biosecurity preparedness across the
country.

96

7.6

Recommendations

The following recommendations have been drawn from the findings of this study.

Recommendation 1
That local government Emergency Management Committees hold exercises that incorporate
interested parties across the community, particularly farmers, representatives from other
agricultural industries, small business owners and representatives of support services.

Recommendation 2
That Education Departments in each State update their Disaster Management Plans for
schools to include procedures for a response to an EAD outbreak in consultation with Animal
Health Australia and in accordance with AUSVETPLAN.
Recommendation 3
That national, state and community hotlines established for emergencies consider providing a
proactive service of calling people within the district to check on their welfare rather than
waiting for people to call them. Furthermore, that consideration regarding privacy and
confidentiality be resolved to enable the establishment of a database of information on farmers
within a community, which can be used by a call centre in an emergency.
Recommendation 4
That a wide range of community organisations be encouraged to consider biosecurity
preparedness to raise awareness of the potential social impact of a disease outbreak across
communities. In many instances, this will merely require an extension of existing disaster
plans.
Recommendation 5
That Local Emergency Management Committees be encouraged to seek a level of consistency
in preparedness to ensure general biosecurity strategies are equally established across Local
Government Areas.
Recommendation 6
That Shire Councils be encouraged to explore options for community-based projects to sustain
a displaced workforce throughout the downturn in local agricultural industries in the aftermath
of an EAD to address the potential loss of people and skills from a community.
Recommendation 7
That in the event of an EAD, that communities be consulted by an Emergency Control Centre
as to how they would prefer to receive information in the event of a disease outbreak.
Recommendation 8
That Shire Councils be encouraged to establish a Media Plan attached to a Disaster
Management Plan to enable the effective flow of information between government agencies
and local communities and disseminate information that is locally relevant through a variety
of mediums but originating from a primary source.

97

Recommendation 9
That future extension policies and programs regarding biosecurity address the particular
concerns of producers about the risk of and EAD. Ongoing consultation with producers to
understand their perceived risks for disease and the addressing these concerns with practical
advice and information, may encourage farmers to be more attentive to biosecurity plans.
Recommendation 10
That response and recovery programs and policies take into account the diversity in the
experience and coping ability of individual communities.
Recommendation 11
That advice and policy guidelines regarding the need to report knowledge of unreported
disease outbreaks be made available to counsellors, general practitioners and other service
personnel who may be confronted with the dilemma of breaking the confidentiality of a client.
Recommendation 12
That the Industry Liaison Officer program be encouraged for various groups (including
farmers) to encourage awareness and facilitate the flow of information between government
and the community.
Recommendation 13
That existing community support networks be sustained to provide support in the event of a
disease outbreak. Furthermore, that self-help groups be encouraged within a community
should an outbreak occur.
Recommendation 14
That support networks for families of emergency workers be established as part of disaster
management control and recovery plans.

98

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106

Appendix 1

Emergency Management
Information Sessions
A Presentation by
Kevin Cooper
Leader Animal Plant & Fish Health Emergency
Preparedness & Response NSW DPI
Casino and Roma, November 2004

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1:

Introduction

Kevin Cooper is the Leader of Emergency

Preparedness and Response with the NSW
Department of Primary Industries.
He is
arguably the most competent and experienced
Local Animal Disease Control Centre Manager
in Australia. He has a wealth of experience in
Control Centres in Emergency Animal Diseases
and fire-fighting. He was the only Australian to
manage a Local Disease Control Centre in the
United Kingdom Foot-and-Mouth outbreak in
2001. He also managed the control of the
outbreak of Newcastle Disease in poultry at
Mangrove Mountain on the Central Coast of
New South Wales. The following summarises
Kevin Coopers presentation to the workshops in
Casino and Roma in November 2004.

Figure 1: Kevin Cooper (left) and Mr

David Steller (Armidale Local
Emergency Committee) at the
Armidale EAD exercise.

I will talk about two specific experiences in todays session. One is my

experience in the United Kingdom with FMD outbreak, and the other is
at Mangrove Mountain, where we responded to an outbreak of
Newcastle Disease in poultry.
Kevin Cooper

Emergency Animal Diseases (EADs) have the potential to cause major economic and social
consequences through serious international trade losses, national market disruptions and severe
production in the livestock industries that are involved. EADs also affect non-farming industries,
exports, tourism and general community and social activities.
As part of the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, a National AUSVETPLAN has been
formulated, which is available on the Internet from the Australian Animal Health Council website and
consists of 68 volumes. AUSVETPLAN is a series of technical response plans that describe the
proposed Australian approach to an emergency animal disease occurrence. There are currently around
66 emergency animal diseases that would have a severe impact upon Australia.
Most of the disease events that have occurred in Australia in the past ten years have been home grown
virusesnot imported. For instance, the Lyssa virus was identified in a black flying fox in Australia
in 1996, and was subsequently found in other bat species in Australia. The Hendra virus first appeared
in Brisbane in 1994, which resulted in the death of a horse trainer and 13 of the racehorses he trained;
and the Menangle virus, which is a paramyxovirus virus in pigs, which infected two people in 1998.

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2:

Current Risks

2.1

Avian influenza (Bird Flu)

Avian influenza is an infectious disease of birds caused by Type-A strains of the influenza virus.
There was extensive media coverage of Bird Flu outbreaks in Asia in 2004, whereas there were few
reports of the disease in The Netherlands. One hundred million chickens were slaughtered in The
Netherlands, 92 of the workers involved in the response were infected and one veterinarian died. One
thousand producers were infected in this outbreak.
Australia is the only continent in the last twelve months not to have had strains of Bird Flu that have
affected other countries. To put this in perspective, between 1975 and 1995, Australia had the second
highest incidence of Bird Flu in the world, second to the UK. We have had five disease events in 12
years.

2.2

BSE (Bovine Spongiform EncephalopathyMad Cow Disease)

BSE is a progressive neurological disorder of cattle. BSE cost the Canadian industry $1.1 billion
(Canadian) in the first three months after detection. Canada is the third largest exporter of beef
products in the world (15% of world business). Australia is the largest exporter of beef products (23%
of world business). Canadian beef exports were worth $4.1 billion (Canadian) in the year before BSE
was diagnosed in a single cow in May 2004, and by late June, the value of beef exports from Canada
was almost zero. All Canadian states were affected, even though BSE was only diagnosed in a single
animal in one state. One interesting fact is that Canada is the only country in the world where the
consumption of red meat per capita increased during the disease event, whereas all other countries that
were affected by BSE significantly reduced their per capita consumption of red meat.

3: What Happens when an Emergency Animal

Disease Comes to Town?
Most people have had some experience with fire, flood or tempest emergencies; if not first hand, they
are aware of these common crises in Australia via the media. What sets those emergencies apart from
emergency animal diseases, or plant or fish diseases?

Time-frame. Emergency animal diseases often persist for months.

Floods and fires are more obvious. When diseases cannot be seen and are not as evident, it
often contributes to the paranoia in the wider community and across the country.

There is very little experience within the local community. Most people in the broader
community have had some involvement with a flood or bushfire, or have witnessed them on
television, and they have some sense of it. With emergency animal or plant diseases, there is
little experience within the Australian community.

Nature of the emergency. When there is a fire, flood or tempest, initially a single person is
affected, followed by the community, which works togetherthen it might be a region or a
district. The approach to the event is usually bottom up. Conversely, an emergency disease
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is of national interest because it affects our export industry. Seventy-five per cent of red meat
that Australia produces is exported. Thus the response is top down. All major decisions are
made at the National level. How do you relate a decision that has been made nationally to a
local community?
The first step involved in an animal disease emergency is to locate the disease quickly. Often, a
farmer contacts a veterinarian with a suspected problem, and a diagnostic team is sent to the property
to collect samples, which are then sent to an animal health laboratory for diagnosis. The property is
then quarantined and there will be either a NSW Department of Primary Industry vehicle or Rural
Lands Protection Board (RLPB) vehicle located at the main entrance to the property. This is the first
sign to the community that there is a problem. In the case with FMD; for example, a diagnosis can be
made in less than 24 hours, from the time the sample is collected to the time of a diagnosis. If the test
is positive, the livestock are then valued, destroyed and disposed of. The property will then be cleaned
up. There are two decontamination cycles, normally separated by 21 days. Eventually, the property
will be restocked.

3.2

Timeline

The timeline from start to finish for a single case of an exotic disease, optimistically, is six months.
More typically, for multiple cases, the first case might take 24 hours. Subsequent cases will take less
than an hour to diagnose if veterinarians go with clinical diagnosis. Destruction could take six hours
per 100 head of livestock.

4:

Response Actions

4.1

Mangrove Mountain

The Newcastle Disease outbreak at Mangrove Mountain occurred on 1 April and was brought under
control by 23 July 1999. Newcastle Disease is a highly-contagious, generalised viral disease of
domestic poultry, cage and aviary birds, and wild birds. This was the largest disease event of its kind
in Australia. This disease was not imported; it was a mutation of a virus that has been in Australia
since 1966.
A single case of Newcastle Disease was confirmed on 1 April. A Control Centre and a Staging Area
were immediately established. Security gates were installed to control movement of animals and
animal by-products. Decontamination pits were constructed, and destruction and disposal of animals
began.

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Figure 2. Local Disease Control CentreGosford Rural Fire Control Centre.

The multi-agency response of 44 various agencies, which included:

NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service

NSW Environmental Protection Agency
NSW Forestry
Queensland Department of Primary Industries
Australian Quarantine Inspection Service
Queensland Fire and Rescue and SES
NSW Department of Public Works and Services
Gosford and Wyong Councils
Rural Lands Protection Boards
NSW Rural Fire Services
NSW Fire Brigades
NSW Police
Royal Australian Airforce and Navy
Dept of Corrective Services.

The large-scale operations in the area lasted over four months, involving a total of 5000 emergency
response personnel, which peaked at 1000 people per day, with 800 working in the field. Of the
people involved in the EAD, 90% were not trained for the work they were doing. There were 500
contracted companies involved, which supplied everything from port-a-loos, to waste bins, to 3500
meals, and laundering of 9000 garments each day that were handled as infectious.
Personnel involved in the EAD were briefed daily at the Local Disease Control Centre each morning
so that information that was delivered was timely and accurate.

112

Figure 3. Aerial view of the forward staging area at that was erected at the Central Coast
Soaring Club, which serviced 600 workers at the beginning and end of each shift for two
months.

An important objective during an EAD is public awareness and relations. At Mangrove Mountain,
15 personnel were employed full-time to assist with public relations to ensure there was support for
the operation and that the community was kept informed. Personnel were involved in a wide range of
activities, which included notification of adjoining neighbours each time veterinarians were sent to a
property to destroy animals.
Figure 4: Media Officer NSW Ag, & PR NPWS keep the community informed.

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4.2

Response actionsUnited Kingdom

Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is an acute, highly-contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals.

FMD was identified in the UK on 20 February 2001. The UK engaged 20 000 people to assist with
the FMD outbreak. Of the personnel involved, 4% were trained for the work they carried out.

5:

In the Beginning

Until July in North Yorkshire, there had been no

disease problem. From Yorkshire, the nearest
outbreak was 50 miles away. On 4 July, one
Yorkshire farmer received a telephone call from
a Government veterinarian at 10.30 am,
informing him that he was a hot tracea
movement of stock had linked him with an
infected property. The farmer had 200 acres of
wheat and 45 heifers. The veterinarian arrived
on his property at 11.30 am, and at 12.30 pm,
began killing his stock. At 6.30 pm that evening,
the job was completed.

Figure 5: Two of the first farmers affected by

FMD outbreak in the Yorkshire area.

The Government had directed that all infected

animals be killed within 24 hours. The military
was brought in to expedite the process.

6:

When the Government has gone

6.1

Isolation and loneliness

Figure 6: Quarantine sign that were

placed on the entrances to farms
during the FMD outbreak.

What was it like for the farmer the next day, and the ensuing
days? When he arose the next morning, his daily routine was
gonehe had no direction, no purpose. There were mixed
emotionsloss of control, grief, anger, and relief. The
quarantine sign on his gate advertised that his was an
Infected Premise (IP).
The family became isolated. His children were harassed at
school. Their older daughter cancelled her wedding even
though there was no legal requirement to do so.

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6.2

Compensation and restocking

Often, the first questions that farmers ask are: When do I get my money for compensation? and
When can I restock? In the UK, compensation was provided within two weeks from the European
Union. In contrast, compensation at Mangrove Mountain took more than six months. Restocking is
dependent upon confirmation that the last case of FMD has been controlled. The average time to
restock in the UK after FMD was nine months.
In Australia, there is a cost-sharing arrangement for compensation. The Commonwealth Government
pays 50%, The State Government pays on a pro-rata basis and the Industry pays up to 1% of gross
value of product.
Figure 7: Destruction and decontamination
of infected animals.

In the UK, the farmers whose stock were not

culled but were nevertheless restricted by the
control measures in their district experienced
more difficulties than those whose stock were
culled and were compensated for their losses.
Once a property was declared an IP, movement
restrictions applied to all properties within a
minimum of three km. The 139 000 farms in
designated Infected Areas were subject to tight
restrictions for nine months, which prevented
movement of animals except for slaughter.
Farmers received no compensation for
difficulties experienced.

Farmers are compensated for the

market value of livestock at the time of
destruction and any livestock products.
Recent changes to the legislation state
that when farmers are ready to restock,
if the value of the livestock is greater,
they can be compensated for the
difference between the two. There is
no
compensation
available
for
consequential losses of a disease
outbreak.

Figure 8: Roadside signs were put in place

to limit the movement of animals and animal
by-products.

There were also animal welfare issues to

consider. For instance, in intensive farming
operations; for example a piggery, the number
of stock increased daily. The UK provides
compensation for destruction on animal welfare
grounds; Australia does not.

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7:
7.1

One Farm becomes Many

Movement restrictions

In Mangrove Mountain, farmers could not leave to go to town without going through a roadside
checkpoint, which was in place around the clock. While it was difficult for the community, bear a
thought for the person who had to stop cars at 2.00 am and ask if the driver was carrying any chicken
products etc.
Figure 9: Security checkpoint at Mangrove Mountain.

7.2

Adjoining properties affected

Contiguous properties in the UK for FMD and properties for dangerous contact in Australia will be
slaughtered out automatically. This increases the isolation of families. The UK had a particularly
strong regulatory approach. Part of their strategy was to have Police on milk tankers, to make sure
where it could go, when to go, and how it should go. Police could issue infringement notices to
farmers for not making up a disinfectant footbath daily at the front gate.

116

7.3

Information

On the producer and community side, there was passive delivery of options and lack of information.
Information was delivered via the Internet. The names and addresses of all 2006 IPs in the UK were
available on the Internet; however, information at a community or producer level was very poor. It
was not timely, was late and incomplete.

7.4

Farmer suicides

In the first three months of the FMD outbreak in Yorkshire, the coroner investigated and found that
thee out of four suicides were directly linked to FMD. A report written 15 months later identified that
the teenage suicide rate was much higher, with 15 suicides related to FMD.

8:

From One to Many

Figure 10: Aerial view of the properties affected at Mangrove Mountain.

117

Other incidences at Mangrove Mountain that provides a sense of the magnitude of the situation were:

A family from China, who operated a King Pigeon export breeding business, were on an
immigration visa that was dependent upon them establishing a successful business operation
within two years. Their birds were killed six weeks before their first export.

On a duck farm that was declared an infected premise, the caretakerwho only spoke
Chinesehad a heart attack at the front gate of the farm. The security guard on the
checkpoint that day spoke English and Italian.

Another couple living on an old piggery was approached to have a disposal site excavated on
their private land. After negotiation, the hole was completed within seven working days, with
people working 18 hours a day. This severely impacted upon the lives of neighbouring
farmers. The excavation held 45 shipping containers of bird carcasses stacked two-high and
covered with nine metres of fill.

A poultry farmer, who had been operating for less than two years, had all his stock culled. His
chicken sheds which were 200 m long, presented another challenge for the emergency crews
moving into the sheds to catch the chickens.

Figure 11. Personnel carrying out the

distressing task of catching chickens
to be euthanased.

Figure 12: Destruction of chickens using carbon monoxide.

118

Dust from the large disposal sites drifted to a neighbouring market gardening operation that
supplied large supermarket outlets. Tests on the produce found that dust exceeded
recommended levels of residues of fruit and vegetables.
On a brand-new farm, which cost $1.2 million for construction, chickens were destroyed at
18 days of age, and the property was not restocked for 7.5 months.

On another property, three generations of one family lived on an egg-producing farm, which
had 7000 birds. Children delivered eggs after school.

The Maitland Correctional Centre supplied 130 prisoners each day to assist the response.
When two prisoners were released some time later, they were responsible for a theft at one
farm they worked on.

Figure 13: Decontamination of infected broiler sheds.

119

Figure 14: Decontamination Pit 3Pre-excavation. Pit site is the centre top of the photo.
Pit size equals one soccer field.

Figure 15: Commencement of construction of Decontamination Pit 3.

120

Figure 16: Construction and lining of Decontamination Pit 3.

Figure 17: Construction Pit 3 operations.

121

Figure 18: Decontamination Pit 3 closed.

9:

From Part to Most

9.1

Community divides

The community divided in every way imaginable. The movement restrictions placed on the properties
were the regulatory Governments restrictions; however, in our experience, the community enforces its
own movement restrictions.
One of my first experiences of community sentiment was at Mangrove Mountain, where a lady from a
property, which had just been declared an IP, asked me to get her some milk, and I navely asked why.
The community had already made up its mind if she left her farm, she would infect the rest of
community, and so she didnt go anywhere.
At Mangrove Mountain, a mother, father and son were isolated on three separate properties. We were
trying to bring them together, but were blamed for their isolation. It was the industry, and the
community generally, that forced their isolation out of fear.
The first business to collapse was the childcare centre. Parents removed their children from the centre
for a variety of reasons.

122

9.2

Business downturn

The impacts were felt by businesses across the country, not just in rural areas or areas of active disease
although it was most severe in those areas. In the early stages, hotels and other tourism-dependent
businesses almost everywhere were affected by the fall in visitors.
In Mangrove Mountain, a junior netball competition was cancelled over the long weekend, which in
turn adversely affected the 14 motels/hotel in the area.

9.3

Environmental issues

Environmental factors were also an issue. There were issues with water tables, for instance. In
Mangrove Mountain, 1.1 million litres disinfectant was collected; this was 95% of the disinfectant that
was made up for use. In the UK, none was collected.

10: Across the UK

The UK Governments priority was to control, then eradicate, the disease. However, at an early stage
in the outbreak, it became clear that the measures put in place to control it were having a major impact
on activities other than livestock farming, notably countryside recreation and inbound overseas
tourism.

10.1 Countryside closed

Footpaths across the country were closed. Fourteen percent of UK farmers were affected by the FMD
outbreak.

10.2 Agribusiness collapsed

Follow-on effects for the UK agricultural supply sector included a decline in sales, livestock market
closures and loss of business to livestock transporters.
Estimates of the impact of FMD suggest whole economy losses for the UK in 2001 ranged from 0.2%
of GDP to 0.8% of GDP (1.6 billion to 6.3 billion).

10.3 Other business affected

Agriculture in the UK is a small industry compared with tourism. The impact on tourism was
significant. The tourism industry suffered a loss of 150 million per day; agriculture was 20 million
per day. Other industries were affected by the down-turn in agriculture. The loss to the National
economy during the 12 months of the outbreak was 6.3 billion, which equals 0.8% of GDP (the UK
economy is not very reliant on livestock industries as they are net importers.)

123

Some of the areas worst affected by the disease are also particularly dependent on countryside tourism,
notably the Lakes District. There, a canoe business in February of that year was worth 200 000.
When it was sold in August, it was worth 2000.
A maggot-breeding industry for fly-fishing was worth 250 000 a week. When all footpaths were
closed, access to fly-fishing points were also closed, which resulted in the collapse of the business.
In EADs, it is important that social and sporting activities are maintained so the community is able to
come together for stress relief and for communication. Often however, these activities cease due to
paranoia about spread of the disease and normal networking within the community is lost. In Penrith,
there were 6 pubs; in two months, only one remained open. Also, church groups ceased activities
through paranoia about disease.

11: What of the Rescuers?

As part of my involvement in bushfire management, most people are very pleased to see me when I
arrive; whereas, when there is an emergency disease outbreak, people are not pleased to see me.
The EAD workforce was just as focused as any other rescue workers. Almost all workers are
temporary; they were living away from home and family. Many people involved in the UK effort
lived for in hotels for 14 months.

11.1 Focus on disease control

At Mangrove Mountain, although we strived to provide human support services through the Council
and local community support workers, they were under-resourced.

11.2 Health and safety

Health and safety was a big issue. In Mangrove Mountain, 1140 injuries occurred amongst the
personnel who assisted in the operation. One third of these injuries involved foreign matter in eye.
Out of that third, six workers were not wearing eye protection that was supplied. There were
12 transports to hospital. Six others were overcome by carbon dioxide that was used to kill the
chickens. These incidences were the result of lapses in training protocol.

124

Figure 19: Human health protected during destruction of birds.

In the UK, the disease incidence that occurred in personnel involved was unexpected. Some military
personnel had contracted Leptospira and Q-feverthese people do not normally get exposed to those
agents, so they dont normally have measures in place in disposal sites.
Mental health was also big issue. Up to February 2004, two people were still receiving support.

11.3 Preparedness and Support

Part of the focus of disease control was whether workers were really ready to cope for the situation
they are going into. In the UK, workers were involved in a one-hour trauma management course.
Veterinarians understood there was a trauma response curve; eg, farmers could get physical when their
stock were destroyed.
The veterinary profession spend most of their careers trying to keep animals alive; in the UK and
Mangrove Mountain, they were doing the opposite.

12: Local Growth Industries

The logistics of a large-scale operation during an EAD are enormous. One positive outcome was that
local economies were boosted during the operation, particularly in the transport and machinery
industries, meals and accommodation and personnel provided for operations.

125

Examples of services
agencies included:

provided

by

Figure 20: Machinery for litter disposal.

Erection of 200+ roadside signs

Multi-agency response of 44
Railway sleepers 60,000+
Soil moved >100,000 cubic meters
Water transported 14 million litres
Task requests 3000
Recording of Entries-on-Duty
>2768
Meals peaked at 2780/day for 3
weeks
Imported disinfectant of 12 tonnes
Shorts/T-shirts 8,500.

13: Consequences of an EAD

13.1 Emotional loss exceeds economic loss
Ten per cent of the Australian poultry industry was located in Mangrove Mountain. There were
72 farms involved with 2300 households affected. Every family in the community was affected.
There were 2.1 million chickens and 2176 backyard birds destroyed, which resulted in a $55 million
financial loss in three months.
In the UK, the impact of FMD on the UKs economy in 2001 was 0.5% of the UKs GDP
4.1 billion. Tourism lost 3 billion in 2001, while the Agriculture industry lost 2.4 billion in 2001.
Operational Costs were 5 billion. The total cost of FMD compensation to farmers for slaughtered
livestock was 1.2 billion.
However, the emotional loss was greater than the economic loss. Many UK farmers took photos of
individual animals before their destruction. Over 5.5 million animals were compulsorily slaughtered
on 9515 farms.
Figure 21. The emotional loss as a result of
compulsory slaughter on farms had a significant
impact on the farmers and the community.

There was very little local community

and charity support. Support was often
started by Churches. Where support did
exist, volunteer networks; e.g. the Good
Samaritans were effective.
In Australia, community support is
administered from established charities.
In NSW alone, there are nearly
200 agencies.
The challenge for
community groups is to work together
towards the same goals.

126

13.2 Skills/training
What happens when people leave a community and skills are lost due to a downturn in the local
economy? How can a community keep people in the local area? Communities need to find reasons to
keep people in the area. In Mangrove Mountain, we recruited enough people in the local community
to sustain local skills and training. For example, the abattoir workforce from Scone, Blayney,
Macksville and Eden was recruited for two months to assist with operations. These abattoirs had
closed and personnel were available for work, and worked in an environment that was familiar to
them.

13.3 Petty crime

Petty crime increased during EADs. At Mangrove Mountain, first-aid kits were frequently stolen as
they could not be locked down for safety reasons. Also, people wore their own clothes to work, and
wore home the clothes supplied, so it was a challenge to maintain the supplies of clothing.
In the UK, a study was undertaken by the UK National Audit Office on petty crime. The ensuing
report did not distinguish between the community and the workforce, as petty crime and fraud was
prevalent in both. Although people expect things to above-board, petty crime and fraud is big business
as a lot of money is turned over.
In the UK during the FMD outbreak, it was law to have a portable tank of disinfectant at the front gate
of IPs. On one property alone, replacement tanks were stolen 3 times in 4 months.
In the UK, 160 burial sites were excavated and were re-buried in the following twelve months. In the
process, a header was excavated from a farm where a farmer had claimed compensation.

14: Economic Measures

Economic measures were put in place to assist communities during and after EADs, as recovery was
dependent on agricultural restructuring, skill and resource retention.
During the EAD in Mangrove Mountain, bank support for affected properties and business was
widespread. Banks were unable to sell affected properties, and therefore, worked with the response
team. There was low-uptake on loan guarantee.
As in the UK, there was no significant increase in the uptake of Social Security. Although social
security was provided, the uptake was low. As in the UK, women were much better at finding other
things to do, both paid and unpaid work, whereas men were less adept at establishing a new routine.
Restructure of the agricultural industry in the UK saw the implementation of a Rural Development
Program that incorporated a 7-year recovery program for the UK. Rate devalue and Tax relief,
Business Recovery Funds were provided and charity funds were matched by the Government.
A Business Advice Service was also provided. It was into the third month of the EAD in the UK that
business advice could be obtained. IPs received compensation and unlimited advice, whereas the
139,000 properties that were affected by movement restrictions only received three days to access
advice. Initially, 78 million was allocated in the first month for business recovery, which was all
targeted at the industries that were already receiving compensation. It took some time before it was
realised that the money was better allocated elsewhere to other industries.

127

15: Contact Details for Kevin Cooper

Phone: (02) 4640 6467
Mobile: 0412 139 267
Fax:
(02) 4640 6300
Email: kevin.cooper@agric.nsw.gov.au

128

Table 5.3.5: Tenure.

Appendix 2:
2001 Census Profile for
Case-study
Communities

Fully owned
Being purchased
RentedGovernment
RentedPrivate and other rental
type
Other tenure type
Not stated
Total

ARMIDALE-DUMARESQ, NSW
Table 5.3.1: Age Structure.
0 to 4
5 to 17
18 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 69
70 to 84
85 and over
Total

%
6.28
21.43
16.57
11.84
20.62
8.53
6.77
6.49
1.5

Agriculture, Forestry and

Fishing
Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water
Supply
Construction
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Accommodation, Cafes,
Restaurants
Transport and Storage
Communication Services
Finance and Insurance
Property and Business
Services
Government Admin. and
Defence
Education
Health and Community
Services
Cultural and Recreational
Services
Personal and Other Services
Non-classifiable* / not stated
Total

No.
48
57
125
173
172
156
93
824

%
5.8
6.9
15.17
20.99
20.87
18.93
11.29

Table 5.3.3: Highest qualification obtained.

Postgraduate Degree
Graduate Diploma or
Certificate
Bachelor Degree
Advanced Diploma and
Diploma
Certificate level
Not applicable
Not stated
Total

No.
894
421

%
4.76
2.24

2046
1053

10.89
5.6

2669
9877
1822
18782

14.21
52.59
9.7

Table 5.3.4: Labour Force Profile.

No
Full-time
Part-time
Employednot stated
Total employed
Unemployed
Total labour force
Not in labour force

%
37.9
20.82
5.02
30.09

252
268
8430

29.89
31.8

Table 5.3.6: Employment by Industry.

No.
1469
5013
3876
2770
4824
1996
1585
1518
346
23397

Table 5.3.2: Age Structure: Agriculture,

Forestry and Fishing.
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 and over
Total

No.
3195
1755
423
2537

5892
3639
239
9770
967
10737
7517

No.
824

%
8.43

93
334
42

.95
3.42
.43

469
295
1469
712

4.8
3.02
15.04
7.29

212
118
191
805

2.17
1.21
1.95
8.24

406

4.16

1942
1116

19.88
11.42

199

2.04

371
172
9770

3.8
1.76

Table 5.3.7: Other Skills.

Natural and Physical Sciences
Information Technology
Engineering and Related
Technologies
Architecture and Building
Agriculture, Environmental &
Related Studies
Health
Education
Management and Commerce
Society and Culture
Creative Arts
Food, Hospitality and Personal
Services
Mixed Field Programs
Field of Study inadequately
described
Not stated
Not applicable(b)
Total

%
60.31
37.25
2.45
9.0

Sources of Information ABS, 2001.

129

No.
500
139
921

%
2.66
0.74

469
462

4.90
2.50
2.46

820
1000
1312
1205
262
329

4.37
5.32
6.99
6.42
1.39
1.75

0.03

112
1369
9877
18783

0.60
7.29
52.58

Table 5.4.5: Tenure.

CASINO (RICHMOND VALLEY

SHIRE)

Fully owned
Being purchased
RentedGovernment
RentedPrivate and other rental
type
Other tenure type
Not stated
Total

Table 5.4.1: Comparative Age Structure.

0 to 4
5 to 17
18 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 69
70 to 84
85 and over
Total

No.
1404
4232
1297
2162
4305
2318
2040
2201
367
20326

%
6.91
20.82
6.38
10.64
21.18
11.40
10.04
10.83
1.81

No.
22
38
106
163
168
139
122
758

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing

Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Accommodation, Cafes,
Restaurants
Transport and Storage
Communication Services
Finance and Insurance
Property and Business Services
Government Admin. and Defence
Education
Health and Community Services
Cultural and Recreational
Services
Personal and Other Services
Non-classifiable* and not stated
Total

%
2.90
5.01
13.98
21.50
22.16
18.34
16.09

Table 5.5.3: Highest qualification obtained.

Postgraduate Degree
Graduate Diploma or Certificate
Bachelor Degree
Advanced Diploma and Diploma
Certificate level
Not applicable
Not stated
Total

No
84
88
574
542
2379
10004
1883
15554

%
0.54
0.57
3.69
3.48
15.30
12.11
64.32

Employed:
Full-time
Part-time
Employednot stated
Total employed
Unemployed
Total labour force
Not in labour force

4176
2325
274
6775
972
7747
7164

1719
287
326
7899

21.76
3.63
4.13

No.
758
15
976
28
369
426
1042
351

%
11.17
0.22
14.38
0.41
5.44
6.28
15.36
5.17

265
116
122
341
289
453
706
110

3.91
1.71
1.80
5.03
4.26
6.68
10.41
1.62

222
38
6785

3.27
0.56

No.
69
37

%
0.44
0.24

Table 5.4.7: Other Skills.

Natural and Physical Sciences
Information Technology
Engineering and Related
Technologies
Architecture and Building
Agriculture, Environmental &
Related Studies
Health
Education
Management and Commerce
Society and Culture
Creative Arts
Food, Hospitality and Personal
Services
Mixed Field Programs
Field of Study inadequately
described
Not stated
Not applicable(b)
Total

Table 5.4.4: Labour Force Profile.

No.

%
45.12
21.43
3.92

Table 5.4.6: Employment by Industry.

Table 5.4.2: Age Structure Agriculture,

Forestry and Fishing.
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 and over
Total

No.
3564
1693
310

%
61.64
34.32
4.0
12.5

1039
383
167

130

561
404
670
262
93
322

1.07
3.61
2.60
4.31
1.68
0.60
2.07

0.05

44
1492
10004
15554

Sources of Information ABS, 2001.

6.68
2.46

0.28
9.59
64.32

ROMA/Bungil Shire

Table 5.5.5: Tenure.

Table 5.5.1: Comparative Age Structure.

Fully owned
Being purchased
RentedGovernment
RentedPrivate and other rental
type
Other tenure type
Not stated
Total

0 to 4
5 to 17
18 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 69
70 to 84
85 and over
Total

No.
686
1709
683
1267
1824
874
640
551
80
8314

%
8.25
20.56
8.22
15.24
21.94
10.51
7.70
6.63
0.96

No.
11
27
139
128
137
135
110
687

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing

Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Accommodation, Cafes,
Restaurants
Transport and Storage
Communication Services
Finance and Insurance
Property and Business Services
Government Admin. and Defence
Education
Health and Community Services
Cultural and Recreational Services
Personal and Other Services
Non-classifiable* and not stated
Total

%
1.6
3.9
20.2
18.63
19.94
19.65
16.01

Table 5.5.3: Highest qualification obtained.

Postgraduate Degree
Graduate Diploma or
Certificate
Bachelor Degree
Advanced Diploma and
Diploma
Certificate level
Not stated
Not applicable
Total

No
24
46
441
270
909
524
4061
6275

%
0.38
0.73
7.03

Employed:
Full-time
Part-time
Employednot stated
Total employed
Unemployed
Total labour force
Not in labour force

2970
1158
138
4266
187
4453
1625

159
132
3155

5.04
4.18

No.
687
122
279
49
310
228
626
190

%
16.24
2.88
6.59
1.16
7.33
5.39
14.80
4.49

222
65
83
209
195
325
391
42
123
85

5.25
1.54
1.96
4.94
4.61
7.68
9.24
0.99
2.91
2.01

Table 5.5.7: Other Skills.

4.30
14.49
8.35
64.72

Natural and Physical Sciences

Information Technology
Engineering and Related
Technologies
Architecture and Building
Agriculture, Environmental &
Related Studies
Health
Education
Management and Commerce
Society and Culture
Creative Arts
Food, Hospitality and Personal
Services
Mixed Field Programs
Field of Study inadequately
described
Not stated
Not applicable(b)
Total

Table 5.5.4: Labour Force Profile.

No.

%
39.75
21.30
3.11
26.62

Table 5.5.6: Employment by Industry.

Table 5.5.2: Age Structure Agriculture,

Forestry and Fishing.
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 and over
Total

No.
1254
672
98
840

%
69.62
27.14
3.23
4.20

No.
25
11
446

%
0.40
0.18
7.11

128

2.04

122

1.95
4.35
3.70
3.96
1.88
0.43
1.90

0.00

18
441
4061
0

Sources of Information ABS, 2001.

131

273
232
248
118
27
119

0.29
7.03
64.78

Table 5.6.5: Tenure.

CAMPERDOWN
(CORANGAMITE SHIRE)
VICTORIA

Fully owned
Being purchased
RentedGovernment
RentedPrivate and other
rental type

Table 5.6.1: Comparative Age Structure.

0 to 4
5 to 17
18 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 69
70 to 84
85 and over
Total

No.
1207
3471
998
1901
3588
1998
1556
1523
310
16552

%
7.3
21.0
6.0
11.5
21.7
12.1
9.4
9.2
1.9

Other tenure type

Not stated
Total

No.
66
144
470
708
578
472
234
2672

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing

Mining
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
Construction
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Accommodation, Cafes,
Restaurants
Transport and Storage
Communication Services
Finance and Insurance
Property and Business Services
Government Admin. and Defence
Education
Health and Community Services
Cultural and Recreational Services
Personal and Other Services
Non-classifiable* and not stated
Total

%
2.5
5.39
17.59
26.5
21.63
17.66
8.76

Table 5.6.3: Highest qualification obtained.

Postgraduate Degree
Graduate Diploma or Certificate
Bachelor Degree
Advanced Diploma and Diploma
Certificate level
Not applicable
Not stated
Total

No
55
111
688
575
1876
7817
1439
12561

%
0.4
0.9
5.5
4.6
14.9
62.2
11.5

No.

4979
2122
273
7374
329
7703
4343

64.6
27.5
3.5
95.7
4.3

419
235
6295

6.7
3.7

No.
2672
32
721
33
382
274
89

%
36.16
0.43
9.76
0.45
5.17
3.71
1.20

275
228
68
65
225
133
432
633
82
154
191
7389

3.72
3.09
0.92
0.88
3.05
1.80
5.85
8.57
1.11
2.08
2.58

Table 5.6.7: Other Skills.

Natural and Physical Sciences
Information Technology
Engineering and Related
Technologies
Architecture and Building
Agriculture, Environmental &
Related Studies
Health
Education
Management and Commerce
Society and Culture
Creative Arts
Food, Hospitality and Personal
Services
Mixed Field Programs
Field of Study inadequately
described
Not stated
Not applicable(b)
Total

Table 5.6.4: Labour Force Profile.

Employed:
Full-time
Part-time
Employednot stated
Total employed
Unemployed
Total labour force
Not in labour force

%
54.2
20.6
2.1 1
12.8

Table 5.6.6: Employment by Industry.

Table 5.6.2: Age Structure Agriculture,

Forestry and Fishing.
15 to 19
20 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 and over
Total

No.
3410
1295
132
804

No.
47
24
751

%
0.37
0.19
5.98

265
511

2.11
4.07

551
463
351
193
77
273

4.39
3.68
2.79
1.54
0.61
2.17

0.05

39
1197
7817
12565

Sources of Information: ABS 2001.

132

0.31
9.53
62.21