By Dr. George Friedman, CEO of Strategic Forecasting Inc.

(Stratfor), an ROA STARs Partner

he concept of Fourth Generation warfare was introduced

into American military thinking in a 1989 article in the Marine
Corps Gazette by William S. Lind,
Col Keith Nightengale, Capt John F.
Schmitt, Col Joseph W. Sutton, and
LtCol Gary I. Wilson. The argument
was elegant and persuasive. It said that
there had been three prior generations
of warfare. The first was built around
the tactics of the muzzle-loading musket. The second was the introduction
of indirect fire. The third was mobile
warfare designed to bypass and disrupt
the enemy. Fourth Generation warfare
was the use of highly disaggregated
forces (guerrillas, terrorists, and the
like) managed by non-state actors to
undermine conventional forces.
In 1989, this was prescient. The
Soviet Union was in the process of collapsing. As the Soviet Union collapsed,

This report is a publication of

the Defense Education Forum of
the Reserve Officers Association
and is intended to advance
discussion and scholarship of
national security issues. The
views expressed in this report are
solely those of the author and
not necessarily those of ROA.

WWW.ROA.ORG

the only conventional military force

that could potentially engage the United States in high-intensity conventional
conflict was disappearing. The question
of the future of American armed forces
was on the table, and a doctrine appropriate to military realities was needed.
Fourth Generation warfare was an intelligent response to circumstances.
In 1989, the U.S. military was
confronting two issues. The first was
Vietnam, which posed the problem of
counterinsurgency operations and the
apparent failure of the United States to
carry those out effectively. The failure
in Vietnam remained an obsession. The
second was the Palestinian Intifada and
the inability of the Israeli Defense Forces to suppress it. Defeat in Vietnam, the
Intifada, and the collapse of the Soviet
Union generated a sense that the U.S.
military was configured to fight the
wrong war at the wrong time.
Prussian military theorist Carl von
Clausewitz argues that military power
must be focused on the center of gravity of the enemy force in order to destabilize and break it. Guerrillas, terrorists, and rioters are designed to deny
their enemy a center of gravity at which
to strike. Fourth Generation warriors
apply force to an enemy without giving him a point at which to carry out
a decisive counter-strike. The Fourth
Generation force has two goals. The
first is simply to survive. The second is

to impose such a level of violence on

the enemy as to create a psychological sense of insecurity, impotence, and
hopelessness.
There is nothing new operationally
in this doctrine. What was new and
important in the Marine Corps Gazette
article was the argument that this sort
of warfare was to become the dominant model of warfare in the future,
as mobile warfare had dominated the
battlefield since the beginning of World
War II, and as linear warfare with indirect fire had dominated the battlefield
in World War I. What mattered in this
argument was that, in continuing to
plan for combined arms warfare against
an enemy fighting a similar war, the
United States was once again planning
for the wrong war.
The United States has a tradition of
planning for the wrong war. In 1900,
the focus of the United States was on
global naval power, with relatively light
land forces. The idea that the next war
the United States would fight would
be a massive ground war in Europe was
far from the minds of strategic planners. After World War II, there was a
deep belief that the introduction of
nuclear weapons had transformed war
so completely that the idea of conventional warfare had been pre-empted.
It was not anticipated that the United
States would fight a conventional, nonnuclear war in Korea, or that it would
the

Officer / SEPTEMBER 2007 57

ROA National Security Report

Beyond Fourth Generation Warfare

ROA National Security Report

fight a profoundly unconventional war

in Vietnam.
These and other doctrinal and strategic failed expectations traumatized
the U.S. military. The U.S. Army that
was supposed to defend the north
German plain ultimately fought in
Vietnam, with unacceptable consequences. Building the right army for
the real mission became an obsession
to U.S. military planners, and the challenges faced by advocates of Fourth
Generation warfare as the paradigm
for warfare wereas they should have
beentaken seriously.
Certainly, when we look at the conflicts that have erupted since the fall of
the Soviet Union (with the exception
of Desert Storm and the conventional
invasion of Iraq in 2003), the argument
that the primary challenges the U.S.
military faced would involve Fourth
Generation rather than Third Generation warfare has stood the test of time.
From Somalia to 9/11 to Afghanistan
and Iraq, the mission of the U.S. military has been to engage in Fourth Generation warfare. And, as we look at U.S.
brigades and battalions fighting combatant forces deployed as individuals or
small groups, we can see the strength of
the argument.
The temptation now is to reconfigure the U.S. military to deal with
Fourth Generation warfare, remembering that the argument is not that this
will be a type of warfare among many
the United States will face but that this
will be the predominant type of warfare
we will face. If we accept that reasoning, then a very different type of force
emerges.
The theory of Fourth Generation
warfare is not simply a military doc58

the

Officer / SEPTEMBER 2007

trine. It is also a political one. All three

prior models of warfare involved military forces controlled by a conventional
state. Fourth Generation warfare is not
simply an argument for a new model of
warfare; it also is an argument for the
prevalence of a new class of international forcethe non-state actor. Fourth
Generation warfare doesnt argue that
states will increasingly use this model to
engage and defeat other states. The core
argument is that state-to-state conflict
will decline while conflicts between
state-based armies and non-state actors
will increase.
That is the heart of the theory. If
that theory is wrong, and the United
States reconfigures its forces to deal
primarily with Fourth Generation conflicts, the results could be catastrophic.
It would leave the United States weakened against a challenge by a peer state.
In 1989, it was extremely difficult to
imagine a nation-state prepared to challenge the United States militarily. The
ones who might, like Iraq or Serbia,
were incapable of resisting even a fraction of American power. The real challenges were in occupying territories that
did not wish to be occupied, or protecting the homeland against terrorism.
It is now 16 years since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. During those 16
years, the United States did not face a
direct challenge from a nation-state.
The threat of nuclear weapons from
North Korea or Iran represented the
extent of state challenges. But there
was no challenge such as that in the
past from the Soviet Union, Germany, or Japana challenge that posed
prolonged conflict in the air, on land,
and at sea against an antagonist that
thought of war much as we did.

The question is whether those 16

years were simply the beginning of a
new era in which the United States
would no longer face nation-states, or
whether it was a transitional period
between one set of peer threats and another. If it is the former, then we need
one type of force, tilted more toward
the kind of wars theorized in Fourth
Generation warfare. If it is the latter,
then we need a different type of force,
built around traditional issues such as
control of the sea, command of the air,
domination of the ground, andmost
importantcontrol of space.
Fourth Generation warfare theory
is not only arguing for an evolution
in warfare. It is arguing for a discontinuity in history. It is arguing that the
predominant form of warfare, certainly
in recent centuries, is coming to an end
and that an entire model of international relations is outmoded. The theory might be right, of course, but that is
not the most obvious answer. The more
obvious answer is that the collapse of
the Soviet Union created the optical illusion of a new system of international
relations in which the non-state actor
predominates. But that generation of
optical illusion is about over, and reality is in the process of asserting itself.
We can also put it this way. The collapse of the Soviet Union broke a balance of power running from Yugoslavia
to the Hindu Kusha predominantly
Muslim region. The result was massive
instability in the Muslim world that
generated a variety of non-state actors.
However, the permanence of these features is far from clear, and the relative
threat from this region compared to
threats from nation-states is minor and
manageable.
WWW.ROA.ORG

WWW.ROA.ORG

sian military has collapsed. That perception is at least five years out of date.
Certainly the Russians no longer have
the massive Red Army, but they do
have extremely competent units again,
new generations of missiles, new fighter
aircraft under development, and so on.
The United States has treaty relations
with Poland and the Baltic states. There
is no war on the horizon and perhaps
not even a Cold War, but given the unpredictability of history, it is difficult to
imagine a force configured for Fourth
Generation warfare dealing with Russian pressure on these NATO allies.
Then there is China. China is interested in trading. But it trades in waters
controlled by the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
It must import raw materials and export manufactured goods. To do this,
it is entirely dependent on the United
States willingness not to interdict that
flow of goods. That is probably a good
bet. On the other hand, the Chinese
are dealing with their very existence as a
vibrant global economy. It is a principle
of national security to focus on capabilities rather than intent, since intent can
change fast. The Chinese cant simply
bet on American good will.
Therefore, they are developing counters to the American naval force. Rather than try to build fleets of ships to do
thiswhich would take at least a generationthe Chinese are focusing on
the question of how the United States
might interdict the flow of goods.
They have conducted exercises in the
Straits of Malacca, and have developed
extensive land- and air-based anti-ship
missile capabilities to drive the Seventh
Fleet back from their coastal waters and
beyond. They are now building missiles
able to strike against the U.S. fleet as

far back as Guam. In other words, they

are building the capability to deny the
United States control of the Western
Pacific.
In order to target their missiles, they
must have reconnaissance capabilities,
and for that they must have space-based
systems, which they are launching. In
order to fight the kind of battle they
seem to be planning in the Pacific, they
need to deny the United States its own
space-based reconnaissance so that it
cant target land-based anti-ship launch
sites or provide other targeting data to
its fleet. We have seen Chinas anti-satellite activities in the past year.
The Chinese are acting out of fear of
an unpredictable United States. Their
intentions might be benign, but their
capabilities represent a threat to U.S. sea
lane control in the Pacific. Just as China
cant depend on U.S. subjective intentions, the United States cant depend
on Chinese intentions. The intensifying
competition between China and the
United States has not yet reached the
point of crisis, or anywhere near to it,
but it is dangerous.
The difference between Fourth
Generation conflict and what we will
label Fifth Generation conflict is that
the lead time to deploy capabilities in
Fifth Generation warfare is much longer than in Fourth Generation warfare.
Fourth Generation warfare is a question
of training and mindset, with a limited technological evolution required.
Fifth Generation warfare requires an
extended weapons development time
line. In order to deal with China, for
example, emphasis must be placed on
advances in fleet missile defense, survivable reconnaissance satellites, targeting
missile sites with hypersonic missiles in
the

Officer / SEPTEMBER 2007 59

ROA National Security Report

The issue is what nation-states have

the ability and appetite to challenge
the United States. One is already challenging us: Russia. The Russian view, as
expressed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, is that the period since the
collapse of the Soviet Union has been
a geopolitical disaster. Russia traded
geopolitical matters to the West in exchange for economic benefits. Before
the collapse, Russia had been powerful
but poor. After the collapse, Russia was
weak and even poorer. President Putin
is determined, quite publicly, to reverse
this outcome, something he can finance
given high energy prices.
The Russians are moving to re-establish their sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. All along its periphery, Russia is increasing its influence
and presence. From Central Asia to the
Caucasus to Ukraine and north to the
Baltic states, Russian pressure, unfelt
for a generation, is being felt again. The
Russian view of the United States is
that its behavior inside the former Soviet Union, and particularly in Ukraine
and the Baltics, has been unacceptable.
Ukraine is clearly not going to move
out of the Russian sphere of influence.
The Baltic states, however, are part
of NATO. There were recent riots by
Russian nationals in Estonia, and the
Russians have made it clear that there
are limits to their tolerance of the way
Baltic states treat Russians. They have
also made it clear that if the United
States places an antiballistic missile
(ABM) system in Poland, they will
place missiles in Kaliningrad. The Polish government has backed the Balts
and has aggressively welcomed the U.S.
ABM treaty.
There is a perception that the Rus-

ROA National Security Report

real time, and a host of attendant technologies. Dealing with a Russian threat
on the north European plain requires
close air support that can survive in an
intense surface-to-air-missile environment, infantry of massively increased
lethality and survivability, and an entire
new sensor-to-shooter cycle for combating armored fighting vehicles. And
obviously, the force itself, the troops,
must be reconfigured for the emerging
mission.
None of these things can arrive on
the scene in a year or two. All of them
require research and development programs, testing, production, doctrine
development, and deployment cycles
that can take a decade. That means
that every decision made regarding the
force today is a bet on what the world
will look like in 10 years. Focusing on
Fourth Generation warfare is a bet that
the non-state actor will remain the primary threat to the United States.
It comes down to how lucky we feel.
If we feel that we have seen not only a
generational shift in warfare but also a
fundamental shift in how the international system works, and that both will
last a long time, then the key is to support asymmetric warfare. If you argue
either that the current shift is an illusion or that whatever the outcome we
must hedge our bets, then the answer is
to increase our spending on Fifth Gen-

Call for Papers

The National Security Report is published in coordination with the
Defense Education Forum of the Reserve Officers Association. Articles
are now being accepted for publication as National Security Reports. The
articles should be a thesis or essay covering some aspect of national defense
or global security, with citations where appropriate. The papers must be
original (no reprints) and a maximum of 3,000 words in length, including
footnotes. All papers will be reviewed by the DEF director, The Officer
editor, and the ROA Communications Advisory Board. Revisions may be
requested, or the paper may be rejected outright. Approved articles will be
edited for grammar, punctuation, and ROA style guidelines, and will be
copyfitted to the allotted space. Submit your papers to eminton@roa.org.

eration warfare: space-based systems,

survivable fleets, advanced infantry systems, and so on.
We do not believe the international
system has made a fundamental shift. In
watching the behavior of potential peer
competitors like Russia and China,
we see the world returning to a more
traditional model. But even if we were
simply uncertain, we would have to ask
for a hedged bet, which is investing in
Fifth Generation systems more heavily.
To bet too heavily on Fourth Generation methods of warfighting could leave
us in the Mekong Delta with a force
trained for the Fulda Gap. Non-state

actors are painful. But they do not

threaten the survival of the Republic.
Nation-states do.
George Friedman, Ph.D., is the
founder and chief executive officer of
Strategic Forecasting Inc. (Stratfor), a
leading private intelligence company. The
author of numerous articles and books on
national security, including Americas
Secret War and The Future of War, Dr.
Friedman has appeared on major television networks and been featured, along
with Stratfor, in such national publications as Time, The Wall Street Journal
and The New York Times Magazine.

Contributions to the Defense Education Trust Fund are tax deductible under the provisions of Sections 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Defense
Education Chairman: MajGen Larry S. Taylor, USMCR (Ret.). Committee: CAPT Gordon Bell, USCG (Ret.); Col Robin L. Davitt, USAFR; COL
Richard S. Eckstein, USAR; Maj Barbara D. Manouse, USAFR; COL William G. Willis, USAR; CAPT Henry E. Plimack, USCGR (Ret.), ex-officio
PAO; CDR William C. Doty, USCGR (Ret.), ExCom liaison; Mr. Steven J. Ford, ROAL representative; BG Louis Lee Myers Jr., ARNG (Ret.), National
Council liaison; LTC Robert Feidler, USAR, staff liaison; LtGen Dennis M. McCarthy, USMC (Ret.), publisher; Eric Minton, editor, ROA National
Security Report.
DEF Emeritus Board
Co-Chairs: CAPT Ned Kulp, USCGR (Ret.), and BG Louis Myers, ARNG (Ret.). Committee members: CAPT Henry Plimack, USCGR (Ret.); *BG
John McAllister, USAR (Ret.); *LTC Nate Allen, AUS (Ret.); CAPT Robert L. Pendleton, USCGR (Ret.); CAPT Joe Wielert, USCGR (Ret.); COL David Davenport, USAR; Maj Joylyn Grant, USAFR; Col John Loughran, USAF (Ret.); Col Paul Groskreutz, USAFR; CDR John Conant, USNR (Ret.); Lt
Col Judy Larson, USAFR; RADM Steve Yusem, USNR (Ret.).
* Deceased

60

the

Officer / SEPTEMBER 2007

WWW.ROA.ORG