DUE PROCESS

Lumigued v Hon. Exevea

282 SCRA 125 (89 SCAD 151) Political Law Constitutional Law Due Process;
Administrative Bodies Assistance by Counsel
Law on Public Officers Right to Due Process Public Office is Not a Property
Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by
Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas
expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for
reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00.
Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks
after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee
hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting
to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he
himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec
Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing
Lumiqued.
Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated as well as his
right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative inquiry?
HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in
writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused
during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked
or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry. In the case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime. The investigation conducted by
the committee was for the purpose of determining if he could be held
administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right
to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or
the law.
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of
lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not

engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not
that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain ones side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by
the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of
motions for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on due
process safeguards life, liberty and property. Public office is a public trust. It is not a
property guaranteed of due process. But when the dispute concerns ones
constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed
analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could
rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute
especially when it was proven, as in this case, that the public officer (Lumiqued) did
not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public officers and employees
must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the
said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for
the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that
the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by
a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source
of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law
of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable
in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since
it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation
clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason
that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in
the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal
a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B.
JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents.
Facts:
The petition at bar seeking to void and set aside the Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for hearing
petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent
Mark B. Jimenez.
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the
extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court
allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.
Issue/s: Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings
Discussions: The constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
Ruling/s: No. The court agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because
he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed
under its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He
already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran
away.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its

Secretary General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]

FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for
reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941),
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis
supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the
resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the
law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically

opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited

congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not violated
for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of
[COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is
the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at
hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. [It is]
obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due
process.

Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils. Vs. COMELEC

289 SCRA 337
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,
Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting
companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as,
among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or
threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the
other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines
affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be
known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially
among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of
charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to
procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92
provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it

contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air
time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do
so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio
and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these
stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for
one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in
view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time
daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.
Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and
supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds
in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment
of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.
Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private
property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress
who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular
sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as
member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However,
inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable
by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO

N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY

FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its
finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC
has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a factfinding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those
of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any

event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O.
No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body
to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of

sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O.
No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In
private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to
know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so
there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those

of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within
a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through
the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined

and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as
Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint
committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the
2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting
a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the
Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of
the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and
South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team
recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be
subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution
ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA,
et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid.
POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC

Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and
functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of
all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the
people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of
prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is
vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the
Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant
to the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional
bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt
investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of
ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection
clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose
is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist
that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as
public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public
officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the
performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the
investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is
intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and
conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.

DISMISSED.