Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR

FACTS:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business allegedly stands to be
adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural,
Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial,
livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily
determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within
sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands
over and above the compensation they currently receive xxx
ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
(the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage
HELD:

Said provisions are unconstitutional.

The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the
word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.

Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang
agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay
namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of
"commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and
poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Association Of Small Landowners Vs. Secretary Of DAR Case Digest

Asso. Of Small Landowners Vs. Sec. Of DAR 175 SCRA 343

G.R. No. L-78742
July 14, 1989
Facts:
Several petitions are the root of the case:
a.
A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are
a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers
under PD 27. The petitioners now contend
that President Aquino usurped the legislatures power.
b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental aga
inst Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of
P50Billion.
c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven
hectares.
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent
Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever
lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain
for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the
method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to
achieve it.

Vinzons-Magana vs. Minister of Agrarian Reform (1991)

FACTS
MAGANA owned a parcel of riceland in Talisay, Camarines Norte, which was tenanted by the late Domingo
Paitan (PAITAN). On Oct 20, 1977, MAGANA filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold agreement
allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals; (2) inability and failure of PAITAN to till and cultivate the
riceland due to illness; and (3) subleasing of the landholding to third parties. This petition was referred by the
presiding judge of the Court of Agrarian Reform to the DAR, which failed to act upon the request for more
than 3 years. Instead, on July 10, 1980, the property was placed under the Land Transfer Program by
Memorandum Circular 11 (1978) which implement LOI 474, which placed all tenanted ricelands with areas of
seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in
aggregate areas, as being covered under the Land Transfer Program. A Certificate of Land Transfer was
awarded to PAITAN, who no longer paid Magana the rentals and instead deposited them with the Land Bank,
which were credited as amortization payments for the riceland. MAGANA now assails the constitutionality of
MC11 and LOI 474, claiming that
the issuance of CLT to PAITAN without first expropriating said property to pay petitioner landowner the full
market value thereof before ceding and transferring the land to Paitan and/or heirs, is invalid and
unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE
WON the said issuances are UNCONSTITUTIONAL
HELD NO.
The validity of LOI 474 has already been recognized by the court in previous cases. LOI 474 is neither class
legislation, nor does it deprive a person of property without due process of law or just compensation As to
MC11, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are
entitled to great respect. As previously held by the court, the taking of private property under the CARP Law is
constitutional. The government merely exercises its police power in prescribing retention limits and, the taking
under the power of eminent domain just requires the payment of just compensation. The determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the COURTS. NOTE: Mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer
does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate merely
evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory
mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under PD27. This
recognition is neither permanent nor irrevocable. The failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with
his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years
to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer. It is only
compliance with the prescribed conditions which entitles the farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent by
which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding

a right which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt and controversy. At best the
farmer/grantee prior to compliance with these conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of
ownership over the landholding. The landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an
opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. Such determination of just compensation by
the DAR is NOT final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party for Section 16 (f)
clearly provides: "Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation." Magana is not without protection. Should she fail to
agree on the price of her land as fixed by the DAR, she can bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction.
Likewise, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to pay his lease
rentals or amortization payments for a period of two (2) years is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of
land transfer.

GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. CAFACTS:
Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land, issued it in the name of its successor, the
Credito Asiatic,Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into twoparcels
LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into aresidential and industrial estate
CAI embarked on the development of the housing project intothree phases and secured a locational clearance
for the projectfrom the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC
CAI decided to continue with the development of its HakoneHousing Project but the project was stymied by a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order andPreliminary Injunction
The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements withthe respondent that they would remain in
peaceful possession of their farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the defendantordered the bulldozing of the
property
In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffsto possess and cultivate the landholding
with fixed rentals
Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into acompromise agreement which eventually led to all of
the other plaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI
CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverageunder Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known
as theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed beforethe DAR by seventeen (17) individuals
who alleged that they arefarmers who have occupied a parcel of public agricultural landadjacent to Pasong
Bayabas River
According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activitieswould convert the land from agricultural to
non-agricultural land,thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancyrights over the property. For
this reason, the petitioners prayedthat a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop thebulldozing of
the property, and that a preliminary injunction or astatus quo order be later issued to enjoin the same
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IIRM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTSUNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS /
ROOM 410 (2009-2010)Marianne Cabacungan8
1.
Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. ActNo. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);
2.
whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against
the privaterespondent;
3.
whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of action against the private respondent for
possession andcultivation of the property in suit;
4.
whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil CaseNo. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of
the petitioners-members of the PBFAI; and
5.

whether the appellate court committed a reversible error indismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP
No. 49363.
HELD:
The contention of the petitioners has no merit.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But longbefore the law took effect, the property subject
of the suit hadalready been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land.
With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classifiedas residential land since 1976, the DARAB
had no original andappellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of thepetitioner PBFAI and its
members.
Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenantsof the private respondent CAI, the petitioners
and its membershad no cause of action against the private respondent for possession of the landholding to
maintain possession thereof andfor damages.
When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven(37) members of the petitioners had already
executed separatedeeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over theportions of the landholding
they respectively claimed, after receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money.In executing
the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAIthereby waived their respective claims over the property.
Hence,they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of thesame.
Petition denied.

Natalia Realty Inc and Estate Developers & Investors Corp vs DAR
FACTS:
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the
Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population
overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The Natalia
properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.

EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances
by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioners were likewise issued development
permits after complying with the requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later became the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision.

On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted.

DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.

Natalia and EDIC protested to this.

Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against
Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas
under cultivation by SAMBA members.

DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners from further developing the subdivision.

Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the Regional
Adjudicator for further proceedings

Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of
Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters.

Hence, this petition.

Natalias contention: Subject properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were
included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for townsite reservation.

OSGs contention: The permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not
comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion of the
NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words, there was
no valid conversion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties shall be included in the coverage of CARP
HELD:

NO.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural
land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and
suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential
use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147146. July 29, 2005]
JOSE, JULIO and FEDERICO, All Surnamed JUNIO, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, in His
Capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15, 1988 -- the date
of effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) -- are outside the coverage of this law.
Therefore, they no longer need any conversion clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
February 24, 2000 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-GR SP No. 37217. The Decision denied
petitioners Petition for Certiorari[3] for its failure to show that the DAR had acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued its Exemption Order dated September 13,
1994. The Order, issued by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, had excluded Lot 835-B from the
coverage of Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
In its Resolution dated April 4, 2001, this Court (through the Second Division) immediately denied the Petition
for failure of petitioners (1) to attach the duplicate original/certified true copy of the CA Resolution denying
their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision; and (2) to state the dates of their receipt and filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration of that Decision.
In their Motion for Reconsideration[4] of the April 4, 2001 Resolution, petitioners alleged that they had
received the assailed CA Decision on March 8, 2000 and filed their Motion for Reconsideration on March 22,
2000. They likewise submitted a duplicate original of the February 2, 2001 CA Resolution,[5] which had
denied that Motion.
On January 22, 2002, petitioners filed a Manifestation.[6] It stated that in a clarificatory letter dated July 30,
1997,[7] Salvador S. Malibong, the deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City, completely reversed the
false Certification he had issued earlier. That Certification had been the basis of the DAR secretarys assailed
Exemption Order.
On February 18, 2002, public respondent submitted its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners. They in turn submitted their Reply to the Comment on June 14, 2002, in compliance with the
Courts Resolution dated April 10, 2002. In its Resolution dated August 13, 2003, the Court (Second Division)

resolved to grant their Motion for Reconsideration and to require the solicitor general to comment on the
Petition within ten days from notice.
On October 9, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.
The OSG stated that its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on February 18, 2002,
had fully addressed the issues presented in their Petition for Review. On November 12, 2003, the Court
resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within thirty days from notice. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the First Division, and finally to the
Third, which will now resolve the controversy.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as follows:
In a Complaint dated February 12, 1994, filed with the [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB)] by complainants (some of whom are herein petitioners), identified as Potential CARP Beneficiaries
per Certification of OIC [Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] dated November 21, 1991 x x x, it is
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the registered owners of a certain parcel of
agricultural land consisting of 71 hectares, more or less, known as Lot No. 835-B of Bacolod Cadastre, Brgy.
Pahanocoy, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79622. Petitioners claim that x x x Sta.
Lucia Realty Corporation and the Estate of Guillermo Villasor, represented by Irving Villasor, are bulldozing
and leveling the subject property for the purpose of converting it into a residential subdivision; that as
prospective CARP beneficiaries of the land in question, being former laborers, actual occupants and permanent
residents of Barangay Pahanocoy, their rights will be prejudiced by the illegal conversion of the land into a
residential subdivision x x x.
On April 13, 1994, the DARAB OIC Executive Director forwarded the complaint to [Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)], DAR, Region VI, Bacolod City for appropriate action x x x. Before any
hearing could be conducted thereon, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an Order
dated September 13, 1994 in RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE PURSUANT
TO DOJ OPINION NO. 44, SERIES OF 1990, IRVING P. VILLASOR, et al., Rep. by Atty. Angel Lobaton,
Jr., Petitioners, portions of which read as follows:
After a careful study of the facts of the case and the evidences presented by the parties, this Office finds the
petition for exemption to be well founded. Under DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, it provides that lands
which has already been classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial and industrial areas, prior to June
15, 1988 shall be excluded from CARP coverage. To this, it is an [i]nescapable conclusion that the subject
property is exempted from CARP coverage considering the fact that the same was classified as residential as
evidenced by the Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of 1976 of the City Council of Bacolod and as approved by
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) in its Resolution dated September 24, 1980 as
per Certification dated June 22, 1994 issued by the said Commission. The Certification of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) dated June 9, 1994 stated that the subject land is not irrigable or is outside the
service area of the irrigation system in the locality. In effect the said application had conformed to the
requirements of the law on exemption. In accord thereto, the stand of Mr. Espanola that the portion, which he
planted to trees and developed into mini-forest should be covered by CARP[,] is beyond recognition as the
program does not apply to those which are already classified as residential lands prior to the effectivity of
CARL on June 15, 1988. Instead, it is confined only to agricultural lands, which under R.A. 6657, Sec. 3(c), it
defines agricultural lands as lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential or industrial land. With the above stated definition, it is beyond reason that the
placing of the said portion under CARP coverage (1.5 hectare) is devoid of legal and factual basis.[8]

As earlier said, the Exemption Order was challenged before the appellate court via a Petition for Certiorari.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the Exemption Order issued by public respondent. It found that prior to June
15, 1988, Lot 835-B had been reclassified from agricultural to residential land. It relied on the Courts
pronouncement in Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian Reform[9] that lands were outside the coverage of
the CARL if they had been converted to non-agricultural uses by government agencies, other than the DAR,
prior to the effectivity of that law.
Further, the CA ruled that neither the CARL nor the Local Government Code of 1991 had nullified the
reclassification of Lot 835-B. The appellate court noted that the land had been validly reclassified from
agricultural to residential in 1976, prior to the effective date of both laws. It added that neither of those two
laws could be applied retroactively, since they contained no provision authorizing their retroactivity.
Hence, this Petition.[10]
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit this lone issue for our consideration:
Whether the respondent DAR secretary had the inherent authority or power to exclude or exempt at will from
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) the subject agricultural land which was
already automatically covered by the CARL (RA 6657) upon its effectivity on June 15, 1988 without affording
due process to herein petitioners and without the necessity of Congress having first to amend Section 4 of the
said law authorizing such exemption or exclusion from CARP coverage.[11]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sole Issue:
Coverage
Section 4 of RA 6657 sets forth the coverage of the CARL as follows:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that
can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as that which is devoted to agricultural activity x x x and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

The meaning of agricultural lands covered by the CARL was explained further by the DAR in its
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990,[12] entitled Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses, issued pursuant to Section 49 of CARL,
which we quote:
x x x. Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not
classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988
for residential, commercial or industrial use. (Emphasis supplied)
Prior to this Order, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990, which was addressed to then
DAR Secretary Florencio Abad, recognized the fact that before the date of the laws effectivity on June 15,
1988, the reclassification or conversion of lands was not exclusively done by the DAR.[13] Rather, it was a
coordinated effort of all concerned agencies; namely, the Department of Local Governments and Community
Development, the Human Settlements Commission and the DAR.[14] Then Justice Secretary Franklin M.
Drilon explained the coordination in this wise:
x x x. Under R.A. No. 3844,[15] as amended by R.A. No. 6389,[16] an agricultural lessee may, by order of the
court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing, it is shown that the landholding is declared by
the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes.[17]
Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and 946) which were issued to give teeth to
the implementation of the agrarian reform program decreed in P.D. No. 27, the DAR was empowered to
authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands, specifically those planted to rice and/or corn, to other
agricultural or to non-agricultural uses, subject to studies on zoning of the Human Settlements Commissions
(HSC). This non-exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid laws was, x x x recognized and
reaffirmed by other concerned agencies, such as the Department of Local Government and Community
Development (DLGCD) and the then Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in a Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the DAR and these two agencies on May 13, 1977, which is an admission that with respect to land
use planning and conversions, the authority is not exclusive to any particular agency but is a coordinated effort
of all concerned agencies.
It is significant to mention that in 1978, the then Ministry of Human Settlements was granted authority to
review and ratify land use plans and zoning ordinance of local governments and to approve development
proposals which include land use conversions (see LOI No. 729 [1978]). This was followed by [E.O.] No. 648
(1981) which conferred upon the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (the predecessors of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] the authority to promulgate zoning and other land use
control standards and guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning ordinances of local
governments, subdivision or estate development projects of both the public and private sector and urban
renewal plans, programs and projects; as well as to review, evaluate and approve or disapprove comprehensive
land use development plans and zoning components of civil works and infrastructure projects, of national,
regional and local governments, subdivisions, condominiums or estate development projects including
industrial estates.
Hence, the justice secretary opined that the authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands
to non-agricultural uses could be exercised only from the date of the laws effectivity on June 15, 1988.
Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DAR issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 6,
Series of 1994,[18] stating that conversion clearances were no longer needed for lands already classified as

non-agricultural before the enactment of Republic Act 6657. Designed to streamline the issuance of exemption
clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44, the AO provided guidelines and procedures for the issuance of
exemption clearances.
Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12,[19] Series of 1994, entitled Consolidated and Revised Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses. It provided that the guidelines on how
to secure an exemption clearance under DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994, shall apply to agricultural lands
classified or zoned for non-agricultural uses by local government units (LGUs); and approved by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1988. Under this AO, the DAR secretary had the
ultimate authority to issue orders granting or denying applications for exemption filed by landowners whose
lands were covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44.
Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA properly applied Natalia Realty v. Department of Agrarian Reform,[20]
which had earlier held that lands previously converted by government agencies, other than DAR, to nonagricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL were outside the coverage of that law. Our ruling in
Natalia was not confined solely to agricultural lands located within townsite reservations, but applied also to
real estate converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL,[21] provided the conversion
was made by government agencies other than the DAR -- like the HLURB and its predecessor, the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC).[22]
The Courts ruling in Natalia was reiterated in Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v. Court of Appeals,[23]
which affirmed the authority of the Municipal Council of Carmona to issue a zoning classification and to
reclassify the property in question from agricultural to residential, as approved by the HSRC (now the
HLURB). The Court held that Section 3 of RA 2264,[24] amending the Local Government Code, specifically
empowered municipal and/or city councils, in consultation with the National Planning Commission, to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations. Hence, the power of the local government to convert or
reclassify lands to residential or non-agricultural was not subject to the approval of the DAR.[25]
It is thus settled that with respect to areas classified and identified as zonal areas not for agricultural uses, like
those approved by the HSRC before the effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15, 1988, the DARs clearance is no
longer necessary for conversion.
The next question before us is whether the subject landholding was in fact reclassified as residential before
June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL. The Exemption Order of the DAR secretary pointed out
that the parcel had indeed been reclassified as residential under Resolution No. 5153-A of the City Council of
Bacolod. This reclassification was later affirmed by the HSRC.
The courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because
of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction.[26] It must be stressed at
this point that with the DAR lies the power to determine whether Lot 835-B is non-agricultural and, hence,
exempt from the coverage of the CARL.
According to DAR AO 6-94, an application for exemption from the coverage of the CARP must be
accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the
Board prior to June 15, 1988 (the date of effectivity of the CARL). In the instant case, the landowner did file
an accompanying Certification from the HLURB.
The Certification issued by the Board expressly mentioned that the property x x x, Lot 835-B located at Brgy.
Tangub, Bacolod City, covered by TCT T-79622, x x x was identified for residential use under the 1976
Framework Plan of the City of Bacolod prepared pursuant to the Program of the then Ministry of Local
Government and approved by the City Council in its Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of 1976.[27] It also

certified that the area where the aforecited property is located was likewise identified for residential use under
the Town Planning, Housing Zoning Program of the National Coordinating Council of the then Ministry of
Human Settlements as approved under the City Council Resolution No. 5792, Series of 1977. x x x.[28]
These Certifications carried the presumption of regularity in their issuance. Petitioners did not present any
evidence to overcome that presumption.[29] The letter of the deputized zoning administrator of Bacolod City -cited by petitioners to contradict the Certifications -- did not touch on, much less corroborate, their claim that
the subject landholding remained classified as agricultural. It merely restated what was already provided in the
law -- that only the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City could reclassify lands.
Petitioners next assert that, for tax purposes, the subject property was declared by its owners as agricultural
land since time immemorial until at least 1994.[30] It is settled, however, that a tax declaration is not
conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes.[31] It may have been declared by its owner as
residential for real estate taxation purposes, but it may well be within a commercial zone.[32] In the
determination of the nature of a piece of property, a discrepancy would thus exist between its classification for
real estate taxation purposes vis--vis that for zoning purposes.
Under the Real Property Tax Code, a tax declaration serves only to enable the assessor to identify a property
for assessment levels,[33] not to bind a provincial/city assessor. Under Section 220 of the Real Estate Tax
Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use, regardless of any previous assessment or taxpayers
valuation thereon which, in turn, is based on a taxpayer's declaration.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[34] ruled thus:
There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is
conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not
the sole basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents,
aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying for exemption from CARP. In Halili v.
Court of Appeals, we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Regulatory
Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration.
Consequently, even if the subject landholding has been declared as agricultural for taxation purposes, once a
local government has reclassified it as residential, that determination must prevail for zoning purposes.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. L-54281 March 19, 1990

CELSO PAGTALUNAN and PAULINA P. PAGTALUNAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROQUE A. TAMAYO, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Bulacan, Branch VI, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and TURANDOT, TRAVIATA, MARCELITA, MARLENE PACITA, MATTHEW and
ROSARY, all surnamed ALDABA, respondents.
Emilio G. Garcia for petitioners.

CORTES, J.:
On January 17, 1978, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan for expropriation of a parcel of land located in Bo. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned by private
respondents herein as evidenced by TCT No. 24006, issued by the Register of Deeds of the province of
Bulacan [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 10]. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 5257-M and entitled
"Republic of the Philippines v. Turandot Aldaba, et al."
On March 2, 1978, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of possession placing the Republic in possession of
the land, upon its deposit of the amount of Seven Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P7,200.00) as provisional
value of the land. On June 8, 1978, petitioners herein filed a supplemental motion for leave to intervene, with
complaint in intervention attached thereto, alleging that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been the bona fide
agricultural tenant of a portion of the land. Petitioners asked the trial court to order payment to Celso
Pagtalunan of just compensation for his landholding or, in the alternative, to order payment of his disturbance
compensation as bona fide tenant in an amount not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) per hectare.
On December 8, 1978, respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo issued an order denying the petitioners'
supplemental motion, holding that to admit petitioners' complaint in intervention would be tantamount to
allowing a person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for disturbance compensation is a claim
against the State. On January 12, 1979, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated February 13, 1979.
On July 23, 1980. the instant petition was filed and was docketed as G.R. No. 54281. On January 14, 1981, this
Court issued a resolution denying the instant petition for lack of merit. On March 10, 1981, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, limiting the discussion on the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the

expropriation case. On August 19, 1981, this Court issued a resolution granting the motion for reconsideration
and gave due course to the petition.
Meanwhile on December 22, 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General filed in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines a notice of appeal, as well as a first motion for extension of thirty (30) days from January 12, 1979
within which to file record on appeal which was granted by respondent court. The Solicitor General was
appealing from that portion of the December 8, 1978 decision of the Court of First Instance which fixed the
compensation for the land expropriated at Thirty Pesos (P30.00) per square meter. Counsel for private
respondents filed an objection to the public respondent's record on appeal claiming that the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period. On August 13, 1979 the Court of First Instance dismissed the appeal
interposed by the Republic. The Office of the Solicitor General moved for reconsideration but this was denied
for lack of merit. Thereafter, public respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the orders of the Court of
First Instance. On April 29, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing public respondent's
petition. On October 24, 1980, public respondent filed with this Court a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 54886,
asking this Court to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals and to direct and compel the lower court to
approve the Government's record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals. In a decision
dated August 10, 1981, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to approve the Government's
record on appeal and to elevate the same to the Court of Appeals.
I.
The principal issue raised in the petition centers on the alleged right of petitioners to intervene in the
expropriation proceedings instituted by the State against private respondents as registered owner of the subject
property.
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention [Gibson v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-41432, July 30,
1979, 92 SCRA 219]. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to
intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. The Court has ruled that such interest
must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and expectant [Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279
(1939); Batama Farmer's Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-30526, November 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 408; Gibson v. Revilla, supra].
In the present case, petitioners claim that Celso Pagtalunan possesses legal interest in the matter in litigation
for he, not private respondents herein, is the party entitled to just compensation for the subject property sought
to be expropriated or, in the alternative, disturbance compensation as a bona fide tenant based on Section 36
(1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389.
Petitioners base their claim for just compensation on Certificate of Land Transfer No. NS-054560 issued to
them, where the tenant farmer/grantee is "deemed owner" of the agricultural land identified therein. *
Petitioners contend that the certificate is a muniment of title evidencing their legal ownership of a portion of
the subject property. Thus, they conclude that they are entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the
expropriation proceedings instituted over the subject property.
There is no merit to the above contention.

The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to describe the grantee of a
certificate of land transfer. But the import of such phrase must be construed within the policy framework of
Pres. Decree No. 27, and interpreted with the other stipulations of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree.
Pres. Decree No. 27 (otherwise known as the "Tenant Emancipation Decree") was anchored upon the
fundamental objective of addressing valid and legitimate grievances of land ownership giving rise to violent
conflict and social tension in the countryside. More importantly, it recognized the necessity to encourage a
more productive agricultural base of the country's economy. To achieve this end, the decree laid down a system
for the purchase by small farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were
tilling. Landowners of agricultural lands which were devoted primarily to rice and corn production and
exceeded the minimum retention area were thus compelled to sell, through the intercession of the government,
their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and conditions. However, a careful study of the provisions of
Pres. Decree No. 27, and the certificate of land transfer issued to qualified farmers, will reveal that the transfer
of ownership over these lands is subject to particular terms and conditions the compliance with which is
necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right of absolute ownership over them.
A certificate of land transfer issued pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 27 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, declare
that _________ having manifested his desire to own the land under his cultivation and having
complied with the implementing rules and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, is
hereby deemed to be the owner of the agricultural land described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
subject to the conditions that the cost of the portion herein transferred to the tenant farmer as
fixed by the authorities concerned, including the interest rate at the rate of six percentum (6%)
per annum shall be paid by the tenant farmer in fifteen (15) equal annual amortization, that the
tenant framer must be a member of a Barrio Association upon organization of such association
in his locality, and that the title to the land herein shall not be transferred except by hereditary
succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree
Number 27, the Code of Agrarian Reform and other existing laws and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
[Annex "B" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 26, Emphasis supplied].
And under Pres. Decree No. 266 which specifies the procedure for the registration of title to lands acquired
under Pres. Decree No. 27, full compliance by the grantee with the abovementioned undertakings is required
for a grant of title under the Tenant Emancipation Decree and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation
patent in favor of the farmer/grantee [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is the emancipation patent which
constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Transfer, or a Transfer Certificate
of Title, in the name of the grantee.
Hence, the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the
land described therein. The certificate simply evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the
party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as
provided under Pres. Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Failure on the part
of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when

they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of
his certificate of land transfer [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 816].
Clearly, it is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an
emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding a right which
has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy [See definition of vested
right" or "vested interest" in Balbao v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928); Republic of the Philippines v. de Porkan,
G.R. No. 66866, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88]. At best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these
conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the landholding.
In the present case, the State in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain has decided to
expropriate the subject property for public use as a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the
Department of Public Works and Highways. On the other hand, petitioners have not been issued an
emancipation patent. Furthermore, they do not dispute private respondents' allegation that they have not
complied with the conditions enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a
patent [See Private Respondents' Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 34. And also Memorandum of Private Respondents,
p. 6; Rollo, p. 109]. In fact, petitioners do not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents, through
the Land Bank of the Philippines, even a single amortization payment for the purchase of the subject property.
Under these circumstances, petitioners cannot now successfully argue that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled
to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding.
Anent petitioners' claim for disturbance compensation, the Court finds that the law cited by petitioners, Section
36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6389, cannot be invoked to hold the State liable for
disturbance compensation [See Campos v. CA, G.R. No. 51904, October 1, 1980] where this Court by
resolution denied for lack of merit therein petitioner's claim that, as agricultural lessee or tenant, he was
entitled to disturbance compensation against the State. It refers to situations where the peaceful enjoyment and
possession by the agricultural tenants or lessees of the land is disturbed or interrupted by the owner/lessor
thereof. Paragraphs 1 to 7 of the said section enumerate the instances when the lessees may be evicted by the
owner/lessor, and paragraph 1 thereof provides that lessees shall be entitled to disturbance compensation from
the owner/lessor, if the land will be converted by the latter into a residential, commercial or industrial land.
Thus, Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, deals with the liability of an owner/lessor to his
agricultural tenant/lessee and cannot be invoked to make the State liable to petitioners herein for disturbance
compensation.
Nor may petitioners invoke this section as basis to hold private respondents liable for disturbance
compensation. Section 36 (1) of Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, is applicable only when it is the owner/lessor
who voluntarily opts for the conversion of his land into non-agricultural land. In the present case, it is the
State, not the private respondents, who disturbed petitioners' possession of the subject property. The conversion
of the property into a permanent site for the Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of Public Works and
Highways was undertaken by the government independent of the will of private respondents herein.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the government has already paid petitioner Celso Pagtalunan
approximately FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) to compensate the latter for improvements introduced
on the property, and expenses for relocating his home [Petitioners' Reply to the Opposition to their Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 2; Rollo, p. 98. And also Private Respondents' Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 93].
Considering, therefore, that petitioners are not entitled to just compensation for the expropriation of the subject
property, nor to disturbance compensation under Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, the Court finds that the trial
court committed no reversible error in denying petitioners' motion for leave to intervene in the expropriation
proceedings below.

II.
On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that since their motion to intervene alleges as justification
therefor that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan is the bona fide tenant of the subject property, the case should have
been referred to the Court of Agrarian Relations which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
expropriation proceedings for public purpose of all kinds of tenanted properties.
The Court finds no reason to dwell on this point. The issue of what court has jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceedings in this case has been rendered moot and academic by B.P. Blg. 129. Under
Paragraph 7, Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, all civil actions and special proceedings which were then under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations were placed under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts [formerly the Courts of First Instance].
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

DAR vs Delia Sutton

FACTS:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian
reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.
On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect.

In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw
their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the
coverage of the CARL.

MARO inspected respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding.
He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

DAR ignored their request

DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands
used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the
coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following
retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio.

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption
from the coverage of CARL. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire
landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.

Office of the President affirmed the order of DAR

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s.
1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock
farms from the land reform program of the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for
owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional.

HELD:

Assailed AO is unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The
A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry- raising.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. UY

G.R. No. 169277 February 9, 2007
FACTS: Dr. Vicente K. Uy, Wellington K. Ong, Jaime Chua, and Daniel Sy, among others, are owners
of a 349.9996-ha parcel of land located in Barangay Camaflora, Barrio of San Andres, Municipality
of San Narciso, Province of Quezon. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 160988.
Sometime in 1993, some 44 farmers who occupied portions of the property filed petitions in the
DAR, seeking to be declared as owners- beneficiaries. The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage under
the CARP over the property. For his part, respondent, in behalf of the co-owners, filed an
Application for Exclusion in the form of a letter, through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO)
Durante L. Ubeda. To substantiate his request to exclude their landholding from CARP coverage
under the Luz Farms ruling, respondent declared that their property had been exclusively used for
livestock-raising for several years prior to June 15, 1988. The Provincial Task Force on Exclusion
led by Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Belen T. Babalcon conducted an ocular
inspection of the property and an actual headcount was conducted.
PARO Durante L. Ubeda recommended the exclusion from CARP coverage a total of 219.50 has: 134
has. for cattle-grazing, 28 has. for horse and carabao grazing, 12.5 has. for infrastructure and 45 has.
for retention of nine landowners.
The applicants, through Uy, wrote a letter to DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Dalugdug
requesting for a reinvestigation of the Report of PARO Ubeda. Dir. Daludug affirmed the findings of
Ubeda. The applicants then appealed the order to the DAR Secretary. The DAR partially granted the
appeal only with respect with the 219.50 hectares.
The applicants appealed the order to the OP via an Appeal with Prayer for Status Quo/Stay of
Execution. The President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona rendered a
decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit, saying that private agricultural lands or portions
thereof exclusively, directly and actually used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as of 15 June
1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of CARP. Corona said By simple reading, it is obvious that
the livestock, poultry and swine, in order to be included in the computation of the area to be
exempted from CARP coverage, should have been existing in the area sought to be exempted at the
time of the effectivity of RA 6657, which is June 15, 1988.
However, on October 5, 1998, then Chief Presidential Legal Adviser Harriet Demetriou submitted
the following Memorandum to the President, advising the latter to exclude the land in question
completely. A second motion for reconsideration was filed and the OP acted upon the said MR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the OP is empowered to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed
before it.
HELD:
Yes. It is settled that rules of procedure are, as a matter of course, construed liberally in
proceedings before administrative bodies. Thus, technical rules of procedure imposed in judicial
proceedings are unavailing in cases before administrative bodies. Administrative bodies are not
bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law.
Rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only
to help secure and not to override substantial justice.
The SC ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies empowers the OP to review
any determination or disposition of a department head. In fact, the doctrine requires an
administrative decision to first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. Thus, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
priorly exhausted before the court's judicial power is invoked.