Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

, 224 SCRA 792(1993)

Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The subject matter of the complaint is
of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of
the Philippines; All the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under
Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present.Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the
present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby
rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough
to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.This case, however, has a special and novel
element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,

Page 1 of 26

for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The minors assertion of their right
to a sound environment constitutes at the same time the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generation to
come.Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental
legal right; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology.The complaint
focuses on one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Same; Same; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.The right to
a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.
Same; Same; The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty to protect and advance the said
right.Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs dutyunder its mandate
and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987to protect and advance the said right.
Same; Political Question; The political question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review.The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777
cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by
the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that
the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the

Page 2 of 26

exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
Same; Contracts; Non-impairment Clause; A timber license is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution.Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Timber licenses are not contracts, the nonimpairment clause cannot be invoked.Since timber licenses are not contracts,
the non-impairment clause, cannot be invoked.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The non-impairment clause must yield to
the police power of the state.In short, the non-impairment clause must yield
to the police power of the state.

G.R. No. 101083

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993 ]
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO AND JOSE ALFONSO, ALL SURNAMED
OPOSA, MINORS, AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ANTONIO AND
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY
HER PARENTS, CALVIN AND ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD AND
PATRISHA, ALL SURNAMED FLORES, MINORS AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR
PARENTS ENRICO AND NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, MINOR,
REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS SIGFRID AND DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE
II AND MA. CONCEPCION, ALL SURNAMED MISA, MINORS AND REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS GEORGE AND MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS ANTONIO AND ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS
JOSE AND MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO,
MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS FREDENIL AND JANE CASTRO,
Page 3 of 26

JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HER PARENTS JOSE

AND ANGELA DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, MINOR,
REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS GREGORIO II AND CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA AND MARIE
GABRIELLE, ALL SURNAMED SAENZ, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR
PARENTS ROBERTO AND AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY,
GOLDA MARTHE AND DAVID IAN, ALL SURNAMED KING, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS MARIO AND HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO AND THERESE VICTORIA, ALL SURNAMED ENDRIGA, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS BALTAZAR AND TERESITA ENDRIGA,
JOSE MA. AND REGINA MA., ALL SURNAMED ABAYA, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS ANTONIO AND MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN,
MARIO, JR. AND MARIETTE, ALL SURNAMED CARDAMA, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS MARIO AND LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL AND IMEE LYN, ALL SURNAMED OPOSA, MINORS AND
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS RICARDO AND MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP
JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN AND ISAIAH JAMES, ALL SURNAMED QUIPIT,
MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS JOSE MAX AND VILMI QUIPIT,
BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL AND FRANCISCO, ALL
SURNAMED BIBAL, MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS FRANCISCO,
JR. AND MILAGROS BIBAL, AND THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC, MAKATI, BRANCH 66, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and
healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin
concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of
action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and
"arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital
Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all
minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,

Page 4 of 26

engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel
C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. [1] The
complaint[2] was instituted as a taxpayers class suit[3] and alleges that the plaintiffs
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are
equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."[4] Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
"x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to -(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs "x x x such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."[5]
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago
of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced
and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a
ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Page 5 of 26

disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a

host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from the
drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers,
brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion
therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island
of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of
soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum -approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of
the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon
winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands
and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses,
irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may
be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed
their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7.Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8.
Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9.
Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10.
More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin oldgrowth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.

Page 6 of 26

11.
Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have granted timber
license agreements (TLA's,) to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached
as Annex A.
12.
At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum
or 25 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour -- nighttime, Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays included -- the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13.
The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minors generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact,
the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being
felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14.
The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
-- especially plaintiff minors and their successors -- who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15.
Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16.
Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel
all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex B.
17.
Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's, to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18.
The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been abundantly blessed
with.
19.
Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary
to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State -(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other;

Page 7 of 26

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)
20.
Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to -a. effect a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth and 'make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic).'
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b.

protect the nation's marine wealth.' (Section 2, ibid);

c.

conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources

(sic). (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d.

protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and

healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature. (Section 16, Article II, id.).

21.
Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind -- the
natural law -- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22.
There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." [6]
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2)
the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned
motion to dismiss.[7] In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim -- that
the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question -- sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the

[6]
[7]
Page 8 of 26

reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent
their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. [8]
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners
filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more
areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment
clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs
are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered
protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the
State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such

[8]
Page 9 of 26

allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive
or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners
recourse is not to file an action in court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA
remains effective for a certain period of time -- usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the
holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of
the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners proposition to
have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant
and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough
to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.[9] Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the

[9]
Page 10 of 26

present as well as future generations.[10] Needless to say, every generation has a

responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration
and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do
not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order read as follows:
xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help
but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the
noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
'Separation of Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to
do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law.[11]
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong

[10]
[11]
Page 11 of 26

committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
-- aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners -- the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve
the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come -generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of
the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo
Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
"MR. VILLACORTA:

Page 12 of 26

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution -- air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries
with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may
be provided for impairment of environmental balance." [12]
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or
environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the
right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources,[13] then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O.
No. 192,[14] Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of
the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development
and use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but
for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and
apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987,[15] specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
Page 13 of 26

"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. -- (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of
the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to
law and higher authority. Said section provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. -- (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfil the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos,
and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a
life of dignity and well-being."[16] As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of

[16]
Page 14 of 26

each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding

generations.[17] The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty -- under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
-- to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse
of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
"x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right."[18]
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action,[19] the question submitted to the court
for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No
other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged
facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint?[20] In Militante vs. Edrosolano,[21] this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."

[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
Page 15 of 26

After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements

under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the subs-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly of partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead,
as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is
the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine
is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,[22] Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of his Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning
of grave abuse of discretion, which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."

[22]
Page 16 of 26

In Daza vs. Singson,[23] Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides: x x x."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the nonimpairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared
that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts'
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law."[24]
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by
such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did
not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless
of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
"x x x Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any
other form of privilege granted herein x x x."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry,[25] this Court held:

[23]
[24]
[25]
Page 17 of 26

"x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held
that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x"
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary:[26]
"x x xTimber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." [27]
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by
its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise
of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people

[26]
[27]
Page 18 of 26

to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the
general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp.,[28] this Court stated:
"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words,
the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare."
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,[29] quoted in
Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,[30] to wit:
"Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that
both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public
to regulate it in the common interest."
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. [31]
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses
for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED,
and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case
No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.

[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
Page 19 of 26

SO

ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and
Quiason,
JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano,
J.,
see
separate
opinion
concurring
in
the
result.
Narvasa,
C.J.,
Puno,
and
Vitug,
JJ.,
no
part.

[1]

Rollo, 164; 186.

[2]

Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.

[3]

Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.

[4]

Rollo, 67.

[5]

Id., 74.

[6]

Rollo, 70-73.

[7]

Annex "B" of Petition; Id., 43-44.

[8]

Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.

[9]

Websters Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.

Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the Administrative

Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.
[10]

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
Page 20 of 26

[11]

Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.

[12]

Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.

For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and
Patrimony.
[13]

The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources.
[14]

[15]

E.O. No. 292.

[16]

Section 1.

[17]

Section 2.

Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community
Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. vda. de
Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
[18]

[19]

Section 1(g), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.

Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra.; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.
[20]

[21]

39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].

[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
Page 21 of 26

[22]

1991 ed., 226-227.

180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377
[1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA
844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].
[23]

[24]

Rollo, 44.

[25]

125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].

[26]

190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].

[27]

Article III, 1987 Constitution.

[28]

110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.

[29]

291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.

[30]

22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].

Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., supra.;
Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24
SCRA 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974];
Kabiling vs. National Housing Authorithy, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].
[31]

[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
Page 22 of 26

CONCURRING OPINION
FELICIANO, J.:

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J. in
this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in
the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to
influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what
the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to
sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision. pp. 11-12). Locus standi is
not a function of petitioners claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of class here
involved -- membership in this class appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the future -- it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take,
is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be
recognizing a beneficiaries right of action in the field of environmental protection, as
against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private
persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such a
beneficiaries right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether
some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown (prior exhaustion of administrative remedies), is not
discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon one
specific fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
(Decision, p. 14). There is no question that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is fundamental and that, accordingly, it has been constitutionalized. But
although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot
be characterized as specific, without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact
very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in
character than a right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The list of particular claims
which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention
and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and
coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping
of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to
Page 23 of 26

rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming;

destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources;
loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out
by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title
XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 -all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 (the right --- to a balanced and
healthful ecology) and 15 (the right to health).
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled The Philippine Environment Code,
is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more specific environment
management policies and environment quality standards (fourth Whereas clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a)air
(b)
(c)
(d)

quality management;
water quality management;
land use management;
natural resources management and conservation embracing:
i

fisheries and aquatic resources;

ii

wild life;

iii

forestry and soil conservation;

iv

flood control and natural calamities;

energy development;

vi

conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

vii

mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the
Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine
Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking
to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the
particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of
guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to
contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of
implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of action as anchored on a legal
right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect
saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing
and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine
Page 24 of 26

will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and farreaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right -- a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality
than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be violated by the actions, or
failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can
validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court
should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights
may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial
court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead
of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a
cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back
on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. x x x
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphases supplied)

When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology
and the right to health are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be,
it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and
executive departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J. rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
Page 25 of 26

concession agreements or TLAs petitioners demand public respondents should cancel,

must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners
entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession
agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual
nexus between petitioners specific legal right and the claimed wrongful acts or failures
to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment,
including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The
doctrines set out in the Courts decision issued today should, however, be subjected to
closer examination.

Page 26 of 26