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the appointment of an
unnecessary proceedings.
administrator
are
superfluous
and
COURT
OF
and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracions only legal heirs,
she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses"
including those related to her fathers final illness and burial have
not been properly settled.14 Thus, the heirs (petitioner and
respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement
because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in
an action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for
the accounting of all expenses for which the estate must answer.
If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees
of the properties may take possession thereof even before the
settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond
conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations. 15
G.R. No. 129163
Page 5 of 14
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, selfevident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS,
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively
show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death,
the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and
situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and
the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin,
creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation
facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration
of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant
of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the
state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in
reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes.
7
OF
APPEALS
and
June 8, 2006
Page 8 of 14
Fr. Nicanor Cortes in Special Proceedings No. 343-C, not being the
presumptive heir of Rufino Cortes. Thus, if it were true that Fr.
Nicanor Cortes had no notice of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and
343, the failure to give such notice must be attributed to whoever
instituted Special Proceedings No. 262 wherein Fr. Cortes was a
presumptive heir, and not to Ireneo and Paula Villamor, the
petitioners in Special Proceedings No. 343, wherein Fr. Cortes was
not a presumptive heir and where the publication of the petition
as required by law was sufficient to give notice to the whole world
including Fr. Cortes.
We find this contention tenable. Just because a person is blind or
of poor memory, it does not follow that she is of unsound said.
This Court has ruled that where the mind of the testator is in
perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor is health nor the
fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might
sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will. 22
Partition is defined as a division between two or more persons of
real or personal property which they own as co-partners, joint
tenants or tenants in common, effected by the setting apart of
such interests so that they may enjoy and possess it in
severalty. 24 The purpose of partition is to put an end to the
common tenancy of the land or co-ownership. It seeks a
severance of the individual interest of each joint owner vesting in
each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one the
right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from
the other. 25 And a partition by deed is a recognized method of
effectuating a separation of interest in property held in common.
We do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower
court and concurred in by the Court of Appeals that in both Special
Proceedings in question, the administrators appointed were
complete strangers to the decedents. There is nothing repulsive in
this nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the
courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the
persons who can act as executors and administrators. It provides
that in case the persons who have the preferential right to be
appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve,
administration may be granted to such other person as the court
may appoint.
The courts also held that the fraud committed by Ireneo and Paula
Cortes Villamor in collusion with Administrator Moises Mendoza,
their lawyer Gaudencio Juezan and Fr. Diosdado Camomot was
extrinsic for it has been shown that when the probate court
approved the project of partition, there was no hearing or trial in
the Court of First Instance for the purpose of determining the
parties lawfully entitled to the estate in the hands of the
administrators; neither was there an opportunity given to Fr.
Nicanor Cortes by giving him prior notice to intervene or oppose,
much less present his evidence, nor was there a declaration of
heirs.
We disagree. Prescription has set in. An action for reconveyance of
real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of
limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four
[4] years from the discovery of fraud. 29 From what time should
fraud be deemed to have been discovered in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the discovery must be deemed to have taken
place, at the latest, on August 18, 1955, when Judge Clementino
Diez, in Special Proceedings No. 364-R declared Fr. Nicanor Cortes
as the only and universal heir of Sixta Ceniza and granted letters
of administration to Fr. Diosdado Camomot, the person constituted
by Fr. Nicanor Cortes as his attorney-in-fact in said proceedings.
From that time, the law imputes to Fr. Cortes knowledge of Special
Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343, the project of partition, and such
facts and circumstances as would have him, by the exercise of
due diligence, to a knowledge of the fraud. During the time that
Special Proceedings No. 364-R had been pending circumstances
existed which should have aroused Fr. Nicanor Cortes' suspicion or
Page 9 of 14
Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so,
any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not
valid. The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so
since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will
covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already
acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased,
including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it
with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. 26 Every act
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which
appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the
case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. 28 In the instant
case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint
agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was
executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court
and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent
were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to
adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature
act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who
may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of
an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of
their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they
were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any
force and effect.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the
probate court is mandatory.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold
private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability
incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim
Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory
notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses
Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
G.R. No. 121597
To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that
once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded in the proper
Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order
authorizing the administrator to mortgage the property, said deed
shall be valid as if it has been executed by the deceased himself.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the
aforecited rule have been complied with. It follows that we must
consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the
controversy at hand.
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three
distinct, independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be
alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction
of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from
the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any
deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the
same at any time before it is barred by
prescriptionwithout right to file a claim for any
deficiency.9
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that
the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the
estate.12 Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes
extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial
foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency
claim.
Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgagecreditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged
property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent
deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M.
Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the
recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after
petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its
favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the
part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chuas estate.
G.R. No. 156403. March 31, 2005
JOSEPHINE PAHAMOTANG
BANK (PNB)
RUIZ,
Page 14 of 14