PREMILIMINARY TITLE

Amos Bellis v Bellis; 20 SCRA 358; GR L-23678; June 6, 1967;

BENGZON, J.P., J.
Doctrine
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
According to NCC, Art. 16, (Par 1)Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. (Par 2)
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
According to NCC, Art. 1039, Capacity to succeed is governed by the
law of the nation of the decedent.
Facts
The Petitioners for the case are TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G.
BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY who is the
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS, and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS. The
defendants are EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL. Amos G. Bellis was a citizen
and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he made
two wills, one disposing his Texas properties, the other disposing his
Philippine properties. In both wills, the recognized illegitimate children
were not given any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of Private
International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under
Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs.
Issue/s
Are Bellis illegitimate children entitled to successional rights?
Held
The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes.
Under Texas law, there are no legitimes. Even if the other will was
executed in the Philippines, his national law, still, will govern the
properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall
be governed by the Philippine law It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision,
under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent. It is therefore evident
that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to

the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to

leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine
estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern
his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention
in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as
this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in
toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
END
Abanag v Mabute; A.M. No. P-11-2922; April 04 : 2011;
BRION, J.
Doctrine
According to Salazar v. Limeta, A.M. No. P-04-1908, August 16,
2005, 467 SCRA 27; and Toledo v. Toledo, A.M. No. P-07-2403, February
6, 2008, 544 SCRA 26, we (Supreme Court) cannot intrude into the
question of whether they should or should not marry.
Facts
The petitioner is MARY JANE ABANAG. The defendant is NICOLAS
B. MABUTE who is the COURT APRIL 4, 2011 STENOGRAPHER I,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT (MCTC), PARANAS, SAMAR.
In her verified letter-complaint dated September 19, 2003, the
complainant, a 23-year old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent
courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on
respondent's promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with
him. She became pregnant, but after several months into her
pregnancy, respondent brought her to a "manghihilot" and tried to
force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she did not agree, the
respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She became
depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling
because of the humiliation that she suffered.
Issue

Can the court force respondent Mabute to marry petitioner

Abanag?
Held
No. While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct
and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority
to decide on matters touching on employees' personal lives, especially
those that will affect their and their family's future. We cannot intrude
into the question of whether they should or should not
marry. However, we take this occasion to remind judiciary employees
to be more circumspect in their adherence to their obligations under
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court personnel
must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with
respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the
Court as private individuals. This is the best way to preserve and
protect the integrity and the good name of our courts.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present administrative
complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute, Stenographer 1 of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs.
END
PERSONS
Limjoco v Intestate Estate of Pedro Fragante; 80 Phil 776; GR
L-770; Apr 27 1948; Hilado, J.
Doctrine
Within the philosophy of the present legal system and within the
framework of the constitution, the estate of P. O. F. should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and
the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his
death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending
application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case,
consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion.
An injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
Facts
The Petitioner for the case is ANGEL T. LIMJOCO. Whereas the
defendant is the INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGANTE. Fragante
applied for a certificate of public convenience to install an ice plant in
San Juan Rizal. The Public Service Commission issued a public
convenience certificate to his Intestate Estate which authorizes its
operation of the ice plant. The petitioner opposed the legalities of the
grant of the aforementioned certificate.
Issue/s

Can the estate of Fragante be considered as an artificial judicial

personality?
Held
Yes. Under the Civil Code, a dead persons estate can be
considered as a artificial juridical person for the purpose of his
properties settlement and distribution. Juridical administration includes
those rights and the fulfillment of the obligations of Fragante which
subsisted after his death which includes surviving rights involved in the
pending application for public convenience before the Public Service
Commission.
END
Manuel v People; GR 165842; Nov 29, 2005; CALLEJO, SR., J.
Doctrine
Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the
following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or
two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances
stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is
already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse
present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration.
The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the
requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so
provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
Facts
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on
November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or
about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally
married to RUBYLUS and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein
complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of
said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus.
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975,
Eduardo was married to Rubylus before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.

Tina agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of

March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio
C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It
appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made
inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she
learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an
NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.
Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his
first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court
to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was
no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than
20 years.
Eduardo appealed the decision of his conviction of bigamy to the
CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because
when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and
without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he
married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his
first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be
criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in
marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the
trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil
Code.
Issue/s
Did the CA err is ruling that the petitioner is liable for bigamy for
not securing a judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for
under Family Code, Art 41?
Held
The CA is correct in ruling that the petitioner is liable for bigamy
for not securing a judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided
for under Family Code, Art 41 before conducting a subsequent
marriage. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule,
mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent.
However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem

excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to
avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will
have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good
faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage;
thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the
absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules
on presumptive death, reads: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the
purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
END
Mercado v Espiritu; 37 Phil 215; GR L-11872; Dec 1, 1917;
TORRES, J.
Doctrine
The annulment of a deed of sale of a piece of land was sought on
the ground that two of the four parties thereto were minors, 18 and 19
years old, respectively, on the date when the instrument was
executed, but no direct proof of this alleged circumstance was adduced
by means of certified copies of the baptismal certificates of the two
minors, nor any supplemental proof such as might establish that in fact
they were minors on that date. Held: That the statement made by one
of the adult parties of said deed, in reference to certain notes made in
a book or copybook of a private nature, which she said their father
kept during his lifetime and until his death, is not sufficient to prove
the plaintiffs minority on the date of the execution of the deed.
The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
effected by minors who have already passed the ages of puberty and
adolescence and are near the adult age when they pretend to have

already reached their majority, while in fact they have not, is valid, and
they cannot be permitted after wards to excuse themselves from
compliance with the obligation assumed by them or to seek their
annulment. (Law 6, title 19, 6th partida.) The judgment that holds such
a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed
against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors
property nor the rules laid down in consonance therewith. (Decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March
1, 1875.) This doctrine is entirely in accord with the provisions of
section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which determines cases of
estoppel.
Facts
The Petitioners are DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO.
The Defendant is JOSE ESPIRITU who is the administrator of the estate
of the deceased Luis Espiritu.
The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and
Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of
Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita
Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of
land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot,
municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in
paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, which hereditary portion had
since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their
father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about
the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa
Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the
sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and
their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said
land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half
of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of
this share, that is, one-fourth of said land, to the plaintiffs, and the
other one-fourth, to their two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part
of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce 180 cavanes
of rice per annum, which, at P2.50 per cavanes was equivalent to P450
per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from
1901 until the time of his death.
Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in
plaintiffs favor by holding to be null and void the sale they made of
their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the
defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares
of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their
deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products
thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per
annum, and to pay the costs of the suit.

In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the
deed Exhibit 3, on the ground that on the date of its execution they
were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the further
reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of
deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for the execution of said
deed.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even
circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud,
deceit, violence or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in
the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910.
Issue/s
Is the contract valid even If the petitioners were minors who
merely alleged that they were capacitated to enter into the contract?
Held
Yes. The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down
the rule that the sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be
of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the
provisions of Law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the said
notarized document was attended by any violence, intimidation, fraud,
or deceit.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said
judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we
should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with the costs against the
appellants.
END

Olaguer v Purugganan, Jr.; G.R. NO. 158907; February 12, 2007;

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Doctrine
According to NCC, Art. 38 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the
state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated
person, from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
or from property relations, such as easements.
Facts
The Petitioner is EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and the defendants are
EMILIO PURUGGANAN, JR., AND RAUL LOCSIN. Petitioner sought to
impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the definition of the
word "absence" to a condition wherein "a person disappears from his
domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an agent to

administer his property," citing Article 381 of the Civil Code, the entire
provision hereunder quoted: When a person disappears from his
domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without leaving an
agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an
interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to
represent him in all that may be necessary. This same rule shall be
observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by
the absentee has expired. Petitioner also puts forward that the word
"incapacity" would be limited to mean "minority, insanity, imbecility,
the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction."
He cites Article 38 of the Civil Code, in support of this definition,
which is hereunder quoted: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state
of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere
restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated
person, from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
or from property relations, such as easements.
Petitioner, thus, claims that his arrest and subsequent detention
are not among the instances covered by the terms "absence or
incapacity," as provided under the SPA he executed in favor of
respondent Locsin.
The issue that the petitioner raised is that there was no valid sale
since respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA issued in
his, Joaquin and Holifena's favor. He alleged that the authority of the
afore-named agents to sell the shares of stock was limited to the
following conditions: (1) in the event of the petitioner's absence
and incapacity; and (2) for the limited purpose of applying the
proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioner's subsisting
obligations with the companies adverted to in the SPA.
Issue
Is there a perfected contract of sale between petitioner Olaguer
and respondent Locsin over the shares?
Held
Yes. In the present case, limiting the definitions of "absence" to
that provided under Article 381 of the Civil Code and of "incapacity"
under Article 38 of the same Code negates the effect of the power of
attorney by creating absurd, if not impossible, legal situations.
Limiting the construction of "incapacity" to "minority, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction," as provided under Article 38, would render the SPA
ineffective.
On the other hand, defining the terms "absence" and
"incapacity" by their everyday usage makes for a reasonable
construction, that is, "the state of not being present" and the "inability
to act," given the context that the SPA authorizes the agents to attend
stockholders' meetings and vote in behalf of petitioner, to sell the

shares of stock, and other related acts. This construction covers the
situation wherein petitioner was arrested and detained.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This
Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 30 June 2003, affirming the validity of the sale of the
shares of stock in favor of respondent Locsin. No costs.
END

FAMILY RELATIONS
Tenebro v CA; SCRA; GR 150758; Feb 18, 2004; YNARESSANTIAGO, J.
Facts
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage
with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until
the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10,
1986.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned
of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.
Issue/s
Is petitioner Tenebro guilty of bigamy despite his contention that
the marriage was void ab initio even if it was not judicially declared as
such when he contracted the second marriage?
Held
Yes, he is guilty of bigamy. This argument is not impressed with
merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of

the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,

invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is
that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
States penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated
on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines
penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime
of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
END

Titan v David; GR 169548; Mar 15 2010; DEL CASTILLO, J.

Facts

The petitioner is TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION. Whereas

the defendants are MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID.
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David (Martha) were
married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the spouses acquired a 602
square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was
registered in the name of "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Manuel A. David" and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 156043 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In
1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no longer communicated
with each other.
Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had
previously sold the property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan)
for P1,500,000.00 through a Deed of Sale dated April 24, 1995, and
that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
130129 in the name of Titan.
Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC
of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale executed by Martha in
favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and therefore
void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be
invalidated, that the property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a
new title be issued in their names.
Titan is claiming that it was a buyer in good faith and for value,
that the property was Martha's paraphernal property, that it properly
relied on the SPA presented by Martha, and that the RTC erred in giving
weight to the alleged expert testimony to the effect that Manuel's
signature on the SPA was spurious. Titan also argues, for the first time,
that the CA should have ordered Martha to reimburse the purchase
price paid by Titan.
Issue/s
- (Issue 1) Is the property part of the spouses conjugal
partnership?
- (Issue 2) In the absence of Defendant Manuels consent, is the
Deed of Sale void?
Held
(Held 1) The property is part of the spouses' conjugal
partnership.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, the law in force at the time of
the celebration of the marriage between Martha and Manuel in 1957,
provides:

Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to

the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Article 153 of the Civil Code also provides: The following are
conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for
the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
These provisions were carried over to the Family Code. In
particular, Article 117 thereof provides: The following are
conjugal partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition
be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that
"[a]ll property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved."
We are not persuaded by Titan's arguments that the property
was Martha's exclusive property because Manuel failed to present
before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970, hence he could not
have had the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the
property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was Martha who
concluded the original purchase of the property. In consonance with
our ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat,22 Manuel was not required to prove
that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather,
the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property
was acquired does not appear.23 Here, we find that Titan failed to
overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the
spouses' marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership.
(Held 2) In the absence of Manuel's consent, the Deed of Sale is
void.
Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal
partnership, the sale to Titan required the consent of both spouses.
Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "the husband is
the administrator of the conjugal partnership". Likewise, Article 172 of
the Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided

by law".
Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written
consent of the other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void. Thus:
- Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 20, 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67090 which affirmed with
modifications the March 7, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 80, and its August 31, 2005 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the
recovery by petitioner Titan Construction Corporation of the amounts it
paid to Martha S. David in the appropriate action before the proper
court.
END

Tribiana v Tribiana; SCRA; GR 137359; Sep 13, 2004; CARPIO, J.

Facts
The petitioner is EDWIN N. TRIBIANA. Whereas the defendant is
LOURDES M. TRIBIANA. Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in
her petition for habeas corpus that the parties exerted prior efforts to
reach a compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground for the
petitions dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of the Family Code,
an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable condition
precedent.
Article 151 provides: No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint

or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,

but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in
fact made, the case must be dismissed.
Issue/s
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts should
have dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on the ground of failure
to comply with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the Family
Code.
Held
The petition lacks merit. This rule shall not apply to cases which
may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Edwins
arguments do not persuade us. It is true that the petition for habeas
corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she resorted to
compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her
opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay
Certification to File Action dated 1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute
the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its contents. This
effectively established that the parties tried to compromise but were
unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition
dismissed despite the existence of the Barangay Certification, which he
does not even dispute.
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare
and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount concern is to
resolve immediately the issue of who has legal custody of the child.
Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender
age full protection.[12] This rule has sound statutory basis in Article 213
of the Family Code, which states, No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one
year and four months when taken away from the mother.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 2 July 1998
and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch in resolving
the petition for habeas corpus pending before it. This decision is
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
END

Trinidad v CA; 289 SCRA 188; G.R. No. 118904; Apr 20, 1998;
PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts
The petitioner is ARTURIO TRINIDAD. Whereas the defendants are
the COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased), and LOURDES
TRINIDAD.

In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by

petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the
nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported
themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the
local parent-teachers association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidads
house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. On
July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes house when Felicidad
gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioners baptismal party
held at the same house. Her testimony constitutes evidence of
common reputation respecting marriage. It further gives rise to the
disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C)
in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the childs father and
mother.
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification that records
relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or
burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17,
1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family
pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardos testimony.
Issue/s
Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents
marriage and of his filiation?
Held
Yes. When the question of whether a marriage has been
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage maybe proven by relevant
evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the
couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the
alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children
born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths
and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not
fatal to petitioners case. Although the marriage contract is considered
the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present
it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant
evidence may take its place.
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by
the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the

preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic
document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[27]
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof
of filiation, it is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of
Court and special laws to show pedigree
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision
dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
END

Tumlos v Sps Fernandez; SCRA; GR 137650; Apr 12, 2000;

PANGANIBAN, J.
Facts
The petitioner is GUILLERMA TUMLOS. The defendants are
SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ.
Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as those
submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is clear that Mario
Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was
legally married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily
admitted by petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of
concubinage.
In this case, petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had
made an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. Indeed,
she anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her cohabitation with
Respondent Mario Fernandez.
Likewise, her claim of having administered the property during
the cohabitation is unsubstantiated.
Issue/s
- Should petitioner be considered as a Co-Owner?
Held
No. Even considering the evidence presented before the MTC and
the RTC, we cannot accept petitioners submission that she is a coowner of the disputed property pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil
Code. Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship
between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each
other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the
beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery

or concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where

there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife.
As correctly held by the CA, the applicable law is not Article 144
of the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides:
(Paragraph 1) In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, 21 only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit. (Paragraph 2) If one of the parties is validly
married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to
the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article. (Paragraph 3) The
foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith."
"Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that the actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147
which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the
actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no coownership and no presumption of equal shares."
Nothing in Article 148 of the Family Code provides that the
administration of the property amounts to a contribution in its
acquisition.
Clearly, there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership of
respondents. Hence, the MTC and the CA were correct in ordering the
ejectment of petitioner from the premises.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
END

Ugalde v Ysasi; SCRA; GR 130623; Feb 29 2008; CARPIO, J.

Facts
The Petitioner is LOREA DE UGALDE. The defendant is JON DE
YSASI. Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951.
The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No.
386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code)
which took effect on 30 August 1950.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791
approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the
termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with
Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided
Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between
petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791
resulted in the dissolution of the petitioner and respondent's conjugal
partnership of gains.
Issue/s
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed
the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains.
Held
The petition is without merit.
Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of
petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership of gains, thus:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements
agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of
gains, as follows:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately
by either spouse during the marriage.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of
property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article
191. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the
Compromise Agreement because the case was for custody, and the
creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also required under
Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the
Compromise Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a
compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other
judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies,
and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.17
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner
and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The
CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted
in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between
petitioner and respondent on even date.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the result of the
21 November 1996 Decision and of the 2 September 1997 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41121.
END

Unson v Navarro; 101 SCRA 183; G.R. No. L-52242; Nov 17,
1980; BARREDO, J.
Facts
The petitioner is MIGUEL R. UNSON III. Whereas the defendants
are HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO and EDITA N. ARANETA. Petitioner and
private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 1 and out of that
marriage the child in question, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971.
However, as stated in a decision rendered on August 23, 1974 in Civil
Case No. 7716 of respondent judge himself, on July 13, 1974 they
executed an agreement for the separation of their properties and to
live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June
1972. The agreement was approved by the Court.
The parties are agreed that no specific provision was contained
in said agreement about the custody of the child because the husband
and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect.
Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of
December 26, 1979 ordering petitioner to produce the child, Maria
Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private
respondent Edita N. Araneta and return her to the custody of the later,
further obliging petitioner to "continue his support of said daughter by

providing for her education and medical needs," allegedly issued

without a "hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation of
Section 6 of Rule 99.
Issue/s
- Should the court grant private respondent rights more than
visitorial rights over the child in question?
Held
No. Under the circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court
finds no alternative than to grant private respondent no more than
visitorial rights over the child in question.
Anyway, decisions even of this Supreme Court on the custody of
minor children are always open to adjustment as the circumstances
relevant to the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible
criterion We have mentioned above.
It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is
the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and
moral situations of the contending parents. Never has this Court
diverted from that criterion.
With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case
in seeing that it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed
from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that
the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as
admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa
who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life.
The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with
her mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish
between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or
notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with
her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sisters mother, is hardly of
any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.
No respectable father, properly concerned with the moral wellbeing of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different
attitude than petitioners in this case.
We deem it a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
judge to have acted precipitably in issuing his order of December 28,
1979 here in question.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge is hereby set aside,
the restraining order heretofore issued is made permanent and the
parties are ordered to submit to this Court within fifteen (15) days from
notice hereof their own agreement as to the visitorial rights of private
respondent, otherwise, the Court will take it upon itself to fix the terms
and conditions thereof No costs.
END