Professional Documents
Culture Documents
187733
February 8, 2012
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
TEOFILO "REY" BUYAGAN, Appellant.
PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal, filed by Teofilo "Rey" Buyagan (appellant), from the
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 19, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01938. The CA decision 2 affirmed with modification the October
30, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City,
finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death
penalty.
The RTC Ruling
In its October 30, 2000 decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It
gave credence to the testimonies of witnesses Cristina Calixto and Melvyn
Pastor that they saw the appellant shoot Jun Calixto after the latter grabbed
the appellants companion (herein referred to as John Doe) who had robbed
the WT Construction Supply store. The lower court likewise gave credence to
the testimonies of witnesses Allan Santiago, Joel Caldito, Jeanie Tugad,
Carlos Maniago and Orlando Viray that they saw the appellant shoot Police
Officer 2 (PO2) Arsenio Osorio while the latter was chasing him. The lower
court further added that the gun recovered from the appellant tested positive
for the presence of gunpowder nitrates. In its dispositive portion, the RTC
ordered the appellant to pay the heirs of Calixto the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P22,400.00 as actual damages, and P592,000.00 as
unearned income; and to pay the heirs of PO2 Osorio P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P50,690.00 as actual damages,
and P1,588,600.00 as unearned income.3
The CA Decision
On intermediate appellant review, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, but
modified the penalty imposed on the appellant from death to reclusion
perpetua. The CA held that the appellant acted in concert with John Doe in
committing the crime; in fact, he shot Calixto to facilitate the escape of John
Doe. It explained that in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
as long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery. The appellate court also ruled that the appellant
failed to impute any ill motive against the prosecution witnesses who
positively identified him as the person who shot Calixto and PO2 Osorio. It
also disregarded the appellants denial for being incredible. 4
Our Ruling
In this final review, we deny the appeal, but further modify the
penalty imposed and the awarded indemnities.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation,
an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter
be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes were committed
at the same time.5 In the present case, we find no compelling reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. The eyewitness
accounts of the prosecution witnesses are worthy of belief as they were clear
and straightforward and were consistent with the medical findings of Dr.
Vladimir Villaseor. Melvyn Pastor and Cristina Calixto positively identified
the appellant as the person who shot Calixto at the back of his head as the
latter was grappling with John Doe; Orlando Viray, Jeanie Tugad, Allan
Santiago, and Joel Caldito all declared that the appellant shot PO2 Osorio at
the market while the latter was chasing him. Significantly, the appellant never
imputed any ill motive on the part of these witnesses to falsely testify against
him.
The lower courts correctly ruled that the appellant and John Doe acted in
conspiracy with one another. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and
are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.
For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence; it is sufficient that at the time of
the commission of the offense, the malefactors had the same purpose and
were united in its execution.6
The records show that after John Doe robbed the WT Construction Supply
store, he casually walked away from the store but Calixto grabbed him. While
John Doe and Calixto were grappling with each other, the appellant suddenly
appeared from behind and shot Calixto on the head. Immediately after, both
the appellant and John Doe ran towards the Hilltop Road going to the
direction of the Hangar Market. Clearly, the two accused acted in concert to
attain a common purpose. Their respective actions summed up to collective
efforts to achieve a common criminal objective.
In People v. Ebet,7 we explained that homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion of robbery if its commission was (a) to facilitate the robbery or
the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the
loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to
eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a
nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be
committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.
Under the given facts, the appellant clearly shot Calixto to facilitate the
escape of his robber-companion, John Doe, and to preserve the latters
possession of the stolen items.
The Proper Penalty
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide is penalized, under
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, with reclusion perpetua
to death. Since the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed
firearm had been alleged and proven during trial, the lower court correctly
sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty pursuant to Article 63 8 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Nonetheless, we cannot impose the
death penalty in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Pursuant to
this law, we affirm the CAs reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua for each count, with the modification that the appellant shall not be
eligible for parole.
Civil Liabilities
For the deaths of Calixto and PO2 Osorio, we increase the amounts of the
awarded civil indemnities fromP50,000.00 to P75,000.00, as the imposable
penalty against the appellant would have been death were it not for the
enactment of R.A. No. 9346.9
We affirm, to be duly supported by evidence, the award of P1,588,600.00 as
indemnity for loss of earning capacity to PO2 Osorios heirs. We, however,
delete the award for loss of earning capacity to Calixtos heirs because the
prosecution failed to establish this claim. As a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning capacity.
While there are exceptions to this rule, these exceptions do not apply to
Calixto as he was a security guard when he died; he was not a worker
earning less than the current minimum wage under current labor laws.
With respect to actual damages, established jurisprudence only allows
expenses duly supported by receipts. Out of the P50,690.00 awarded by the
RTC to PO2 Osorios heirs, only P15,000.00 was supported by receipts. The
difference consists of unreceipted amounts claimed by the victims wife.
Considering that the proven amount is less than P25,000.00, we award
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages,
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Villanueva. 10 For the same reasons, we
also award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual
damages, to the heirs of Calixto since the proven actual damages amounted
to only P22,400.00.
The existence of one aggravating circumstance also merits the grant of
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, we award exemplary damages of P30,000.00,
respectively, to the heirs of PO2 Osorio and of Calixto. 11
Finally, we uphold the award of moral damages to the heirs of PO2 Osorio
and to the heirs of Calixto, but reduce the amount awarded
from P200,000.00
to P75,000.00
to
conform
to
prevailing
jurisprudence.12 However, we observed that the dispositive portion of the
RTC decision, as affirmed by the CA, only awarded moral damages to the
heirs of PO2 Osorio. " While the general rule is that the portion of a decision
that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the
dispositive part thereof, there are recognized exceptions to this rule: (a)
where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the opinion may be
referred to for purposes of construing the judgment, because the dispositive
part of a decision must find support from the decision's ratio decidendi; and
(b) where extensive and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is
found in the body of the decision."13
We find that the second exception applies to the case. The omission to state
in the dispositive portion the award of moral damages to the heirs of Calixto
was through mere inadvertence.1wphi1 The body of the RTC decision
shows the clear intent of the RTC to award moral damages to the heirs of
Calixto.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 19,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01938 isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant Teofilo "Rey" Buyagan is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. For the death of
Calixto, the appellant is ordered to pay the victims heirs the following
amounts: P75,000.00
as
civil
indemnity; P75,000.00
as
moral
damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; andP25,000.00 as temperate
damages, in lieu of actual damages. For the death of PO2 Osorio, the
appellant is ordered to pay the victims heirs the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages;P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages;
andP1,588,600.00 as loss of earning capacity.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181071
This case comes before this Court as an appeal, by way of a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, from the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of herein petitioner,
Ladislao Espinosa, for the crime of Serious Physical Injuries under the third
paragraph of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code.2 The dispositive portion
of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch 71 dated 30 March 2005, finding appellant Ladislao Espinosa
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he will suffer the
straight penalty of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor and pay the amount
of P54,925.50 as actual damages.
With costs against accused-appellant.
The Facts
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the Regional Trial Court, and
as confirmed by the Court of Appeals on appeal, may be so summarized:
On 6 August 2000, at about 10 oclock in the evening, private complainant
Andy Merto, bearing a grudge against the petitioner, went to the house of the
latter in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. While standing outside the
house, private complainant Merto shouted violent threats, challenging the
petitioner to face him outside.
Sensing the private complainants agitated state and fearing for the safety of
his family, petitioner went out of his house to reason with and pacify Merto.
However, as soon as he drew near the private complainant, the latter hurled
a stone at the petitioner. The petitioner was able to duck just in time to avoid
getting hit and instinctively retaliated by hitting the left leg of the private
complainant with a bolo scabbard. The private complainant fell to the ground.
Petitioner then continuously mauled the private complainant with a bolo
scabbard, until the latters cousin, Rodolfo Muya, restrained him. 3
PEREZ, J.:
The Case
That on or about the 6th day of August 2006 at about 10 oclock in the
evening, at Brgy. Pagatpat, in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of
Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, with treachery, evide[nt] premeditation and intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and hack
several times one Andy Merto, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following
physical injuries, to wit:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction with the
modification that the penalty imposed by the trial court should be lowered by
one degree in accordance with the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense under Article 698 of the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration9 filed by the petitioner was
also denied by the Court of Appeals via a Resolution 10 dated 4 January 2008.
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued.
On 14 December 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch
71, convicted petitioner only of Serious Physical Injuries under the third
paragraph of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, noting that the
prosecution had failed to prove the element of "intent to kill," which is
necessary to a conviction for Frustrated Homicide. The dispositive 6 portion of
the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE premises considered, judgment is rendered finding accused
Ladislao Espinosa GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Serious
Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Art. 263, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced [to] suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of Arresto Mayor as minimum to two (2) years, eleven (11) months
and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum. Accused is ordered to
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether under the set of facts given in
this case, complete self-defense may be appreciated in favor of the
petitioner.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court rules in the negative.
The requirements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance are found in
the first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following requisites concur:
presented to show that Norman was armed with an ice-pick at the time of the
incident. In fact, no ice-pick was found in the crime scene or in the body of
the victim. There was also no proof showing that Norman attempted to stab
appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house. Granting arguendo that
Norman was armed with an ice-pick, the repeated hackings were not
necessary since he can overpower or disable Norman by a single blow on
non-vital portion/s of his body.
Again, as correctly observed by the OSG, had the appellant merely wanted
to protect himself from what he perceived as an unlawful aggression of
Norman, he could have just disabled Norman. When Norman fell on the
ground, appellant should have ceased hacking the former since the alleged
aggression or danger no longer exists. By appellant's own testimony,
however, he hacked Norman with his bolo even when the latter was already
lying on the ground. It appears, therefore, that the means used by appellant,
which were simultaneous and repeated hackings, were adopted by him not
only to repel the aggression of Norman but to ensure the latter's death. In
sum, such act failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means
employed in preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression. (Emphasis
supplied)
Notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a scabbard in
fending off the unlawful aggressionthe totality of the circumstances shows
that after the aggressor was taken down to the ground, the petitioner ceased
to be motivated with the lawful desire of defending himself. He was, by then,
acting with intent to harm the private complainant whose aggression had
already ceased.
Finally, in trying to disprove the testimony of Rodolfo Muya that there was
"continuous hacking," the petitioner also posits that the injuries sustained by
the private complainant could not have been serious enough to be the
product of repeated hacks, and claims that the same are merely a product of
a single blow. This contention has had ample study and consideration in the
trial court and in the Court of Appeals. It deserves no further ado.1avvphi1
As to whether the fractures suffered by the private complainant resulted from
a single blow or a product of multiple hackings is a question of fact best left
to the judgment of the trial court. It is a well-settled principle that factual
findings of the trial courtespecially if already affirmed by an appellate court
are binding and conclusive upon this Court, save only for certain
compelling reasons which are absent in this case.14 Hence, the Court refuses
to disturb the facts, and defers to the determination of the Regional Trial
Court and of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 25 September 2007, in
CA-G.R. CR No. 29633 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195534
who was armed with a .22 caliber firearm. The appellant and Edmundo
immediately fired at the victim six (6) times, hitting him three (3) times - in the
arm, in his left thigh and in his left chest.6 The victim expired before he could
receive medical treatment.
The appellant denied the charge and claimed that he had acted in selfdefense. He narrated that he was at his house watching television when the
victim suddenly arrived, armed with a short firearm. The victim shouted
invectives at the appellant and threatened to kill him. When efforts by the
appellant to pacify the victim proved to be futile, the appellant retrieved his
own firearm inside his house. A struggle for the possession of the appellants
firearm then ensued between the appellant and the victim which caused the
appellants gun to discharge three times; thus, hitting the victim.
The RTC found the prosecutions version more consistent with the physical
findings that the victim was not shot at close range, in the absence of powder
burns on his skin.7 The RTC rejected the appellants self-defense theory in
the absence of evidence of unlawful aggression. The RTC ruled that the
appellant was guilty of murder, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation, given the manner and the means employed in attacking the
unsuspecting victim, leaving him no time or opportunity to resist. 8
In due course, the appellant appealed his judgment of conviction with the CA,
contending that the RTC committed reversible errors in the appreciation of
the evidence, namely: (1) in giving weight and credence to the highly
inconsistent and questionable testimony of the prosecution eyewitness; (2) in
disregarding the justifying circumstance of self-defense; and (3) in finding
that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
attended the killing.
The CA rejected the appellants arguments and affirmed the RTCs decision
holding that the prosecution eyewitness account of the shooting was
straightforward, categorical and without any established ill-motive. The CA
also held that the eyewitness testimony was compatible with the physical
evidence showing that the appellant, not the victim, started the attack. The
CA agreed with the RTC that the killing was qualified by treachery since the
attack was executed in a manner that rendered the victim defenseless and
unable to retaliate.9 The CA did not rule on whether evident premeditation
was present in the victims killing.
The Issue
On the basis of the same arguments raised before the CA, the appellant
questions the sufficiency of the evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In this case, the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is
patently absent. The records fail to disclose any circumstance showing that
the appellants life was in danger when he met the victim. What the evidence
shows is that the victim was unarmed when he went to the house of the
appellant. Likewise, there was also no evidence proving the gravity of the
utterances and the actuations allegedly made by the victim that would have
indicated his wrongful intent to injure the appellant.
We note that the appellants claim of self-defense was even disproved by the
narration of his own witness, Teofilo Posadas, who came into the scene to
witness the ongoing attack by the appellant on the victim. As Posadas
testified:
Q Mr. Witness, how did you know Mr. Witness that it was Eligio Donato
shouting at Eduardo Gonzales "Anggapo lay Balam" [You have no more
bullet]?
A When Eduardo fired his gun in the air twice, maam.
Q Which came first Mr. Witness, Eduardo Gonzales firing his gun in the air
twice or Eligio Donato shouting at Eduardo Gonzales "Anggapo lay Balam"?
A The firing in the air, maam.
xxxx
Q By the way Mr. Witness, you mentioned a while ago that Eduardo
Gonzales fired his gun in the air twice, did you notice what kind of gun did
(sic) Eduardo Gonzales used [in] firing two gunshot or two shots in the air?
A [.]22 caliber long barrel, maam.
Q And how did you know that Eduardo Gonzales fired a [.]22 caliber gun or a
long barrel gun?
A I saw that gun before while he was using it in targeting fish and birds,
maam.
Q So Mr. Witness did Eligio Donato and Eduardo Gonzales get near each
other?
A Yes, maam.
Q What did they do when they got close [to] each other, Mr. Witness?
A They scuffled over the possession of the gun, maam.
xxxx
Q When they were scuffling over the possession of the gun, what happened
Mr. Witness?
A The gun fired, maam.
xxxx
Q How many gun burst did you hear Mr. Witness?
A Two (2) or more, maam.
Q After you heard two (2) or more gun burst Mr. Witness, what happened to
Eligio [Donato], if any?
A He fell down, maam.15
The testimony of Posadas reveals that: first, the appellant who was armed
met the victim; second, while at a distance, the appellant fired twice at the
victims direction; and third, the appellant fired at the victim when the latter
tried to take away his firearm.
Posadas testimony, taken together with the testimony of prosecution
eyewitness Eduardo Rodriguez,16 provides a clear picture on how the
unlawful aggression was initiated by the appellant, not by the victim. The
unlawful aggression started when the appellant immediately fired at the
victim as the latter alighted from a tricycle and continued when the appellant
fired at the victim six (6) times. The assault ended when the appellant fired at
the victim when the latter tried to take away his firearm.
More importantly, Posadas testimony was even corroborated by the physical
evidence that should clearly defeat the claim of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, in that: first, it was only the victim who was wounded in the
assault; and second, the physical evidence showed that the victim had three
(3) gunshot wounds thereby indicating that he had already been shot by the
appellant when he tried to gain possession of the appellants firearm.
(b) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
victims attack
The second requisite of self-defense could not have been present in the
absence of any unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. However, even
granting that it was the unarmed victim who first acted as the aggressor, we
find that the means employed by the appellant in repelling the attack - the
use of a firearm, the number of times he fired at the victim and the number of
gunshot wounds sustained by the victim - were not reasonably necessary.
On the contrary, we find that the number of gunshot wounds reveals a clear
intent to kill, not merely to repel the attack of the unarmed victim.
(c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant
The records disclose that the struggle between the victim and the appellant
occurred after the appellant fired at the victim. In other words, the third
requisite was not established given the sufficient provocation by the appellant
in placing the victims life in actual danger. Thus, any aggression made by the
victim cannot be considered unlawful as it was made as an act of selfpreservation to defend his life.
In addition to the above considerations, the appellants claim of self-defense
was also belied by his own conduct after the shooting. The records show that
the appellant went into hiding after he was criminally charged. 17 He also
stayed in hiding for four (4) years and could have continued doing so had it
not been for his arrest.18 Self-defense loses its credibility given the
appellants flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities
about the incident.19
Credible Eyewitness Testimony
As the appellant failed to prove that he had acted in self-defense, he
effectively admitted to the unlawful shooting and the unlawful killing of the
victim. Accordingly, we no longer need to examine the issue relating to the
credibility of the prosecution witness testimony. We reiterate, however, that
the findings of the trial court on matters relating to the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies will not be disturbed on appeal unless some
weight and serious facts or circumstances have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of
the case.20 Under the circumstances, we find no compelling reason to deviate
from this rule.
The Nature of the Killing
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that [a]ny
person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to
death if committed with x x x treachery. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that
the crime committed was murder, taking into account the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The CA held:
As established on record and as found by the trial court, the victim lost that
opportunity to defend himself because of x x x appellants unexpected attack.
[The victim], who was then unarmed, was alighting a tricycle when x x x
appellant suddenly shot him. Such swiftness of the attack even made it
physically impossible for [the victim] to run for his safety. Clearly, the killing of
[the victim] was attended by treachery which qualifies the crime to
murder.21(emphases supplied)
We agree with the CAs findings. There is treachery (alevosia) when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.22The two elements that must be proven to
establish treachery are: "(a) the employment of means of execution which
would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive and retaliatory acts of
the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the
means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the offender."23 The two elements are present in this case.
The first element was established by the prosecution eyewitness testimony
showing the sudden attack by the appellant on the unsuspecting victim who
had just alighted from a tricycle. The victim was then unarmed and had no
opportunity to defend himself.1wphi1
The second element was established by the prosecution eyewitness
testimony showing that the appellant deliberately and consciously adopted a
pre-conceived plan on how to kill the victim. The evidence showed that the
unsuspecting victim was first lured in going to the house of the appellant by
Edmundo. The appellant who was armed waited for the arrival of the victim.
Afterwards, the appellant immediately fired at the victim.
The Penalty and the Civil Liability
The CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances established.24 We find that the
prosecution failed to establish that the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation was present in the case. The prosecution failed to prove the
concurrence of the following requisites to establish evident premeditation: (1)
the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a
sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the
crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The
prosecution failed to prove how and when the plan to kill the victim was
planned and determined.25
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross annual income -living
expenses (50% of gross annual income)31
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Under this formula, we award to the heirs of the victim the amount
of P1,685,184.48 as compensatory damages for the victims loss of earning
capacity, calculated as follows:
2(80-36)
x
x [P 114,912.00 57,456.00]
3
=
=
29.33
x P 57,456.00
P 1,685,184.48
On appeal is the August 13, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00568-MIN which affirmed with modification the
October 24, 2007 Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 38, finding appellant Andy Zulieta a.k.a. Bogarts guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of he crime of Murder.
Factual Antecedents
On July 21, 2006, an Information3 was filed charging appellant with the crime
of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on June 13, 2006, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less,
at Sto. Nio, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one Armand Labando, with the use of a Batangas knife,
hitting on the chest x x x the latter thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
caused his immediate death. Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to RA 7659, as amended.
which could be a knife and by the location of the wound, the assailant was in
front of the victim.
After the testimony of Dr. Villaflor, the prosecution offered their exhibits:
exhibit "A", the Death Certificate of Armand Labando, Jr. and exhibit "B", the
Autopsy Report of Dr. Villaflor, which were admitted by the defense. The
prosecution then rested its case.
Summary of Facts
The Facts as summarized by the trial court are as follows:
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO1 Apolinario Ubilas who
testified that on June 13, 2006, at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, Police
Precinct Commander Police Inspector Ladao directed him to verify and
investigate x x x a stabbing incident x x x which took place in Sto. Nio,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. The victim was no longer at the crime scene
as he was reportedly brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center
(NMMC) so he made inquiries as to possible witnesses of the incident and
learned that Bryan Pascua witnessed the incident. He then proceeded to
NMMC and saw the body of the victim, which was declared dead-on-arrival.
Per order of their Precinct Commander, a police team conducted a pursuit
operation and was able to arrest, on the following day, Jonathan Zaporteza
and Rey Sabado, companions of the accused Andy Zulieta.
The next witness was Bryan Pascua who testified that on June 13, 2006, at
about 10:30 in the evening, he and deceased Armand Labando, Jr. were
outside their boarding house, seated at the bench just outside the store of
Jimmy Saura. While they were eating bananas, Bogarts, Rey and Tantan
approached them. Bogarts, who had with him a pitcher, dropped it in front of
them so they immediately stood up. He then heard Tantan shout, "birahi na
na" (hit him now), then saw Bogarts pull a batangas knife and stab the
deceased, hitting him on his chest. He ran towards their boarding house,
afraid that he will be attacked next.
The next witness for the prosecution was Dr. Francisco Romulo C. Villaflor, a
Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police, who testified that he
conducted an autopsy of the deceased Armand Labando, Jr. and found that
the stab wound was inflicted on the anterior chest hitting the most vital organ
of the body, the right ventricle of the heart. Based on his analysis, the
instrument used in inflicting the wound was a bladed, pointed instrument,
Accused set up denial and alibi as his defense claiming that on June 13,
2006 at 10:00 oclock in the evening, he was asleep in his house in Gingoog
City with his wife and in-laws. Sometime in November, 2006, he was arrested
by Police Officer Radam and companions at his house in Gingoog City for
being accused of killing the deceased Armand Labando, Jr. Accused claimed
that he does not know the deceased Armand Labando, Jr., Rey Sabando,
Jonathan Zaporteza or witness Bryan Pascua. When cross-examined by the
Court, accused claimed that his nickname is Andy as his real name is Zandy
and he is not known in Sto. Nio as Bogarts. He, however, admitted that he
was born in Sto. Nio, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City in 1985, lived and
stayed with his parents in Sto. Nio, Lapasan, until he got married in x x x
2005. He then transferred residence with his own family to Gingoog.
The next witness for the defense was Maryflor Mamba Zulieta, wife of the
accused, who testified that she married the accused [o]n August 28, 2005 in
Nazareno Parish, Cagayan de Oro City. They resided in Gingoog City from
the time they got married until the day that her husband was arrested. Her
husband works at the farm of Mr. Lugod, in Cabuyuan, Gingoog City,
planting, weeding and harvesting rice, from 7:00 oclock in the morning until
4:00 oclock in the afternoon, but goes home at noontime to eat lunch. On
July 13, 2006, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, they were asleep in
their house in Gingoog City. Sometime in October or November, 2006, at
around 4:00 oclock in the morning, while they were still sleeping, they were
surprised when some men entered their house, went upstairs and
handcuffed her husband as he is said to be under arrest. 6
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 24, 2007, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty
of killing the victim Armand Labando, Jr. (Labando) with the attendant
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The dispositive portion of the Judgment
reads as follows:
Accordingly, the Court finds accused Andy Zulieta guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with accessory penalties provided by law. He is also
liable to pay the heirs of Armand Labando, Jr. civil damages in the amount of
Php50,000.00, moral damages of Php50,000.00 and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, appellant filed his Notice of Appeal8 which was approved by the
RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated August 13, 2009, the CA affirmed with modification the
Judgment of the RTC, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38
in Cagayan de Oro City finding appellant Andy Zulieta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that
appellant is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Armand Labando, Jr., the
amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this present appeal.
Assignment of Error
Appellant seeks his acquittal by assigning the lone error that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.10
Appellant insists on his alibi that on June 13, 2006, at around 10 oclock in
the evening, he was sleeping at his house in Gingoog City. He argues further
that even assuming his presence at the scene of the crime at Sto. Nio,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and that he killed Labando, the killing could
not have been attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. He
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make."13 "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a
warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape."14 Otherwise stated, an unexpected and sudden attack which
renders the victim unable and unprepared to put up a defense is the essence
of treachery. In this case, the victim Labando was totally unaware of the
threat. He was merely sitting on the bench in front of a sari-sari store eating
bananas when appellant, without any provocation or prior argument,
suddenly stabbed him on his chest, piercing the right ventricle of his heart
thus causing his instantaneous death. The stabbing was deliberate,
unexpected, swift and sudden which foreclosed any escape, resistance or
defense coming from the victim. This is a classic example of treachery.
Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on
the credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. In this case,
we find no reason to deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court
there being no showing that it has overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts
which if considered would materially impact on or change the outcome of the
case. On the contrary, we find that the trial court meticulously studied the
case and properly weighed the evidence presented by the parties. Thus, we
stand by its pronouncement thatAfter a careful review and analysis of the evidence for the prosecution and
the defense and recalling the mien and manner of testimony by the
witnesses, especially the positive testimony and identification by eyewitness
Bryan Pascua of the accused, the Court is convinced that it is accused Andy
Zulieta a.k.a. "Bogarts" who suddenly stabbed the deceased, resulting in his
instantaneous death.15
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for the crime
of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Both the trial court and the CA
correctly found appellant guilty of murder and imposed upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties, due to the
absence of an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the
crime.16
"When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded:
(1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
Antonio Ardet tried to get out of his house, but Gary Alinao shot him and fell
inside the burning house. Gary and Jocel Alinao ran towards Barangay
Baduat. Nestor Ardet went out of the house and shouted, asking for help to
bring Antonio Ardet out of the burning house. Boyet Tamot, Elvis Singsing,
Tano Singsing and Wally Sipsip responded to his call. The premises were
bright because of the fire.8 When the police came, the accused were also in
the vicinity of the crime.9 Nestor likewise saw accused-appellant go to
Antonios wake once.10
The deceaseds daughter, Annie Ardet, testified that accused-appellant Gary
Alinao is the husband of her fathers sister (and was thus the deceaseds
brother-in-law). Jocel Alinao is Gary Alinaos son and Annie Ardets cousin.
She incurred more than P112,000.00 as burial expenses. After her father was
buried, Annie Ardet reported her fathers death to the Municipal Hall of
Kabugao, Apayao and she was issued a Death Certificate. She testified that
when her father died, her family grieved so much and could not sleep or eat
well.11
Boyet Tamot, nephew of the victim Antonio Ardet and accused-appellants
wife, Linda Ardet, testified that he was inside his house with his wife and two
children on February 27, 2006. His house was around 10meters away from
that of Antonio Ardet. At around 11:00 p.m., he heard dogs barking and went
to the cornfield beside his house. He saw Gary and Jocel Alinao going near
the house of Antonio Ardet. Gary Alinao took a container from Jocel and
poured the contents on the wall of Antonio Ardets house. Gary Alinao set the
house on fire. Boyet Tamot went inside his house as the place grew brighter
from the fire. He heard gunshots. When he peeped outside, he saw that Gary
and Jocel Alinao had left.12 On cross, Boyet Tamot explained that he only
revealed what he saw on November 23,2006 as he was afraid of accusedappellant Gary Alinao. Gary did not threaten Boyet Tamot personally, but as
he and his son have already killed somebody, Boyet was afraid they could do
it to him as well. Accused-appellant Gary Alinao was already in jail on
November 23, 2006. Boyet did not, however, see Gary Alinao shoot Antonio
Ardet or even point a gun at him.13
Edison Beltran, another nephew of the victim Antonio Ardet and accusedappellants wife, Linda Ardet, testified that on February 27, 2006,he was in
the house of his cousin Nio Singsing Beltran. He saw Gary and Jocel Alinao
pass by, going upstream to the house of Antonio Ardet. Gary Alinao was
holding a plastic gallon container and a winch ester shotgun. Five minutes
later, Edison heard gunshots and saw fire. He ran towards the fire to help.
Gary Alinao, holding a short homemade shotgun, and Jocel Alinao, holding a
win chester shotgun, were running back to the place where they came from.
On cross, Edison Beltran explained that he only went to the police on May
26, 2006, which was after the burial, because he was frightened of Gary
Alinao, who said in public that anyone who will give his testimony will be
killed. Edison changed his mind when people were telling him that reporting
the incident would stop the criminal activities of the accused. 14
Era arrived, and the five of them went to the scene of the crime aboard two
motorcycles. He left his other son, co-accused Jocel Alinao, in the house. On
the way, they dropped by the house of Rene and Aldrin Ukong, who were
nephews of Antonio, but nobody came out of the house. When they reached
the house of Antonio, Gary Alinao went directly to the body of Antonio to look
at him. He told Nestor Ardet to move the body of Antonio, but Nestor
answered, "later." Nevertheless the body was moved into the house of
Nestor.20
For the defense, 71-year old Manuel Morta testified that on February27,
2006, he attended the wake of Elvie Agculao at around 7:00 a.m. and left the
place at around midnight. Gary Alinao was among the many people who
attended the wake. Gary was there from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. Garyinvited
him to sleep in the house but he refused. Two minutes after Gary left, they
heard that Antonio Ardet was dead.15
The police arrived at around 2:00 a.m. and started asking Gary questions. He
told them to ask Nestor instead. The police proceeded to talk to Nestor, with
Gary one meter away from them. He heard Nestor tell the police "I heard
something running towards upward (sic), sir." He stayed at Nestors house
until morning, drinking gin with Edison, his co-barangay tanod Stewart Alinao,
Celso Tallong and Junior Siddayao.21
Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Marcelino Tenay testified that onFebruary 27,
2006, his office received information from the Vice Mayor thatthere was an
incident at Sitio Colilimtao, Barangay Baduat wherein a certainBoy Ardet was
shot to death and his house was burned. SPO3 Tenay called the fire station
and requested a car from the Vice Mayor to bring him and hiscompanions to
the area.16
Sometime during his stay that night, the vice mayor talked to him onthe
cellular phone to ask him if Rene Ukkong, Aldrin Ukkong and Edison Beltran
were there. He went home at around 10:00 a.m. His wife, Linda Alinao,
arrived home at 5:00 p.m. from Tuguegarao. The following day, he went to
the house of Antonio to help.22
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tenay and his companions saw that while the fire
was still blazing, the house was already completely burned and that only the
posts were left standing. Antonio Ardets body was brought to the backyard,
which was around 7 to 10 meters away from the house. SPO3Tenay was
able to talk to a person who claimed to be the brother of the victim. This
alleged brother saw two persons ascending towards Sitio Tabba. 17
Accused-appellant Gary Alinao testified that on February 27, 2006,he went to
the house of Elvy18 Agculao for the latters wake. Elvys house is300 meters
away from his own, or around four minutes walk. He stayed in Elvys house
from 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. He knew that he left at 11:00 p.m. because he
partook of the last merienda at that time.19
A few minutes after arriving home, accused-appellant Gary Alinao heard
someone call his name. He went out of the house and saw three persons,
Warry Mahuray, Elvis Singsing, and his son Edgar. They told him that
"Manong Antonio is dead," and that the house of Antonio was burned. Jesus
testify by Aldrin Ukkong and Rosendo Ukkong by hitting him with a firearm.
She claimed that the mark of the gun can be seen on Nestor Ardets body.26
SPO3 Felipe Erving testified that they reached the crime scene between 1:00
a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on February 27, 2006. The house was burned and the
body of Antonio Ardet was retrieved by his neighbor and placed 10 meters
away from the burning house. It was a moonless night. He asked the people
at the scene about the incident, but they told him nothing. 27
SPO3 Erving went to the house where the body was brought and got the
chance to talk to Nestor Ardet. SPO3 Erving asked Nestor Ardet where he
was when the victim was shot and his house was burned. Nestor Ardet told
him that he was sleeping inside his room at that time. SPO3 Ervingasked
Nestor Ardet if he noticed any person during the incident, but Nestor replied
"None, sir." Upon further questioning, Nestor said that he peeped through the
windows when he heard a shot from the burning house. He saw two persons
running towards Sitio Tabba, but did not recognize them. He estimated the
house of Nestor to be 29 meters away from Antonio Ardetshouse. He saw
accused-appellant Gary Alinao at the scene, but did not talk to him. 28
The prosecution then presented rebuttal witnesses.
Benito Agculao testified that his house was considered a public place on
February 27, 2006 during the wake of his daughter, Elvy Agculao. While he
had seen accused-appellant playing cards on February 25, he did not seehim
on the 26thand the 27th. On the 27th, he did not see accused-appellant from
5:00 p.m. until midnight, although he admittedly had to go out sometimes and
urinated twice or thrice.29
Nestor Ardet was recalled to the witness stand. He admitted that he was
asked by SPO3 Erving if he saw who burned and shot the victim and that he
told SPO3 Erving that he did not recognize the two persons running away.
He testified that he was frightened at that time because both Gary and Jocel
Alinao had firearms and were not yet arrested. He denied the claim of Linda
Ardet that Rosendo Ukkong forced him to testify in favor of complainant and
stated that he voluntarily testified to tell the truth. On February 28, Nestor
Ardet revealed the names of the perpetrators to Annie Ardet. The court asked
Nestor to show if there was really a scar on his breast allegedly caused by
Rosendo Ukkong. The court interpreter identified a white portion on his
breast, but the opposing counsels disagreed as to whether it was a scar.30
As regards the distance of the houses of Antonio and Nestor, we agree with
the finding that Nestors estimation of 12 meters should be considered more
accurate as he is certainly more familiar with the surroundings of the place
than SPO3 Erving, who estimated the distance to be 29 meters.
Accused-appellant emphasizes the testimonies of defense witnesses that
there was no moon on the night of February 27, 2006. Nestor Ardet,
however, testified that the surroundings were very bright because of the fire
that razed the victims house. It should be furthermore stressed that the three
eye witnesses, Nestor Ardet, Boyet Tamot and Edison Beltran are all
relatives of accused-appellant and his son Jocel. As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, it was settled in People v. Amodia 47 that "once a person
knows an other through association, identification becomes an easy task
even from a considerable distance; most often, the face and body
movements of the person identified have created a lasting impression on the
identifier's mind that cannot easily be erased."
Finally, Nestor Ardet, Boyet Tamot and Edison Beltran all adequately
explained their delay in revealing what they saw. We cannot underestimate
how they feared for their lives as they all saw firsthand what accusedappellant can do to them. Edison Beltran even heard accused-appellants
warning that anyone who will give his testimony will be killed. As regards
Nestor Ardet, it is certainly very understandable that he would refrain from
identifying accused-appellant as the perpetrator to the police officer, with the
armed accused-appellant close by. Accused-appellant himself testified that
he was merely one meter away when SPO3 Erving was asking Nestor
questions and can actually hear what they were saying. Neither does Jocel
Alinaos remaining at large at the time they revealed what they witnessed
affect their credibility. Having seen that it was accused-appellant and not
Jocel Alinao who actually started the fire and shot Antonio Ardet, it makes
perfect sense that Nestor Ardet, Boyet Tamot and Edison Beltran are more
frightened of accused-appellant than his son.
The appellate court committed no error in applying the jurisprudential
principle that delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime
does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, especially where
sufficient explanation is given.48
Whether or not evident premedition should be considered
February 7, 2012
the same time Presidential Action Officer, while in the performance of their
official functions, taking advantage of their positions, acting in concert and
mutually helping one another thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith[,]
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in a series of
anomalous transactions, abstract from the funds of the Ministry of Human
Settlements the total amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic), Philippine Currency,
in the following manner: Jose Conrado Benitez approved the cash advances
made by Rafael Zagala and Imelda R. Marcos concurred in the series of
cash advances approved by Jose Conrado Benitez in favor of Rafael G.
Zagala; and in furtherance of the conspiracy, Imelda R. Marcos in order to
camouflage the aforesaid anomalous and irregular cash advances,
requested that funds of the KSS Program be treated as "Confidential Funds";
and as such be considered as "Classified Information"; and the above-named
accused, once in possession of the total amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic),
misappropriated and converted the same to their own use and benefit to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours]4
Only the respondents and Zagala were arraigned for the above charges to
which they pleaded not guilty; Dulay was not arraigned and remains at large.
On March 15, 2000, Zagala died, leaving the respondents to answer the
charges in the criminal cases.
After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The
prosecutions chief evidence was based on the lone testimony of
Commission of Audit (COA) Auditor Iluminada Cortez and the documentary
evidence used in the audit examination of the subject funds. 5
The gist of COA Auditor Cortez direct testimony was summarized by the
Sandiganbaya, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 20345
[s]he was appointed on March 31, 1986 by then COA Chairman Teofisto
Guingona, Jr. to head a team of COA auditors. Upon examination of the
documents, she declared that an amount of P100 Million Pesos (sic) from the
Office of Budget and Management was released for the KSS Project of the
Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) by virtue of an Advice of Allotment for
Calendar Year 1984. Also, an amount of P42.4 Million Pesos (sic) was
and found out that accused Dulay had liquidated the same
amount.6 (footnotes omitted)
According to COA Auditor Cortez, Zagalas cash advances were supported
by a liquidation report and supporting documents submitted to the resident
auditor even before the P100 Million Kilusang Sariling Sikap (KSS) fund was
made confidential.7 The witness also testified that the COA resident auditor
found no irregularity in this liquidation report.8
COA Auditor Cortez stated that since the P100 Million KSS fund was
classified as confidential, the liquidation report should have been submitted
to the COA Chairman who should have then issued a credit memo. No credit
memo was ever found during the audit examination of the MHS
accounts.9 COA Auditor Cortez admitted that she did not verify whether the
supporting documents of Zagalas cash advances were sent to the COA
Chairman.10
Respondent Marcos was prosecuted because of her participation as Minister
of the MHS, in requesting that theP100 Million KSS fund be declared
confidential. Respondent Benitez was prosecuted because he was the
approving officer in these disputed transactions.
In Criminal Case No. 20346
Regarding the Kabisig Program of the MHS, the COA team of auditors
examined the vouchers of the MHS, which upon inspection revealed that
there were at least three (3) memoranda of agreements entered into between
the MHS and University of Life (UL). With reference to the first Memorandum
of Agreement dated July 2, 1985, an amount of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic) was
transferred by the MHS to the UL to pay for the operations of the Community
Mobilization Program and the Kabisig Program of the MHS. Accused Benitez
as the Deputy Minister of the MHS and accused Dulay as Vice President of
the UL were the signatories of this agreement. Although there is no
disbursement voucher in the records, it is admitted that a Treasury Warrant
was drawn in the sum of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic). The second
Memorandum of Agreement dated July 10, 1985 provided for a fund transfer
in the amount of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic) for the Human Resources
Development Plan of the MHS. Accordingly, a Disbursement Voucher
certified by accused Dulay and approved by accused Benitez was drawn in
the sum ofP3.8 Million Pesos (sic). The third Memorandum of Agreement in
the sum of P17 Million Pesos (sic) was granted for the acquisition of motor
vehicles and other equipment to support the Kabisig Program of the MHS.
For that reason, a Disbursement Voucher pertaining thereto accompanied by
a Treasury Warrant was drafted.
Similarly, the witness declared that although they did not examine any of the
records of the UL, the abovementioned sums were not received by the UL
based on the affidavit of the UL Comptroller named Pablo Cueto. In the same
way, an affidavit was executed by the UL Chief Accountant named Ernesto
Jiao attesting that there is no financial transaction on record covering the
purchase of motor vehicles. Again, witness Cortez admitted that they did not
examine the books of the UL on this matter but only inquired about it from Mr.
Jiao. The affidavit of Mr. Jiao with respect to the nonexistence of the
purchases of motor vehicles was further corroborated by the affidavit of one
Romeo Sison, who was the Administrative Assistant of the Property Section
of the UL.
The respective treasury warrants representing the various sums of P21.6
Million Pesos (sic), P17 Million Pesos (sic) and P3.8 Million Pesos (sic) were
subsequently deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Shaw Blvd. Branch, Mandaluyong, under various accounts. Soon after,
several checks were drawn out of these funds as evidenced by the Photostat
copies recovered by the COA auditors. In the course of the testimony of the
witness, she revealed that her team of auditors classified said several checks
into different groups in accordance with the account numbers of the said
deposits.
x x x [T]he amount of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic), the same was intended for the
Human Resource Development Plan of the UL. x x x [T]he aforesaid amount
is not a cash advance but rather paid as an expense account, which is
charged directly as if services have already been rendered. Hence, UL is not
mandated to render liquidation for the disbursement of P3.8 Million Pesos
(sic).
The sums of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic) and P17 Million Pesos (sic) were
deposited under x x x the name of the UL Special Account. Out of these
deposits, the following first sequence of withdrawals of checks 11 payable
either to its order or to cash x x x reached a total sum of P5,690,750.93
Million Pesos (sic).
funds involved and the special prosecutors failure to oppose the demurrers
to evidence.
The Courts Ruling
special prosecutors conduct allegedly also violated the States due process
rights.
There is grave abuse of discretion when the public respondent acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in the exercise of its judgment.28 An act is done without
jurisdiction if the public respondent does not have the legal power to act or
where the respondent, being clothed with the power to act, oversteps its
authority as determined by law,29 or acts outside the contemplation of law.
For the grant of the present petition, the petitioner must prove, based on the
existing records, action in the above manner by the Sandiganbayan.
I. States right to due process
In People v. Leviste,30 we stressed that the State, like any other litigant, is
entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts
for and represents the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the
criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public interest. 31 The States
right to be heard in court rests to a large extent on whether the public
prosecutor properly undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action for
the punishment of the guilty.32
The prosecutors role in the administration of justice is to lay before the court,
fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist,
without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence
of the accused and without regard to any personal conviction or presumption
on what the judge may or is disposed to do.33 The prosecutor owes the State,
the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts
at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end
that the courts mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may
not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape unpunished. 34 In the conduct of
the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample discretionary power to
control the conduct of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part of
which is the option to choose what evidence to present or who to call as
witness.35
The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give
effective legal representation to enable the State to fully present its case
against the respondents, citing Merciales v. Court of Appeals 36 where we
shall address the instances cited in the petition as alleged proof of the denial
of the States due process rights, and our reasons in finding them
inadequate.
First. The petitioner bewails the alleged lack of efforts by the special
prosecutor to ascertain the last known addresses and whereabouts, and to
compel the attendance of Pablo C. Cueto, Ernesto M. Jiao and Romeo F.
Sison, UL officers who executed affidavits in connection with the alleged
anomalous fund transfers from MHS to UL.
The special prosecutor likewise allegedly did not present the records of the
UL to show that the sums under the Memoranda of Agreement were not
received by UL (based on the affidavit of UL Comptroller Cueto) and that no
financial transactions really took place for the purchase of the motor vehicles
(based on the affidavit of UL Chief Accountant Jiao, as corroborated by the
affidavit of UL Administrative Assistant Sison).
We note that, other than making a claim that these instances demonstrate
the serious nonfeasance by the special prosecutor, the petitioner failed to
offer any explanation showing how these instances deprived the State of due
process. An examination of the records shows that the affidavits of
Cueto,41 Jiao and Sison surfaced early on to prove the alleged anomalous
fund transfers from MHS to UL. The records further show that during the
hearing of December 5, 1995 - when the special prosecutor was asked by
the presiding judge what she intended to do with these affidavits the
special prosecutor replied that she planned to present Jiao and Cueto who
were the chief accountant and the designated comptroller, respectively, of
UL.42 The same records, however, show that, indeed, an attempt had been
made to bring these prospective witnesses to court; as early as April 20,
1994, subpoenas had been issued to these three individuals and these were
all returned unserved because the subjects had RESIGNED from the service
sometime in 1992, and their present whereabouts were unknown. 43
We consider at this point that these individuals executed their respective
affidavits on the alleged anomalous transactions between MHS and UL
sometime in 1986; from that period on, and until the actual criminal
prosecution started in 1994, a considerable time had elapsed bringing
undesirable changes one of which was the disappearance of these
prospective witnesses.
in ULs name instead of the MHS.48 In this regard, the special prosecutor
presented COA Auditor Cortez who testified that the audit team did not assail
the existence of the motor vehicles and she also did not dispute that the
amount of P12.5 Million (out of P17 Million) was used to purchase 500
motorcycles and eight cars. The witness stated that the audit team was more
concerned with the documentation of the disbursements made rather than
the physical liquidation (inventory) of the funds.49 The witness further
explained that it was the Presidential Task Force which had the duty to keep
track of the existence of the motor vehicles.50 She reiterated that the audit
team was only questioning the registration of the vehicles; it never doubted
that the vehicles were purchased.51
More importantly, COA Auditor Cortez stated that at the time the team made
the audit examination in April 1986, 500 registration papers supported the
purchase of these motorcycles;52 none of the audit team at that time found
this documentation inadequate or anomalous.53 The witness also stated that
the Presidential Task Force gave the audit team a folder showing that P10.4
Million was used to purchase the motorcycles and P2.1 Million was used to
purchase the cars.54 Checks were presented indicating the dates when the
purchase of some of the motor vehicles was made.55 COA Auditor Cortez
also testified that 270 of these motorcycles had already been transferred by
UL in the name of MHS.56 She stated that all the documents are in order
except for the registration of the motor vehicles in the name of UL. 57
Given these admissions regarding the existence of the motor vehicles, the
presentation of the resident auditor who would simply testify on the physical
inventory of the motor vehicles, or that an inspection had been conducted
thereon, was unnecessary. Her presentation in court would not materially
reinforce the prosecutions case; thus, the omission to present her did not
deprive the State of due process. To repeat, the prosecutions theory of
misappropriation was not based on the fact that the funds were not used to
purchase motor vehicles, in which case, the testimony of the resident auditor
would have had material implications. Rather, the prosecutions theory, as
established by the records, shows that the imputed misappropriation
stemmed from the registration of the motor vehicles in ULs name an
administrative lapse in light of the relationship of UL to MHS simply as an
implementing agency.58
Third. Despite the Sandiganbayans warning on June 7, 1996 that the various
checks covering the cash advances for P40 Million were "photostatic" copies,
the special prosecutor still failed to present the certified copies from the legal
custodian of these commercial documents.
The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for failing to present the original
copies of the checks drawn out of theP21.6 Million and P17 Million
combination account from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), as well
as theP3.8 Million expense account with the same bank. The presentation
would have allegedly proven the misappropriation of these amounts. 59
Records show that instead of presenting the original copies of these checks,
the special prosecutor tried to establish, through the testimony of COA
Auditor Cortez, that these checks were photocopied from the original checks
in the possession of UCPB, which were obtained through the assistance of
the UL management.60 Thus, while the originals of these checks were not
presented, COA Auditor Cortez testified that the photostatic copies were
furnished by the UCPB which had custody of the original checks. 61 Further,
the witness also testified that at the time she made the examination of these
documents, the entries thereon were legible.62 She also presented a
summary schedule of the various micro film prints of the UCPB checks that
she examined.63
At any rate, we observe that the defense never objected 64 to the submission
of the photostatic copies of the UCPB checks as evidence, thus making the
production of the originals dispensable. This was our view in Estrada v. Hon.
Desierto65 where we ruled that the production of the original may be
dispensed with if the opponent does not dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful purpose would be served by requiring its
production. In such case, we ruled that secondary evidence of the content of
the writing would be received in evidence if no objection was made to its
reception.66 We note, too, that in addition to the defenses failure to object to
the presentation of photostatic copies of the checks, the petitioner failed to
show that the presentation of the originals would serve a useful purpose,
pursuant to our ruling in Estrada.
We reiterate in this regard our earlier observation that other than
enumerating instances in the petition where the State was allegedly deprived
of due process in the principal case, no explanation was ever offered by the
petitioner on how each instance resulted in the deprivation of the States right
to due process warranting the annulment of the presently assailed
Sandiganbayan ruling.
Fourth. The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for making no effort to
produce the "final audit report" dated June 6, 1986, referred to in the last
paragraph of the Affidavit67 dated June 10, 1987 of COA Auditor Cortez.
The records show that although this final audit report dated June 6, 1986 was
not presented in court, the prosecution questioned her on the contents of this
audit report since she had a hand in its preparation. COA Auditor Cortez
directly testified on the audit teams findings and examination, which took
three hearings to complete; the cross-examination of COA Auditor Cortez
took two hearings to complete; and subsequently, the Sandiganbayan
ordered that a clarificatory hearing be held with respect to COA Auditor
Cortez testimony. In addition to her testimony, the special prosecutor did
present, too, other pieces of documentary evidence (from which the final
audit report was based) before the Sandiganbayan.
Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to consider the special
prosecutors omission as significant in the petitioners allegation of serious
nonfeasance or misfeasance.
Fifth. The petitioner presents the special prosecutors failure to oppose the
demurrer to evidence as its last point and as basis for the applicability of the
Merciales ruling.
The failure to oppose per se cannot be a ground for grave abuse of
discretion. The real issue, to our mind, is whether the special prosecutor had
basis to act as she did. As the point-by-point presentation above shows, the
dismissal of the criminal cases cannot be attributed to any grossly negligent
handling by the special prosecutor. To begin with, the prosecutions case
suffered from lack of witnesses because, among others, of the time that
elapsed between the act charged and the start of the actual prosecution in
1994; and from lack of sufficient preparatory investigation conducted,
resulting in insufficiency of its evidence as a whole. In sum, in the absence of
circumstances approximating the facts of Merciales and Valencia, which
circumstances the petitioner failed to show, no basis exists to conclude that
the special prosecutor grossly erred in failing to oppose the demurrer to
evidence.
Neither are we persuaded by the petitioners position that the special
prosecutors Manifestation of non-opposition to the demurrer needed to be
submitted to, and approved by, her superiors.68 The petitioners argument
assumes that the special prosecutor lacked the necessary authority from her
superiors when she filed her non-opposition to the demurrers to evidence.
This starting assumption, in our view, is incorrect. The correct premise and
presumption, since the special prosecutor is a State delegate, is that she had
all incidental and necessary powers to prosecute the case in the States
behalf so that her actions as a State delegate bound the State. We do not
believe that the State can have an unbridled discretion to disown the acts of
its delegates at will unless it can clearly establish that its agent had been
grossly negligent69 or was guilty of collusion with the accused or other
interested party,70 resulting in the States deprivation of its due process rights
as client-principal.
Gross negligence exists where there is want, or absence of or failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It involves a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them.71 As the above discussions show, the State failed to clearly establish
the gross negligence on the part of the special prosecutor (or to show or
even allege that there was collusion in the principal case between the special
prosecutor and the respondents) that resulted in depriving the petitioner of its
due process rights; and, consequently prevent the application of the rule on
double jeopardy. If at all, what the records emphasized, as previously
discussed, is the weakness of the prosecutions evidence as a whole rather
than the gross negligence of the special prosecutor. In these lights, we must
reject the petitioners position.
III. Grave abuse of discretion
Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan is under no
obligation to require the parties to present additional evidence when a
demurrer to evidence is filed. In a criminal proceeding, the burden lies with
the prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt, as the constitutional presumption of innocence
ordinarily stands in favor of the accused. Whether the Sandiganbayan will
intervene in the course of the prosecution of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction, competence and discretion, provided that its actions do not result
in the impairment of the substantial rights of the accused, or of the right of
the State and of the offended party to due process of law.72
A discussion of the violation of the States right to due process in the present
case, however, is intimately linked with the gross negligence or the fraudulent
action of the States agent. The absence of this circumstance in the present
case cannot but have a negative impact on how the petitioner would want the
Court to view the Sandiganbayans actuation and exercise of discretion.
The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or allow the
prosecution to present additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a
motion) after a demurrer to evidence is filed. This exercise, however, must be
for good reasons and in the paramount interest of justice. 73 As mentioned,
the court may require the presentation of further evidence if its action on the
demurrer to evidence would patently result in the denial of due process; it
may also allow the presentation of additional evidence if it is newly
discovered, if it was omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is
intended to correct the evidence previously offered.74
In this case, we cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Sandiganbayan when it exercised restraint and did not require the
presentation of additional evidence, given the clear weakness of the case at
that point. We note that under the obtaining circumstances, the petitioner
failed to show what and how additional available evidence could have helped
and the paramount interest of justice sought to be achieved. It does not
appear that pieces of evidence had been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or that these pieces of evidence are intended to correct evidence
previously offered. More importantly, it does not appear that these
contemplated additional pieces of evidence (which the special prosecutor
allegedly should have presented) were ever present and available. For
instance, at no point in the records did the petitioner unequivocally state that
it could present the three UL officers, Cueto, Jiao and Sison. The petitioner
also failed to demonstrate its possession of or access to these documents
(such as the final audit report) to support the prosecutions charges the
proof that the State had been deprived of due process due to the special
prosecutors alleged inaction.
IIIa. Grave abuse of discretion and the demurrers to evidence
In Criminal Case No. 20345 that charged conspiracy for abstracting P57.59
Million out of the P100 Million KSS fund, the prosecutions evidence showed
that P60 Million of this fund was disbursed by respondent Benitez, as
approving officer, in the nature of cash advances to Zagala (who received a
total amount of P40 Million) and Dulay (who received P20 Million).
COA Auditor Cortez, certain documents they were looking for during the audit
examination (including the credit memo) could no longer be located after the
(EDSA) revolution.81 She further declared that she did not know if COA
Chairman Alfredo Tantingco complied with the required audit examination of
the liquidated P60 Million.82
In Criminal Case No. 20346, respondents are sought to be held liable under
the criminal information for converting P40 Million (subdivided to P21.6
Million, P3.8 Million and P17 Million or a total of P42.4 Million) to their own
use given that these funds were never allegedly transferred to UL, the
intended beneficiary.
Records show that the disputed amount allegedly malversed was
actually P37,757,364.57 Million because of evidence that an amount of P4.5
Million was returned by respondent Benitez.83 As previously mentioned, the
documentary evidence adduced reveals the existence of treasury warrants
and disbursement vouchers issued in the name of UL bearing the amounts
of P21.6 Million, P3.8 Million and P17 Million.84 Documentary evidence also
exists showing that these amounts were deposited in the UCPB and drawn
afterwards by means of checks issued for purchases intended for the Kabisig
Program of the MHS.
showed that the total amount of P21.6 Million was exhausted in the Kabisig
Program.87
With respect to the P17 Million, evidence adduced showed that 270 units of
the motorcycles have already been transferred in the name of MHS by
UL.88 There is also evidence that the audit team initially found nothing
irregular in the documentation of the 500 motorcycles during the audit
examination conducted in April 1986; the same goes for the eight cars
purchased.
Under the circumstances, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that registration
of these vehicles in ULs name alone did not constitute malversation in the
absence of proof, based on the available evidence, to establish that the
respondents benefited from the registration of these motor vehicles in ULs
name, or that these motor vehicles were converted by the respondents to
their own personal use.89 In the end, the prosecutions evidence tended to
prove that the subject funds were actually used for their intended
purpose.1wphi1
IV. Conclusion
Except for the appropriated P17 Million, the petitioners evidence does not
sufficiently show how the amounts ofP21.6 Million and P3.8 Million were
converted to the personal use by the respondents. The testimony of COA
Auditor Cortez revealed that documents showing the disbursements of the
subject funds were in possession of one Flordeliz Gomez as the Records
Custodian and Secretary of UL. For undisclosed reasons, however, COA
Auditor Cortez failed to communicate with Gomez but merely relied on the
documents and checks, which the audit team already had in its possession. 85
In dismissing this petition, we observe that the criminal cases might have
been prompted by reasons other than injury to government interest as the
primary concern.90 These other reasons might have triggered the hastiness
that attended the conduct of audit examinations which resulted in evidentiary
gaps in the prosecutions case to hold the respondents liable for the crime of
malversation.91 As matters now stand, no sufficient evidence exists to support
the charges of malversation against the respondents. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the demurrers to evidence and,
consequently, dismissed the criminal cases against the respondents.
This omission, in our view, raises doubts on the completeness and accuracy
of the audit examination pertaining to the P21.6 Million and P3.8 Million
funds. Such doubt was further strengthened by COA Auditor Cortez
testimony showing that P3.8 Million was listed in the books of the MHS as a
direct expense account to which UL is not required to render an accounting
or liquidation.86 Also, she admitted that the amount of P21.6 Million was
contained in a liquidation voucher submitted by Dulay, which was included in
the transmittal letter signed by the respondents to the COA and accompanied
by a performance report on the Kabisig Program. This performance report
We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this Court is as much
a judge in behalf of an accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it
is the judge in behalf of the State, for the purpose of safeguarding the
interests of society.92 Therefore, unless the petitioner demonstrates, through
evidence and records, that its case falls within the narrow exceptions from
the criminal protection of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to
apply the finality-of-acquittal rule.
On its part, respondent maintains that petitioners failure to account for the
shortage after she was demanded to do so is prima facie proof that she
converted the missing funds to her personal use. It insists that the
prosecution has sufficiently adduced evidence showing that all the elements
of the crime of Malversation of public funds are present in the instant case
and that it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to convict her of the crime
charged.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
Under Article 217, a presumption was installed that upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming
any public funds or property with which said officer is accountable should
be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or properties to
personal use. When these circumstances are present, a "presumption of law"
arises that there was malversation of public funds or properties as decreed
by Article 217.17 To be sure, this presumption is disputable and rebuttable by
evidence showing that the public officer had fully accounted for the alleged
cash shortage.
In the case at bar, after the government auditors discovered the shortage and
informed petitioner of the same,18petitioner failed to properly explain or justify
the shortage that was subject to her accountability. Petitioner denied that she
put the amount involved to personal use and presented various sales invoice,
chits, vale forms, and disbursement voucher to prove her claim. 19 Petitioner
even went further by testifying that the total amount ofP681,000.00 appearing
in a disbursement voucher20 were cash advances given to the mayor during
the height of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. However, the date when the eruption
occurred was way before the period subject of the audit. As aptly found by
the court a quo:
This Court takes judicial notice that the Mt. Pinatubo erupted in June 1991,
and has not erupted again up to the present.1wphi1 As stated earlier, the
COA audit conducted on the account of accused Legrama covers the
financial transactions of the municipality from June 24, 1996 to September 4,
1996. Therefore, the said cash advances, which accused Legrama confirmed
were given to accused Lonzanida "during the height of the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption," which occurred five years before the subject audit, are not
expenses of the municipality during the period of audit covered in the instant
case. As it is, it has been disallowed by the COA for lack of necessary
supporting papers. Even if the said disbursement voucher had been
completely accomplished, and granting that all the necessary supporting
documents had been attached thereto, it would nonetheless be disallowed
because it covers a transaction which is not subject of the audit. 21
painstakingly identified in open court each and every sales invoice, chit, vale
and the disbursement voucher which are likewise the evidence of the
prosecution marked as Exhibits "B-3" to "B-3NN" (Exhibits "1" to "1-NN") and
in addition, presented various sales invoice, chit and vale form marked as
Exhibits "3" to "72," all in the total amount of Php1,169,099.22, an amount
more than what is involved in the instant indictment. 22
To reiterate, the subject of the audit from which the instant case stemmed
from are financial transactions of the municipality from June 24, 1996 to
September 4, 1996. Therefore, official receipts, chits or vales, even if they
are in the name of the municipality, but nonetheless issued to it for
transactions as far back as the year 1991 are immaterial to the instant case.
It is sad and even deplorable that accused Legrama, in an attempt to
extricate herself from liability, tried to deceive this Court in this manner.
Having obtained a degree in Bachelor of Science Major in Accounting and
being the municipal treasurer for eight (8) years, accused Legrama is
presumed to be aware that she knowingly attempted to deceive this Court. 23
Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar.
First, it is undisputed that petitioner was the municipal treasurer at the time
material to this case. Second, it is the inherent function of petitioner, being
the municipal treasurer, to take custody of and exercise proper management
of the local governments funds. Third, the parties have stipulated during the
pre-trial of the case that petitioner received the subject amount as public
funds24 and that petitioner is accountable for the same.25 Fourth, petitioner
failed to rebut the prima facie presumption that she has put such missing
funds to her personal use.
Verily, in the crime of malversation of public funds, all that is necessary for
conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds
and that he failed to account for the said funds upon demand without offering
sufficient explanation why there was a shortage. In fine, petitioners failure to
present competent and credible evidence that would exculpate her and rebut
the prima facie presumption of malversation clearly warranted a verdict of
conviction.
xxxx
In her defense, accused Legrama testified that except for the expenses she
incurred for her official travels, she did not put the amount involved in the
instant case to personal use. As proof of her claim, she produced and
July 3, 2013
entrusted to him by Gen. Diaz. Major Cantos added that as far as he knows,
he is the only one with the keys to his office. Although there was a safety
vault in his office, he opted to place the money inside the steel cabinet
because he was allegedly previously informed by his predecessor, Major
Conrado Mendoza, that the safety vault was defective. He was also aware
that all personnel of the 22nd FSU had unrestricted access to his office
during office hours.9
Major Cantos also narrated that on December 20, 2000, he arrived at the
office at around 9:00 a.m. and checked the steel filing cabinet. He saw that
the money was still there. He left the office at around 4:00 p.m. to celebrate
with his wife because it was their wedding anniversary. On the following day,
December 21, 2000, he reported for work around 8:30 a.m. and proceeded
with his task of signing vouchers and documents. Between 9:00 a.m. to
10:00 a.m., he inspected the steel cabinet and discovered that the duffel bag
which contained the money was missing. He immediately called then Capt.
Balao to his office and asked if the latter saw someone enter the room. Capt.
Balao replied that he noticed a person going inside the room, but advised
him not to worry because he is bonded as Disbursing Officer.10
In a state of panic, Major Cantos asked for Capt. Balaos help in finding the
money. Capt. Balao asked him how the money was lost and why was it not in
the vault, to which he replied that he could not put it there because the vault
was defective. Capt. Balao then suggested that they should make it appear
that the money was lost in the safety vault. In pursuit of this plan, Capt. Balao
went out of the office and returned with a pair of pliers and a screwdriver.
Upon his return, Capt. Balao went directly to the vault to unscrew it. At this
point, Major Cantos told him not to continue anymore as he will just inform
Gen. Diaz about the missing funds. Major Cantos was able to contact Gen.
Diaz through his mobile phone and was advised to just wait for Col. Espinelli.
When Col. Espinelli arrived at the office, Col. Espinelli conducted an
investigation of the incident.11
Lt. Col. Al I. Perreras, Executive Officer of the Judge Advocate General Office
(JAGO), likewise conducted an investigation of the incident. His testimony
was however dispensed with as the counsels stipulated that he prepared the
Investigation Report, and that if presented, the same would be admitted by
defense counsel.12 It likewise appears from the evidence that Police
Inspector Jesus S. Bacani of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
SO ORDERED.14
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the RTC explained that although there
was no direct proof that Major Cantos appropriated the money for his own
benefit, Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that
the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal uses. The RTC concluded that Major Cantos failed to
rebut this presumption.
Aggrieved, Major Cantos appealed to the Sandiganbayan questioning his
conviction by the trial court.
On July 31, 2008, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
We note that all the above-mentioned elements are here present. Petitioner
was a public officer occupying the position of Commanding Officer of the
22nd FSU of the AFP Finance Center, PSG. By reason of his position, he
was tasked to supervise the disbursement of the Special Duty Allowances
and other Maintenance Operating Funds of the PSG personnel, which are
indubitably public funds for which he was accountable. Petitioner in fact
admitted in his testimony that he had complete control and custody of these
funds. As to the element of misappropriation, indeed petitioner failed to rebut
the legal presumption that he had misappropriated the fees to his personal
use.
That on or about February 24, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
Violeta Sicor y Sapitula, by then and there stabbing her hitting her buttocks,
thereby inflicting upon the said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula mortal wounds which
were necessarily fatal, thus, performing all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of her will, that is, by the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to said Violeta Sicor y Sapitula which
prevented her death.
On cross-examination, Maniego testified that she had known the accused for
almost ten years and had a close relationship with her. She stated that the
accused got angry with her when she eloped with Santiago. 8
During her arraignment, the accused gave a negative plea to both charges.
PO3 Alateit testified that on the day of the incident, he was riding his
motorcycle on his way home. While he was on the corner of Juan Luna and
Moriones Streets, it was reported to him that a stabbing incident had taken
place. He headed towards an area where a crowd was causing a commotion.
He then saw a woman who looked like a lesbian running towards him. Her
head was bloodied. He handcuffed the injured woman after he was informed
that she had stabbed someone. At the time of her arrest, a sharp object fell
from the womans waist. He confiscated the item and brought the woman to
the police station and to Gat Andres Bonifacio Hospital. He identified the
woman as the accused.10
Both the prosecution and the defense stipulated that Senior Police Officer 2
Edison Bertoldo was the police investigator in the case against the accused
and that he prepared the following:
(1) Sworn Statement of Maniego, Exhibit "A";
(2) Affidavit of Apprehension of PO3 Alateit, Exhibit "C";
(3) Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Exhibit "E";
(4) Crime Report dated February 25, 2002, Exhibits "F," "F-1" and "F2"; and
(5) Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 27, 2002,
Exhibit "F-3."11
The last witness for the prosecution, PO3 Samson, testified that on the date
of the incident, he was assigned at the Western Police District Crime
Laboratory Division. He presented before the court the sharp object used in
stabbing the victim (Exhibit "M") and the Request for Laboratory Examination
(Exhibit "M-1").12
SO ORDERED.16
For their part, the defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Dr.
Mario Lato.
On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not considering the
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witness
Maniego. She also averred that the same witness credibility was improperly
appreciated, as the judge who heard the case was different from the one who
rendered the decision.
Chiefly relying on denial as her defense, the accused claimed that on the
date of the stabbing incident, she confronted Maniego and asked her if it was
true that she had been spreading the rumor that the accused was insane.
Maniego answered in the affirmative. Angered, the accused slapped Maniego
and left, leaving Santiago, Sicor, and Maniego in pursuit. Santiago then hit
her with a lead pipe. Since she needed medical treatment after the attack,
she was brought to Gat Andres Bonifacio Medical Hospital by her mother and
a barangay kagawad.13
At the police station, the accused denied killing Santiago. She averred that
nothing was found on her body when she was frisked. She said that the knife
recovered by PO3 Alateit was not hers and that there were other people in
the area where it was found. She added that she had an argument only with
Maniego, not with Sicor or Santiago.14
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the
totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that accused-appellants guilt
was proved beyond reasonable doubt. It added that accused-appellant failed
to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely
testify against her. The dispositive portion of the May 14, 2010 CA Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 18, 2008
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal Case Nos. 02200106 and 02200107 is AFFIRMED.17
Hence, We have this appeal.
Dr. Mario Lato testified that on February 24, 2002, he treated the accused,
who had a laceration on the head which was possibly caused by a hard
object such as a pipe. He said that the accused sustained a two-centimeter
laceration in her mid-pectoral area.15
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 18, 2008, the RTC convicted the accused of Murder in Crim.
Case No. 02-200106 and Less Serious Physical Injuries in Crim. Case No.
02-200107. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Cecilia Lagman y Pring guilty of
Murder in Crim. Case No. 02-200106. She is sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Jondel Lari Santiago, the amount
of P50,000 as civil indemnity. In Crim. Case No. 02-200107, this court finds
same accused guilty of Less Serious Physical Injuries. She is sentenced to
suffer six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay Violeta Sicor the amount of
P25,000 as temperate damages.
The Issues
I
Whether the CA erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
II
Whether the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecutions witness despite patent inconsistencies
III
Whether the CA erred in finding that the killing of the victim was
attended by treachery
16, Art. 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Maniegos testimony proved the presence of treachery in this case, as
follows:
Q What did you do after Cecilia Lagman punched you in your face?
A I went outside of the side car x x x, and I went to the barangay hall
to ask help x x x.
Q And what happened after that?
xxxx
A Papauwi na po ako sa bahay ng biyenan ko sakto po ng pagpunta
ko ho doon nasalubong po ni Cecilia Lagman si Jondel Mari wala
hong sabi sabi inundayan po niya ng saksak si Jondel Mari. (When I
went home to the house of my mother-in-law because the barangay
chairman was not in the barangay hall Jondel Mari meet [sic] Cecilia
Lagman and without any word Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Mari.)
Q And in what place was that where Cecilia Lagman suddenly
stabbed Jondel Mari Santiago?
Q When you saw Cecilia Lagman stabbed Jondel Santiago how far
were you?
A (Witness demonstrating 5 to 6 meters away).
xxxx
Q What was Jondel Santiago doing when he was stabbed by Cecilia
Lagman?
A He was lighting a cigarette x x x.
Q What part of the body of Jondel Santiago was hit when he was
stabbed?
A One at the chest and two at the back and one at the neck. x x x
Q x x x [I]f the person who boxed you on the face is in court, will you
be able to identify her?
A Nabigla po kasi hindi naman niya alam na sasaksakin siya eh. [He
was shocked because he did not know he was going to be stabbed.]
A Yes x x x.
xxxx
x x x [Witness pointing to a woman, Cecilia Lagman]
Q x x x [I]f the person whom you saw stabbed Jondel Santiago four
times is in court will you be able to identify him or her?
A Siya rin po." [She is the same person.]20
In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be
present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted
the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. 21 The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning,
done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.22 These elements were
present when accused-appellant stabbed Santiago. We quote with approval
the appellate courts finding on the presence of treachery:
In the case at bar, the victim was caught off guard when appellant, without
warning, stabbed him four times successively leaving the latter no chance at
all to evade the knife thrusts and defend himself from appellants onslaught.
Thus, there is no denying that appellants act of suddenly stabbing the victim
leaving the latter no room for defense is a clear case of treachery.23 x x x
PhP 50,000 and PhP 30,000 in exemplary damages, with an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum, are also proper.38
We delete the award of PhP 25,000 in temperate damages to Sicor, since
only slight physical injuries were committed and no proof of medical
expenses was presented during trial.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03289 finding accused-appellant guilty of Murder in Criminal Case No.
02-200106 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Jondel Mari Davantes Santiago the
sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 50,000 as moral damages, PhP
30,000 as exemplary damages, and interest on all damages at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid. With
respect to Criminal Case No. 02-200107, accused-appellant is convicted of
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES and is sentenced to twenty (20) days of
arresto menor. The award of temperate damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181036
July 6, 2010
maximum for each count of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610. The appellant was further ordered to pay the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of rape and the amount of P25,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P25,000.00 as moral damages for each count of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
In Criminal Case Nos. 550-V-02 and 551-V-02, however, the appellant was
acquitted of the charges of rape for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant Adriano Leonardo y Dantes was charged in 13 separate
Informations5 with the crime of rape, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610,
committed against AAA, the accusatory portion of which state:
In Criminal Case No. 348-V-02:
That on or about [11 May 2002] in XXX City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], with lewd design, by means
of force and intimidation employed upon AAA, 12 years old, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said AAA,
thereby subjecting the said minor to sexual abuse which debased, degraded
and demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. 6
In Criminal Case No. 544-V-02:
That on or about [10 May 2002] in XXX City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], being then the uncle-in-law of
AAA, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation employed upon
AAA, 12 years old, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of said AAA, thereby subjecting the said minor to
sexual abuse which debased, degraded and demeaned her intrinsic worth
and dignity as a human being.7
The Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 545-V-02, 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548V-02, 549-V-02, 550-V-02, 551-V-02, 552-V-02, 553-V-02, 554-V-02 and 555V-02 contained similar averments except for the different dates of
commission on the first week of April 2002, second week of April 2002, 1 May
2002, 2 May 2002, 3 May 2002, 4 May 2002, 5 May 2002, 6 May 2002, 7
May 2002, 8 May 2002 and 9 May 2002, respectively.
appellant stopped what he was doing to AAA when he heard his daughter
calling him. He then ordered AAA to dress up. AAA did not report to anyone
the said incident because she was afraid of the appellant. 14
Then, in the second week of April 2002 at around 4:30 in the afternoon, while
AAA was alone in their house because her foster mother was working as a
laundrywoman and her foster father was in a drinking spree with his friends,
the appellant suddenly came in drunk and immediately closed the door of
their house. The appellant then began touching AAAs breasts, however, the
latters foster mother arrived. At once, the appellant went out of the house
through the back door.15
Again, on 1 May 2002 at around 8:30 in the morning, while AAA was left
alone inside their house, the appellant surprisingly arrived thereat. Upon
knowing that AAA had no other companion, he began touching AAAs breasts
and vagina. Afterwards, CCC, the aunt of AAA, arrived and this prompted the
appellant to leave the house.16
The following day, or on 2 May 2002 at around 8:00 oclock in the morning,
while AAA was cleaning their house, the appellant arrived. He then inquired if
there were other persons inside the house. As he found no other person
thereat, except AAA, he commanded AAA to close the windows and the door
located at the back of the house. He then opened the television set,
increased its volume and closed the main door of the house. Thereafter, he
touched the private parts of AAA and told her to remove her clothes. After
removing her clothes, the appellant held her breasts and touched her vagina.
However, upon hearing his daughters voice calling and looking for him, he
instantly went out of the house.17
On 3 May 2002 at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, AAA was sleeping
alone inside their house. Since the door was unlocked, the appellant entered
the house, woke up AAA and asked her if there were other persons inside.
He himself inspected the room of the house, finding none, he asked AAA to
get him a glass of water and to buy him cigarettes. When AAA returned, the
appellant requested her to turn on the television set. Then, he began
touching AAAs private parts and he even instructed AAA to undress.
Thereafter, the appellant told AAA to lie down on the bed inside the room to
which she acceded because the appellant was holding a knife that he got
from his waist. The appellant followed AAA inside the room where he
removed his shorts and underwear. He then inserted his penis into AAAs
vagina and made push and pull movements. After satisfying his lust, he told
AAA to dress up and he went out of the house.18
In the afternoon of 4 May 2002, when AAA was hanging their washed clothes
in the clothesline located at the back of the house of the appellant, which was
only adjacent to their house, the appellant called her and asked her to buy
cigarettes. After buying cigarettes, she brought the same to the appellant
who was already inside the warehouse at the back of his house. While they
were inside the warehouse, the appellant touched her breasts and vagina.
This same incident of appellants touching AAAs breasts and vagina was
repeated the following day, 5 May 2002.19
Then again, on 6 May 2002 at around 3:30 oclock in the afternoon, AAA saw
the appellant circumcising children. Afterwards, the appellant went to the
house of AAA who was watching television at that time. Once inside, the
appellant closed the main door of the house, instructed AAA to go inside the
room and to remove her clothes. The appellant then told AAA to lie down on
the bed. Subsequently, the appellant went on top of AAA, inserted his penis
into her vagina and made push and pull movements. After doing such bestial
act, the appellant went out of the house.20
The next day, or on 7 May 2002, at around 7:00 oclock in the evening while
AAAs foster parents were not yet home and AAA had just finished washing
the dishes, the appellant entered their house through the main door and
asked AAA to buy him cigarettes as he would always do. When AAA came
back, she handed the cigarettes to the appellant. The latter then ordered AAA
to turn on the television and to lock the door. The appellant also told AAA to
sit beside him on the sofa and he then began touching AAAs private parts.
The appellant, thereafter, instructed AAA to go inside the room, to remove
her shorts and panty and to lie down on the bed, to which she complied
because the appellant was holding a knife. The appellant then placed the
knife beside the bed, removed his shorts and undergarment, lay on top of
AAA, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and made push and pull
movements. After satisfying his hideous desire, the appellant asked AAA to
put on her clothes. He then proceeded to the sala and watched a television
program. When AAAs foster mother arrived at around 9:00 oclock in the
evening, the appellant was no longer there.21
On 8 May 2002 at around 8:30 oclock in the morning, AAA was once again
left alone in their house because her foster parents and their children went to
work. The appellant then went inside the house and asked AAA to buy him
cigarettes. When AAA came back, she gave the cigarettes to the appellant
who was then watching a television program. AAA proceeded to the kitchen
to clean the table and to put the dishes outside of their house. While the
appellant was still watching a television program at the sala, AAA went
upstairs but the appellant called her and told her to go inside the room where
the appellant began touching her vagina. The appellant likewise told AAA to
undress and thereafter, he started fondling her breasts. Suddenly, the
appellant heard AAAs cousin calling her from the outside. The appellant
promptly told AAA to dress up and to go out of the room. 22
On 9 May 2002 at around 3:30 oclock in the afternoon, AAA was at the back
of their house playing with her sister. The appellant called her and asked her
if her foster mother and the latters children were in their house to which AAA
replied in the negative. The appellant again asked AAA to buy him cigarettes.
AAA then brought the cigarettes at the back of their house believing that the
appellant was still there. Unknowingly, the appellant was already inside their
house. When AAA saw the appellant inside their house, she gave him the
cigarettes and the appellant asked her to switch on the television. When AAA
was about to get out of the house, the appellant prevented her, instead, he
ordered AAA to go inside the room, but AAA insisted to go out as she wanted
to continue playing with her sister. The appellant then showed AAA his knife
and told her to remove all her clothing. Afraid, AAA could not do anything but
to submit to the vicious desire of the appellant. The latter then touched AAAs
breasts and vagina. Thereafter, the appellant ordered AAA to put on her
clothes and left.23
On 10 May 2002, at around 6:30 oclock in the afternoon, while AAA was
playing in front of their house, the appellant saw her and commanded her to
buy him cigarettes. He also told AAA to bring the same to the warehouse.
Upon giving the cigarettes to the appellant, the latter instructed AAA to go
inside the warehouse but she refused as she was still playing outside. The
appellant, however, did not allow her to go out anymore and he, once again,
showed his knife to AAA. Out of fear, AAA stayed inside the warehouse.
Later, the appellant told AAA to undress and he proceeded to touch her
breasts. He also inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA. Thereafter, he
removed his finger into AAAs vagina and made her lie down on the floor. He
then removed his shorts, mounted AAA, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina
and made push and pull movements. AAA felt pain in her private organ. After
being satisfied, the appellant instructed AAA to dress up and to go home. 24
The last sexual advances of the appellant to AAA happened on 11 May 2002
at around 7:00 oclock in the evening near the well located at the back of the
house of the appellant. During that time AAA was removing their washed
clothes from the clothesline at the back of the house of the appellant. The
appellant, who was then taking a bath at the well near their house, saw her,
called her and requested her to buy him one stick of cigarette. After she
bought cigarette, she gave it to the appellant who was still taking a bath at
the well. When AAA was about to go home, the appellant prevented her and
showed her his knife tucked on his waist. The appellant instructed AAA to
undress to which the latter obeyed because the appellant was holding a
knife. When AAA was totally naked, the appellant touched her private parts
and told her to lie down on the grassy ground. She felt itchy as she was lying
on the grassy ground. While in that position, the appellant went on top of
AAA, inserted his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements.
AAA felt pain. When the appellant heard his wife calling him, he stopped
what he was doing to AAA and told the latter to put on her clothes. AAA went
home. At the time this incident happened, the appellant was drunk as he just
came from a birthday party.25
When AAA went home, her aunt, CCC, who was there cooking, asked her
why she was pale and uneasy. Her aunt also wondered why she was
scratching her back. AAA did not immediately tell CCC what truly happened.
However, when CCC became so persistent to know what really happened to
her, AAA began to cry. She then disclosed to CCC what happened to her on
that day, as well as all her harrowing experiences in the hands of the
appellant.26 CCC instantly called up AAAs biological mother, BBB, whose
house was only three meters away from CCC and informed her of AAAs
ordeal. Thereafter, BBB came to accompany AAA in going to the police
station to report what the appellant did to her. At the police station, AAA gave
her written statements against the appellant.27
The following day, AAA was subjected to a medical examination by P/Sr.
Insp. Carpio, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, which examination yielded the following results: 28
EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL
PHYSICAL BUILT: Light built.
MENTAL STATUS: Coherent female child.
BREAST: Conical with light brown areola and nipples from which no
secretions could be pressed out.
ABDOMEN: Flat.
PHYSICAL INJURIES: No external signs of application of any form of
trauma.
GENITAL
PUBIC HAIR: Absent growth.
LABIA MAJORA: Full, convex and coaptated.
LABIA MINORA: light brown; non-hypertrophied.
HYMEN: deep healed laceration at 8 oclock position.
POSTERIOIR FOURCHETTE: sharp.
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE: Offers strong resistance of the
examining index finger.
VAGINAL CANAL: Narrow.
CERVIX:
PERIURETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS: Negative for
spermatozoa.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically. There are no external signs
of application of any form of trauma. [Emphasis supplied]. 29
Thereafter, 13 separate Informations for rape, in relation to Republic Act No.
7610, were filed against the appellant.
For its part, the defense presented the following witnesses, to wit: the
appellant, who interposed the defense of denial and alibi; Candida Urbina
(Candida), neighbor and cousin of the appellant; Lea Mae Leonardo (Lea
Mae), niece of the appellant; and Ma. Victoria Leonardo (Ma. Victoria), wife
of the appellant. The defense likewise submitted pieces of documentary
evidence marked as Exhibits "1" to "6,"30 inclusive of submarkings.
When the appellant took the witness stand, he admitted that he knows AAA
because she was his neighbor and her foster father who reared her since
childhood is his brother, which is the reason why AAA called him Mama
Adring, although he was not related to her by blood in any manner. The
appellant even described AAA as "gala" as she used to roam around, and
there were times that her foster father would ask him as to the whereabouts
of AAA.31
The appellant, however, denied all the rape charges against him and claimed
that they were all lies and that he was just framed up. He argued that these
cases were only filed against him by AAA upon the initiative of her aunt,
CCC, with whom he had an illicit affair.32 The appellant even professed that in
April 2002, AAAs aunt, CCC, made a proposal to him to leave their
respective spouses and children so that the two of them can begin to live
together as husband and wife in Pampanga. The appellant claimed that CCC
even offered to buy him a tricycle. When the appellant did not agree with
CCCs proposal, the latter threatened him that she would file a case against
him.33
The appellant also maintained that it was impossible for him to rape AAA on
1 May 2002 because on the said date at around 7:00 oclock in the morning,
he was in Angat, Bulacan, with his children as they had an excursion with the
members of AMATODA, an association of tricycle owners and drivers in their
place. It was already 10:00 oclock in the evening when they got home. 34
Similarly, the appellant denied having raped AAA on 2 May 2002 until 4 May
2002. The appellant stated that on 4 May 2002, he was again in an excursion
in Angat, Bulacan, this time, with CCC and her mother. While in the said
place, he and CCC had an intimate moment with one another.35 On the
succeeding dates beginning 5 May 2002 up to 10 May 2002, the appellant
also denied having raped AAA without giving any explanations therefor.36
The appellant also denied having raped AAA on 11 May 2002. He avowed
that as early as 9:00 oclock in the morning of the said date, he was already
at the house of his cousin, Candida, located at 103 NY Street, Bisalao,
Bagbaguin, Valenzuela City, where he assisted in the cooking of the food for
the birthday celebration of Candidas nephew. In the evening thereof, the
appellant engaged in a drinking session with his cousins and friends who
attended the said birthday party. He stayed there until 10:00 oclock in the
evening and then he went home. At around 11:00 oclock in the evening, he
was arrested by the police authorities because AAA had filed a complaint
against him charging him with 13 counts of rape.37
To buttress the theory of the defense, Candida testified affirming that on 11
May 2002, the appellant was at their house as early as 9:00 oclock in the
morning as she had invited him as a cook for the birthday celebration of her
nephew. She stated that the appellant stayed at their house the whole day
because after the preparation of the food they had a drinking session which
started at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon and lasted until 10:00 0clock
in the evening. To prove the same, the defense even presented pictures
depicting that the appellant was among those having a drinking spree at the
house of Candida. The latter admitted, however, that there was an instance
on that date when the appellant left her house when she requested him to
get the big casserole from the house of his sister living nearby. After less
than an hour, the appellant returned. Candida also disclosed that her house
was just a 15 minute-walk away from the house of the appellant. 38
To establish that AAA is a girl of ill repute, the defense presented Lea Mae,
the niece of the appellant, who testified that she knows AAA as she is her
neighbor and friend. Lea Mae declared in open court that AAA has two
boyfriends, one whose name is "alias Pogi" and the other is known to her
only as "Frankie." She knew that they were AAAs boyfriends because AAA
herself told her so. Lea Mae further testified that on one occasion AAA
requested her to deliver a letter to "Frankie" but she was not able to do so as
her mother might get angry. Having failed to deliver the said letter, Lea Mae,
instead of giving it back to AAA, just kept the same. Later, Lea Mae gave the
said letter to her aunt, the wife of the appellant, after the filing of the rape
cases against the latter. Her only reason for doing so is because she trusted
her aunt. Lea Mae divulged, however, that she did not see AAA writing the
said letter.39
The defense also presented the wife of the appellant who testified that prior
to the filing of the rape cases against the appellant, she and CCC had a
quarrel regarding the rumor that the latter and the appellant were having an
illicit affair.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented CCC who denied having an illicit affair
with the appellant. She maintained that before the rape cases against the
appellant commenced, their family are in good terms as neighbors. She used
to sell food and the appellants wife used to buy from her. However, from the
time the appellant was arrested and incarcerated in connection with the rape
cases filed against him by her niece, AAA, both the appellant and his wife did
not talk to her anymore.40
After trial, a Joint Decision was rendered by the court a quo on 28 January
2005 giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
particularly of AAA and rejecting the defense of denial and alibi proffered by
the appellant. The trial court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Cases Nos. 550-V-02 and 551-V-02, the Court finds the
guilt of [appellant] ADRIANO LEONARDO not to have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt and acquits him of the charges therein for
insufficiency of evidence, with costs de officio;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 348-V-02, 544-V-02, 545-V-02, 549-V-02,
552-V-02 and 553-V-02, the Court finds [appellant] ADRIANO
LEONARDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of six
(6) counts of rape without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion
perpetua in each case with all the accessory penalties provided for
by law. Further, the [appellant] is sentenced to pay [private]
complainant AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, and the
amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages in each case, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Finally, the [appellant]
is sentenced to pay the costs of suit; and
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-02, 554-V-02 and
555-V-02 the Court finds [appellant] ADRIANO LEONARDO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and as principal of the crime of sexual
abuse as defined in and penalized under Section 5(b) of Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610 without any attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
minimum to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and TWENTY
Based on the records and transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
proceedings of the cases, appellant has nothing to offer but denial and alibi
for his defense. He now faults the trial court for his conviction as it allegedly
relied solely on AAAs declarations in court.
xxxx
In finding appellant guilty, it is not as if the trial court relied only on AAAs
testimony, without any critical assessment at all, as appellant would like it to
appear. It should be noted that the testimony of AAA was corroborated by the
findings of [P/Sr. Insp. Carpio] that she was indeed violated. Where a rape
victims testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration,
there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take
place.43 The proceedings before the trial court indicated that the trial court
gave credence to her testimony only after it has satisfied itself that the same
was competent and credible as shown by the manner in which she testified
and her demeanor on the witness stand.
xxxx
the rape incidents created doubts that she was raped by the appellant. Thus,
the self-serving allegations of AAA that she was raped many times by the
appellant deserved scant consideration.
The appellant further argues that the court a quo failed to consider that AAA
was merely forced by her aunt, CCC, who has moral ascendancy and
authority over her to file the rape cases against him as a form of revenge for
his refusal to live with her in Pampanga.
Finally, the appellant posits that the essential elements of the crimes charged
were not sufficiently proven by the prosecution and that the pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution fell short of the degree of proof
required by law to convict him of the crimes charged. Therefore, the
appellant strongly calls for his acquittal.
The appellants contentions are bereft of merit.
This Court will concurrently discuss the aforesaid arguments raised by the
appellant.
Anent the third assigned error, appellant insists that the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the
possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.44 All the prosecution needs to prove, which it did, was
carnal knowledge of the victim by the [appellant] against her will and without
her consent and that she was sexually abused and molested through
appellants lascivious conduct.45 [Emphasis supplied].
The appellant appealed to this Court contending that his convictions for the
crimes charged were based mainly on the bare allegations of AAA as there
were no evidences presented to corroborate her allegations that he truly
raped her. The appellant also harps on the possibility that the laceration
found on AAAs vagina may be due to her having sex with her boyfriends
because the prosecution did not submit or present even a single evidence or
witness who actually saw that he raped AAA. Moreover, the appellant asserts
that AAAs testimony contains inconsistencies that would readily show that
she is not telling the truth. Also, the long delay on the part of AAA in reporting
records support his conviction of six counts of rape. During her testimony
before the trial court, AAA clearly, candidly, straightforwardly and explicitly
narrated before the trial court how the appellant took advantage of her on the
1st week of April 2002, 3 May 2002, 6 May 2002, 7 May 2002, 10 May 2002
and 11 May 2002. AAA repeatedly pointed out the horrendous part of her
ordeal when the appellant would command her to undress, would place
himself on top of her, would insert his penis into her vagina and would make
push and pull movements. She was cowed into submission to the appellants
beastly desires because the latter always had a knife tucked to his waist and
whenever she would resist his sexual advances, the appellant would draw
the knife from his waist and wield it on her. Considering that AAA was barely
out of childhood at the time when her person was criminally violated, the
mere sight of the deadly weapon in the hands of the appellant intimidated
her; and easily so because appellant was a 49 year-old man of superior
strength to the child. On top of these, the appellant is not just AAAs neighbor
- he is also the brother of AAAs foster father. These concurring
circumstances provided the occasion for the infliction of appellants bestiality
upon AAAs hapless helplessness.
It is a well-entrenched law that intimidation in rape includes the moral kind of
intimidation or coercion. Intimidation is a relative term, depending on the age,
size and strength of the parties, and their relationship with each other. It can
be addressed to the mind as well. For rape to exist it is not necessary that
the force or intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could
not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient
to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation
must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the
time of the rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that
it produces fear -- fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands
of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter,
as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. Intimidation
would also explain why there are no traces of struggle which would indicate
that the victim fought off her attacker.46
With the aforesaid, the prosecution, indeed, has proven beyond reasonable
doubt the existence of carnal knowledge through threat or intimidation, which
is enough to establish the crime of rape.
The prosecution likewise proved the essential elements of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. It thus provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended,
the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be:Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall bereclusion temporal in
its medium period; x x x.
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as
follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3)
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 47
AAA testified that on the 2nd week of April 2002, 1 May 2002, 2 May
2002, 8 May 2002 and 9 May 2002, the appellant touched her
breasts and vagina. The said incidents happened inside the house of
AAAs parents whenever AAA was left alone. In all instances, there
was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert appellants penis
into AAAs vagina.
The aforesaid acts of the appellant are covered by the definitions of
"sexual abuse" and "lascivious conduct" under Section 2(g) and (h)
of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of
Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610:
No significance can be given to the claim of the appellant that his convictions
for the crimes charged were based mainly on the bare allegations of AAA, as
there was no evidence presented to corroborate her allegations that he truly
raped her.
It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.51 This Court has repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in
the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial
judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an
oath.52 These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses,
in the process of unearthing the truth.53 The appellate courts will generally
not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the
case.54 In this case, none of these circumstances are present.
Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for
the determination of the weight of a particular testimony. This principle could
not ring any truer where the prosecution relies mainly on the testimony of the
complainant, corroborated by the medico-legal findings of a physician. Be
that as it may, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone,
uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is
clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature. 55
Needless to say, this is a matter best assigned to the trial court which had the
first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and observe
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Such
matters cannot be gathered from a mere reading of the transcripts of
stenographic notes. Hence, the trial courts findings carry great weight and
substance.56
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals in its Decision, the trial court did not
unthinkingly rely on the testimony of AAA in finding the appellant guilty of the
crimes charged. There was a critical assessment of her testimony and the
manner it was given. The first hand observation was that AAAs testimony
when he denied her request to live with her as husband and wife in
Pampanga. Such a defense burdens the imagination. It is utterly
preposterous and unthinkable. Both the [appellant] and CCC are presently
married to and living with their respective spouses. The Court failed to see
anything so appealing on the part of the [appellant] as to drive CCC, who
was already 41 years of age x x x and with six (6) children with her husband,
out of her mind to make such proposal to the [appellant]. As a laundrywoman
and a food vendor on the side, CCC would not be financially in a position to
offer to buy for the [appellant] a passenger tricycle as their means of
livelihood in Pampanga. In any event, the [appellant] failed to substantiate his
said claim by document or other evidence of relationship like mementos, love
letters, notes, pictures and the like.
Even in the remote possibility that CCC was indeed so obsessed to have the
[appellant] as her live-in partner, it does not follow that she can impose her
will on AAA and her mother for them to concoct a story of not just one but
multiple rape alleged to have been committed against AAA. The [biological]
mother of AAA would particularly not allow her daughter to be used by her
sister as an engine of malice, specially (sic) since to do so would expose her
daughter to embarrassment and public trial.70
As has been repeatedly stated by this Court in a number of cases, it is
unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice if it will
subject her to embarrassment and even stigma. No mother would stoop so
low as to subject her daughter to the hardships and shame concomitant to a
rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings, more so, of her sister.
It is unthinkable that a mother would sacrifice her daughters honor to satisfy
her grudge or even her sisters grudge, knowing fully well that such an
experience would certainly damage her daughters psyche and mar her
entire life. A mother would not subject her daughter to a public trial with its
accompanying stigma on her as the victim of rape, if said charges were not
true.71
In contrast, the evidence presented by the defense consisted mainly of bare
denials and alibi. As the Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are
inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible
testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the
crime.72 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not sufficient that appellant
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must
also show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis
or its immediate vicinity when the crime was perpetrated. 73 Further, the
defense of alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by the accused
themselves and their relatives like in this case and not by credible persons. 74
May 2002 there was an instance when the appellant left her house for about
an hour and then returned to continue with the drinking session. This
indicates the possibility that it was during that hour that appellant raped AAA.
In the case at bench, the appellant vehemently averred that at the time of the
incidents on 1 May 2002 and on 11 May 2002 he was in Angat, Bulacan, and
in Bagbaguin, Valenzuela City, respectively. On 1 May 2002, the appellant
insisted that it was impossible for him to sexually abuse AAA at 8:30 in the
morning because as early as 7:00 oclock in the morning he already went out
of his house to join the excursion of his co-drivers in Angat, Bulacan, and
returned home only at 10:00 oclock in the evening. Also, on 11 May 2002, at
around 7:00 oclock in the evening, the appellant claimed that it was not
possible for him to rape AAA because as early as 9:00 oclock in the morning
he was already at the house of his cousin in Bagbaguin, Valenzuela City, to
assist in the cooking of food for the birthday celebration of his cousins
nephew and he went home only at around 10:00 oclock in the evening.
However, these assertions of time and hour are bare and bereft of support.
Neither is there any evidence to prove that it was physically impossible for
him to be present at the place where the crimes were committed at the time
they happened.
For failure of the appellant to support by clear and convincing evidence his
defense of denial and alibi, and in light of the positive declaration of AAA,
who in a simple and straightforward manner convincingly identified the
appellant as her ravisher, the defense offered by the appellant must
necessarily fail.
Additionally, it is worthy to note the findings of the trial court, which was
affirmed by the appellate court, that from the time the appellant left his house
on 1 May 2002 at 7:00 oclock in the morning up to the time the incident of
sexual abuse happened at 8:30 in the morning of the same day, there is only
a time difference of one and one-half hour, thus, it was entirely possible that
before leaving his house he had already committed the act complained of
against AAA. Besides, the appellant can easily give a different time to make it
appear that at the time of the incident he was no longer at the place where it
happened. In the same breath, though the appellant was at the house of his
cousin at the time the crime of rape was committed on 11 May 2002, it was
not physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time
it happened because the records clearly show that his cousins house is only
a 15-minute-walk away from the house of AAA.
The testimonies of the appellants wife, cousin and niece designed to
strengthen his defense of denial and alibi cannot be given any value for their
testimonies are suspect because of their relationship to appellant. This Court
has held that relatives would freely perjure themselves for the sake of their
loved ones.75 Notably, the cousin of the appellant even admitted that on 11
With the aforesaid provisions, the appellant can be held guilty of a lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness performed on a child, i.e., sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, which was the offense
proved because it is included in rape, the offense charged.
As to penalty. This Court similarly affirms the penalty of reclusion
perpetua76 imposed by the lower courts against the appellant for each count
of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 545-V-02, 549-V-02, 552-V-02, 553-V-02, 544V-02 and 348-V-02.
This Court, however, modifies the penalty imposed by the lower courts
against the appellant in Criminal Case Nos. 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-02,
554-V-02 and 555-V-02 for sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610.
For acts of lasciviousness performed on a child under Section 5(b), Article III
of Republic Act No. 7610, the penalty prescribed is reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding that Republic Act No.
7610 is a special law, the appellant may enjoy the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.77
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant shall be entitled to a
minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by Republic Act No. 7610. The penalty next lower in degree is
prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is
from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. On the other hand, the
maximum term of the penalty should be taken from the penalty prescribed
under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, the range of which is
from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua. The minimum,
medium and maximum term of the same is as follows: minimum 14 years,
8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months; medium 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 20 years; and maximum reclusion perpetua.
In this case, the trial court imposed on the appellant an indeterminate
sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 15 years, 6
months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of
sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. The
minimum term imposed is correct because it is within the range of prision
mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum, the penalty next lower in
degree to that imposed by Republic Act No. 7610. But the maximum term
thereof is wrong. The maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should
be anywhere from 14 years, 8 months and one day to reclusion perpetua.
We, thus, impose on the appellant the indeterminate sentence of 8 years and
1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 in Criminal Case Nos. 546V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-02, 554-V-02 and 555-V-02.
As to damages. This Court affirms the awards of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages given by the lower courts to
AAA for each count of rape. Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact
of rape.78 Moral damages in rape cases should be awarded without need of
showing that the victim suffered trauma of mental, physical, and
psychological sufferings constituting the basis thereof. These are too obvious
to still require their recital at the trial by the victim, since we even assume
and acknowledge such agony as a gauge of her credibility.79
In line with this Courts ruling in Abenojar v. People, 80 this Court deems it
proper to reduce the award of civil indemnity from P25,000.00 to P20,000.00,
as well as the award of moral damages from P25,000.00 toP15,000.00 for
each count of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7610. In the same breath, in line with this Courts ruling in People v.
Sumingwa,81 this Court impose a fine of P15,000.00 on the appellant for each
count of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01092 dated 28 May 2007 finding herein appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 545-V-02, 549-V-02,
552-V-02, 553-V-02, 544-V-02 and 348-V-02 of six counts of rape and in
Criminal Case Nos. 546-V-02, 547-V-02, 548-V-02, 554-V-02 and 555-V-02 of
five counts of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7610 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon the
appellant for each count of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of
Republic Act No. 7610 should be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal; (2) the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages for each count
of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 are
reduced from P25,000.00 to P20,000.00 and from P25,000.00 to P15,000.00,
The evidence of the Prosecution shows that at about 4:00 pm on May 29,
2002 Taguilid suddenly entered AAAs room while she was resting; that the
room was in the third floor of the house owned by her parents and located in
Barangay Talayan, Quezon City; that he was a cousin of her mother who had
been living with her family in that house since 2000; that upon entering her
room, he pushed her down on her back, then inserted his finger in her vagina
and later on inserted his penis in her vagina; that she cried and pushed him
away, but to no avail; that he next turned her over and penetrated her anus
with his penis while in that position; and that she did not shout for help
because he threatened to kill her if she did.5
At the time of the rape, AAA was 12 years and ten months old, having been
born on July 28, 1989.
The Prosecution further established that BBB, AAAs father, was at the time
tending to the family store at the ground floor when he decided to go up to
the third floor to look for and talk to AAA; that upon reaching her room, he
found Taguilid standing by her bed in the act of raising the zipper of his
pants, and AAA was on her bed, crying and uttering inaudible words; that
BBB saw that her skirt was raised up to her waist, and her panties, though
still on her, were disheveled (wala sa ayos); and that it seemed to BBB that
his sudden appearance in the room had taken Taguilid by surprise, causing
the latter to hurriedly leave the room even before BBB could say anything to
him.
BBB later on brought his daughter to the United Doctors Medical Center
(UDMC) in Quezon City for a medico-legal examination before reporting the
matter to the barangay office. He lodged a complaint for rape with the police
authorities in order to seek their assistance in the arrest of Taguilid. 6
The RTC summarized the medico-legal findings on AAA thuswise:
Dr. Jerico Angelito Q. Cordero, 28 years old, physician and a medico-legal
officer assigned as Deputy Chief of DNA Analysis Center conducted medical
and physical examination upon the victim on May 29, 2002 at 7:50 in the
evening. His findings, marked as Exhibit "E" show that under genital
category, the hymen is annular with deep healed laceration at 4 and 9 oclock
positions. Under labia minora, it is light brown slightly hypertrophied
(increased in size) labia minora; that the fourchette (part of the sex organ
located just below the hymen), was abraded, meaning "nagasgas or
nalagusan" (TSN, September 20, 2002, p. 6). He found out that AAA is in a
non-virgin state physically and there are no signs of application of any form
of physical trauma. He said that deep-healed laceration means that the injury
has healed 5 to 10 days from the time of the injury.7
was raped by the accused not only on that fateful day of May 29, 2002, but
several times before.
Taguilid denied the accusation. He testified that AAAs mother was his third
cousin; that he lived with AAAs family because his means of livelihood was
playing their drums at birthday parties and fiestas; that on May 28, 2002, he
and AAA had an argument after she refused to follow his instruction to wash
the dishes; that he whipped her with two sticks of walis tingting, but she
retaliated by stabbing his shorts, causing his shorts to fall off; that it was
while he was pulling up his shorts and zipping them when BBB suddently
appeared and found him inside her room in that pose; and that he
immediately rushed down the stairs, with BBB saying to him: Hintayin mo ako
sa ibaba. Pinakain na, pinatulog pa, ahas sa bahay na ito. 8
xxx
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000) as civil indemnity in consonance with
prevailing jurisprudence (People v. Obejaso, 299 SCRA 549; People v. Ibay,
233 SCRA 15); the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000) as
moral damages; and the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P25,000) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed Taguilids conviction, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated April 21, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 106 of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. 02109810 finding accused-appellant Julius Taguilid y Bacolod GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA explained its affirmance in the following manner, viz:
In the instant case, we agree with the trial court that the testimony of private
complainant should be accorded full faith and credit as it amply supports a
finding of guilt on the part of accused-appellant for the commission of the
said offense. Indeed, the narration of her ordeal was honest, straightforward
and clear and all through her entire testimony she remained firm and
steadfast in identifying accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the offense.
On the other hand, accused-appellant can only set up the defense of denial.
Denial, although a legitimate defense, is an inherently weak defense that
perpetua for absent any circumstance that would qualify the rape under the
instances enumerated under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, the proper imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua.11
Incidentally, we cannot also help but observe that the weakness of accusedappellants defense becomes all the more apparent in this appeal
considering as to how he is now trying to change his theory as to what had
transpired on May 29, 2002. For instance, during the trial of the case,
accused-appellant contended that there was no rape but a serious case of
misunderstanding between him and the father of the private complainant as
his shorts fell as a result of private complainants retaliation for beating her
with walis tingting. On appeal however, a reading of the arguments of the
accused-appellant shows that while he still maintains that there was no rape,
he avers that the sexual congress was consensual as there was absence of
physical struggle or resistance on the part of the private complainant.
Issues
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS DEFENSE.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
THE FINDINGS/PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AS CONTAINED IN THE MEDICOLEGAL REPORT DOES NOT SHOW AND/OR IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH
THE OFFENSE OF RAPE.12
Taguilid argues that AAAs testimony on how the rape had happened and
how easily he had undressed her indicated that he did not use force and
intimidation against her; that her fear of him had been only the product of her
imagination; and that her silence during the entire event, and her failure to
escape from him or to report his allegedly previous sexual assaults had
revealed her having voluntarily consented to the sexual act. 13
Taguilid submits that the State did not prove that he had any moral
ascendancy over AAA; that the age gap between them did not suffice to
establish his moral ascendancy over her;14 and that the medico-legal findings
of the hymenal lacerations found on her on the same date of the rape being
already healed, not fresh, were inconsistent with rape. 15
Ruling
The Court affirms the conviction.
First of all, it is basic that findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC as the
trial court are generally conclusive on the Court which is not a trier of
facts.16 Such conclusiveness derives from the trial courts having the firsthand opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of the victim when
she testified at the trial.17 It also looks to the Court that both the RTC and the
CA carefully sifted and considered all the attendant circumstances. With
Taguilid not showing that the RTC and the CA overlooked any fact or material
of consequence that could have altered the outcome if they had taken it into
due consideration, the Court must fully accept the findings of the CA.
Secondly, the medico-legal finding made on May 29, 2002 showing AAAs
hymenal laceration as "deep-healed" and as having healed "5 to 10 days
from the time of (infliction of) the injury" did not detract from the commission
of the rape on May 29, 2002. For one, hymenal injury has never been an
element of rape, for a female might still be raped without such injury
resulting. The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either against
her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the
female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years
of age, or is demented).18 It is relevant to know that carnal knowledge is
simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a
woman.19 Thus, although AAA testified on her sexual penetration by Taguilid,
the fact that her hymenal injury was not fresh but already deep-healed was
not incompatible with the evidence of rape by him. In this regard, her claim
that he had previously subjected her to similar sexual assaults several times
before May 29, 2002, albeit not the subject of this prosecution, rendered the
absence of fresh hymenal injury not improbable even as it showed how the
deep-healed laceration might have been caused.
Thirdly, AAAs failure to shout for help although she knew that her father was
tending to the family store just downstairs was not a factor to discredit her or
to diminish the credibility of her evidence on the rape. She explained her
failure by stating that Taguilid had threatened to harm her should she shout.
She thereby commanded credence, considering that she was not expected
to easily overcome her fear of him due to her being then a minor just under
13 years of age at the time of the rape. Nor would it be reasonable to impose
on her any standard form of reaction when faced with a shocking and
horrifying experience like her rape at the hands of Taguilid. The Court has
recognized that different people react differently to a given situation involving
a startling occurrence.20 Indeed, the workings of the human mind placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some
may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into insensibility
even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion. 21
There can be no question that the testimony of a child who has been a victim
in rape is normally given full weight and credence. Judicial experience has
enabled the courts to accept the verity that when a minor says that she was
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed against her.22 The credibility of such a rape victim is surely
augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that suggests the
possibility of her being actuated by ill-motive to falsely testify against the
accused.23 Truly, a rape victims testimony that is unshaken by rigid crossexamination and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material
points is entitled to full faith and credit.24
And, fourthly, Taguilids defense at the trial was plain denial of the positive
assertions made against him.1wphi1 He then declared that the charge of
rape against him resulted from BBBs misunderstanding of what had really
occurred in AAAs bedroom just before BBB had appeared unannounced.
Yet, such denial was devoid of persuasion due to its being easily and
conveniently resorted to, and due to denial being generally weaker than and
not prevailing over the positive assertions of both AAA and BBB. Also,
Taguilids explanation of why he was then zipping his pants when BBB found
him in AAAs bedroom, that AAAs stabbing had caused his pants to fall off,
was implausible without him demonstrating how the pants had been
unzipped from AAAs stabbing of him as to cause the pants to fall off.
Besides, Taguilids act of quickly leaving the room of AAA without at least
attempting to tell BBB the reason for his presence in her room and near the
bed of the sobbing AAA if he had been as innocent as he claimed exposed
the shamness and insincerity of his denial.
In this connection, the Court is not surprised that Taguilid changed his
defense theory on appeal, from one of denial based on the charge having
resulted from a misunderstanding of the situation in AAAs bedroom on the
part of BBB to one admitting the sexual congress with AAA but insisting that it
was consensual between them. Such shift, which the CA unfailingly noted,
revealed the unreliability of his denial, if not also its inanity.
September 5, 2012
floor of her sisters room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her
nape and neck.5 AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and BBB with a
blanket.6 The appellant removed AAAs clothes, short pants, and underwear;
he then took off his short pants and briefs.7 The appellant went on top of
AAA, and held her hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs
using his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. 8 The
appellant stopped when AAAs cry got louder; AAA kicked the appellants
upper thigh as the latter was about to stand up. The appellant put his clothes
back on, and threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone.
Immediately after, the appellant left the room.9 AAA covered herself with a
blanket and cried.10
At around 6:00 a.m. of the same day, AAAs brother, CCC, went to her room
and asked her why she was lying on the floor and crying. AAA did not
answer, and instead hurled invectives at CCC.11 AAA went to the house of
her other brother, but the latter was not in his house. AAA proceeded to the
house of her older sister, DDD, at Block 19, Welfareville Compound, and
narrated to her what had happened. Afterwards, AAA and her two (2) siblings
went to the Women and Childrens Desk of the Mandaluyong City Police
Station and reported the incident.12
For his defense, the appellant declared on the witness stand that he hauled
"filling materials" at his house, located at Block 38, Fabella Compound, on
the evening of June 15, 2003. At around 10:00 p.m., he went to his room and
slept.13 On the next day, the appellant, accompanied by his mother and
brother-in-law, went to the municipal hall to ask for financial assistance for his
wife who was confined in the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctor
told him that his wife needed blood. Immediately after, the appellant and his
companions went to Pasig City to find blood donors. 14
On the evening of June 16, 2003, and while the appellant was folding the
clothes of his son, two policemen entered his house and informed him that a
complaint for attempted rape had been filed against him. The police brought
him to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, forced him to admit
the crime, mauled him, and then placed him in a detention cell. 15 The
appellant added that he filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against the police officers who beat him up. 16
The RTC convicted the appellant of rape in its decision of February 22, 2007,
under the following terms:
Q: When you felt that some (sic) is embracing and hugging you, what did
you do?
A: I didnt mind it because I thought that the person beside me just moved
and when he made the movement, its like that I was embraced, maam.
Q:
A:
My brother-in-law, maam.
Q:
A: Before that happened, my nephew cried and so I picked him up and put
him on my chest and after a while, I slept again and brought him down again
and then "dumapa po ako" and I felt that somebody was kissing my nape,
maam.
Q:
Were you able to see who was that somebody kissing your nape?
A: When I tried to evade, I looked on my side where the room was not that
dark that I could not see the person and so, I saw that it was my brother-inlaw, maam.
xxxx
Q: When you saw that it was your brother-in-law kissing your nape while
you were on a prone position, what else happened, if any?
A:
Q:
A:
A:
Q: While he was taking off your short pants and your underwear, what did
you do, if any?
xxxx
A:
Q:
Why were you crying at that time while he was kissing your neck?
A:
xxxx
Q: Aside from that incident that he was kissing your neck, was there any
other previous incident that happened?
A:
Q: You said that he was trying to take off your clothes and undergarments,
what was your position at that time?
A:
Q:
A:
Yes, maam.
xxxx
Q:
Q:
You said that you saw him take off his short pants?
Q:
A:
Yes, maam.
A:
xxxx
Q: You said that he covered you and your nephew with a blanket and then
taking (sic) off your clothes?
A:
Q:
A:
Yes, maam.
Yes, maam.
xxxx
xxxx
Q:
Q:
A:
Yes, maam.
Q:
Could you please tell us how did (sic) he able to part your legs?
A:
He did that with his legs while he was holding my hands, maam.
Q:
And when he was able to part your legs, what happened next?
A:
He tried to insert his sexual organ but he was not able to do so, maam.
Q:
How did you know that he was trying to insert his sexual organ?
A:
Q:
Which part of your body was he able to touch his sexual organ? (sic)
A:
xxxx
Q: You mentioned earlier that he was not able to penetrate your private
part, AAA?
A:
Yes, maam.
Q:
A: I cried and then while I was resisting, I hit my wrist on the wall and my
wrist was "nagasgas," maam.
xxxx
Q:
A: Yes, maam, I was able to kicked (sic) his upper thigh, maam. 23 (italics
supplied; emphasis ours)
From the foregoing, we find it clear that the appellants penis did not
penetrate, but merely touched (i.e.,"naidikit"), AAAs private part. In fact, the
victim confirmed on cross-examination that the appellant did not
succeed in inserting his penis into her vagina. Significantly, AAAs
Sinumpaang Salaysay24 also disclosed that the appellant was holding the
victims hand when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This
circumstance coupled with the victims declaration that she was resisting
the appellants attempt to insert his penis into her vagina makes penile
penetration highly difficult, if not improbable. Significantly, nothing in the
records supports the CAs conclusion that the appellants penis penetrated,
however slightly, the victims female organ.
Did the touching by the appellants penis of the victims private part amount
to carnal knowledge such that the appellant should be held guilty of
consummated rape?
In People v. Campuhan,25 the Court laid down the parameters of genital
contact in rape cases, thus:
Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of
the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in
this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated
rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by
their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface,
to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath
the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia
minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs
that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia
minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the
rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible
within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface.
The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is
pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any
hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the
labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered
for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the
surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female
organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum
pudendum of the victim. We further held that the appellant could not be
convicted of consummated rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain.
The Court had a similar ruling in People v. Miranda, 31 where the accused
tried to insert his penis into the victims private parts, but was unsuccessful,
so he inserted his fingers instead. We convicted the accused of attempted
rape only due to lack of evidence to establish that there was even a slight
penile penetration. We noted, however, that the appellants act of inserting
his fingers would have constituted rape through sexual assault had the
offense occurred after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
In People v. Alibuyog,32 the victim declared that the accused placed his penis
on her vagina; and claimed that it touched her private parts. The Court set
aside the accuseds conviction for rape, and convicted him of attempted rape
only, because we found the victims testimony too ambiguous to prove the
vital element of penile penetration. We added that the victims testimony was
"replete with repeated denial of penile insertion." 33
Similarly, in People v. Quarre,34 the evidence for the prosecution consisted
only of the victims testimony that the accused tried, but failed, to insert his
penis into her vagina, and she felt pain in the process. No medico-legal
examination report was presented in evidence. Accordingly, the Court
reversed the accuseds conviction for rape, and found him guilty of attempted
rape only.
In People v. Ocomen,35 the Court also set aside the appellants conviction for
rape because no proof was adduced of even the slightest penetration of the
female organ, aside from a general statement of the victim that she had been
"raped."
People v. Monteron36 is another noteworthy case where the Court set aside
the appellants conviction for rape. In this case, the victim testified that the
accused placed his penis on top of her vagina, and that she felt pain. In
finding the accused guilty of attempted rape only, we held that there was no
showing that the accuseds penis entered the victims vagina. We added that
the pain that the victim felt might have been caused by the accuseds failed
attempts to insert his organ into her vagina.
In People v. Mariano,37 the accused tried to insert his penis into the victims
vagina, but failed to secure penetration. The Court set aside the accuseds
conviction for three (3) counts of rape and found him guilty of attempted rape
only. We explained the necessity of carefully ascertaining whether the penis
of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to
accurately conclude that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Arce, Jr.,38 the Court found the accused guilty of attempted rape
only, because the victim did not declare that there was the slightest
penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape. On the contrary, she
categorically stated that the accused was not able to insert his penis into her
private parts because she was moving her hips away. We further ruled that
the victims attempt to demonstrate what she meant by "idinidikit ang ari" was
unavailing to prove that rape had been consummated.
In People v. Francisco,39 the victim testified that the accused "poked" her
vagina. The Court set aside the accuseds conviction for qualified rape, and
convicted him instead only of attempted rape after failing to discern from the
victim's testimony that the accused attained some degree of penile
penetration, which was necessary to consummate rape.1wphi1
In People v. Dimapilis,40 the Court refused to convict the accused for
consummated rape on the basis of the victim's testimony that she felt the
accused's penis pressed against her vagina as he tried to insert it. We
explained that in order to constitute consummated rape, there must be entry
into the vagina of the victim, even if only in the slightest degree.
Finally, in People v. Tolentino,41 the Court reversed the accuseds conviction
for rape and convicted him of attempted rape only, as there was paucity of
evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place. We reasoned out that
the victims statements that the accused was "trying to force his sex organ
into mine" and "binundol-undol ang kanyang ari" did not prove that the
accuseds penis reached the labia of the pudendum of the victims vagina.
"In rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case
with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only
logical and inevitable conclusion."42 We emphasize that a conviction cannot
be made to rest on possibilities; strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. In the present case, the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving all the elements of consummated rape.
The Proper Penalty and Indemnities
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
attempted rape is two degrees lower than the prescribed penalty of reclusion
perpetua for consummated rape. Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua
is prision mayor whose range is six (6) years and one (1) day to 12 years.
Without any attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
upon the appellant is prision mayor in its medium period, while the minimum
shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision
correccional whose range is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years,
in any of its periods. Accordingly, we sentence the appellant to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
10 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
In addition, we order the appellant to pay the victim P 30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P 25,000.00 as moral damages and P 10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on attempted rape
cases.43
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 15, 2009 decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02759 is MODIFIED, as follows:
The appellant's conviction for the crime of rape is VACATED, and
(1) we find appellant Christopher Pareja y Velasco GUILTY of the
crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE;
(2) we SENTENCE him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor, as maximum; and
(3) we ORDER him to PAY the victim the amounts of P 30,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P 25,000.00 as moral damages; and P 10,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181202
December 5, 2012
which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
victim as a human being.5
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. 6
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 20, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 00344, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Edgar Padigos, which affirmed with modification the
Judgment2 dated September 26, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 14 in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-64584 & CBU-64585. The
trial court found appellant Edgar Padigos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 or the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act."
The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-64584 charged appellant with the
crime of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, while the Information in
Criminal Case No. CBU-64585 charged him with the crime of acts of
lasciviousness also in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. The relevant
portions of said Informations read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-64584
That sometime in the evening of the 26th day of August, 2002, at x x x and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
moved by lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with his own daughter, "AAA" 3 who is a minor 6 years
of age, that resulted to devirginizing her and causing her great dishonor.4
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-64585
That sometime in the evening of the 27th day of August, 2002, at x x x and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with deliberate intent and with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously let his own daughter, "AAA" who is a minor 6 years
of age, masturbate his penis, which act is constitutive of physical abuse
The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed July 20, 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The government presented as its witnesses, the minor victim and Dr. Naomi
Poca. The defense, on the other hand, only had accused-appellant for its
witness.
THE PROSECUTIONS THEORYThe evidence for the State discloses that "AAA" who was then only six-years
old was sleeping inside their house on August 26, 2002 when her father,
herein accused-appellant raped her. He undressed her and removed her
panty. He also took off his pants. He inserted his penis into her vagina and
made push and pull movements. She felt pain in her private organ. Her
mother was not around as it was only her and her father who were home.
The next day or on August 27, 2002, accused-appellant made her hold his
penis. He, on the other hand, touched her genitals and inserted his fingers
into her vagina causing her to feel pain.
She related the incidents to her mother who simply gave her father a fierce
piercing stare but did nothing. She also confided to her aunt, sister of her
mother, who brought her to a doctor for medical examination and to the
police station to report the matter.
She was examined by Dr. Yu and Dr. Aznar of the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center. Since the two physicians were no longer connected with the
said hospital, it was one Dr. Naomi Poca who was called to the witness stand
who, testifying on the medical certificate (Exh. "B") issued by the two doctors,
came-up with the following declarations, thus
"Based on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Yu and Dr. Aznar, their written
findings include, 1x1 cm. healed circular scar frontal lateral side left sec. to
varicella, healed circular scar with the torso back abdomen sec. to varicella,
3x3 cm. wound in left foot aspect sec. to varicella, height 110.5 cm., weight,
belief because it allegedly lacked details as to how the crimes of rape and
acts of lasciviousness were actually committed.
In the recent case of People v. Bosi,11 we reiterated a long held principle that
when the credibility of the victim is at issue, the Court gives great weight to
the trial courts assessment. Expounding on the said principle, we declared in
that case that the trial courts finding of facts is even conclusive and binding if
it is not shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The wisdom behind this rule is that the
trial court had the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses
deportment and manner of testifying, thus, it is in a better position than the
appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals categorically
held that AAA is a credible witness and that her testimony deserves full faith
and belief. In spite of the brevity of her testimony, the trial court considered
the same as delivered in a clear and straightforward manner that is devoid of
any pretense or equivocation.
An examination of the transcript of AAAs testimony would indicate that the
crime of rape was indeed committed by appellant. The relevant portion of
said testimony reads:
PROS. CALDERON:
Q. Now, you were then in your house at that time. Can you remember now?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were sleeping, can you remember what happened to you?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Can you tell this court what happened to you?
A. In my vagina.12
Pertinently, this Court has repeatedly stressed that no young girl would
concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own
father, undergo medical examination, then subject herself to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire
to seek justice.13
According to the sixth paragraph of Article 266-B, the death penalty shall be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed "when the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code which deals with the offense of rape
provides:
It would appear from the death penalty imposed by the trial court that it found
appellant guilty of qualified rape. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, albeit reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic
Act No. 9346.
After a careful review of the records of this case, we are persuaded that
appellant is indeed guilty of qualified rape. In People v. Pruna, 15 we
formulated a set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential benchmark
in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions
regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victims age in rape cases. The
Pruna guidelines are as follows:
during trial, however, that failure to present relevant evidence will not deter
this Court from upholding that qualified rape was indeed committed by
appellant because he himself admitted, in his counter-affidavit which formed
part of the evidence for the defense and the contents of which he later
affirmed in his testimony in open court, that AAA was below 7 years old
around the time of the rape incident. In the Courts view, this admission from
appellant, taken with the testimony of the victim, sufficiently proved the
victims minority.
Parenthetically, we are not unmindful of the observation of the trial court, to
wit:
Back to the instant case, by no stretch of even a fertile imagination can this
Court, observing her frail and diminutive mien, hold that AAA, at the age of 6
when she was raped, could be mistaken to be above eleven (11) years old
for the offense to fall under simple rape, much more could it be mistaken that
she was above 17 years old, for the accused to be saved from the supreme
penalty: death. The offense of rape could, thus, only fall under subparagraph
d), par. 1), ART. 266-A of R.A. 7877 The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (statutory
rape).17
Anent the charge of acts of lasciviousness, Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by
prision correccional.
Therefore, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is composed of the following
elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
AAAs testimony in this regard provides adequate basis for appellants guilt:
PROS. CALDERON:
Q. What about the following day?
A. He told me to hold his penis.
Q. That was the next day?
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 20, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 00344, finding appellant
Edgar Padigos guilty in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-64584 and CBU-64585, is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) The award of exemplary damages is increased to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00); and (2) Appellant Edgar Padigos is ordered to pay the private
offended party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six
percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
A. Yes, Sir.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Q. That would be on August 27, 2002?
SO ORDERED.
A. Yes, Sir.
G.R. No. 192941
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated May 29,
2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00063, which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Carigara, Leyte finding
locally called a sundang, from the scabbard on his waist and ordered her to
go upstairs. Poking the sundang at AAAs stomach, he then ordered AAA to
take off her shorts, and told her he will kill her, her siblings and her mother if
she does not do as she was told.8
AAA complied with accused-appellants orders. When she was lying on the
floor, already undressed, accused-appellant placed the sundang beside her
on her left side. He took off his shirt and shorts and went on top of her. AAA
did not shout since accused-appellant threatened to kill them all if she did.
He held her hair with his right hand and touched her private parts with his left
hand. He then "poked" his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull
movement. AAA felt pain. Accused-appellant kissed her and said "Ah, youre
still a virgin." When accused-appellant was done, he stood and said "If you
will tell this to anybody, I will kill you."9
AAA did not tell her mother about the incident as she was afraid accusedappellant will execute his threat to kill them all. The sexual advances were
thereafter repeated every time AAAs mother sold bananas on Wednesdays
and Sundays.10
On January 8, 2001, accused-appellant ordered AAA to pack and go with him
to Tabontabon, Leyte, threatening once more to kill her siblings if she does
not comply. In Tabontabon, accused-appellant once again forced AAA to
have sex with him. The following day, AAAs mother, accompanied by police
officers of Tunga, Leyte, arrived, searching for AAA and the accusedappellant. AAA was finally able to talk to her mother, which led to AAAs filing
a complaint for rape against accused-appellant. Accused-appellant was
arrested a few days later on January 11, 2001.11
Dr. Rogelio Gariando, Municipal Health Officer IV of the Carigara District
Hospital, requested a vaginal smear in the course of his physical examination
of AAA. Dr. Gariando testified that the specimen secured from AAA at around
2:00 p.m. of January 10, 2001 was positive for the presence of
spermatozoa.12 Medical Technologist II of Carigara District Hospital, Alicia
Adizas, confirmed the finding of Dr. Gariando.13
BBB, the mother of AAA, testified that she and accused-appellant Alcober
lived together from 1989 to 2001. BBB and accused-appellant had three
children, who were three, eight and ten years old, as of her testimony on
October 30, 2001. AAA, however, was her daughter with a previous live-in
partner. AAA was six years old when she and accused-appellant Alcober
started living together. BBB was the one who supported their family the entire
time they lived together, since accused-appellant was not always gainfully
employed. AAA called accused-appellant "Tatay."14
watched him having sexual intercourse with AAA and that BBB was crying
while watching them. To prove that the sexual intercourse was consensual,
accused-appellant presented in court what he claimed was the underwear of
AAA, alleging that they agreed to exchange underwear with each other.19
BBB resided in Tunga, Leyte, while AAA was living with BBBs sister, CCC.
The house of CCC was around one kilometer away from her and accusedappellants house. AAA, however, was frequently in BBBs house since she
had lunch there and since it was nearer to her school than CCCs house.
BBB remembered AAA crying on July 20, 1999, but when she asked AAA,
the latter told her that she was merely fondled by accused-appellant. AAA
was 13 years old on July 20, 1999.15
On March 15, 2002, the RTC of Carigara, Leyte rendered its Decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The dispositive portion of the
Decision is as follows:
II THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE.22
Accused-appellant asserts that AAAs testimony that the sexual intercourse
between them was not consensual is "patently incredible." According to
accused-appellant, AAA could have escaped after she was raped for the first
time on July 20, 1999. Since AAA was already residing in her aunts house,
she should never have returned to BBB and accused-appellants house in
order to prevent the repeated sexual intercourse after July 20, 1999 and the
before the incident in Tabontabon.23 Accused-appellant furthermore claim that
the delay in revealing her alleged sexual ordeals from July 20, 1999 up to
January 10, 2001 creates serious doubts as to her contention that she was
raped.24
We must emphasize that when the accused in a rape case claims, as in the
case at bar, that the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant
was consensual, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now
enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an
affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing evidence, such as
by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters,
notes, pictures and the like.25
A Yes, sir, and her panty is even here. I brought this to the Court as
evidence.
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is
not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduce evidence that the
intercourse was consensual. (Citations omitted.)
Q What was then in your mind that you would make your own stepdaughter
without a panty after you had sex with her? What was in your mind?
This make-believe story of the sex escapade of accused Daniel Alcober and
the minor [AAA], conveying to the court that the 13 year old [AAA] enjoyed
the morbid situation that [befell] on her life is unavailing and deserves no
credence. The trauma, the shame and the embarrassment and the public
humiliation to which [accused-appellant] has forced the minor child to stop
her studies, denying her the proper education and a bright future, all because
of the [insatiable] beastful lust of her stepfather who virtually reduced her to a
sex slave, a pawn for almost two (2) years, who cannot do anything but obey
the whims and caprices of the accused Alcober until he was apprehended
and formally charged in court on March 21, 2001. x x x.27
A: Because, he told me that if I will not follow him, he will kill me, my brothers
and sisters and my mother.
Q: After you noticed that it was your stepfather who embraced you, what else
transpired, if any? A: I resisted, but at that time he was always bringing with
him a long bolo, locally known as "sundang." He took it off from the scabbard.
xxxx
Q: You mean when he embraced you, he was already holding a long bolo?
A: It was still tucked at his waist, together with the scabbard.
Q: You said that you resisted. When was that time when he unsheathed his
bolo then tucked on his waist?
A: When I resisted.
Q: Did you comply with his order that you would have to undress yourself
and took your attire?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why did you have to comply to that?
xxxx
Q: When you went upstairs, what next transpired, if any?
A: He ordered me to take off my short pants.
Q: What was then your attire that time?
A: I was then wearing shorts and t-shirt.
Q: How about that bolo, what did the accused do with that bolo?
A: It was poked on me.
A: Towards my stomach.
A: He took off his t-shirt and shorts and thereafter, he placed himself on top
of me.
Q: Did you not make any shout that which you would be heard?
A: I did not shout, because he told me not to shout or make any noise.
Q: Did you comply to such order?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why?
Q: After he placed himself on top of you, what did the accused do, if any?
A: He held every part of my body.
xxxx
Q: After the accused poked his penis to your vagina, what did the accused
then do after poking his penis to your vagina?
xxxx
A: He did the act of pulling and pushing.
Q: What portion of your body was touched by the accused?
xxxx
A: My breast.
Q: What else, if any?
Q: When this penis of the accused was placed in your vagina as you earlier
testified, what else did you feel?
A: Until down.
Q: After he was through with this push and pull movement, what did the
accused do next, after he caressed you and told you that statement that you
are still a virgin?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How did he touch your breast, your vagina and other extremities of your
body. Describe that. A: While he places himself on top of me, his other hands
was used in touching other parts of my body.
A: He stood up and said this things, "if you will tell this to anybody, I will kill
you."
Q: Did you tell your mother of what the accused did to you?
Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, the fact that AAA was not
able to escape when she had the opportunity to do so, her continued visit to
their home after the incident, and her delay in filing the complaint does not at
all contradict her credibility. As discussed by the Court of Appeals, when a
rape victim is paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act
coherently. Her failure to take advantage of an opportunity to escape does
not automatically vitiate the credibility of her account.29 Similarly, in People v.
Lazaro,30 we propounded on the impropriety of judging the actions of child
rape victims by the norms of behavior that can be expected from adults
under similar circumstances:
It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for some time the assault on
her virtue. Her initial hesitation may be due to her youth and the molesters
threat against her. Besides, rape victims, especially child victims, should not
be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a
situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone
traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under
similar circumstances. x x x. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions
from them. Certainly, the Court has not laid down any rule on how a rape
victim should behave immediately after she has been violated. This
experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim
depending on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with
any modicum of doubt. Indeed, different people react differently to a given
stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful
experience. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
Indeed, AAAs explanation for the delay in reporting the crime is more than
adequate:
Q: Would you kindly tell the Court the reason why you did not immediately
file a case against your stepfather on July 20, 1999?
A: Because I was afraid of his threat that he will kill my mother, my brother
and sisters including me.
Q: When was this threat by the way?
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
The Court of Appeals, however, found the fifth paragraph of Article 266-B
inapplicable. According to the appellate court, although it is undisputed that
accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of the victims mother, the
records are bereft of independent evidence to prove that AAA is a minor,
apart from the testimonies of AAA and her mother.32
We disagree.
Q: But you would admit that you have sexual intercourse with [AAA] while
she was still 13 years old?
A: No, sir, it was her uncle who raped her and that was according to [AAA] on
that date of July 20, 1999.
Q: I am referring to October 20, 1999 when she accompanied her mother you
[had] sex with your stepdaughter on October 20, 1999 when she was still 13
years of age?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is it not a conscious revolting act in your part to have sex with your
stepdaughter who was still a minor when your wife was in the premises
where you live?
Q: You mean to tell this Court that you made sex with a minor daughter of
your common-law-wife in her presence?
Q: You would like this Court to believe that your own wife was there looking
at you having sex with her daughter, her eldest minor daughter?
A: Yes, sir.35
A: It depends to the Court if the Court will believe to that I have stated but
that is the truth.36
Furthermore, BBB categorically testified that AAA was 13 years old at the
time material to this case.1wphi1 To be sure, there is no disparity between
the evidence for the prosecution and the defense on the point that the
accused had carnal knowledge of AAA when she was only 13 years old.
Taking into account that the minority of the victim and accused-appellants
being the common-law spouse of the victims mother, this Court finds it
proper to appreciate this qualifying circumstance under the fifth paragraph,
item number 1, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court of Appeals also made several modifications with regard to the
appreciation of aggravating circumstances. The trial court considered the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling, use of weapon, force and
intimidation, nighttime and ignominy.37 The Court of Appeals correctly
modified the RTC Decision in finding the appreciation of force and
intimidation improper for being an element of the crime of rape. The Court of
Appeals likewise correctly reversed the consideration of dwelling, nocturnity
and ignominy as these circumstances were not alleged in the Information.
Furthermore, this Court observes that nocturnity cannot be appreciated in
this case since there was no showing that it was deliberately sought to
prevent the accused from being recognized or to ensure his escape. 38
The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of use of a deadly weapon. We agree with this assessment. As
discussed by the Court of Appeals, this circumstance was sufficiently alleged
in the Information and proven during the trial through AAAs credible
testimony, which clearly showed that the sundang was used to make the
victim submit to the will of the offender.
The proper penalty for qualified rape is reclusion perpetua pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, we modify the amount of exemplary
damages for qualified rape by increasing the same from Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
following established jurisprudence.39
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 29, 2009 in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00063 which affirmed with modifications the finding of
the Regional Trial Court of Carigara, Leyte finding accused-appellant Daniel
Alcober guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is further
MODIFIED as follows: (1) accused-appellant Alcober is hereby found
GUILTY of the crime of rape qualified by minority and relationship under
number 1, fifth paragraph, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code for which
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is imposed; (2)
After more than a year of being at large since the issuance on September 1,
2004 of the warrant for his arrest,5appellant was finally arrested and
subsequently arraigned on January 30, 2006 wherein he pleaded "NOT
GUILTY" to the charge of rape.6
The prosecutions version of the events that transpired in this case was
narrated in the Plaintiff-Appellees Brief in this manner:
[Appellant] and wife [BBB] were separated in 1998. They have four (4)
children namely: [AAA], [CCC], [DDD] and [EEE]. In 1999, [appellant] began
living in with a certain Irene Valoria, his common-law wife, who became the
aforementioned childrens stepmother. They were staying in a one-bedroom
house owned by a certain Edgar Magsakay at Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva
Ecija. At night, [appellant] and his common-law wife sleep in the sala while
the children occupy the bedroom. [AAA] is the eldest of the brood and was
15 years old in the year 2003, having been born on 13 June 1988.
Around midnight of 16 September 2003, [appellant] was alone at the sala
and the children were asleep inside the bedroom. [AAA] suddenly was jolted
from her sleep when somebody pulled her out of the bed and brought her to
the sala . She later recognized the person as her father, herein [appellant],
who covered her mouth and told her not to make any noise. At the sala,
[appellant] forcibly removed [AAA]s short pants, t-shirt, bra and panty. As she
lay naked, [appellant] inserted his penis into [AAA]s vagina. [AAA]s ordeal
lasted for about five (5) minutes and all the while she felt an immense pain.
[Appellant] tried to touch [AAA]s other private parts but she resisted. During
the consummation of [appellant]s lust upon his daughter, he warned her not
to tell anybody or else he will kill her and her siblings.
The next day, [AAA] went to the house of Francisco and Zenny Joaquin.
Spouses Joaquin are friends of [appellant], whose house is about 500 meters
away. Zenny Joaquin noticed something was bothering [AAA] so she
confronted the latter. [AAA] broke down and revealed to Zenny what
happened to her at the hands of [appellant]. Taken aback by the trauma
suffered by the young lass, Zenny promptly accompanied [AAA] to the police
to report the incident.
The examination of the medico-legal officer on [AAA] revealed "positive
healed laceration at 7 oclock position positive hymenal tag." 7 (Citations
omitted.)
On the other hand, the defense presented a contrasting narrative which was
condensed in the Accused-Appellants Brief, to wit:
[Appellant] together with his family were living in the house of Edgar
Magsakay in Sta. Maria, Licab, Nueva Ecija. He has four children but only
three, namely: [EEE], [CCC] and [DDD] were staying with him. His daughter
[AAA] was staying with his kumpare Francisco Joaquin at Purok 2, Sta.
Maria, Licab, Nueva Ecija, since August 15, 2003. He did not have the
opportunity to visit her nor was there an occasion that the latter visited them.
On September 16, 2003 at 4:00 to 5:00 in the morning, he was at the fields
harvesting together with Irene Valoria (his wife and stepmother of his
children). They finished at around 5:00 to 6:00 in the evening, then they
proceeded home (TSN November 14, 2008, pp. 2-4).
[EEE] corroborated in material points the testimony of his father [appellant].
(TSN, February 13, 2009, pp. 2-5)8
Trial on the merits ensued and at the conclusion of which the trial court
rendered judgment against appellant by finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 31 of Republic Act No.
7610. The dispositive portion of the assailed June 26, 2009 RTC Decision is
reproduced here:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, this court sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to pay
[AAA] P50,000 in moral damages.9
Insisting on his innocence, appellant appealed the guilty verdict to the Court
of Appeals but was foiled when the appellate court affirmed the lower court
ruling in the now assailed March 18, 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 26 June 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33, in Criminal Case
No. 2163-G, finding the accused-appellant RICARDO M. VIDAA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.10
Hence, appellant takes the present appeal and puts forward a single
assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5 IN RELATION TO SECTION
31 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610.11
We are of the opinion that the testimony of AAA regarding her ordeal was
delivered in a straightforward and convincing manner that is worthy of belief.
The pertinent portions of her testimony are reproduced below:
[PROS.] FLORENDO
Q We are referring to this particular case. During the last setting, you stated
that you were raped on September 16, 2003. Is that right Miss Witness?
A Yes Sir.
Q And where were you at that time on September 16, 2003 when your father
raped you?
Q And what were you doing before your father raped you on September 16,
2003?
A We were sleeping with my siblings, Sir.
Q And where was your father at that time?
A He was also there in our house, Sir.
Q He was sleeping with you?
A No Sir. They were sleeping in the sala.
Q You said "they". You mean your father has companions?
A When my stepmother is present, she was sleeping with my father, Sir, but
when she was not there, my father sleeps alone in the sala, Sir.
Q So, about what time of the day on September 16, 2003 that you said you
were raped by your father?
A I cannot remember exactly the time, Sir. As far as I can recall, it was almost
midnight, Sir.
A No Sir.
A Yes Sir.
Q So, he pulled you out of the bed, out of the bedroom and took you to the
sala?
Q Aside from the shots and t-shirt, you were not wearing anything?
PROS.] FLORENDO
A Yes Sir.
A When my stepmother was not there, he was alone in the sala, Sir.
A He also removed my panty and inserted his penis into my vagina with a
warning that I should not tell it to anybody because he will kill us all, Sir.
Q When your father pulled you, you did not shout, you did not scream?
Q What do you mean by "penis"?
A I was not able to shout or scream because he covered my mouth and told
me not to make noise, Sir.
Q Was that your first time that your father raped you on September 16,
2003?
of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime
imprisonment of her father.16 That legal dictum finds application in the case at
bar since appellant did not allege nor prove any sufficient improper motive on
the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of such a serious charge of raping his
own flesh and blood. His allegation that AAAs admission in open court, that
she is not close to him and that they do not agree on many things, 17 cannot
suffice as a compelling enough reason for her to fabricate such a sordid and
scandalous tale of incest.
With regard to appellants contention that AAAs lack of resistance to the rape
committed against her, as borne out by her own testimony, negates any truth
to her accusation, we rule that such an argument deserves scant
consideration. It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure to shout or offer
tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victims submission to the
criminal acts of the accused since rape is subjective and not everyone
responds in the same way to an attack by a sexual fiend. 18
Furthermore, we have reiterated that, in incestuous rape cases, the fathers
abuse of the moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter can
subjugate the latters will thereby forcing her to do whatever he wants. 19 In
other words, in an incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation
need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father
would suffice.20
We likewise rule as unmeritorious appellants assertion that he could not
have committed the felony attributed to him because, at the date of the
alleged rape, AAA was not residing at the place where the alleged rape
occurred. Jurisprudence tells us that both denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime, thus, as between
a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere
denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 21
Moreover, we have held that for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the
corroboration is credible, the same having been offered preferably by
disinterested witnesses.22 Based on this doctrine, the corroborating testimony
of appellants son, EEE, who, undoubtedly, is a person intimately related to
him cannot serve to reinforce his alibi.
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, it is required that "the
complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it." The information clearly charged appellant with rape, a crime
punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the relevant
portions of which provide:
In the case at bar, appellant was accused in the information with feloniously
having carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter against her will by using
his influence as a father. Considering further that the minority of AAA and her
relationship to appellant were both alleged in the information and proven in
court, the proper designation of appellants felony should have been qualified
rape. As such, the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole, in
lieu of the death penalty, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 23 must be
imposed. Furthermore, in line with jurisprudence, the award of moral
damages should be increased to P75,000.00 in addition to the award of civil
indemnity and exemplary damages in the amounts of P75,000.00
and P30,000.00, respectively.24 Likewise, interest at the rate of 6% per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality
of this judgment until fully paid.25
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo
(Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of Manila against the
attending physicians.12
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed an
information solely against Dr. Solidum,13alleging:
That on or about May 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then an anesthesiologist at the Ospital ng Maynila, Malate,
this City, and as such was tasked to administer the anesthesia on three-year
old baby boy GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO, represented by his mother, MA.
LUZ GERCAYO, the former having been born with an imperforate anus [no
anal opening] and was to undergo an operation for anal opening [pull through
operation], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and
neglect to use the care and diligence as the best of his judgment would
dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly
the levels of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO
and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a
consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD
ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect
called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in the
brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable of
moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.14
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was
transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997),15 where it was docketed as Criminal Case No.
01-190889.
Judgment of the RTC
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries,16 decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR.
FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure that the child could withstand
the surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the child was healthy. The tests
and other procedures failed to reveal that he was suffering from any known
ailment or disability that could turn into a significant risk. There was not a hint
that the nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in the events that
finally led to hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except
to attribute the accident to a failure in the proper administration of
anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case. The High Court
elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their
solidary liability,18 the RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the
damages, modifying its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando
Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one
(1) month and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum and to
indemnify jointly and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private complainant
Luz Gercayo the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000
as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled.19
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to
find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without
the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an
inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When
the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained
while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to
produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to
res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and
ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury
suffered by him.
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum,20 pertinently stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
xxxx
x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo
a major operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused himself testified that
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act
complained of and the injury sustained, and in line with the hornbook rules on
evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial court the respect they
deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness or disregard of material
facts that might affect the disposition of the case. People v. Paraiso 349
SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases.
Although it creates a presumption of negligence, it need not offend due
process, as long as the accused is afforded the opportunity to go forward
with his own evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this
light not inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence of an
accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
III.
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion
on May 7, 2010.22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED BASED
ON THE TRIAL COURTS OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS
A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF
CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE
PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS
THIS BREACHES THE CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE
PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE
INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND NOT ON
THE BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE
DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO
asphyxiation took place over a very short period of time. Under these
circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer that the physician was
negligent. There was no palpably negligent act. The common experience of
mankind does not suggest that death would not be expected without
negligence. And there is no expert medical testimony to create an inference
that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next
determines whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum
for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.32Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing
or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.33
Dr. Solidums conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to
monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on
Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA
observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed
the findings and conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to
all intents and purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He
wanted to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage of the
anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he made a
mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it
should have been 100% oxygen.
The records he was relying on, as he explains, are the following:
(a) the anesthesia record A portion of the chart in the record was
marked as Exhibit 1-A and 1-B to indicate the administration at
intervals of the anesthetic agent.
(b) the clinical abstract A portion of this record that reads as follows
was marked Exhibit 3A. 3B Approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes
through the operation, patient was noted to have bradycardia (CR =
70) and ATSO4 0.2 mg was immediately administered. However, the
bradycardia persisted, the inhalational agent was shut off, and the
patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4
0.2 mg was given. However, the patient did not respond until no
cardiac rate can be auscultated and the surgeons were immediately
told to stop the operation. The patient was put on a supine position
and CPR was initiated. Patient was given 1 amp of epinephrine
initially while continuously doing cardiac massage still with no
cardiac rate appreciated; another ampule of epinephrine was given
and after 45 secs, patients vital signs returned to normal. The entire
resuscitation lasted approximately 3-5 mins. The surgeons were then
told to proceed to the closure and the childs vital signs throughout
and until the end of surgery were: BP = 110/70; CR = 116/min and
RR = 20-22 cycles/min (on assisted ventilation).
Dr. Vertido points to the crucial passage in the clinical abstract that the
patient was ventilated with 100% oxygen and another dose of ATSO4 when
the bradycardia persisted, but for one reason or another, he read it as 100%
halothane. He was asked to read the anesthesia record on the percentage of
the dosage indicated, but he could only sheepishly note I cant understand
the number. There are no clues in the clinical abstract on the quantity of the
anesthetic agent used. It only contains the information that the anesthetic
plan was to put the patient under general anesthesia using a nonrebreathing
system with halothane as the sole anesthetic agent and that 1 hour and 45
minutes after the operation began, bradycardia occurred after which the
inhalational agent was shut off and the patient administered with 100%
oxygen. It would be apparent that the 100% oxygen that Dr. Vertido said
should be read in lieu of 100% halothane was the pure oxygen introduced
after something went amiss in the operation and the halothane itself was
reduced or shut off.
The key question remains what was the quantity of halothane used before
bradycardia set in?
The implication of Dr. Vertidos admission is that there was no overdose of
the anesthetic agent, and the accused Dr. Solidum stakes his liberty and
reputation on this conclusion. He made the assurance that he gave his
patient the utmost medical care, never leaving the operating room except for
a few minutes to answer the call of nature but leaving behind the other
members of his team Drs. Abella and Razon to monitor the operation. He
insisted that he administered only a point 1% not 100% halothane, receiving
corroboration from Dr. Abella whose initial MA in the record should be
enough to show that she assisted in the operation and was therefore
conversant of the things that happened. She revealed that they were using a
machine that closely monitored the concentration of the agent during the
operation.
But most compelling is Dr. Solidums interpretation of the anesthesia record
itself, as he takes the bull by the horns, so to speak. In his affidavit, he says,
reading from the record, that the quantity of halothane used in the operation
is one percent (1%) delivered at time intervals of 15 minutes. He studiedly
mentions the concentration of halothane as reflected in the anesthesia
record (Annex D of the complaint-affidavit) is only one percent (1%) The
numbers indicated in 15 minute increments for halothane is an indication that
only 1% halothane is being delivered to the patient Gerard Gercayo for his
entire operation; The amount of halothane delivered in this case which is only
one percent cannot be summated because halothane is constantly being
rapidly eliminated by the body during the entire operation.
xxxx
In finding the accused guilty, despite these explanations, the RTC argued
that the volte-face of Dr. Vertido on the question of the dosage of the
anesthetic used on the child would not really validate the non-guilt of the
anesthesiologist. Led to agree that the halothane used was not 100% as
initially believed, he was nonetheless unaware of the implications of the
change in his testimony. The court observed that Dr. Vertido had described
the condition of the child as hypoxia which is deprivation of oxygen, a
diagnosis supported by the results of the CT Scan. All the symptoms
attributed to a failing central nervous system such as stupor, loss of
consciousness, decrease in heart rate, loss of usual acuity and abnormal
motor function, are manifestations of this condition or syndrome. But why
would there be deprivation of oxygen if 100% oxygen to 1% halothane was
used? Ultimately, to the court, whether oxygen or halothane was the object of
mistake, the detrimental effects of the operation are incontestable, and they
can only be led to one conclusion if the application of anesthesia was really
closely monitored, the event could not have happened. 34
The Prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence beyond
reasonable doubt because the circumstances cited by the CA were
insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack
of precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to
Gerald. The Court aptly explained in Cruz v. Court of Appeals35 that:
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to
the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of
the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical
science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et.
al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents
that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and
skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least
the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use
to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of
medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only
the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in
the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the
causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in
the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony
is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
xxxx
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon
as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attending
physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainants wife and
newborn baby, this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and
the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
ATTY. COMIA Doctor tell this Honorable Court where is that 100, 1-0-0 and if
there is, you just call me and even the attention of the Presiding Judge of this
Court. Okay, you read one by one.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this
Gerald, Doctor?
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald,
there is a possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed to some risk is that
correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that
Geralds operation for his imperforate anus, considered a major operation,
had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same condition. 43 He then
corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane had been administered on
Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen.44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate
properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo
and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." 45However, the
foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude the
probability that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which could
or could not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia,
had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia.
Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the
anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures,
still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur." 46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has
engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums
guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according
to United States v. Youthsey:47
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a
captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the
unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility
of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides,
you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of
certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and
crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not proof
beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately
exempt him from civil liability.1wphi1 But we cannot now find and declare
him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here
do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal
did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and
competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant
that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not
necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia
experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable
would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do
so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we
have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of
expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr.
Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is
deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the
offense charged.48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could
have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum
for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an
artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower
courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their
judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the
RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the
following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence,
its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The R
TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no
person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary
liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The
conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first
be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind
of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art,
occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is
engaged in industry.49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital,
was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work.50Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was
engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee
of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the
operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a
consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was
adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here),
the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20,
2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no
pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138696
July 7, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Felizardo
and Juan Obando seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated August
13, 1998 and the Resolution2 dated May 17, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20187.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1964, Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras (Alegria), together with
Eduardo and Francisco Figueras, sons of her husband Jose Figueras by
previous marriage, filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of the estate
of Jose Figueras, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 61567. Alegria was
named administratrix of Joses estate without opposition from her stepsons.
While the settlement of Joses estate was still pending considerations in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Alegria died in May 1979. Eduardo was issued
new Letters of Administration with the duty to administer both Joses and
Alegrias estates. Fritz Strebel, as brother of Alegria, came forth claiming part
of Alegrias estate as Alegria died without issue which the Figueras brothers
made no opposition.
Subsequently, the Figueras brothers and Fritz Strebel were served with
copies of a Petition for Probate of the alleged last will and testament of
Alegria filed by petitioner Felizardo Obando, which petition was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 123948. In his petition, petitioner Felizardo asked to
be named as executor of Alegrias last will and testament, which bequeathed
Alegrias rights and interest in the real properties left by the Figueras couple,
as well as personal properties, including all her pieces of jewelry to
petitioners Felizardo and Juan, and their families. The Figueras brothers
Eduardo and Fritz still opposed the probate of the alleged Alegrias will,
insisting that the will was a forgery. Subsequently, these conflicting parties
agreed to submit the alleged will to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
for examination and comparison with the common standard signatures of
Alegria.3
After the examination and comparison of the submitted documents, NBI
Document Examiner Zenaida Torres submitted her report 4 dated March 26,
1990, with the findings that the questioned and standard sample signatures
of Alegria S. Vda. de Figueras were NOT written by one and same person.
By reason of the forged will which was the basis of the CA in appointing
Felizardo as co-administrator of the Figueras estates, petitioners had taken
possession of the pieces of jewelry, furniture and other personal properties
enumerated in the alleged will, as well as the rentals of the Figueras
residence in Gilmore Street, Quezon City being leased to the Community of
Learners.
Eduardo and Fritz questioned these acts of petitioner Felizardo and, since
the latter could not account for these properties which were under his
possession when the probate court required him to do so, they sued him for
Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document since the alleged will which
petitioner Felizardo submitted for probate was found to be forged.
On July 26, 1990, an Information was filed with the RTC of Manila, charging
petitioners Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, together with the
persons who signed in the alleged will, namely, Cipriano C. Farrales,
Mercedes B. Santos, Victorino Cruz, and Franklin A. Cordon, with the crime
of estafa thru falsification of public document, committed as follows:
That on or about November 11, 1978, and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused Felizardo S.
Obando, Juan S. Obando, Mercedes B. Santos, [Victorino] Cruz and Franklin
A. Cordon, being then private individuals, and accused Cipriano C. Farrales,
a Notary Public, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Eduardo F. Figueras thru falsification of public document in the following
manner, to wit: the said accused forged and falsified or caused to be forged
and falsified, a document denominated as the Last Will and Testament of
Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras, dated November 11, 1978, duly notarized
by accused Cipriano C. Farrales and, therefore, a public document, by
stating in said Last Will and Testament, among others, that the said Alegria
Strebel Vda. de Figueras had bequeathed to her nephews, herein accused
Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, all her rights and interests over all
her jewelries (sic), except those given to her other relatives, with an
aggregate total value of P2,000,000.00, that she had appointed accused
Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her Last Will and Testament and
the exclusive administrator of her estate, and thereafter, feigning, simulating
and counterfeiting or causing to be feigned, simulated and counterfeited the
signature of the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras appearing on the left
hand margin of pages 1 and 2 and over the typewritten name Alegria Strebel
Vda. de Figueras on page 3 of said document, thus making it appear, as it
did appear, that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras had, in fact,
bequeathed all her rights and interests over the said jewelries (sic) to
accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, and that she had
appointed the said Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her Last Will
and Testament and the exclusive Administrator of her estate, and causing it
to appear further that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras participated
and intervened in the signing of said document when in truth and in fact as
the said accused well knew, such was not the case in that the said Last Will
and Testament is an outright forgery; that the late Alegria Strebel Vda. de
Figueras did not bequeath all her rights or interests over the aforementioned
jewelries to accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, that she did
not appoint accused Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her Last
Will and Testament and the exclusive Administrator of her estate, and that
she did not participate and intervene in the signing of said document, much
less did she authorize the said accused, or anybody else, to sign her name
or affix her signature thereon; that once the said document has been forged
and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused Felizardo S.
Obando and Juan S. Obando presented the same for probate with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila wherein an ensuing litigation which ultimately
In so ruling, the RTC found that: the fact of damage was sufficiently
established with the testimonies of Felizardo and Juan that Alegria's rights
and interests in the real and personal properties of the Figueras couple were
to go to them, and that they already gave the pieces of jewelry to their sister,
to Juan's wife and his two daughters, and Felizardo's daughter which showed
that they had already profited from the estate of the Figueras couple even
before the same was brought to the court for settlement. As to the matter of
forgery, the RTC gave more credence to the findings of NBI Document
Examiner Zenaida Torres than that of PNP Document Section Chief
Francisco Cruz, since (1) Torres was the common choice of all the parties,
thus by which act, petitioners became bound to the results of said findings;
(2) Torres was definite in her conclusion that the question and standard/
sample signatures of Alegria S. Vda. de Figueras were not written by one
and same person unlike Cruz's report stating that no definite conclusion can
be made due to the limited amount of appropriate standard signatures for
comparison; and (3) Torres was not paid for her services and, therefore,
impartial while Cruz received honorarium from Juan Obando; that while
petitioners presented copies of pictures showing Alegria allegedly signing the
will in the presence of Mercedes Santos Cruz, Victorino Cruz and Franklin
Cordon, nothing would establish what document was being held by them.
The RTC found petitioners to have conspired to commit forgery as
established by the following evidence, to wit: (a) Felizardo admitted that the
last will and testament which Alegria voiced out to him was dictated by him to
a certain Atty. Alcantara; (b) that Felizardo retained the services of Atty.
Alcantara and Atty. Farrales who notarized the alleged will; (c ) Juan was the
one who enticed Mercedes Santos Cruz, his sister-in-law, and Victorino Cruz
into acting as attesting witnesses and Juan's taking pictures of the entire
signing ceremony which was a sign of evil intention because it was an
expectancy of future rift or trouble; (d) Felizardo held and kept the alleged will
from the time of alleged signing up to Alegria's death which possession and
control lasted for several months; (e) the testimony of Torres that the first two
pages of Exhibit "A," which contained the dispositions of the properties of the
Figueras estates, as well as the forged signatures were substitutes for the
originals; and (g) that petitioners and their respective families gained
enormously by reason of said will.1avvphi1
The RTC said that even if the alleged will was found to be authentic, it will
still be contested as the dispositions made therein were contrary to law most
particularly that portion bequeathing to petitioners the whole residential
property of the spouses Jose and Alegria Figueras, which was conjugal, to
the exclusion of Eduardo and Francisco Figueras and Fritz Strebel who are
forced heirs; that because of such disposition, the RTC was convinced that
the alleged will was not that of Alegria but of petitioners, since Alegria being
the administratrix of the estate of her husband Jose would be the last person
to give this property outside of the Figueras family. Mercedes Santos and
Victorino Cruz were acquitted for lack of evidence.
Petitioners filed their appeal with the CA.
On August 13, 1988, the CA issued its assailed Decision affirming in toto the
decision of the RTC.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May
17, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioners on the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD OVERLOOKED AND
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
SHOULD HAVE DRAWN A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION AND WHICH SHALL
CONSIDERABLY AFFECT THE RESULT OF THIS CASE.
B. THE NON-PRODUCTION AND/OR NON-PRESENTATION OF THE
ORIGINAL COPY OF THE ALLEGED FALSIFIED LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT IS A FATAL DEFECT WHICH ENTITLES HEREIN
APPELLANTS TO ACQUITTAL.
C. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CONSPIRACY TO WARRANT
CONVICTION OF FELIZARDO AND [JUAN] OBANDO.
due execution of said Last Will and Testament," but nowhere did they object
to such submission of the machine copy. In fact, petitioners never sought
reconsideration when the RTC admitted the machine copy of the alleged will.
More importantly, we note that a duplicate original copy of the alleged will
was formally offered in evidence13 as one of petitioners' documentary
evidence and the same was already admitted by the RTC. Thus, a duplicate
original copy of the alleged will was already admitted in the records of the
case which the RTC used for comparison of the questioned signatures with
that of the standard signatures of Alegria.
Petitioners fault the RTC and the CA for giving more weight to the findings of
NBI Document Examiner Torres that the signature in the alleged will was
forged as against the findings of PNP Document Examination Chief Cruz that
the questioned signature was genuine.
The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court unless when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support
on record, or when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or
overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion,14 which we do not find in this case.
In examining the questioned signatures of Alegria, Torres used the standard
specimen signatures submitted by petitioners, Eduardo and Fritz, the parties
in the probate proceedings. Torres found that the questioned and
standard/sample signatures of Alegria were not written by one and the same
person. However, as petitioners did not agree with such findings, petitioners
moved for another examination of the same documents together with three
additional documents to be conducted by the PNP. PNP Document Examiner
Chief Francisco Cruz submitted his report where he found that the
questioned signatures and the standard signatures executed in 1978
indicated that they were written by one person. Both Torres and Cruz testified
in court.
On the other hand, PNP Document Examiner Cruz stated that there was a
wide range of variations existing between the questioned signatures made in
1978 and the standard signatures executed in 1974, 1976 and 1978,
indicating that there was a radical change in the physical condition of the
writer wherein the muscle and nerves were affected resulting in the loss of
muscular control. He also stated that while the questioned signatures and the
standard signatures were dissimilar in the manner of execution, quality of
lines, alignment and size of letter, no definite conclusion can be reached in
view of the wide gap of execution. He then stated that the questioned
signatures executed on November 11, 1978 and the standard signature
executed in December 1978, which was most contemporaneous to the date
of the execution of the questioned signatures, he found they were similar and
showed that they were written by one person.19
We note that Cruzs findings as to the loss of muscular control in Alegrias
hand allegedly due to her physical condition was contradicted by Torres'
testimony that the standard signature executed by Alegria in December 1978,
i.e., one month after the alleged will was executed, showed that she was in
good physical condition, because her signature was smooth with flowing
strokes with an even alignment which indicated that Alegria had good
muscular control and coordination.20 Notably, Dr. Elena Cariaso, the doctor
who was tasked by the probate court to examine the physical and mental
condition of Alegria in December 1978, testified that Alegria was physically
and mentally fit with only a weakness in her lower extremities; thus,
corroborating Torres finding that Alegria's hand had good muscular control
and coordination. In fact, Torres established that the standard signatures
written in 1966, 1974, 1976 and in December 1978, all showed that the
signatures were made in a continuous, spontaneous and unconscious
manner21 unlike that of the questioned signatures.
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as
purely advisory in character. The courts may place whatever weight they
choose upon and may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the
facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. When faced with conflicting
expert opinions, as in this case, courts give more weight and credence to that
which is more complete, thorough, and scientific.22 The value of the opinion
of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between
genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice
or detection from an unpracticed observer.23
We agree with the RTC and the CA in giving more weight and credence to
the testimony of Torres as the examination conducted by Torres was
complete, thorough and scientific. We find that the RTC had the opportunity
to examine the relevant documents and make comparisons thereof. In fact,
upon our own comparison of the questioned signatures and the standard
signatures taking into consideration inconspicuous differences noted by
Torres on the questioned and standard signatures, we find that the
questioned signatures showed substantial differences with that of the
standard signatures of Alegria.
Petitioner claims that the testimonies of the notary public, as well as the two
attesting witnesses that they saw Alegria sign the will in their presence,
should have outweighed the testimony of Torres.
We are not persuaded.
In his testimony, Notary Public Farrales testified that when he, together with
another lawyer, Atty. Cordon, went inside the room of Alegria who was in bed,
he presented to her copies of the will which he brought from his office; 24 that
Alegria read the same and called in petitioner Felizardo to bring some small
board where she could write; after Felizardo handed the same, he again left
the room. Farrales said that Alegria signed the will in his presence, as well as
in the presence of Atty. Cordon and the other attesting witnesses, Mercedes
and Victorino; that petitioner Felizardo was just outside the room when the
signing was on-going;25 that Farrales was the one who assisted Alegria in
turning the pages of the documents and was the one who pointed to her the
portion where she was to affix her signatures;26 and that after the signing and
notarization of the will, Alegria requested them to call on petitioner Felizardo
and once Felizardo was inside the room, Alegria gave the documents to the
latter who placed the will in an envelope.27
On the other hand, Mercedes testified that when she and Victorino entered
Alegria's room, she saw Alegria, Felizardo, Attys. Farrales and Cordon; that
Alegria instructed petitioner Felizardo to read aloud the will which Felizardo
did;28 and that Alegria and the other witnesses signed the will in the presence
of each other and was duly notarized; and that she saw Felizardo keep the
will inside the vault. 29
Victorino testified that when he and Mercedes entered Alegria's room, he saw
Atty. Farrales, Cordon, Felizardo and Alegria who was in a reclined position
in her bed; that Alegria asked Felizardo to get the sealed document from a
cabinet;30 that Alegria told petitioner Felizardo to give each one of them a
copy of the document and instructed petitioner Felizardo to read the contents
of the will aloud;31 and that he saw Alegria signed the will in their presence.
Notably, their testimonies showed material inconsistencies which affected
their credibilities. Farrales testified that the copies of the alleged will came
from his office and he was the one who gave the same to Alegria which,
however, was contrary to Victorinos claim that petitioner Felizardo got the
alleged will from the cabinet. Farrales testified that petitioner Felizardo was
not inside the room when the signing was ongoing which was again contrary
to the claims of both Mercedes and Victorino that petitioner Felizardo was
inside the room while the signing was on-going; and that Alegria even
instructed Felizardo to read aloud the contents of the same to them. Notably,
Farrales testified that he was the one who turned the pages of the will and
was also the one who pointed to Alegria the portion where to affix her
signatures and that no other person rendered such assistance except
him.32However, in petitioner Felizardo's testimony, he said that he was
present when the will was being signed by Alegria.33 In fact, petitioner
Felizardo submitted photographs which were admittedly taken by copetitioner Juan to prove the former's presence during the signing and to show
that he was the one assisting Alegria in signing the will.
Such contradictory statements coming from persons who allegedly were
present when the will was executed render doubtful the genuineness of the
alleged forged will. Thus, we find no error committed by the RTC in not giving
credence to their testimonies.
We find the elements of falsification of public document present in this case.
Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of Public Document
under Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the acts
of falsification enumerated under Article 171; and (3) that the act of
falsification is committed in a public document. Under paragraph 2 of Article
171, a person may commit falsification of a public document by causing it to
appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or
proceeding, when such person or persons did not, in fact, so participate in
the act or proceeding.
In this case, petitioners are private individuals who presented the alleged will
to the probate court and made it appear that Alegria signed the alleged will
disposing of her rights and interest in the real properties, as well as all of her
personal properties to petitioners when in fact petitioners knew that Alegria
never signed such alleged will as her signatures therein were forged.
We find apropos the findings of the RTC that petitioners conspired to
perpetuate such forgery, to wit:
1. The so-called Will and Testament was admitted by Felizardo S.
Obando in open hearing to have been dictated by him to a certain
Atty. Alcantara allegedly as voiced out to him by Alegria;
2. He said he procured the service of said lawyer and the very notary
public, one Atty. C. Farrales to notarize it;
3. Juanito Obando enticed the couple Mercedes B. Santos and
Victorino Cruz into acting as witnesses, Mercedes being his sister-inlaw, and his taking pictures of the entire ceremony of signing such
document. This taking of such pictures is itself a sign of evil intention,
because it is an expectancy of future rift or trouble;
4. Felizardo held and kept the questioned document with him from its
inception to its alleged signing and up to Alegrias death which
possession and complete control lasted for several months;
5. Felizardo and Juanito Obando and their respective families again
by their joint admissions, gained enormously and by reason of said
will.
The crime of falsification of public document was the means for petitioners to
commit estafa. The elements ofestafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC34 are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that
such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199150
February 6, 2012
The RTC found the petitioner liable for estafa, and sentenced the petitioner
to imprisonment of six (6) years and six (6) months of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. 4 The RTC
also ordered the petitioner to restitute the private complainant P1,047,720.00
as actual damages.
The petitioner appealed the judgment of the RTC to the CA which affirmed
the petitioners conviction. The CA held:
As to the first element, without a doubt[,] appellant acquired material
possession of the jewelry. She admitted that she received the subject pieces
of jewelry from De Dios.
xxxx
Additionally, by the terms and conditions of the memorandum of agreement,
Brokmann agreed to hold in trust the said pieces of jewelry for the purpose of
selling them to the customers and with the obligation to remit the proceeds of
those sold and return the items unsold. What was created was an agency for
the sale of jewelry, in which Brokmann as an agent has the duty to return
upon demand of its owner, herein appellee.
On the second element, misappropriation was clearly evident. Appellee sent
a demand letter to appellant, reminding the latter of her subsisting obligation,
however, it was simply ignored. x x x. The demand for the return of the thing
delivered in trust and the failure of the accused-agent to account for it are
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. x x x.
xxxx
The third element, it is apparent that appellee was prejudiced when appellant
did not return the pieces of jewelry upon her demand. x x x. Damage as an
element of estafa may consist in 1) the offended party being deprived of his
money or property as a result of the defraudation; 2) disturbance in property
right; or 3) temporary prejudice. x x x.
Lastly, the fourth element, it has duly been established that appellee
demanded for the payment and return of the pieces of jewelry, however, the
same was unheeded.5 (Emphases supplied.)
The petitioner elevated her judgment of conviction to the Court under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
of People v. Singson6 and People v. Ojeda7 where the Court acquitted the
accused for the failure of the prosecution to prove the element of deceit.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty imposed, we find no reversible error in the CAs
decision.
First, the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of
confidence or (b) means of deceit.8The acts constituting estafa committed
with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa
committed by means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa
by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or
deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas. 9 In this case, the charge
against the petitioner and her subsequent conviction was for estafa
committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the
prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an element of the estafa that the
petitioner was charged with.
Second, the cases cited by the petitioner are inapplicable. Our
pronouncements in Singson and Ojeda apply to estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) where the element of deceit was necessary to be proven.
Nevertheless, we find the modification of the penalty imposed to be in order
to conform to the prevailing jurisprudence. The second paragraph of Article
315 provides the appropriate penalty if the value of the thing, or the amount
defrauded, exceeds P22,000.00:
The petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA committed a reversible
error in affirming the judgment of the RTC finding her guilty of estafa beyond
reasonable doubt.
The petitioner prays for her acquittal for the prosecutions failure to prove the
element of deceit. She argues that her actions prior to, during and after the
filing of the estafa case against her negated deceit, ill-motive and/or bad faith
to abscond with her obligation to the private complainant. She cites the cases
The minimum term of imprisonment imposed by the CA and the RTC does
not conform with the Courts ruling in People v. Temporada, 10 where we held
that the minimum indeterminate penalty in the above provision shall be one
degree lower from the prescribed penalty for estafa which is anywhere within
The Issue
the range of prision correccional, in its minimum and medium periods, or six
(6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. In this case,
the minimum term imposed by the CA and the RTC of six (6) years and six
(6) months of prision mayor is modified to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence.1wphi1
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the
decision dated May 4, 2011 and the resolution dated October 26, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31887. We find petitioner Carmina G.
Brokmann GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of estafa defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
We MODIFY the penalty imposed and sentence her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum term, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum term.
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223
(RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pretrial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between
the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against
him before the RTC Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
The Decision of the Trial Court
G.R. No. 172060
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the
pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon
City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the
validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC
Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is,
for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,5 the
RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals,
assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon
City.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of
the criminal action. In this case, the Information 7 for Frustrated Parricide was
dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October
2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14
February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392
on 7 February 2005.8 Respondents petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was
dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil
case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that
would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants
or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married
to respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that
"the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x."
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on
a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in
that case. Second, the Court ruled inTenebro that "[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in
that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
States penal laws are concerned."19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the
guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
paper together with BPI Check No. 17657 he allegedly immediately left the
office with his accountant, bringing the checks with them.
SMC sent a letter to Puzon on March 6, 2001 demanding the return of the
said checks. Puzon ignored the demand hence SMC filed a complaint
against him for theft with the City Prosecutors Office of Paraaque City.
Rulings of the Prosecutor and the Secretary of Department of Justice
(DOJ)
SO ORDERED.7
The motion for reconsideration of SMC was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
Issues
Petitioner now raises the following issues:
I
Petitioner's Arguments
probable cause for theft, which at this point is more properly resolved through
another more clear cut route.
SMC contends that Puzon was positively identified by its employees to have
taken the subject postdated checks. It also contends that ownership of the
checks was transferred to it because these were issued, not merely as
security but were, in payment of Puzons purchases. SMC points out that it
has established more than sufficient probable cause to justify the indictment
of Puzon for the crime of Theft.
Respondents Arguments
On the other hand, Puzon contends that SMC raises questions of fact that
are beyond the province of an appeal on certiorari. He also insists that there
is no probable cause to charge him with theft because the subject checks
were issued only as security and he therefore retained ownership of the
same.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matters
At the outset we find that as pointed out by Puzon, SMC raises questions of
fact. The resolution of the first issue raised by SMC of whether respondent
stole the subject check, which calls for the Court to determine whether
respondent is guilty of a felony, first requires that the facts be duly
established in the proper forum and in accord with the proper procedure. This
issue cannot be resolved based on mere allegations of facts and affidavits.
The same is true with the second issue raised by petitioner, to wit: whether
the checks issued by Puzon were payments for his purchases or were
intended merely as security to ensure payment. These issues cannot be
properly resolved in the present petition for review on certiorari which is
rooted merely on the resolution of the prosecutor finding no probable cause
for the filing of an information for theft.
The third issue raised by petitioner, on the other hand, would entail venturing
into constitutional matters for a complete resolution. This route is
unnecessary in the present case considering that the main matter for
resolution here only concerns grave abuse of discretion and the existence of
The evidence of SMC failed to establish that the check was given in payment
of the obligation of Puzon. There was no provisional receipt or official receipt
issued for the amount of the check. What was issued was a receipt for
the document, a "POSTDATED CHECK SLIP."13
Furthermore, the petitioner's demand letter sent to respondent states "As per
company policies on receivables, all issuances are to be covered by postdated checks. However, you have deviated from this policy by forcibly taking
away the check you have issued to us to cover the December
issuance."14 Notably, the term "payment" was not used instead the terms
"covered" and "cover" were used.
Although the petitioner's witness, Gregorio L. Joven III, states in paragraph 6
of his affidavit that the check was given in payment of the obligation of
Puzon, the same is contradicted by his statements in paragraph 4, where he
states that "As a standard company operating procedure, all beer purchases
by dealers on credit shall be coveredby postdated checks equivalent to the
value of the beer products purchased"; in paragraph 9 where he states that
"the transaction covered by the said check had not yet been paid for," and in
paragraph 8 which clearly shows that partial payment is expected to be made
by the return of beer empties, and not by the deposit or encashment of the
check.1avvphi1 Clearly the term "cover" was not meant to be used
interchangeably with "payment."
When taken in conjunction with the counter-affidavit of Puzon where he
states that "As the [liquid beer] contents are paid for, SMC return[s] to me the
corresponding PDCs or request[s] me to replace them with whatever was the
unpaid balance."15 it becomes clear that both parties did not intend for the
check to pay for the beer products. The evidence proves that the check was
accepted, not as payment, but in accordance with the long-standing policy of
SMC to require its dealers to issue postdated checks to cover its receivables.
The check was only meant to cover the transaction and in the meantime
Puzon was to pay for the transaction by some other means other than the
check. This being so, title to the check did not transfer to SMC; it remained
with Puzon. The second element of the felony of theft was therefore not
established. Petitioner was not able to show that Puzon took a check
that belonged to another. Hence, the prosecutor and the DOJ were correct in
finding no probable cause for theft.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" during her arraignment.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177761
feloniously take, steal, and carry away cash money amounting to Four
Hundred Seventeen Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-two [Pesos] and ninety
centavos (P417,922.90) [from] said Complainant, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter x x x.
Appellant also received P20,000.00 from Tomass wife, Mila Manongsong, for
the processing of the properties land titles. Appellant liquidated the same in a
handwritten statement7 in which she indicated payment ofP10,089.45 for
transfer tax under Official Receipt (OR) No. 1215709 and of P7,212.00 for
registration with the Registry of Deeds of Bauan, Batangas under OR No.
5970738. An inquiry, however, later revealed that OR No. 1215709 was
issued only for the amount of P50.00, representing payment for the issuance
of a certified true copy of a tax declaration,8 while OR No. 5970738 was
never issued per Certification9 from the same Registry of Deeds. Rebecca
also found out that the documents relevant to the said transfer of titles are
still with the BIR since the amount of P4,936.24 had not yet been paid.
Appellant also duped Rebecca relative to the P105,000.00 for the payment of
the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes. Said taxes arose from the
sale of a house and lot covered by TCT No. (62911) T-33899-A to her client
Dionisia Alviedo (Alviedo). Appellant submitted a liquidation
statement10 stating that she paid the sums ofP81,816.00 as capital gains tax
and P20,460.00 for documentary stamp tax under Equitable Bank OR Nos.
937110 and 937111, respectively. However, said bank certified that said ORs
do not belong to the series of ORs issued by it.11 As a result, Rebecca was
constrained to pay these taxes with the corresponding penalties and
surcharges.
Rebecca further alleged that in connection with the payment of the capital
gains and documentary stamp taxes imposed on the property of another
client, Carmelita Sundian (Sundian), she gave appellant P120,000.00.
Appellant purportedly presented a handwritten liquidation report stating that
she paid the amounts of P94,281.00 as capital gains tax and P23,571.00 as
documentary stamp tax under Equitable Bank OR Nos. 717228 12 and
717229.13 Appellant also stated that the balance from the money intended for
processing the papers of Sundian was only P2,148.00.14 However, Rebecca
discovered upon verification that the receipts submitted by appellant are
bogus as Equitable Bank issued a Certification15 that said ORs were issued
to different persons and for different amounts. Rebecca was again forced to
refund the sum to Sundian.
With regard to Rebeccas client Rico Sendino, Rebecca claimed that she
gave appellant P35,000.00 for the payment of capital gains and transfer
taxes in connection with the deed of sale executed between one Priscilla
Cruz and her said client. In the handwritten liquidation statement 16 submitted
to her by appellant, the latter claimed to have paid the amount of P35,000.00
under Traders Royal Bank OR No. 1770047.17 Again, the receipt turned out
to be a fake as said bank issued a Certification18 negating the issuance of
said OR. And just as in transactions with her other clients, Rebecca was
forced to shell-out money from her own funds to pay the same.
Leilani Gonzaga (Gonzaga) was another client of Rebecca who engaged her
services to pay the capital gains tax imposed on the sale of a property. After
Rebecca told appellant to go to the BIR, the latter indicated in her
handwritten liquidation statement that she paid the capital gains tax using
two Equitable PCI Managers Checks for which she was issued OR Nos.
1770016 and 1770017, and cash payments of P71,184.00 under OR No.
1770018 and P17, 805.00 under OR No. 1770019.19 However, no payments
were actually made. To complete the processing of the transaction, Rebecca
had to pay the sum of P3,273.00 to the Registry of Deeds andP9,050.00 for
the transfer tax imposed on the transaction.
The same thing happened with the payment of capital gains tax as a result of
a Deed of Transfer with Partition Agreement of a Land executed between
Rebeccas client Edmer and his siblings, Evelyn and Renato, all surnamed
Mandrique.20 This time, appellant showed Rebecca a donors tax
return21 accomplished in her own handwriting as proof of payment of the sum
of P12,390.00. Appellant also liquidated the amount of P6,250.00 as advance
payment made to a geodetic engineer for the purpose of subdividing the
property.22 Again, Rebecca was later able to verify that no payments in such
amounts were made.
According to Rebecca, appellant likewise pocketed the sum of P10,000.00
intended for the processing of 15 titles that the latter claimed to have paid in
her liquidation report. Also, Rebecca asserted that appellant did not pay or
file the proper application for the issuance of title of the Grand Del Rosario
property. Aside from the above, Rebecca was likewise constrained to
complete the processing of one of the three other titles recovered from
appellant and had to pay the capital gains tax imposed on the purchase of
the land in the sum of more thanP100,000.00.
All in all, the money supposed to be used as payments for capital gains and
transfer taxes as well as for the registration of sale of properties of Rebeccas
various clients amounted to P427,992.90. Aside from this sum, Rebecca also
spent at least P650,000.00 for the reconstitution of all the documents,
SO ORDERED.24
Appellant admitted that she used to be the legal secretary and liaison officer
of Rebecca. In particular, as liaison officer, she attended to the transfer of
titles of Rebeccas clients such as Gonzaga, Manongsong, Alviedo and
others whose names she could no longer remember. She claimed that the
processing of the title of the Manongsong property was her last transaction
for Rebecca. She was given money to pay the capital gains tax at the BIR.
When confronted with the charges filed against her, appellant merely denied
the allegations.
In its Decision of July 4, 2005, the trial court found the existence of a high
degree of confidence between Rebecca and appellant. It noted that the
relationship between the two as employer-employee was not an ordinary
one; appellant was being considered a part of Rebeccas family. Because of
this trust and confidence, Rebecca entrusted to appellant cash in
considerable sums which were liquidated through appellants own
handwritten statements of expenses. However, appellant gravely abused the
trust and confidence reposed upon her by Rebecca when she pocketed the
money entrusted to her for processing the clients land titles. And as a cover
up, she presented to Rebecca either fake or altered receipts which she did
not even deny during trial. The trial court thus found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
However, the trial court ruled that the total amount stolen by appellant
was P407,711.68 and not P417,907.90 as claimed by Rebecca. It disposed
of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the accused
Remedios Tanchanco y Pineda GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Theft as defined and penalized under Article 309,
paragraph 1 and Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of Four Hundred Seven Thousand
Seven Hundred Eleven Pesos and Sixty Eight Centavos (P407,711.68)
P 117,852.00 Sub-total
Appellant maintains that there is no direct evidence to prove that she actually
received the alleged amounts intended for the processing of various
documents. She also denies the claim that she took the money entrusted to
her during the period from May 2000 to May 8, 2001 as alleged in the
Information.
Our Ruling
"The elements of the crime of Theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code [(RPC)] are: (1) x x x there [was] taking of personal
property; (2) x x x [the] property belongs to another; (3) x x x the taking [was]
done with intent to gain; (4) x x x the taking [was] without the consent of the
owner; and (5) x x x the taking was accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things." 40
Thus, the dispositive portion of its Decision37 dated September 27, 2006
reads:
As to the first and second elements, we quote with approval the CAs
discussion on the matter:
SO ORDERED.38
xxxx
P 10,000.00 Sub-total
Issue
In this appeal, appellant again raises the lone issue she submitted to the CA,
viz:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
OF QUALIFIED THEFT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE IN HER FAVOR.39
There is no doubt, as held by the trial court, that the prosecution was able to
establish the following circumstances:
xxxx
[These] pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution
constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion that
accused-appellant took sums of money that were entrusted to her by the
private complainant. x x x41
Circumstantial evidence may prove the guilt of appellant and "justify a
conviction if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."42 In other words, "[f]or circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to support conviction, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt."43 Here, we agree with the CA that the circumstances above
enumerated lead to the reasonable conclusion that appellant took amounts of
money from Rebecca.
With regard to the third element, "[i]ntent to gain (animus lucrandi) is
presumed to be alleged in an information, in which it is charged that there
was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the
things subject of asportation."44 In this case, it was established that appellant
padded her expenses and submitted fake receipts of her supposed payment
for the processing of the transfer of land titles, to gain from the money
entrusted to her by Rebecca. Her intentional failure to properly and correctly
account for the same constitutes appropriation with intent to gain.
Anent the fourth element pertaining to Rebeccas lack of consent, same is
manifested by the fact that it was only after appellant abandoned her job on
April 18, 2001 that Rebecca discovered the missing sums of money. Her
subsequent acts of confirming the payment or non-payment of fees and of
verifying from different banks the issuance of the purported ORs presented to
Unfortunately for appellant, she was not able to refute Rebeccas allegations
against her as well as the evidence supporting the same since what she
advanced during trial were mere bare denials. The Court has "oft pronounced
that x x x denial x x x [is] an inherently weak [defense] which cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime."47 The Court therefore concludes that
appellant took undue advantage of Rebeccas confidence in her when she
appropriated for herself sums of money that the latter entrusted to her for a
different purpose. The theft in this case was thus committed with grave abuse
of confidence. Hence, appellant was correctly held by the lower courts as
liable for qualified theft.
With respect to appellants contention that she could not have taken the
alleged amount of money until May 8, 2001 since her employment with
Rebecca lasted only until April 18, 2001, same fails to impress. The
Information alleged that the crime was committed "during the period from
October 2000 to May, 2001". The word "during" simply means "at some point
in the course of"48 or "throughout the course of a period of time" 49 from
October 2000 to May 8, 2001. In the Information, "during" should therefore
be understood to mean at some point from October 2000 to May 8, 2001,
and not always until May 8, 2001. Further, the period alleged in the
Information, which is from October 2000 to May 8, 2001 is not distant or far
removed from the actual period of the commission of the offense, which is
from October 2000 to April 17, 2001.
As to the total amount unlawfully taken by appellant, we hold that the sum
of P407,711.68 which the trial court came up with has no basis. After a
thorough review of the records, we find as correct instead the result of the
detailed computation made by the CA as to the total amount of money that
appellant stole or padded as expenses, which is only P248, 447.75.
The Proper Penalty
Article 310 of the RPC provides that the crime of qualified theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively
specified in Art. 309. Under paragraph 1, Art. 309 of the RPC, the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is to be imposed if the
value of the thing stolen is more thanP12,000.00 but does not
exceed P22,000.00. But if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
said paragraph [prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods], and one
year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total of the penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In such cases and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of the RPC, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. Here, the amount
stolen by appellant, as correctly found by the CA, isP248,447.75. Since the
said amount exceeds P22,000.00, "the basic penalty is prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period, which
is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of
prision mayor."50 To determine the additional years of
imprisonment, P22,000.00 must be deducted from the said amount and the
difference should then be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount
less than P10,000.00. Hence, we have twenty-two (22) years that should be
added to the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty for simple theft
should not exceed a total of twenty (20) years. Thus, had the appellant
committed simple theft, the penalty for this case would be twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal. But as the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees
higher, the proper penalty as correctly imposed by both lower courts is
reclusion perpetua.51
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01409 finding appellant Remedios
Tanchanco y Pineda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
theft is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187736
February 8, 2012
This is an appeal from the August 14, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 02870, which affirmed the April 23, 2007
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Malolos City, Bulacan
(RTC).3 The RTC convicted accused Flordeliza Arriola (Arriola) of having
committed a violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165,
otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On December 17, 2002, Criminal Case No. 3503-M-2002 was filed with the
RTC charging accused Arriola with illegal sale of dangerous drugs in violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of December, 2002, in San Jose del Monte,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law and legal
justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver,
dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of four (4) heatsealed transparent plastic sachets having a total weight of 0.186 gram.
Contrary to law.4
The evidence for the prosecution would show that a buy-bust operation was
conducted on December 13, 2002 based on an information received by Col.
Makusi, the Chief of Police of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, from a barangay
tanod. On the basis of said report, surveillance was conducted around the
house of Arriola located at Phase 1, Section 7 of Pabahay 2000. It was
observed that men were going in and out of the house and that Arriola was
peddling shabu therein.
Subsequently, a buy-bust operation team was formed to act on the
intelligence report they had gathered. SPO4 Abelardo Taruc (SPO4
Taruc) was designated as the poseur-buyer and he was to be assisted by
four (4) police aides and a civilian asset. Before going to the target site, they
prepared the marked money that would be used. Two (2) one hundred
(P 100) peso bills with serial numbers LE627251 and FP609651 were
marked by placing SPO4 Tarucs initial "AT" on the bills.
When the team reached Arriolas house, the civilian asset told Arriola that
"Iiscore daw siya," referring to SPO4 Taruc who was just beside him. Arriola
replied by asking, "Magkano?" The asset answered, "P 200.00 po," and then
simultaneously handed over the marked money. In exchange for the amount,
Arriola gave them four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing
crystalline substance. After the exchange of the marked money and the
merchandise, SPO4 Taruc arrested Arriola. Upon her arrest, he recovered
the marked money that was earlier paid to her. The asset, on the other hand,
turned over the four (4) sachets that Arriola gave in exchange for
the P 200.00 paid to her.
After the operation, the buy-bust team brought Arriola and the seized articles
to the police station, where the four (4) confiscated sachets of shabu were
marked "AT" and "FA," the initials, of SPO4 Taruc and that of Flordeliza
Arriola, respectively. Thereafter, they reported to the office of the Bulacan
provincial police the successful buy-bust operation which resulted in the
apprehension of Arriola. Also, a laboratory examination request for the seized
articles was prepared and the said four (4) sachets of shabu were then
brought to the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office.
The resident forensic chemical officer, P/Insp. Nelson Cruz Sta.
Maria (P/Insp. Sta. Maria), conducted a qualitative examination of the
specimen submitted. His findings contained in Chemistry Report No. D-7422002, showed that the four (4) sachets with markings AT-FA, Exhibits A-1 to
A-4, containing white crystalline substance yielded a positive result of the
presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Arriola, however, has a different version of what happened on the day of the
buy-bust operation. According to her, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon
of December 13, 2002, she was at home with her child resting when all of a
sudden policemen with firearms kicked the door of her house. She tried to
block the door but she was shoved aside by one of the men. She told them
not to push because she was pregnant but to no avail since one of them
simply said, "Wala akong pakialam." She also testified that one of the men
asked her if she knew the whereabouts of a certain Ogie dela Cruz. When
she answered that the man they were looking for was not residing in her
house but in the "kanto" or corner, she was the one who was brought to the
precinct.
Arriola further testified that while at the police station, they entered the office
of the Chief of Police, Col. Makusi, where she was asked her name and her
address. Then, he brought out a plastic sachet which he took from another
room. Later, she was brought outside the office and escorted to a room with
a group of men where she was made to point at the plastic sachet.
Afterwards, she was brought back to the office of Col. Makusi but this time
SPO4 Taruc was already inside. It was at this moment when he asked her,
"Gusto mong makalaya? Pagbigyan mo lang ako ng kahit isang gabi." Arriola
replied by saying that she would not agree to his proposal because, to begin
with, she did not commit any crime. This reply angered SPO4 Taruc. In sum,
she was saying that there was no valid buy-bust operation as everything was
a set-up. The drugs as well as the marked money were all just taken from the
table of Col. Makusi and not from her as claimed by the prosecution.
On April 23, 2007, RTC rendered the assailed decision convicting Arriola.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Flordeliza Arriola y Lara is hereby convicted for sale
of the dangerous drugs methylamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known
as shabu in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002" and
is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay the fine of five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00).
The specimen subject matter of this case which consists of four (4) heat
sealed transparent plastic sheets having a total weight of 0.186 gram is
hereby confiscated in favor of the government. The Clerk of Court is directed
to dispose of said specimen in accordance with the existing procedure, rules
and regulations.
Furnish both parties of this judgment and the Provincial Jail Warden.
SO ORDERED.5
Aggrieved by the pronouncement of the RTC, Arriola interposed an appeal
with the CA. On August 14, 2008, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision based on the testimony of SPO4 Taruc whom the said court
considered to be the best witness as he was the poseur-buyer.
According to the CA, the account of SPO4 Taruc, the poseur-buyer, was
corroborated in every material detail by the affidavits executed under oath by
the buy-bust team, debunking the version of Arriola that what transpired was
a set-up. The CA held that denial and frame-up were intrinsically weak
defenses as they were viewed with disfavor as they could easily be
concocted.
As to the position of Arriola that the buy-bust operation was illegal because of
the absence of coordination between the buy-bust team and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the CA debunked it citingPeople v. Sta.
Maria6 where the Court held that there is nothing in R.A. No. 9165 which
indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to consider an arrest
made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.
Finally, the CA also agreed with the RTC that failure of the operatives to
strictly comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal. It did not
render the arrest of Arriola illegal and the evidence gathered against her
inadmissible. As noted by the CA, the alleged violations of Sections 21 and
86 of R.A. No. 9165 were never raised before the RTC but were brought out
for the first time only on appeal. This, according to the CA, was against the
ruling in the case of People v. Uy7 where it was held that when a party wants
a court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. In other words, one cannot raise said question for the first time on
appeal.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that alibi and frame up are weak forms
of defense usually resorted to in drug-related cases. In this regard, the Court
is careful in appreciating them and giving them probable value because this
type of defense is easy to concoct. This Court is, of course, not unaware of
instances when our law enforcers would utilize means like planting evidence
just to extract information, but then again the Court does realize the
disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to
mention the well-being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the
police officers' alleged rotten reputation, accept in every instance this form of
defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that
the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists.
Bare denial cannot prevail over the positive identification by SPO4 Taruc of
Arriola as the one who sold them the shabu.8 For the defense position to
prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their
duties in a regular and proper manner.9 This, unfortunately, Arriola failed to
supply. What she made was a bare allegation of frame-up without presenting
any credible witness that would support her claim.
On the first issue, Arriola argues that no buy-bust operation took place but
rather a frame-up with her as the victim. She stuck to her story that when the
policemen arrived at her house, they were looking for a certain Ogie Dela
Cruz. And when she could not help them, she was brought to the police
station where all the evidence against her were produced by Col. Makusi.
Furthermore, she failed to show any motive on the part of the arresting
officers to implicate her in a crime she claimed she did not commit. On this
point, it is good to note the case of People v. Dela Rosa, where this Court
held that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence
is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police
officers.10 In fact, Arriola herself testified that it was the first time she saw
SPO4 Taruc and the rest of the arresting team and that she did not know of
any motive why SPO4 Taruc or any of the police aides would arrest
her.11 Thus, there could be no reason for SPO4 Taruc or any member of the
buy-bust team to begrudge her since they did not know each other. This only
goes to show that she was not arrested by reason of any personal vendetta
or prejudice on the part of the raiding team as what Arriola was trying to
impress. The simple fact was that she was caught in flagrante
delicto peddling prohibited drugs.
Fiscal
In the present case, all the elements have been clearly established during
the direct and cross-examination of SPO4 Taruc:
Fiscal:
Fiscal
Q: Will you be able to identify those 4 sachets [since] you were the one who
saw the transaction and [was] the one who prepared the request for
laboratory examination?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: After I gave the money to our civilian asset, we proceeded to the house,
Sir, of the target.
Q: Why?
Q: And when you said you proceeded to the house of Flordeliza together with
your civilian asset, what happened next?
Fiscal
Q: You said you arrested her, what did you do upon the arrest of Flordeliza?
A: After I have arrested her, I brought her to our police station and marked
the evidence with my initials and prepared the request for the laboratory
examination for me to bring the items for examination.
Q: What happened to the 4 sachets handed to by Flordeliza to your asset?
Fiscal
A: These are the items bought from her and in fact here are the initials I
placed. Sachet with initials "AT" and FA 1, 2, 3, 4.
Q: The brown envelope on which these 4 sachets was placed were already
marked as Exh. C. And the medium size transparent plastic sachet as Exh.
C-1. The 4 sachets in which shabu were placed were previously marked as
Exh. C-2, 3, 4, 5.
Witness is identifying the photocopies the first 100 peso bill with serial
number LE627251 we request as Exh. D.
Q: In this bill, can you please point to us the initials you mentioned.
Q: How about the money, what happened to the testimony given to Flordeliza
by your asset?
A: Here Sir. (Witness pointing to the initial "AT" on the left collar of the person
in the bill).
Q: We request likewise for the marking of the initial pointed to by the witness
in the collar of Manuel Roxas as Exh. D-1. The second bill with serial number
FP609605 earlier identified as Exh. E and E-1 for the initial. Provisional
marking your Honor.
Court: Mark them.
Fiscal
A: Yes sir.
Q: I have here a photocopy of the bills, by the way what marking did you
place?
You mentioned of the preparation for drug examination, tell us who delivered
the request as well as the accompanying specimen to the Crime Laboratory.
A: My entrusted co-police officer in the investigation section, Sir.14
Q: Mr. Witness, when you conducted the said buy bust operation and you
told this Honorable Court that you were near with the poseur buyer, what
happened Mr. Witness?
Q: Where?
A: In the collar of the picture depicted in the said bills
Q: I am showing to you 2 photocopies of P 100 peso bills, please identify if
these were the one you used in the operation.
A: I have seen the transaction Sir while they were talking and when our
civilian asset was able to buy.
XXX
Q: What exactly Mr. Witness if you have said any?
A: When we arrived there, our civilian asset told that he will buy.
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court the phrase that the poseur buyer told
the accused?
A: He said that "iiscore daw siya."
Regarding the second issue, Arriola is of the position that there was no proof
that the alleged confiscated shabuwas taken from her. She adds that there
was violation of the chain of custody on the part of the buy-bust team.
Specifically, she claims that SPO4 Taruc did not explain how the corpus
delicti transferred hands from the time it was supposedly confiscated from
her to the time it was presented in court as evidence. 16
A: P 200.00
In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a trial
of drug case, must account for the custody of the evidence from the moment
in which it reaches his custody until the moment in which it is offered in
evidence, and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of
evidence. Com. v. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.
Court
Q: How about the seller, what did she do after the money was paid to her?
A: After giving the money, she took from her pocket 4 sachets and gave it to
our asset.15
As shown by the above-quoted testimony, SPO4 Taruc, as the poseur- buyer,
was able to positively identify the seller. He categorically stated that it was
Arriola who dealt with their civilian asset who was just beside him. According
to him, Arriola was the one who asked "Magkano?" when their civilian asset
told her that "Iiscore daw siya," referring to SPO4 Taruc. She was the one
who handed the 4 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with white
crystalline substance to the civilian asset, which later on tested positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, in exchange of the P 200.00
that she received as payment. He was also able to identify the marked
money with serial numbers LE627251 and FP609605 both bearing the initials
"AT" as well as the sachets with initials "AT" and "FA" that contained the
shabu. Clearly, the exchange of the buy-bust money and the four (4) heatsealed transparent plastic sachets of shabu established the fact that Arriola
was, without a doubt, engaged in the sale of illegal drugs.
Fiscal
Q: Will you be able to identify those 4 sachets [since] you were the one who
saw the transaction and [was] the one who prepared the request for
laboratory examination?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Why?
A: I placed my initial and the initial of Flordeliza Arriola.
Q: Where were you at the time you placed your initials?
A: She was there at the investigating room, Sir.
Fiscal
I am showing to you 4 sachets; please identify the relevance of these 4
sachets to one you referred earlier as the subject of [the] transaction
between your asset and Flordeliza.
A: These are the items bought from her and in fact here are the initials I
placed. Sachet with initials "AT" and FA 1, 2, 3, 4.
Q: The brown envelope on which these 4 sachets was placed were already
marked as Exh. C. And the medium size transparent plastic sachet as Exh.
C-1. The 4 sachets in which shabu were placed were previously marked as
Exh. C-2, 3, 4, 520
XXX
Fiscal
You mentioned of the preparation for drug examination, tell us after the
preparation, who delivered the request as well as the accompanying
specimen to the Crime Laboratory?
A: My trusted co-police officer in the investigation section, Sir.
Fiscal
A: Before I turned them over Sir, I arranged the evidence and put my marking
on it.
Q: So, you only put your marking only when you were at the police station?
A: Yes, Sir.21
Q: From the time that you received the said alleged shabu or drugs from your
asset, where did you put the drugs?
ATTY. MENDOZA:
A: In my hand.
Afterwards you immediately brought her to the police station?
ATTY. MENDOZA:
A: Yes, Sir.
Up to the police station?
Q: In the police [station] what happened next?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: The statement was taken then at our office and we learned that her full
name is Flordeliza Arriola.
Q: Who [accompanied] the accused when she [was] brought to the police
station?
For the first link, SPO4 Taruc testified that after the buy-bust, the civilian
asset turned over the sachets to him.1wphi1From the site, he brought
Arriola and the sachets to their police station where he marked the items. He
marked the evidence with his initials and the initials of Arriola and all these
were done in her presence. As to the second link, he told the court that after
he put his markings on the seized items, he turned them over, together with
Arriola, to the investigating officer. With respect to the third link, SPO4 Taruc
said that the person who brought the specimen to the crime laboratory for
examination was his trusted co-police in the investigating section. Forensic
chemist, P/Insp. Sta. Maria, examined the specimens submitted to him which
tested positive for shabu and issued a chemistry report 23 dated December
13, 2002, or within the same day that the buy-bust operation was conducted.
Therefore, from the account made by SPO4 Taruc, the RTC did not err in
coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does
not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua nonfor
every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an
in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of the
Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending
violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust
operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
WHEREFORE, the August 14, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CAG.R. CR-HC. NO. 02870 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180177
20, 2005.11 PO2 Payumo and the lady confidential informant arrived together
to wait for petitioner. The rest of the buy-bust team, who had gone to the area
on board an L300 van,12 took positions nearby. Petitioner came by five
minutes later,13 and, after asking the lady confidential informant whether PO2
Payumo was the buyer, instructed Payumo to follow him to his house where
he told PO2 Payumo to wait. Two other individuals, later identified as
Conchita Carlos and Jeonilo Flores, were also waiting for petitioner.14
Upon getting back, petitioner asked PO2 Payumo for the payment, 15 and the
latter complied and handed the marked money consisting of three P50.00
bills all bearing the initials "TF".16 Petitioner then went into a room and
returned with a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance that he
gave to PO2 Payumo. Receiving the plastic sachet, PO2 Payumo placed a
missed call to PO1 Miguelito Gil, a member of the buy-bust team, thereby
giving the pre-arranged signal showing that the transaction was completed.
PO2 Payumo then arrested petitioner after identifying himself as an officer.
PO2 Payumo recovered another sachet containing white crystalline
substance from petitioners right hand, and the marked money from
petitioners right front pocket.17 The rest of the buy-bust team meanwhile
came around and recovered two sachets also containing white crystalline
substance from the sofa where Conchita and Jeonilo were sitting. The buybust team thus also arrested Conchita and Jeonilo. 18
Back at the police station, PO2 Payumo placed on the plastic sachet that
petitioner had handed him the marking "RRS-1" and on the other sachet
recovered from petitioners right hand the marking "RRS-2." 19 The seized
items were thereafter turned over to the Western Police District Crime
Laboratory for examination by P/Insp. Judycel Macapagal, who found the
items positive for methampethamine hydrochloride or shabu. 20
On the other hand, petitioner denied that there had been a buy-bust
operation, and claimed that he had been framed up.
Petitioner testified that he was at his house entertaining his visitors Conchita
and Jeonilo in the afternoon of January 20, 2005; 21 that Conchita was selling
to him a sofa bed for P800.00, while Jeonilo was only contracted by Conchita
to drive the jeepney carrying the sofa bed;22 that the three of them were
surprised when a group of armed men in civilian clothes barged into his
house and conducted a search, and arrested them; that he was also
surprised to see a plastic sachet when the armed men emptied his pocket;
that the plastic sachet did not belong to him;23 that PO2 Payumo was not
among those who entered and searched his house; 24 that the three of them
were made to board a van where PO1 Rudolf Mijares demanded P30,000.00
for his release;25 and that because he told them he had no money to give to
them, one of the men remarked: Sige, tuluyan na yan; and that they were
then brought to the police station.26
Jeonilo corroborated petitioners story.27
Ruling of the RTC
As stated, on May 23, 2006, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, to wit:
Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buybust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to the operation deserve
full faith and credit.
However like alibi, we view the defense of frame up with disfavor as it can
easily be concocted and is commonly used as a standard line of defense in
most prosecution arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Acts.
"A police officer or private person, without warrant, may arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; xxx
"It has been held that the testimonies of police officers involved in a buy-bust
operation deserve full faith and credit, given the presumption that they have
performed their duties regularly. This presumption can be overturned if clear
and convincing evidence is presented to prove either two things: (1) that they
were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any
improper motive." (People of the Philippines vs. Reynaldo Remarata et al.,
G.R. No. 147230, April 29, 2003)
The positive identification of appellants by the prosecution witness should
prevail over the formers denials of the commission of the crime for which
they are charged, since greater weight is generally accorded to the positive
testimony of the prosecution witness than the accuseds denial. Denial, like
alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the
crime. (People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Belibet, Manny Banoy and
Ronnie Rosero, G.R. No. 91260, July 25, 1991) 28
The dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC reads:
The specimens are forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk
of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is directed to turn over with
dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the law
and rules.
Petitioner wants the Court to give credence to his defense of frame-up, and
to believe the testimony of Jeonilo Flores who had no reason to testify falsely
against the arresting officers.
SO ORDERED.29
With his motion for reconsideration being denied by the RTC, petitioner filed
his notice of appeal.30
In this jurisdiction, we convict the accused only when his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt. Conformably with this standard, we are mandated
as an appellate court to sift the records and search for every error, though
unassigned in the appeal, in order to ensure that the conviction is warranted,
and to correct every error that the lower court has committed in finding guilt
against the accused.32
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC thuswise:
A fortiori, viewed in the light of the foregoing, We are strongly convinced that
the prosecution has proven the guilt of the Appellant for the crimes charged
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The
challenged Decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.31
The CA gave more weight to the testimony of poseur buyer PO2 Payumo,
and believed the findings of the laboratory examination conducted by P/Insp.
Macapagal. It recognized the validity of the buy-bust operation.
Issue
Petitioner is now before the Court seeking to reverse the decision of the CA
upon the sole error that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT FINDING WORTHY OF CREDENCE PETITIONERS
WITNESS TESTIMONY CREATING DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF THE
PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
Ruling
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
This appeal involves two distinct drug-related offenses, namely: illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The successful
prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires: (a) proof that the
transaction or sale took place, and (b) the presentation in court as evidence
of the corpus delicti, or the dangerous drugs themselves. On the other hand,
the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs necessitates the
following facts to be proved, namely: (a) the accused was in possession of
dangerous drugs, (b) such possession was not authorized by law, and (c) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
dangerous drugs.36 For both offenses, it is crucial that the Prosecution
establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way that the
integrity thereof has been well preserved from the time of seizure or
confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in
court. Nothing less than a faithful compliance with this duty is demanded of
all law enforcers arresting drug pushers and drug possessors and
confiscating and seizing the dangerous drugs and substances from them.
This duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is
discharged only when the arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of
custody is unbroken. This has been the reason for defining chain of custody
under Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series
of 2002, viz:
(b) "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and
time when such transfer or custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition;
(Emphasis supplied)
show that PO2 Payumo placed the markings of "RRS-1" on the sachet
allegedly received from petitioner and "RRS-2" on the two sachets allegedly
seized from petitioners hand already at the police station with only petitioner
present. Yet, the Prosecution did not also present any witness to establish
that an inventory of the seized articles at least signed by petitioner at that
point was prepared.
We clarified in People v. Sanchez41 that in compliance with Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165, supra, the physical inventory and photographing of the seized
articles should be conducted, if practicable, at the place of seizure or
confiscation in cases of warrantless seizure. But that was true only if there
were indications that petitioner tried to escape or resisted arrest, which might
provide the reason why the arresting team was not able to do the inventory
or photographing at petitioners house; otherwise, the physical inventory and
photographing must always be immediately executed at the place of seizure
or confiscation.
In People v. Pringas,42 the non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section
21, supra, was held not to be fatal for as long as there was justifiable ground
for it, and for as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated or seized articles were properly preserved by the apprehending
officer or team. The Court further pronounced therein that such noncompliance would not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized
or confiscated from him inadmissible, for what was of utmost importance was
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized or
confiscated articles, considering that they were to be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
However, the omissions noted herein indicated that the State did not
establish the identity of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner
with the same exacting certitude required for a finding of guilt.
To be sure, the buy-bust operation was infected by lapses. Although PO2
Payumo declared that he was the one who had received the sachet of shabu
("RRS-1") from petitioner and who had confiscated the two sachets of shabu
("RRS-2") from petitioner, all of which he had then sealed, nothing more to
support the fact that the evidence thus seized had remained intact was
adduced. In fact, the State did not anymore establish to whom the seized
articles had been endorsed after PO2 Payumo had placed the markings at
the station, and with whose custody or safekeeping the seized articles had
Payumo himself), namely: PO1 Mijares, PO1 Mark Dave Vicente, PO1
Maurison Ablaza, PO1 Elmer Clemente and PO1 Gil.49 The Prosecutions
failure to explain why only six members of the buy-bust team actually
executed and signed the Joint Affidavit might indicate that the incrimination of
petitioner through the buy-bust operation was probably not reliable.1wphi1
DECISION
This is an appeal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 02342 dated April 18, 2008, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati finding accused-appellant Catalino
Dulay y Cadiente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5
and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant, charging him with
violations of Section 5 (Criminal Case No. 03-3799) and Section 15 (Criminal
Case No. 03-4000), respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The
Information charging accused-appellant of violation of Section 5 states:
That on or about the 23rd day of September, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without the necessary license or prescription and
without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give awayP100.00 worth of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram and zero
point zero two (0.02) gram, a dangerous drug. 3
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188345
cigarette. PO1 Robles and Barbosa rushed to the place of the transaction.
They introduced themselves as narcotic operatives. They arrested alas "Lino"
(TSN dated 3/3/05, pp. 16-17). It was PO1 Robles who informed the accused
of his constitutional rights. Jose Guadamor, the poseur buyer marked the
sachets of shabu with "CDC" the initials of the accused at the place of
operation (TSN dated 3/3/05, p. 18). After the arrest, the accused was
brought to the DEU where a complaint was filed against him. Thereafter, the
accused was brought to Fort Bonifacio, Taguig for drug test of the accused
and laboratory examination of the subject of sale." 5
Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt on account of the failure of PO1 Barbosa to identify him at
the trial, and the unreliability of the testimonies of PO1 Robles and PO1
Barbosa on account of their distance of ten to fifteen meters from the place
ATTY. YU
Who are they?
WITNESS
One of them is a tricycle driver who is also a MADAC operative.
ATTY. YU
What about the other two?
WITNESS
Francisco Barbosa, Jose Guadamor, and Rogelio Milan.17
The necessity of asking the witness to identify the accused in court is for the
purpose of being able to pinpoint said accused to be the very same person
referred to in the testimony. As regards the testimony of PO1 Barbosa, it has
to be established that accused-appellant was the very same person that was
arrested by the team which includes PO1 Barbosa at around 5:20 p.m. on
September 23, 2003. Having himself affirmed his own arrest at the hands of
the group of PO1 Barbosa on the same date and time, accused-appellant
cannot now assert that he was not the person referred to in PO1 Barbosas
testimony.
Furthermore, accused-appellant was, in fact, positively identified in court by
PO1 Robles and the poseur-buyer himself, PO1 Guadamor. Accusedappellants persistent assertion that PO1 Robles and PO1 Barbosa were too
far at ten to fifteen meters away from the scene of the alleged transaction
does not disprove their ability to positively identify accusedappellant, as they
have testified that they eventually went closer to the scene when PO1
Guadamor gave the signal. Neither was the proximity of PO1 Robles and
PO1 Barbosa relevant to prove the details of the transaction since their
account was merely to corroborate the already convincing testimony of PO1
Guadamor.
Accused-appellant further points out that the prosecution failed to present the
informant in court, alleging that the same was necessary to corroborate the
testimony of PO1 Guadamor, since it was only the informant and PO1
Guadamor who witnessed the actual transaction.
of P300,000.00 as provided for under Section 11, Par. (3) [o]f RA 9165. As
amended.46
For Criminal Case No. 03-25497 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs:
That on or about the 17th day of April 2003 in the Municipality of Cainta,
Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused without being authorized by law, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to
another 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heatsealed transparent plastic sachet which was found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "Shabu[,]" a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.42
For Criminal Case No. 03-25498 for possession of dangerous drugs:
That on or about the 17th day of April 2003 in the Municipality of Cainta,
Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession,
direct custody and control 0.03 gram, 0.03 gram, 0.03 gram and 0.03 gram
with a total weight of 0.12 gram of white crystalline substance contained in
four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which were found positive to
the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "Shabu[,]" a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
Upon appeal, the accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in
finding that the prosecution was able to prove the requisites of a buy-bust
operation.47 He doubted the entrapment operation as there was already an
existing warrant of arrest against him.48 Further, he emphasized the failure of
the prosecution to establish thecorpus delicti of the case as the five plastic
sachets allegedly containing dangerous drug were not presented in court.
What were presented were only pictures which do not prove that those in the
pictures were the same ones tested at the forensic laboratory.49 Finally, he
questioned the non-adherence to the procedures to establish the chain of
custody of evidence such as the marking of the five sachets of confiscated
drugs at the time and in the place where the accused was arrested. 50
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, stressed the legality
of a buy-bust operation.51 It relied on the presumption of regularity of
performance of police officers in fulfilling their duties, 52 and on the
prosecutions proof of all the elements of illegal sale of shabu.53
After review, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification on
the penalty imposed. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the decision subject of the present
appeal is hereby AFFIRMED save for a modification in the penalty imposed
by the trial court. Accordingly, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer
life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).54
CONTRARY TO LAW.43
Upon arraignment on 29 May 2003, accused Remigio with the assistance of
his counsel, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the offenses charged against him. 44
Trial ensued and on 12 October 2007, the trial court 45 found the accused
guilty of the offenses charged against him. The disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Ricardo Remigio is found
guilty of the offense charged in the Informations and is sentenced to
Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal Case No. 03-25497. In Criminal case No. 0325498, accused Ricardo Remigio is sentenced to suffer an Imprisonment of
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
The appellate court gave great weight on the findings of facts of the trial court
and full credit to the presumption of regularity of performance of the arresting
officer Ramos. It discredited the argument of the defense of frame-up and
upheld the presence of the requisites to prove illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.55 No weight was given by the CA to the argument about noncompliance with the procedures laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 to
establish the chain of custody of evidence ruling that there was no taint in the
integrity of the evidentiary value of the seized items. 56
This appeal is moored on the contention about the break in the chain of
custody and the absence of identification of illegal drugs. 57 Appellant
capitalizes on the non-marking of the sachets allegedly recovered from his
In this case, no illegal drug was presented as evidence before the trial court.
As pointed out by appellant, what were presented were pictures of the
supposedly confiscated items. But, in the current course of drugs case
decisions, a picture is not worth a thousand words.64 The image without the
thing even prevents the telling of a story.1wphi1 It is indispensable for the
prosecution to present the drug itself in court.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:
As testified by PO2 Ramos, he did not transfer the seized items to the
investigating officer. And nothing in the records reveals that there was such a
transfer. From his statements, he kept the alleged shabu from the time of
confiscation until the time he transferred them to the forensic chemist. We
quote:
We could have stopped at the point where the prosecution failed to present
the substance allegedly recovered from the appellant. The failure already
renders fatally flawed the decision of conviction. Indeed, an examination of
the chain of custody of the substance, without the substance itself, is
nonsensical. We, however, see more than an academic need for a
discussion of the concept of chain of custody. We want to depict the
carelessness, if not the brazen unlawfulness, of the law enforcers in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. What
happened in this case is a one-man operation, seemingly towards the
objective of the law, but by means of outlawing those specifically outlined in
the statute, in the rules implementing the statute and in our decisions
interpreting law and rule. As testified to by the prosecutions sole witness,
PO2 Ramos, he was the one who conceived the operation; who, although
with his informant as the lone actor, conducted the operation by himself being
the poseur-buyer with a one hundred peso bill he himself pre-marked and
recorded in the police blotter only after the arrest. PO2 Ramos was himself
the apprehending officer who confiscated the sachets of illegal drugs
together with the wallet of the accused.
There was no showing when, where and how the seized plastic sachets were
marked. It was not shown that there was a marking of evidence at the place
of arrest or at the police station. It was unexplained why the five plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance were already marked as
"RZR-1," "RZR-2," "RZR-3," "RZR-4" and "RZR-5" when transmitted to the
forensic chemist.
Already, the omission of the first link in the chain tainted the identification of
the drugs that was allegedly seized from the accused. What followed was no