Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Account?
OlivierJeanne
ArvindSubramanian
JohnWilliamson
PetersonInstituteforInternationalEconomics
Washington,DC
June11,2012
Purpose
Toreassessthecaseforcapitalaccount
openinginthelightofnewdevelopments
Newtheoreticaldevelopments
Newdiscussionsandthinkinginofficialcircles
Newcrises.
Toproposepolicyattitudesthatwebelieve
theinternationalcommunityshouldadopt.
History
White/Keynestoleranceofcapitalcontrols
basictoBrettonWoods
Increasingcapitalmobilityledtodownfallof
BrettonWoods
LatinAmericandebtcrisisandAsiancrisis
bothcausedbysuddenstop tocapitalinflows
HappenedagainwithE.Europein200809
ThiswasalsothecauseoftheEurozonecrisis.
IMFPolicies
IMFhasneverhadconsistentpolicytoward
capitalmovements
Toleratedtheminearlydays,became
increasinglyhostileculminatinginaborted
1997reform
G20atCannesdisplayedawillingnessto
envisagearegime,butfailedtoformulateone
Weformulateaproposal,tobepresentedin
duecoursebyJeanne/Subramanian.
StatusQuo
Emergingmarketfinancecharacterizedbywide
varietyofapproachestocapitalaccountpolicies
opencapitalaccounts(Chile)
prudentialcontrols(Brazil)
closedcapitalaccount(China).
Unlikefortradeingoods,thereisnointernational
regimetoguide/disciplinecapitalaccount
policies.
Isthisaproblem?
StatusQuo
Oneviewisthatnationaldiscretionisnota
problembecausetradeinassetsismuchless
beneficialthantradeinwidgets(Bhagwati,
1998)
weconfirmtheunderlyingempiricalevidencein
Chapters3and4ofthebook
However,wearguethattheinternational
communityshouldagreeonasetofrulesfor
capitalaccountpolicies
encouragegoodpolicies,discouragebadones
spillovers
TheCaseforInternationalRules
Weunderstandmuchbetterthecasefor
prudential capitalcontrols
curbingtheboombustcycleincapitalflows
newwelfareeconomicsofprudentialcontrols
reviewedinchapter2
countercyclicaltaxoncapitalinflows
Acodeofgoodpracticescouldreducethe
stigma associatedwithprudentialcontrols
theIMFmoretolerant,butstillnotenough
TheCaseforInternationalRules
Capitalaccountpoliciescanbeusedtodistort
exchangeratesandtrade
balancesheetofChinesebankingsector
140
400
120
350
100
300
250
80
200
150
Forexreserves(%GDP,
lhs)
100
TradeBalance($bn,rhs)
60
40
Domesticloansand
portfolio(%GDP,lhs)
20
50
TheCaseforInternationalRules
Correlationbetweenundervaluationandcapitalcontrols
V
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C
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O
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N
U
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B
G
R
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
Misalignment, avg residual
.2
.4
TheCaseforInternationalRules
Theoreticalresult: onecanachievethesame
outcomewithcapitalaccountpoliciesaswith
tariffs(subsidies)onimports(exports).
Practicalimplication:alevelplayingfieldin
internationaltraderequireslimitsontheuse
ofcapitalaccountpolicies.
Proposal
Theinternationalcommunityshouldadopt
internationalnormsforcapitalaccountpolicies
undertheauspicesoftheIMF
Thegoalshouldbetoencouragegoodcontrols
anddiscouragebadones
notpromotefreecapitalmobility
Wewouldfavortransparent,pricebased
measures(e.g.,atax)
witha15%ceiling
caveatsandexemptions
ObstaclestoCooperation
Principleandcontents
Principleofinternationalregulation:Brazil,
emergingmarkets?
Countercyclicaltaxesoninflows:Financialsector
Openingupcapitalaccount:China
SticksandCarrots
Sticks:CountervailingcapitalcontrolsbyUSto
restrictChinesepurchasesofUSgovernment
assets(Bergsten,GagnonandHufbauer)
Carrots:
Grantingmarketeconomystatus
Revisitinginvestmentrulesastheyapplyto
ChineseFDItoUS
Conclusion
Regulationofcapitalflowsoverduetocorrect
foreignfinancefetish
Eurozonecrisis
USFTAsofearly2000swithSingaporeandChile
Asymmetricinternationalregulationoftradeand
capitalflowsincreasinglyuntenable
Needtoregulateproblemoftoomuchinflows
(Brazil)andtoolittleinflows(China)