Cognitive Development 27 (2012) 6476

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Cognitive Development

Mental verb input for promoting childrens theory of mind:

A training study
Alice Ann Howard Gola
University of Connecticut, United States

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Keywords:
Theory of mind
Training study
Overheard vs. interactive mental state
language
False belief

a b s t r a c t
An experimental study investigated the effect of the type of mental
verb input (i.e., input with think, know, and remember) on preschoolers theory of mind development. Preschoolers (n = 72) heard 128
mental verb utterances presented in video format across four sessions over two weeks. The training conditions differed only in
the way the mental verbs were presented: the form (statement
or question), the referent (rst person or other person), and the
interaction style (overheard or interactive). Children who overheard the characters discussing the mental states of someone else,
either in statement or question form, signicantly improved in their
false belief understanding. These experimental ndings demonstrate mental verb utterances about other people, even when not
directed to the child, scaffold childrens attention to differing perspectives, thus more efciently promoting some aspects of their
ToM development.
2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The understanding that people are mental beings with beliefs, desires and emotions, and whose
actions can be interpreted by evaluating their mental states is dened as a theory of mind (ToM).
Language, particularly mental state language (i.e., talk about feelings, cognitive states, and emotions), is argued to play a pivotal role in childrens ToM development (Jenkins & Astington, 1996;
Meins et al., 2002; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002). Most studies examining the role of mental state
input in childrens ToM development are correlational and focus on conversations between parents
and children (Adrian, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007; Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007). However, children learn language and other social-cognitive skills through observing the conversations of

Correspondence address: MANILA Consulting Group, Inc., 6707 Old Dominion Drive, McLean, VA 22101, United States. Tel.:
+1 571 633 9797x217; fax: +1 571 633 0335.
E-mail address: aliceann.howard@gmail.com
0885-2014/$ see front matter 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2011.10.003

A.H. Gola / Cognitive Development 27 (2012) 6476

65

others (Akhtar, Jipson, & Callanan, 2001; Akhtar, 2005; ODoherty et al., 2011; Rogoff, Paradise, Arauz,
Correa-Chavez, & Angelillo, 2003). Furthermore, it is difcult, using a correlational design, to disentangle whether mental state input promotes childrens ToM or whether mothers adjust their mental
state talk to support a childs already existing ToM. The present experimental study examines the type
of mental verb input that promotes ToM when children either overhear a conversation or when the
conversation is directed at them.
Conversations about emotions and mind are an important source of information about inner states
of self and other (Dunn & Brophy, 2005). Mothers increase their use of mental state language at the age
children are beginning to develop a ToM (Beeghly, Bretherton, & Mervis, 1986; Brown & Dunn, 1991;
Moore, Furrow, Chiasson, & Patriquin, 1994; Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003; Taumoepeau
& Ruffman, 2008). Moreover, mothers mental state utterances and talk about feelings are positively
correlated with childrens performance on various tasks assessing ToM (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski,
Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Meins et al., 2002; Ruffman et al., 2002). ToM is commonly assessed by false
belief tasks, which assess the understanding that beliefs inuence how one behaves. Although children
can be trained to pass false belief tasks (Appelton & Reddy, 1996; Clements, Rustin, & McCallum, 2000;
Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996; Swettenham, 1996; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003), they perform better at
posttest if the training includes mental state language (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003), suggesting that
there is something uniquely benecial about mental state language for ToM development.
In addition to frequency, specic uses of mental state language play an important role in ToM development. For example, maternal questions containing mental verbs (e.g., Do you remember where
your boots are?) were positively correlated to 35-year-olds understanding of mental states (Adrian
et al., 2007; Howard, Mayeux, & Naigles, 2008). Moreover, Harris (2005) contends that exposure to
conversations containing different points of view is essential to childrens developing understanding
of the mental world. Indeed, maternal utterances about others are positively related to childrens false
belief understanding (Adrian et al., 2007; Slaughter et al., 2007). Similarly, mothers talk of their childrens mental states, instead of their own, is positively related to childrens understanding and use of
mental state language (Howard et al., 2008; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). In contrast, utterances in
which the mother refers to her own mental state (e.g., I remember where it is) are negatively related
to childrens mental state understanding (Howard et al., 2008).
While informative, correlational research does not address why certain utterances are correlated
with childrens ToM. For example, questions with mental verbs may predict childrens ToM because
these utterances require children to reect on their own mental state in order to provide a response
(e.g., Do you remember where it is?). The more children reect on their own mental states, the better
they may become at reecting on others mental states in relation to their own. Alternatively, as
noted, exposure to questions might aid in ToM development because they are often, if not always,
about someone other than the speaker (e.g., Do you remember where your boots are?). Mental verb
input was carefully controlled in the present study, making it possible to separate the effect of the form
(question or statement) and the referent (rst person or other person) of the mental verb utterance.
Because success on a ToM task requires children to answer from the perspective of someone else
(e.g., What will Bobby think is inside of this box?), it was hypothesized that taking the perspective of
someone else (other-person utterances) is the key factor in mental state language promoting childrens
ToM development. Whether these utterances were questions or statements, they were expected to
help children develop a ToM more effectively.
The present study also addressed the interaction style of the mental verb inputoverheard
(directed to someone other than the child) versus interactive (directed to the child). The majority
of research investigating the relation between mental state language and childrens ToM development has examined parentchild conversations. That is, the conversations were always directed to
the child. Children are keen observers and very capable of learning through observation (Bandura,
1986; Piaget, 1962). Therefore, it is possible that children can learn about differing beliefs by observing conversations of others. Akhtar et al. (2001) demonstrated that young children learned a novel
word by observing a conversation between two adults (e.g., Im going to show you the toma.) as well
as they did when the adult only addressed the child. ODoherty et al. (2011) examined the overheard
versus direct learning distinction via a television screen. They found that 30-month-olds learned a
novel word better by observing an onscreen conversation between two adults (e.g., one adult labeled

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A.H. Gola / Cognitive Development 27 (2012) 6476

an object for another adult) than when the adult faced the camera and directly labeled the object for
the child. As with other areas of language development, children may be able to learn about peoples
differing mental states by observing conversations that do not include them.
However, it might be that children cannot acquire a ToM through the observation of others interactions. Lohmann, Tomasello, and Meyer (2005) showed that children who engaged in a conversation
about being deceived by an object (e.g., soap that looks like a golf ball) did better on a ToM task than
children who observed someone elses discussion of the deceptive object. Similarly, participation in
talk about inner states explains individual differences in later understanding of mind and emotion that
is independent of factors such as witnessing other family members engaging in mental state discourse
(Dunn & Brophy, 2005).
The present study explored whether mental state language presented in conversations that
addressed the child (interactive) or that did not address the child (overheard) affected childrens
ToM development differently. Based on research that demonstrates children learn from observing
third-party interactions, preschoolers may show equal or greater ToM improvement from overhearing
others conversations. Alternatively, as in other studies, children may only improve in ToM understanding when mental verb utterances are directed to them.
ToM understanding encompasses different aspects of childrens understanding of the mental world
(Wellman and Liu, 2004). In the present study, ToM was measured using six tasks. Three assessed the
understanding that people hold diverse desires, beliefs, and knowledge. The other three assessed the
understanding of false beliefs.
A meta-analysis of 104 studies revealed a signicant relation between all types of language ability
(e.g., semantic, syntactic, and general) and false belief understanding (Milligan, Astington, & Dack,
2007). Far fewer studies have assessed the relation between language ability and diverse desire/belief
understanding. Greater language skill may be required to discuss false beliefs (e.g., She thinks the
block is in the basket, but it is really in the box) than diverse desires/beliefs (e.g., I like cookies, she
likes cupcakes). In support of this hypothesis, deaf children born to hearing parents often have no
common language and therefore, no way of discussing complex and abstract thoughts with each
other (Peterson & Siegel, 2000). The lack of mental state input is reected in the delayed false belief
understanding of deaf children born to hearing parents compared to deaf children born to deaf parents
(Peterson & Siegel, 1999). However, similar ndings have not been investigated with childrens diverse
desire/belief/knowledge understanding. J. deVilliers (2005) argues that understanding the language
needed to discuss false beliefs (i.e., a mental verb and an embedded tensed complement, e.g., I think the
block is in the basket.) is causally involved in the development of false belief understanding. Relatedly,
previous research has linked mental state input to childrens false belief understanding (Ruffman
et al., 2002). Overall then, the link between mental state language and false belief understanding
is more robust than the link between mental state language and diverse desire/belief/knowledge
understanding. Therefore, it was expected that exposure to mental verb language would
improve childrens false belief understanding, but not their diverse desire/belief/knowledge
understanding.
Using a training methodology, the effects of the form (question or statement), referent (rst person or other person), and interaction style (overheard or interactive) of the mental verb utterances
were examined. The mental verb utterances were presented to the children through the conversations of three characters on video. Preschoolers were exposed to one of six types of conversations
containing mental verbs across a two-week span: overheard statements in the rst person, overheard
questions in the rst person, overheard statements in the other person (2nd/3rd person), overheard
questions in the other person, interactive statements in the other person, and interactive questions
in the other person. The mental verb utterances in the interactive conditions were identical to those
in their corresponding overheard conditions, but, in the interactive conditions, the characters turned
toward the screen to speak to the child. Utterances in the rst person were excluded from this analysis
because of most interest were the situations in which the child was asked or told about his or her own
mental states, situations only possible when the character spoke in the other person. In addition to
language ability, previous research also links childrens nonverbal intelligence to false belief performance (Jenkins & Astington, 1996). Thus, nonverbal IQ, expressive, and receptive language was also
assessed.

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1. Method
1.1. Participants
Participants were 72 (35 males) preschool children between the ages of 3.0 and 4.8 years (M age = 3.5
years, SD = .35 years) recruited through preschools and child care centers. Mothers mean educational
attainment was 16.87 years (SD = 2.41) and fathers was 16.41 years (SD = 2.97). Children were Caucasian (n = 56), Asian (n = 5), Black (n = 3), and of other ethnicities (n = 8). All children were uent in
English. To be included, children had to fail three or more of the six tasks.
1.2. Tasks
1.2.1. Theory of mind tasks
Childrens ToM was measured using six tasks (adapted from Wellman & Liu, 2004). The posttest
tasks were similar to the pretest tasks, but the objects and characters were changed. Three
tasks assessed understanding that people have diverse desires, beliefs, and knowledge about the
same object. Children received one point for a correct answer on each task and hence a diverse
desire/belief/knowledge score ranging from 0 to 3 at pretest and posttest.
In the diverse desires task, children were shown a picture of Mr. Jones, a carrot and a cookie.
They were asked which snack they would like best and were then told that Mr. Jones preferred the
alternative snack. Children were then asked, Which snack would Mr. Jones like to eat? Children
received 1 point if they answered they answered opposite from their own desire. In the diverse beliefs
task, children were shown a picture of Linda, some bushes and a garage. They were told Linda was
trying to nd her cat and asked, Where do you think the cat is hiding? The experimenter then said
that Linda thought her cat was in the alternative location and were asked, Where will Linda look for
her cat? Children received 1 point if they answered opposite from their own belief. In the diverse
knowledge task, children were shown a brown box and were asked, What do you think is in this
box? The experimenter then revealed that it contained a tennis ball. Children were shown a picture
of Polly and were told that Polly had never seen inside of the box. Children were then asked, Does
Polly know what is inside of the box? Children received 1 point if they answered, No.
The remaining three tasks assessed childrens understanding that people: (1) have false beliefs, (2)
act on their false beliefs (explicit false belief task), and (3) have emotions affected by their false beliefs
(false belief-emotion). Children received one point for a correct answer on each task and hence a false
belief score ranging from 0 to 3 at pretest and posttest.
In the false belief task, children were shown a Band-Aid box and asked, What do you think is
inside of this box? (Most answered Band-Aids.) Children were then shown that ribbons were inside
of the box. The experimenter then revealed a picture of Aunt Sally and said that Aunt Sally had never
seen inside of the box before. Children were asked, What does Aunt Sally think is inside this box,
band-aids or ribbon? (target question). Children received one point if they answered, band-aids.
In the explicit false belief task, children were shown a picture of Scott, a backpack, and a closet. The
experimenter said that Scotts mittens were really in his backpack, but Scott thought his mittens
were in his closet. Children were asked, Where will Scott look for his mittens? (target question),
and Where are his mittens really? (reality question). Children received 1 point if they answered the
target question, closet, and the reality question, backpack. In the false belief-emotion task, children
were shown a picture of Suzie and a Cheerios box. They were asked, What do you think is inside of
this box? (Most answered Cheerios.) The experimenter then said that Cheerios were Suzies favorite
snack. While Suzie was outside playing, the children were shown that rocks were really inside of
the Cheerios box. Once Suzie returned, the children were asked, How does Suzie feel when she sees
this box, happy or sad? (target question). The experimenter then opened the box for Suzie to look
inside. The children were asked, How does Suzie feel after she looks inside of the box, happy or sad?
(emotion-control question). Children received 1 point for answering the target question happy, and
the emotion-control question sad.
1.2.2. Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales (SB5)
Childrens non-verbal intelligence was measured using the following Stanford-Binet subtests: nonverbal uid reasoning, nonverbal working memory, and nonverbal common knowledge of objects. The

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A.H. Gola / Cognitive Development 27 (2012) 6476

scores from each of the three subscales were summed to yield a raw total nonverbal IQ score (possible
score: 076).
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals Preschool, 2nd Edition (CELF-Preschool II) (Wiig,
Secord, & Semel, 2004). Two subscales from the CELF-Preschool assessed childrens expressive language (Word Structure subscale) and receptive language (Concepts and Following Directions subscale).
The Word Structure subscale assessed childrens production of appropriate pronouns and morphology. For example, children were shown a picture of a boy standing and the experimenter pointed and
said, This boy is standing. The experimenter then pointed to a picture of a boy sitting and said, This
boy is - Children received one point if they answered, sitting. (total possible score was 024). The
Concepts and Following Directions subscale assessed childrens ability to interpret spoken directions
of increasing complexity, to remember names and characteristics, and to remember the order in which
pictures are mentioned. For example, children were shown a picture of a variety of animals and were
told, Point to the turtle after you point to the sh. Children received 1 point if they pointed in the
correct order. (total possible score: 022).
1.3. Training videos
The term mental state language encompasses desire, emotion, and cognitive terms. Based on
research suggesting maternal cognitive terms (e.g., think, know) were more predictive of 33-montholds mental state language than desire and emotion terms (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008), only the
mental verbs think, know, and remember were used. To maximize control over the manner in which
mental verbs were presented to children, video format was used. Four original 23 min videos were
created for each condition. The non-mental verb language and plots for each of the four videos were
consistent across all conditions.
The plots of the four videos centered around the characters experiencing surprise after the true
identity of an object was revealed: (1) a ower that looked like a pen, (2) a candle that looked like a
Christmas ornament, (3) soap that looked like a golf ball, and (4) a plastic container that looked like
a cupcake (For similar training procedures, see Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003, or Slaughter & Gopnik,
1996.) The three characters were novel puppets: Spot the dog, Bessie the cow, and Freddy the frog.
Three characters were used so that two characters could discuss a third characters mental state (e.g.,
Spot saying to Freddy, Bessie thinks this is a golf ball.), and so that multiple points of view in the
rst person could be presented (e.g., Character A: I got a golf ball for us to play with! Character B: I
dont think this is a golf ball. Character C: I dont think this is a golf ball either.).
The frequency of mental verb utterances at each training session was the same across all conditions:
16 think utterances, 14 know utterances, and 2 remember utterances. Therefore, across the four sessions,
children heard 128 mental verb utterances, all containing sentence complements. The conditions
differed only in the way the mental verbs were presented. For example, in one video, Freddy looked
closely at the golf ball and said But hey! The next utterance, a mental verb utterance, varied by
condition: (1) statement in the rst person (I dont think this is a golf ball!), (2) question in the
rst person (Do I think this is a golf ball?), (3) statement in the other person (2nd or 3rd person,
e.g., to Bessie: You think this is a golf ball.), and (4) question in the other person (e.g., to Bessie:
Do you think this is a golf ball?). In the two interactive conditions, the statements and questions
in the other person were directed to the children instead of to the characters in the video: (5) other
person statement interactive (e.g., Freddy to child: Hey kids, you think this is a golf ball.) and (6)
other person question interactive (e.g., Freddy to child: Hey kids, do you think this is a golf ball?).
See Appendix A for the complete script for one of the videos.
1.4. Procedure
Children rst participated in the six ToM pretests. Children who failed at least half of these were
randomly assigned to one of the six training conditions. Children were then individually shown the
four videos corresponding to their condition. Children also watched the four videos during each of the
remaining three training sessions across a two-week period. Each visit lasted approximately 30 min
and took place at the childs preschool or child care setting. An experimenter was present to direct

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69

Table 1
Correlations among childrens expressive and receptive language, non-verbal intelligence, and theory of mind scores.
1
1. Age
2. Expressive language
3. Receptive language
4. Nonverbal IQ theory of mind scores
5. Pre Desire/Belief/Knowledge
6. Pre False Belief
7. Post Desire/Belief/Knowledge
8. Post False Belief
+
*
**

.62**
.34**
.20+
.16
.37**
.12

.57**
.11
.15
.51**
.32**

.06
.17
.31**
.05

.17
.40**
.23+

.01
.11

.24*
.39**
.40**
.11
.10
.18
.04

.30**

p < .10.
p < .05.
p < .01.

attention to the video if needed. In addition to watching the videos, children were given the nonverbal
Stanford-Binet at Session 2, the two subscales of the CELF-Preschool II at Session 3, and participated
in six ToM posttests at Session 4.
2. Results
A series of one-way ANOVAs revealed no signicant condition differences by age, expressive
language, receptive language, nonverbal IQ, diverse desire/belief/knowledge pretest score, or false
belief pretest score. Correlational analyses revealed three main ndings (Table 1). First, age was not
related to performance on any of the ToM pretest or posttest measures. Similarly, scores on all ToM
pretest measures were not related to nonverbal IQ or language scores. Finally, receptive language was
signicantly correlated with both diverse desire/belief/knowledge and false belief posttest scores.
However, expressive language and nonverbal IQ were only related to performance on the diverse
desire/belief/knowledge posttest tasks.
The majority of children passed the diverse desires (n = 60) and diverse beliefs (n = 57) tasks at
pretest. The number of children who passed these tasks at posttest (n = 60 for diverse desires and
n = 61 for diverse beliefs) did not vary from pretest. Nine children passed diverse knowledge at pretest
and 14 at posttest. Overall, children improved the most on the explicit false belief task. See Table 2 for
number of children who passed each false belief task at pretest and posttest.
2.1. Childrens diverse belief/desire/knowledge understanding
A 2 (belief/desire/knowledge pretest vs. posttest) 6 (condition) mixed analysis of variance
(ANOVA) examined the effect of the mental verb input on childrens understanding of diverse
beliefs/desires/knowledge from pretest to posttest. There was no main effect of test, indicating that
children did not improve over time in their understanding of diverse beliefs, desires, and knowledge.
Table 2
Number of children who passed each false belief task at pretest and posttest.

False belief pretest

False belief posttest
Explicit false belief pretest
Explicit false belief posttest
False belief-emotion pretest
False belief-emotion posttest
Note. n = 12 for each condition.

Overheard
rst person
statement

Overheard
rst person
question

Overheard
other
person
statement

Overheard
other
person
question

Interactive
other
person
statement

Interactive
other
person
question

Total

0
2
0
3
4
0

0
1
1
2
5
2

0
1
2
5
0
0

0
2
2
8
1
3

0
2
3
6
3
4

0
0
3
3
3
2

0
8
11
27
16
11

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A.H. Gola / Cognitive Development 27 (2012) 6476

Fig. 1. Childrens false belief understanding scores at pretest and posttest by condition. [Note. * = p < .05; + = p = .08].

Moreover, there was no signicant effect of mental verb input on childrens understanding of diverse
beliefs, desires, and knowledge.
A 2 (false belief pretest vs. posttest) 6 (condition) mixed ANOVA examined the effect of mental verb input on false belief understanding from pretest to posttest. A main effect of test emerged,
F(1, 66) = 8.69, p < .01, 2p = .12, which was qualied by a signicant task by condition interaction, F(5,
66) = 2.74, p < .05, 2p = .17 (Fig. 1). Post hoc paired sample t-tests indicate that only children in the overheard other person statement condition, t(11) = 2.35, p < .05, and the overheard other person question
condition, t(11) = 4.42, p < .01, signicantly improved in their false belief understanding from pretest
to posttest. Children in the interactive other person statement condition marginally improved in their
false belief understanding from pretest to posttest, t(11) = 1.92, p = .08. The task condition interaction remained signicant when childrens nonverbal intelligence, expressive, and receptive language
were entered as covariates, F(5, 63) = 2.84, p < .05, 2p = .18.
3. Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine how mental verb input promotes childrens ToM by
exposing preschoolers to carefully controlled mental verb input that was either overheard or interactive. Unlike naturalistic studies, experimental manipulation of the input rules out the possibility that
the input was a result of childrens ToM development, rather than a promoter. Three main ndings
emerged.
First, childrens understanding of beliefs, desires, and knowledge access did not improve after exposure to the mental verb input. Unlike the robust literature linking mental verb language to childrens
false belief understanding (Meins et al., 2002; Peterson & Siegel, 2000; Ruffman et al., 2002), research
examining how mental verb language affects childrens diverse desire/belief/knowledge understanding is scarce. Childrens ToM development is a gradual processone in which children rst develop
an understanding that people have diverse beliefs and desires, different from their own (Wellman &
Liu, 2004). In contrast to the more conceptual false belief tasks, there is no wrong belief that children
must reason about in the diverse desire/belief/knowledge tasks. Instead, children need only to understand that it is possible for two people to have two different beliefs or desires. Indeed, the majority
of preschoolers in this study performed near ceiling on these pretest tasks, which is the most likely
explanation for why the mental verb input did not affect childrens diverse desire/beliefs/knowledge.

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71

Presumably, language input about desires has an effect on childrens diverse desire/belief understanding earlier in development. Taumoepeau and Ruffman (2008) contend that language input serves
as a zone of proximal development for childrens ToM development. That is, mothers rst introduce
desire words into conversations with their children (e.g., want, like), and as children develop a greater
understanding of desires and beliefs, mothers introduce more abstract cognitive terms to their children
(e.g., think, know). The process of speaking slightly above what children understand is one way that
children develop an understanding of the mental world. The mental verb input in the present study
revolved around characters realizing that their beliefs about a particular object were false. This more
abstract language containing mental verbs only promoted preschoolers false belief understanding in
this study. A younger sample of children would need to be examined to determine whether childrens
diverse desire/belief/knowledge understanding is amenable to training containing talk about desires.
Second, specic mental verb uses did promote childrens false belief understanding. In particular,
three of the four other person conditions (overheard other person statement, overheard other person
question, and interactive other person statement) improved in false belief understanding from pretest
to posttest. That is, preschoolers who heard characters address second or third person perspectives
(e.g., You know where it is.) improved in their false belief understanding. Furthermore, questions
alone did not promote childrens false belief understanding, suggesting that the documented relationship in the naturalistic literature between questions containing mental verbs and childrens ToM
is most likely driven by the fact that questions most commonly are about someone else. Mothers
talk about others thoughts becomes increasingly important in childrens developing understanding
of mental states (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). The present nding demonstrates that increased
use of these utterances promotes childrens ToM understanding rather than the alternative theorymothers increase their use of these utterances around children who already have a more developed
ToM understanding.
Harris (2005) argues that exposure to conversations where multiple points of view are presented
is essential to childrens developing understanding of minds. The present study suggests that it is not
only the presentation of multiple points of view (as in the rst person conditions), but the interest in
and discussion of others points of view that promotes childrens false belief understanding. Although
preschoolers are aware that people of different ages can differ in knowledge (Jaswal & Neely, 2006),
4-year-olds do not use their understanding to predict differences in peoples interpretations of the
same event (Taylor, Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991). The rst person utterances in the present study
emphasized multiple perspectives (e.g., I know where it is./I dont know where it is.). However, hearing
characters take the perspectives of others (as in the other person conditions) possibly took it one
step further and helped children apply the knowledge of differing perspectives to predict peoples
behaviors. Indeed, to be successful on a ToM task, children must answer from the perspective of
the character. Exposure to characters discussing other peoples mental states, either in statement or
question form, helped children learn to do this more effectively.
Third, the perspective taking did not need to be directed to, or about, the childs mental states
for the child to improve in false belief understanding. The two conditions that showed signicant
improvement were both overheard conditions (i.e., the utterances were directed to other characters
in the video). Children are keen observers and very able to learn through observation (Akhtar et al.,
2001; Bandura, 1986; Piaget, 1962). Oshima-Takane, Goodz, and Derevensky, (1996) argue that only
through overhearing conversations among others do children learn that you is a universal pronoun
since models for correct pronoun usage are not available in parentchild speech. In the present study,
it may have been easier for preschoolers to map perspectives onto the characters experiences when
they observed the characters address each other in the 2nd or 3rd person perspective than when they
themselves were addressed. The results underscore childrens observational skills by demonstrating
that preschoolers false belief understanding can be promoted by observing conversational exchanges
among others.
While children in the interactive other person statement condition marginally improved in their
false belief understanding, children in the interactive question condition did not signicantly improve.
ODoherty et al. (2011) found that toddlers who overheard a social exchange on video successfully
learned a new word, but children did not learn the word when the person on the video directly
addressed them. They hypothesize that the difference in learning was due to an intact social exchange

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in the overheard condition, but a disrupted interaction in the latter case. Likewise, in the present study,
the interaction among the characters was not disrupted in the overheard conditions, or even in the
interactive statement condition. In contrast, during the interactive question condition, the characters
paused and waited for a reply from the child. It is possible that children were better able to imagine
themselves as part of the overheard exchange when there was no added distraction of a disrupted
interaction. One hypothesis is that childrens false belief understanding would be positively affected
by interactive questions if it were a live conversation instead of on video.
Deaf children who acquire uent sign language early are signicantly better at reasoning about
mental states than deaf children born to hearing parents (P. deVilliers, 2005; Peterson & Siegel, 1999).
Peterson and Siegel (2000) contend that this is because deaf children born to hearing parents are
deprived of the important conversational exchanges about abstract mental thoughts. Based on the
present results that children can improve in their false belief understanding through overhearing
conversations about mental states, another hypothesis is that this delay might be due, in part, to the
fact that deaf children are unable to overhear the conversations that typically developing children are
exposed to regularly. Indeed, as deaf children develop language ability through signing, they continue
to improve in their false belief understanding well into adolescence (Wellman, Fang, & Peterson,
2011).
Childrens receptive language skills, but not their expressive language skills, were signicantly
related to their false belief understanding at posttest. Childrens receptive language was also related
to their diverse desire/belief/knowledge at posttest but not at pretest. Both of these ndings highlight
the previously documented signicance of childrens receptive language in their ToM development
(Meins et al., 2002; Walkenfeld, 2000). Nelson (2005) discusses the importance of childrens receptive
language, over and above their expressive language, in entering into the community of minds (i.e.,
conversing about the minds of others). It is possible that children with better receptive language skills
are more equipped to make use of mental verb input for both diverse desire/belief/knowledge and false
belief tasks. However, this most likely was not the case in the present study given that the mental verb
effects on childrens false belief understanding remained signicant even after controlling for their
receptive language.
De Villiers and Pyers (2002) found that it was only after children mastered the sentence structure
necessary to discuss false beliefs (a mental verb and an embedded tensed complement) that they
passed false belief tasks. In fact, de Villiers argues that sentence complement understanding aids in
the development of childrens false belief understanding. Therefore, it is possible that children in this
study who already had a rm grasp on sentence complements may have made the best use of the
mental verb input in relation to their false belief performance.
Childrens age was not related to their performance on any of the ToM measures at pretest or
posttest. Because this was a training study, the age range was more highly restricted than is most
research investigating childrens ToM; this lack of variance most likely contributed to the absence of
an age effect.
A limitation of the present study is the inability to separate effects of the individual mental verbs.
Past research with 47-year-olds found maternal input with think, but not know, to be positively
correlated with mental state understanding (Adrian et al., 2007), suggesting that there might be unique
effects of the verb think on childrens ToM. Future research should investigate whether think (a verb
that takes false complements) only improves childrens ToM when used to address the 2nd or 3rd
person perspective.
The present study does not negate other areas of development that contribute to childrens ToM
development (e.g., executive function skills) or argue that other aspects of language are not important
to childrens ToM development. Instead, these experimental ndings add to the literature a more
complete explanation of why mental state language matters for ToM during the preschool years. It is
possible is that exposure to conversations where people take the perspectives of others throughout
the preschool years has a lasting impact on childrens understanding of minds. Future studies should
examine whether perspective-taking without the use of mental state language promotes childrens
understanding of mental states. Mental state language provides a wonderful platform with which to
discuss different points of view; however, the pragmatics may be more important than the words
themselves.

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73

In conclusion, this is the rst experimental study we know of to investigate the role of mental verb
input at a level of detail comparable to a naturalistic study while retaining all the benets of a training
study (e.g., random assignment, controlled input, a control condition). The separation of the referent,
form, and interaction style of the mental verb utterances allowed for the examination of important
theoretical questions left unanswered by naturalistic studies. The study provides evidence as to what
type of mental verb input promotes false belief understandingthat which focuses on anothers mental
state. These experimental results suggest that overhearing people talk about someone elses mental
states possibly scaffolds childrens attention to differing points of view and the interest that exists in
discussing them. Thus, the exposure to conversations in which people take the perspectives of others
may indeed be a necessary step in preschoolers introduction to, and understanding of, the mental
world.
Acknowledgement
I am very grateful to the parents and children who participated in this research. This study would
not have been possible without their involvement and the help of the teachers and principals who
graciously allowed me to see the children in their preschools and child care centers. I thank Dr. Letitia
Naigles for her guidance and support throughout the research process, and I am indebted to Henry R.
Gola and Dr. Marissa Puckett Blais for their time spent voicing the characters and editing the videos.
Appendix A. Main script for golf ball video
Freddy: My name is Freddy. And these are my two best friends, Bessie and Spot. Bessie and Spot came to my house to play
today. Right now, we are playing hide and seek.
(Spot is hiding under the table)
Bessie: And I cannot nd Spot. Where is he?
(Buster looks around the room and doesnt see Spots ear peaking out.)
Bessie: Is he over here? (looks in one direction, then the other) Bessie: I cannot nd Spot.
[Mental Verb Utterance with know-varies by condition]
1st Person Statement:
Freddy: I know where he is!
Bessie: Oh, I know where he is!
1st Person Question:
Bessie (to self): Do I know where he is?
Freddy (to self): Do I know where he is?
Other Person Statement:
Bessie (to Freddy): You know where he is.
Freddy (looks at Spots ear peaking out and then says to Bessie): You know where he is.
Other Person Statement Interactive:
Bessie (to child): You know where he is.
Freddy (to child): Yeah, you know where he is.
Other Person Question:
Bessie (to Freddy): Do you know where he is?
Freddy (to Bessie): Do you know where he is?
Other Person Question Interactive:
Bessie (to child): Hey kids, do you know where he is?
Freddy (to child): Yeah kids, do you know where he is?
[main script]
Bessie (eyes move to Spots ear peaking out): I found him!
Bessie (to Spot): That was a great hiding place!
Freddy: Yeah, that was great! You are so good at hide and seek!
Freddy: So, what should we do now?
Bessie: Lets play something else! I can go get a toy for us to play with.
[Mental Verb Utterance: know]
1st Person Statement:
Bessie: I know just what everyone will like!
Spot: I know just what everyone will like!
1st Person Question:
Bessie (to self): Do I know what everyone will like?
Spot (to self): Do I know what everyone will like?

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A.H. Gola / Cognitive Development 27 (2012) 6476

Other Person Statement:

Bessie (to Spot): You know just what everyone will like.
Spot (to Bessie): You know just what everyone will like.
Other Person Statement Interactive:
Bessie (to child): Hey kids, you know just what everyone will like.
Spot (to child): Yeah kids, you know just what everyone will like.
Other Person Question:
Bessie (to Spot): Do you know what everyone will like?
Spot (to Bessie): Do you know what everyone will like
Other Person Question Interactive:
Bessie (to child): Hey kids, do you know what everyone will like?
Spot (to child): Yeah kids, do you know what everyone will like?
[main script]
Spot (calls out to Bessie after she is gone): You should get a ball.
Freddy: You should get a jump rope.
(Bessie comes back into the room)
Bessie: I got something better! I got a golf ball for us to play with. Do you like playing golf Freddy?
[Mental Verb Utterance: know]
1st Person Statement:
Freddy: I know what golf is!
Spot: I know what golf is!
1st Person Question:
Freddy (to self): Do I know what golf is?
Spot (to self): Do I know what golf is?
Other Person Statement:
Freddy (to Spot): You know what golf is.
Spot (to Freddy): You know what golf is.
Other Person Statement Interactive:
Freddy (to child): Hey kids, you know what golf is.
Spot (to child): Yeah kids, you know what golf is.
Other Person Question:
Freddy (to Spot): Do you know what golf is?
Spot (to Bessie): Do you know what golf is?
Other Person Question Interactive:
Freddy (to child): Hey kids, do you know what golf is?
Spot (to child): Yeah kids, do you know what golf is?
[main script]
Freddy: Golf is a game you play with a club and this kind of ball.
Freddy: But hey!
[Mental Verb Utterance 4: think]
1st Person Statement:
Freddy: I dont think this is a golf ball!
Spot: I dont think this is a golf ball either!
1st Person Question:
Freddy (to self): Do I think this is a golf ball?
Spot (to self): Do I think this is a golf ball?
Other Person Statement:
Freddy (to Bessie): You think this is a golf ball.
Bessie (to Spot): You think this is a golf ball.
Other Person Statement Interactive:
Freddy (to child): Hey kids, you think this is a golf ball.
Bessie (to child): Yeah kids, you think this is a golf ball.
Other Person Question:
Freddy (to Bessie): Do you think this is a golf ball?
Bessie (to Spot): Do you think this is a golf ball?
Other Person Question Interactive:
Freddy (to child): Hey kids, do you think this is a golf ball?
Bessie (to child): Yeah kids, do you think this is a golf ball?
[main script]
Freddy: Golf balls look like this, but they dont smell like this!
(everyone leans down and loudly sniffs at the ball)
Freddy: This is really soap, not a golf ball! (Freddy picks up the soap and drops it to see it to see if it bounces). I can tell it
isnt a golf ball because it doesnt bounce!
Freddy: Youre so silly Bessie!
Spot: Were all pretty silly! (they all laugh)

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75

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