1

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 118664. August 7, 1998]

JAPAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS ENRIQUE AGANA,
MARIA ANGELA NINA AGANA, ADALIA B. FRANCISCO and JOSE
MIRANDA, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner Japan Airlines, Inc. (JAL)
seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, [1] which affirmed with
modification the award of damages made by the trial court in favor of herein private
respondents Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana, Adelia Francisco and Jose
Miranda.
On June 13, 1991, private respondent Jose Miranda boarded JAL flight No. JL 001 in
San Francisco, California bound for Manila. Likewise, on the same day private respondents
Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia Francisco left Los Angeles,
California for Manila via JAL flight No. JL 061. As an incentive for travelling on the said
airline, both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan, at the airlines
expense, thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day.
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan on June 14, 1991, private respondents were billeted at
Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. The next day, private respondents, on the final leg of their
journey, went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However, due to the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption, unrelenting ashfall blanketed Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA),
rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. Hence, private respondents trip to Manila was
cancelled indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers, JAL rebooked all the Manilabound passengers on flight No. 741 due to depart on June 16, 1991 and also paid for the
hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. On June 16, 1991, much to the dismay
of the private respondents, their long anticipated flight to Manila was again cancelled due
to NAIAs indefinite closure. At this point, JAL informed the private respondents that it
would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, 1991, private
respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their
personal funds from June 16 to June 21, 1991. Their unexpected stay in Narita ended on
June 22, 1991 when they arrived in Manila on board JL flight No. 741.

Obviously, still reeling from the experience, private respondents, on July 25, 1991,
commenced an action for damages against JAL before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 104.[2] To support their claim, private respondents asserted that JAL failed to
live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to
pay for their hotel and accommodation expenses from June 16 to 21, 1991 at Narita,
Japan. In other words, they insisted that JAL was obligated to shoulder their expenses as
long as they were still stranded in Narita. On the other hand, JAL denied this allegation and
averred that airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is
cancelled due to force majeure.
On June 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents
holding JAL liable for damages, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs ordering the defendant Japan
Airlines to pay the plaintiffs Enrique Agana, Adalia B. Francisco and Maria Angela Nina
Agana the sum of One million Two Hundred forty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Six
Pesos (P1,246,936.00) and Jose Miranda the sum of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Six
Hundred sixteen and 31/100 (P320,616.31) as actual, moral and exemplary damages and
pay attorneys fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and to
pay the costs of suit.
Undaunted, JAL appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals, which, however,
with the exception of lowering the damages awarded affirmed the trial courts finding,
[3]
thus:
Thus, the award of moral damages should be as it is hereby reduced to P200,000.00 for
each of the plaintiffs, the exemplary damages to P300,000.00 and the attorneys fees
to P100,000.00 plus the costs.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing Modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
JAL filed a motion for reconsideration which proved futile and unavailing. [4]
Failing in its bid to reconsider the decision, JAL has now filed this instant petition.
The issue to be resolved is whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to
shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached
their final destination, even if the delay were caused by force majeure.

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To begin with, there is no dispute that the Mt. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from
proceeding to Manila on schedule. Likewise, private respondents concede that such event
can be considered as force majeure since their delayed arrival in Manila was not imputable
to JAL.[5]
However, private respondents contend that while JAL cannot be held responsible for
the delayed arrival in Manila, it was nevertheless liable for their living expenses during
their unexpected stay in Narita since airlines have the obligation to ensure the comfort and
convenience of its passengers. While we sympathize with the private respondents plight,
we are unable to accept this contention.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a plethora of cases we have consistently ruled
that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued with public
interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live up to the exacting standards
of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that may be sustained by its
passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers are absolutely responsible for
all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule
otherwise would render the defense of force majeure, as an exception from any liability,
illusory and ineffective.
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation
because of force majeure, the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for
non-performance.[6] Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to
Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form
of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to
JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their
unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.

The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting
standard required by law. Undisputably, PALs diversion of its flight due to inclement
weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PALs
contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to
operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at
bar.What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and
passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and has left
the carriers premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise extraordinary
diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded passengers
until they have reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed
considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in
Cotabato City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.
The reliance is misplaced. The factual background of the PAL case is different from
the instant petition. In that case there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the
diversion of the PAL flight. However, the unforeseen diversion was worsened when private
respondents (passenger) was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride in a Ford
Fiera loaded with PAL personnel,[10] not to mention the apparent apathy of the PAL station
manager as to the predicament of the stranded passengers. [11] In light of these
circumstances, we held that if the fortuitous event was accompanied by neglect and
malfeasance by the carriers employees, an action for damages against the carrier is
permissible. Unfortunately, for private respondents, none of these conditions are present in
the instant petition.

Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to
the mode of travel.[7] In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes
are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger must
assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.[8]

We are not prepared, however, to completely absolve petitioner JAL from any
liability. It must be noted that private respondents bought tickets from the United States
with Manila as their final destination. While JAL was no longer required to defray private
respondents living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event,
JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on
the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to
look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private
respondents from transit passengers to new passengers as a result of which private
respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next
flight to Manila. Private respondents were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June
24.To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight, they were compelled to stay in the
airport the whole day of June 22, 1991 and it was only at 8:00 p.m. of the aforesaid date
that they were advised that they could be accommodated in said flight which flew at about
9:00 a.m. the next day.

Paradoxically, the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of force majeure, still
ruled against JAL relying in our decision in PAL v. Court of Appeals,[9] thus:

We are not oblivious to the fact that the cancellation of JAL flights to Manila from
June 15 to June 21, 1991 caused considerable disruption in passenger booking and

Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating

experience for the private respondents. To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety
during their unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament was not due to the fault or
negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in
the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by
reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.

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reservation. In fact, it would be unreasonable to expect, considering NAIAs closure, that
JAL flight operations would be normal on the days affected. Nevertheless, this does not
excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to transport private
respondents on its first available flight to Manila. After all, it had a contract to transport
private respondents from the United States to Manila as their final destination.
Consequently, the award of nominal damages is in order. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any
loss suffered by him.[12] The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising
from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has
been invaded.[13]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 22, 1993 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages is hereby DELETED. Petitioner JAL is ordered to pay each of the private
respondents nominal damages in the sum of P100,000.00 each including attorneys fees
of P50,000.00 plus costs.

On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia
Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to
recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted
that the deceased was killed in self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing
him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was a casofortuito for
which the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages
against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this
ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for
more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein
appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad
Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees
upon the passengers. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar
are very different however. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope
and the course of duty of the guilty employee. As this Court there found:

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22272

in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of
Appeals.1wph1.t

June 26, 1967

ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.
Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated
by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found
guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased

Page 3 of 17

x xx when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in
connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The
stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was
assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco
Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he
was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after
the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to
safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was
riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of
Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also
awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of
the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a
result, Devesa's assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of
transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

4
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the
passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of
carriage. In other words, unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took
place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting
within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889
which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute
liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by
their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event
which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on
fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the
law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. And herein
significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and present Civil Codes, in the
backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result in
theGillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly
makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon
its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees
may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers 1 are new and were taken
from Anglo-American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on
passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat
superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger
safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be
within the course of employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that
the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier
that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. 5 The

carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from
assaults committed by its own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the
rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As
explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390,
and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the
carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the
exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and
insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the
carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the carrier
for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the
servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating
therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and
(3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts
or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the
passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees
with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no
less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers,
and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly
adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal
of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated
on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil
liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiffappellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art.
1764 in connection with Art.2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the
passenger's death. As has been the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award
should be increased to P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding
that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts.
2206 and 1764 awardmoral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents
of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim
therefor, having been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral
damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We

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consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as
sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10

to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr.Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic

surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have
to ambulate in crutches during said period.

Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's
favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the filing
of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. No costs. So ordered.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. Korte

[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000]

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE
SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
D E C I S I ON
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated
March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza
JujeurcheSunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved
Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for
the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. Rtcspped
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground
that Sungas cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that
the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The
appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas
liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and

SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee
Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:

At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G.
Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University,
took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney
was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Sclaw

(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

On the way to PoblacionSibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger
off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger.
Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by IglecerioVerena and owned by Francisco
Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She
sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case
wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23

(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and

Page 5 of 17

(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

(5) to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

6
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that
to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its
passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was
a casofortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the
ground that it is not supported by evidence. Sdaadsc

created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil
Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the
safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. It provides: Slxsc
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

The petition has no merit.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver
and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party
to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Missdaa

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further

expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth
in articles 1755 and 1756.

Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in
Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict
for the damage caused to petitionersjeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known
as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because
it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.[2] In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. Slxmis
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding
Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitionersjeepney, should be binding
on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney
and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves
who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as

far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by
articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight
could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
against petitioners contention. Slx
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No.
4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:

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7
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle
in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor,
while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading
freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.

to enroll in the second semester of that school year. She testified that she
had no more intention of continuing with her schooling, because she
could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical
Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."

Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm

Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under

confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result
of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual
bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue
Physical Education as her major subject, because "my left leg x xx has a
defect already."

Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle

shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than
its registered capacity.

Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable
bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of
P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.

The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes casofortuito. A casofortuito is an event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.[3] This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtors will; (b)
the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take
part in causing the injury to the creditor.[4] Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of
parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. Kycalr
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and
without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.

As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on
a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code.[5] As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap
results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.2206(3) of
the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual
finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the
contract of carriage. Sungas contention that petitioners admission in open court that the
driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed
as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her
to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his
injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at
fault for the accident. Exsm
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its
resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
award of moral damages is DELETED.

In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: Kyle

Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college
student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University,
majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury, she was not able

SO ORDERED.

Page 7 of 17

8
FIRST DIVISION

Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc., the
insurer of the jeepney, with contrary evidence. Purportedly riding on the front seat with
Manalo was Mercedes Lorenzo. On the left rear passenger seat were Caridad Pascua,
Alejandro Morales and ZenaidaParejas. On the right rear passenger seat were Catalina
Pascua, AdelaidaEstomo, and ErlindaMeriales. After a brief stopover at Moncada, Tarlac
for refreshment, the jeepney proceeded towards Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan.

G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CASIANO
PASCUA, ET AL., respondents.
Santiago & Santiago for petitioner.
Federico R. Vinluan for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals) dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. Nos. CV-65885, CV-65886
and CV-65887 which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Pangasinan dated December 27, 1978; and its resolution dated November
28, 1983 denying the motion for reconsideration.
It is an established principle that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reviewed by this Court on appeal. However, this principle is subject to certain
exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of
the trial court (see Sabinosa v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47981,
July 24, 1989) in which case, a re-examination of the facts and evidence may be
undertaken. This is Our task now.

Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney
was detached, so it was running in an unbalanced position. Manalo stepped on the brake, as
a result of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way)
made a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping on the western lane of the road in such a
manner that the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the
north (towards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the
greater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the
north, among which was Bus No. 753 of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
(Rabbit) driven by Tomas delos Reyes. Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden
U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway as claimed by Rabbit and delos
Reyes, or after stopping for a couple of minutes as claimed by Mangune, Carreon and
Manalo, the bus bumped from behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of
the collision, three passengers of the jeepney (Catalina Pascua, ErlindaMeriales and
AdelaidaEstomo) died while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. What
could have been a festive Christmas turned out to be tragic.
The causes of the death of the three jeepney passengers were as follows (p. 101, Record on
Appeal):

The antecedent facts are as follows:

About 11:00 o'clock in the morning on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad
Pascua, AdelaidaEstomo, ErlindaMeriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and
ZenaidaParejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and
GuillermaCarreon and driven by TranquilinoManalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga bound
for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas at their respective homes. Although
they usually ride in buses, they had to ride in a jeepney that day because the buses were
full. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip. The private
respondents' testimonial evidence on this contractual relationship was not controverted by

Page 8 of 17

The deceased Catalina Pascua suffered the following injuries, to wit:

fracture of the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull; fracture of
the left mandible; fracture of the right humenous; compound fracture of
the left radious and ullma middle third and lower third; fracture of the
upper third of the right tibia and fillnea; avulsion of the head, left
internal; and multiple abrasions. The cause of her death was shock,
secondary to fracture and multiple hemorrhage. The fractures were
produced as a result of the hitting of the victim by a strong force. The
abrasions could be produced when a person falls from a moving vehicles
(sic) and rubs parts of her body against a cement road pavement. . . .
ErlindaMariles (sic) sustained external lesions such as contusion on the
left parietal region of the skull; hematoma on the right upper lid; and
abrasions (sic) on the left knee. Her internal lesions were: hematoma on

9
the left thorax; multiple lacerations of the left lower lobe of the lungs;
contusions on the left lower lobe of the lungs; and simple fractures of the
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th ribs, left. The forcible impact of the
jeep caused the above injuries which resulted in her death. . . .
The cause of death of Erlinda or Florida Estomo (also called as per
autopsy of Dr.Panlasiqui was due to shock due to internal hemorrhage,
ruptured spleen and trauma. . . .
Caridad Pascua suffered physical injuries as follows (p. 101, Record on Appeal):
. . . lacerated wound on the forehead and occipital region, hematoma on
the forehead, multiple abrasions on the forearm, right upper arm, back
and right leg. . . .
The police investigators of Tacpal and policemen of San Manuel, Tarlac, Tarlac, upon
arrival at the scene of the mishap, prepared a sketch (common exhibit "K" for private
respondents "19" for Rabbit) showing the relative positions of the two vehicles as well as
the alleged point of impact (p. 100, Record on Appeal):
. . . The point of collision was a cement pave-portion of the Highway,
about six (6) meters wide, with narrow shoulders with grasses beyond
which are canals on both sides. The road was straight and points 200
meters north and south of the point of collision are visible and
unobstructed. Purportedly, the point of impact or collision (Exh."K-4",
Pascua on the sketch Exh. "K"-Pascua) was on the western lane of the
highway about 3 feet (or one yard) from the center line as shown by the
bedris (sic), dirt and soil (obviously from the undercarriage of both
vehicles) as well as paint, marron (sic) from the Rabbit bus and greenish
from the jeepney. The point of impact encircled and marked with the
letter "X" in Exh. "K"-4 Pascua, had a diameter of two meters, the center
of which was about two meters from the western edge of cement
pavement of the roadway. Pictures taken by witness Bisquera in the
course of the investigation showed the relative positions of the point of
impact and center line (Exh. "P"-Pascua) the back of the Rabbit bus
(Exh."P"-1-Pascua"), the lifeless body of Catalina Pascua (Exh. "P-2
Pascua"), and the damaged front part of the Rabbit bus (Exh. "P-3
Pascua"). No skid marks of the Rabbit bus was found in the vicinity of
the collision, before or after the point of impact. On the other hand, there

was a skid mark about 45 meters long purportedly of the jeepney from
the eastern shoulder of the road south of, and extending up to the point of
impact.
At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there were no vehicles following the
jeepney, neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of
that day was fair.
After conducting the investigation, the police filed with the Municipal Court of San
Manuel, Tarlac, a criminal complaint against the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. At the
preliminary investigation, a probable cause was found with respect to the case of Manalo,
thus, his case was elevated to the Court of First Instance. However, finding no sufficiency
of evidence as regards the case of delos Reyes, the Court dismissed it. Manalo was
convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment. Not having appealed, he served his
sentence.
Complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. In Civil Case No. 1136, spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as
heirs of Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf. In Civil Case No. 1139,
spouses Manuel Millares and FidenciaArcica sued as heirs of ErlindaMeriales. In Civil
Case No. 1140, spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento also sued as heirs of
AdelaidaEstomo.
In all three cases, spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo, Rabbit and delos Reyes were all
impleaded as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and
Carreon and Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes,
plaintiffs based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as additional defendant in Civil Case No.
1136 only.
For the death of Catalina Pascua, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1136 sought to collect the
aggregate amount of P70,060.00 in damages, itemized as follows: P500.00 for burial
expenses; P12,000.00 for loss of wages for 24 years; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
P10,000.00 for moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees. In the same case,
plaintiff Caridad Pascua claimed P550.00 for medical expenses; P240.00 for loss of wages
for two months; P2,000.00 for disfigurement of her face; P3,000.00 for physical pain and
suffering; P2,500.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.

Page 9 of 17

10
In Civil Case No. 1139, plaintiffs demanded P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the
death of Erlinda, P63,000.00 for loss of income; P10,000.00 for moral damages and
P3,000.00 for attorney's fees or total of P80,000.00.

d) In Civil Case No. 1140, for the death of Erlinda (also called Florida or
AdelaidaEstomo), to pay her heirs (the plaintiff the amount of
P12,000.00 for indemnity for the loss of her life; P580.00 for actual
expenses; P53,160.00 for loss of wages or income and P2,000.00 for
moral damages.

In Civil Case No. 1140, plaintiffs claimed P500.00 for burial expenses; P6,000.00 for the
death of Adelaide, P56,160.00 for loss of her income or earning capacity; P10,000.00 for
moral damages; and P3,000.00 for attorney's fees.

2) The defendant Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., having contracted to

ensure and answer for the obligations of defendants Mangune and
Carreon for damages due their passengers, this Court renders judgment
against the said defendants Filriters Guaranty Insurance Co., jointly and
severally with said defendants (Mangune and Carreon) to pay the
plaintiffs the amount herein above adjudicated in their favor in Civil
Case No. 1136 only. All the amounts awarded said plaintiff, as set forth
in paragraph one (1) hereinabove;

Rabbit filed a cross-claim in the amount of P15,000.00 for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon filed a cross-claim in the
amount of P6,168.00 for the repair of the jeepney and P3,000.00 for its non-use during the
period of repairs.
On December 27, 1978, the trial court rendered its decision finding Manalo negligent, the
dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 113-114, Record on Appeal):

3) On the cross claim of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the
defendant, Isidro Mangune, GuillermaCarreon and TranquilinoManalo,
to pay jointly and severally, cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.,
the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to its Bus No. 753 and
P2,173.60 for loss of its earning.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court is of the opinion and so holds:

1) That defendants Isidro Mangune, GuillermaCarreon and
TranquilinoManalo thru their negligence, breached contract of carriage
with their passengers the plaintiffs' and/or their heirs, and this Court
renders judgment ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
the plaintiffs

All of the above amount, shall bear legal interest from the filing of the
complaints.
Costs are adjudged against defendants Mangune, Carreon and Manalo
and Filriters Guaranty.

a) In Civil Case No. 1136, for the death of Catalina Pascua, to pay her
heirs the amounts of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss of her life;
P41,760.00 for loss of earnings; P324.40 for actual expenses and
P2,000.00 for moral damages;
b) In the same Civil Case No.1136 for the injuries of Caridad Pascua, to
pay her the amounts of P240.00 for loss of wages, P328.20 for actual
expenses and P500.00 for moral damages;

SO ORDERED
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the above-quoted decision by finding
delos Reyes negligent, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 55-57, Rollo):

c) In Civil Case No.1139 for the death of ErlindaMeriales, to pay her

heirs (the plaintiffs) the amount of P12,000.00 for indemnity for loss
of her life; P622.00 for actual expenses, P60,480.00 for loss of wages or
income and P2,000.00 for moral damages;

Page 10 of 17

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the lower court's decision

is hereby REVERSED as to item No. 3 of the decision which reads:
3) On the cross claim of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. ordering the
defendants Isidro Mangune, GuillermaCarreon and TranquilinoManalo,
to pay jointly and severally, the amounts of P216.27 as actual damages to
its Bus No. 753 and P2,173.60 for loss of its earnings.

11
and another judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-appellants
Casiana Pascua, Juan Valdez and Caridad Pascua, ordering the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver Tomas delos Reyes to pay the
former jointly and severally damages in amounts awarded as follows:
For the death of Catalina Pascua, the parents and/or heirs are awarded

Total P10,550.00
For the death of ErlindaArcegaMeriales.the parents and/or heirs:
Civil Case No. 1139

Civil Case No. 1136

a) Indemnity for loss of life P12,000.00

a) Indemnity for the loss of life P12,000.00

b) Loss of Salary or Earning Capacity 20,000.00

b) Loss of Salaries or earning capacity 14,000.00

c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 500.00

c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 800.00

d) Moral damages 15,000.00

d) For moral damages 10,000.00

e) Exemplary damages 15,000.00

e) Exemplary damages 3,000.00

f) Attorney's fees 3,000.00

f) For attorney's fees 3,000.00

Total P65,500.00

Total P38,200.00 (sic)

For the death of Florida Sarmiento Estomo:

For the physical injuries suffered by Caridad Pascua:

Civil Case No. 1140

Civil Case No. 1136

a) Indemnity for loss of life P12,000.00

a) Actual damages (hospitalization expenses) P550.00

b) Loss of Salary or Earning capacity 20,000.00

b) Moral damages (disfigurement of the

c) Actual damages (burial expenses) 500.00

face and physical suffering 8,000.00

d) Moral damages 3,000.00

c) Exemplary damages 2,000.00

e) Exemplary damages 3,000.00

Page 11 of 17

12
f) Attorney's fees 3,000.00

(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda also of the San
Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they found on the road and
indicated in the sketch (Exh. K-Pascua) was shown by skid marks which
he described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the jeep,
after its wheel was removed;"

Total P41,500.00

(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Serious Physical Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless
Imprudence by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (Exh. 24-Rabbit)
upon the criminal Information by the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac (Exh.
23-Rabbit), as a result of the collision, and his commitment to prison and
service of his sentence (Exh. 25-Rabbit) upon the finality of the decision
and his failure to appeal therefrom; and

With costs against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.

SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
The issue is who is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers of
the jeepney?

(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsaloquitar (sic) attesting to

the circumstance that the collision occured (sic) on the right of way of
the Phil. Rabbit Bus.

The trial court, in declaring that Manalo was negligent, considered the following (p. 106,
Record on Appeal):
(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger plaintiff Caridad
Pascua that a long ways (sic) before reaching the point of collision, the
Mangunejeepney was "running fast" that his passengers cautioned driver
Manalo to slow down but did not heed the warning: that the right rear
wheel was detached causing the jeepney to run to the eastern shoulder of
the road then back to the concrete pavement; that driver Manalo applied
the brakes after which the jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in such a
manner that it inverted its direction making it face South instead of north;
that the jeepney stopped on the western lane of the road on the right of
way of the oncoming Phil. Rabbit Bus where it was bumped by the latter;
(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police Investigator Tacpal of
the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who, upon responding to the reported
collission, found the real evidence thereat indicate in his sketch (Exh. K,
Pascua ), the tracks of the jeepney of defendant Mangune and Carreon
running on the Eastern shoulder (outside the concrete paved road) until it
returned to the concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane
and the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the western
lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the point of impact;

The respondent court had a contrary opinion. Applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last
clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty
and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial
factor test.concluded that delos Reyes was negligent.
The misappreciation of the facts and evidence and the misapplication of the laws by the
respondent court warrant a reversal of its questioned decision and resolution.
We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in
a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where
a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on
the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This was Our ruling
in Anuran, et al. v. Buo et al., G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354, May 20, 1966, 17 SCRA
224. 1 Thus, the respondent court erred in applying said doctrine.
On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause
of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said (p.
49, Rollo):

Page 12 of 17

13
. . . thejeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time
of impact was already facing the western side of the road. Thus the
jeepney assumed a new frontal position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus
assumed a new role of defensive driving. The spirit behind the
presumption of guilt on one who bumps the rear end of another vehicle is
for the driver following a vehicle to be at all times prepared of a pending
accident should the driver in front suddenly come to a full stop, or
change its course either through change of mind of the front driver,
mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is given the
responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the
rear vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in a position to
observe the vehicle in front of it.
The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the
U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which was
then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35
meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15
meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K" Pascua). Hence, delos
Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. The respondent
court did not realize that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of evidence.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent court that (p.
52, Rollo):
. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct
is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the
actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or
the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable
(Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast
speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest
effort to avoid the accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney,
not only because he was driving fast and did not even attempt to avoid
the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical force
which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the
jeepney.

According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag,
IlocosNorte, at 4:00 o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at
approximately around 12:30 P.M., after travelling roughly for 8 hours
and 30 minutes. Deduct from this the actual stopover time of two Hours
(computed from the testimony of the driver that he made three 40-minute
stop-overs), We will have an actual travelling time of 6 hours and 30
minutes.
Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365
kms.) driving at an average of 56 km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30
minutes. Therefore, the average speed of the bus, give and take 10
minutes, from the point of impact on the highway with excellent
visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms. per hour, as this is the place
where buses would make up for lost time in traversing busy city streets.
Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed
when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming
such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. We cannot
even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the jeepney left
a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel was detached
up to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous condition of the
jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90 meters away,
considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and south of the point of
collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less
50 kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered
the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour,
delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little
time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too
much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to
him. As the trial court remarked (pp. 107-108, Record on Appeal):

The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):

Page 13 of 17

. . . They (plaintiffs) tried to impress this Court that defendant de los

Reyes, could have taken either of two options: (1) to swerve to its right
(western shoulder) or (2) to swerve to its left (eastern lane), and thus
steer clear of the Mangunejeepney. This Court does not so believe,
considering the existing exigencies of space and time.
As to the first option, Phil. Rabbit's evidence is convincing and
unrebutted that the Western shoulder of the road was narrow and had tall
grasses which would indicate that it was not passable. Even plaintiffs

14
own evidence, the pictures (Exhs. P and P-2, Pascua) are mute
confirmation of such fact. Indeed, it can be noticed in the picture (Exh. P2, Pascua) after the Rabbit bus came to a full stop, it was tilted to right
front side, its front wheels resting most probably on a canal on a much
lower elevation that of the shoulder or paved road. It too shows that all of
the wheels of the Rabbit bus were clear of the roadway except the outer
left rear wheel. These observation appearing in said picture (Exh P-2,
Pascua) clearly shows coupled with the finding the Rabbit bus came to a
full stop only five meters from the point of impact (see sketch, Exh. KPascua) clearly show that driver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to
the right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune'sjeepney. That it was not
successful in fully clearing the Mangunejeepney as its (Rabbit's) left
front hit said jeepney (see picture Exh. 10-A-Rabbit) must have been due
to limitations of space and time.
Plaintiffs alternatively claim that defendant delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus
could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid bumping the
Mangunejeepney which was then on the western lane. Such a claim is
premised on the hypothesis (sic) that the eastern lane was then empty.
This claim would appear to be good copy of it were based alone on the
sketch made after the collision. Nonetheless, it loses force it one were to
consider the time element involved, for moments before that, the
Mangunejeepney was crossing that very eastern lane at a sharp angle.
Under such a situation then, for driver delos Reyes to swerve to the
eastern lane, he would run the greater risk of running smack in the
Mangunejeepney either head on or broadside.
After a minute scrutiny of the factual matters and duly proven evidence, We find that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed precisely pro hac vice.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only
be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or that the death or injury of the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657).
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of
Caridad Pascua, Police Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, his (Manalo's)
conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Injuries with Damage

to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur supra. The negligence of spouses Mangune and Carreon was likewise proven
during the trial (p. 110, Record on Appeal):
To escape liability, defendants Mangune and Carreon offered to show
thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he
periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of said defendants, the last
on Dec. 23, the day before the collision, which included the tightening of
the bolts. This notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was
detached while in transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence was
offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain, much less
establish, it to be one caused by a casofortuito. . . .
In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for his failure to
safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by defects
in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not
a casofortuito which would avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu
Autobus Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657;
Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and Carreon are jointly
and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous The driver cannot be held jointly and
severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale
behind this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and
the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible
therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver
(seeViluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos.L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA
742). In other words, the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver
nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his. 4 Secondly, if We make the driver
jointly and severally liable with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal
instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only the share which
corresponds to the driver, 5 contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the
New Civil Code. 6
We affirm the amount of damages adjudged by the trial court, except with respect to the
indemnity for loss of life. Under Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the New Civil
Code, the amount of damages for the death of a passenger is at least three thousand pesos
(P3,000.00). The prevailing jurisprudence has increased the amount of P3,000.00 to
P30,000.00 (see Heirs of Amparodelos Santos, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,

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G.R. No. 51165, June 21, 1990 citing De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co., G.R. Nos. L-3569799, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 70).

, Adelaida Estomo Erlinda Meriales MercedesLorenzo Alejandro Morales

And Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses IsidroMangune

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate

Appellate Court dated July 29, 1983 and its resolution dated November 28, 1983 are SET
ASIDE. The decision of the Court of First Instance dated December 27, 1978 is
REINSTATED MODIFICATION that only Isidro Mangune, GuillermaCarreon and
Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims or their heirs and
that the amount of indemnity for loss of life is increased to thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
DIGESTS
1) Philippine Rabbit v. IACPARTIES:
Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida Estomo,Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo,
AlejandroMorales and Zenaida Parejas

Jeepney PassengersIsidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon

JeepneyOwnerTranquilino Manalo
Jeepney DriverFilriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc.

Jeepney InsurerPhilippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.

And Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga
bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmast at their respective homes
paying ManaloP24.00 for the trip. Although they usually ride in buses,t hey had to ride in a
jeepney that day because the buses were full. The passengers testimonial evidence on this
contractual relationship was not controverter by Mangune, Carreon and Manalo, nor by
FilritersGuaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. , the insurer of the jeepney, with contrary
evidence.Mangune jeepney was "running fast" that itspassengers cautioned driver Manalo
to slow down butdid not heed the warning. Upon reaching barrioSinayoan, San Manuel,
Tarlac, the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached causing the jeepney to runto the
eastern shoulder of the road then back to the concrete pavement running in an unbalanced
position. Manalo applied the brakes after which the jeepney made a U-turn (half-turn) in
such a manner that it inverted its direction making it face South (from where it came)
instead of north (towards where it was going). The jeepney practically occupied and
blocked thegreater portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of Bus No. 753 of
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,Inc. driven by Tomas delos Reyes , which bumped from
behind the right rear portion of the jeepney. As a result of the collision, three passengers of
the jeepney(Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and AdelaidaEstomo) died while the other
jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries. At the time and in thevicinity of the
accident, the weather condition was fairand there were no vehicles following the
jeepney(running more or less 50kph), neither were thereoncoming vehicles, except the bus
(running 80 to90kph)

After investigation, the police filed with the MunicipalCourt of San Manuel, Tarlac a
criminal complaintagainst the two drivers for Multiple Homicide. At thepreliminary
investigation, a probable cause was foundwith respect to the case of Manalo, thus, his case
waselevated to the CFI. However, finding no sufficiency of evidence as regards the case of
delos Reyes, the Courtdismissed it. Manalo was convicted and sentenced tosuffer
imprisonment. Not having appealed, he servedhis sentence.

Bus Driver

CFI RULING:

FACTS: About 11:00 A. M., Catalina Pascua CaridadPascua

Trial court found jeepney driver Manalonegligent. Hence, Isidro Mangune, Guillerma
Carreonand Tranquilino Manalo thru their negligence werefound in breach of their contract

Bus OwnerTomas delos Reyes

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of carriage with theirpassengers and/or their heirs, and were ordered, jointly and severally,
to pay the plaintiffs for indemnityand damages, and cross-claimant Phil. Rabbit BusLines,
Inc. actual damages for loss of its earning.
IAC RULING:
IAC; applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance , (2) the presumption that
drivers whobump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the causeof the accident unless
contradicted by other evidence,and (3) the substantial factor test ; reversed the CFIdecision
and found bus driver delos Reyes negligentand ordered the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. andits driver to pay the jointly and severally damages inamounts awarded for the death
of Catalina Pascua,Florida Sarmiento Estomo and Erlinda Arcega Meriales,the parents
and/or heirs and for the physical injuriessuffered by Caridad Pascua.
ISSUE: Who is liable for the death and physical injuriessuffered by the passengers of the
jeepney?
HELD:
The jeepney. The IAC was not able to properlyappreciate the evidence and misapplied the
laws thatwarrant a reversal of the decision.
The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in a suitbetween the owners and drivers of
the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demandsresponsibility from
the carrier to enforce itscontractual obligations. For it would be inequitable toexempt the
negligent driver of the jeepney and itsowners on the ground that the other driver
waslikewise guilty of negligence.On the presumption of guilt on one who bumps therear
end of another vehicle, the spirit behind it is for the driver following a vehicle to be at all
times prepared of a pending accident, giving the rear vehicle the responsibility of avoiding
a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control of the
situation as it is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it.
Said presumption is not applicable in thiscase present contradictory evidence, the
undisputedfact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was abruptwhich bus driver delos
Reyes could not haveanticipated. Under the substantial factor test , the rule is that if
theactor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing aboutharm to another, the fact that the
actor neitherforesaw nor should have foreseen the extent of theharm or the manner in

which it occurred does notprevent him from being liable. The SC was notconvinced in
applying the rule. The Court held that itcannot fault delos Reyes for not having avoided
thecollision because of the sudden U-turn of the jeepney,having little time to react to the
situation. Aside fromthe time element involved, there were no optionsavailable to him.
Evidence clearly showed that busdriver de los Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to its
right(western lane) in an attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney but was
unsuccessful due tolimitations of space and time. And the alternative of swerving to its left
(eastern lane), run a greater risk of running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head onor
broadside considering the time element involved,for moments before that, the Mangune
jeepney wascrossing that very eastern lane at a sharp angle.After a minute scrutiny of the
factual matters and dulyproven evidence, the Court found that the proximatecause of the
accident was the negligence of Manaloand spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all failed
toexercise the precautions that are needed precisely prohac vice. In culpa contractual , the
moment a passengerdies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have beenat fault or to
have acted negligently, and thisdisputable presumption may only be overcome byevidence
that he had observed extra-ordinary diligenceas prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756
of theNCC or that the death or injury of the passenger wasdue to a fortuitous event.
The negligence of Manalo was proven and in an action for damages against the carrier for
his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an accident caused either by
defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a cas of fortuitous ,
which would avoid the carriers liability for damages. The trial court was therefore right in
finding that Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon were negligent. However, the
driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the
contract of carriage, since a contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger,
and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to
the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In otherwords, the
carrier can neither shift his liability on th econtract to his driver nor share it with him, for
hisdriver's negligence is his. Also in making the driver jointly and severally liable with the
carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and
consequently, entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver.
MARANAN VS PEREZ
20 SCRA 412
FACTS:

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Rogelio Corachea, a passenger in a taxicab owned
and operated by Pascual Perez, was stabbed and killed by
the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. Valenzuela was found
guilty for homicide by the Court of First Instance and was
sentenced to suffer Imprisonment and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000. While pending
appeal, mother of deceased filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez
and Valenzuela. Defendant Perez claimed that the death
was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. The
court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded
her P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim
against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this
ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this
Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter
insisting on non-liability.
Defendant-appellant relied solely on the ruling
enunciated in Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co. that the
carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its
employees upon the passengers.
ISSUE:
Was the contention of the defendant valid?
RULING:
No. The attendant facts and controlling law of that
case and the one at bar were very different. In the Gillaco
case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the
course of duty of the guilty employee. The Gillaco case was

decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889

which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon
common carriers absolute liability for the safety of
passengers against willful assaults or negligent acts
committed by their employees. The death of the passenger
in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which
exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105
of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been
substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their
exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides
for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. The
Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers
are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. The
basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers
committed by its drivers rested either on the doctrine of
respondent superior or the principle that it was the
carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by
the later cases, it was enough that the assault happens
within the course of the employee's duty. It was no defense
for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority
or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's
liability here was absolute in the sense that it practically
secured the passengers from assaults committed by its own
employees.

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