CARP COVERAGE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH DUE PROCESS, TWO NOTICES

ARE REQUIRED: FIRST, THE NOTICE OF COVERAGE AND LETTER OF

INVITATION TO A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND, SECOND, THE NOTICE
OF ACQUISITION TO BE SENT TO THE LANDOWNER
EXEMPTION, MORE THAN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND
AS PARK IS THAT SAID LAND FORMS A VITAL PART OF A WATERSHED
AREA AND HAS SLOPES OF 18% AND OVER WHICH ARE EXEMPT UNDER
SECTION 10 OF R.A. NO. 6657
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 112526 (October 12, 2001)
Facts:

Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was

the registered owner of two parcels of land situated at Barangay Casile,
Cabuyao, Laguna covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 81949 and
84891 with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of
land are watersheds which provide clean potable water to the Canlubang
Community and ninety (90) light industries located in the area.

Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the property,
thereby destroying the ecosystem. Respondents filed a civil case with the RTC of
Laguna seeking an easement of a right of way to and from Barangay Casile.
Petitioner countered by seeking the ejectment of the respondents and filed
separate complaints for forcible entry against the respondents before the
Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. After the filing of the ejectment cases,
respondents petitioned the DAR for the compulsory acquisition of the SRRDC
property under CARP.

Eventually, after a long and arduous process, the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition to
petitioner and placed the properties under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program despite the protest made by SRRDC that the property was not
appropriate for agricultural purposes. The area being rugged in terrain with
slopes of 18% or over and that the occupants of the land were squatters not
entitled to any land as beneficiaries. SRRDC further averred that the properties
were exempt from CARP coverage because it had been classified as watershed
area and were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion. Later, the
case was referred to the DARAB for summary land valuation.

In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24

rendered a Decision finding that the private respondents illegally entered the
SRRDC property and ordered them evicted.

On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a Memorandum

directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open a trust account in favor of
SRRDC for P5,637,965.55 as valuation for the SRRDC property.

On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated its Decision which, among

others, dismissed the petitioner's protest against compulsory coverage for lack
of merit, ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay SRRDC the amount of
P7,841,997.64 for the landholdings covered by the two titles and ordered the
DAR through the MARO to take immediate possession of the landholding after
transfer of the titles in the name of the Republic of the Philippines for the
immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to farmer-beneficiaries.

On January 20, 1992, the RTC of Laguna, Branch 24 rendered a Decision in

Civil Case No. B-2333 ruling that private respondents were builders in bad faith.

On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for
review of the DARAB decision. The CA promulgated a decision affirming the
Decision of the DARAB. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP considering that

it forms part of a watershed area and has slopes of 18% and over

Held:

First, under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition of
private land, Compulsory and Voluntary.

In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners

and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR
shall send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and
barangay hall of the place where the property is located.

Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.

If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor

of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days
from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer
or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings
to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP
representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just
compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from
submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision
and the amount of just compensation.

The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land
acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Under Sec. 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory
acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the farmer
beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process shall
be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR issued Administrative Order
No. 12, series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of
such lands.

Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural
lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required
information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF)
for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of
Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land
covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective farmerbeneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to
discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions,
objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked
to indicate his retention area.

For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are required: (1)
the notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to
the landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer-beneficiaries and
other interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the
notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.

The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage and the
letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct cannot be
understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of

the State's police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that
the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of
lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking
under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation on the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to
and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.

In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question.
However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the
procedural requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by
trust accounts as was done by DAR.

In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, we held that "The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either."

Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries
and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent
watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, so why
was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At
the time of the titling, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
had not declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of land in
Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the
municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao,
Laguna issued Resolution 26 voiding the Zoning classification of the lands at
Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land was now classified as
agricultural land.

The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning

classification is an exercise of its police power, not the power of eminent
domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs."

In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that lands
classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL, may not be
compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer beneficiaries.

However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact
that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of land in question
form a vital part of a watershed area.

The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The
most important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most
important human necessity. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
"intergenerational responsibility" that needs to be answered now.

Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB
hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18%
and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R.A. No. 6657,
Section 10, provides:
"Section 10.
Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and
mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for
educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production
centers, church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, communal burial
grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by
the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers, and all
lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."

Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the
disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition
coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes.

To resolve the issue as to the nature of the parcels of land involved in the
case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.
JURISDICTION; DAR HAS JURISDICTION OVER ALL CONTROVERSIES
INVOLVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Roberto J. Cuenca
G.R. No. 154112 (September 23, 2004)

Facts:

Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of

land designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an
area of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and
devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane.

On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer

(MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private
respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the
compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and
Land Bank of the Philippines for 'Annulment of Notice of Coverage and
Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With
Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order.'

Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared

null and void ab initio and Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 be
declared unconstitutional.

MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the
action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.

The respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing MARO

and LBP to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage. In the
same order, the respondent Judge set the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on January 17 and 18, 2000.

In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe
Fortunado's motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from
implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the
determination of the value of the subject land.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) thereafter filed before the CA a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into
cognizance that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private
respondent, which seeks to exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP, is
an agrarian reform matter and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the
trial court.

The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely abused its
discretion by sustaining the writ of injunction issued by the trial court, which is a
violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657.

Held:

The Petition has merit. The issue involves the implementation of agrarian
reform, a matter over which the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction,
pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657)

All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian

Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or
constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since
the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate
agrarian matters

Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it
follows that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to
issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be
stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the
express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative
Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to
strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:
"Section 68.
Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall
be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program."

JURISDICTION, THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DECIDE

JUST COMPENSATION CASES REMAINS WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN
COURT WHILE ONLY THE PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION THEREOF IS
VESTED WITH THE DARAB; RESORT TO THE COURTS CANNOT BE
FORECLOSED ON THE THEORY THAT THE COURTS ARE THE GUARANTORS
OF THE LEGALITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals, The Secretary of DAR, DARAB, Davao
City and Land Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 132767 (January 18, 2000)

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in

Tagum, Davao which were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for
distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the valuation of the Land Bank of
the Philippines and the DARAB, petitioner filed a petition for determination of the
just compensation for its property with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Tagum, Davao on January 26, 1994. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglamentary period for filing appeals
from the orders of the DARAB. The Decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this Petition for Review.

Issue:

Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in
the determination of just compensation

Held:

No.
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly Section 50 thereof,
Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
"Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. The decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from

receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for
reconsideration."

As we held in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, this Rule is an acknowledgement

by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the Courts. It is error to think that,
because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the
courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby
been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in
accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is
vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to
challenge in the courts.

The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and
exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that
matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and
unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the
theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.

Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the
15-day period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB,
the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly
affirmed the order of dismissal.
LAND VALUATION; FINALITY OF DARAB DECISION ON LAND VALUATION
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez
G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2007)

Facts:

After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform, on

November 16, 1993, of respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land
in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657,
or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land
Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation, for which
respondent rejected. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary
administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of just
compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.

On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment ordering

the LBP to pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property
covered with the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50).

A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel
before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan,
Romblon.

Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision,

filed before the Office of the PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, which was eventually granted on November 11, 2003. The PARAD
denied LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution on February 23, 2004.

LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD
resolution. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved,
LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September 28,
2004 dismissed the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ
of execution despite the pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just
compensation with the SAC?

Held:

In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the
same time petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. In both
proceedings, the parties are identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In
the two actions, petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD resolutions
should not be executed in view of the pendency of the petition for fixing of just
compensation with the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two fora could
come up with conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be avoided
by the rule against forum-shopping.

We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by the

appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule
XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.

In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of Agrarian

Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said
rule to the effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality
after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case,
LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days
after its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the
reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could
very well issue the writ of execution.

On determination of just compensation: LBP VS HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO CRUZ

The petition lacks merit.
The Court laid down in Paris v. Alfeche[25] the applicability of P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. No. 228 in relation to R.A. No. 6657 in the matter of the payment of just
compensation. There the Court explained that while under P.D. No. 27 tenant
farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to
pay the cost of the land before the title is transferred to them and that pending the
payment of just compensation, actual title to the tenanted land remains with the
landowner.
In Paris, the application of the process of agrarian reform was still incomplete
thus, the Court held therein that with the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before its
completion, the process should now be completed under R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 applying only suppletorily.[26]
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[27] the Court explained why the
guidelines under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 are no longer applicable to the
delayed payment of lands acquired under P.D. No. 27, to wit:
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering
the DARs failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable
length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially
imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. [28]
The decisive backdrop of the instant case coincides with that in Paris, that is,
the amount of just compensation due to respondents had not yet been settled by
the time R.A. No. 6657 became effective. Following the aforementioned
pronouncement in Paris, the fixing of just compensation should therefore be based
on the parameters set out in R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having
only suppletory effect.
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 states:

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining

just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value
of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment
made by government assessors, shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and
by government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or
loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,[29] the Court ruled that the factors
enumerated under Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 had already been translated into a
basicformula by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to its rulemaking power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the Court held
in Celada that the formula outlined in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998 [30] should be
applied in computing just compensation.
Likewise, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,[31] the Court ruled that
the applicable formula in fixing just compensation is DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992,
as amended by DAR A.O. No. 11, series of 1994, then the governing regulation
applicable to compulsory acquisition of lands, in recognition of the DARs rulemaking power to carry out the object of R.A. No. 6657. Because the trial court
therein based its valuation upon a different formula and did not conduct any hearing
for the reception of evidence, the Court ordered a remand of the case to the SAC for
trial on the merits.
The mandatory application of the aforementioned guidelines in determining
just compensation has been reiterated recently in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Lim,[32]where the Court also ordered the remand of the case to the SAC for the
determination of just compensation strictly in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 6,
series of 1992, as amended.
A perusal of the PARADs Decision dated 23 November 1999, which mandated
payment of just compensation in the amount of P80,000.00 per hectare, reveals
that the PARAD did not adhere to the formula prescribed in any of the
aforementioned regulations issued by the DAR or was at least silent on the
applicability of the aforementioned DAR regulations to the question of just
compensation. The PARAD decision also did not refer to any evidence in support of
its finding.
The SAC, meanwhile, referred to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended,
as the controlling guideline in fixing just compensation. Pertinently, to obtain the
land value, the formula[33] under said regulation requires that the values for the
Capitalized Net Income, Comparable Sales and Market Value based on the tax
declaration must be shown. Moreover, said formula has been superseded by DAR
A.O. No. 05, series of 1998, which also requires values for Capitalized Net Income,
Comparable Sales and Market Value, the same parameters laid down in the prior
regulation.

Stating that no evidence was presented by respondents on the

aforementioned parameters, the SAC ruled that it was constrained to adopt the
finding of the PARAD, which fixed the value of the land at P80,000.00 per hectare.
On appeal, the CA adopted the same finding.
The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on the Court. However, the rule
admits of exceptions, as when the factual findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures or when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based. [34]
A perusal of the PARAD decision, which was adopted by both the SAC and the
CA, shows that its valuation of P80,000.00 per hectare is sorely lacking in any
evidentiary or legal basis. While the Court wants to fix just compensation due to
respondents if only to write finis to the controversy, the evidence on record is not
sufficient for the Court to do so in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93207
areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Agrarian Case No. 0058 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, which is directed to
determine with dispatch the just compensation due respondents strictly in
accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.

Land bank vs CA, pascual

Petitioner LBP having consistently refused to comply with its obligation despite the
directive of the Secretary of the DAR and the various demand letters of private
respondent Jose Pascual, the latter finally filed an action forMandamus in the Court
of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the PARAD. On
15 July 1996 the appellate court granted the Writ now being assailed. The appellate
court also required petitioner LBP to pay a compounded interest of 6% per annum in
compliance with DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994. 21 On 11 March
1997 petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied; 22 hence, this petition.
Petitioner LBP avers that the Court of Appeals erred in issuing the Writ
of Mandamus in favor of private respondent and argues that the appellate court
cannot impose a 6% compounded interest on the value of Jose Pascual's land since
Administrative Order No. 13 does not apply to his case. Three (3) reasons are given
by petitioner why the Court of Appeals cannot issue the writ:
First, it cannot enforce PARAD's valuation since it cannot make such determination
for want of jurisdiction hence void. Section 12, par. (b), of PD
946 23 provides that the valuation of lands covered by PD 27 is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Petitioner asserts that Sec. 17 of EO
229 24 and Sec. 50 of RA No. 6657, 25 which granted DAR the exclusive jurisdiction
over all agrarian reform matters thereby divesting the Court of Agrarian Relations of

such power, did not repeal Sec. 12, par (b), of PD 946. Petitioner now attempts to
reconcile the pertinent laws by saying that only the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
can determine the value of rice and corn lands under Operation Land Transfer of PD
27, while on the other hand, all other lands covered by RA 6657 (CARL) shall be
valued by the DARAB, hence, the DARAB of the DAR has no jurisdiction to determine
the value of the lands covered by OLT under PD 27.
To bolster its contention that Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946 was not repealed,
petitioner LBP cites Sec. 76 of RA 6657. 26 It argues that since Sec. 76 of RA 6657
only repealed the last two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 12 of PD 946, it is obvious that
Congress had no intention of repealing par. (b). Thus, it remains valid and effective.
As a matter of fact, even the Secretary of Agrarian Reform agreed that Sec. 12, par.
(b), of PD 946 still holds. Based on this assumption, the Secretary of the DAR has
opined that the valuation of rice and corn lands is under his exclusive jurisdiction
and has directed all DARAB officials to refrain from valuing lands covered by PD
27. 27 Petitioner maintains that the Secretary of the DAR should conduct his own
proceedings to determine the value of Parcels 2 and 3 and that his valuation of
Parcel 1 28 should be upheld.
We do not agree. In Machete v. Court of Appeals 29 this Court discussed the effects
on PD 946 of Sec. 17 of EO 229 and Sec. 50 of RA 6657 when it held
The above quoted provision (sec. 17) should be deemed to have
repealed Sec. 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which
invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original exclusive
jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation
to the agrarian reform program (emphasis supplied).
Thus, petitioner's contention that Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946 is still in effect cannot
be sustained. It seems that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform erred in issuing
Memorandum Circular No. I, Series of 1995, directing the DARAB to refrain from
hearing valuation cases involving PD 27 lands. For on the contrary, it is the DARAB
which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian
reform 30 although such valuation may only be considered preliminary as the final
determination of just compensation is vested in the courts. 31