Simmel's Goethe in the Thought of Ortega y Gasset

Author(s): Nelson R. Orringer

Source: MLN, Vol. 92, No. 2, Hispanic Issue (Mar., 1977), pp. 296-311
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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IMMEL'S GOETHE IN THE THOUGHT

OF ORTEGA Y GASSET

NELSON R. OR-

for
reflect
admiration
RINGER MiOrtega'searlywritings

Goethe which fades in his mature works.While criticsexplain this

attitude change as a function of Ortega's philosophical
development, they overlook that through the years he is usually
reacting, in differentbut predictable ways, to Georg Simmel's
Goethe(1913). Ortega has called this book the only readable one
thatGermanyhas produced on the poet, yeta superficialtreatment
at best (1932, IV, 398). Nevertheless,the firstedition,stillstanding
in Ortega's home library,' has apparently furnished main
tiempo(1923), doctrines
metaphysicaldoctrinesforEl temade nuestro
later to be refutedin "Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro" (1932)!
To account forOrtega's shiftsin positiontowardsSimmel'sGoetheis
our present purpose. Here we shall sketch Simmel's
relate to it his view of Goethe's life,and point out
Lebensphilosophie,
the varyingeffectsof this vision on Ortega from 1914 to 1949.
Simmel sees life as a synthesisof contentand form,whereby
content denotes anythingpresent or representable to the mind,
and form, any principle choosing and structuringthe content.
Conceived as form,life is an orderly, self-governingprocess of
endless movement, motivated by self-promoting needs. It
References from Ortega include date of firstpublication (of composition if
posthumous), volume number of Obras Completas(Madrid: Revista de Occidente,
1963-69), page number. We employ 6th ed. of vols. I-VI, 2nd ed. of vols. VII-IX.
l Visitedbyus June 8, 1975. ReferencesfromSimmel,Goethe(Leipzig: Verlag von
Klinkhardt& Biermann, 1913) hereafterappear parenthesized in our text. Only
Egon Schwarz,"Jose Ortega y Gassets Verhaltniszu Goethe," in Studiesin Germanic
ed. Erich Hofacker and Liselotte Dieckmann (St . Louis:
Languagesand Literatures,
Washington UniversityPress, 1963), p. 67, observes similarityof approach to
Goethe in Simmel and Ortega, but does not pursue the comparison. On Ortega's
Welt(Stuttgart:J.B.
philosophicalevolution: Udo Rukser,Goethein derhispanischen
Metzlersche, 1958), pp. 190-91. Also see Kessel Schwartz,"Ortega y Gasset and
Goethe," Hisp., 43 (Sept. 1960), 320-27; and Julian Marias, Ortega ante Goethe
(Madrid: Taurus, 1961), 28 pp.

MLN 92 (1977) 296-31,

Press
University
t 1977 byTheJohnsHopkins
Copyright
reserved.
inanyform
Allrights
ofreproduction

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M L N

297

overcomes obstacles to generate new forms in its on-going flow.

Yet, regarded as content,life originates beings with their own
meanings and laws, oftenantitheticalto those of theirprogenitor.
Cultural products contend with cultivatedman and dehumanize
him. Normallyhe livesenslaved to the teleologyof the body, which
controlshis purposiveactionin culture.Witheffort,though,he can
free himself, actualize his vital potential, and discover a new
and self-contained.2
principleof culture,self-sufficient
The capacity for creative self-realizationdefines what Simmel
means by genius. And Goethe exemplifiesthisabilityto harmonize
personal need withobjectivevalue, lifeas formwithlifeas content.
Indeed, Simmel's Goethe demonstrates that the ideal of such
harmony guides Goethe's thoughts and actions. Hence his
unmindfulness of extraneous considerations like professional
standards:"Es kommtoffenbarim Leben aufs Leben und nichtauf
ein Resultatdesselben an." Simmel connects Goethe's phrase with
Schiller's remark that man is only human insofar as he plays. In
play, Simmel explains, man suspends objective limitationsand
allows his will and talentsto guide him. But just as play can entail
risk,so Simmel regards Goethe's life's work as a rigorous game,
whereinhe earnestlysurrendershimselfto objects and surmounts
ever new difficulties-though only to further his personal
development. He synthesizesouter strictureswith self-imposed
limits.3(pp. 5-6). He accords equal value to every contentof his
as he
activity.Each, Simmel finds, allows him self-affirmation,
suggeststo Eckermannon May 2, 1824: "Ich habe all mein Wirken
und Leisten immer nur symbolischangesehn und es ist mir im
Grunde gleichgultig gewesen, ob ich Topfe machte oder
Schiisseln." For Simmel, the 'acts' ("Wirken") symbolizethe secret
meaning of things; the 'works' ("Leisten"), Goethe's personal
2
On life as formand life as content: R. H. Weingartner,Experienceand Culture:
ofGeorgSimmel(Middleton,Conn.: WesleyanUniversityPress, 1960),
ThePhilosophy
Viermetaphysische
pp. 22-40, 69-71. Also consulted: Georg Simmel,Lebensanschauung.
Kapitel(Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1918), pp. 40-44; "Der Begriff
und die Tragodie der Kultur,"Logos, 2 (1911-12), 21.
3 From "Ein Wort furjunge Dichter," in Schriften
zur Literatur,SimtlicheWerke
(Berlin: Propylaen Vlg., 1909), XLIV, 309. From the original passage, Simmel,
Goethe,p. 144, omits"aber," the thirdword. Ortega's Spanish version,1921,11,240,n
1, containsno equivalent to "aber" nor translatesthe preceding sentenceto whichit
refers.Hence Ortega probablytranslatedSimmel here withoutpreviouslychecking
Goethe himself!

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298

NELSON

R. ORRINGER

destiny.Both sets of symbolssignifythe harmonybetween Goethe

as creator and the experience out of which he creates.
Likewise, writes Simmel, Werther reflects that his mother
wishes him active, yet fails to notice that he is already; for what
differencedoes it make whetherhe count peas or lentils?Only a
fool, Wertherthinks,pursues goods to please others rather than
serving his own needs (pp. 12-13). Simmel deems Goethe so
well-adjustedto the world,thathe likensthe creativeprocess,in its
naturalness,to breathing in and out. He considers his poetry at
once 'occasional verse' ("Gelegenheitsgedichte")and partof a 'great
confession'(pp. vii, 14).
The unityof his lifeboth as formand as contentmarkshis theory
of. knowledge. The true thought is one he finds 'fruitful'
("fruchtbar")for him; its content,according to Simmel, must fit
into the rest of his thought and must also increase his
energies. Meaningfulforhim as a whole man, truth
life-promoting
joins him with the whole of being, the natural order (pp. 21-5).
Understandablyhe criticizesexperimentalmethods of physicsfor
artificiallyseparating nature from the experimenter. And he
preferssimple observationas more adequate to its object, nature,
which, in its simplicity,merely 'is.' In the presence of sea life
Goethe exclaims, "Wie wahr! wie seiend!" (pp. 29-31). Moreover,
the truth-seekerharmonious with himself and the world also
harmonizeswitheveryother well-adjustedindividual,whateverhis
but harmoniously,like
viewpoint.All reflectthe cosmos differently
mirrors set around a marketplace. Knowledge comes from
possessingsome of the objectunder studywithinoneself,as Goethe
suggestsin the ZahmeXenien,III:
War'nichtdas Auge sonnenhaft,
Die Sonne kdnnt'es nie erblicken;
Lag' nichtin uns des GotteseigneKraft,
(p. 42)
entzucken?
Wie k6nnt'uns Gottliches
In Goethe's pantheisticterms,the God-Nature dwellswithinand
among the harmony of minds with one another and with the
universe (pp. 42-9). In fact, Goethean pantheism, in Simmel's
opinion, stems from an identificationmade between life as form
and life as contentor, as Simmel otherwiseputs it, between lived
realityand objective value. Goethe calls himselfa non-Christian,
Simmel finds,because Christians,even more than Hindus, separate
value fromexperience. Hinduism reduces spatio-temporalreality

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299

to dream and thus deprives it of potential for value. But

Christianitygrantsit merelyconditionalvalue, ultimatelyforfeited
forthe sake of salvation:thislife,forthe Christian,has worthonly
as preparationforthe Afterlife,the true locus of value. Yet Goethe
attributesgrace to a God immanentin lived reality.Religious piety
is a 'grace' bestowed by nature upon the devout (pp. 97-8).
The keynoteof Goethe's esthetics,Simmel writes,is the union of
natural reality and artisticvalue. This outlook persists through
three epochs into which Simmel divides his life and works: youth,
the period colored by the Italian travels,and advanced age. He
reaches his acme in the middle epoch, when ancient and
Renaissance art reveal nature to him as a harmonyof forms,the
site of the 'idea' perceptible in appearances. Previously,he has
simplyperceived nature as a burgeoning force, undifferentiated
fromvalue. His Weimar years before departing for Italy awaken
him to the dichotomyof nature and art. Temporarily unable to
write,he takes up nature study, discovers the autonomy of the
natural order, and goes to Italy in hopes of integratinghis poetic
world with natural reality (p. 105). This integration, Simmel
suggests,occurs in Rome, as Goethe notes in March 1788: "In Rom
hab ich mich selbst zuerst gefunden, ich bin zuerst
ubereinstimmend mit mir selbst, glucklich und vernunftig
geworden" (p. 110). Greek art shows him that nature and sensory
perception have immanent value and can form a harmonious
whole. When realityand art flowtogether,the beauty of nature is
apprehensible in its full truthbeyond individual aspects (p. 112).
The ideal of life as harmony pervades Goethe's final epoch.
Often equating life with activity,the aging poet sees the activity
which is life as aiming in every instanttoward a differentgoal,
which contains everything needed for the moment, until the
followingmoment presentsits own need (pp. 135-6). Because the
contentof his own lifefitsso wellintoitsdevelopmentalprocess,he
takes for granted,Simmel theorizes,that life as movementcreates
estimableproducts. These do not lie apart fromthe producing as
itsgoals, but remain withinit and stimulatefurtherproductivity
(p.
147). The producer benefits himself-and others. Seen from
withinhis life, his creations assure him individuality;seen from
without,theymayintegratehim withmankind.In everyindividual,
Goethe discerns a differentpossibilityfor harmonizing with all
humanity.His own creations, in Simmel's judgment, purport to
promote world harmony:

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R. ORRINGER

Wennich aussprechensoll,sagter kurzvorseinemTod, was ich

den Deutschen uberhaupt, besonders den jungen Dichtern
gewordenbin,so darfichmichwohlihrenBefreier
nennen:dennsie
sindan mirgewahrgeworden,
dass,wiederMenschvoninnenheraus
leben,der Kunstlervon innen heraus wirkenmuisse,indem er,
gebardeer sich,wie er will,immernur sein Individuumzutage
fordernwird.3
Goethe pursues wholeness of being, Simmel explains, by living
'outward from within,' that is, by attempting to objectify his
intimacy.This self-disciplineconvinces Simmel that it is begging
the question to regard Goethe's lifeas a workof art,as so manydo:
life progresses by following self-set laws, not those of other
structureslike art, which originatein life. Goethe himselfesteems
life over art, a mere embellishmentfor life, as he writesaround
1825. Withhis own art,he shapes himselfboth as a creatorand as a
formed creature that he contemplatesover and against himself:
"Meine ernstlicheBetrachtungistjetztdie neueste Ausgabe meiner
Lebensspuren, welche man, damit das Kind einen Namen habe,
Werke zu nennen pflegt" (pp. 175-7). He even perceives his
thoughts and feelings, Simmel supposes, as events occurring
outside him. His oneness with cosmic being imparts to his
life-processthe same objectivitythatcharacterizesits contents(pp.
182-3).
Indeed, to synthesizeSimmel's Goethe,the book is a eulogy of
human lifeas a creativeforceover and againstitscontent.We have
seen how Goethe aspires to make creativitya game; disregards
end-results,'pots' or 'dishes'; disdains professional goal-setting;
appreciates activityas such; feels himself one with nature; and
accepts as valid all truth-seekers'viewpoints,however opposed to
one another. Simmel's preference for productivity over the
product appears in an epoch of German philosophy when the
contraryopinion prevails but is givingground to new intellectual
currents.Certain contrastsin Simmel's book between Goethe and
Kant, the formerfavoringthe life-process,the latterits contents,4
point to Simmel's probable adversary: Marburg Neo-Kantianism,
led by Hermann Cohen. To the contents of culture, Cohen
subordinates the life-process. He assumes the perfection of
4 pp. 107-10, 165-68, 214-15. Phenomenologists of the period also oppose
Neo-Kantian objectivism.

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physico-mathematicalprinciples,and would constructby analogy

the laws of the sciences of the spirit.5
Attractedto Marburgin 1906 by Cohen's reputationfordepth,a
young Ortega absorbs his reverence for cultural principles.
Quotations from Goethe, appearing in Ortega's early works,
support the idea of human life as a struggle to attain cultural
absolutes: Truth, Beauty,Justice.6Thereafterthe idea of livingas
a striving,a personal task (Cohen's Aufgabe,Ortega's quehacer),
remains constant in Ortega's writings,embellished with passages
fromGoethe where Ortega sees thatstrifein the contextof culture.
What changes, however,is his attitudetowardsthe twocontenders,
individuallifeand itsculturalmilieu.Our own researchof Ortega's
sources, among them Simmel's Goethe,enables us to hypothesize
three shiftsof positionin Ortega's essays after 1913, as a resultof
from
three phases in his philosophical evolution: (1.) Withdrawal
Neo-Kantian culturalism(1914-19). Defining human life as the
interactionof selfand circumstance(1913,1,350), Ortega relegates
culturalabsolutes to the background,whilehe phenomenologically
describes and defines circumstantialimmediacies-for instance,
the stylesof his contemporariesMoreno Villa, Azorin,and Baroja.7
anthropology
(1919-29). Now Ortega attemptsto
(2.) Metaphysical
imparta circumstantialbasis to such sciencesof man as psychology,
human biology,ethnology,and history.8As against culturalists,he
argues that immediate existence deserves to be a firstcognitive
principlebecause of its immanentvalue, apart fromcultural content. (3.) Ontology
(1929-54). Shiftingaway from
of humanexistence
anthropology, the final Ortega concentrates on clarifyinghis

5Ciriaco Mor6n Arroyo,El sistemade Ortegay Gasset(Madrid: Alcald, 1968), pp.

56-57.
6 1910,1,135states,"Dios, en una palabra, es la cultura,"and quotes fromGoethe,
"Lo que se hereda de los mayores[i.e., culture]hay que conquistarlopara poseerlo."
Cf 1909,1,446 and 1909,1,126 withGoethean quotations.
7 On Ortega's naive phenomenology as of 1914, see our study "Esthetic
Enjoymentin Ortega y Gasset and in Geiger,a NewlyDiscovered Source," RLC, 48
(Jan.-Mar. 1974), 36.
8 Dates and definitionof thisepoch stem fromresearchon Alexander Pfander in
Ortega, made public in our lecture,"Love in the SentimentalPsychologyof Ortega y
Gasset and of Pfander," San Francisco MLA Conference, Special Topics 7,
December 26, 1975. On Ortega's anthropology: Arturo Garcia Astrada, El
de Ortegay Gasset(Buenos Aires: Troquel, 1961), pp. 51-64; also see
pensamiento
Arroyo,pp. 169-99.

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R. ORRINGER

metaphysicalbases. He conceives life as a quest for being in the

world withculture as a functionof that pursuit.
Probably acquainted with Simmel's Goethein 1913,9 Ortega
interpretsthe poet withindependence and witha view to his own
theoreticalconcerns. Thus in what is possiblythe firstof Ortega's
essaysshowingthe influenceof Simmel'sbook,10a marked interest
in circumstancebecomes evident. It appears in the title,"Leyendo
el <<Adolfo>>,
librode amor," and in the firstsentence,whereOrtega
mentions that he has just chanced upon a copy of Benjamin
Constant'snovel (1916,11,25). Moreover,Ortega praises Goethe for
masteringcircumstanceby daring to poetize emotionsclose to him,
but previouslyoverlooked by artists."Por eso, cuando habla de sus
obras completas,puede llamarlas: ?la edicion de las huellas de mi
vida ... .>>"(11,27). How distantSimmel'sinterpretationof Goethe's
Lebensspurenas endeavors to objectifyhimself,to unite with his
surroundings! Yet Ortega's subjectivistic notion of Goethe
continuesinto his anthropologicalperiod. In "Musicalia" (192 1), an
essay on esthetic psychology, Goethe and Chateaubriand are
mentioned as the first to free sentiments for literature. The
corroboratingquotation fromGoethe, witha notationof the date
rare in Ortega, is doubtlesslya translationof the Simmeltext(see n
3):
En los iltimosdias de su vida,y comoresumiendola
dijo Goethe:
<<Situviese que formularlo que he sido para los alemanes, y
para los poetasj6venes,podriamuybienllamarme
particularmente
su libertador,
porqueen mihan averiguadoque, asi comoel hombre
tieneque vivirde dentroafuera,el artistatieneque crearde dentro
afuera,pues,haga lo que quiera,s6lo lograradar a la luz su propia
(11,240,n 1).
individualidad?
Whereas Simmel here discernsa desire in Goethe forobjectivity,
Ortega offersa contraryinterpretation.Simmel findsin Goethe's
word Individuuma nuance of unity with all mankind: since the
human race must live outside from within,the artist,as a human
being, must affirmhimselfin the same centrifugaldirection.But
Ortega conceives individualidadas everythingwhich distinguishes
9 In 1923,111,200, n 1, Ortega dates his perspectivismto 1913. He may be
implyingthat his source is Goethe(1913), pp. 39-40.
10Both the essay and the book containan identicalopinion of Greek classicismas
being "historischeingegrenzte," as Simmel, p. 111, puts it; "un orbe reducido,
<born&>,"in Ortega's words: 1916,11,25.

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one man fromall others. Goethe is for Ortega a poet of personal

sentiments;and preciselythese mark off one human being from
the next, as Ortega notes in another essay of this anthropological
period (1924,11,467). Simmel's Goethe is a monad harmonizing
with other monads; Ortega's Goethe, a soul radically alone and
distinctivein the universe.
Therefore in El temade nuestrotiempo(1923), Goethe's outlook
lends supportto Ortega's viewthatindividuallifedeservesto be the
basis of contemporary philosophy. Simmel's influence is
unquestionable. Critics note sporadic reminiscences of his
metaphysical work Lebensanschauungin Ortega's work." But
Simmel's Goethefurnishesmuch of the doctrinalsubstance of the
last fourchaptersin El temade nuestrotiempo.Chapter VII develops
Simmel's contrast between the Eastern, the Christian, and the
Goethean valuations of experience; chapter VIII praises Goethe's
acumen in valuing life forits own worthand meaning; chapter IX
points out the rise in Europe of a sportiveoutlook (also attributed
by Simmelto Goethe); and chapterX clearlyincorporatesGoethe's
epistemology into Ortega's own doctrine of the point of view!
While verbal comparisons will show Simmel's impact, Ortega
modifieshis thoughtin two main ways: (1.) Simmel's Goethe seeks
harmony with himself and his surroundings, while Ortega's
authenticman strivesto asserthimselfvis-A-vis
establishedcultural
principles; (2.) hence, Simmel observes what Goethe has in
common withall men, but Ortega writeson what is unique about
each man. Doctrines fromSimmel's harmonious world-viewenter
Ortega's writing with subtle qualifications, as if they were
problematic. Little wonder, then, that in 1932, he will relent of
having admittedthem at all!
A close study of El temade nuestrotiempofor the influence of
Simmel'sGoethereveals that,withouta doubt, Ortega is employing
this text to combat Neo-Kantian culturalism still persisting in
Madrid.12 He triesto justifyhis own practicesince 1914 of taking
human life as the radical datum of his philosophy. Thus he
accounts forthe delay of philosophicaltraditionin doing the same.
His predecessors have not made life their first principle, he
reasons, because their outlooks have blinded them to the values

12

Garcia Astrada, p. 67, n 4; Arroyo,pp. 117-18.

Rukser,pp. 190-91; Arroyo,p. 351; but of Kessel Schwartz,pp. 325-6.

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R. ORRINGER

immanent in existence. From here, he explores the contrast

suggested to him by Simmel's appraisal of Goethean paganism as
opposed to Christianityand Hinduism. For the Eastern viewpoint,
however, Ortega examines Buddhism, withits negative valuation
of life, seen as a thirst extinguishable only through nirvana,
dissolutionin the Great All. In treatingthe Christianview of life,
Ortega more nearly approaches Simmel. Both thinkersfind that
Christianitymakes the value of temporal existence contingenton
its relationshipto the Afterlife,haven of supreme values. Simmel
writesas follows:
Erstdie hdrtereDenkartdes Christentums
hat die Welt... in ihrer
vollenDreidimensionalitat
und Substanzbestehenlassenundihrdennoch
jeden Eigenbestandan Wertgenommen:sei sie nun Jammertalund
Teufelsdomdne,seien ihr ihre Wertedurch Gnade vom Jenseitsher
verliehen,sei sie der Ort der Sehnsuchtund der Vorbereitung
furdas
Uberirdische,
den Ortder Werte(p. 98).
Similarly, Ortega remarks, "el cristianismo no parte de
consideracionessobre la vida, sino que, desde luego, comienza con
la revelacionde una suprema realidad: la esencia divina,centrode
todas las perfecciones."Consequently,the Christianvalues thislife
"no en sfmisma, sino en su ma's alla." Temporal existence is "una
fluenciade miserias,que se ennoblece al desembocar en lo eterno."
The Christianattitude,as interpretedby Ortega, is not to live life
for itself,but to make it "un ejercicio y entrenamientoconstante
para la muerte, hora en que comienza la vida verdadera"
(1923,111,184-5).
Since Ortega polemicizes with Neo-Kantian culturalists, he
cleverly extends Simmel's vision of Christianityto fit Cohen's
outlook, a 'ChristianitywithoutGod.' For the apotheosis of Truth,
Beauty, and Justice,Ortega suggests,places these cultural ideals
out of reach, makes earthlylivinga functionof utopian absolutes
(111,185). The obligation to strive for such goals calls for effort
estimable only "en vista de su resultado." This obligatoryeffort,
which Ortega terms 'work,' acquires value contingent on the
cultural need subserved by that effort. Yet Ortega favors a
differenttype of effort,one responding to an intimateneed with
lavishenergiesand no thoughtof externalrewards."Se tratade un
esfuerzo lujoso, que se entrega a manos llenas sin esperanzas de
recompensa,como un rebose de intimasenergias" (III,195). Lavish
effort,termed'sport' by Ortega, has intrinsicvalue, independently

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of its object. Of itself,it confirmsGoethe's intuitionthatlife holds

immanent worth (III, 192). 'Sport' originates all innovation in
culture,and as Ortega writesin 1923, he findsyouthgivinglife a
sportive tone (III,195). CertainlyGoethe stands in his mind as a
forerunnerof this attitude: in much the same terms,Simmel has
characterized Goethe's life's work as serious 'play' ("Spielen"), as
"nichts anderes, als dass die Lebensenergien sich in voller
Unabhangigkeitvon all solchemAussern auswirkensollen,das, wie
wertvolles an sich sei, dem Leben ein ihm im Prinzip Fremdes als
Direktivevorsetzte.Ja, er lbstsogar das inhaltlicheErgebnisals das
Unwesentlichevon dem Lebensprozess los, aus dem es kommtund
aus dem es fliesst"(pp. 5-6).
Like his sportive sense of life, Goethe's epistemology, as
presentedby Simmel,enables Ortega to affirmthe value immanent
in existence.His perspectivismcalls forgrantingequal credence,in
principle,to everyman's point of view. Each life holds a different
perspective on the universe, and one complements the other as
partial visions of a total reality.Ortega's doctrine thus supersedes
culturalism,which invalidatesevery perception except that made
sub specieaeternitatis;
and it surmountsrelativism,which deprives
truthof objectiveexistenceand makes it depend on the perceiver.
Nowhere does Ortega more closelyfollowthe source we examine.
But Simmel's Goethe regards the subject as all mankind,
harmoniouslycognizingthe same truth,whileOrtega conceivesthe
subjectas the individual,acquiring partialinsightsinto a truthalso
partly unveiled to other individuals. With these qualifications,
three aspects of Goethe's perspectivism pass via Simmel into
Ortega: (1.) the refutation of relativism; (2.) the relationship
between truth and historicalchange; and (3.) the arrival at the
truththroughthe synthesisof divergentopinions.
(1.) The two textsrefutingrelativismshow evident similarities:
Kein Zweifel,dass die gewohnliche Dos
sujetos diferentes-se
a verdades
aus
solcher pensaba-legaran
Folgerung
der Erkenntnis: divergentes.Ahora vemos que la
Individualisierung
das furden einenWahrheit
ist,was divergenciaentre los mundos de
es fur den anderen nicht dos sujetosno implicala falsedadde
ist,-namlichder Skeptizmus,.. . uno de ellos. Al contrario,
Goethevolligfernlag;.................... precisamenteporque lo que cada
[Er istder Meinung],dass all diese cual ve es una realidady no una
Erkenntnisbil-ficci6n,tiene que ser su aspecto
individualistischen
der nichtmit ihrerZerfallungin distintodel que otro percibe.Esa

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R. ORRINGER

atomistische
Selbstgenugsamkeiten
divergenciano es contradicci6n,
abschliessen,sonderneine ideelle sinocomplemento
(111,200).
Zusammengehorigkeit in dem
Sinne besitzen,dass sie sich alle
unter einander zu einer einheitlichen Totalitat des Erkennens
uberhaupterganzen(p. 36).
(2.) In treatingtruthas related to historicalflux,Ortega transfers
to an individual scale what Simmel's Goethe applies to mankind.
For Goethe, truth-seekersfunctionas "Glieder eines einheitlichen
Organismus,"whichis all humanity,the author of everyindividual
discovery.Each act of cognition,though historicallyconditioned,
acquiresjustificationfromits contributionto the lifeof the species
(p. 37). Research bringsman more into harmonywiththe objective
order of things,transcendingthe relativecontrastbetween truth
and error.This transcendentorder validatesbasic principleswhich
each pursuer of knowledgefeelsbound, as an individual,to follow.
Thus Simmel interpretsthe followingwords of Goethe: "Jedes
Individuum hat vermittelst seiner Neigungen ein Recht zu
Grundsatzen, die es als Individuum nicht aufheben" (p. 40). We
recognize a like assertionin Ortega: "Cada vida es un puntode vista
sobreel universo. . . Cada individuo-persona, pueblo, epoca-es un
organo insustituiblepara la conquista de la verdad." Like Goethe,
therefore,Ortega situates truthoutside of historicalchange; but
unlike Goethe, he stresses the need for a concrete setting,an
individual life,in which truthmay be disclosed (III,200).
(3.) To unifyall individual insightsis to approach omniscience,
godliness.Since God's pointof viewis the trueone, reasons Ortega,
it is that of each and every man. God, Ortega writes, sees
everythingthrough men's eyes. In more figured language, "los
hombres son los organos visuales de la divinidad" (III,203). This
anthropomorphizationof God in Ortega may stem fromSimmel.
Recall his interpretationof the quatrain from the ZahmeXenien,
which attributessomethingof the sun to the perceivingeye and
something divine to reverent man. According to Simmel, the
synthesisof all life removes subjective ambivalence from truth.
Minds harmonize with one another and with the objects they
cognize. "Denn unter der Harmonie des Geis'teswie der Geister
und unterder Sonnenhaftigkeitdes Auges lebt die Gott-Natur"(p.
49). The likenessof the eye to the sun here symbolizesthe Sum of
all being, dwellingin the inner and outer concord of minds. Such

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divinizationof knowledge exemplifiesculture-worshipin Simmel.

This is preciselythe attitudethatOrtega has been tryingto combat
in El temade nuestrotiempo.Therefore the theologyin his closing
paragraphs, while perhaps merelya rhetoricaladornment,seems
entirelyinconsistentwithall that has come before.
Less docile to his source in handling other borrowings,Ortega
hedges them with qualifiers as if uncertain of their validity.We
have seen that they all justify his selection of human life as a
philosophical basis; and that for this purpose he finds especially
useful the central doctrine of Goethe- the estimabilityof life as
form, process, viewed apart from its content. Paradoxically,
however,Ortega cannot in principleadhere to such a theory.His
idea of individual life,touchstoneof his whole philosophy,implies
thatthe visionof lifedetached fromitscontentis a fiction.Afterall,
as we have noted, in 1914 Ortega has defined human existenceas
the interactionof subjectand circumstance;and inEl temade nuestro
tiempohe repeats the doctrine with differentwords: "Vivimos en
funcionde nuestrocontorno,el cual, a su vez, depende de nuestra
sensibilidad"(III,192). How, then,is it possible to contemplatelife
apart from its content,its circumstance,which togetherwith the
selfcomprisesit? Only by assuming an awkwardtheoreticalstance,
a posture which distortsthe phenomenon being studied. In other
words, human life must virtuallysuspend its forward thrustto
bend back over itself and calculate its own worth. But thus
contorted,it ceases to be lifein Ortega's sense of self-realizationin
concrete time and space. Hence he asserts with Fichte, "Filosofar
no es propiamente vivir, vivir no es propiamente filosofar"
(III,188). Yet in sayingso, Ortega exposes doctrinesderived from
Simmel's Goethe. We must conclude, then, that all Ortega's
remarks on valuations of life, life esteemed as sport, and equal
validityof points of view leave room for doubt in his mind!
Apparentlythe doubt grows in the late 1920's. For Heidegger's
Sein und Zeit (1927), as criticshave shown,13 refocuses Ortega's
attentionon lifeas essentiallya quehacer,a taskto acquire being. He
changes his attitudetowards Simmel's Goethe,with its praise of a
man not primarily goal-oriented himself, although often

13

Rukser, pp. 190-91; Arroyo,p. 351: but cf Kessel Schwartz,pp. 325-36.

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concerned in his writingwith personal goal-setting.In "Pidiendo

un Goethe desde dentro" (1932) and in his 1949 lectures on
Goethe, Ortega tries to explain the contradiction'from within'
Goethe's biography (1932,IV,401). Simmel's presence is often so
apparent in the explanations,that a philosophical dialogue seems
to be takingplace betweenOrtega and him,even thoughthe Berlin
philosopher has long predeceased the Goethean centennial of
193214Ortega findshimselfcelebratingthat anniversaryin a time
of culturalcrisis,proof thatlifeitselfis a problem. Like Simmel,he
rejectsthe notionof Goethe's lifeas a workof art. But whileSimmel
serenely reasons that life creates and thus precedes art, Ortega
affirmswithpassion thatlife is a personal dilemma far surpassing
art in seriousness. He labels Goethe the firstRomantic for having
perceived before everyone else that life, by definition, is the
problem of selfhood (IV,403-4). Now, Simmel associates
Romanticism with the perception of yearning as something
"als der naturlicheDauerzustand der
definitive,though satisfying,
romantischenSeele." Nevertheless,Simmel's Goethe, in seeking
cosmic harmony,devotes himselfto surmountingyearningsof all
kinds (pp. 186-7). Ortega agrees withthe letterof this statement,
but not withitsimplicationsforGoethe's search forhimself:"En la
obra de Goethe, en efecto, se nos hace manifiestouna energica
intencion de presentarnos un Universo hecho de serenidad [es
decir, de unitariedad en su constituciony en su evolucion]. Pero
esta serenidad de sus creaciones era lograda a costa de incesantes
inquietudes, dolores, renuncias" (1949,IX,577). These sorrows,
Ortega thinks,sharplydivide Goethe's lifefromhis literature.Such
an assertionis a complete reversalof Ortega's published opinions
of 1916 and 1921.
In 1949 Ortega again recalls Goethe's referencesto his work as
"confesiones," as "Lebenspuren [sic!]-<<huellas de vida>>"
(IX,577-8). But critics,and Simmel among them,frequentlynotice
in Goethe what Ortega calls a "tendencia objetivadora."Therefore
Ortega hypothesizesthat Goethe has donned a literarydisguise to
conceal the true Goethe. His subterfugeis the harmonious view of
human life,the analogue of plantlife(IX,583). Or as Ortega puts it
14
Simmel, born in 1858, died in 1918. Ortega attended his classes in Berlin in
vocacion(Madrid: Revistade Occidente,
1906: JulianMarfas,Ortega,I. Circunstanciay
1960), p. 209.

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in "Pidiendo un Goethe desde dentro,"Goethe presentsexistence,

not as it is here and now, but as an ideal 'form' ("forma"),
indifferentto determined 'content' ("contenido"). The mere fact
that Ortega formulatesthe form-contentantithesis(1932,IV,415)
suggests an attack directed as much against Simmel as against
Goethe. For Ortega criticizesas untrue to Goethe's destinythe use
he makes of twoideas related by Simmelto the superiorityof lifeas
form:the viewof accomplishmentsas symbolsand the appreciation
of activityforits own sake. FirstOrtega translatesinto Spanish the
quotation on symbolismto be found in Simmel's Goethe:"Siempre
he considerado mi actuacion y mi labor como meramente
simbolicas, y en el fondo me era bastante indiferente (ziemlich
verme haciendo pucheros o vasijas." Next Ortega, like
gleichgfiltig)
Simmel,compares the aged Goethe's unconcernwiththatof young
Werther.Simmel's comparison may exalt life as form or process,
but Ortega's introduces an ironically grisly accent. He likens
Goethe's apathy towardsgoals to Werther'ssuicide: both character
and author refuse to pursue their identities. In an imagined
dialogue with life, which commands him to be what he must be,
Ortega's Goethe responds, "Ya estoy siendo, puesto que actdo sin
cesar: hago pucheros, hago vasijas; no descanso un minuto." But
life informsGoethe that activityfor its own sake is not sufficient
and that only the creation of his personal being is necessary
(IV,414-5).
As against Simmel, Ortega maintainsthat Goethe tends to flee
from himselfand his destiny to revolutionize literature.As the
promisingyoung poet of Strassburg,Wetzlar, and Frankfurt,he
causes Ortega to exclaim, "Wie wahr, wie seiend!"-according to
Simmel, Goethe's own exclamation upon contemplating the
simplicity of nature. But the first Weimar stay marks a
turning-pointin his life. Simmel thinks the experience a harsh
confrontation with the real; Ortega finds it a more or less
permanent break with reality. For ,the poet newly arrived at
Weimar seems to Ortega to have run away from true love and
intellectualstimulation,only to slide into financial securityat an
orderly little court. Benumbed to the awareness of life as a
problem,he loses his identity.Nor does he findit,Ortega thinks,in
Italy despite his notation of March 1788, also quoted in Simmel:
"Por vez primera me he encontrado a mfmismo y he coincidido
felizmenteconmigo" (IV,408-13).

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For the mature Ortega, then,Goethe's insightsinto lifeare rare.

But in the instanceshe does see clearly,he perceiveshuman lifeas a
task of self-authentication.A single passage from Goethe has
suggestedto Ortega titlesfortwoessays:both "Pidiendo un Goethe
desde dentro" and "Goethe, el libertador" (1932) evoke the
sentence,quoted by Simmel,wherein Goethe defines himselfas a
Befreier,a liberator of young German poets. He would free his
readers to be themselves,Ortega explains, rather than slaves of
circumstance.Yet his advocacy of life 'outward fromwithin'("de
dentroafuera") calls, not forintrospection,but forself-affirmation
throughaction directedtowardthe outside (IV,425-6). To thistask,
this program for selfhood, Ortega feels that culture must be
subordinated. In this new sense he repeats in 1949 words from
Goethe that he quoted in 1923, when he seemed to agree with
Simmel thatlifeis estimableapart fromits contents:"<<Cuantomas
lo pienso-dice [Goethe] en edad ya muy avanzada-mas claro me
parece que la vida existe simplementepara ser vivida>>;y en otro
imLebenaufsLebenund nichtauf einResultat
offenbar
lugar: Es kommt
1923,III,189 and Simmel,p. 6). The factis
cf
an" (IX,561;
desselben
that, despite all appearances, Ortega has never wholeheartedly
subscribedto the notionof authenticexistenceas harmonywiththe
universe. Rather, he has always seen living as strifewith one's
The sense of dissatisfaction
surroundingsto achieve self-discovery.
thataccompanies such strivingis personifiedin literatureby Faust,
called by Goethe "el Ungeniigsamer-elinsatisfecho"(IX,568).
A Faustian sentimentpervades Ortega's effortsto trace,correct,
and retrace his own image of Goethe. The frequent congruency
between this image and that of Simmel's Goethe has just been
revealed. Even when seeming to rebut Simmel's evaluation of the
poet, Ortega so closelyfollowsthe termsset by Simmel, that what
emerges on the printed page is at times more a heated dialogue
withSimmel than an impartialelucidationof Goethe. But Ortega's
shifting reactions to Simmel's Goethelogically follow from his
philosophical evolution out of and beyond Neo-Kantianism. The
concept of life as a problem withculture as a problematicsolution
has Neo-Kantian roots.In 1916, we have seen, Ortega's interestin a
culture of circumstantialimmediacies gives rise to a Goethe who
impartscultural formto previouslyunattended passions; whereas
Simmel's Goethe harmonizes his sentimentswithobjective cosmic
norms. Ortega most nearly approaches Simmel in 1923, when

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tryingto justifybasing a philosophyon the problem of individual

causes Ortega to lose sight,at
life. Yet concern withthejustification
one point, of the problem.El temade nuestrotiempoborrows from
Simmel doctrines more culturalisticthan the main thesis of the
work permits.Later Heidegger restoresthe awareness of life as a
problem to the center of Ortega's vision, while the other
doctrines-life as sport, perspectivism-move to the periphery
(without,however,dropping out of sight).15"Pidiendo un Goethe
desde dentro" (1932) seems to be a volte-facewith respect to
Simmel-or perhaps to the Simmelian Ortega of 1923. But
Simmel's Goetheremains in Ortega's mind through 1949. Possibly
because of Simmel's insistence on the desire of Goethe for
objectivity,Ortega in turn denies the confessional nature of
Goethe's work and sees him as a fugitive from himself. The
comparison of Ortega withhis source shows at least as much about
Ortega as it does about Goethe. Then what Simmel applies to
himself in the foreword to his Goetheapplies equally as well to
Ortega: "Die GesamtdeutungGoethes, der alles, was er geschaffen
hat, als eine grosse Konfession bezeichnet,wird, zugegeben oder
nicht,immer auch eine Konfession des Deutenden sein" (p. vii).
Storrs
of Connecticut,
University

15 On the redefinitionof sport after 1929 in view of Ortega's more ontological

concerns,see our study,"Ortega y Gasset's SportiveTheories of Communication,"
MLN, 85 (March 1970), 21 1; on the redefinitionof Ortega's perspectivism:Arroyo,
pp. 235-43.

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