KURODA VS.

JALANDONI
83 Phil. 171 (1949) Court of the Philippines
Facts:
Kuroda, Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army, was prosecuted for war crimes before the
Military Commission set up by Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines. Kuroda
challenged the legality and constitutionality of the Military Commission and contended that it lacked
jurisdiction to try him for violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the Laws of War, since
the Philippines was not a signatory to these conventions.
Issue: Whether or not the established Military Commission is legal and constitutional.
Held:
The court ruled that the Military Commission was legal and constitutional base on the citation of Article
II, Section 3 of the Philippine Constitution declaring that the Philippine adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.
The court ruled that in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the
present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention, and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian,
who had been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war,
of humanity and civilization, were held accountable therefore. Although the Philippines was not a
signatory to the conventions embodying them, our Constitution has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law
as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the
Philippines had acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international
law which are part of our Constitution.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113 Nov. 16, 1945
Facts of the case:
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of
First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge
Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General
Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of
the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the
Philippine government under the Japanese).
Issues:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could
continue hearing the cases pending before them.
Ratio:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are
good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and
deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by
the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the existence of a state of insurrection
and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for
MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase processes of any
other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial
proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it
could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of
international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief
done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not
intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase processes of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the
occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did
not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established continues until changed
by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF
SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws
and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may
continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them
are repealed by the said government.
DECISION:
Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even
during occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and
control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the
rightful government) through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of
paramount force) through insurrection (established as an independent government by the
inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ, G.R. NO. L-7995, May 31, 1957 (101 Phil 1155)
Facts:
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a
legislative enactment, fundamental and farreaching in significance. The enactment poses questions
of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact,
that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it
regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and
tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so
that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do
the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
Held:
It has been said the police power is so far reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to
limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to
be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be coextensive with selfprotection and survival, and
as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent
and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power
has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become
almost allembracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee
the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive
world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through
which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define
the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof.
The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually

necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with
whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not
misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void
for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Gonzales vs. Hechanova
9 SCRA 230
FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to
be purchased from private sources. Thereupon, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter,
and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition herein, averring that,
in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No. 2207, explicitly,
prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency.
ISSUE: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.
HELD: The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled in the affirmative by providing in Section
2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order, or regulation is in question. In other words,
our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render
this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our government not from entering into contracts for
the purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act.
A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to
default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of rice in
question because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said
commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the
provisions of the aforementioned laws.
In RE: Garcia
2 SCRA 984
FACTS: Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting
to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a Filipino citizen born in
Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of Bachillerato Superior in
Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the Insitututo de Cervantes for admission to the
Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as
Licenciado en derecho. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims
that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession
in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
ISSUE: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar
RULING: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees

and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot
be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice
the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines.
Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore
subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose
territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state
could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the
consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines.

G.R. No. L-45892

July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-45893

July 13, 1938
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
Severino P. Izon for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
AVANCEA, J.:
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa
are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense
Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty
years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th
of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence
shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before
the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said
appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the
military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years
old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and
does not wish to kill or be killed.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of
imprisonment, with the costs.
In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is
impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides as follows:
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against

this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service
adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the
power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and
maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military
service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the
life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25
Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by
force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of
being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said
that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is
no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual existence of war
does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory
military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more
effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support
does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if
such circumstance exists, they can ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at all events,
they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (Secs. 65 and
69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman

G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997
FACTS:
This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.
Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented that
she was singlealthough she was married. When management found out, she was made to explain.
However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed from work.
Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the Labor Arbiter,
Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally dismissed by PT&T.
Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.
Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her
concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty, which was
why she was dismissed from work.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was
discriminatory

 Whether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of

confidence
Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed
HELD:
There was discrimination
Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a
female employee.
Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it
dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses
clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed
acts of dishonesty.
Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly
because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was
practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear
of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause fortermination of employment,
it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not
on the employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which
are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be
sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary
suspension of Grace from work.
Grace attained regular status as an employee
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When
she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary
period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That
her dismissal would be effected just when herprobationary period was winding down clearly raises the
plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.
There was illegal dismissal
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just
cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full
back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
On Stipulation against Marriage
In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very
essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family
as the foundation of the nation.

Petition dismissed.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
Posted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and
towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the
lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the
towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149
thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the
consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with
fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna
Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared
illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A
of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits
for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927,
specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160
has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal
waters.The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting
the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as
an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of
the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by
mere implication.

The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand,
the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is
for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for
lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive,
least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly,
the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC
of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases
with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal
fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Oposa Vs. Factoran Case Digest
224 SCRA 792 G.R. No. 101083
July 30, 1993
Facts: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, nonstock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted
as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the
issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory
and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains

sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to selfpreservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled.
Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.
Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain
period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all
the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence,
all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident
to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance
of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful

ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources
as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of
falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted.
Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies

already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and
purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for
the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of
yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083

Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083

Fact:
a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother
Earth."
The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate
that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:
1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of
judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: YES
petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a
balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the countrys forests. This right is
also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who
has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION
CO., INC.
GR No. 167614 March 24, 2009
En banc
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer,
with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation
leave per month.
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused
to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving only two
(2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and
twenty-three (23) days.
Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation
of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999)
as well as moral and exemplary damages.
The LA declared the petitioners dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his salaray
for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for
salary differential and for attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no
compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3)
months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorneys fees. This decision
was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC
ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by

herein petitioner Serrano.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on nonimpairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive
is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective
operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in
existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the nonimpairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that
would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the
employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that
R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties.
Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have
incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly
the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the
dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by
the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of
the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence,
for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to
promote public welfare.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without
distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be
denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it
sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must
comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the
purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all
members of the class.
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification
needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an

important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that
interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However,
a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an
invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment
contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally
discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated
in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on
local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes
a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts,
but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject
clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the
Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a
compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in
the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which
some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or
maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the
subject clause may possibly serve.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling
state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject
clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the
employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and
cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of
government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another
sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a
compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement
agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based
Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring
foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their
Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive
suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of

Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring
foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local
placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Taada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods. Further, they contended that the national
treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First
policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
II.

THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and
economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the
Presidents ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry

of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it
allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that
is unfair.
xxx

xxx

xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily
rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic
seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in
such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without discrimination
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that
apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity,
the fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but
one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the
foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity
to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers
in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered
under a policy of laissez faire.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino
labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such
principles while serving as judicial and legislative guides are not in themselves sources of
causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon
by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes
all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the promotion of
industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby justifying its
acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation
and amity with all nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its
sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross arbitrariness or despotism by reason of
passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least
some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national
interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave
abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in
the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of
its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial
inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether
the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a

matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement
allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
Tanada vs angara GR 118295
Tanada vs angara
GR 118295
Facts: the instant case is a petition for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus filed bby petitioner to
contest the constitutionality of joinuing the WTO which was concurred upon by majority of the Senate.
Petioner contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, specifically Art,11 sec 19,
and art 12, sec 10.
Issue: whether or not such affiliation is prohibited by our constitution
Held: art 2 of the constitution, the principles stated herein are not self-executingg. They are used by
the judiciary as aids or as guidelines in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactments of laws. They are not sources for causes of action.
Furthermore, the treaty is in harmony with the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and the adherence of the amity with all nations. The deliberation and voting of
the senate, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO agreement, thereby making it
a part of the law of the land.
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Isagani Cruz vs DENR
Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition
was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain
somehow against the regalian doctrine.