A.C.

1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its
competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the
bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors
bearing on the specific case, public interest, the
integrity of the profession and the welfare of the
recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are
given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A.
Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote
being unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979,
he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated.
The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980,
granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it
"is without prejudice to issuing an extended
opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts
that led to the disbarment of respondent may not be
amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the
late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to
the
IBP
since
the
latter's
constitution
notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976,
the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph
2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further
continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it
shall
deem
appropriate,
including
a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the
removal of the delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should
be submit by registered mail to the member and to
the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On
January 27, 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976,
the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment:
On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3,
1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted
for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the
IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found
in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues.

Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this

Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as
summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which
he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no legal force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the
resolution that such issues was raised on a
previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the
Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The
Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration
of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion
reached by the Court was that the integration of the
Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and
is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippine, has become an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively."7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was
unanimous. From the time the decision was
rendered, there were various pleadings filed by
respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion
for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978.
Characterized as it was by persistence in his
adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of
the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that
it would be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the
consensus that he continued to be oblivious to
certain balic juridical concepts, the appreciation of
which does not even require great depth of intellect.
Since respondent could not be said to be that
deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings
in other cases coming before this Tribunal were
quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled
with invective for which he had been duly taken to
task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance
arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the
extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was
more than justified.
Since
then,
however,
there
were
other
communications to this Court where a different
attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of
defiance was gone and circumstances of a
mitigating character invoked the state of his
health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of

the welfare of former clients who still rely on him for

counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished.
For he had in his career been a valiant, if at times
unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to
him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that
reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that
there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
plenary power to regulate the legal profession and
can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly
paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years
had elapsed during which he war. barred from
exercising his profession was likewise taken into
account. It may likewise be said that as in the case
of the inherent power to punish for contempt and
paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that
there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission
to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss
of membership. What must ever be borne in mind is
that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide
by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if
the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after
actuations evidencing that there was due contrition
on the part of the transgressor, he may once again
be considered for the restoration of such a privilege.
Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar
Marcial A. Edillon.

[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR.,
REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner
sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the
amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged
that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service
from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he
cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he
was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones
profession while in government service, and neither
can he be assessed for the years when he was
working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the
IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its
comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the
IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a
lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of
Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member
of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member
is the payment of annual dues as determined by the
IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the
Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and
10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the
validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has
been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the
IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from
payment of dues is but an implementation of the
Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help
in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It
maintained that there is no rule allowing the
exemption of payment of annual dues as requested
by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It
asserted that what petitioner could have done was
to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to
stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP
could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to
pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged
that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive
status for its members, which if approved by the
Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt
inactive IBP members from payment of the annual
dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner
contends that what he is questioning is the IBP
Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in
active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the

due process clause. He also posits that

compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership
dues would indubitably be oppressive to him
considering that he has been in an inactive status
and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from
nonpayment of annual membership dues would
constitute deprivation of property right without due
process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice
of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is
neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow
lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner
is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues
during the time that he was inactive in the practice
of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from
1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 19862003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar association organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying
out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to
bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an Integrated
Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers
are required to be members. They are, therefore,
subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the
Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of
every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to foster the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power
and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power
required members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward

defraying the expenses of regulation of the

profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of
integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been
explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,
[9]
thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the
members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an
exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is
a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to put on an
integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to
regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The
public interest promoted by the integration of the
Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a
member resulting from his required payment of the
annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary
consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no
one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as
ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of
the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the
member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows
exemption from payment of membership dues. At
most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could
have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar
of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In
such case, his membership in the IBP could have
been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated
that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing the situation of members under inactive
status and the nonpayment of their dues during
such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty
bound to comply with his obligation to pay
membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the
penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes
on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re
Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right,
in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to
practice law before the courts of this country should
be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory

measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to

enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of
law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power
of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity
thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption
from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is
ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed
by the IBP as membership fees for the years 19772005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from receipt of this decision, with a warning
that failure to do so will merit his suspension from
the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY

SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF,
Complainant,

HIGH

Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction

of salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents
expiration of his commission.

despite

the

According to complainant, respondent was

legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31 May
1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable
Judge
Tomas
W. Macaranas. He
thereafter
contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary
Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge
Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994, said
second marriage was subsequently annulled for
being bigamous.
On the charge of malpractice, complainant
alleged that respondent deliberately subscribed and
notarized certain legal documents on different dates
from 1988 to 1997, despite expiration of
respondents notarial commission on 31 December
1987. A Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999 was
issued by the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent
had not applied for commission as Notary Public for
and in the City of Baguio for the period 1988 to
1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization,
as evidenced by the following documents:

- versus 1.
Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March
1991, executed by Fernando T. Acosta, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ,
Respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty
members and Staff of the Saint Louis UniversityLaboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty.
Rolando C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS,
predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that
there is a pending criminal case for child abuse
allegedly committed by him against a high school
student filed before the Prosecutors Office
of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed
by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before
an Investigating Board created by SLU for his
alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of
misappropriating money supposedly for the
teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLULHS Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera

2.
Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992,
executed by Maria Cortez Atos, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
3.
Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992,
executed by Fanolex James A. Menos, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
4.
Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993,
executed by Ponciano V. Abalos, subscribed and
sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
5.
Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June
1993, executed by Danilo Gonzales in favor
of Senecio C.Marzan,
notarized
by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
6.
Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited
Parties[7] dated 5 March 1994, executed by Evelyn
C. Canullas andPastora C. Tacadena, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
7.
Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May
1994, executed by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed
and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8.
Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994,
executed by Woodrow Apurado in favor of
Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;

9.
Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested
Parties[10] dated 1
June
1994,
executed
by Ponciano V. Abalos andArsenio C. Sibayan,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10.
Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23
March 1995, executed by Eleanor D.Meridor in
favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
11.
Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20
December 1996, executed by Mandapat in favor of
Mario R.Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
12.
Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested
Parties[13] dated 17
April
1996,
executed
by Villiam C. Ambongand
Romeo
L. Quiming,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13.
Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27
February
1997,
executed
by
Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma.
A. Pangilinan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
14.
Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19
July 1996, executed by JARCO represented by Mr.
JohnnyTeope and AZTEC Construction represented
by
Mr.
George Cham,
notarized
by
Rolando Dela Cruz.
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his
comment, denied the charges of child abuse, illegal
deduction of salary and others which are still
pending before the St. Louis University (SLU),
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
the Prosecutors Office. He did not discuss anything
about the allegations of immorality in contracting a
second marriage and malpractice in notarizing
documents despite the expiration of his
commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The
IBP
conducted
preliminary conference.

the

On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C.

Pacheco submitted his report and recommended
that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully recommended that respondent be
administratively penalized for the following acts:
a. For contracting a second marriage
without taking the appropriate legal steps to have
the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents
despite full knowledge of the expiration of
his notarialcommission, he be suspended from the
practice of law for another one (1) year or for a total
of two (2) years.[17]
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors,
approved
and
adopted
the
recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation
of
the
Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex A and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that Respondent
contracted a second marriage without taking
appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage
annulled, Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year and for notarizing legal documents despite full
knowledge
of
the
expiration
of
his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz
isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for
another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years
Suspension from the practice of law.[18]
This Court finds the recommendation of the
IBP to fault respondent well taken, except as to the
penalty contained therein.

mandatory

The complainants, thereafter, submitted their

position paper which is just a reiteration of their
allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted
his second marriage despite the existence of his
first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of
the former. He also admitted having notarized
certain documents during the period when
his notarial commission
had
already
expired. However, he offered some extenuating
defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and
noble intentions in doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the

practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer
has the privilege and right to practice law only
during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it
for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard
has been afforded him. Without invading any
constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to
practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to
hold a license or to exercise the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or
disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the
profession a person whose misconduct has proved

him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and

responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney
and, thus, to protect the public and those charged
with the administration of justice, rather than to
punish an attorney. Elaborating on this, we said
on Maligsa v. Atty. Cabanting,[19] that the Bar should
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well
as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings
honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing
his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
his clients. A member of the legal fraternity should
refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney
may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of
his oath or of his duties as an attorney and
counselor, which include statutory grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, all of these being broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity.
Equally worthy of remark is that the law
profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of
standards among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not
divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another.[20] Thus, not
only his professional activities but even his private
life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably
upon the good name and prestige of the profession
and the courts, may at any time be the subject of
inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[21]
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar
is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Possession of such moral character as
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice
must
be
continuous. Otherwise,
membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral conduct.[22]
In the case at bench, there is no dispute
that respondent and Teresita Rivera
contracted
marriage on 31 May 1982before Judge Tomas
W. Macaranas. In less than a year, they parted
ways owing to their irreconcilable differences
without seeking judicial recourse. The union bore
no offspring. After their separation in-fact,
respondent
never
knew
the
whereabouts
of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms of
communication with her. Seven years thereafter,
respondent became attracted to one Mary
Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of
SLU-LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact
that in
1989, respondent married Mary
Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of BaguioCity, Branch 68. Respondent even
admitted this fact. When the second marriage was
entered
into,
respondents
prior
marriage
with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action
having been initiated before the court to obtain a
judicial declaration of nullity or annulment of
respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a

judicial
declaration
of Teresita Rivera.

of

presumptive

death

Respondent was already a member of the Bar

when he contracted the bigamous second marriage
in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in
1985. As such, he cannot feign ignorance of the
mandate of the law that before a second marriage
may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting
marriage must first be annulled by the appropriate
court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4
October 1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch
9, or about five years after respondent contracted
his
second
marriage. The
annulment
of
respondents second marriage has no bearing to
the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as
earlier emphasized, the annulment came after the
respondents
second
bigamous
marriage. Secondly, as we held in In re: Almacen, a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation
by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if
the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him,
or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case
does not affect its course, then neither will the
judgment of annulment of respondents second
marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing
actually committed. So long as the quantum of
proof - clear preponderance of evidence - in
disciplinary proceedings against members of the
Bar is met, then liability attaches.[23]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites
grossly immoral conduct as a ground for
disbarment.
The Court has laid down with a common definition
of what constitutes immoral conduct, vis-vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is
that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community and what is grossly
immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.[24]
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes
immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to warrant
his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable
lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. In particular, he made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality.[25]
However, measured against the definition, we are
not prepared to consider respondents act as
grossly immoral. This finds support in the following
recommendation and observation of the IBP
Investigator and IBP Board of Governors, thus:
The
uncontested assertions
of
the
respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law

and the high moral standard of the legal profession,

to wit:
a.
After his first failed marriage and
prior to his second marriage or for a period of
almost seven (7) years, he has not been
romantically involved with any woman;
b.
His second marriage was a show of
his noble intentions and total love for his wife,
whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c.
He never absconded from
obligations to support his wife and child;

his

d.
He never disclaimed paternity over
the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his
wife;
e.
After the annulment of his second
marriage, they have parted ways when the mother
and child went toAustralia;
f.
Since then up to now, respondent
remained celibate.[26]
In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent
was disbarred because his moral character was
deeply flawed as shown by the following
circumstances, viz: he convinced the complainant
that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and
void ab initio and that she was legally single and
free to marry him. When complainant and
respondent had contracted their marriage,
respondent went through law school while being
supported by complainant, with some assistance
from respondents parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant
pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant
without support and without the wherewithal for
delivering his own child safely to a hospital.
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,
respondent was also disbarred for his grossly
immoral acts such as:first, he abandoned his lawful
wife and three children; second, he lured an
innocent young woman into marrying him;third,
he mispresented himself as a bachelor so he
could contract marriage in a foreign land;
and fourth, he availed himself of complainants
resources by securing a plane ticket from
complainants office in order to marry the latters
daughter. He did this without complainants
knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to
assure complainant that everything is legal.

great caution, and may be imposed only in a clear

case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court. Disbarment should never be decreed
where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired.[29] In line with this philosophy, we find that a
penalty of two years suspension is more
appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension
recommended by the IBP is too light and not
commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized
several documents during the years 1988-1997
after his commission as notary public had expired,
respondent humbly admitted having notarized
certain documents despite his knowledge that he no
longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged
that he received no payment in notarizing said
documents.
It has been emphatically stressed that
notarization
is
not
an
empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is
invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization of a private
document converts the document into a public one
making it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for
this reason, notaries public must observe with the
utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined.[30]
The requirements for the issuance of a
commission as notary public must not be treated as
a mere casual formality. The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission to do
so as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of
public documents.[31]

[28]

Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no

less than the respondent himself acknowledged and
declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was
humble enough to offer no defense save for his love
and declaration of his commitment to his wife and
child.
Based on the reasons stated above, we find
the imposition of disbarment upon him to be unduly
harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with

The Court had occasion to state that where

the notarization of a document is done by a
member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has
no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or
one, performing a notarial act without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to
obey
the
laws,
more
specifically,
the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear
that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is,
for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting
as a notary public without the proper commission to
do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the
same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.

In the case of Buensuceso v. Barera,[32] a lawyer

was suspended for one year when he notarized five
documents after his commission as Notary Public
had expired, to wit: a complaint for ejectment,
affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and
a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in
said case, we find that a suspension of two (2)
years is justified under the circumstances. Herein
respondent notarized a total of fourteen (14)
documents[33] without
the
requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents
misconduct such as the pending criminal case for
child abuse allegedly committed by him against a
high school student filed before the Prosecutors
Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative
case filed by the Teachers, Staff, Students and
Parents before an Investigating Board created by
SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS
Faculty before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative
Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by
respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still
pending before the proper forums. At such stages,
the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor
of the respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty.
Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct, in
disregard
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and
another two (2) years for notarizing documents
despite the expiration of his commission or a total of
four (4) years of suspension.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the
courts of the land through the Court Administrator,
as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and recorded in the personal records of the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 2001-9-SC

July 14, 2006
DOROTEO
IGOY, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GILBERT F. SORIANO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 11, 2001, this Court unanimously ruled
to dismiss respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government
including
government-owned
or
controlled
corporations, and indefinitely suspended him from
the practice of law. We denied with finality
respondent's motion for reconsideration on June 10,
2003.
On March 31, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte
Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of
Suspension from the Practice of Law alleging that

his dismissal from the service and suspension from

the practice of law for more than five years now is
ample penalty for his transgressions. He claimed
that at 61 years of age, he may no longer find
gainful employment but as a lawyer, he could still
be a productive citizen and family provider. On even
date, respondent also filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Recover Money Equivalent of Respondent's
Accrued Leave Creditswhich he earned during his
28 years of service in the judiciary.
On May 22, 2006, respondent filed a Supplement to
Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order
of Suspension from the Practice of Law and
submitted certifications attesting to his good moral
character issued by (a) Rev. Fr. Ariel O. Tecson,
Parish Priest of Our Lady of the Most Holy Rosary
Parish, Paraaque City; (b) Sr. Silvana Rescigno of
the Franciscan Sisters Adorers of the Cross; (c)
Rev. Fr. Christopher Salonga of the Fr. Hannibal
Foundation Center in Paraaque City; (d) Rev. Fr.
John Lucas of Di-Francia Center of Studies in
Paraaque City; (e) Joseph Tan of the Knights of
Columbus; and (f) Eduardo Timbungco, Bgy.
Secretary of Manuyo Dos, Las Pias City. At the
same time, respondent prayed for the lifting of the
prohibition for his re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
In fine, respondent is now asking this Court (a) to lift
the order suspending him from the practice of law;
(b) to release the monetary equivalent of his
accrued leave credits; and (c) to lift the order
prohibiting his re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporation.
Without overlooking respondent's infractions which
caused his dismissal from the service and
suspension from the practice of law, we take a
second look at the penalties imposed upon him.
The suspension of a lawyer is not intended primarily
as a punishment, but as a measure of protection of
the public and the profession,1 the lifting of which is
based on the same criterion used by the Court in
applications for reinstatement to practice law, that
is, whether or not "the public interest in the orderly
and impartial administration of justice will be
conserved by the [respondent's] participation
therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor
at law."2 The respondent must, like a candidate for
admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character a fit and proper
person to practice law. The Court will take into
consideration his character and standing prior to the
suspension, the nature and character of the charge
for which he was suspended, his conduct
subsequent thereto, and the time that has elapsed
after his suspension.3
In this case, respondent manifests that he is
sincerely repentant and deeply remorseful for the
wrong he committed having realized that as a
lawyer of the Highest Court of the Land, he should
have "lived up to the strictest standards of integrity
in the public service bearing in mind that the image
of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and
women who work thereat." He also undertakes to
always faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and

ethics of the legal profession once his suspension is

lifted.
Respondent has been suspended from the practice
of law since October 11, 2001. Thus, for more than
five years, respondent had ample time and
opportunity to amend his erring ways and
rehabilitate himself as proven by the certifications
attesting to his moral character. Thus, he has
shown that he is worthy once again to enjoy the
privilege of being a member of the Bar. The lifting of
the order suspending him from the practice of law is
therefore in order.
Similarly, we find merit in respondent's plea for the
release of the monetary equivalent of his accrued
leave credits. Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides in
part:
Section 58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent in
Certain Penalties.
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, unless
otherwise provided in the decision.
The above Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, specifically Section 86 thereof,
repealed Section 9, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292), which provides for
the forfeiture of not only the retirement benefits but
of the leave credits as well. By so repealing, it must
have been the intent of the framers of the Rules to
exclude the forfeiture of the latter as one of the
penalties inherent in the penalty of dismissal.
In Villaros v. Orpiano,4 the Court noted that even
when the penalty is dismissal, the forfeiture of the
leave credits is not imposed by the applicable rule
found in Section 58 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative
Cases
in
the
Civil
Service. In Paredes v. Padua,5 the Court held that
despite their dismissal from the service,
government employees are entitled to the leave
credits that they have earned during the period of
their employment. As a matter of fairness and law,
they may not be deprived of such remuneration,
which they have earned prior to their dismissal.
Considering the foregoing cases and the provisions
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, the release of the monetary
equivalent of respondent's accrued leave credits is
hereby ordered.
However, we cannot grant respondent's plea for the
lifting of the prohibition for reemployment in the
government service. The records show that during
the investigation of the instant case, respondent
offered to retire not once, but twice. In
the Memorandum of the Office of Administrative
Services dated December 3, 2001, it was noted that

Lastly, respondent claims that his offer to resign

was erroneously construed as an admission of guilt.
He broached the idea that such offer came at a time
when he was emotionally, intellectually and
physically wrecked by the filing of the complaint.
The OAS cannot simply bite this self-serving claim.
The offer to retire/resign came initially as part of the
first comment submitted by respondent on

November 6, 2000, where in the ultimate portion, he

stated that "if you find that I have committed a
misconduct in helping Mr. Taneo despite my
explanation, may I request Your Honor that I just be
allowed to retire from the service" (underscoring
supplied). By saying so, all along respondent
honestly believed that he committed a misconduct.
It may be true that by then, respondent was still
emotionally bothered, which is why he reacted the
same. However, what OAS cannot surmise is why
on January 8, 2001, respondent reiterated the same
offer through a letter of even date addressed to the
Honorable Chief Justice. This only means that he
made this reiteration after he already had sufficient
opportunity to determine the consequence or effect
of the first offer. Considering that he is bent in doing
so, it is reasonably assumed he made the
subsequent offer to resign/retire freely and
voluntarily.
We also note that when respondent filed the ExParte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of
Suspension from the Practice of Law on March 31,
2006, he prayed only for the lifting of his
suspension from the practice of law. In fact, he
admitted that he is no longer interested in appealing
his "dismissal from the service" considering the
denial with finality of his motion for reconsideration.
He likewise conceded that at "61 years of age, a
senior citizen and almost in the twilight of [his] life x
x x [he] may no longer find a gainful employment x
x x."
Records show that this Court denied on June 10,
2003 respondent's motion for reconsideration of his
dismissal from the service. The denial was with
finality hence it should no longer be disturbed.
Likewise, pursuant to Section 58 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dismissal from the service carries with it
the cancellation of eligibility and perpetual
disqualification
for
re-employment
in
the
government service.
Besides, mere passage of time is not a license to
overlook the infractions of the respondent which
were committed within the hallow grounds of this
Court. Lest it be forgotten, we reiterate our findings
thus:
Respondent's acts seriously undermined the
trust and confidence of the public in the entire
judicial system. What makes his infraction
worse is the fact that he is not a mere court
employee, but a senior attorney employed in the
Highest Court of the Land. He has indelibly
sullied his record of government service
spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing he
has prejudiced the integrity of the Court as a
whole. Once more, this Court is called upon to
apply disciplinary sanction on an errant
member, and again it will not shirk from its
responsibility. Thus, this Court imposes on
respondent the only penalty that he deserves
that of dismissal from the service.
Finally, respondent is sternly warned that the
practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree
of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of
legal profession are the conditions required for

remaining a member of good standing of the bar

and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.6
ACCORDINGLY, the order suspending respondent
Atty. Gilbert Soriano from the practice of law
is LIFTED. The monetary equivalent of his accrued
leave credits is ordered RELEASED. However,
respondent shall REMAIN DISQUALIFIED for reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
The Fiscal Management and Budget Office is
directed to compute the monetary equivalent of
respondent's accrued leave credits and release the
same to him.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the
courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let this Resolution be also made of record in the
personal files of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MARY D. MALECDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY.
PERCIVAL L. PEKAS and ATTY. MATTHEW P.
KOLLIN, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The
instant
case
arose
when
Mary
D. Malecdan filed a verified Letter-Complaint dated
January
19,
2001
addressed
to
Atty. Ceasar G. Oracion, then President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio
and Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival
L. Pekas and Atty. Matthew P. Kollin, with violation
of the lawyers oath, as they committed acts not
only prejudicial to [the IBP] but are in themselves in
violation of the oath that they have sworn to uphold
as [a] condition for their admission to the bar.[1]
The undisputed facts as culled from the records are
as follows:
On November 25, 1999, the complainant entered
into a deed of sale with the Spouses Washington
and Eliza Fanged over a parcel of land located
in Baguio City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-71030.[2] The complainant paidP10,000
as earnest money, and P2,600,000 as the full and
final payment of the consideration of the sale. The
money was received by Eliza Fanged and
deposited
in
the
account
of
Atty. Artemio Bustamante, then counsel for the
latter. The complainant later found out, however,
that the said lot was the subject of a
controversy[3] between the former owners and the
Fanged Spouses.
When Atty. Bustamante refused to release the
proceeds of the sale to Eliza Fanged, the latter,
through her new counsel respondent Atty. Kollin,
filed a complaint for rescission of contract with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order with damages[4] against the complainant,
Atty. Bustamante, Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB) and Washington Fanged
on December 2, 1999.[5]
Eliza Fanged and the respondents thereafter
caused the filing of a Manifestation of Compromise
Settlement with Motion dated December 14, 1999.
[6]
It was prayed, among others, that an order be

issued directing defendant PCIB to transfer the

amount of P30,000 from the account of
Atty. Bustamante to a joint account in the name of
respondents Atty. Kollin and Atty.Pekas by way of
attorneys fees. The complainant was not a
signatory to the compromise settlement, as she was
in theUnited States at the time. The money was
then transferred to the respective accounts as
prayed for in the compromise settlement.
The Complainants Allegations
According to the complainant, respondent
Atty. Kollin knew very well that the money entrusted
to him did not belong to his client, Eliza
Fanged. Yet, when the complainants duly
authorized
representative Wilfreda Colorado requested that the
money be released to her, Atty. Kolin refused to do
so, on the pretext that there was no written
authorization from the latter. The respondent,
however, admitted that the money was in his
possession.[7] The complainant further averred that:
11. The said lawyers were aware that the money in
the bank which was the subject of Civil Case No.
4580-R was the consideration for a supposed sale
between me and Eliza Fanged which did not
materialize because it could not be registered aside
from the fact that it is void pursuant to the decision
in Civil Case No. 4528-R. They knew that the
money is not owned by Eliza Fanged. Yet, despite
this knowledge, they misled the court by making it
appear that all the parties agreed to the settlement
by filing the manifestation of compromise settlement
with motion (Annex G) knowing that I was abroad
and could not have given my consent thereto.
12. Worse, they made it appear that I was copy
furnished of the pleading when in truth and in fact I
never received the same as I was in the United
States of America. My investigation of the matter
reveals that the sister of Eliza Fanged,
Veronica Buking, received the pleading for me.
13. When confronted, Eliza Fanged admitted to me
that the money was actually entrusted to
respondent Atty. Matthew Kollin.[8]
The complainant also alleged that she filed the
complaint against the respondents because of the
latters connivance in causing the withdrawal of the
money in the bank. She pointed out that while the
manifestation of compromise settlement does not
bear the signature of Atty. Kollin, paragraph (b) of
the prayer clearly shows that the amount
of P30,000 was appropriated to a joint account
belonging to the respondents by way of attorneys
fees.
The complainant explained that respondent
Atty. Kollin, as counsel for Eliza Fanged in Civil
Case No. 4580-R, prayed that the sale of the
property to her (the complainant) be declared null
and void. Proceeding from this premise, then, Eliza
Fanged had no right to the money in the bank; the
respondents, likewise, had no right to withdraw the
amount of P30,000 to answer for their attorneys
fees. She further averred that the respondents
made it appear to the trial court that she (the
complainant) was duly notified of the purported
settlement, when she was, in fact, not a party
thereto as evidenced by the records. Thus:

[T]he records reveal that the person who received

the copy of the document purporting to cover the
settlement intended for me is the very sister of his
client, Eliza Fanged, in the person of
Veronica Buking. Veronica Buking is not and was
never a resident of Dagsian,Baguio City, the
location of my permanent residence. Eliza Fanged
could not have thought of this scheme.
9. But lawyer as he is, Atty. Kollin must have
anticipated possible legal repercussion[s] that
would ensue as a result of this scheme. In the
Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with
Motion, he asked his co-respondent, Atty. Pekas, to
sign
as
counsel
for
Eliza
Fanged.
Atty. Pekas seem[ed] to be too willing to extend
assistance to Eliza Fanged if only to get the money
from the bank. However, in the actual release, and
the partition of the money, the respondents
reportedly actively participated to insure their share
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. Atty. Pekas did
not stop there. As counsel for Eliza Fanged, he
signed the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16,
1999with a misleading statement that the parties
have extrajudicially settled this case amicably
among themselves, when in truth and in fact, I was
never consulted. [9]
The Respondents Allegations
The respondents denied the foregoing allegations in
their respective answers.
Respondent Atty. Kollin admitted that he knew that
the money in the bank was the complainants
payment for the land purchased from the Fanged
Spouses. He pointed out, however, that it was
unfair to state that his client Eliza Fanged was not
entitled thereto, since in the first place, she
appeared as the vendor in the deed of sale
executed
between
her
and
the
complainant. Furthermore, although Civil Case No.
4528-R had already been decided by the trial court,
the same was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
[10]
and did not become final and executory as
erroneously
stated
by
the
complainant. Atty.Kollin also pointed out that he
was not the original counsel of the Spouses Fanged
in the said case, but merely inherited the same
from Atty. Artemio Bustamante.[11]
The respondent further averred that because
Atty. Bustamante and the Fangeds failed to settle
the problem, he filed a complaint for the rescission
of the sale, and not for the release of the money in
Atty. Bustamantes possession. According to the
respondent:
To me, this is the gist of the problem. Complainant
Mary Malecdan strongly believes that she was
swindled because of the said decision. However,
the only problem between Dato and Fanged is the
determination of the actual balance and the
payment thereof. Settle the balance with
Mrs. Dato and everything would be settled likewise.
As of this time, it is very safe to say that the issue is
still SUB JUDICE and complainant could not even
be sure of the outcome of said case, although there
is a pending proposal for the eventual settlement of
the case by the payment of the unpaid balance.
Moreover, the title of the subject land is in the
possession of the Complainant and could transfer
said title in her name anytime. Perhaps, what the

complainant is saying is that the title could be

transferred in her name, however, a notice
of lis pendens was annotated therein due to the
filing of the case between O. Dato and the spouses
Fanged.
For all intents and purposes, complainant could
transfer the title in her name and take possession of
the property although the notice oflis pendens will
be transferred or be likewise annotated in her title.
Complainant knows very well that the problem
between O. Dato and Eliza Fanged is the actual
balance to be paid as per the first deed of sale; [12]
Respondent Atty. Pekas, for his part, admitted that
the amount of P30,000 was transferred by
Atty. Bustamante to their account, but averred that it
was done voluntarily. He denied the allegation that
they misled the court by making it appear that the
parties agreed to the compromise settlement with
motion, since, as can be gleaned from the
compromise agreement itself, the complainant was
not a party thereto.[13] The respondent further
alleged that:
20. As best as the respondent can recall, on the
late afternoon of December 12, 1999, Atty.
Matthew Kollin called up respondent on the
telephone. He was requesting for respondent to
attend a hearing of his case the following
day, December 13, 1999, for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order. This was on the pretext
that he has another out of town case on the same
date and cannot attend the hearing. As it is a
common practice among lawyers, respondent
acceded to the request;
21. As agreed by the respondent and Atty.
Matthew Kollin, respondent shall enter a special
appearance for that hearing only. Respondent shall
not argue on the matter but shall only manifest
submission of the matter for resolution;

27. That
after
Eliza
Fanged
and Wilfreda Colorado related the foregoing story,
respondent asked about the settlement being
proposed by the Honorable Court. Eliza Fanged
then expressed her willingness to accept the
counter-offer of Atty. Artemio Bustamante to settle
the case in the amount of Two Million;
28. With the new development, respondent
contacted the office of Atty. Matthew Kollin to refer
the matter but was informed that the latter is still out
of town. Respondent then advised that if Eliza
Fanged is willing, he can assist her in the
settlement, to which advice Eliza Fanged acceded;
29. Respondent
contacted
Atty. Artemio Bustamante who likewise was willing
to settle and the details of the settlement were
agreed upon. Afterwhich the proper manifestation
and motion was submitted to the Honorable Court
for consideration and ultimately dismissal of the
case;
31. That during the whole time that respondent
participated in the resolution of the case, he never
committed any act involving deceit and
machination. He acted in a way which he thinks is
proper [14]
Respondent Atty. Pekas prayed that the case be
dismissed for lack of merit, averring that as a new
and young lawyer, there was no reason for him to

risk his future for a measly sum, through dishonest

conduct.[15]
The Proceedings Before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline
On May 7, 2002, Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan issued the following Order:
When this case was called for hearing, Atty.
Percival Pekas appeared.
Atty.
Matthew
P. Kollin failed to appear despite the notice duly
served on him.
Complainant Mary D. Malecdan appeared without
counsel. She manifested that she is submitting her
case for resolution based on the pleadings on
record.
The complainant was ordered to present certified
true copies of Annex A attached to her complaint,
the Agreement of Purchase andSale and the Deed
of Absolute Sale, Annex B of her complaint in
favor of Mary Malecdan and the Decision Annex
D. Complainant is given ten (10) days from today
to present true copies of her documentary
evidence.
Atty. Percival Pekas is given ten (10) days from
today to file his rejoinder. Atty. Pekas likewise
manifested that after he shall have filed his
rejoinder he submits this case for resolution.[16]
In his Rejoinder, respondent Atty. Pekas reiterated
that he acted in good faith, and did not commit any
act of deceit or machination. He also averred that
Atty. Artemio Bustamante would have been a great
help in determining the truth, but unfortunately, the
complainant chose not to implead him.[17]
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XV-2002-395, finding
respondent Atty. Kollinguilty of dishonesty to the
court, while dismissing the complaint as to
respondent Atty. Pekas, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules,
and
considering
Atty.
Matthew
P.Kollins dishonesty to the court with resulting
damage and prejudice to the complainant,
Respondent
Atty. Kollins (sic)
is
herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three
(3) years. The complaint
against
Atty. Pekas is DISMISSED for there is no evidence
on record to prove that he was aware of the defect
in Eliza Fange[d]s right to claim the sales proceeds
with a WARNING that Atty.Pekas should be more
circumspect with respect to taking over other
lawyers cases and handling sensitive matters such
as the compromise settlement in Civil Case No.
4580-R.
According to IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juans Report dated May 30, 2002, the main issue
to be resolved in the case was factual in nature:
whether or not the respondents knowingly caused
the withdrawal from the bank of the purchase price
of the lot in question, despite their knowledge of a
defect in their clients right to claim the said
amount. The Commission found that respondent

Atty. Kollin knew that his clients title was defective,

having represented her in Civil Case No. 4528R. He should have been mindful that his client had
no right over the purchase price as paid by the
complainant. Respondent
Atty. Pekas was,
however, exonerated of the charges against him,
thus:
Insofar as respondent Atty. Pekas is concerned, it
should be noted that there is no evidence on record
to prove that respondent Atty.Pekas was aware of
the defect in Eliza Fangeds right to claim [t]he sales
proceeds.
It
is
likely
that
respondent
Atty. Pekas unwittingly played into the hands of
respondent Atty. Kolin when he signed said
Manifestation of Compromise Settlement. [18]
In his October 12, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration
of the foregoing IBP Resolution, respondent
Atty. Kollin alleged that contrary to the finding of the
Commission, he was unaware of the defect in his
clients (Eliza Fangeds) right to claim the sales
proceeds. He filed the case for nullification of
contract with prayer for the rescission of the sale
between the complainant and his client on the
ground that the latter would be disadvantaged if
Atty. Bustamante succeeded in taking a huge chunk
of the money deposited in his name. According to
the respondent, if he was, indeed, interested in the
money, he could have filed a case to compel
Atty. Bustamante to release the money to his client,
and not a complaint for rescission of contract. The
respondent also reiterated that the reason why he
requested respondent Atty. Pekas to attend the
hearing of the case as collaborating counsel was
that
he
attended
a
hearing
in Bontoc, Mt. Province on December 14, 2002.[19]
According to the respondent, the complainant
should have filed the instant case against
Atty. Bustamante who was the real architect in the
release of the money and the execution of the
compromise
settlement
with
motion. The
complainant should have also questioned the order
of the RTC judge concerned as to why no notice
was issued to her before the money was released.
The Ruling of the Court
It is a settled principle that the compensation of a
lawyer should be but a mere incident of the practice
of law, the primary purpose of which is to render
public service.[20] The practice of law is a profession
and not a money-making trade.[21] As they are an
indispensable part of the system of administering
justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath
of office and the canons of professional ethics a
duty more than imperative during these critical
times when strong and disturbing criticisms are
hurled at the practice of law. The process of
imbibing ethical standards can begin with the
simple act of openness and candor in dealing with
clients, which would progress thereafter towards the
ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous
with an ordinary business proposition but a serious
matter of public interest. [22]
Respondent Atty. Kollin knew that the money did not
belong to his client, Eliza Fanged. He admitted this
much in the complaint he himself prepared in Civil
Case No. 4580-R, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it
is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:

I. BEFORE HEARING:
1.
That it orders (sic) the issuance of a
temporary restraining order directing the manager
of the PCIBank Session Rd., Baguio City branch,
through its branch manager, Oscar Aquino, to
cease and desist from allowing withdrawal by
Atty. Bustamante of the amount ofP2,450,000.00
deposit in his account;
II. DURING HEARING:
1.
That it orders the issuance of a writ of
preliminary
injunction
restraining
the
defendant PCIBank or its agents from disbursing or
allowing withdrawal by Atty. Bustamante of the
amount of P2,450,000.00 deposited in his account;
III. AFTER HEARING:
1.
To
order
defendants
Atty. Artemio Bustamante and
the PCIBank,
Session Rd., Baguio City branch, to release the
amount
ofP2,450,000.00
in
favor
of
Mary Malicdan (sic);
2.
To
order
defendant
Atty. Artemio Bustamante to pay the amount
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
3.
To order that the deed of sale executed
between the Spouses Washington Fanged and
Eliza Fanged in favor of Mary Malicdan(sic) be
declared null and void;
4.
To order Atty. Artemio Bustamante to release
the original owners copy of title no. T-71030 of the
registry of deeds of BaguioCity to the complainant;
[23]

Respondent Atty. Kollin cannot now assert that the

reason why the prayer in the complaint included the
release of the money in favor of the complainant
was that his client realized that P600,000 would be
too much to be given to Atty.Bustamante as
attorneys fees. The respondent is bound by this
assertion in his pleading,[24] which, as can
reasonably be inferred, was made because he
himself believed that his client was not entitled to
the money in question. The respondent cannot,
likewise, find refuge in the fact that his signature did
not appear in the compromise agreement executed
between the parties. As found by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline:
[A]lthough it was respondent Atty. Pekas who
signed the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement
with Motion as counsel for Eliza Fanged, it is
unbelievable that respondent Atty. Pekas would
dare to sign said Manifestation without the approval
or consent of respondent Atty. Kollin, the counsel of
record of Eliza Fanged. As respondent
Atty. Pekas himself stated his authority with respect
to Civil Case No. 4580-R was limited as follows: As
agreed by the respondent and Atty. Matthew Kollin,
respondent shall enter a special appearance for
that hearing only. Respondent shall not argue on
the matter but shall only manifest submission of the
matter
for
resolution. If
as
respondent
Atty. Pekas claims he was only authorized by
respondent Atty. Kollin to attend one hearing of Civil
Case No. 4580-R, why did he exceed such
authority by executing the Manifestation of
Compromise Settlement on behalf of Eliza Fanged,
respondent Atty. Kollins client?
The most plausible explanation in this matter is that
respondent Atty. Kollin in fact authorized respondent

Atty. Pekas to execute the Manifestation of

Compromise Settlement on behalf of his
(respondent Atty. Kollin) client Eliza Fanged in order
to pave the way for the release of the sales
proceeds. This maneuver was resorted to by the
respondent Atty. Kollin in order to avoid any
responsibility for securing the release of the sales
proceeds to his client despite his knowledge that his
client Eliza Fanged had no right thereto. By having
respondent Atty. Pekas sign the Manifestation of
Compromise Settlement, it was the intention of
respondent Atty. Kollin to distance himself from
such pleading and claim no responsibility or
participation therein so that the same would not be
tainted by his apparent knowledge of the defect in
Eliza Fangeds right to claim the sales proceeds. In
this respect, respondent Atty. Kollin and his client
Eliza [F]anged have succeeded as they have
secured the release of the sales proceeds to the
detriment and prejudice of herein complainant.[25]
Contrary to the findings of the IBP, respondent
Atty. Pekas cannot validly claim that he acted in
good faith as his superior, respondent Atty. Kollin,
merely authorized him to attend the December 2,
1999 hearing of Civil Case No. 4580-R. Atty. Pekas,
in entering into a compromise agreement,
overstepped the authority he was purportedly
given. He was only authorized to manifest
submission
of
the
matter
for
resolution. Furthermore,
respondent
Atty. Pekas himself claimed that the complainant
could not question the compromise agreement as
she was not a party thereto. Atty. Pekas, thus,
knew that there was no valid compromise
agreement, as one of the parties in the case was
absent at the time it was entered into. He knew that
no valid notice was given to the complainant, since
the signatory to the notice of the manifestation of
compromise
agreement
was
a
certain
Veronica Buking.[26]
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule
1.01 of the Code specifically provides that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.[27] A lawyer is expected, at all
times, to uphold the integrity of the legal profession.
Whenever it is made to appear that a lawyer is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the
public, it becomes not only the right but the duty of
the Court which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar to
withdraw the privilege.[28]
A lawyer may legally apply a clients funds in his
possession to satisfy professional fees which the
client owes him, in the absence of any dispute as to
the legality of the amount thereof.[29] However, the
fact that a lawyer has a lien for his fees on the
clients money in his possession or the
circumstance that the client owes him more than
the clients funds in his hands may not excuse him
from making an accounting nor entitle him to
unilaterally apply the clients money to satisfy his
disputed claims.[30] In this case, the amount
of P30,000 which the respondents took for
themselves as attorneys fees belonged to athird
person, not their client, as admitted by them in their

complaint; the owner was, in fact, an adverse

party. It was the possession of the money, its
entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the
complaint for rescission of contract, and, if
respondent Atty. Kollin is to be believed, prompted
the filing of the complaint itself. Thus, the
respondents could not, without a claiming partys
knowledge, apply the amount of P30,000 for
themselves as attorneys fees. If there was
someone liable for the respondents attorneys fees,
it was their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said
that there was a real compromise as to the
manner in which the amount of P2,600,000 was to
be applied, since the complainant was not present
when the said agreement was made.
In the recent case of Emiliano Court Townhouses
Homeowners Association v. Atty. Michael Dioneda,
[31]
we had the occasion to state, thus:
The primary objective of administrative cases
against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline
the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the courts
and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and
to remove from the legal profession persons whose
utter disregard of their lawyers oath has proven
them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed
in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.[32]
An attorneys only safe guide is high moral principle,
as the torch to light his way; his best shield is a
clear conscience and an unblemished personal
record; and his just reward is to find his highest
honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private
trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a
patriotic and loyal citizen.[33] The fiduciary duty of a
lawyer and advocate is what places the law
profession in a unique position of trust and
confidence, and distinguishes it from any other
calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed,
the faith of the people not only on the individual
lawyer but also in the legal profession as a whole is
eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are
strictly required to, at all times, maintain the highest
degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty,
and integrity of their profession.[34]
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Matthew
P. Kollin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) years. Atty. Percival
L. Pekas is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the
Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO
C.
ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent
to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes
"A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein
petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET
MARRIAGE?
P560.00
for
a
valid
marriage.
Info
on
DIVORCE.
ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232,
5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita,
Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 5217232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements
above
reproduced
are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the
bar and that, as a member of the legal profession,
he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his
petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the
fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van
O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on
June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2)
Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine
Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The

said bar associations readily responded and

extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and
gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the
Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by
it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the
merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the
respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned
bar
associations
and
the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues
involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that
the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in
need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not
wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the
view espoused by respondent (to the effect that
today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms
its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the
same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
gives the impression that respondent corporation is
being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it
offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in
fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect
that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes

lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes

doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published
in the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the
more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam,
and this practically removes whatever doubt may
still remain as to the nature of the service or
services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is
merely offering "legal support services" as claimed
by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support
services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt
in the minds of the reading public that legal services
are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims,
the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however,
emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student
ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code
(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation
during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it
is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can
be considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is
outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that

advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of
the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper
and seems to address those planning a "secret
marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is
how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously
to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse,
this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of applications for
a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be
reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions
one
may
gather
from
the
advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone
confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it
can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged
or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas)
with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal
support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood,
the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent corporation is being operated by
lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is
that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which are contrary
to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of
the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should
be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal
forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and
like services will greatly benefit the legal profession
and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by
non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the
case at bar can be better performed by specialists
in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting
requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession
will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer

using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer

using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be
careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of
law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly,
for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention
of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent
is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would
then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of
carefully distinguishing between which service may
be offered to the public in general and which should
be made available exclusively to members of the
Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited
outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under
Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information
regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law, that certain course
of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it
is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before
deciding on which course of action to take, and that
it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising
should be directed exclusively at members of the
Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot
be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective
means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice
in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous
to the legal profession, but before allowance of
such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform
to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public
under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and
soliciting employment for its enumerated services

fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields

itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme
Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From
all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is
offering and rendering legal services through its
reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them to
an attorney and ask the latter to look after their
case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can
engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this
is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and
solicits employment of its legal services. It is
an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when
the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons
who have been duly admitted as members of the
Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses
its business name, the persons and the lawyers
who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who
wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal
right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting
for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of
law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of
law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the
practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to answers, litigants and the
general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation.
(See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But
its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its

advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces,
annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent
fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court,
paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take
a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a
four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and
then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only
then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact
remains that at present, these do not exist in the
Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those who
may be dealing with the general public in the guise
of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do
so.
In the same manner, the general public should also
be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services.
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility
from advertising, it appears in the instant case that
legal services are being advertised not by lawyers
but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general
public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such
services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them
if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name
The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or
can cure the legal problems brought to them.
Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed
purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading

impression that there are lawyers involved in The

Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any
medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved
in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the
very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek"
article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it
is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal
in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of
a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that
one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a
valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for
valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized
only by officers authorized to do so under the law.
And to employ an agency for said purpose of
contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada
and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use
of advertisements such as are the subject matter of
the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act
even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve.
The law has yet to be amended so that such act
could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that
seem to project that secret marriages and divorce
are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it
is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic
about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it
falsely represents to the public to be able to do that
which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the
Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the
practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of

respondent (assuming it can be engaged in

independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must
be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which
the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of
that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that
all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law
accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct
not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and
laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge
of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who
must be familiar with zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to
omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are
they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building
on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and
the architect in respect to the building code and the
like, then an architect who performed this function
would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if
the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and business
agents of the labor unions and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it
has been the practice for some years to delegate
special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform
a certain function have no right to do so, or that the

technical education given by our schools cannot be

used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we
should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant
being engaged primarily to advise as to the law
defining his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client along the path charted by law. This,
of course, would be the practice of the law. But
such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic
and psychological lines. The law only provides the
frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work,
he performed services which are customarily
reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the adjustment
of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or
without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion, and the person appointed
is free to accept the employment whether or not he
is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may
be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if
the value of the land depends on a disputed rightof-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to
assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is
quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer
before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is without power to interfere
with such determination or to forbid representation
before the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his
work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the
Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely
legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person

engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice
of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental
to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily
reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice
or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work
for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and nonlawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears
to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may
not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx
for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may
be involved is actually the practice of law. If a nonlawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B"
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may
not constitute of law. The business is similar to that
of a bookstore where the customer buys materials
on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside
from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal
text which publication of a legal text which purports
to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And
the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in
the text may be accepted by a particular reader as
a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to
how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book
is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal

advice on a specific problem peculiar to a

designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation in their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication and sale did not
constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There
being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office
for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a
divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating
to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment
against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the
change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant
gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts
concerning particular problems which might arise in
the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals
in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment
of separation agreement sought and should be
affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973],
cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services
are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve
giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is
in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry
may be necessary for the judicious disposition of
this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in
that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With
all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code),
no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which
is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails
to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?"
or "legal support services", and not legal services,
are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the
phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the
petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts
have laid down general principles and doctrines
explaining the meaning and scope of the term,
some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,

which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or
skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and
contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney
at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to
clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before
public tribunals which possess power and authority
to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and
advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises
them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look
after the case in court, is also practicing
law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the
legal status and rights of another and the conduct
with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is,
to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after
citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments
of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with
the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in

such representative capacity, performs any act or

acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the
rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co.,
102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers
Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters or estate and guardianship have been held
to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many
aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity
for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth
in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing
In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile
Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range
of activities in and out of court. Applying the

aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree

with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied
by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving
ready information by trained paralegals to laymen
and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory, through the extensive use of computers
and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and
reproduction of information and communication,
such as computerized legal research; encoding and
reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared
by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen
in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth,
marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications,
obtaining documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information about laws
of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they
can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and
installing computer systems, programs, or software
for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other
entities engaged in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of
computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization
of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is
non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all
the respondent corporation will simply do is look for
the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will
not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not

limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting

and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by
an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue
of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the
Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose
and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted
everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N.
Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the
Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation,
and family law. These specialist are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984.
Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients.
"when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you
how you contracted what's bothering you, they take
your temperature, they observe you for the
symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too.
And once the problem has been categorized, then
it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms,
require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The
Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or,
if this were a hospital the residents or the interns.
We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, outpatient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in
taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and
your relative is even taxed by the state for the right
to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting
your rich relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out

by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the
services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american
jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also
stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted
to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically
so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of
attainments previously acquired through education
and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or
defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients,
with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for
excluding from the practice of law those not
admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the
public from being advised and represented in legal
matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over
whom the judicial department can exercise little
control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject
respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate
from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent
cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not
of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies
and degrees in paralegal education, while there are
none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the

"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the

United States, standards and guidelines also
evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up
Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are
also associations of paralegals in the United States
with their own code of professional ethics, such as
the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept
and limited acceptance of what may be considered
as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or
have been allowed limited representation in behalf
of another or to render legal services, but such
allowable services are limited in scope and extent
by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial
policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been
admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered
by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement
of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the
use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code
of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with
causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged
or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance
of the lawyer's position, and all other like selflaudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests
on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R.
Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of

respondent which are involved in the present

proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper
advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question
was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things
that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal
by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation
are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against
advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are
of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily
implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of
brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of
his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinction; public or
quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership
and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and,

with their written consent, the names of clients

regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may
not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is
also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm
which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office
address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even
includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we
find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the abovementioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar
of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by
respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case
at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as
an
exception
to
the
prohibition
against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement
of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of
fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code
of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers
after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy
from
71%
to
14%
Professional
from
71%
to
14%

Honest
from
65%
to
14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present
situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used
by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in
general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part
of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable
instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major
stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc.
is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to
the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed
upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain
from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is
clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative
in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter
be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present
state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of
law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted
by
employing
some
so-called
paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this
prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute
the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis
for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off
from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be
necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN
and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or
dissemination of any advertisement in any form
which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose
as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.